Community-driven reconstruction in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

capacity building, accountability, power, labour, and ownership

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This research was conducted under the auspices of the Wageningen School of Social Sciences (WASS)
Community-driven reconstruction in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

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Thesis

submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of doctor

at Wageningen University

by the authority of the Rector Magnificus

Prof. Dr. M.J. Kropff,

in presence of the

Thesis Committee appointed by the Academic Board

to be defended in public

on Tuesday 11 March 2014

at 11 a.m. in the Aula.
Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa

Community-driven reconstruction in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: capacity building, accountability, power, labour and ownership, 253 pages.

PhD thesis, Wageningen University, Wageningen, NL (2014)
With references, with summaries in Dutch, English and French

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I started lecturing at the Institut Supérieur des Techniques Médicales de Bukavu a decade ago, my students always encouraged me to pursue a PhD. They always believed that I would be able to achieve this. Some of them even did not hesitate to ask me whether or not my studies were already done.

But when I was selected as PhD candidate, I wondered when I would be able to thank the sponsor organisations, the Dutch agency Stichting Vluchteling and the Government of the Netherlands: I am lacking words to express my sentiment of profound gratitude. I cannot forget Tineke Ceelen, Liesbeth Volkert, Floor Overbeeke, Loan Liem, Renske Boetje, Youssef Rahman, Jacqueline Boer and others whose names I cannot mention here. My enduring gratitude to you and to your team. The same goes to the Marie Curie HUMCRICON consortium for the financial support I received while preparing my proposal. I think specifically of Itziar de la Fuente, Joost Herman and Renée Bakker.

My warm thanks also go to my supervisors: Professor Dorothea Hilhorst, Emeritus Professor Paul Richards and Professor Murhega Mashanda. To Professor Dorothea Hilhorst, you were always more than my supervisor, through paying attention to other aspects of my life: from my integration into social and academic life in Wageningen, to my integration into several research projects. These include evaluations in both the DRC and Burundi. I learnt a great deal from these projects and I look forward to collaborating with you in further research projects.

To Emeritus Professor Paul Richards, you were always a source of inspiration. I remember when we met for supervision meetings, you were always ready to offer advice on how to better organise the book, which arguments would be better and more convincing. I paid much attention to what you said, writing down all your remarks. I benefited a lot from your experience and I am counting on your advice and support in my prospective career. To Professor Murhega Mashanda, for your advice and encouragements.

To Gerrit-Jan van Uffelen and Jeroen Cuvelier, you were always available to provide your advice, be it on the draft proposal for the current research (for the former), or to co-author the chapter ‘Labour mobilization: the case of Tushiriki in DRC’ (for the latter). Importantly, you have always done this in a very friendly way. Thank you for your guidance. My particular thanks also go to Gemma van der Haar, Carolien Jacobs and Bart Weijs, for never hesitating to provide me with valuable literature on topics related to my writing. You became involved promptly, assisting in the writing of some of the chapters of this book. Please find here the expression of my gratitude.

It would be inappropriate to forget Professor Georg Frerks: you were always encouraging when you met me, when I was sometimes lonely in our PhD room, telling me that I was working very hard and that it was good to do so. And to Dr Paul Hebinck, you were always supportive and encouraging. Please find here the expression of my sincere thanks.
My thanks also go to my dear colleagues at Disaster studies now at Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction, you were wonderful, and shared your experience related to academic life, which stimulated me to endure tough times of concentrating on the literature review, on reading, on drafting chapters and on following courses. Some of you were senior, while others were junior to me. I think of Jeroen Warner, Mathijs van Leeuwen, Bram Jansen, Luis Arthur, Hilde van Dijkhorst, Maliana Serrano, Annelies Heijmans, Rens de Man, Hilde Geerling, Aschale Dagnachew Siyoum, Winnie Wairimu, Fons van Overbeek, Rens Twijnstra, Carlos Morales, Raimond Duijsens, Martijn van Staveren, Rose Bashwira, Claude Iguma Wakenge and Jose Diemel. Some of you went far beyond, by planning and organising visits to Paris, Valkenburg and Schiermonnikoog where we enjoyed visiting the Eifel tour, climbing the highest point of the Netherlands and sharing the wonderful Dutch winter time on one of the northern islands. Veel dank!

My particular gratitude goes to our dear secretariat, you were always ready to make all financial arrangements regarding rooms and booking tickets for fieldwork, conferences and so forth. You also made sure that I had everything I needed for these activities, and in some circumstances, in close collaboration with Hilde van Dijkhorst, you made my meetings with my supervisors possible. Lucie van Zaalen, Jos Michel, Wendy Ömerköylu and Inge Ruisch, please find here the expression of my profound appreciation. Also Ferko, it would be inappropriate to forget you, always ready to pick up my stuff and keep it at your place with ease and with pleasure. Merci beaucoup!

On the side of the International Rescue Committee, I would like to thank Jana Frey, Brian Sage, Xavier Badou, Renaud Rodier and Charles Lor, for appreciating my ability to undertake a PhD. Please find here the expression of my profound gratitude: Asante Sana! Other senior and junior IRC staff also contributed to this achievement, either by encouraging me or by offering their collaboration in the field. I think of Jodi Nelson, Jeannie Anhan, Isatou Batmon, Mederic Jacottin, Muriel Tschopp, Lorina, Hélène Morvan, Tanya Walmsley, Francois Delfourney, Vera Quina, Pierre Kondji and others: so many Tuungane and Tushiriki senior staff and field staff. Asante sana! Particular thanks go to Sheree Bennett, who took time to read the chapter on capacity building in CDR in eastern DRC, before its submission to Development in Practice.

To take part in several evaluations would be difficult without collaborating with their team leaders. I think of my dear friend Adriaan Ferf with whom I spent more than four weeks in rural areas of the DRC and Burundi, and from whom I learnt a great deal. You were more a mentor and a friend, than a team leader. I also think of Ton de Klerk, my team leader in the end-of-programme evaluation in South-Kivu and Burundi: I learnt much from your experience in evaluating a community-driven development programme. I further think of Professor Macartan Humphreys: you were always helpful when I was working on my ethnographic analysis of the impact of Tuungane. All of you, please find here the expression of my reconnaissance.

My thanks further go to the Director of ISTM-Bukavu and his team, particularly Ordinary Professor Zachary Kashongwe Munogolo: you were always encouraging me in achieving this
My sincere gratitude goes also to professors Bosco Muchukiwa, Pascal Isumbisho, for your collaboration during the long journey of this project.

My sincere gratitude also goes to fellow Congolese, whether you are living in Wageningen, Ede and elsewhere in the Netherlands, and in Europe, you were always available for socializing. I think of mzee Léandre, mzee Heri, Grek, papa Mayemba, Nelly, Mimy, Corneille Ewango, Bashi, Nadine Ekwanzala, Marcel and so forth.

To neighbours, colleagues from CERES school, the Marie Curie scholarship and classmates from the Netherlands, Africa and elsewhere; I think of Innocent Babili, Reko, Augustin Kouevi, Lodji, Doya, Fremke, Perubi, Milagros, Bram Jansen, Nancy Tokola and others; please receive a few words to indicate my appreciation. To those with whom I spent my leisure time to play football in Wageningen: you contributed enormously to my integration in social life in Wageningen. I think of Bert, Augusto, Martijn van Staveren and others. Please accept here my sincere thanks.

To Rev Rosine, Ingeborg Brouwer, Alexandre Nunes Villela, Piet Oosterom and others that I cannot name here, you were more than brothers and sisters, sharing the word of God in the chaplaincy church at Wageningen University. You involved me in visiting and singing for prisoners in Breda and in Nijmegen. May God strengthen you in your mission! To the 7e CEGC members and pastors (including those of our Kahuwa church, those leading our community fellowship, Rev Dr Bill, Fred Vinton): you were always supportive in prayer for the achievement of this project, so please find here my sincere gratitude.

To people of Burhinyi, Luhwindja and Kaziba chiefdoms, you were always ready to welcome me as a friend, and a brother. I think particularly of Rev Kantu, Dr Thomas and the schoolmaster Akilimali. Koko bwenene! To my late parents, Emmanuel Kyamusugulwa and Alphonsine Kimpemba: you spent much time and effort for my education. Please find here my immeasurable thanks.

To my brilliant children (Alphonsine, Rachel, Myriam, Emmanuel and Germain), you have had to miss me for a long time, either when I went to the Netherlands or when I went to the field. Let this achievement be an example to you!

To Suzanne, my wonderful wife and partner, the mother of my children, always leading our family during my absence, when some decisions had to be taken on the phone. You endured living lonely without your husband, for his studies. This thesis is dedicated to you and to our children. May God bless you!

To all, brothers, sisters, nephews, aunts, cousins, whose names are not mentioned here, you are acknowledged for your contribution directly or indirectly to the achievement of this PhD project. Ninawashukuru sana!
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADMR Action pour le Développement en Milieux Ruraux
AFDL Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo
AFEDEM Appui aux Femmes Démunies et Enfants Marginalisés
AVSI Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale
BDD Bureau Diocésain de Développement
BDOM Bureau Diocésain des Œuvres Médicales
CAB Comité Anti-Bwaki
CBD Community-Based Development
CBOs Community Based Organizations
CDC Community Development Committee
CDD Community-Driven Development
CDR Community-Driven Reconstruction
CEDAC Centre d’Etudes, de Documentation et d’Animation Civique
CELPA Communauté des Eglises Libres de Pentecôte en Afrique
CEPAC Communauté des Eglises de Pentecôte en Afrique Centrale
CNCA Communauté Nations du Christ en Afrique
COOPEC Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit
CPEA Chef de Poste d’Encadrement Administratif
CRS Catholic Relief Services
CSD Civil Society Development
CSOs Civil Society Organisations
DA Democratic Accountability
DFID Department for International Development
DRC The Democratic Republic of Congo
FARDC Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FDLR Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda
GAC Groupe d’Approbation Communautaire
GAR General Assembly Reports
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEADEBU Groupe des Eleveurs et Agriculteurs de Développement de Burhinyi
HDI Human Development Index
HINARI Health InterNetwork Access to Research Initiative
ICCO Interchurch organization for development cooperation
ILO International Labour Organization
INGOs International Non-Governmental Organizations
IRC International Rescue Committee
KDC Kaziba Development Committee
LAV Laissez l’Afrique Vivre
MDG Millennium Development Goals
MGL Minière des Grands Lacs
MONUC Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo
MONUSCO  Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et de Stabilisation au Congo
NGO  Non-Governmental Organizations
PCG  Pentecostal Church of God
PHC  Primary Health Care
PRA  Participatory Rural Appraisal
RCD  Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
Requa  Relais qualité
SV  Stichting Vluchteling
UN  United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF  United Nations International Children and Emergency Fund
VDC  Village Development Committee
WFP  World Food Programme
WHO  World Health Organization
WUR  Wageningen University and Research Centre
1. Introduction
1.0. Introduction to the thesis

This thesis is about community-driven reconstruction (CDR) in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The CDR approach has become one of the most popular programmes in development and reconstruction, specifically in post-conflict settings. The experiences with the approach; however, have also given rise to criticisms and it has been questioned how successful the approach is in practice. This thesis presents an in-depth case study of one CDR programme, in Eastern DRC, in order to shed light on these questions. It analyses issues related to capacity building and its supposed outcome capacity development of local communities; and looks at techniques used for accountability and how these work in practice. The thesis also highlights issues of power and labour and how these dynamics evolve in a CDR programme, and examines the level of local ownership the population felt about the projects.

1.1 Researching Community-Driven Reconstruction/Rationale

‘Community-driven’ as a prefix to development or reconstruction is a part of a broader paradigm shift that answers well-known criticisms of the top–down methodologies that have controlled development interventions in the first five decades (Dasgupta & Beard 2007). Community-Driven Reconstruction (CDR) has its origin in Community-Driven Development (CDD) that was initiated by the World Bank and it applies the same methodology as that of the CDD. The idea of CDR is that local populations and local institutions are key players in project planning, execution, and monitoring processes by which ordinary people are actively involved in the intervention (McBride & D’Onofrio 2008). This new generation of ‘community-driven’ originally comes from an old generation of ‘community-based’ programming’. While ‘community-based’ refers to projects that actively include beneficiaries in the project execution, ‘community-driven’ refers to projects in which communities have a direct control over key project decisions as well as the management of investment funds (Mansuri & Rao 2003).

The relevance of the approach stems from the idea that it is both for poverty reduction in post-conflict and post-disaster (in terms of access to education, health, water, and similar services), and strengthening of local governance. The CDR approach is popular among the International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), donors, and collective action advocates. CDR/CDD represents a multi-million or even multi-billion project portfolio, and it
is adopted as one of the main instruments of direct development intervention both by bilateral donors and by such international bodies and agencies. These agencies are the World Bank, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Development Programme (UN 2004). In addition to its propensity for poverty reduction and strengthening good governance, ‘community-driven’ is said to have another potential, which is interconnected to this; that is, substantial support to decentralization in the context of post-conflict in developing countries (Tanaka, Singh et al. 2006).

However, the CDR approach has also been criticised in practice as it has both strengths and shortcomings. Four critiques about CDR and similar approaches are recurrent in the literature. The first critique is the complexities of power relations around the intervention. Not only is the local elite said to capture the intervention by excluding powerless people, but also the participatory approach is said to reproduce the existing power structures. A second questions the sustainability of the approach, in the sense that no activity takes place once the project ends. Another critique is about the concept of ‘community’ itself. Though it sounds like an idea of a cohesive and egalitarian place where reciprocity and mutual concern prevail, but when it comes to the notion of common interest, values, and identity for those who are living in the same area, the concept of ‘community’ may be quite challenging. Finally, where new committees are created as in the case of Tushiriki, there are de facto parallel structures, which may compete with the existing local institutions, such as chief-based or religious-based structures. As a result, the created structures cease to function with the end of the intervention, thereby threatening the sustainability of the approach (Zakus & Lysack 1998; Buchya & Hovermanb 2000; Cooke & Kothari 2001; Dasgupta & Beard 2007; Ingamells 2007; Labonne & Chase 2007).

This thesis wants to contribute to the debates on community-driven reconstruction by offering a detailed case study into one CDR programme in Eastern DRC: the SV-supported Tushiriki programme that was implemented by IRC. It unravels the realities of who drives the process, how are social relations constructed around the intervention, what is the source of legitimacy of those who drive it, what are the mechanisms to enhance local accountability in the context of post-conflict, how capacity building has been undertaken and shaped by actors, and what are the types of labour and the incentive structure in the dynamics of the programme. Through this case study, the black box of community driven Reconstruction can be opened to reveal the inner working of the programme, in order to arrive at a better understanding of the contradicting experiences with the approach.
1.2 Study Aim, Research Questions, and Organisation

1.2.1. Study aim

**Purpose:** To understand the social dynamics around and meanings attached to the Community-Driven Reconstruction programme implemented by the International Rescue Committee with funding of Stichting Vluchteling, in the target communities in order to assess the assumptions and approaches underlying the CDR programme’s design and implementation.

1.2.2. Research questions

**Main research question:** How do local people and IRC staff shape development through their everyday practice in the communities of Burhinyi, Luhwindja, and Kaziba and how do social dynamics and power relations influence decision making and implementation of the CDR from 2008 to 2010?

**Sub questions**
1. What are the social dynamics and power relations in the areas of implementation?
2. How do they play out in individual and community-level decision making?
3. How are the objectives of the CDR (good governance and reconstruction) and the programme activities (formation of committees and implementation of projects) translated in practice and responded to by the community members and local staff of the IRC?
4. How do other reconstruction interventions that happened in the past or at the same time affect the working of CDR in the communities?
5. What are the implications of the findings for the assumptions, policies, and practices of the CDR in general?

1.2.3. Research organisation

This PhD research was carried out over the period of 2007–2014 under the collaboration of the International Rescue Committee (IRC)–Stichting Vluchteling (SV)–Wageningen University (WUR). At the same time the Tushiriki programme supported by the SV was under implementation in Burhinyi, Luhwindja, and Kaziba. Indeed, the current research was sponsored by the Dutch Government and SV as the latter wanted an independent qualitative impact research to serve as one of the instruments for monitoring and evaluation of the Tushiriki programme. To do so, there were conditions such as the independence of the researcher, the provision of feedbacks and the organisation of workshops as well as the
involvement in evaluations of the programme. Before I was involved in the current research, I was employed by the IRC as the Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor with IRC based in Bukavu, South-Kivu, the DRC, from late 2006 through late 2007.

1.3. Tushiriki as a Community-Driven Reconstruction Programme

1.3.1 Core ideas about the Community-Driven Reconstruction Approach

As mentioned above, the CDR applies the methodology of the CDD approach that was initiated by the World Bank. The CDR is a proponent of the ‘reconstruction from below’ approach (Hickey & Kothari 2009; Hilhorst, Christoplos et al. 2010). It has two main objectives: speedy and cost-effective delivery of reconstruction assistance on the ground and building governance that stresses local choice and accountability (Cliffe, Guggenheim et al. 2003).

The CDR considers the processes of decision making and project implementation as equally important as the decisions and subsequent material outputs. It brings people together to exchange ideas about the future and decision-making, identifying needs, and prioritizing interventions. By doing so, people and local management can overcome distrust that originates from pre-conflict or conflict and can make effort for common recovery and sustainability of their area (Cliffe, Guggenheim et al. 2003:3). As such, CDR is also meant to enhance peacebuilding. Also, projects and decision making are important and people’s community contribution in the form of labour to the reconstruction is crucial.

In short, the core thought of the CDR revolves around the idea that people not just learn local governance through a reconstruction project but also share vision, decision making, prioritization, and can rebuild trust between and among themselves and their institutions. It is further assumed that people will feel ownership over these projects that they decided on, and hence will be prepared to provide labour for their implementation.

1.3.2. Implementing agency and funding

This section introduces the implementing agency, the short history of the programme, and its funding. Firstly, Tushiriki, a Kiswahili word to mean ‘let us involve in it together’ is the local name of one of the CDR programmes executed by the IRC, an American agency based in New York, via its office based in Bukavu in the DRC. It was implemented from 2008 through 2010 in Burhinyi and Luhwindja in the Mwenga territory, and in Kaziba in the Walungu territory, in the South-Kivu province of the DRC. The fieldwork of the current research took
place in the same areas, while the Tushiriki programme was under implementation. The motivation for implementing such a programme lies in the fact that it is applied where there are weak or nonexistent local institutions, or where there are communities that are less willing to work together in conflict affected areas, such as in the eastern DRC (McBride & D’Onofrio 2008:2).

Secondly, the Tushiriki programme consisted of two separate, but complementary components, that are depicted in Figure 1: the civil society and community development. These two sections functioned differently over the course of the programme. The community development section was developed under the bigger CDR programme known as Tuungane, which was funded by the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID). Simultaneously, the civil society section of IRC had a distinct programme named Ushirika, traditionally meaning in Kiswahili ‘be involved altogether’, for strengthening capacity of civil society organisation partners. After the mid-term review of the programme, which took place in 2009, the two initially separated sections were merged under one programme coordination, known as Tushiriki.

The Tushiriki programme aimed to contribute to poverty alleviation and post-conflict rehabilitation through the CDR in the DRC, especially: (i) poverty alleviation through improvement of socio-economic conditions through the CDR; (ii) Governance/Civil Society Development (CSD) by increasing the understanding of good governance principles and practices; (iii) lobbying/advocacy through increasing advocacy efforts on behalf of communities and towards policy makers (SV & IRC 2007:6). Figures 1 and 2 depict the interconnection between the two sections. While the programme’s community development section aimed at improving governance and social cohesion through social infrastructure reconstruction, its civil society section aimed at strengthening governance through civic education and advocacy activities.

Lastly, with regard to the Tushiriki funding, this is a CDR programme supported by the Dutch-Stichting Vluchteling (SV) organisation based in the Hague, The Netherlands (SV, the Netherlands Foundation for Refugees) in partnership with the IRC. The total amount of funding was $US 2-million-grant for both civil society and community development components of the programme (Klerk, Kyamusugulwa et al. 2011:1). In short, as conceived, the Tushiriki programme was executed by the IRC, based in Bukavu, and had Dutch-funding for governance through reconstruction in the Burhinyi, Luhwindja, and Kaziba chiefdoms.
1.3.3. *The Tushiriki Community Development Component*

The key characteristic of the community development programme is that it establishes local committees that are formed and become operational through standardized steps that are being introduced and monitored by the staff of the programme. When communities follow the steps and conditions set in the protocol of the programme, they receive a small fund for the implementation of a reconstruction project of their choice. Hence, in the community development component of the programme the selected infrastructure is being rebuilt. Figure 2 shows that the community development component was formed by a set of committees, at the village/subcommunity and community levels. Each target village organised an electoral meeting through which a body of ten participants (five men and five women) was elected for five positions of a president, a treasurer, a secretary, a mobilizer, and an inclusion officer. This structure was known as the Village Development Committee (VDC). Similarly, Figure 2 shows that besides the VDC structure, there was another body (i.e., the *Relais qualité* or *Requa*), that consisted of two members (one man and one woman), whose role was to be a watch-dog of the execution of the project by the village committee and to serve as the liaison between the committee and the population. Then, four to five VDCs formed a Community Development Committee (CDC). In total, there were four CDCs that comprised 17 VDCs in each of the chiefdom in Burhinyi and Luhwindja.

In terms of the target population, the programme randomly selected communities inhabited by 22,948 out of 55,993 people in Burhinyi, 21,225 out of 47,073 people in Luhwindja, and the entire population of Kaziba; that is, 38,834 inhabitants. Table 2 shows that, in the two former chiefdoms, each Tushiriki ‘community’ that elected a CDC consisted of nearly 6,000 inhabitants. In addition, each Tushiriki ‘village’, that elected a VDC consisted of nearly 1,200 inhabitants.

Although some communities were similar to *groupements* (*groupement* is an intermediate entity between a chiefdom and a village that composes a set of villages), and some villages were similar to localities, not all Tushiriki structures coincided to administrative entities. Some of them were a combination of entities, which were smaller to form a target structure, and some consisted of a section of a larger administrative unit. In addition to the population size criterion, homogeneity and location were other criteria for community and subcommunities formation. This thesis focuses on Burhinyi and Luhwindja. The Tushiriki was also implemented in all 15 communities (*groupements*) of the Kaziba chiefdom, but here it was already the third time that communities experienced the CDR approach.
That said, this study concerns VDCs rather than VDCs and CDCs. My main interest was to understand the local dynamics of implementation, and at the CDC level there was very little involvement of the population. At that level, the implementation of the intervention at CDC level looked more contractor-driven rather than community-driven. For instance, the male president of Cibanda II CDC in Luhwindja chiefdom revealed that labour in creating digs for water pipes was more a decision made by the project contractor than residents. Additionally, people’s participation in road construction work was motivated by the payment of wages by the contractor rather than by the mobilisation supposedly by the committee members. I thus decided to focus on the village level.

1.3.4. The Tushiriki civil society component

The civil society component of the programme consists of strengthening governance and advocacy in the target communities. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show that the civil society component of the programme complemented its community development component in reinforcing the capacity of civil society organisation partners about good governance principles; particularly transparency, accountability, inclusion, and participation. To do so, the programme partnered with four national Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), of which two were based in my research area: in Burhinyi (the Centre d’Etudes, de Documentation et d’Animation Civique, CEDAC) and in Luhwindja (the Action pour le Développement en Milieux Ruraux, ADMR). During the first phase of the programme (2008–2009), these civil society organisations partnered, in turn, with Community Based Organizations (CBOs) known as ‘Interest Groups’ to foster sensitisation about good governance principles in the area.

With regard to the watch dog role, the Requas and GAC on the side of the community development section and the CBOs on the side of the civil society section of the programme were said to play this role. However, it appeared to be duplicating because these two bodies (Requa/GAC and CBOs) were assigned the same responsibilities (Ferf, Kyamusugulwa et al. 2009). As a result, checks and balances of the committee actions during project execution were not necessarily effective. The difference between the two bodies was not clear enough, and those who were asked to be the requa were sometimes the same people, or they played this role for the first time. In this thesis, therefore, I will not analyse the requa function separate from the analysis of the other accountability mechanisms in the programme. Whereas the community development component executed the hard side of the programme, its civil society component executed, partly, its soft side.
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Figure 1.1: Tushiriki staff-area level organization chart within IRC, South-Kivu, DRC

![Organization Chart]

IRC: International Rescue Committee; DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo (The); M&E: Monitoring and Evaluation

Figure 1.2: Tushiriki partners per entity: civil society and communities

![Partners Chart]

Legend: AB: Advisory Board; RDC: Regional Development Committee; CDC: Community Development Committee; Requa: Relais de qualité; P.P: Porte-parole (spokesman), representatives of GAC; VDC: Village Development Committee; GAC: Groupe d’Approbation Communautaire; NGO: Non-Governmental Organization; CBO: Community-Based Organization.

1.4 The Community-Driven Reconstruction analytical framework

Figure 1.3 depicts the main implementing structures and mechanisms of the CDR programme, as well as the actors and factors important for my analysis.
Figure 1.3: CDR Analytical Framework

1.4.1. The actor orientation approach

Ethnographic research emphasizes the crucial importance of everyday practices for understanding aid in conflict-affected areas. This is founded theoretically and methodologically in an actor-oriented approach. Such an orientation starts with the premise that social actors have agency, and that people reflect upon their experiences and happenings around them, and use their knowledge and capabilities to interpret and respond to their environment. Aid programmes, which must be seen as an arena, are shaped through the interaction of actors, where each brings its own perceptions and interests to the programme (Biggs & Matsaert 1999:237; Long 2001; Nyamu-Musembi 2002:1, Hilhorst 2003; Hilhorst...
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& Jansen 2010). This means that the programme is translated and negotiated locally, and that the way the programme evolves in practice may not follow the foreseen trajectories. For instance, participation in decision making is supposed to take place in meetings, whereas, in reality the negotiation over the projects to be implemented may happen in other informal venues before the meetings.

One implication of this orientation is that understanding the dynamics of the programme requires a broader understanding of the social and political setting, power relations, and surrounding processes. For instance, the response of people to aid interventions is shaped by their experiences with earlier and concurrent interventions. When some programmes continue to supply material free, it is harder for people to understand why other programmes require that they provide a counterpart contribution. Likewise, bad memories of forced community labour may colour their motivation to participate in meetings.

This is a perception of programmes as social interfaces between intervening actors (in particular the ‘frontline’ NGO workers, the facilitators) and the recipient population. Interface analysis focuses on the linkages and networks between individuals or parties at points where different and often conflicting life-worlds or social fields intersect. Interface analysis can reveal important dynamics concerning the interplay of discourses, the way in which power relations are shaped and actors give meaning to, and transform aid interventions. Power relations are not just happening inside localities but also in the process of implementation. These may be complex processes, for instance because staff may not only have an IRC identity but may be tied in other ways into communities (by their ethnicity, religion, kinship ties, history with the conflict etcetera). I thus view Tushiriki as an arena or a set of subarenas where the intervention dynamics are constructed.

1.4.2. Resources, strategy and organization

Figure 1.3 shows the resources, strategy and organization employed by IRC as well as the actors and factors that have an influence on the programme. Resources refer to (skilled) human, material and financial resources used within the programme, strategy refers to both capacity building and mechanisms to enhance democratic accountability within the programme.

To implement a CDR programme, there is a lot of attention to developing capacity of the local actors of the created governance structures, namely the committee members (Pierson & Ntata 2007) and the existing Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) through skilled and
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experienced facilitators (Hanusaik, O’Loughlin et al. 2007). Additionally, there is emphasis on sensitizing local people in terms of raising awareness with regard to information about the project and how they could better involve it. In the Tushiriki programme, the civil society component emphasised the sensitization of the ordinary citizen about advocacy and good governance; good governance here referring to its twine principles, transparency and accountability that are supposedly enhanced through reconstruction.

The CDR programme goes also with the idea that if well implemented, this approach may promote equity and inclusiveness, efficiency, and good governance (Tanaka, Singh et al. 2006). To do so, capacity building involves training, management, and technical assistance about governance principles. It also involves partnership between the implementing agency and local institutions; defining skills required, material and financial resources; and it is associated with labour mobilization for people’s participation in the intervention. In the same vein, selected CBOs after being strengthened by the selected NGOs were said to play the watchdog role toward VDCs during a village project implementation activities.

To analyse these processes as they happen in the everyday implementation of the programme, I will emphasize aspects of power and how they influence the programme outputs and outcomes. I am particularly interested to understand the role of the elite in the programme. Even though the elite has no assigned role in the design of the programme, I was assuming that they would nonetheless play a role in the dynamics of implementation. In addition, I will look into the ways in which the IRC staff translate the approach in practice, and how they deal with the power structures in their everyday activities. The second emphasis in this thesis concerns the nature of participation. Participation is at the heart of the CDR approach, and in chapter 2, I will elaborate on this concept with a literature review. I will study participation as both a tool in development and reconstruction interventions and an end as it can lead to transformation of powerful and powerless beneficiaries. I will specifically pay attention to forms of voluntary labour that are used in the participatory approach of CDR and ask how local people perceive of their labour contribution. I also analyse how residents perceive of the idea of ‘ownership’, which is an important notion in the CDR approach.

The third emphasis is on mechanisms of accountability that are applied in the studied CDR programme. I will analyse the ways in which mechanisms of accountability that were built into
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the programme worked in practice, while asking how these interact with other processes of (informal) accountability that already take place in communities.

1.5 Context and setting of the DRC

1.5.1 Main dislocative events and main features of local governance in the DRC

As can be seen in Box 1, the main dislocative events in the DRC from 1996 through 2003 range from the rebellion movement that toppled the Mobutu regime in 997 to the killing of Kabila father and to the Sun City peace agreement that culminated into the run of the presidential and parliamentarian elections of 2006 (Dijkzeul and Wakenge 2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 1: Short summary and timeline of the main dislocative events in the DRC, 1996-2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996-97: Rebels capture much of eastern Zaire while Mobutu is abroad for medical treatment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 May: Rebels capture the capital, Kinshasa; Zaire is renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo; Laurent-Desire Kabila installed as president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 August: Rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda rise up against Kabila and advance on Kinshasa. Zimbabwe, Namibia send troops to repel them. Angolan troops also side with Kabila. The rebels take control of much of the east of DRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000: UN Security Council authorises a 5,500-strong UN force to monitor the ceasefire but fighting continues between rebels and government forces, and between Rwandan and Ugandan forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 January: President Laurent Kabila is shot dead by a bodyguard. Joseph Kabila succeeds his father.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 May: US refugee agency says the war has killed 2.5 million people, directly or indirectly, since August 1998. Later, a UN panel says the warring parties are deliberately prolonging the conflict to plunder gold, diamonds, timber and coltan, used in the making of mobile phones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 December: Peace deal signed in South Africa between Kinshasa government and main rebel groups. Under the deal rebels and opposition members are to be given portfolios in an interim government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 June: French soldiers arrive in Bunia, spearheading a UN-mandated rapid-reaction force. President Kabila names a transitional government to lead until elections in two years time. Leaders of main former rebel groups are sworn in as vice-presidents in July. Source: BBC 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This thesis deals with the dynamics of a reconstruction programme at the local level. While the reconstruction programme did not interact directly with the representatives of the state – who were not part of the implementation process – it is important to understand the local authority structure in place. Hence, we briefly describe in what follows how the Belgian system of administration looked like and what form of administration functions at local level in the DRC.
At the provincial level, the Congolese state inherited the Belgian system of administration that consists of a governor of province in each province, a chief of district in each district and a territory administrator in each territory. At the local level; however, there was an hybrid type of administration that combined the state to the traditional system to the extent that kings as expressions of custom and popular will occupied an important position in the local administration.

Since 1906, the royal system was incorporated to the colonial administration despite the fact that kings who were not obedient to the colonial rule were substituted by those who were kind (Ngoma-Binda, Otemikongo et al. 2010). Nonetheless, in the post-independence regime even nowadays, kings and chiefs who come to power according to the customary law constitute the heart of local administration below the territory level. In fact, every territory consists of multiple chiefdoms and groupements, whereby traditional rulers are associated with the state administration because they have a certain control of the local administration and land.

According to the 18 February 2006 constitution, the customary authority has responsibility to promote cohesion and national unity as well as to link up the central administration to the population. Each chiefdom or sector is led by a King (Mwami) or a chief of sector, each groupement is led by a chief of groupement and each village or locality is led by a chief of village or locality. Except the chief of sector, all other chiefs are sworn according to the customary law meaning by inheritance. At the same time, the Mwami is also recognised by the national government through a decree of the Minister of Interior (Ngoma-Binda, Otemikongo et al. 2010). Once in power, the King has authority on chiefs of groupements and villages who depend on him. Next to the traditional powerholders, every territory is governed by the Territory Administrator who is nominated by the president of the country by decree. In chiefdoms located far from the chef-lieu of a territory–such as in Burhinyi, Luhwindja and Kaziba–a representative of the Territory Administrator is nominated by the central administration as the Chef de Poste d’Encadrement Administratif (CPEA). The CPEA administratively leads the entity in close collaboration with the traditional authority (i.e., the King), and military officials based in the area. In short, at territory level, there functions a hybrid type of administration consisting of both state administrator and traditional leaders who are recognised by the customary law, since colonial time up today.
Although violence persisted, the area was not in a vacuum of power holders. Each chiefdom is headed by a king (the *Mwami*), who is a traditional authority enthroned by the local people themselves according to the custom law and then,

### 1.5.2. Geographic setting

The maps of the DRC and of the South-Kivu province show that the current research took place in three chiefdoms—Burhinyi, Luhwindja, and Kaziba—situated in two territories (Mwenga and Walungu). The first two chiefdoms are part of the Mwenga territory on its north-eastern side, whereas Kaziba is located in the Walungu territory on its south-western side. Each of the entities is populated by inhabitants, who belong, in the vast majority of cases, to the same tribe or ethnic group. The people of Burhinyi are called the *Barhinyirhinyi*, whereas the people of Luhwindja are known as the *Bahwindjahwindja*, and the people of Kaziba are named the *Bazibaziba*. Nonetheless, in September 2008, some 6,000 Hutu people (including their families) estimated at 14% of the entire population of Burhinyi were reported to live in nine foothill *groupements* until the Kimia II operation, that took place in 2009. This operation, which was led by the Congolese army (i.e., the FARDC) was backed by the United Nations peace keepers in the DRC, when the Hutu combatants were driven into the bush of the Mwenga territory. At the same time, 1% of inhabitants representing other Congolese ethnic groups such as the *Bafuliro* and the *Balega* were reported to live in the Burhinyi chiefdom.

As for the history of the conflict in the area, these three chiefdoms were heavily affected by the violence that the whole country experienced between 1996 through 2003; that is, from 1996 through 1997 with the first war led by the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération* (AFDL) and from 1998 through 2003 by the rebellion movement led by the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD), which was based in Goma in the North-Kivu province. In fact, the area of the study was particularly vulnerable because of the prolonged presence of the Hutu combatants, who were targeted by a variety of forces such as the *Mai-Mai*, rebellion movements, and government military forces. Indeed, these waves of fighting contributed to enormous loss not just in terms of human capital but also in terms of other capitals such as physical, financial, material, and social.
As for the history of the conflict in the area, these three chiefdoms were heavily affected by the violence that the whole country experienced between 1996 through 2003; that is, from
Why did the researcher select this area for the current study? First, this is among the settings heavily affected by the violence and therefore, it offers opportunity to study how the local people interacted in the reconstruction effort in the conflict affected areas. Second, it was interesting to conduct a research about the CDR in both areas, which were targeted by the Tushiriki programme; that is, Kaziba, Burhinyi and Luhwindja. Nonetheless, because the project implementation at the village level was more participatory than at community level, this research focused more on the first level than on the second.

1.5.3. Post-war vulnerability

Post-war vulnerability is likely to occur after conflict, where there is loss of capitals including human beings (Haug 2000; De Vita, Fleming et al. 2001; Longley & Maxwell 2003; Korf 2004). For example, Humphreys (2008:2) has reported that 11% of the sample population suffered from severe sickness over the two weeks before the survey, 42% of schooled kids lacked access to education, and for the majority of residents, there was a long distance (more than a half an hour) to access clean water. In addition, in terms of human loss, there have been 5.4 million excess deaths that occurred between August 1998 and April 2007 in the DRC (Coghlan, Ngoy et al. 2007). Last, consequences of the war in terms of loss of capitals (i.e human, social, natural, financial, and physical), especially in the eastern DRC were devastating (Balemba 2004). All of this, in the sense that, the conflict was termed as the ‘First African World/International War’ (Reyntjens 2001:311; Lemarchand 2002; Marysse 2003; Reyntjens 2005:587; Reyntjens 2007:308).

1.5.4. Other reconstruction actors operating in the area

Like Tushiriki, other interventions took place in the same area, either by the International Rescue Committee (IRC), by other international and national agencies, or by government-based or church-based agencies.

Firstly, four IRC programmes had a history of intervening there, namely Ushirika (former programme that aimed to strengthen the capacity of civil society organisations partners), Tuungane (the CDR pilot programme implemented in Kaziba in 2006 and 2007), PAGE (the programme that supported capacity for better management of schools) and Tushiriki.
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Secondly, among other international agencies, some have been active in relief aid, such as World Food Programme (WFP) and 1AVSI in providing food and relief kit to returnees. Others such as UNICEF/AVSI, 2ICCO/Comité Anti-Bwaki (CAB) were active in school reconstruction in Burhinyi, Luhwindja, and Kaziba. There were other schools reconstructed by the United Nations Development Programme (PNUD/COMREC), and Caritas for catholic schools. None of these agencies that operated in the reconstruction sector applied a methodology like CDR’s Tushiriki programme. Though diverse, they had all more a typical community-based development approach, meaning that they involved local people only at the stage of project execution through manual labour. Furthermore, other international agencies were reported to be active in the health sector, particularly Malteser International in assisting the district hospitals and health centres to provide primary health care either at lower cost or for free for a certain period of time. Similarly, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) supported the Mwana Health District, which is under the management of the Bureau Diocesain des Oeuvres Médicales (BDOM) of the Catholic Archdiocese of Bukavu. It is worth to mention that like in other parts of the country, churches dominate the management of schools while the State organizes them in Burhinyi, Luhwindja and Kaziba (Titeca & De Herdt 2011).

In addition to the IRC and other international agencies, one of the powerful private actors who is based in 3Twangiza in Luhwindja is the 4Banro mining company. This is a Canadian-based gold exploration company that started the exploitation of gold in 2010 at the site initially discovered by the Minière des Grands Lacs (MGL) in the 1950s under the Belgium

1 AVSI: Assosiazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale, an Italian international agency funded by UNICEF. In Burhinyi, it has reconstructed the Budaha and Bwishasha primary schools, while in Luhwindja, AVSI has reconstructed the Makala and Lubanza primary schools.
3 The Twangiza gold deposit was discovered by Minière des Grands Lacs (MGL) in the 1950s. The company followed the occurrence of alluvial gold deposits upstream from the Mwana River to the present-day Twangiza deposit. MGL tested the deposit through 8,200 metres of trenching and 12,100 metres of adits on seven levels, collecting a total of 17,400 samples. In the mid-1970s, Charter Consolidated undertook detailed exploration, including the excavation of numerous close-spaced adits into the mineralized zone. In 1996, Banro acquired control of the Twangiza Property, and during the following year, undertook a US $9 million exploration program, which included 10,490 line-kilometres of airborne geophysics, 1,613 samples from 16 adits, and 8,577 drill core samples from 9,122 metres of core drilling along 800 metres of strike. This represented less than 20 per cent of the identified mineralized trend. Retrieved 21st September 2010, from http://www.banro.com/s/Twangiza.asp?ReportID=307249
4 Banro is a Canadian-based gold exploration and development company with four wholly-owned properties, each with mining licenses, along a major gold belt of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Company is constructing a “phase one” gold mine at its Twangiza project, which is designed to process 1.3 million tonnes of ore per year and is scheduled to begin operations in late 2011. Banro has to date identified 6.72 million ounces of Measured and Indicated Resources, plus Inferred Resources of 4.46 million ounces. Retrieved 21st September 2010, from http://www.banro.com/s/Home.asp
colonial rule. Banro has been active in both the water and education sectors in its social services for the population.

But the international agencies and the Banro mining company were not the only to operate there. There were also government-related and church-related organizations as well as national agencies. For instance, the *Fonds National*, which was said to be under the management of the presidency of the country, was actually supported by the World Bank funding to the Government of the DRC. Many other national organizations such as *Laissez l’Afrique Vivre*, GEADEBU, etc. implemented some activities with subsidies from international agencies. Even though some of their actions were reported, most of them were rarely visible in the area.

Lastly, among the church-based institutions, one of the well-known and the oldest in the area is the 5e CELPA protestant church, created in 1922. It has a variety of departments such as health and education that contributed enormously to initiate, construct, and manage a number of existing hospitals, health centres and posts, maternities, as well as a huge number of primary and secondary schools. For example, Kaziba has a prestigious school of nurses, which was founded by the Norwegian missionaries, and which is well known across the entire province of South-Kivu. Another popular church institution is of course the Roman Catholic church that has a parish in each of the three chiefdoms. While the Kaziba health district and its Referral District Hospital is managed by the 5e CELPA, the Mwana health district and its Ifendula referral District Hospital based in Luhwindja is managed by the BDOM, which is under the administration of the Catholic Archdiocese of Bukavu. Other churches that initiated, constructed, and administered some schools in the area are the *8e CEPAC*, the *21e CNCA*, and the Pentecostal Church of God (PCG).

Indeed, many schools were (re)built alongside the main road to the extent that the more an area was remote, the less schools existed there. One of the reasons is that, unlike Tushiriki, other NGOs favoured areas accessible by car. In short, IRC-Tushiriki was not alone, other agencies were active in the area. But the uniqueness of the Tushiriki programme lies in the

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5 5e CELPA: *Communauté des Eglises Libres de Pentecôte en Afrique*, meaning Free Pentecostal Churches in Africa initiated by Norwegian Missionaries in the 1920s. It ranks 5 in the classification of Christian Churches of the DRC.

6 8e CEPAC: *Communauté des Eglises de Pentecôte en Afrique Centrale*, Pentecostal Churches in Central Africa initiated by Swedish Missionaries in the 1920s. It ranks 8 in the classification of Christian Protestant Churches in the DRC.

fact that it was the only programme that promoted governance through reconstruction. Other programmes operated in either the relief mode or a community-based reconstruction mode.

1.6 Methodology

This section outlines four aspects related to the methodology of the current study: the definition of concepts, the social reality of the programme and its assessment, the study design and unit of analysis, and the different phases of the field work.

1.6.1. Concepts, indicators, and related practices

Table 1.1 summarizes a number of the key concepts that are being used in community-driven reconstruction, their indicators and related practices. As these are concepts that are common in social science and development studies I will also use these concepts in my discussion of the practices of CDR. At the same time, I have been observing how the actors in and around the CDR programme interpret some of these concepts in practice.

Table 1.1: Broad definition of concepts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Related practices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community-Driven</td>
<td>Community participation</td>
<td>- Degree of participation/involvement, stakeholders, steps (decision making and community work), nature of labour (managerial, technical and manual), motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction</td>
<td>Project activities</td>
<td>- Type and quality of the infrastructure building, whether achieved or not, reconstruction sectors (education, health, road/bridge, water); - reconstruction refers to development (future, building new infrastructure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance</td>
<td>Transparency and accountability</td>
<td>- Information provision/dissemination and access to information, answerability, possibility of sanctions (control of corruption/enforcement), inclusion, partnership, equality and social inclusion (gender, age, religious, ethnicity); - governance refers to administration (the activities that are done in order to plan, organize and run an institution) and government (the activity or the manner of controlling a country)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanisms of local governance</td>
<td>Means through which spread out information related to a project</td>
<td>- Public meetings (committee election, project identification, project approval, general assembly report), report postage, watch dog role (CBOs, Requa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power relations</td>
<td>Power holders / drivers of the process</td>
<td>- Persons/positions (traditional, intellectual elite, church leaders), group of people (traditional, intellectual or religious networks), source of legitimacy, interest/motivation (individual, group, community), modus operandi (informal talks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social dynamics</td>
<td>Interface, perceptions and people’s behaviour with regard to projects</td>
<td>- Factors that influence the processes of people’s involvement in project activities : trust and distrust, power relations (competition/confrontation, domination or synergy of power holders/negotiation/consensus), views/representations towards the project; - Interface elite and non-elite (power relations); - Interface trainees and committee members (capacity building); - Interface field staff and residents (labour and incentive structure),</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meanings / perceptions attached to CDR</th>
<th>Representations</th>
<th>- Difference in views (people, officials at local-provincial-national levels, CDR staff, other NGO staff), nature (project’s objectives, outcomes), similar approach (past, current or parallel), capacity building.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>Trainings, management and technical assistance</td>
<td>- Content of trainings, training of trainers, training of committee members/local authorities, quality of managerial and technical support, effects of capacity development inside and outside the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentive structure</td>
<td>Benefit/reward/recompense</td>
<td>- Types of incentives (social/immaterial/ soft; economic/material/hard; and political).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual labour</td>
<td>Physical work / unskilled work</td>
<td>- Less harder (carrying out sand, rocks, bricks, etc. at shorter distance.), more harder (road construction or carrying out materials at longer distance or in a mountainous area).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other types of labour</td>
<td>Technical, managerial</td>
<td>- Skilled work (of masons, carpenters, etc.); - Organisational skills (leading meetings, supervising community work, managing funds, reporting on community project, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>Beneficiaries of a certain project feeling that it is theirs</td>
<td>- Control over a project or a program and the commitment of the beneficiaries to the success of the undertaking; - Abilities and power of stakeholders to set and take responsibility for a development agenda and to muster support and sustain it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>In contrast to national</td>
<td>- Grassroots communities, stakeholders or beneficiaries in contrast to the Ministry or to the Central Government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.6.2. Social reality of Tushiriki programme and assessment

Participative approach to development/reconstruction needs more of qualitative research to understand the contextual realities in which programmes take place. In this regard, Pottier mentioned:

The participative approach to development has in recent years provided several openings for qualitative, contextual research which aims to gauge the impact and acceptability of programmes already implemented and to gather information relevant for the design and management of future interventions (Pottier 1993).

As a qualitative research, this research is concerned by the social realities within the Tushiriki programme. As such, social realities cannot be understood without paying attention to meanings and purposes attached by human actors to their activities (Guba & Lincoln 1994:106).

Having said that, to assess these realities, I stayed extensively in the field where I participated (as a researcher rather than an implementing agency staff) in both public meetings and community work undertaken by the local people in the Tushiriki programme. Also, I took part in training, workshop, and sensitization sessions about the programme, which were held either by its community development component or by its civil society
component. The main questions that are related to the thesis research, subquestions, and guided interviews and participant observations are as follows: ‘Who drives the process? How does the process work? For what purposes and based on what legitimacy do power holders act? What are the perceptions of officials, CDR staff, trainees, and the population about the training, workshop, and sensitization sessions? What are the types of projects selected by the residents? What is the nature of labour involved in project execution? What are people’s perceptions vis-à-vis the intervention as governance programme? These questions and other related questions were articulated in semi-structured interviews that I undertook in the field.

1.6.3. Data collection techniques

I used several techniques to collect data. First, participant observation that is defined as the evidence through the eyes. Metcalfe (2007) describes it as the mainstay of science. In social science, observational evidence usually involves a researcher personally observing peoples’ actions, behaviours, or artefacts through his/her own eyes or through some instrument that helps their eye in the way that a microscope or video does. In this research, I am concerned by peoples’ actions, that is, behaviours in the CDR programme implementation (Metcalfe 2007). Nonetheless, one of the problems of participant observation is the change in a behaviour of persons or groups, attributed to their being observed, which is well known as the Hawthorne Effect (Kumar 2005). I have been among the villagers, dressed as a villager and talking ‘Kiswahili,’ working with them, and discussing with them the issue of reconstruction in each particular case. In my view, this has reduced the bias which could be attributed to this effect. A good ‘rapport’ was built between the interviewees and me before every interview.

Furthermore, I have stayed extensively in the areas of interest and have lived there, sharing people’s everyday life. This has engendered trust and distinguished me from the NGO staff who normally stay briefly to implement a predefined activity rather than collect data for a research purpose. As pointed out by Malinowski, time is necessary for the people to get used to the researcher, but time also allows the researcher to begin to feel as a part of happenings and to understand them from the point view of those being researched (O'reilly 2005).

Another technique used for data collection is in-depth interviews, which were, at the same time, semi-structured interviews. The face-to-face interview, coupled sometimes by repeated interactions between the informants and me, sought to understand the perspectives of the informants in relation to this research at its different steps (Kumar 2005).
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To state emphatically, I did interviews at different steps of the Tushiriki project execution with the local people, authorities, CSOs, and the CDR staff (senior and field) about the topic. Some of the interviews took the form of a ‘focus group’ when I interviewed a group of people, who were VDC members, residents working in a field, on road construction, or after a Sunday church service. Others were in the form of an individual interview.

As ‘ethnography’ stands for, some of the semi-structured interviews took the form of oral stories about the programme being implemented there asking the narrator what happened exactly, who participated, how, and why. To do so, I collected information about issues related to power relations, transparency and accountability, motivations of participants to contribute to both decision making and project execution and other related issues. For example, an open-ended question concerning corruption within an on-going project could not provide enough information about what was going on within it. In a story hearing, however, about how funds allocated to a project was being managed, I got more and valid insights about the issue. Some of these oral stories took place while walking on a foot road with the informants, while the residents worked their fields or while staying at their homes.

In addition, reflexivity means thinking through what one is doing, specifically on how the researcher–interviewee relationship influences data collection processes (Mauthner & Doucet 2003:223; Alversson et al. 2008:497). To perform this, I had time to reflect every day on stories and semi-structured interviews of the day. Additionally, I took the advantage of triangulating data by comparing information gathered by observation of the participant, the information collected by semi-structured interviews, and the information gathered through oral stories (Silverman 2009: 291).

Finally, I used desk review as a source of secondary data. That is, monitoring and evaluation reports, baseline, midterm review, and end evaluation reports about the Tushiriki and similar programmes, which were implemented by the IRC in the DRC. As pointed by Kumar (2005), by using documentation, one has to extract the required information for the purpose of the study. For example, I reviewed 16 modules of training, workshop, and sensitization sessions to assess their content with regard to governance principles applied within the Tushiriki programme.

1.6.4. Study design and unit of analysis

Table 1.2 describes the target communities, population, and the project selected referring to 34 target villages in the Burhinyi and Luhwindja chiefdoms as well as the 15 communities in
the Kaziba chiefdom that were targeted by the current research. These three chiefdoms are the three areas of the study, which are separate but similar in some instances, and from which numerous case studies (villages) discussed in the current research were selected. On the one hand, they were separate in the sense that each constituted a distinct administrative entity with its own king, people, and settlement. At the same time, while Kaziba has already experienced the CDR approach before 2008, in Burhinyi and Luhwindja, this was the first time the CDR was implemented. On the other hand, they were similar in the sense that the three chiefdoms were neighbours, had the same culture, and were affected by the conflict during the same period of time and in the same way. As Sneddom and Fox (2007) have pointed out, I see the case study approach as an especially apt methodology for examining the notion of participation. From a case study, knowledge production is possible in relation to issues, such as power relations, capacity building, accountability, labour, ownership, etc.

As the current research was focused much more at the village level, the unit of analysis was a village or a set of villages that belonged to the same community, such as school reconstruction in Luduha community of Luhwindja. Relevantly, Gray (2006) notes that within a single case study, there may be a number of different units of analysis, which may present several entry points.
Table 1.2: Target Communities, population and selected projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chiefdom</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>*34 VDC projects and **15 small CDCs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birhala</td>
<td>Birhala ler</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>2 kms road reconstruction and guest-house chiefdom rehabilitation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kwishasha</td>
<td>2156</td>
<td>2 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ciriri</td>
<td>1089</td>
<td>2 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muli</td>
<td>1712</td>
<td>3 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budaha</td>
<td>Budaha ler (Kakwende)</td>
<td>1559</td>
<td>2 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Budaha II (Mbogo)</td>
<td>1659</td>
<td>1 water reservoir and 3 water points construction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kanyimba</td>
<td>1082</td>
<td>2 kms road and office chief of groupement reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Karvera</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>2 kms road construction and office schoolmaster reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Busherega</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>3 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cishagala</td>
<td>1031</td>
<td>3 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kalambiro</td>
<td>1322</td>
<td>3 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Karhala</td>
<td>1034</td>
<td>3 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mulungu</td>
<td>1072</td>
<td>3 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itudu</td>
<td>Citudu</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>3 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luhala</td>
<td>1540</td>
<td>3 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luhela</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>3 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Namashongo</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>3 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntondo II</td>
<td>Cibanda II</td>
<td>1765</td>
<td>1 km road construction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cishali</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>2 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kabingu I</td>
<td>1489</td>
<td>1 classroom construction and classrooms equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kabingu II</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>2 kms road construction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chibanda II</td>
<td>Cibanda II</td>
<td>1765</td>
<td>1 km road construction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ithogwe</td>
<td>1577</td>
<td>1 bridge reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lukaya</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>3 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mushugula</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>3 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>936</td>
<td>Extension of water system and 3 water points construction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhwindja</td>
<td>Byazi</td>
<td>1185</td>
<td>2 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chonga ler</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>2 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chonga II</td>
<td>1394</td>
<td>3 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Majindi</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>1 schoolmaster office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lwonga</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>1 classroom and 1 schoolmaster office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mulama ler</td>
<td>1550</td>
<td>2 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mulama II</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>2 classrooms reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mulama III (Kalambo)</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>Water system and 3 water points construction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaziba</td>
<td>15 communities</td>
<td>38834</td>
<td>VDC projects did not exist in Kaziba, projects were selected only at community level: road, school, maternity, water system, equipment meeting room, bridge, chiefdom's office, polyvalent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>83007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*VDC: Village Development Committee; ** CDC: Community Development Committee (small communities of Kaziba).

1.6.5. Different phases of field work

Diagram 1.1 depicts three phases of the research fieldwork. First, the preparatory phase which took place from August through September 2008 consisted of contacting with the IRC senior staff, the provincial authorities, as well as local people in the form of exploratory visits and the preparation of the logistics. In fact, meetings were held with the senior IRC staff based in Bukavu and two conference calls, which were held about the research proposal, involved the IRC’s Director of Research based in New York, the office of Stichting Vluchteling based in the Hague (The Netherlands), and the Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction Group of Wageningen University (The Netherlands). Then, I got the permission to start the fieldwork within the SV-IRC targeted communities. At the same time, I did a desk review about the geographic setting at the library of the Institut Supérieur Pédagogique of Bukavu. In terms of logistics, I bought a motorbike, Yamaha 125, which was
appropriate for field visits both in rainy and dry seasons. With regard to provincial authorities, I got a clearance letter that allowed me to undertake the current research in both the Mwenga and Walungu territories and through which I introduced myself and the research to local authorities before I began the observation of participants and interviews in a village.

Second, the data collection period started effectively from November 2008 through April 2010. During this period, I was mainly based in the area conducting participant observation and semi-structured interviews in this ethnographic study. As I have shortly mentioned in subsection (d) of this section, interviews were held either with the residents who participated in the programme activities or with field staff of the programme. Similarly, I interviewed the field officers from the partner organisations of Tushiriki project, that is, Arche d’Alliance, AFEDEM, ADMR, and CEDAC, as well as the field staff of other organisations that operated in the area such as the CAB. In addition to interviews with the local authorities based in the chiefdoms (namely the King and the CPEA), I visited the capital city Kinshasa in March 2010, where I had interviews at three national ministries, specifically with the Secretary General at the Ministry of Relations of the Parliament, the Minister’s Advisor at the Ministry of Decentralisation, and the Chef de Division of action research at the Ministry of Rural Development. Then, I did interviews with the minister’s advisor at the provincial Ministry of Interior, Justice and Relation of Parliament in South-Kivu, as well as with the senior Tushiriki staff, who was the Territory Supervisor of the community component of the programme.

Finally, during the last phase, that included the whole period of data collection, I was involved in four types of evaluations as one of the team members. These evaluations were all related to the CDR programmes, that is, the midterm review of the Tuungane programme, the midterm review of the Tushiriki programme, the final evaluation of the Tushiriki programme, and the ethnographic component of the Tuungane programme (Ferf & Kyamusugulwa 2009; Ferf, Kyamusugulwa et al. 2009; Klerk, Kyamusugulwa et al. 2011).
CHAPTER 1: Introduction

Diagram 1.1: Showing the phases of fieldwork

Phase one Preparatory phase: August –September 2008
- Introduction of study to IRC Senior Staff and Conference calls
- Collect literature on geographic setting
- Introduction of study to provincial Minister of Interior, Justice, Decentralisation and Relation with the Parliament in South-Kivu province in the Democratic Republic of Congo
- Obtaining research clearance from the above Ministry
- Establishing rapport with local people, local leaders (chief of village, chief of groupement, IRC staff and CSOs staff)
- Prepare logistics

Phase two Documentation, Participant Observations, Semi-structured Interviews, Oral stories: from November 2008 to April 2010
- Visit all three sites Burhinyi, Luhwindja and Kaziba chiefdoms
- Participate in activities of Village Development Committee (Public meetings, community work, training sessions)
- Interview with local people, officials at local, provincial and national levels and with CDR staff
- Desk review about reports, training modules and different evaluations related to CDR programmes
- Collect data through stories
- Return to the area to complement information or gather new information

Phase three Participation as team member in evaluations of the Tushiriki programme or related programme: From October 2008 to May 2011
- Mid Term Review Tuungane programme in Katanga, Maniema and South-Kivu: October to December 2008.
- Mid Term Review Tushiriki (South-Kivu, DRC) and PADM (Muyinga, Burundi): September to October 2009
- Tushiriki End of Programme Evaluation (South-Kivu, DRC) and PADM (Muyinga, Burundi): November to December 2010
- Ethnographic component of Tuungane Programme in Mwenga and Kalehe territories (South-Kivu): January to May 2011

IRC: International Rescue Committee; CSO: Civil Society Organization; CDR: Community-Driven Reconstruction; Tuungane: similar programme to Tushiriki, implemented at the same time by IRC in South-Kivu (Kalehe, Mwenga and Uvira), Katanga and Maniema provinces. Unlike Tushiriki, Tuungane is funded by DFID (UK Department for International Development); Tushiriki: CDR programme implemented by the IRC on which the current study has been undertaken; PADM: Programme d’Appui à la Décentralisation à Muyinga (Programme to Support Decentralisation in Muyinga), which was a similar programme to Tushiriki in Burundi, funded by the same donor (Stichting Vluchteling).

1.7. Relation with IRC

This section briefly describes my relationship with the IRC staff and the ways we interacted during this PhD project both positively and negatively. Firstly, as I was a former staff of the IRC, I could familiarise easily with the field of Burhinyi, Luhwindja and Kaziba chiefdoms as with the programme field staff. Secondly, there were mutual interactions between the researcher and both the senior and field staff informally and formally either during the field or in different workshops/conference workshop. For instance, in the workshop held by the Tushiriki programme, both field and senior staff played a role game of power relations, in
which I was one of the key facilitators. Finally, under the collaboration Wageningen University–International Rescue Committee–Institut Supérieur de Développement Rural, the conference-workshop was held in Bukavu in January 2010 on development initiatives and rural transformation in South-Kivu. This culminated in the publication of a special Cahier du Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches pour la Promotion Rurale that comprised mainly scientific articles discussed in the abovementioned forum.

On the negative side; however, there were instances at the beginning of this project where the management of the programme gave less attention to what I presented as findings from the field because they still regarded me as an IRC staff. With time, more consideration was given to his findings, which were shared in one or another way within the programme. In short, we can see that interactions between the researcher and the programme as a whole went well in the sense that facilitated data collection and discussion of the research findings, despite some drawbacks at the beginning.

1.8 Thesis outline

In order to study the social dynamics of the CDR programme, and analyse the role of different actors, I have on the one hand focused on factors internal to the design of the programme, and on the other on processes at the interface of the programme with institutions and actors in the communities.

Chapter two presents a literature review on participatory development/reconstruction. It analyses the main trends of both strengths and weaknesses of the approach over the last decade.

Chapter three focuses on the staff of the CDR programme, as main implementors of the programme. It analyses the types of training they receive to be capacitated for their job, and how they deal with the implementation of the programme in practice. It introduces the notion of the chain of capacity building and analyses its effects both inside and outside the Tushiriki programme.

Chapter four starts from the assumption that the methods of intervention are important to co-determine the effects of the intervention. As the interventions aim to enhance local institutions of accountability, the chapter deals with institutional engineering in the eastern DRC. The chapter presents the general assembly report, the display of reports, and the watch-
dog role of civil society as techniques for transparency and accountability and how residents viewed them in relation to the existing types of (informal) accountability in the area. The chapter also brings out how IRC staff dealt in practice with the ongoing realities of accountability, rather than relying on the mechanisms prescribed by their programme.

In chapter five, I shift examines the issue of power relations within the Tushiriki programme by emphasising on the existing institutions that influence the exercise of power during the programme dynamics. The Tushiriki programme did not want to give a role to the existing power structures in the community, but I assumed from the start that they would nonetheless play a role. I analyse in this chapter, how they performed a role in the programme and use this to ask whether elite capture is always negative for development, and which of the prevailing elites (government/chiefs or churches) were more powerful in determining development.

Chapter six analyses the issue of labour mobilization in this programme. It departs from the idea that people’s involvement in reconstruction takes several labour forms, varying from managerial to manual and to technical labour. While the Tushiriki programme assumes that people feel ownership over the public goods they produce, and hence want to provide voluntary labour to realise these goods, the paper takes issue with both these assumptions. It analyses the labour question in relation to the long history with forced community labour in DRC, and questions the notion of public good in the context of DRC.

Chapter seven outlines local ownership in the CDR in the DRC. It describes cases and analyses the conditions where the residents felt or not felt ownership of the Tushiriki village project. Finally, chapter eight concludes the thesis.

1.9. References


CHAPTER 1: Introduction

Photo 1.1: Author visiting a household in Karhala village, Itudu groupement, Burhinyi

Photo 1.2: Author with informants in Kabalole groupement, Luhwindj
CHAPTER 2: Participatory development and reconstruction: a literature review

2. Participatory development and reconstruction: a literature review

This chapter has been published as:

ABSTRACT

In the past decade researchers and development experts have been preoccupied by participatory development and reconstruction. Despite criticisms of its potential, it has been at the centre of development practices. This review of both published and unpublished literature aims to assess the importance of participatory development and reconstruction, especially its positive and negative characteristics. The paper shows that, despite its potentially transformative role, its main drawback rests in the power relations between elites and non-elites and that creating comprehensible ways through which non-elites can deal with these relations is one issue that needs additional research. Other issues that need more research are related to how to sustain the participatory development and reconstruction outcomes by increasing local ownership, and how to better involve existing structures and institutions (both state and non-state actors) in development and reconstruction efforts for poverty alleviation.

2.1. Introduction

Despite the emergence of ‘participation’ as one way to contribute to development in the poorest areas in the 1980s, in the 1990s it has been claimed that it is associated with power relations that undermine its potential. Nonetheless, the mounting criticisms have not affected the wide use of participation practices for development or reconstruction. Similarly the literature suggests that grasping the relationships between participation and existing power structures may lead to progress on how participatory development or reconstruction functions. It must be noted that participatory development is also used to signify participatory reconstruction, because ‘reconstruction’ must be seen as a transition phase from an immediate post-conflict situation to development; that is, from relief aid to development aid. The latter sometimes coincides with the reconstruction phase.

This literature review is based on a computerised search of the literature on this topic, using numerous bibliographic databases. The short-listed literature consisted of 60 peer-reviewed journal articles, eight books and 22 reports. Most of the reports, also comprising the unpublished literature, are from the World Bank and concern community-driven development (CDD), one of the well-known methodologies of participatory development. The main criteria for selecting the documents were as follows: they had to have been published between 1995 and 2010 and to reflect the main trends about participatory development and reconstruction or related terms in the developing world in general. The focus was placed on issues such as the benefits of participatory development and reconstruction, its possible...
transformative role, and risks and critiques. Several databases were used to gather information from the selected articles. One was Google Scholar, which facilitated the search for academic publishers and development agencies across many disciplines and sources. The other was the Wageningen University and Research Digital Library (formerly AGRALIN). In addition, Scopus was used for scientific information and other literature about the topic, as well as Medline, a clinical and medical database maintained by the US National Library of Medicine. Finally, I used the Thomson Reuters (formerly ISI) Web of Knowledge, also known as Web of science, and the Health InterNetwork Access to Research Initiative (HINARI) for journals relevant to community development. For each selected article, it was interesting to look at the related articles as well. Endnote X4 was used either to classify documents or to present the bibliography of this study. The aims of the study were to review the value of participatory development and reconstruction and to describe its potentially transformative role, its benefits and the risks and criticisms associated with it.

As we will show, despite the potential of participatory development and reconstruction, one of its main challenges remains the imbalance in power relations between those who lead communities and those who are led. Understanding the ways through which changes may occur when poor people negotiate space within these power relations and politics is one way that needs further investigation.

The remainder of the paper consists of nine sections. The next section briefly describes similar and related concepts of participation. It is followed by sections outlining the brief history of community participation and highlighting participation and other associated terms. The factors making for effectiveness in participatory development approaches are examined in the subsequent section, which is followed by a presentation of the areas of participation that apply to development and a section discussing participation and its potentially transformative role. The next two sections describe the benefits of participation, its risks and the criticisms made of it, while the final section concludes the paper.

2.2. Similar and related concepts

The literature suggests other related terms used to signify the idea of working together. These are public participation, popular participation, collective action or collective management, social capital, community-based/community-driven action, and stakeholder or civic engagement. Nevertheless, even if these concepts conceal some nuances, it appears that they
have all have in common ground people’s involvement for a common objective or public goods activities regarding either economic or social life.

2.3. Brief history of community participation

The history of ‘community participation’ has changed with time, context, and circumstances. Commons played a crucial role in European history, particularly from 1000 CE onwards. Commons and other forms of collective action evolved as responses to the social dilemmas of the times. During colonialism measures were taken to prevent diseases, which are now considered community participation. In the 1930s the Antagonish movement in the east of Nova Scotia, Canada was an inspired and new initiative to solve the social and economic difficulties of farmers, fishers and miners.

In the 1970s Julius Nyerere set up the Ujamaa in Tanzania, which was a form of community participation. At the same time the idea of community participation became popular in a range of areas of life. In 1987, at Alma-Ata, the World Health Organization (WHO) articulated the concept that became the heart of the strategy to achieve ‘Health for All’ by 2000, known as Primary Health Care. In the 1980s structural adjustment programmes for economic recovery and transformation were applied in numerous developing countries. When criticism built up against this policy, in the 1990s a renewed emphasis emerged on people’s involvement in decision making and project implementation. This is when the World Bank developed the concept of Community Driven Development (CDD).

Over the past 30 years governments and related agencies have implemented postcolonial development programmes based on Weberian bureaucracy theory. This resulted into a more top-down, hierarchical approach, which was widely criticized. Higher participation thus became a way to create democratic movements, to give power to the ‘marginalised and poor’ to enable them to ‘do their own analysis, to take command, to gain in confidence, and to take their own decision’; that is, ‘bottom-up’ systems based on participation and empowerment.

Since then participatory approaches to development and reconstruction have started to be widely applied either to post-conflict or post-disaster situations, in this way aiming to facilitate the setup of a community where inhabitants are respectful to each other, can make democratic choices, and are able to own their development. A further aim is to strengthen social cohesion.
2.4. Participation and other associated terms

2.4.1. Participation

The concept of ‘participation’ is now more than 80 years old within development. It signifies people taking part in decision-making processes, or the type and level of people’s involvement in development planning, projects and practices. Participation takes the form of ‘community participation’, which may range from consultation or information to decision making.

‘Community participation’ is seen as an indicator of people’s involvement in either decision making in a project or its implementation. It is said that the more people are involved in decision making for a project, the more the community is driving the project. It is through this concept that the World Bank initiated the concept of CDD, seen as a new generation of the more traditional form of community-based development (CBD).

2.4.2. Community

There is no way to situate participation without mentioning ‘community’, a problematic concept when it comes to development and reconstruction. In fact, ‘community’ refers both to geographical entities and to associations of people who share interests or who live in the same area with the same culture, where reciprocity and mutual concern triumph. However, many divisions may emerge in terms of religion, ethnicity, education or gender when members of the same community are invited to take part in development and reconstruction projects.

2.4.3. Governance

The World Bank report, released in 1989, situated Africa’s development problems as a crisis of governance. Since then, promoting governance has become one of the main focuses of donors, even one of the conditions of aid. The idea of governance refers to its two main and intertwined principles: transparency and accountability. The notion of governance is related to ‘participation’ and ‘community participation’ because, in a given society, there is a need for those in high positions or those who have power to account to ordinary citizens for what they do. Conversely there is a need for local people to hold their leaders to account about decision making and actions regarding public goods; otherwise, they have the right to sanction them. While transparency refers to information provision, accountability refers to both answerability and enforcement. Other governance principles besides these two main
ones relate to citizen engagement, equality and social inclusion (gender, ethnicity, age, religion, etc.), ethical and honest behaviour, equity (fair procedures and due process), partnership, sustainability, and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{29}

\textbf{2.4.4. Empowerment}

Empowerment signifies the idea of giving to somebody more control over his or her own life or the situation he or she is in. It is related to participation because participation is seen as the vehicle through which empowerment can be realised.\textsuperscript{30} Similarly any mechanisms that provide room for what people do involve empowerment. Its success is the ability to translate Western knowledge locally, instead of trying to replace local by Western knowledge and vice versa.\textsuperscript{31}

\textbf{2.5. Factors of effectiveness}

There are several factors that are said to influence the effectiveness of participation and its approaches to development and reconstruction. First, having a concrete approach, with the readiness of the stakeholder to act in both international and local arenas to achieve specific goals, are considered important factors.\textsuperscript{32} Second, appropriate leadership and a strong sense of identity are important: a small and homogeneous group has a better chance of success than a heterogeneous, large one.\textsuperscript{33} Also, a higher level of social homogeneity is needed to facilitate the formation of social capital (that is, the value of social relationships, trust and reciprocity norms), which may be conducive to collective action.\textsuperscript{34}

Third, there is evidence that participation is more effective when the programme in which it takes place provides more space for negotiation and mediation among local people and where the latter perceive the programme as engaged to do so.\textsuperscript{35} Fourth, communication and strong relationships in the community are important to reduce conflict between a programme’s goals and actors’ needs in a way that maintains a space of dialogue with community members, as well as in a way that engages them in the review of suggested new activities and projects. The four relevant ways are: facilitation, dialogue, consultation and partnership.\textsuperscript{36} Lastly, the ability to face challenges and dilemmas is crucial. This factor relies, in turn, on two other factors, namely money and staff leadership.\textsuperscript{37}
2.6. Sectors of application

There is a range of sectors within which community participation may be applied to development and reconstruction.\textsuperscript{38} The UN conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972, and the UN General Assembly through the adoption of the World Charter for Nature held in 1982, addressed participation in the environmental field, which took some time before it became a major issue in the international policy arena in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{39}

In the field of health community participation was presented as the main means for implementing primary health care, because the idea was supposedly to create people’s autonomy over health care.\textsuperscript{40} However, weak experience with community participation in health efforts has been reported in the Democratic Republic of Congo.\textsuperscript{41} In the field of education experience from Brazil has shown that school empowerment may make progress by weakening patronage structures, enhancing transparency of education decisions and leading to school administrators who are more accountable to their constituencies,\textsuperscript{42} while, in the agricultural field, participation in the community decision-making process and women’s involvement in running rice banks may enhance the latter’s social mobility.\textsuperscript{43}

In the infrastructure sector experience from the Amazon region has shown that, for viable ‘road governance’, there was a need for a planning process not only involving the community but also the state, in order to foster transparency and accountability.\textsuperscript{44} In the livestock field (including fishery activities), evidence suggests that what counts is the combination of rural people’s knowledge in their context and the ways in which they manage their livestock, rather than just keeping animals per se.\textsuperscript{45} Finally, in other fields, such as micro-credit or income generation, the importance of social networks and means that reinforce people’s capacity for collective action that addresses their needs are of increasing interest.\textsuperscript{46}

By targeting these sectors, participation and its approaches are said to contribute to poverty alleviation, in the sense that beneficiaries may improve access to social services, and to restore natural, physical, social and human capital, which may have been destroyed during a conflict or disaster.\textsuperscript{47}

2.7. Participation and potential transformative role

There are two main observations to make about the potential transformative role of participation: that related to participation per se and that related to participatory approaches. In the first case ‘participation’ has been used as a means through which intended beneficiaries
have the opportunity to share, enhance and analyse their knowledge. This means that it has primarily been used as a method or tool for development objectives. The common example is Participatory Rural Appraisal, used to identify and assess community needs and priorities, to monitor and evaluate the impact of these, and to inform continuous readjustment of the programme. This is motivated by the fact that less literate people can be fully involved in the process.\textsuperscript{48}

At the same time participation has been used as an end itself, meaning that it may play a transformative role by empowering intended beneficiaries, particularly by reducing the gap between those who have voice and the voiceless.\textsuperscript{49} The idea here is that reinforcement of the capacity of poor people to negotiate power within existing power relations, instead of reversing them, can be a factor of transformation in a given society. Two reasons for this come together here. One is that local patrons are portrayed as being of great utility to ‘lowers’, with the former preferring to work through them rather than take their place.\textsuperscript{50} The concept of ‘patrons’ versus ‘lowers’ is akin to that of ‘elites’ versus ‘non-elites’ or to ‘big men’ versus ‘ordinary people’, ‘rulers’ versus ‘ruled’, local ‘uppers’ versus ‘lowers’, and ‘leading lineages’ versus ‘the rest’.\textsuperscript{51} A second reason is that, in the context of developing countries, where people view their clans and ethnic groups representatives as the obliged way to access to development, the former can resist making the processes of decision transparent and public. This, as people stay in touch with their leaders through informal politics. This means that participation can only enhance this by empowering the poor so that they can advance their room for manoeuvre within existing power relations and increase their ability to hold their leaders to account.\textsuperscript{52} Here it must be noted that one way to move towards a more transformative approach to development is through an understanding of how participation relates to existing power structures and politics system.\textsuperscript{53}

The second major observation is related to the way participatory approaches operate. According to the distinction made previously, whether participation is used as a method or an end, in participatory approaches, particularly community-driven ones, it appears to be both a method and an end. One justification is that what makes CDD or community-driven reconstruction (CDR) different from other approaches to CBD is its intense community participation and empowerment. In fact, among five characteristics of a CBD approach, there are two which are typical of CDD/CDR, namely, participatory planning and design, and community involvement in project implementation. The latter means that residents may contribute directly by supplying inputs, labour or funds, or indirectly by managing or
supervising project operations. All the other three characteristics (community focus, community control and community-based action) may be common to CBD projects or not essential to CDD/CDR projects.\textsuperscript{54} Similarly, CDD/CDR is justified in situations of local institutional failure resulting either from omission, particularly in post-conflict or post-disaster situations, or from commission, where local institutions are non-functional, because of incapacity, corruption, elite capture or lack of accountability.\textsuperscript{55} Lastly, one of the strategies through which CDD is said to be effective is by addressing the information problems between planners and beneficiaries, and by making resources available to the poor so that projects are well planned and executed in a way that takes into account cost-effectiveness and time.\textsuperscript{56} In short, participation can lead to transformation if a space is created for the poor to negotiate power relations and local politics within development and reconstruction, and if they can be effectively involved in both decision making and project execution.

### 2.8. Benefits of participation

There are two main typologies of benefits from participation and its approaches. The first highlights the ineffectiveness of externally driven and expert-oriented approaches to development, which would be called a shift from ‘top-down approaches’, known as blueprint approaches, to bottom-up approaches. This is said to be associated with a shift from ‘expert’ knowledge to people’s knowledge.\textsuperscript{57} The latter is seen as a response to the failure of the former, and there is evidence that it has contributed to poverty alleviation and mitigation of exclusion where some strict conditions have been met by permitting local communities to influence decision-making processes.\textsuperscript{58} Additionally, participatory interventions offer a space for promoting governance through mechanisms of transparency and answerability.\textsuperscript{59} It is said that one way to deal with power and politics in development and reconstruction projects is to engage with a strictly political project; where this has not taken place, one should be more cautious in claiming transformative effects for these approaches.\textsuperscript{60} Finally, participatory approaches offer the possibility of building close personal relationships between an agency’s staff and targeted communities in such a way that mechanisms for negotiating power relations may be found. Nonetheless, these approaches are less often recommended because they can have real operational limitations and may be culturally inappropriate.\textsuperscript{61}

The second typology of benefits from participatory approaches, particularly those said to be community-driven, consists of promoting equity and inclusiveness through their ability to tackle issues of inequality/inequity, exclusion and poverty through a process of
empowerment. In addition, they can promote efficiency by assigning control of planning and resources allocated to the project directly to the intended beneficiaries. Likewise, they can promote governance through devolution of decision-making and resources directly to given communities in such a way that local institutions become more accountable and responsive. One common example is decentralisation reform, where this exercise takes place between leaders of local communities and their populations. It is believed that this can lead to a citizenry who are capable of undertaking self-initiated development activity.

2.9. Risks and critiques of participation

There are several criticisms and dangers related to participation and its methods, some of which are interwoven, and related to ‘power and politics’. In fact, what one would call the main critique of the approach is undoubtedly ‘power and politics’, which has been discussed in diverse ways in the literature. Participation affects social (power) relations in communities. Some authors have suggested focusing on developing the ‘political capabilities of the poor’ because local structures can limit and, at the same time, improve the prospects of participatory development. Others have noted that power relations are often less visible because they are rooted in social and cultural practices, and that those who believe in participatory development have been naive about the complexities of relations of power. Some authors have mentioned that the more participatory a project is, the more it will mask the power structures of local communities, and that the term ‘community’ may conceal power relations. Lastly, others have stated that elite capture is a serious problem for participatory development, although some authors have insisted that not all elites capture a project and that a distinction should be made between ‘elite capture’ and ‘elite control’.

However, power relations are not only found among those who lead a community and community members, but also exist between facilitators of development and potential beneficiaries. This is because decision making is said to be dominated by those who facilitate the process to the extent that it will reflect the interests of already-existing powerful people. Similarly there may be cases of ‘supply-driven demand-driven’ development, which are considered rare, whereas projects selected by communities may reflect donor agencies’ predetermined priority sectors.

In addition to power relations, another set of criticisms focuses on the differences in definitions, objectives, application, and the rightness of techniques and methods used. Critics
have also noted the limitations of participation in terms of theory, politics and concepts. Likewise, it has been shown that in the name of decentralisation, participation can conceal continued centralisation of development policy and planning. Finally, it has been demonstrated that, as knowledge is a highly normative construction, associated with social norms, ritual and practices, it is influenced by power relations that exist in a given area.\textsuperscript{71}

Another set of critiques points out how ‘participation’ and its methods may lead to the tyranny of decision making and control, to tyranny of the group and tyranny of methods, and that individuals’ thoughts are influenced by collective decisions that are more uncertain than those they would have chosen individually.\textsuperscript{72} In the same vein, because of the aforementioned criticism, some authors are sceptical whether to compare participatory development to the so-called bottom-up approach, seen as an alternative to top-down approach.\textsuperscript{73} Participatory development is subject to higher costs in the preparation of sub-projects, because these are not identified at the beginning of the process. At the same time, the idea of participation may be used to legitimise donors who need to incorporate such processes in their projects.\textsuperscript{74} Finally, there is a concern about governance or participatory structures created within an intervention because they do not only run parallel to, but also compete with existing local structures, and the former are less sustainable than the latter.\textsuperscript{75}

The final set of criticisms pays attention to the idealised transformatory capacity of participation, which casts doubt on the idea that exposure to participation can contribute to social transformation, because ‘voice’ and ‘choice’ can be quite costly in some conditions.\textsuperscript{76} Here, two reasons come together. One is that participatory systems are only occasionally an answer to demands from local people; rather, they are promoted in response to Western values imported by donors. Another reason, not the least, is that learning and practising new values forces local communities to overcome local opposition or social obstacles, which may prove difficult to change.\textsuperscript{77} Those who traditionally hold power may resist its redistribution, thereby hampering attempts at collaboration, while those who have gained new skills need to operate inside people’s agency.\textsuperscript{78} Similarly, committee members may be part of patrimonial elites, repackaged for agency purposes.\textsuperscript{79} Indeed, this shortcoming relates to a clash between new social norms based on transparency and accountability, as well as existing social norms that reflect how rural society in developing countries is more traditional and hierarchical.
2.10. Conclusion

There is no doubt that participatory development and reconstruction has become one of the popular approaches to development and reconstruction in the past decade, despite numerous criticisms of it. Participatory development and reconstruction has both benefits and challenges. One of the alleged benefits is its transformative role as both a tool for development purposes and an end through intense community participation and empowerment of target recipients. In the form of the latter, participatory development and reconstruction is justified in situations of either local institutional failure such as in post-conflict or post-disaster or non-functional local institutional because of corruption and lack of accountability. Other benefits range from being an answer to the failure of the blue-print approach to development, from promoting governance through mechanisms of transparency and answerability, from favouring friendships between aid workers and communities, to promoting equity, inclusiveness and efficiency.

The challenges; however, range from power relations and politics between community elites and non-elites and between aid workers and local people, from tyranny of decision making, from diversity in definitions, to high costs in the preparation of micro-projects, to competition with existing structures. There is also doubt whether exposure to participation can lead to social transformation given the fact that acquiring new values may prove difficult to overcome social obstacles and that elected body can be part of patrimonial elite wrap up for agency objectives.

On its alleged benefits of possible social transformation by improving the ability of marginalised people to bargain relations of power within political systems, questions that need further investigation emerge. These questions are how they do this and to what extent are they able to reduce the imbalance between them and their leaders. There is a need to better grasp what composes the social structure, particularly of rural societies, where participatory approaches take place, and to understand how social relations evolve in aiding target setting when an intervention takes place. Among possible ways forward, the need for more consideration of how participation can transform the power relations that lead to marginalisation and subordination has been mentioned.80 Similarly, the urgent need for an anthropology of development, that is, of development in its entire process, including discourses, institutions and practices, has been emphasised.81 It has been insisted that the costs and complexity of participatory approaches should be recognised, and that it is
necessary to find effective ways of balancing bottom-up control with top-down authority. Finally, sharing new experiences, both positive and negative, of how participation and its methods can increase social accountability so that it results in more equitable and responsive norms in existing hierarchical societies is another urgent need.

Other ways forward require research on how participatory development and reconstruction can be made sustainable by developing local ownership; how newly created participatory structures can be connected to existing government structures; and how all stakeholders, both local government officials and existing elites such as church leaders, can be involved in a development and reconstruction project. Finally, there needs to be more research on how to regularly harmonise views among state and non-state actors operating in the same area in a way to place potential beneficiaries at the centre of the intervention. This should, as a result, to some extent promote local governance, empowerment and poverty alleviation.

Endnotes


CHAPTER 2: Participatory development and reconstruction: a literature review


10 De Moor, ‘The silent revolution of collective action’.


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16 Wieniecke, ‘Community-driven development in Central Asia’, p 23.


20 Hickey & Mohan, Participation.

21 Ibid, p 81.


CHAPTER 2: Participatory development and reconstruction: a literature review


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36 Reynolds et al, Issues and Options for Improving Engagement between the World Bank and Civil Society Organizations.


38 Swaminathan, Sourcebook for Community-driven Development in Sub-Saharan Africa.


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CHAPTER 2: Participatory development and reconstruction: a literature review


52 Hickey & Mohan, Participation, p 14.

53 Cooke & Kothari, Participation, p 10.


55 Ibid, p 11.


57 Hickey & Kothari, Participation, p 81.


60 Hickey & Mohan, ‘Relocating participation within a radical politics of development’, p 243.

61 Cooke & Kothari, Participation, p 10.


66 Cooke & Kothari, Participation, p 14.


68 Dasgupta & Beard, ‘Community driven development, collective action and elite capture in Indonesia’.

69 Hickey & Kothari, Participation, p 87.


71 Hickey & Kothari, Participation, p 87.

72 Cooke & Kothari, Participation, pp 7–11.

73 Hickey & Mohan, Participation, p 4; and Hilhorst ‘Reconstruction “from below”’.


75 Cliffe et al, Community-driven Reconstruction as an Instrument in War-to-Peace Transitions; and Mansuri & Rao, Evaluating Community-based and Community-driven Development.

76 Hickey & Mohan, Participation, p 11.


Photo 2.1: VDC general assembly for village project approval in Kanyimba village, Budaha, Burhinyi

Photo 2.2: VDC meeting on replacing one of the VDC members, by election, in Birhala, Burhinyi
3. Capacity building for governance

This chapter has been submitted for publication as:

CHAPTER 3: Capacity building for governance

ABSTRACT

Community-driven reconstruction has become a new paradigm in post-conflict development. Programmes in community-driven reconstruction (CDR) typically combine infrastructure restoration with introducing accountability and good governance at the local level. Recent evaluations show that governance objectives are not easily met and significant change cannot be demonstrated. This paper adds to this argument on the basis of ethnographic research on a Community-Driven Reconstruction Programme in eastern DRC. It seeks to find explanations for the lack of demonstrable governance impact in the content and implementation of training. It identifies room for improvement by better adjusting capacity building to locally prevailing accountability mechanisms and by coordinating capacity building with other development programmes in the same area.

Key words: community-driven reconstruction, capacity building, post-conflict, governance programme, Democratic Republic of Congo (The).

3.1. Introduction

Post-conflict reconstruction programmes increasingly claim to be community-driven. Community-driven reconstruction programmes (CDR) typically combine objectives related to the restoration of infrastructure with good governance objectives. Capacity-building is a crucial element in CDR: at the same time as it wants to build capacities for the implementation of small-scale reconstruction projects, programmes want to build capacities for governance by teaching people the values and practices of transparency, accountability, representativeness, and inclusion. Community-driven reconstruction appears a powerful answer to conflict affected area challenges as it promises to deliver rapid and cost-effective reconstruction aid on the ground and build a governance structure that stresses local choice and accountability (Cliffe, Guggenheim et al. 2003:2). It seeks to effectively involve local people in decision-making, which is believed to help communities to make the transition from conflict to peaceful development (McBride and Patel 2007:6). Similarly, CDR is expected to promote reconciliation and create community cohesion (Fearon, Humphreys et al. 2009:287). It comes as an answer to earlier criticisms of top-down, blueprint-driven approaches, that fail to meet needs on the ground and miss, or even undermine, local capacities (Cramer, 2006; Barakat and Zyck, 2009; Hilhorst et al., 2010; Kyamusugulwa, 2013).
Although community-driven reconstruction represents a fast growing trend in the last decade, the effectiveness of the approach has been questioned (Mansuri and Rao 2003:31; Richards, Bah et al. 2004). Recent evaluation of a major community-driven reconstruction (CDR) in Eastern DRC, for example, have shown that although the implementation of reconstruction projects was largely successful, this was not matched with significant impact of the programme on people’s socio-political attitudes and behaviour (Humphreys et al., 2012). While this evaluation was robust in its findings, it was not able to provide explanations for the weak impact of the programme. This paper adds to this argument, building on an ethnographic study into the everyday practices of community-driven reconstruction. For two years, the research followed the implementation of the programme in selected villages of Eastern DRC and monitored the working of the community-driven reconstruction programme through participant observations and interviews with staff, participants and stakeholders. We concur with the findings of Humphreys et al that the major impact of the programme was in the realisation of projects, rather than in affecting local governance (Kyamusugulwa, forthcoming). While there are several contributory factors to this, including the working of power relations on the ground and the mismatch between the project initiatives and the locally prevailing norms and existing accountability mechanisms, this paper singles out the capacity building component of the community-driven reconstruction programme, and more in particular the training process. We found it to discourage rather than encourage the desired governance changes.

The programme under study was implemented by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and funded by the Stichting Vluchtelings based in the Netherlands. The aim was to provide community-driven reconstruction to 83,007 people in eastern DRC. To realise its capacity building objectives, the programme relied mainly on training village committees, which was a central vehicle in the programme to enhance local capacity and governance. To unravel the capacity building process, this paper examines the entire chain of capacity building: the content of the educational messages, the way staff understands and provides the training, the interface between aid workers and participants, and the perceptions of participants and community residents on the training. In the programme examined, training was a key strategy, that distinguished it from programmes that happened at the same time in the region and were concentrated on restoring infrastructure without additional objectives relating to governance.
CHAPTER 3: Capacity building for governance

We will argue that the content of the training for capacity building was not consistent and had little relation with people’s life worlds. Training was to some extent effective, as far as the immediate trainees were concerned, yet had little impact beyond them. We will also show that there were few incentives for staff to take the capacity building seriously, compared to the pressure to implement projects. We highlight some of the implications of the programme’s choice not to ‘work with what is there’ in terms of local institutions and forms of accountability but instead to create separate institutions and adopt de-contextualised rules. We see room for improvement in the capacity building process, particularly by better adjusting capacity building to locally prevailing accountability mechanisms and we argue for a more coordinated approach to capacity building with other development agencies.

The first part of the article describes the International Rescue Committee (IRC) CDR programme, the conceptual framework that guides the programme, the capacity building and good governance components, and the research methodology. The second part presents the findings, and the final part analyses and concludes the article.

3.1.1. The community-driven reconstruction programme of the International Rescue Committee

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) gave one of its community-driven reconstruction programmes in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) the name Tushiriki, which in the local language (Kiswahili) means “let us become involved together”. The IRC is an international agency based in New York that has been active in eastern DRC since 1996. The Tushiriki is a US$ 2-million-worth programme funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through the Netherlands Foundation for Refugees known as Stichting Vluchteling (SV), which is based in The Hague. The programme aims are: (i) poverty alleviation through the improvement of socioeconomic conditions, (ii) the development of governance and civil society by increasing the understanding of principles and practices of good governance, and (iii) increased advocacy efforts on behalf of communities and towards policy makers (SV and IRC, 2007:6). The Tushiriki programme strongly resembles another CDR programme also implemented by IRC, the Tuungane programme, which was subject to the rigorous evaluation by Humphreys et al. (2012), referred to above (Humphreys et al., 2012:8). The two programmes were highly similar in design, the main difference being that Tushiriki provides scope for civil society partners to co-implement the programme with IRC.
The IRC-Tushiriki programme was implemented from 2008 through 2010 in the South Kivu province in eastern DRC. Specifically, it was executed in the Burhinyi, Luhwindja, and Kaziba chiefdoms, which in 2008 had a total population of 141,900, of which 83,007 were targeted by the programme (and covered in this research). In order to implement the programme, the IRC formed so-called ‘villages’. These one-size ‘villages’ were artificially designated as units of intervention for the project and did not correspond with any real administrative governance unit. The villages comprised population groups within a given territory, to amount to around 1,200 people, for example some hamlets or a neighbourhood in a community. Five such ‘villages’ were then grouped together in Tushiriki community. Each Tushiriki ‘village’ received an amount of $US 3,000, whereas each community received an amount varying from $US 15,000 to $US 70,000 for reconstruction projects (IRC and CARE, 2009).

The central idea of the community-driven approach is to put people at the heart of the decision making and implementation of reconstruction in order that it suits their priority needs, while it also allows for enhancing governance practices (McBride and Patel, 2007). This double objective was clearly reflected in the Tushiriki programme. In each of the 34 target villages of the IRC programme, a committee was set up to run a selected project, with programme field staff providing technical assistance. The committees were part of the CDR governance structure, which included, at the top, a Regional Development Committee, such as the Kaziba Development Committee (KDC), as the intermediate echelon, the Community Development Committee (CDC), which comprises four to five Village Development Committees (VDCs).

The programme stipulated that, village-level committees consisted of ten elected members who had the responsibility to meet frequently with residents. The committee members (five women and five men) occupied the positions of president, treasurer, secretary, mobilizer, and inclusion officer, respectively. In each target village, projects were selected in public meetings that required the presence of 40% of the adult population. The village level projects usually selected were: a classroom, a water system, or a road (re)construction. At the community level, the usual projects were a school, a community building for meetings, or a bridge or/and a road (re)construction.. One of the main strategies of the programme was capacity building for the members of the village-level committees. The committee members were regularly trained on either the IRC-Tushiriki programme (including its protocols) or the project finance management of the programme (including practices of governance). At the
same time, management and technical assistance in the form of informal trainings by the programme field staff followed the formal trainings.

The village committee was also responsible for project implementation in that it was in charge of recruiting local technicians for (re)constructing infrastructure. It was to mobilise residents to contribute to the reconstruction effort, for instance, by carrying sand, stones, and bricks. The committee was accountable both to the programme staff as well as to residents. It is remarkable that the committees that were formed did not incorporate the ruling elite. Generally speaking, the committees were composed of a sub-strata of elites, namely those that had studied, and held for example a position as teacher.

Next to the village committee, a team composed of a woman and a man, known as *Requa* (*Relais qualité*), served as a liaison between the committee members and the population and acted as a watchdog of the project implementation by the committee. At the same time, agencies other than the IRC-Tushiriki (such as Catholic Relief Services, Malteser International, UNICEF/AVSI, etc.) have executed reconstruction projects in the same area, using different methodologies that do not emphasise the governance aspect. The coordination of the Tushiriki programme was based in Bukavu. For the community development section, one territory supervisor was assisted by two development officers, six development agents, and two technicians. In addition, a programme manager assisted by three technical advisors administered the civil society section.

### 3.1.2. Capacity building

Capacity building of local beneficiaries was a central strategy in the Tushiriki programme, as in many community-driven reconstruction programmes. For the sake of the argument in this paper, it is important to briefly discuss capacity building and the related concept of capacity development. In its essence, capacity building is forward-looking: rather than alleviating immediate needs, it aims to enhance problem-solving capacities for the future. Capacity building typically involves several types of interventions: management consultation, training, and/or technical assistance (De Vita and Fleming 2001:39). The popularity of capacity building in development programmes has also engendered criticism. It has been argued that capacity building is often no more than a buzzword without substantial content, a serious-sounding alternative to “training” (Eade 2007). It has also been suggested that capacity building involves the (largely unacknowledged) exercise of power, where the knowledge and
experience of the facilitator (often an outsider) dominates the trainees, whose capacities need to be improved (Girgis 2007:354).

Capacity development, is a more encompassing concept than capacity-building and refers to abilities that are developed by individuals, organisations, institutions and societies, both individually and collectively, for functions performance, problems solving and objectives setting and achievement. This entails that not only individuals develop skills (which is the main focus of capacity-building), but that the conditions and the enabling environment for using these skills productively are met (Godfrey et al 2002:356). Along these lines, capacity development would be a result of capacity building, whereby communities would transfer the acquired governance principles beyond the project, but into their life worlds. In the Tushiriki case, capacity development aimed primarily to develop the abilities of committee members to practice good governance, and through them, the abilities of the population at large for practising good governance. As we will argue below, the link between the training of individuals and the ambition of enhancing the problem-solving capacities of local societies, was not adequately considered.

3.1.3. Good governance in CDR

Since a 1989 World Bank report framed Africa’s development problems as a crisis of governance, the notion of “good governance” has been widely adopted (Mkandawire 2007:679). In the field of post-conflict reconstruction and development, the idea of good governance has been firmly embraced both as an answer to the governance failures that were seen to underlie these conflicts and as a promising avenue for the recovery of society. Community-driven reconstruction programmes in Asia as well as in Africa often include good governance at the grassroots level as an explicit goal, with an emphasis on two main principles: transparency and accountability. Accountability is the obligation of those in power to provide information and explain what they are doing. It also implies enforcement, that is, the capacity of a constituency to impose sanctions on power holders who violate their public duties (Ackerman 2004). Transparency relates to the financial management of projects and is the key measure to prevent the capture of funds by individuals. Both of these measures are seen to limit the risk of elite capture and the deviation of funds away from locally felt needs. Other frequently mentioned characteristics of good governance in post conflict reconstruction programmes are citizen engagement, equality, social inclusion (gender, ethnicity, age, religion, etc.), ethical and honest behaviour, equity (fair procedures and due process), partnership, sustainability, and the rule of law. As Table 3.1 shows, in the Tushiriki
programme, as we will elaborate below, the core of good governance consisted of 4 to 6 key values, which were reflected to variable extents in the different training modules.

In the context of post-conflict reconstruction programmes, “good governance” is generally conceptualised as something that is not already part of local social organisation, in part because traditional, pre-war forms of governance are understood as exclusionary or despotic. Also in part because the years of violence are seen to have eroded whatever functional governance may have been in place. “Good governance” is then introduced as an effort to correct these earlier wrongs and support societies in developing effective governance for the future, in ways they would not have been able to devise themselves. Though there is increasing criticism of treating post-conflict societies as a blank slate and insistence that it is more effective to work ‘with what is there’ (Cramer, 2006; Barakat and Zyck, 2009; Hilhorst et al., 2010), in practice many community-driven reconstruction programmes opt for introducing new institutions (such as the village level and community level committees) and new rules of the game (related to project selection, implementation and financial management). As the programme coordinator of the Tushiriki programme explained, she viewed the capacity development of the communities through the programme as a necessity to come to the right project decisions for reconstruction (a sophisticated needs analysis), and an opportunity for the individuals involved “to experience democratic accountability, at least once in their lives”.1 In the Tuskiriki programme, the creation of the committees was an attempt to avoid capture by traditional elites. As we will argue below, this implied creating a space for a sub-strata of elites, namely those that had studied and held for example a position as teacher. It also implied that the sustainable impact of the capacity building efforts was limited.

3.1.4. Research methodology

The research that this paper builds on consisted of an aidnography, i.e. an ethnographic inquiry into development relations. Stichting Vluchteling wanted to have the programme qualitatively monitored and facilitated this independent research project. From 2008 to 2010 Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa was thus embedded in the programme as participant observer. The paper looks at capacity building in 34 Village Development Committees that were part of 8 Community Development Committees (4 in Burhinyi and 4 in Luhwindja). To analyse the content of the training and capacity building of the Tushiriki programme, we did a desk review of 16 training and workshop modules (see Table 3.1), which were conducted either by the programme’s community development team or by its civil society team (see
In the desk review, we looked at the consistency of governance principles across training modules. In addition, PM Kyamusugulwa conducted extensive fieldwork during which he observed the processes of training sessions, workshops, and sensitisation sessions carried out in the course of the programme implementation, as well as participated in the everyday life in the area.

Table 3.1: *Modules of trainings and local good governance principles in Tushiriki programme*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modules of training</th>
<th>N=11</th>
<th>Labelling 'local governance'</th>
<th>N=16</th>
<th>Classifying principles of good governance/meaning attributed to them</th>
<th>N=16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For committee members (VDC, CDC)</td>
<td>6 (54.5)</td>
<td>Democratic governance, good governance</td>
<td>6 (37.5)</td>
<td>Classifications that emphasise six principles mentioned in the facilitator’s guide (original document of the training)</td>
<td>1(6.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitator’s guide to the training workshop/introduction to Tushiriki</td>
<td>2 (18.2)</td>
<td>Principles guide to manage community funds/principles to follow/major principles</td>
<td>8(50.0)</td>
<td>Classifications that include transparency and accountability as principles of good governance</td>
<td>13 (81.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (for Requa, electoral team and advisory board)</td>
<td>3(27.3)</td>
<td>Other (no specific label)</td>
<td>2(12.5)</td>
<td>Inconsistency in classifications that emphasise four major principles of good governance (transparency, accountability, representativeness and inclusion)</td>
<td>12 (75.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VDC: Village Development Committee; CDC: Community Development Committee; Requa (*Relais qualité*): a body composed of a man and a woman who serve as liaison between a committee and village residents

Table 3.2: *Overview of training, workshop and sensitization sessions in Burhinyi, Luhwindja & Kaziba, 2008 to 2010*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trainer</th>
<th>N=11</th>
<th>Lieu</th>
<th>N=11</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>N=11</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>N=11</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>N=11</th>
<th>Target group</th>
<th>N=11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development, officers &amp; agents</td>
<td>6(54.5)</td>
<td>Burhinyi</td>
<td>7(63.7)</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1(9.0)</td>
<td>Committee initial, finance trainings &amp; planning</td>
<td>6(54.5)</td>
<td>3(9.0)</td>
<td>Committee members /students</td>
<td>7(63.6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society staff and/or partner</td>
<td>3(27.3)</td>
<td>Luhwindja</td>
<td>3(27.3)</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>9(82.0)</td>
<td>Good governance, advocacy and related topics</td>
<td>3(27.3)</td>
<td>2.5(45.5)</td>
<td>field staff</td>
<td>2(18.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainer of trainers</td>
<td>2(18.2)</td>
<td>Kaziba</td>
<td>1(9.0)</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1(9.0)</td>
<td>IRC-Tushiriki protocols</td>
<td>2(18.2)</td>
<td>1.5(45.5)</td>
<td>local authorities</td>
<td>2(18.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through participant observation and semi-structured interviews, we studied how the content of training modules was used by the committee members, and how they and the local population more in general, developed an understanding and practice of governance principles within and outside the Tushiriki programme. We observed 11 training sessions, which represented 40% of the total number of training events held in the area during the fieldwork period. In addition to participant observation, we did 113 individual and group interviews that were directly related to the capacity-building activities of the programme.
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These 113 interviews were held with the programme senior and field staff, committee members, residents, and representatives of NGOs that operated in the area during the same period of time.

This methodology allowed us to analyse the entire capacity-building chain, starting with the ways in which the capacity-building content was defined by the programme, how it was implemented in practice, and finally, how the participants from the communities viewed the capacity-building activities and what the main outputs and outcomes of the intervention were in terms of knowledge and governance practices.

3.2. Findings

3.2.1. Content of training, workshop, and sensitisation sessions

Within the Tushiriki programme, training was a key strategy to achieve capacity building and ‘good governance’ objectives. Our discussion of the capacity building process starts with a content analysis of the manuals that were used to train staff and committee members about the meaning and importance of good governance in local development (Cfr. Table 3.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance and related practices as stated by aid workers</th>
<th>How they are viewed by participants</th>
<th>How they should be explained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If a selected project is not approved by the majority of residents, IRC Tushiriki will not fund it.</td>
<td>As a rule in the programme</td>
<td>(i) You are learning how to exercise democratically your citizen rights; (ii) a selected project should reflect the need of the majority in order to prevent conflict in the future; (iii) it is about representativeness and inclusion as governance principles; (iv) it is also about transparency and accountability in a public meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a committee does not justify the first amount of money received, the next tranche of money will not disbursed.</td>
<td>As a rule in the programme</td>
<td>(i) this is accountability about money; (ii) residents are learning how to better manage money in the programme and beyond it; (iii) those who mismanaged funding should be punished.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a participant is absent the day of training, (s)he should not receive SUS 4 for food at lunch time.</td>
<td>As a rule in the programme</td>
<td>(i) it is transparency on the side of programme regulations; trainees are learning how to strictly follow regulations (e.g state &amp; other regulations); (ii) it is also about respect for rules that is a governance principle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every committee member should know what everyone is doing in it.</td>
<td>As a rule in the programme</td>
<td>(i) could be illustrated as an example of transparency and horizontal accountability where information about project circulates and answers to questions are given in a committee; they learn this practice beyond the IRC-Tushiriki programme as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every expense should follow VDC budget lines, otherwise money should be reimbursed before project funding continues.</td>
<td>As a rule in the programme</td>
<td>(i) Illustration of enforcement when applying accountability (i.e sanction for those who stole money for community project); (ii) trainees learn this value inside and beyond the programme; they learn how to combat corruption and mishandling of public resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money of white wo/man is to report for</td>
<td>As a rule in the programme</td>
<td>(i) residents should be accountable about any funding, both inside and outside aid interventions; (ii) it is one of the practices trainees are learning in the programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee needs to hold a general assembly report before the next disbursement of money.</td>
<td>As a rule in the programme</td>
<td>(i) this is transparency and accountability about project management; (ii) to make sure that everybody (including residents) has the same understanding that money received is better managed; (iii) trainees (including residents) are learning this value inside and beyond the intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telling that every target village receives a grant of $3,000 in IRC Tushiriki programme for reason of transparency and that other agencies should do the same.</td>
<td>As a rule in the programme</td>
<td>(i) people are learning more transparency on the side of implementing agencies; (ii) residents can require this information to other agencies but the result depends on power relation between these agencies and residents; residents are learning transparency about money inside and beyond aid interventions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention to be paid to those who can hinder a reconstruction project such as thieves, demobilized soldiers and politicians.</td>
<td>As a rule in the programme</td>
<td>(i) Those who can hinder a reconstruction project while applying governance principles are existing power holders such as chiefs, church leaders and other local elite who are used to accountability other than the public one; (ii) they need to be identified and committee members should know how to deal with them; (iii) they can use positively or negatively their power; (iv) they are not necessarily outsiders of a community.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The training, workshop, and sensitisation sessions contain three closely related themes: one, local good governance principles, two, their application in finance management, and three, complementary themes related to project execution. The major principles of local good governance as defined in the programme were transparency, accountability, representativeness, and inclusion, next to other principles, such as participation, honesty, respect for rules, punctuality, regularity, flexibility, collaboration, integrity, respect, and being mindful of rights, were defined in a variety of training modules. These principles were translated into rules to be followed strictly in project finance management and in the cycle of reconstruction projects (see Table 3.3). Finally, the modules also paid attention to a range of complementary themes related to general aspects of decentralisation, good governance principles, participatory planning and sustainability of projects, expropriation for public utility, mechanisms for conflict prevention, judiciary organisation and competency, etc.

A first observation from the modules is that a multiplicity of terms is used. The number of principles of local good governance varied across the modules from four to five, even to six. When the training module mentioned four principles, these were often transparency, accountability, inclusion and representativeness, whereas some others replaced representativeness by honesty. Where a fifth principle was added, it was either participation or respect for rules.

A second observation is that the modules showed variations in the meanings attributed to some of these principles, there was some confusion in terminology. For instance, in the training module about financial management for village development committee (VDC) members, “transparency” was described as “information provision for both other committee members and community members about project progress, including financial aspects, when necessary.” Elsewhere, the term was also defined as “the need to keep all receipts in order to explain to any community member who requests it about the project.” The modules describe the principles yet do not give advice on how the beneficiary population should get access to information related to the project.

The most striking observation was that the modules made no attempt to link the principles of good governance to existing practices of accountability within and between citizens and elite in Eastern DRC. It is as if the modules assume there is no local accountability to begin with. As a result, the modules make no connection to existing norms and practices of accountability (Kyamusugulwa et al., forthcoming) and are disconnected from local people’s
life worlds. This is a missed opportunity to enhance accountability practices and limits the sustainability of the interventions.

The inconsistencies throughout the modules can be explained in relation to the way they were produced. Most of the modules were written by local staff on the basis of a number of key modules in English written by the management of the programme. Hence, they reflected more strongly the general policy discourse on good governance than local realities on the ground. The production of the modules was supervised by the management of the organisation, but consistency was hampered by the fact that not all of the expatriate staff were fluent in written French and that there was a high turnover in the international staff responsible for these processes.

3.2.2. Training of trainers
The training of the village trainers was done by the senior Tushiriki staff member, who was the Deputy Manager in charge of training in four areas. He holds a degree in applied pedagogy and has been familiar with community-based work for two years before working with the IRC. The training usually lasted one or two days and was held for seven field staff at a time. It was meant for newly recruited staff and, occasionally, for existing staff, for whom the protocols were substantially changed. Most of the field staff hold a college degree in rural development from the *Institut Supérieur de Développement Rural* in Bukavu.

The training consisted of different components, starting with the methodological aspects of facilitation, Second, attention was given to the content of the training so that the facilitators could understand the choices and preferences of the programme. Third, attention was given to the protocols of the programme. For instance, it was stipulated that field staff should visit possible projects before the day of project selection and seek advice from the development technician about the technical and financial feasibility of the proposed project. Finally, the training paid attention to ways of dealing with the power dynamics of project interventions. For example, the trainees were advised to approach authorities indirectly in cases wherein they were antagonistic to the project. This could be done, for example, by first talking to the wife of the *Mwami* (king) rather than directly to the *Mwami*. The training partly relied on role plays, with the participants acting as community development committee (CDC) members.

The training programme was intensive and difficult to absorb in one or two days. Training was not meant to be a stand-alone event. The Territory Supervisor of the programme, in
charge of field staff management, ensured that the training messages were often repeated during meetings where the fieldwork was reported. In all of these meetings, discussions about community development protocols were repeated. The field staff showed during interviews that they had indeed internalised the content of the training. Although the training was effective in many places, there were also instances, for example in Burhinyi where the timing of the training was delayed until after villages have selected projects. There was also a marked difference in the quality of the trainings held in the villages depending on the experience of the trainers.

3.2.3. Training of the committees
Training and workshop sessions were held with village and community committees and lasted from one to three days. They were usually facilitated by two field staff, one as the main trainer and the other in charge of the logistics. The training brought together committee members, men and women in equal numbers, from two or three villages of the same area. Participants travelled back home everyday, which shortened the training days because the distance to the training centre was sometimes considerable. The sessions would start with a prayer introduced by one of the participants, preferably a pastor. After this, the codes of conduct for the session were discussed and set. During the training days, the participants would sing a song that rehearsed the three objectives of the community development component (good governance, socioeconomic recovery and social cohesion). The main teaching aids were flip charts. There were also printed modules, but these were usually not enough in number for the participants, and only few could take the modules home after the training. The written texts were in French-Kiswahili, whereas the discussions were held in Kiswahili or Mashi. We observed that participation of committee members during these trainings was limited to asking questions and it was remarkable that most questions were about the practical aspects of the reconstruction projects. No attempts were made to relate the training to the lived-in world of the participants.

There were specific trainings devoted to financial management: committee members had to learn the procedures for the management of project funds. This included, for instance, the strict observation of budgets, the identification of the person responsible for all monetary transactions, and the identification of the person responsible for reporting on all transactions and for keeping receipts and documents. Committee members were taught how to keep the books and report the finances back to the Tushiriki programme. Emphasis was placed on getting receipts for every expense. The participants learned that if one committee member or
a group of members stole project funds, (s)he or they would be asked to reimburse the funds before the project could continue. At the community level, the training was more elaborate and included, for example, how to use a bank. Another important point in the training related to the purchase of materials for construction, how to ensure the reliability of suppliers, and how to manage stocks. There were strict rules to follow; for instance, committee members were forbidden to buy materials from their relatives. Finally, attention was given to the principles and practice of local contribution, which was supposed to be worth 10% of the budget, in the form of labour, money, or means of transportation.

We observed that there was an emphasis on knowledge transfer regarding project management at the expense of discussions about good governance. The training sessions paid attention to the principles of the Tushiriki programme but insufficient attention was given to how people could apply them in their everyday life or outside the Tushiriki intervention. As a result, these principles were seen by the trainees as specific rules of the programme rather than values that could order their everyday interactions. This was reinforced by the fact that people were discouraged from mobilising resources through their kinship-based networks, which from the perspective of transparency, were suspect.

The lack of concrete examples and discussion beyond the knowledge transfer was partly related to the mismanagement of time and, in some cases, a lack of understanding of the main concepts discussed on the side of the facilitator. Some sessions were highly dominated by lectures, followed by questions and answers, rather than by group discussions among participants. Although the participants were allowed to speak during the workshop, they were not very much encouraged to do so.

In addition, it was often observed that training tended to steer away from sensitive issues. For instance, during a training session in Luduha about people who could potentially harm the project by exercising their power negatively, the facilitator did not give space for the participants to identify such people in their own local context. He referred to power holders, such as thieves, demobilised rebels, and politicians, who were not represented among the participants and in their villages, steering the discussion away from chiefs, church leaders, and educated people, who could actually hinder the project implementation. Some of these categories of actors were present in the training session, and the facilitator choose not to address or confront them directly, a point to which we will return later.
3.2.4. Management and technical assistance

Beyond training, capacity building took shape in accompaniment and monitoring of project management. The field staff were all trained to assist committee members in the reporting, planning, and budgeting of reconstruction projects. An important aspect of the staff visits to field sites was the checking of procedures and books to correct any errors so that committee members ‘learned by doing’. Assistance took the form of talks or supervision two or three times a week.

Tushiriki field staff also facilitated the identification of needs during meetings with the population and the drafting of the Community Development Plan. Although the people offered ideas about costs and materials, substantial technical support was provided by the field staff. Field staff further also assisted committee members in mobilising people for public meetings or in encouraging local contributions through the involvement of local chiefs and church leaders.

The Tushiriki technicians regularly visited infrastructure projects during construction. For instance, in June 2009, when PM Kyamusugulwa visited the Mughuru primary school in Citudu village in Burhinyi, he met with a Tushiriki field technician monitoring the construction. The technician had on an earlier visit told the community to take down one of the newly built walls because it did not meet the programme standards. On this visit, he had come back to check whether the wall of the classroom had indeed been rebuilt. Local people could also report problems with materials or procedures during staff visits. Company representatives involved in the reconstruction works told us that they considered the staff and the committee members to be in control of the construction. On the other hand, we also found cases where it appeared that the contractor hired for the reconstruction project was effectively in control of project management. In some cases, when the programme became more contractor-driven than community-driven, this resulted in disengagement on the side of CDC members. When we look at the everyday reality of project implementation, it appears that the attitude of the staff and contractors was geared towards finishing the infrastructure rather than facilitating a process of enhancing locally driven project management. The acquired knowledge on project management and good governance seemed to move to the background.

3.2.5. Perceptions on the ground

Capacity building was experienced differently between the committee members receiving training and the local villagers participating in the reconstruction projects. Many committee
members were enthusiastic about the training because it enabled them to better manage projects. However, they were also motivated by the lunch allowance of $US 4, which they perceived as a wage. Although officially committee members did not receive any salary from the project, they wanted to be paid for programme activities they were involved in; whereas the programme considered them as volunteers they saw themselves as workers hired by the programme.

Although the training activities were restricted to members of the VDCs and CDCs, there were some efforts to sensitise the entire community. For instance, messages and reports on project progress were posted in the community. However, these could not be read by many people and were usually torn down or blown away with the wind within hours after they had been put up. Some village level sensitisation sessions were organised, where teaching about good governance was announced through a megaphone in a public space. However, their effectiveness was very limited. They suffered from lack of resources, took place in less than 10% of the target area, and they lacked professionalism, remained superficial and were not at all practical. These “sensitisation” sessions were useless in the eyes of most villagers and most respondents did not remember them. One 30-year-old woman from Kabingu I village expressed her discontent with the training by comparing the CDR with a different project in the area, implemented by the ICCO/CAB, which did not have additional good governance objectives:

In Cishali, ICCO/CAB built a beautiful primary school in a few months, while IRC took one year. They had a lot of meetings without any achievement. CAB did not train people and organise meetings. In Tushiriki, only VDCs are trained and they are probably paid. The population is not benefiting from those frequent training sessions, how are they useful for us?

As this quote also reveals, local people were aware of some of the dynamics of the project that were undertaken and that were widely communicated in the name of transparency, especially the fact that there was $US3,000 available for it. Because people were not well informed on the overall set-up, this bit of knowledge led to much dissatisfaction and many rumours. In a considerable number of target villages, it was difficult to mobilise people to provide labour because they believed that committee members should do the job, because they were thought to be paid within the programme. People were mainly interested in the projects and were not much concerned about the capacity building aspects or governance objectives. They valued the IRC for the reconstruction of the infrastructure rather than for local governance. Part of the explanation for this is that both the trainer of trainers and the
trainers of committee members placed more emphasis on the former than on the latter, and that village-level sensitization hardly took shape. Moreover, it appears that the governance objective was directed to a ‘need-without-demand’. Not having experienced this type of governance before, people had no expectations relating to the governance objectives of the programme.

3.3. Analysis

This final part of the paper analyses the governance effects of the capacity building component of the CDR programme examined and identifies a number of factors that contributed to the limited governance impact.

3.3.1. Committee members as local governance actors

In the course of fieldwork, it became clear that there was a varying level of uptake of the training. Village Development Committees usually consisted of a mix of educated people, like teacher or church workers, and illiterate people. We found that illiterate participants, often women, had difficulty with the training and did not recollect much of the content. Among the educated committee members, we generally found that the awareness of good governance principles resonated in the implementation of the projects. There were, for example, some cases where the mishandling of money resulted in accountability procedures, and the money had to be restored. However, such accountability was not enforced by the villagers but by the king, other committee members, and some road workers. Rather than a tendency towards downward accountability – as the programme had aimed for –, these were instances of horizontal and upward accountability. In as much as good governance principles were adopted in the community, this did not involve the poorest people. While this contributes to a widening gap between the elite and the illiterate residents (Cleaver, 2005), it could also be seen as positive for the community as a whole that governance principles became part of inter-elite negotiation processes.

3.3.2. Avoiding governance effects

Our observations of the everyday practices of the programme lead us to conclude that, if anything, governance effects are avoided rather than encouraged by local staff. There are two arguments in this regard: one related to the internal project dynamics and the other to the internal community dynamics. The effective training of the trainers was hindered by lack of consistency in the modules, issues of time management and teaching resources, and the
failure of the training programme to provide, in some instances, opportunities for discussion and active participation. More importantly, the programme did not provide incentives to staff to emphasise good governance. The training of trainers emphasised programme content aspects more than governance ones. Also, staff members were much more motivated to ensure the proper reconstruction of infrastructure. They were eager to be seen as people who brought projects to the area to enhance their status in the communities. And, ultimately, their performance was valued against the number and quality of projects they had delivered rather than their achievements in the less tangible domain of enhancing governance practices.

This tendency became clear during the training, and even more during project implementation. Staff that were supposed to facilitate the management and technicalities of the projects were more often inclined to take control and direct processes rather than facilitate them. In other cases, it was found that contractors, who had not been part of the training, assumed a driving role in the project. The pressure to emphasise the completion of projects over the governance quality of the process was strengthened after the IRC management of the programme realised it was behind schedule in spending the funds, which compelled them to speed up the reconstructions.

With regard to the dynamics in the community, we also observed that staff veered away from discussing sensitive issues. This was one reason why they would not talk about the ways in which elites could spoil the projects. In some cases, they were perhaps concerned about repercussions from the power holders in the communities. In general, we observed that staff members were often socially close to the traditional leaders, teachers, and pastors that make up the majority of the power holders and they were not inclined to confront or offend them. While the programme introduced ideas of good governance into the community, and had the ambition to curtail elite capture, in practice it did so without effectively challenging the existing ‘rules of the game’ or institutions (Bastiaensen et al. 2005: 979). Rather than seeing this simply as a limitation of the programme, we argue that it invites reflection of how elites – and inter-elite negotiation- might be engaged in accountability mechanisms at the local level.

The local population did not press staff members for better or more governance training. The programme represented a kind of needs-supply-without-demand: the ‘governance gap’ which the post-conflict reconstruction programme sought to fill, was not experienced as such by the population. Hence, the villagers did not call on the staff to meet this need.
3.3.3. Enhancing governance in isolation

The Tushiriki did not operate in a vacuum. Figure 1 captures the institutional complex in which the programme operated. Apart from the different local authorities and power holders, there were numerous other interventions, such as the ICCO/Comité Anti Bwaki (CAB) and UNICEF/AVSI, that took place in the same area. Each of these interventions was geared towards reconstruction, and all had their own specific objectives, their own ways of working, and their own conditions for engaging with the community (Cfr. Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1: Capacity building and behaviour change within Tushiriki programme

![Diagram](image)

Source: PM. Kyamusugulwa 2011

Eade (2007) noted that training may be successful in its own terms but contribute very little to enabling participants to change their realities. In our observations, there was little evidence of the impact of the training beyond the Tushiriki programme itself. Although we found that the governance within the programme often largely followed the training, this did not mean that people changed their behaviour outside of it. The following example serves to illustrate this. In November 2009, while a road construction was going on in the Birhala groupement of the Burhinyi chiefdom under the Tushiriki programme, the same community was engaged in the reconstruction of the local road connecting Birhala to Tshishadu. This road reconstruction was initiated by a different organisation, and people witnessed corrupt practices in this project in the recruitment of road workers for the construction. To be hired as a casual road worker, one had to agree to pay back $US 1 for every working day to the chief of the groupement. Because the payment was only $US 4 per day, this amounted to a tax of 25% just for the privilege of being hired. Interestingly, the same people were also involved in the implementation of the Tushiriki programme in the same area, where such practices would
not be allowed and would be reported. The incident illustrates that people were not inclined to translate the governance values learned in the training to other programmes or other domains of life. This, because capacity development of local communities in terms of such values took hardly place after the intensive programme of capacity building activities.

Without underestimating the complexity of learning and the complex ways in which values are translated into behaviour in general, the Tushiriki could hope to be more effective if it had put more effort into enrolling local authorities and their institutions and coordinating with other agencies. If the rules of engagement were more aligned – and focusing on those institutions that are effectively there at the local level (Bastiaensen et al. 2005: 990), the chances that the governance training would lead to significant changes in values and behaviour would have been increased.

3.4. Conclusion

In conclusion, looking at the chain of capacity building for governance through reconstruction, we observed that despite some hindrances, capacity building contributed to project implementation according to the governance values advocated by the community-driven reconstruction approach. Most of the projects planned were executed with the strong involvement of residents, including 25 classrooms and a schoolmaster office, six local road and bridge projects, and water system projects.

However, the second objective of the programme, concerning the promotion of accountable practice beyond the projects, was much less successful. There were many disincentives to enhance accountable practice: the training modules were not consistent and were disconnected from existing local practices of accountability; the staff were more motivated to generate projects and staff performance was measured against project outputs more than the intangible governance outputs. On the side of residents, our study revealed that because the sensitisation to governance principles was poorly executed, the population perceived of the governance training as a useless activity. Residents who were weakly informed about governance principles valued the infrastructure reconstruction, which was tangible, more than the governance, which was considered intangible. Therefore, people’s behaviour regarding existing governance practices hardly changed.

In practice, the implementation of the projects became often more staff-driven or contractor-driven than community-driven. Where the governance principles were upheld and
accountability advanced, this was promoted within the programme rather than beyond it. In such programme, there is a need to find out how the staff translate these objectives in the field (Hilhorst and Schmiemann 2002). After all, capacity building depends on the quality of the facilitators. As it worked out, the values were considered more as specific rules of the Tushiriki project, than as values to be considered more broadly. This was related to the lack of effort to contextualise these values and was exacerbated by the fact that surrounding programmes in the same areas provided reconstruction projects without enhancing accountability, which made the Tushiriki efforts quite isolated.

This paper underlines that capacity building processes require more attention and need to be more systematically evaluated. The capacity building components of the Tushiriki programme were weak and have contributed to the disappointing lack of evidence of significant change. Although capacity building is no magic bullet, there is room for improvement for community-driven reconstruction. Governance practices may be enhanced beyond these programmes when: the existing community dynamics are taken into account, including the prevailing accountability norms and practices; when the training content is consistent and adjusted to local realities; when incentives are built in to promote accountable project delivery in practice; and when coordination is undertaken with other actors promoting governance in the same area.

Acknowledgements

The present article is written from the research supported by Stichting Vluchteling (The Netherlands Foundation for Refugees), which we gratefully acknowledged. PM. Kyamusugulwa is thankful to the Marie-Curie Fellowship for its support during the preparatory phase of this research. Special thanks go to the International Rescue Committee, especially the community-driven reconstruction coordination in Bukavu South-Kivu province and Sheree Bennett from the Direction of Research of IRC New York for her comments on the first draft of this paper. We are thankful to communities of Burhinyi, Luhwindja and Kaziba for their participation in the current research. Finally, we are grateful to two anonymous referees for their criticism and advice.

Note

1. Interview project leader, December 2008

3.5. References


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Photo 3.1: Training of trainers (Tushiriki staff) in the field, Birhala, Burhinyi

Photo 3.2: VDC initial training, taking place in Mbogo protestant church, Mbogo village, Burhinyi
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Photo 3.3: Female participant (illiterate) slippping in a VDC training session, Mbogo village, Burhinyi

Photo 3.4: Local leaders in training on good governance by Tushiriki civil society component staff in Kaziba
4. Institutional engineering: Techniques of community-driven reconstruction

This chapter will be published as a book chapter as:

ABSTRACT
A lack of accountability is often considered a root cause of conflict, and for this reason much post-conflict reconstruction efforts aim to enhance accountability between authorities and the population through community-driven reconstruction programmes. This paper looks into detail in the mechanisms of accountability that are introduced in one such programme: the Tushiriki CDR programme in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. These mechanisms include public meetings, display of reports and enhancing the watch-dog role of civil society. Based on semi-structured interviews and participant observation, we found little impact of the formal accountability mechanisms in the programme. Nonetheless, as we argue there was accountability; yet, this was shaped differently. Accountability took its own context-specific meaning. For sustainable culture of accountability, there is a need for stronger embeddedness and a more appropriate translation of abstract concepts into the local context.

Key words: Community-driven reconstruction, institutional engineering, accountability, Democratic Republic of Congo.

4.1. Introduction
Interventions for post-war reconstruction increasingly espouse a commitment to be bottom-up, contextual, looking beyond state institutions, and providing space for local ownership. One of the manifestations of this trend is the upsurge of programmes for community-driven reconstruction (CDR). Community-driven reconstruction is promoted by the World Bank. One of its major proponents is the International Rescue Committee which has implemented large DFID-supported community-driven reconstruction programmes in, amongst others, the post-conflict context of Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Numerous other INGOs have developed participatory programmes for community-
based reconstruction, that follow similar working methods as community-driven projects even though they may not use that label to denote to their projects.

A typical feature of these bottom-up reconstruction programmes is that they combine objectives of ‘hardware’ reconstruction activities for the restoration of schools, roads and services with ‘software’ objectives to enhance democratic values and local level accountable institutions.\textsuperscript{11} This is especially of importance in post-conflict contexts where levels of trust, accountability, and social cohesion are considered to be low.\textsuperscript{12} Programmes are based on the idea that people’s involvement in making decisions and democratic accountability may lead to change from conflict to development, by addressing some of the root causes of conflict, such as corruption, a lack of accountability, a lack of trust between people and their institutions, and weakly functioning institutions.\textsuperscript{13}

There have recently been a number of robust evaluations, based on large-scale randomized control trials, that have brought out sobering messages about the effectiveness of these so-called software objectives. Both in DRC and in Sierra Leone, no significant differences were found between the ‘treatment’ areas that were part of the CDR effort and non-treatment areas.\textsuperscript{14} Findings in Liberia show that social cohesion can increase through the provision of post-conflict development aid, yet the mechanisms behind this increase remain largely unclear.\textsuperscript{15} Overall, the impact of community-driven development on social cohesion seems to be limited.\textsuperscript{16}

The lack of effectiveness established by these evaluations may be conclusive, but the question remains how this can be explained? To what extent are these programmes really community-driven? And to what extent are results influenced by the historical context of prolonged conflict? This paper wants to fill part of this gap by focusing on the micro-mechanisms of implementation of a community-driven reconstruction in Eastern DRC:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Casey, K. et al (2012), Reshaping institutions…
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Casey et al. 2012, Reshaping institutions…; Humphreys et al. 2012, Social and Economic Impacts
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Fearn et al. 2009, Can Development Aid Contribute…?
\end{itemize}
general assemblies, the display of reports and watchdog civil societies. The paper is part of an aidnography into the so-called Tushiriki\textsuperscript{17} programme that was implemented by IRC in 49 sites between 2008 and 2010. Our research has focused on dynamics of the programme that are internal to the organization of the project and dynamics in the villages of implementation.

The effectiveness of community-driven reconstruction is influenced by many different dynamics, such as local power relations, the availability of labour, or mechanisms of accountability.\textsuperscript{18} In this paper we focus specifically on the mechanisms of implementation in regard to accountability. The paper is based on the simple premise that whichever noble intentions of development inspire programmes and whichever amount of resources are devoted to them, their effect crucially depends on the mechanisms of implementation that are used. This paper thus asks through what mechanisms specifically a big word like accountability gets translated in the implementation of projects in the villages, and how these mechanisms work in practice. We show that concepts such as accountability have their own context-specific meaning and that their implementation is not neutral. Whereas Science and Technology Studies have for some time now been arguing for an understanding of technological interventions within their social context,\textsuperscript{19} we here argue that the same goes for institutional engineering and the way in which the ‘software’ of an intervention should be understood and implemented.\textsuperscript{20} We do this by setting out how accountability was implemented in the programme, and how this was perceived by various stakeholders, showing that the concept needs to be ‘read’ and understood differently at different levels.

The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we highlight the background of democratic accountability in development aid. In section 3, we briefly outline the history of accountability and conflict in DRC. In section 4, we describe the setting of the Tushiriki programme, and the methodology used in the current study. In section 5, we illustrate the three accountability mechanisms used in the programme with case studies, each followed by a brief analysis. In section 6, we present agency staff perceptions of accountability. In the final section, we conclude the paper and outline some implications of the research.

\textsuperscript{17} Tushiriki: a Kiswahili word meaning ‘let us all be involved in it together’.

\textsuperscript{18} Please see Kyamusugulwa, PM. (2013), ‘Participatory development and reconstruction: a literature review’, \textit{Third World Quarterly} 34: 7, 1265-1278.


4.2. Background of democratic accountability in development aid

Enhancing accountability is a major objective of community-driven reconstruction. Rather than aiming for accountability through formal democratic institutions such as elections,\(^{21}\) accountability is sought in the everyday relations between authorities and populations: transparency and accountability. Transparency is part of accountability which obliges those in power to provide information and to explain what they are doing. In its most literal sense, accounting is after all to make something ‘tell-a-story-aboutable’. Accountability goes beyond transparency, as it also refers to responsibilities. Authorities have to take responsibility and can be held responsible. In a situation of accountability, a constituency has the capacity to enforce and to impose sanctions on power holders who violate their public duties.\(^{22}\) Increasingly, people are supposed to be active participants rather than merely passive beneficiaries of aid and accountability is considered a precondition for genuine participation.\(^{23}\)

The literature suggests three reasons for enhancing accountability in improving governance and deepening democracy.\(^{24}\) Firstly, accountability provides a way of discouraging and penalizing corruption, by strengthening the demand-side of governance.\(^{25}\) Secondly, accountability can be used as a goal in itself, or as a device to improve project effectiveness, efficiency and economy.\(^{26}\) Thirdly, the major potential of democratic local governance is that, by building popular participation and accountability into local governance, local government and even other local institutions will become more responsive to the desires of citizens and more effective in service delivery.\(^{27}\)


\(^{24}\) C. Malena, R. Forster, et al., Social Accountability: …, *op cit.*, p. 6


\(^{26}\) S. Cavill, and M. Sohail, « Increasing strategic accountability… », *op cit.*, p. 232

CHAPTER 4: Institutional engineering

Literature about accountability makes a distinction between formal and informal accountability. Formal or rational accountability constitutes reporting mechanisms to make performance transparent and controllable. Informal or moral accountability is geared to creating trust and commonality through everyday practice. Interventions of community-driven reconstruction aim to introduce more formal forms of accountability into the interactions between duty-bearers in a community and the poor or vulnerable people targeted by humanitarian or development agencies.\(^{28}\) One way to do so is through public meetings. Bringing information and findings into the public sphere, and generating public debate around them, is considered a key element for accountability.\(^{29}\) Another mechanism through which accountability is exercised comprises enhancing countervailing powers by encouraging civil society to hold state authorities answerable on public affairs, or the so-called watch dog role.\(^{30}\) The people’s demand for accountability may not be in line with the one prescribed in the programme and people’s prospects vis-à-vis accountability are generally low after a long period of country maladministration. Interventions that focus on promoting accountability can then be seen as unsolicited interventions.

The engineering of local accountability in the framework of a development programme, may bring about increased knowledge and transparency, and create conditions that foster empowerment, efficiency, assurance, and honesty.\(^{31}\) However, it has also been observed that they bring the risk of conflict between local power holders and newly empowered, waste of resources, turn-away attention, enhancement of mistrust, and difficulty to manage multitude of accountabilities.\(^{32}\) This chapter will explore how the introduction of accountability mechanisms in community-driven reconstruction worked out in the IRC programme in Eastern DRC.

4. 3. A brief history of accountability in DRC

The accountability context of DRC is complex, given the prolonged conflict that especially affected the eastern part of the country. It is here that large scale displacements of people


\(^{29}\) C. Malena, R. Forster, et al., Social Accountability: ..., op cit, p. 9 S. Cliffe, S. Guggenheim, et al., Community-Driven Reconstruction..., op cit, p. 11

\(^{30}\) R. Eyben, « Power, Mutual… », op cit, p. 13

\(^{31}\) See D. Cronin, and J. O’ Regan, Accountability in..., op cit, p. 18; L. Wenar, « Accountability in... », op cit, pp. 7-9

\(^{32}\) See D. Cronin, and J. O’ Regan, Accountability in..., op cit, pp. 2 & 99; L. Wenar, « Accountability in... », op cit, pp. 6-7; J. Rubenstein, « Accountability in... », op cit, p. 14
took place, resulting in uprootedness and changes in the way in which people relate to each other.\textsuperscript{33} Having said that, the complexity of the conflict in DRC, especially during this period, cannot be grasped if the pre-conflict period is not also considered, i.e. the Mobutu era (1965-1997). Coming to power through a\textit{ coup d’état}, Mobutu soon became one of the worst dictators in the history of post-independence regimes in Africa, characterized by personal enrichment.\textsuperscript{34} His regime can be described as one of patronage, corruption, maladministration and fraud, and\textit{ Zairianisation}. He built up an institutional structure through patronage networks that permitted him, his family and his political allies to accumulate wealth.

Corruption, maladministration and fraud were institutionalized; soldiers were allowed to predate on the population, the state bureaucracy was encouraged to be unaccountable, and the president saw little difference between the nation’s resources and his own personal wealth. The state apparatus was encouraged to be self-financing, by exploiting its own people without any sense of a social contract-like responsibility.\textsuperscript{35} In 1974,\textit{ Zairianisation} was a policy that meant nationalization of schools, hospitals, and foreign-owned business by the regime.\textsuperscript{36} The result was catastrophic in the sense that the president and his political allies benefited even more from their governance system, by securing an effective monopoly in key sectors of the Zairian economy, rather than serving the national interest, in a way that became difficult to reverse. Briefly, this lack of state accountability was the context in which the wars of 1996–1997 and 1998–2003 occurred.

Additionally, this lack of state accountability has strongly influenced the way people, including officials, behave. Until today this influence can be felt; officials at both provincial and national governments adopt the vocabulary of accountability, influenced by international donor discourse. Yet when it comes to their behavior, it is hard to notice any change in this sense. For instance, it is easy for them to state that training about transparency and


\textsuperscript{36} L. Ndikumana, and J. Boyce, « Congo’s Odious debt… », art.cit., p. 208; K. Vlassenroot, and H. Romkema, Local Governance and…,\textit{ op cit}, p. 9
accountability is a good idea and that governance is key that cannot be neglected. But in practice, accountability remains far from being an everyday reality in government offices.

4.4. Setting, programme description and methodology

4.4.1. Setting

The geographic setting for this research was the Burhinyi and Luhwindja chiefdoms, located in the north-east of the Mwenga territory, in South-Kivu province in eastern DRC. Both chiefdoms belong to the Shi tribe. In 2008, next to the indigenous population, 14% of the population of the Burhinyi chiefdom consisted of Hutu combatants who fled from the Rwandan genocide that took place in 1994. The Hutu presence in the area is one of the reasons why these chiefdoms were heavily affected by the conflict from 1996 to 2003. In the aftermath of the war, this also made these chiefdoms into obvious targets for development interventions.

With regard to potential beneficiaries, the programme targeted about 44,173 people from eight randomly selected communities out of 103,066 inhabitants of the Burhinyi and Luhwindja chiefdoms. Each Tushiriki community was populated by nearly 6,000 inhabitants, the Tushiriki village was inhabited by only about 1,200 residents. Small but adjacent communities were sometimes clustered and approached as single entities in the programme as long as cooperation existed between these communities.

4.4.2. Programme description

The CDR programme was called Tushiriki; ‘let us all be involved in it together’. It was implemented by the American-based IRC through its office in Bukavu, South-Kivu province. It has been operating in this province since 1996. The Tushiriki programme is one of two CDR programmes that IRC implemented from 2008 to 2010, with Dutch funding from Stichting Vluchteling (SV). The other CDR programme by IRC was Tuungaane.37

One of the objectives of the SV-IRC CDR programme (as it is sometimes called) was strengthening the capacity of civil society by increasing the understanding of good governance principles and practices, and promoting advocacy efforts on behalf of

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communities and towards policy makers. To achieve these objectives, the programme focused on both community development and civil society. For community development, Village Development Committees (VDC) were set up to design and plan local reconstruction projects, such as classrooms, schoolmasters’ offices, and local roads. The population was involved in the processes of committee elections, project identification, management and execution, training and regular general assembly reports (GAR), to familiarize them with accountability (in the programme translated as redevabilité).

The 10 Members of the VDCs were chosen during election meetings for different roles; president, treasurer, secretary, mobiliser and inclusion officer. Equal participation of men and women was required in the VDCs. Each of the 34 target villages in the two chiefdoms was allocated a block grant of $US 3,000. A block grant varying from $US 50,000 to 70,000 was allocated to each of the 8 target communities. It was up to the communities and villages themselves to decide on the allocation of the grant within the parameters of the programme. Next to the VDCs, the civil society section was in charge of supporting the activities of non-governmental organization (NGO) and community-based organization (CBO) partners through training on local governance and advocacy in the target villages. Besides, the VDCs were checked by a specific control mechanism: the Relais de Qualite (Requas), consisting of one man and one woman elected locally as well, to act as the eyes of the population.

4.4.3. Methodology

In order to assess how people view service delivery by international agencies in conflict-affected areas, one needs to understand local perceptions vis-à-vis an intervention. ‘How did participating beneficiaries view the Tushiriki’s type of accountability?’ Specifically, how did they view the strategies initiated within the Tushiriki programme in order to foster democratic accountability practices in the target villages? Democratic accountability as a

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social phenomenon can be shaped differently by beneficiaries, depending on their understanding of the process and the context in which they live.

Data are based on ethnography, conducted by Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa from 2008 to 2010 in the course of the Tushiriki programme. He participated in observations and in-depth semi-structured interviews about the project activities for both the intangible and tangible processes, using a case study approach at a village level. Interviews sometimes took the form of oral histories about what had happened in the village with regard to project activities. We talked to informants at reconstruction sites (of schools/roads), at public meetings, alongside a footpath or at their households. They were farmers, students, wives of soldiers, assistant masons, evangelists, chiefs of the locality, groupement, and their wives, head teachers, teachers, masons, traders and wood workers.

At the same time, some of them were committee members, elected team members, or members of Community Based Organizations (CBOs). Some people were interviewed several times. At the chiefdom level, we interviewed the Chef de Poste d’Encadrement Administratif (who represents the territory administrator in the chiefdom) based in Luhwindja. Finally, We also interviewed eight field staff and their territory supervisor who runs the Tushiriki programme in the current study area. The processes outlined in this paper were followed in 29 of the 34 target villages in the Tushiriki programme. The other five villages (Itudu community, Burhinyi chiefdom) were not accessible because of insecurity. In this paper we present four cases, which reveal the working of the three mechanisms of accountability applied within the Tushiriki programme in the area. We embed the cases into their local context. We see the case study approach as being the appropriate method for analyzing participatory methodology for reconstruction and the meanings given to intervention and democratic accountability.42

4.5. Democratic accountability mechanisms in the Tushiriki programme

In the following we will present three mechanisms that were requested by the Tushiriki programme in order to promote democratic accountability; General Assembly Reports, the display of reports and the CBO watchdog role. These mechanisms were meant to ensure accountability within the programme. We will show how these mechanisms were taken up

and implemented in the respective programme sites, and how they fitted within the local context.

4.5.1. A General Assembly Report in Karwera village

Public meetings are considered a powerful component of accountability initiatives. Malena and colleagues\textsuperscript{43} have recognized that bringing information and findings into the public sphere, and generating public debate around them, is a key element for most democratic accountability initiatives. Also, Cliffe and colleagues\textsuperscript{44} have acknowledged that mandating open meetings is a common way of encouraging accountability. In this section we will analyze a public meeting in one of the villages of the Tushiriki programme: Karwera village. Karwera village belongs to the Budaha groupement in the Burhinyi chiefdom. It is a 15-minute walk from Kakwende, one of the suburbs of the chiefdom, where missionaries from Norway settled in 1928 and where one of the main Communauté des Eglises Libres de Pentecôte en Afrique (5e CELPA) bible schools still operates today. The village does not have a school, so children have to go to either the Budaha primary school situated in the neighboring village of Kanyimba or the Kakwende primary and secondary schools. Karwera is led by a village chief and has one 5e CELPA local church. The values of these two institutions strongly influence people’s behavior. The village is inhabited entirely by Barhinyirhinyi (i.e. people of Burhinyi), with an estimated population in 2008 of 953, and is accessible by car. In the past a number of self-initiated associations were set up, organizing people into groups for either agriculture activities or bee-keeping. To subscribe, a person had to pay US$ 5. As one resident said, these associations generally were not very serious regarding the outcomes and dividends of the group activities. Accountability was low. As a result, the associations were not very popular in the village and membership numbers declined.

Before the Tushiriki programme came to the village in 2008, people already obtained experience with the functioning of an international programme through the reconstruction of the Budaha primary school by the Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale/United Nations International Children and Emergency Fund (AVSI/UNICEF) between May and August 2008. For this project, residents of the two villages contributed through labor and local materials; carrying water, stones and sand from the river. One reason why this school was selected by AVSI was accessibility of the area by car, which made it

\textsuperscript{43} C. Malena, R. Forster, et al., Social Accountability: …, \textit{op cit}, p. 9
\textsuperscript{44} S. Cliffe, S. Guggenheim, et al., \textit{Community-Driven Reconstruction…}, \textit{op cit}, p. 11
easy for the officials of the implementing agency to visit the school. It made residents to realize the importance of a road network. Hence, when people were given the possibility to select their own village project as part of the Tushiriki programme, they soon decided to take the local Kakwende–Karwera–Kanyimba road as the village project. This idea was initiated by local leaders, including the chief of the groupement, and then became popular among the residents of the two villages; as one of the residents put it: ‘a road facilitates commercial activities, access to health services and schooling’.

After the first and second disbursement of Tushiriki funds to the Karwera VDC via the local bank (the Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit /COOPEC Tulime), a General Assembly Report (GAR) was required to give feedback to the residents about the on-going project. Only then would the next funding tranche be released. The GAR was held on April 19, 2009 by the committee at a Sunday church service. Otherwise it would be difficult to mobilize the required minimum of at least 40% of the residents for this special public meeting. Committee members and church leaders were closely related and therefore it was possible to give a prominent place to the GAR during the service. Tushiriki field staff also participated. Around 200 attendees of the church were present, including children. Even then, the 40% attendance requirement was not even met in this setting.

The male president, a development technician with a 3-year-university degree in development, informed participants that the Tushiriki had released two tranches of money, i.e. $US 1,315 from a total of $US 3,000, which had been spent on a trip to the provincial capital to buy materials for the road rehabilitation, such as trowels, forks, and wheelbarrows, and on wages for road workers, who were selected from among the Karwera residents. During the report, three questions were raised, all by men; about how much VDC members received as wages, about reconstructing the church building, and about the next step at the community development committee (CDC) level for the project. Very quickly, the male president answered those questions by mentioning that the VDC members were not paid, otherwise the realization in terms of road upgrading could hardly be achieved, that nothing was planned for the church reconstruction and that there would be an election for the project at the CDC. His responses evoked no discussion, but at his back, Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa heard some youth quietly discussing among them that some of the costs were too high. After this special announcement, the senior pastor asked somebody for a final prayer to end the service.
This case epitomizes how difficult it was to really discuss the progress of a project within a public meeting. First of all, people were not really used to this type of accountability. The AVSI/UNICEF project for instance did not require any reporting back to the population, nor did people expect this to take place. What mattered most to them, was the actual realization of concrete results; the vast majority of the residents appreciated what they saw when the school was completely rebuilt; walls of burnt bricks, roofs, floors, blackboards and six classrooms equipped with solid tables. In contrast, the Tushiriki programme did have the obligation of a GAR, but it was difficult to interest people in turning up at the meeting, as it did not provide direct and concrete benefits. Secondly, it was a smart move to embed the meeting in an existing social institution, where participation is relatively high; the church service. At the same time however, the church service is a setting in which people are not used to open discussions, let alone to discuss money matters. Besides, people might be inclined to follow the opinion of the leaders organizing these meetings, in this case the church leaders. Thus, the GAR mainly served as an obligatory passage point, but without much critical reflection.

Does it mean public meetings such as the GAR have little to contribute to development interventions? When analyzing the place of public meetings in fostering accountability, the literature suggests that the relevance of public meetings is not new in developing countries, especially in the context of rural areas, nor is it without any effect. Also in the framework of the Tuungane programme in eastern DRC, which is very similar to the Tushiriki programme analysed here, Humphreys\textsuperscript{45} has shown that the greatest individual initiative was expressed at a community meeting. While the mechanism of public meetings thus has its merits, local residents may have a different idea about this. In the case of the Tushiriki, people quickly lost their interest in these meetings that failed to produce tangible results. This was resolved in the case described above by embedding the public meeting in the already existing social life of church services, even though this had the unfortunate effect that it inhibited discussion. The Tushiriki programme design asks for separate meeting with a strict quorum, but this was adapted locally. In the case of agriculture technology and other technical interventions in development, it has been amply shown how these tend to become appropriated locally into adapted technologies. In a similar vein, we see here that the social technology to enhance

accountability through meetings was adapted in local use and transformed in a question and answer session during a church service.

4.5.2. Displaying reports in Cibanda II, Kanyimba and Mubone villages

Apart from the General Assemblies, the Tuungane/ Tushiriki protocol, section 11, also contained a procedure to display reports with updates of the finances and implementation of the project in the community. We observed this mechanism in several communities. It states that the VDC should post a report about the project activities, including a financial report, i.e. the amount received and the amount spent when released. Cibanda II and Mubone are villages in the Luhwindja chiefdom, Kanyimba is a village in the Burhinyi chiefdom. These were target villages in the Tushiriki programme in which reports of the expenditures made within each project village were displayed, as required by the programme. However, residents indicated that, despite the public display of the reports, nobody was willing to read them because it was not something they were used to doing, and many of them, especially women, were illiterate. For instance, when a report was attached to the door of the Mubone 5e CELPA church on March 6, 2009, a group of masons who were constructing a school near the church never read it. When asked about it, they said they were not aware of any expenditure report, because they did not read the attachment. Interestingly, they argued that they trusted the VDC members because they were able to talk to them easily about the project.

Similarly, on March 25, 2009, when PM. Kyamusugulwa visited Cibanda II village, a VDC report was being displayed at a junction of two local roads, alongside the main road for the Referral Ifendula district hospital and for the Luduha groupement in the Luhwindja chiefdom. The report mentioned one decameter, 40 trowels, 20 forks, 15 pickaxes, one piece of string and two machetes bought. Other materials were mentioned as still needed, especially two wheelbarrows, seven trowels and three forks. These materials were for a local road reconstruction to connect Cibanda II village with the suburb of Luhwindja. However, the report did not mention the exact amount of money received and the amount spent for these materials, which information remained unclear. What was striking about this report was that it contained some crossings-out about the exact number of materials bought, as they were

46 IRC and CARE, Les Protocoles de …, op cit, p. 24
47 An instrument used to measure the distance of daily manual labour for residents on the local road construction site
uncertain. Before people had been able to read the report, it was taken away by young people of the village.

In Kanyimba village in Burhinyi, the experience of displaying reports was similar to the stories from Mubone and Cibanda II in the neighboring chiefdom. Here a report about the ongoing project in the village, providing details about the amount of money received by the VDC, was pinned up on display. The male VDC secretary witnessed that 10-year-old children soon took it, arguing that it was for a football match. In fact, the young people in the village thought that every poster was a football advertisement, because this was the only activity for which they ever saw a poster.

The examples in the preceding sections all show that the display of reports did not contribute much to accountability; not only did reports lack detailed information, but also did people not read them; either because they simply did not care, because they were illiterate, or because the announcements were quickly taken away. An alternative form of accountability however comes clear in the words of the mason; if the VDC members are well trusted, people do not have problems in talking to them about the project. People believed in oral narratives given by committee members about the project and they preferred this to be done in an informal way rather than through public meetings. Although it has been argued that displaying council decisions, budgets and expenditures on public notice boards is a way of encouraging accountability, people’s perceptions of this may be different, especially in areas dominated by the oral tradition. In the Tushiriki programme, people could obtain information in more informal ways, if they felt the need to get this. As long as trust was maintained, most people were not interested in obtaining more information.

4.5.3. CBOs as watchdog in Ishogwe village

An important aspect of democratic accountability in CDR is to strengthen the countervailing power of civil society actors and encourage them to hold authorities responsible. In the Tushiriki programme, this meant that local civil society was trained to act as a watchdog to ensure that the VDC was accountable to residents about the project that was selected by the community. This aspect is exemplified with the case of Ishogwe village. This village belongs to the Bujiri groupement in the Luhwindja chiefdom and is located near the main Kaziba–Luhwindja road, just on the other side of the Namnana river, facing the Lubanda suburb of the Luhwindja center. In 2008, it was populated by 1,577 inhabitants, the

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48 S. Cliffe, S. Guggenheim, et al., Community-Driven Reconstruction..., op cit, p. 11
vast majority of who originated from Luhwindja. The village has only one primary school, the Makala primary school, that was initiated by 5e CELPA, and is still under protestant church management. It has no secondary school, nor a health center. The protestant church and the chieftaincy are the most prominent institutions; the village is headed by a chief who was acting, in 2008, as chief interim of the Bujiri groupement.

In 2008, when the Tushiriki programme came to the village, a series of public meetings was held for VDC elections, identifying needs, project selection and project budget approval. Following this process, Ishogwe residents selected the reconstruction of the Namnana bridge, although the amount of grant available (i.e. $US 3,000) was not sufficient. Residents were motivated by the fact that this bridge would connect three groupements (Bujiri, Burhembo and Idudwe) and that people could cross the river even during flooding. The previously existing bridge collapsed during a flood more than 5 years ago. In the eyes of the Ishogwe inhabitants, this was a crucial project for them and the area. In 2008, 36 out of 70 CBOs in the chiefdom were selected for the Tushiriki programme. The local CBOs were partnered to NGOs, which were in turn partners to Tushiriki. These NGOs represented the local civil society at programme level e.g. the Centre d’Etudes de Documentation et d’Animation Civique, CEDAC, and the Action pour le Développement en Milieux Ruraux, ADMR. The CBOs (e.g. Groupe de Sauvetage des Vies Humaines) were supposed to watchdog VDCs in managing project funds on behalf of the population. To do so, the NGOs provided a number of trainings for both VDCs and CBOs so that they could familiarize themselves with the watchdog idea. Governance, bookkeeping and advocacy are among topics developed by CEDAC and ADMR in the training session. Yet, both NGOs did not have any previous experience about a watchdog role nor about advocacy activities on behalf of local communities. While the CEDAC was well known for awareness raising regarding the duties of a citizen, ADMR was well known for its tree-planting activities in the area.

During the training, ADMR and CEDAC distributed items such as paper, pens, pencils, etc., to every target CBO for reporting its activities to the NGO, and one copy of the training module was given to the president of each VDC and CBO. So, within the setting of the community, the CBOs were said to play the role of a check and balance on the VDC project management, and to check regularly whether there was progress in executing the project (or otherwise remind the VDC about it. If the VDC was proven to be less than accountable to its constituency, participants were told that they had the right to ask questions of the VDC
members about the project activities. Also, when no progress was noticed in the reconstruction, CBO members were told to ask the VDC members about this. Yet, the aim of the training was not always reflected in what people reported to have learnt. One attendee for instance said that he remembered two main things, (i) democracy and avoiding a dictatorship and (ii) working together to include disabled people. More generally, when recalling the training, residents reported that this was done quickly, with big groups of trainees, and sometimes the main concepts of the teaching were taught in French (some of the educated attendants spoke French, but even for them the abstract concepts of the training were difficult to grasp). Concepts such as democratic accountability, governance and advocacy were explained in French (but without/with limited translation in the local language), while one training session comprised 100 participants including 52–56 CBO members and VDC members.

In addition to the training provided by the NGOs, the community development component of the programme trained VDC and CBO members on democratic accountability. The message of the training was believed to be that residents should collaborate, work together and protect the infrastructure rebuilt under the project. For example, trainees recalled that CBO members were asked to complain to the local chiefs so that anyone damaging the school would be punished by having to repair it. People were also encouraged to take complaints to the local police, the King (i.e. the paramount chief) and the Chef de Poste d’Encadrement Administratif, who represented the territory administrator in the chiefdom. VDC members were asked to account for how much of the grant was allocated to the bridge reconstruction and materials bought and how much of the materials were contributed locally.

In general, what complicated the checks and balances of the CBOs’ watchdog role is that social relationships between people in small communities are often multiplex and there is little distance between them. Members of the two committees were both residents of the same village and saw themselves as the same people, because they belonged to relatively close families or clans. For instance, the chief of the village, who was adviser to the vice-president of a CBO (at the same time the VDC male president), was also a member of the VDC. The same was true for the Requas, formally supposed to control the VDC, which made it more difficult for them to take up a critical position against the VDC. When setting up an intervention, it is easy to hear complaints about preferential treatment from people that are not part of the direct beneficiaries. This was also the case in Ishogwe with another CBO,
focusing on teenage mothers. People said all beneficiaries belonged to the clan of the manager’s wife. In the end however, both beneficiaries and the decision takers have an interest in maintaining relations workable.

In terms of accountability within the existing institutions, neither the chieftaincy nor the church (or even the CBO) used to be transparent to people about the management of funds. However, the chieftaincy and the local church used to inform local people about contributions to a village project, either by shouting through a megaphone or by delivering the message during a church service. The Tushiriki programme used the same means of informing people about their contribution to the village project; what appeared to be new was the message of Tushiriki to be transparent about project funding, including details about expenditure and creating an arena where the VDC’s decisions were more open for discussion. In the eyes of residents, this was a sensitive issue as the public discussion of financial matters would go against local culture. The training on accountability did not overcome this sensitivity. Besides, the message of the training was not well understood by all participants, due to language barriers, but also because it was not enough tailor-made to the local context and did not provide people with the adequate tools at hand to take up the role of watchdog.

Our observations led us to question the extent to which the collaboration NGOs/CBOs contributed to incorporate in their focus the watchdog role while VDCs implemented village projects. Two factors are worth mentioning here. Firstly, there is a lack of analysis of the organizational capacity of CBOs before they are selected by NGO partners to engage in the Tushiriki programme. Organizations were not necessarily selected for their watchdog capacities, but simply for their presence in the area. Secondly, the partnership between NGOs and CBOs was based only on training about ‘accountability and advocacy’, i.e. on the theoretical aspect of the function, rather than on its practical aspect. These observations are supported by others, who have acknowledged that a group’s willingness to embrace change can obstruct the organizational capacity to serve the community. Hence, Borren emphasizes the importance of both defining beforehand how to engage with a particular partner, and of empowerment and emancipatory learning. Only this will really take partners on board. Lastly,

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Eade\textsuperscript{51} has stated simply that one cannot build capacities in others that he/she does not have him/herself. Clearly, the failure in technical assistance of CBOs by NGOs was one of the problems. Providing adequate training could help CBOs and \textit{Requas} to take up a more critical role.

\section*{4.6. Practices of Tushiriki staff on democratic accountability}

Figure 4.1: Democratic accountability as one of good governance principles

![Diagram showing democratic accountability principles, mechanisms, and outputs]

Figure 4.1 depicts the place of democratic accountability as one of the local governance principles promoted by the Tushiriki programme, the three mechanisms by which these principles are promoted and the expected outputs of the intangible part of the programme. Having set out the functioning of the accountability mechanisms in practice, we will now turn to the practices of the Tushiriki staff on accountability. How did they interpret and shape the expectations and instructions of the Tushiriki protocol? Already, we saw in the above that staff tends to adapt these instructions to the local context, in order to address difficulties that

came forth from the contradictions between the protocols and existing institutions and practices of accountability. For instance, they incorporated the required General Assembly into a church gathering. In this section we will show how staff – while advocating for downward accountability prioritised in practice that VDC were accountable to the IRC staff more than to their population.

The Tushiriki field staff based in Burhinyi and Luhwindja consisted of two development officers, four development agents and two technicians, who were supervised by the territory supervisor, one of the senior staff for the community development component of the programme. The Tushiriki staff, including the field staff, generally believed in the programme’s aim to promote governance, particularly accountability through public meetings. In addition, in comparison with other reconstruction programmes, agency staff felt that this is the most appropriate in a post-conflict context, which is characterized by corruption. As expressed by the territory supervisor:

This is an excellent approach, the best, the most appropriate; there is a place to deal with ‘anti-valeurs’, that is ‘corruption’, because the decisions are made in public meetings. However, there is a need for stronger facilitation to deal with the problems of ambitious project choices, project planning and regular follow-up. Facilitation is a key factor of success.\(^{52}\)

Staff’s general internalization and support of the programme’s aims, did not always mean that they translated these in practice. In training sessions, for example, they taught VDC members about the democratic accountability principles that should guide their work.\(^{53}\) For instance, in the finance management training for committee members, the trainer said: “everybody is able to control or to know what everybody is doing. When VDC members misappropriate funds, Tushiriki needs then to stop money disbursement unless money stolen is reimbursed”.\(^{54}\)

At the same time, however, staff would often remind people that they were ultimately accountable to the IRC. For instance, in the above mentioned session, the trainer said: “Franka ya Muzungu ni ya kupana ripotil Money of white (wo)man is to report for”.\(^{55}\)

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\(^{52}\) Interview with the Tushiriki Territory Supervisor, Bukavu, April 26, 2010.

\(^{53}\) Participant observation in the initial training session held in Mbogo Burhinyi for VDC members, 22 November 2008.

\(^{54}\) Participant observation in the finance management training session in Birhala Burhinyi for VDC members, 25 February 2009.

\(^{55}\) Participant observation in the same training session of 25 February 2009.
From numerous observations in the field, it also became clear that staff stepped away from the idea that power holders needed to be confronted to be held accountable, in favour of accommodating the existing relations and seeking informal types of accountability. For instance, when visiting Mulungu and Busherega community, a lunch meal was offered to aid workers in the senior pastor house where informal discussions took place between aid workers and the village power holders (locality chief, senior pastors 8è CEPAC and 5è CELPA local churches). The discussions were about how to mobilize more people and which project (school reconstruction) would be worth in Tushiriki programme.\textsuperscript{56}

In the same vein, during the training of trainers held on 24 March 2009, the schoolmaster of the Mwenda primary school reported that the 3-classroom-building of its school was destroyed by wind the day before. By hearing the news, the field staff said that there was a need to hold the re-approval public meeting in order to get it budgeted as the new village project. Not surprisingly, the roof reconstruction of these 3 classrooms became the village project executed in this area.\textsuperscript{57} Clearly, informal talks between aid workers and the existing village local elite on the one hand and between local elite and residents on the other hand, is how accountability worked out in this context.

At the same time, in case of problems, staff would exercise its own accountability mechanisms with the VDC members rather than leaving room for local accountability processes. For instance, talking to the male Citudu VDC president, one development officer who was visiting this area said: “You should move forward, how can we explain that you have already received money without any progress. Look, we have been here last week, we need to see progress”. Also, when the VDC president and field staff disagreed on an issue related to a village project, the public meeting was likely held by the aid worker himself rather than facilitated by the VDC president\textsuperscript{58}. Although the staff wanted to ascertain in this way that the idea approved in general assembly came from residents rather than from the committee, it also underlined that when the project was put to a test, in case of problems, upward accountability to the field staff of IRC was the overriding principle.

\textsuperscript{56} Participant observation made in Busherega, Burhinyi, 20 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{57} Interview with 2 male development agents based in Birhala Burhinyi, 16 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{58} Participant observation made in the Muli public meeting on project budget re-approval, Burhinyi, 24 March 2009.
4.7. Conclusion

Democratic accountability has become one of the popular themes in conflict-affected areas, especially regarding local governance principles, because it is connected with root causes of conflict in developing countries. Accountability is also a key element in the software side of the Tushiriki programme, one of the CDR programmes that took place in eastern DRC from 2008 to 2010.

This paper has analyzed people’s views about democratic accountability and its three mechanisms as applied in the Tushiriki programme. We have shown that the implementation of the three mechanisms did not have a major impact on levels of accountability within the programme. Just like technical development interventions, also interventions on the software side are not neutral, and need to be embedded into the local context to achieve the desired level of impact. The first mechanism presented in this paper was the General Assembly Reporting. The setting of the church service to organize a public meeting was well-chosen and turn out at the meeting was relatively high. Yet, it was not a setting in which people were used to discussions. Besides, according to local culture, financial matters should not be spoken out in public. Hence, the mechanism of public meetings to increase financial accountability does not seem to be adequate. The second mechanism discussed was the prescribed display of reports at public places within the communities. This had limited impact due to high levels of illiteracy. Besides, reports were often removed rapidly by people unaware of the message. People were clearly more used to absorbing information through oral narratives than in writing.

Thirdly, we discussed the watchdog role of CBOs. We showed that CBOs often either lacked the capacity to fulfill this task, or were too closely connected to the VDCs to really act as a critical counterweight. The latter seems to be something that is difficult to overcome in small communities, the lack of capacity was tried to overcome through training, but with limited results for various reasons.

In the latter part of the paper, we analyzed how the staff of IRC, notwithstanding their support for the ideas of social and community-based accountability in practice stepped away from this idea. To some extent, they adapted the idea of accountability to local conditions, for example by preferring to dialogue with power holders rather than demanding accountability. On the other hand, they also undermined local accountability in practice when they overrode this by demanding accountability to the staff and the IRC rather than to the community.
Can we conclude from all this that people did not care about accountability? This is certainly not the case. Based on our interviews, observation and participation, we are confident to say that people did care about it. Yet, accountability, in their perceptions took different shapes, and thus needs to be ‘read’ differently by development agencies to be well understood. This was reflected, amongst others, in the words of the mason who said that levels of trust between people allowed them to ask questions when needed. As long as the concrete results of the programme became visible and tangible to people, they did not care as much about the way in which the results had come about.

For successful implementation of mechanisms of accountability, agencies need to make sure that the mechanisms are embedded in the local context. For example, it has been noted that village networks in Cambodia provided a useful and replicable method of developing participatory local governance in rural areas, because they take into account the values and norms associated with traditional forms of collective action. In the Tushiriki programme this was formally not yet the case. Stronger embeddedness and a more appropriate translation of abstract concepts into the local context might be a way forward to develop a sustainable culture of democratic accountability. This might lead to a more durable culture of local governance in DRC and similar contexts in conflict-affected areas, and thus contribute, to some extent, to the alleviation of poverty in this environment.

Photo 4.1: NGO partner to Tushiriki sensitising on accountability and transparency in Burhinyi

Photo 4.2: Cibanda II VDC postage on material bought for local road reconstruction, Luhwindja
CHAPTER 4: Institutional engineering

Photo 4.3: Residents public meeting in a church before project budget’s approval in Mubone, Luhwindja

Photo 4.4: Residents outside a church before attending a VDC public meeting in Mujindi, Luhwindja
5. Power holders and social dynamics

This chapter has been submitted for publication as:


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ABSTRACT

Increasingly, post-conflict reconstruction involves participatory programmes where communities select and implement small scale reconstruction projects with the double aim to restore infrastructure and services and to enhance accountable development politics. This paper analyses the types and dynamics of power relations within such a community-driven reconstruction (CDR) programme in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. While CDR aims to empower the population and by-pass local elites, deemed to be predatory, we find that village-level projects owe their success to the interventions in the programme by these elites. The selection and execution of reconstruction projects was less the outcome of a democratic process whereby local people freely express a preference for the public good but the outcome of existing power holders actions. Rather than capturing the immediate benefits of the projects, power holders that represent existing institutions based on kinship relations, common identity, and religion, often had more interest in promoting good project implementation, as a means to strengthen their power base in the community. Hence, some elites are better than others. The article further builds on the project data base to demonstrate that in current DRC churches are more powerful in local development than chiefs. The paper concludes that in Eastern DRC development programmes should bring churches into the equation of governance and invest in understanding better the working and accountability of churches for development.

Key words: – Community-driven reconstruction, power holders, social dynamics, power relations, power over power, Democratic Republic of Congo.

5.1. Introduction

Post-conflict reconstruction in the 1990s was criticised for being too state-centred and top-down\textsuperscript{61}. In response, development agencies have increasingly sought to develop alternative approaches that aim to strengthen institutions at the local level. One of these approaches, popularised by the World Bank and international NGOs, is community-driven reconstruction (CDR) where democratic institutions are introduced in communities to select, manage and implement reconstruction projects. These programmes have the dual objective to restore services and infrastructure, while enhancing accountability in development. In conflict-affected Eastern DRC, large-scale CDR programmes have been implemented by the International Rescue Committee.

While building accountable development committees in villages, CDR programmes need to consider how to deal with established power holders, that may not be perceived by the

intervening parties as accountable or democratic. CDR programmes then face the strategic question whether to by-pass existing power holders or to involve them. The IRC has opted for the first strategy and sought to establish elected committees of men and women that would handle a small fund for local reconstruction. The programme is grounded in the idea that people’s involvement in decision making strengthens their capacity to manage the shift from conflict to development. Involving citizens directly in governance systems would enable citizens to by-pass local authorities or to call these authorities to account for their duties. Our research has ethnographically followed the implementation of one of the IRC implemented CDR programme, called Tushiriki (meaning, let us become involved in together), which was funded by the Netherlands-based Stichting Vluchteling.

Our research focused on the role of elites in the CDR programme. Even though they were not part of the design of the programme, which aimed to by-pass the elite, we assumed that elites would nonetheless play a role in the programme. We wanted to examine the role of elites to enhance our understanding of the dynamics of community-driven reconstruction. At the same time, we wanted to use the research to observe ‘elite in action’ and seek what this could tell us about local power relations in Eastern DRC. It is recognised that chiefs, religious leaders, or other forms of authority play a crucial role in public sector reform and participatory development interventions, yet their actual role and interactions are under-researched. Moreover, development programmes in Eastern DRC are wary of elite capture – the appropriation of development for personal benefits rather than the public good – and this paper therefore explores how and to what effect elite interfere in the projects. As participatory approaches to post-conflict reconstruction and development aim to render power relationships inclusive, just, and pro-poor, we argue that and this should start with

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64 The Tushiriki programme was very similar to the larger Tuungance programme, financed by the DFID.


understanding where and how to engage. Power holders, who represent existing institutions based on kinship relations, common identity, and religion, may be spoilers for developments, yet they can also bring about the potential for development initiatives to succeed.

Governance has in DRC historically been organized by a multiplicity of institutions, where the state may not play the central role next to traditional leaders, religious organisations or international actors of development. Churches, in particular, have developed as authorities in the domain of service provision, such as health and education. The practices that evolve around community-driven reconstruction provide a window to examine the relative power of these different authorities and the ways they relate, intertwine or compete with each other. How do these elites connect, which elite is more influential than others, and where does the real power lie? How do existing agencies influence the outcome of one or another intervention? And, importantly, is elite capture always detrimental to development?

By analysing the role of power holders in community-driven reconstruction, this paper also aims to contribute to debates on governance in DRC. While it is widely recognised that governance in DRC is hybrid, or characterised by institutional multiplicity, the actual relations and everyday forms of interaction between different authorities is little understood, even though this is crucial in shaping governance on the ground. How does institutional multiplicity affect order and security, public service provision, and the regulation of access and entitlements? By following the processes of selecting projects for reconstruction in 34 villages, we have aimed to establish the relative weight of elites in the governance of public service provision. For this, we followed in a number of cases if church leaders or local chiefs were the more dominant in decision-making and implementation of the project, and sought how this related to development outcomes. As church leaders consistently favour school buildings, while chiefs prefer road construction, the distribution of these projects tell us something about the relative power of these elites. This is consistent with the study of Titeca and De Herdt (2011) who found that in the DRC, while the State manages the schools, churches administer them. The outcome directs our gaze to churches as the most influential

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authority for development, which raises a number of questions for development policies and strategies in DRC\(^69\).

The next section of the paper elaborates the conceptual framework that underpins the analysis and is followed by a section that describes the evolution of the state, church and traditional authorities in the DRC and South-Kivu. Having set out this context, the paper presents three sections with findings from the practices of community-driven reconstruction, showing the pervasive influence of elites in the implementation of the programme, the ways in which different levels and types of power interact, and the relative power of authorities at the local level. The final section discusses the findings and concludes the paper.

### 5.2. Power, authority and elites

The concept of power holders refers in the first place to authority, legitimacy and force. A figure of authority derives a certain command over others on account of his/her knowledge or position. Max Weber classifies legitimate authority into three types: rational, traditional, and charismatic.\(^70\) Rational domination is based on a system of rules under which those in power issue commands. Traditional domination is based on a belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising commands under them. Charismatic domination rests on devotion to the exceptional sanctions, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person and the normative patterns exposed or meant by him.\(^71\) The three types of legitimation can co-incide and reinforce each other. In central African countries, particularly in the eastern DRC, authority is often primarily anchored in ‘spiritual powers’, or the energy to command special healing powers.\(^72\) People believe that those holding positions of authority, such as kings and church leaders, are endowed with spiritual power, which is not only subject to control and legitimation, but can also be used for blessing or cursing.

In recent years, governance in DRC – as in many contemporary African states – has been characterised as a hybrid political order, or a situation of institutional multiplicity. In hybrid

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political orders, as defined by Boege, Brown and Clements (2009), diverse and competing authority structures, sets of rules, logics of order, and claims to power co-exist, overlap, interact and intertwine, combining elements of introduced Western models of governance and elements stemming from local indigenous traditions. There is institutional multiplicity in the sense that there are multiple sets of institutions that are each derived from different normative frames, building on separate historical trajectories of legitimation. Authority, and the power commanded by authority in DRC is thus not a given but the outcome of interaction between these different power holders and the population. Authority and elites are closely connected concepts in DRC. Members of the elite find their power in their position, strengthened by elements of economic power and/or education. Military commanders, NGO employees, and school teachers are, for example, considered part of the elite.

Relations of power are relations of social influence in which the opinions and attitudes of one person affect the opinions and attitudes of another person. Power holders may use hard strategies by seeking obedience through intimidation and aggression, they may use rational strategies by bargaining and logic, or they may use soft strategies by seeking submission by polite, friendly, or humbler manner. Webs of power are often woven through patron-client relations, where ‘patrons’ in DRC are often referred to as big men. People depend for their livelihoods in different ways on those who lead existing institutions. These patronage relations are based on complex lineages and other social ties and kindled by hope that investing in the relationship will result in a certain level of social protection. Local people can tolerate their patrons, when they abuse the power in their hands, as long as the latter can meet the demands of the former, which demands are related to their daily livelihoods.

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The relation between elites and development are diverse. While the concern of elite capture, where power may be exercised for individual interest rather than for community interest has often dominated development debates, we find increasing recognition that elite control can also be exerted for popular benefit rather than for personal enrichment. CDR aims to enhance the motivation of populations for the development of public goods. Ostrom defines public good as the one that ‘yields non-subtractive benefits that can be enjoyed jointly by many people who are hard to exclude from obtaining these benefits’. In relation to supplying public goods, elite involvement can take the form of ‘bad elite capture’ where local decisions are made by powerful local elites, who can dominate participatory development either by choosing projects that represent their own preferences rather than community preferences or by misusing the funds provided to the community. At the same time, community members can desist from complaining about a project, even when it did not reflect their choice, for fear of not receiving another project in the future. On the other hand, in the context of Africa, elite involvement may take the form of ‘good elite capture’ where notions of moral obligation and interpersonal accountability contribute to channel energies into family, ethnicity, religion, and ritual, which are potential foundations on which to build a new development strategy. Although we often speak of power holders, power cannot be held but becomes manifest in its execution, and we have to establish empirically how this works out in practice and why certain elites are better than others. The CDR programme provides an opportunity to observe these processes in action.

5.3. Power and governance in the DRC and South-Kivu

Institutional multiplicity can encompass a range of different sets of institutions, including the state, non-state or rebel authorities, external interventions, social movements or religious orders. For service provision, the most central institutions are the state and the traditional authorities on the one hand, and churches on the other. In this section, they are briefly introduced.

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83 For example see J. Labonne and R. Chase, op cit, p. 4.
5.3.1. Clans, kings, state history

Vansina describes pre-colonial society of the Shi kingdoms, now the Kivus, as consisting of dispersed settlements, tied into a political tradition of centralisation based on a sacred kingship. The title of *Mwami*, or king, was restricted to the oldest son of the first wife, whereas other sons were princes that formed an aristocracy that was a framework of the state.\(^8^4\) The legitimacy of the king and chiefs in precolonial time stemmed from power over land and cattle.\(^8^5\) Sosne states that “each Shi kingdom is headed by a ruler (*Mwami*) to whom all the land and cattle in his region belong”.\(^8^6\) The personality of the king is meant to embody the identity of his people, and the belief that the position of the king is sacred is strongly attached to the tradition of the Shi culture. People owe obedience to the king and to his representatives who are local chiefs. The Shi proverb “Ecihugo cirhali mwo, mwami, cithalonge era, cirhania na nkula”, meaning “a State without a king can be neither consistent nor prosperous”, exemplifies the taken-for-granted respect for a king in this society since pre-colonial era until today\(^8^7\).

With the passage of time, however, especially when local livelihood became much more based on salary as a result of employment, or based on self-employment through trade or gold exploitation, the power basis of land and cattle has changed, gradually affecting the sacred power of the king. The Shi proverb “Obwami kwali mira, bunola”, or “The kingdom was from times gone by, nowadays a good salary is better than cows”, is illustrative. Nonetheless, as land continues to be important, the kingdom remains the major institution to settle land disputes.

Notwithstanding the respect kings had before the arrival of the Belgians in the area, the institution of kingship suffered during colonial times, both in its tradition and in its power over its people. Starting in 1906, each chiefdom became part of the colonial administrative system which led to a major attrition of the royal system. Chiefs that were not loyal to the colonial system were suspended or replaced by chiefs without any ancestral ties to the

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populations. A similar pattern was seen in the recent wars when some rebellion movements forced the loyalty of the Kings to gain control over the populations. Another difference was that the colonial administration confiscated land to establish national parks and anti-erosion forests.

During the Mobutu regime in the post-independence era, the status of traditional leaders was partly revived when traditional leaders either became part of Mobutu’s networks to consolidate his power or recovered a certain place in the acquisition of land. In 1973 Mobutu introduced a law declaring all land property of the state, and the Bami (representing several Mwamis) were placed in a position to mediate between networks of customary law and state patronage. In the post-war constitution of 18 February 2006, customary authorities are given a role to link the central administration to the population. Article 207 of this Constitution states: “The customary authority is recognized. It is devolved according to the local custom, as much as it is not contrary to the Constitution, to the law, to the public order and to good habits. Every customary chief who desires to exert an elective public mandate should be elected, or be coopted for a mandate of five years renewable. The customary authority has the duty to promote national unity and cohesion’. Nowadays, among 261 chiefdoms and 476 sectors in the DRC, 18 chiefdoms and five sectors are in South-Kivu province. As figure 5.1 shows, official state representation reaches until the level of the territory, where the chef de poste d’encadrement administratif (CPEA) is the administrator. Territories comprise multiple chiefdoms and groupements, that are ruled by traditional leaders that are linked to the state administration. The traditional kings and chiefs exercise

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91 See F. VanAcker, op cit, p. 89; D. Tull, op cit, p. 436.
93 In fact, he is based in the administrative centre of a chiefdom located far from where the territory administrator is based (i.e., at the administrative centre of the territory). For instance the CPEA Burhinyi is based in Birhala while the territory administrator is based in Mwenga centre.
power over their people by controlling the local administration and by controlling land under a legal pluralistic system.\textsuperscript{94}

**Figure 5.1: Administrative Structure at Territory Level in South-Kivu province**

Source: Kyamusugulwa 2012

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(i) CPEA: The Chef de Poste d'Encadrement Administratif / representative of the Territory Administrator, who is based in the chef-lieu of a chiefdom other than where the Territory Administrator is based.

(ii) One Territory consists of more than one chiefdom. For instance, the Mwenga Territory comprises the Basile, Burhinyi, Luwindja, Lwindi, Wamuzimu chiefdoms, and Itombwe sector. The difference between a chiefdom and sector resides in the fact that the former is a traditional system based on kingship; that is, a dynasty of one ruling family, where the chiefdom is a homogenous entity in terms of ethnic group. However, the latter is more consensual or democratic system of ruling the entity, whereby each ethnic group that composes the entity has the chance to rule it for a mandate of five years. This system is applied where there are more than one ethnic groups living in the same area.

(iii) Below every king or chief of sector are chiefs of groupements, below whom, are chief of villages. In The case of a chiefdom, chiefs of groupements as well as chiefs of villages are appointed by the King.

(iv) FARDC: Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo/Congolese Army. In chiefdoms affected by conflict, some units are deployed in order to fight against enemies, who may be either the FDLR Interamwe; that is, the former Rwandese Army that fled to eastern DRC after the genocide of 1994 or other local militia such as the Mai-Mai. Although these units collaborate with the local administration; that is, the King and the CPEA, they depend on military officials at both provincial and national levels.

(v) Tribunal: at each chiefdom or sector, there is a Tribunal de collectivité/chiefdom or sector tribunal, that rests under the authority of the King or the chief of Sector. When grievances cannot be solved at this layer, the plaintiff can appeal to the tribunal of peace, nowadays functioning with well-educated judges at territory level. Otherwise, s/he can appeal to courts at district tribunal as well as at provincial level and even at national level.

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5.3.2. *Church history and governance structure*

The Catholic Church and Protestant churches played and continue to play a significant role in the education and health sectors in the DRC, especially in South-Kivu province. As the Belgians could conquer eastern Congo only after western Congo in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, formal Protestant missionary activity could only reach this area in the earlier 20\textsuperscript{th} century.

Seay notes that Congo is among a few countries where the government (both colonial and

\textsuperscript{94}This process will remain unchanged even in the context of decentralization, because according to the Constitution of 18 February 2006, the customary authority is recognized and that it is devolved according to the local custom, as much as it is not contrary to the Constitution, to the law, to the public order and to good habits.
independent) allowed first the missionaries and then the national church to organise and administer the school system for the rest of the nation. In the South-Kivu, like in other parts of the former Kivu province, the Catholic Church was established alongside the colonial administrators for the evangelisation and civilising mission.

In 1973, during the post-independence era, the Mobutu regime took the step to nationalise not all schools and hospitals as well as foreign-owned businesses, a policy known as Zairianisation. Its effects were quickly devastating, to the extent that a clear decline in the provision of services by the state was visible. This was the turning point in the Mobutist state, which became more and more unable to fulfill the supposed functions of a state, such as the provision of education and health services. In 1977, nationalised education was so bad that Mobutu asked churches to resume their responsibilities in the administration and management of public schools. As the Mobutist state withdrew its responsibilities in the education sector, it did so as well in the health sector, leaving a space for civil society organisations to take over state functions. It was no surprise that in the 1990s, during the wars, and even in the aftermath of the conflicts, the state did not have the ability to recover its functions. If roads were not maintained, then schools and hospitals were not equipped and teachers and health professionals were not paid.

Now, what is the governance structure in church organisations? This description is important because churches do not simply partner with the government to provide health care and education; they can also be seen as substitutes for or competitors with the state. The churches have always retained a certain autonomy from the state. They are part of the few Congolese institutions that never collapsed, and they did not become part of the patronage networks of the Mobutist regime.

In the main research areas for this paper, Burhinyi and Luhwindja, two churches are dominant: the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant church initiated by the Mission Libre Norvégienne, nowadays known as the 5e Communauté des Eglises Libres de Pentecôte en Afrique (5e CELPA). Both types of churches were initiated by missionaries from Europe (from Italy and Belgium for the Catholic Church, and from Norway for the Protestant

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97 Please see L. Seay, op cit.
church). The Catholic Church is more hierarchical, as its administration follows a strict vertical line from the Pope in Rome, by way of the Archbishop in Bukavu to the head priest at a local parish. The Protestant church is more decentralised: it has its head office in Bukavu, followed downward by a church district in an area where many of its local churches spread out into villages. Upward, the 5e CELPA is member of the Eglise du Christ au Congo, which is a body that represents all Protestant churches recognised by the Congolese state, with its head office based in Bukavu and in Kinshasa. There is one Catholic parish in every chiefdom, and every parish manages a variety of chapels that depend on it. The 5e CELPA has experienced exponential growth during the movement of evangelisation of the area, and now has churches in practically every village. The vast expansion resulted in ill-equipped initiatives to build schools and the late 1990s conflict-related violence exacerbated the destruction of infrastructures that were already ill-constructed.

Both types of churches benefit from aid agencies: the Roman Catholic Church from agencies such as Caritas International and Catholic Relief Services, and the Protestant church by organisations related to Norwegian agencies. Subsidies are directed to activities such as education, health, and the like. In short, as Kelsall (2008) observed, one can notice how these churches very much affect the daily life of inhabitants of these chiefdoms in both spirituality and social services. Both churches are locally governed by a church committee which is more accountable to church leaders than to church members. In fact, neither the church committee nor the assembly of church members can sack a senior pastor or a priest.

5.4. The Tushiriki as a community-driven reconstruction programme

Community Driven Reconstruction applies the methodology of community-driven development to a post-conflict setting. It focuses on building a governance structure that stresses local choice and accountability and promotes quick and efficient delivery of reconstruction assistance locally.

Tushiriki is a CDR programme implemented by the US-based International Rescue Committee. CDR aims to work directly with citizens, rather than with authorities or elites. It delineates areas of intervention of around 17,177 families/households. These areas usually do

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not coincide with the regular administrative organisation of groupements, but they are nonetheless called ‘villages’. In every target area 10 representatives (five men and five women) are selected to form the Village Development Committee. There are also larger target areas, consisting of 34 VDCs, which are called ‘sub-communities’ and which are governed by committees made up of representatives of the VDCs. After a series of meetings – where at least 40% of the adult population must be present – each target village got an amount of US$ 3,000 to use for a reconstruction project of choice by the community. In addition, communities received an amount varying from US$ 50,000 through US$ 70,000, depending on the size of the community population. In this paper, we focus on the village level, as at the time of fieldwork the community level processes became more contractor-driven than community-driven. For instance, in Cibanda II community, committee members complained that they had little to say in decision making of mobilizing residents to construct digs for water pipes, because these were paid by the contractor without any consent of the CDC committee.

5.4.1. Setting

This research was undertaken in the DRC, South-Kivu province, in Mwenga territory, especially in the Burhinyi and Luhwindja chiefdoms, where the Tushiriki CDR programme that was implemented by the IRC intervention took place, from 2008 through 2010. Burhinyi is 94 kilometres and Luhwindja is 67 kilometres away from the provincial capital of Bukavu. The population belong to the Shi ethnic group. Burhinyi and Luhwindja are two chiefdoms populated by 103,066 inhabitants, Burhinyi has 18 groupements, and Luhwindja 9. There were 34 Tushiriki villages in total in the two chiefdoms, with a total of 44,173 inhabitants. These ‘villages’ were composed of approximately 1,200 inhabitants each, often a hamlet of a groupement. The 34 ‘villages’ were grouped together in 8 ‘communities’, consisting of roughly 6,000 inhabitants each.

5.4.2. Research methodology

This paper is based on qualitative research in 15 of 34 target villages by the Tushiriki/IRC programme in the chiefdoms of Burhinyi and Luhwindja, which means on four of eight target communities: Budaha and Birhala in the Burhinyi chiefdom and Cibanda II and Karhundu in the Luhwindja chiefdom. The paper presents findings from these 15 villages, and highlight cases of two villages, which were purposively selected to analyse issues of power relations

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and social dynamics during the programme implementation. Both villages were small in size and homogeneous in terms of ethnicity. In Mubone, the church played an active role in the project, exemplifying the role of elites observed in the research areas. Ciriri was simultaneously targeted by more than one international agency for reconstruction, and was exceptional in becoming the locus of an open contestation of local authority, providing insights into the interlocking layers of power that operate in DRC.

During the period of data collection, Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa spent nearly two years (i.e., from 2008 to 2010) in the area, where he did both formal and informal interviews, some of which were repeated (i.e., done several times) as they took place at different moments of the project implementation. These interviews were semi-structured and coupled with participant observation during both project planning and execution. For instance, Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa participated in public meetings held under the Tushiriki programme regarding election, and project approval and reporting, as well as Sunday church services in both Catholic and Protestant churches, to understand the role played by churches in the project. He also participated in manual work during local road reconstruction, where he identified the main actors in the processes of project execution. Finally, he visited the reconstruction sites, which were subsidised by other agencies, such as Comité Anti-Bwaki/ICCO\(^{101}\) and Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale/United Nations International Children and Emergency Fund (AVSI/UNICEF).

Participants in the interviews were local authorities (i.e., the CPEA, the chief of locality, the chief of groupement, and the chief of chiefdom/Mwami) and religious leaders (i.e., senior pastors, the head catholic priest/Curé and church elders), residents of the respective villages (i.e., men and women) and the educated elite (schoolmaster, teachers, and students of secondary school) who led most of the VDCs. In total 134 participants, some of whom were interviewed individually or collectively, provided their views on what occurred in their respective villages.\(^{102}\)

5.4.3. Mubone: the role of elites in CDR

Mubone is a village located in the Karhundu groupement in the southeast of the Luhwindja chiefdom. It is reachable by a 20-minute walk from the main road Kaziba-Luhwindja. Its

\(^{101}\) ICCO is the interchuch organisation for development cooperation. See [http://www.icco.nl](http://www.icco.nl)

\(^{102}\) Some interviews were recorded on tape, while others were not, because of lack of energy in this rural area of South-Kivu. These interviews (both formal and informal, recorded or not) were transcribed into a field manuscript book by Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa.
inhabitants are originally from the same ethnic group, the Bahwindjahwindja in this rural area. Majority is protestant and belongs to the 5e CELPA church, some residents are catholic.

The dominant institution in the area is the 5e CELPA local church. Its compound also houses the only school in the area that is built and managed by the church. The church leaders are highly respected in the area. They embody the power to baptize new Christians and pray for those who have misfortune, for marriage and for peace in the area. As in other areas where church leaders are initiators of schools and health centres/posts, they also symbolise power over the schoolmaster of the Mubone primary school. They have a say in who has access to school. Their position in the village also puts them in a privileged connection with chiefs, police and military authorities.

The influence of the church was highly visible in the composition of the Village Development Committee of the Tushiriki. Two of the ten positions of the VDC were occupied by the senior pastor and his wife. Other influential members in the VDC were either members or elders of the same church. The male VDC president was one of the elders of this church and the schoolmaster of another 5e CELPA primary school in the neighbouring village. Other influential VDC members (including the female VDC president) were teachers at a primary school. Catholic members represented 30% of the VDC, among whom was one teacher at another school, which was managed by the Catholic Church.

During the project selection meeting, which took place in the church, the Mubone primary school, which was in lamentable status before its reconstruction, was selected as the village project within the Tushiriki/IRC programme. Before the project was selected a number of public meetings were organised to elect VDC members, approve the project’s budget and others. As time passed by before the actual start of the project, residents became less interested in public meetings. They felt the Tushiriki/IRC was not different from other agencies that made promises without any concrete realisation in the village.

As the regulations of Tushiriki required one more meeting before the money could be disbursed, the church leaders – still confident in the project – stepped in. During a church service, the VDC president and church elder announced: “Last time, the Tushiriki meeting was cancelled for lack of quorum (i.e., 40% of adult population of the entire village). We run the risk of losing the Tushiriki funding. If you say ‘yes’ the project will continue. How can you allow that our school, the school in which your kids are studying, to be not reconstructed because of your absence in a meeting!”. He then gave the instruction: “Presidents of the local
three choirs, please take care of your people. We would like to see everybody there, christians and no christians”. While the announcement was given, the senior pastor stood at the main door of the church building, paying particular attention to how participants reacted. The next day the meeting was held and indeed the quorum was met and the budget unanimously approved. Voting happened by posing a form in either the YES box or the (smaller) NO box (Cfr. Photo1.1). There was no confidentiality as everyone could see in which box every one puts the voting ticket. In the case of Mubone, the chief was present at the church service and the public meeting, but took no active role in the meetings or the supervision of the project execution.

Photo1.1: Difference of box size for project’s budget approval in Mubone village

The active role of the church continued during the implementation of the project. When Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa visited the village on 22 January 2009, he found the senior

103 Participant observation made by Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa, on 16 November 2008 in Mubone 5e CELPA church.
104 Participant observation made by Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa, on 17 November 2008 during project’s budget approval in Mubone 5e CELPA church.
pastor burning bricks for the school in a kiln, where a group of school children was producing bricks, under the strict supervision of their schoolmaster. Women were mobilized by the church heads to carry sand from the Namnana river to the top of the mountain where the school was located (about an hour’s walk).

Residents who were not members of this church contributed less, if at all, to the community work seen as local participation, although they were interested in the project. One Catholic mother considered the school to be part of the Protestant church, and she was not approached to carry sand. Nonetheless, she intended to send her kid to the school once it was completed as it would be closer to her household. In 2010, when the project ended, the village got its three classrooms completely rebuilt (at least according to the standards of the area).

The Mubone case illustrates the influence of the local elite, in this case the church, on the Community Driven Reconstruction programme. This was typical for the cases observed in our research. In the CDR programme, the committee members are supposed to be powerful. However, due to overlapping identities and networks, they lean more to the elites than to the people. They could even be seen as part of the elites, or the upcoming elite because they are linked either to chiefs (traditional authorities) or to church leaders (Cfr. Figure 5.2). In some areas chiefs were dominant, in others churches but invariably these authorities took control.
over the process in different ways. This included controlling the flow of information about reconstruction, bringing in their pre-existing agenda for reconstruction, getting themselves or their relatives elected in committees. It also included stimulating (or forcing) attendance in public meetings and participation in community works, by managing the intervention on the ground, for example in the case of road construction to give permission to use the land for the road.

At the same time, the case of Mubone illustrates that elite control is not equal to elite capture. In the case of Mubone, the church dominated the project, yet the population felt they did so for the benefit of the community and they respected and appreciated the role of the church. Remarkably, the Tushiriki was designed to circumvent local authorities yet owed its success – in the case of Mubone and similar cases – to the influence of these authorities.

5.4.4. Ciriri: inter-elite struggle

Ciriri is a groupement located at the southeast of the Birhala groupement, the suburb and chef-lieu of the Burhinyi chiefdom. Given its small size and the homogeneity of its population, it is considered a village within the Tushiriki/IRC programme. It is accessible by footpath at nearly half an hour’s walk from Birhala. People originally from the same area, the Barhinyirhinyi, inhabit the village. They are from the Shi ethnic group that is dominant in this rural chiefdom.

The existing institutions in the village include the chieftaincy, with which the residents of Ciriri identify themselves, and the 5e CELPA, the Protestant church. The chief takes care of matters of security and organises regular administrative census. Chiefs are also the primary institution where people turn to in cases of disputes over land and livestock (Cfr Figure 5.1). Also and importantly, they take care of local customs and residents identity. Most of its residents are illiterate, and their social actions are influenced by both traditional customs and religious beliefs. The village has one primary school, the Ciriri primary school, which was initiated by the 5e CELPA local church in 1998.

The chieftaincy and the church are particularly close in Ciriri. The current 5e CELPA senior pastor was the former chief of the groupement before he graduated at the Kakwende Bible school (a 5-year Bible study), leaving the chieftaincy to his young brother. In the eyes

105 Ciriri groupement is composed of 3 localities (Ciriri, Kabibi and Mulama), each of which is headed by a locality chief.
106 While the 5è CELPA church is dominant in the groupement (about 367 members), there is a local catholic church (about 30 members).
of the residents, despite the change at the top of the groupement, the senior pastor continued to influence decisions made at both chieftaincy and church. One female resident explained that he was very powerful, because he was tied to the Mwami and to 5e CELPA officials. She said: “We believe in what chiefs decide to do. We follow everything he decides to do”. The senior pastor was also influential in the Tushiriki process.

The VDC in Ciriri selected the school as their reconstruction project. While the selection of projects should follow nominations by ordinary village people, the idea to reconstruct the school pre-dated the project and originated from the senior pastor: “The 5e CELPA church initiated this school construction. My effort, the effort of the church and of local people. My prayer was always how to get five thousands US dollars to rebuild it.” The pastor was able to mobilize funds from a different agency, CAB/ICCO, to rebuild 4 class-rooms, leaving 2 class-rooms to be reconstructed under Tushiriki. At the end of the project, CAB/ICCO rebuilt 6 classrooms, while two years later, the 2-Tushiriki classrooms were used as the local 5è CELPA church because its big building was under reconstruction.

While the Tushiriki/IRC aimed to improve governance through reconstruction, CAB was only focusing on reconstruction of the infrastructure, or what we refer to as the hardware of development. There were only a few meetings and the agency provided all the material, hired masons and carpenters and paid the local technical labour involved. The money involved was kept secret, but believed to mount up to 25,000 USD. In comparison, Tushiriki only availed of 3,000 USD, only used local resources, and organised many public meetings during the first three months, for election of the VDC, for the project selection, for project approval, and for reporting about the on-going project. As a result, CAB was seen as a manna in the village, and people became reluctant to take part in the Tushiriki, especially because those who worked for the CAB project got regular wages. One of the residents explained: “Even if we transport material for reconstruction, there will not be exemption for school fees for our kids. So I prefer to go to my field rather than spend time for this project”. To enable completion of the project, the senior pastor distributed exercise books to the chiefs so that they could write down names of people who carried out or not everyday stones and sand. Eventually, after a lot of mobilization through church service and daily calls by the chief’s advisors to participate in the execution of the project, the school was finished in 2010.

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107 Interview on 16 January 2009 with Giselle, female resident of Ciriri village.
108 Interview on 20 April 2009 with Jusua, the senior pastor of Ciriri 5e CELPA church (also former Ciriri groupement chief) in Ciriri village.
The implementation of the Tushiriki was further riddled by inter-elite conflict, which had become prominent in earlier development interventions. When Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa visited the area, reconstruction of the school was under the supervision of either the senior pastor or the chief of groupement. Residents were reluctant to talk with the researcher and referred him to the leaders, hinting that they would not want them to talk about the project. It turned out that there had been a conflict between the former headmaster of the Ciriri primary school and the senior pastor over the CAB school: “I have been in overt conflict with the Ciriri senior pastor about why I was not able to give him his percentage from 70 metal sheets I received (from an NGO) to construct the school. Or why I did not give to him or to his brother (groupement chief) a goat. He wanted his young brother to become schoolmaster in order to replace me. He wanted to kill me. God protected me”. Although the residents were aware of these complications and that projects were partly a means for the local elite to get funding from international agencies and therefore benefit from it in order to survive, they did not consider this irregular, as they believed that their chiefs were privileged because they represented the entire population.

When the Tushiriki made its first cash disbursement to the VDC, this was misappropriated by the committee (a mix of chief(s) and church leaders). During their meeting, they distributed US$ 100, US$ 50, and US$ 10 to each other. In the case of Tushiriki, this became a big issue. When the Tushiriki staff heard people talking about it, he informed the Mwami about the misuse of funds, and the Mwami reacted promptly. He jailed the entire VDC, as well as the senior pastor and the chief of the groupement. They stayed in jail for up to two days and had to reimburse the funds. According to some local people, the male president of the VDC was even given a beating by the police. When Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa interviewed the Mwami on 31st March 2010 about what happened in Ciriri village, the Mwami, a man in his 30s, who held a university degree and was inaugurated as a king in February 2008, mentioned that when he heard that news, he went to the place and decided to punish everyone involved. Continuing his thoughts, he said:

You know, the value of my decision was to avoid corruption, embezzlement of Tushiriki funds in other villages. With that decision, I showed that the Tushiriki programme should work and leave signs here. What you see are the outputs, the effects of my decision implicitly. That is how I work. I am for the population, at the same time I punish the one who goes away! Otherwise we would not get the success we have now.

109 Interview on 20 March 2009 with Guillaume, the schoolmaster of Busherega primary school (former schoolmaster of Ciriri primary school).
In our interview, the Mwami gave different reasons for his intervention. On the one hand, he wanted to show that he understood the objective of the approach (governance through reconstruction) and that he wanted to contribute in his manner as a new type of educated King, holding a bachelor degree from University of Bukavu. He also explained that he wanted to secure the continued support of the IRC because he knew that the IRC, after supporting the villages, would disburse larger amounts of money to the community level. Last, he was motivated politically as in November 2011, he became candidate at the National parliament, unfortunately was elected in the second position.

In Ciriri, the local elite attempted to capture the project. The appropriation of funds is regular local practice, and usually projects do not become controversial. The (larger) CAB project, for example, had led to inter-elite fighting over the distribution of the goods, but the appropriation in itself did not get challenged or sanctioned. In the case of the Tushiriki the handling of money became a public issue. This was not due to downward accountability and vigilance of the residents, but came about through inter-elite control. In particular, the Mwami in conjunction with the field staff of IRC intervened to avoid further elite capture of the project.

While the local power-holders wanted to capture the project, we see in this case that this was corrected by ‘power over power’. In this case, the field staff used the authority of the king to undermine the influence of the particular chief of groupement. Rather that through downward accountability, the project comes about through a ‘game of powers’ which – indeed – reflected how power relations evolved in practice in this participatory development or reconstruction programme.

5.4.5. Development elites: the dominance of churches
In the above, we have demonstrated how elites have a decisive influence in the governance of the CDR programme. We can build upon this argument to establish who is the more influential authorities in South Kivu? In our sample of 34 villages, we determined who was the more influential stakeholder in the process: the church, the chief, or a combination of the two. Comparing this with the outcome of the selection process, we found clear evidence that the nature of the authoritative stakeholders strongly relates to the type of projects that was selected. Chiefs have traditionally been responsible for roads and infrastructure, and would naturally favour the construction of a road as the first priority. In the five cases where Chiefs were dominant, the selected project consisted of roads and water works. Churches, on the
other hand, have a vested interest in public services, in particular education and health. Where church leaders dominated the process, the village development committees invariably choose for education-related projects. This was the case in 25 villages. In our sample, the churches come above as the more influential authority in the domain of public services and development.

The IRC has been implementing another large CDR programme, covering four territories of the South Kivu province (that is Kalehe, Mwenga, Uvira and Mwenga). In each of the villages, residents have elected a project for reconstruction. The records of the IRC show that an overwhelming % of these projects have focused on education (25/34 projects representing 73.5% in Tushiriki programme (Cfr. Table 5.1). In addition, education was by was selected at both VDCs (44.9%) and CDCs (63.7%) in Tuungane I (programme implemented from 2008 through 2010) and by VDCs (56.3%) in Tuungane II (programme being implemented from 2011 through 2014). This means that churches are the more dominant authority when it comes to development services.

Table 5.1: Key power holders by types of projects executed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Power Holders</th>
<th>Types of projects</th>
<th>Villages</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chiefs of chiefdom, groupement, village and chef de poste administratif Church leaders</td>
<td>Road, bridge, guest-house of the chiefdom, water system and water points</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church leaders</td>
<td>Classrooms, schoolmaster office, water reservoir and water points, road</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>73.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination of chiefs and church leaders</td>
<td>Road, office of chief, office of schoolmaster, classrooms</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
Churches: (i) Protestant (*5ème CELPA: 5ème Communauté des Eglises Libres Pentecôte en Afrique; **8ème CEPAC : communauté des Eglises Pentecostistes en Afrique Centrale, ***PCG : Pentecostal Church of God) and (ii) ****Catholic church; to exercise power meant at least two out of three criteria of scoring (pre-existing project, key player in decision making and key player in execution of the project); while chiefs had pre-existing projects and played a key role in prioritization of them, they were not necessarily key players in execution of them. Church leaders, however, were much influential in decision making and execution of their pre-existing projects.

5.5. Conclusion
The CDR programme of Tushiriki is designed in such a way that village committee that are elected by the population at large govern reconstruction projects with regular meetings
securing full transparency of the project, to enable downward accountability of the committee members to the population.

In our analysis of the local dynamics of reconstruction we found instead an overwhelming role of the local authorities and elites in the project. Our findings suggest that despite the chaos of war and the collapse of the Mobutu state, local institutions, in particular chieftaincy and churches, which are based on customs and faith proved to be relatively robust. The elite consisting of the old generation of chiefs and church leaders and the new generation of educated villagers (schoolmaster, teachers, students at secondary school) who emanate from and are related to the old generation dominated the CDR. This group of non-elite comprises peasants and residents who depend on the former group in order to survive.

Chiefs have a power base in the control of land and cattle, their relation with the local administration and the traditional beliefs that convey spiritual power to traditional leaders. Churches, on the other hand, in the context of a failed state, adopt the state function of initiating and running social services, such as schools, health centres, and even hospitals. This means that pastoral power, grounded in Christian faith, is expended through their central role in service delivery.

The Village Development Committees were usually dominated by the educated elite (teachers, headmasters and church elders), while less educated members played a secondary role. In reality, the VDCs were thus an instrument of, or at least closely related to, authority figures from the church or the chiefdom. In the election of committee members, the two institutions may either compete or compromise. The selection of projects strongly depended on authority figures that instructed the VDCs about their preferred project, which often was a pre-conceived project in need of funding. Authorities were also important in the execution of projects, especially to ensure the labour participation of the population. In many projects, people were later motivated to contribute with their labour, and the pressure of authorities was important to enforce their contribution. Ostrom showed, the problem of free-riding in the production of collective benefits usually require an external authority system, an internal monitoring and sanctions system, and strong group consciousness. In this case, it was especially the authorities that made the difference. While CDR assumes that people will be motivated to contribute to a public good once they feel they are in control, in reality the

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pressure of the authorities was an important element in realizing the projects. Hence, and contrary to how the IRC wanted to operate, we found that the success of the projects in terms of restoring infrastructure and services, largely depended on local elites. Only when chiefs or church leaders made an effort for the project, it was possible to mobilize the meetings and labour.

While there is a tendency to think that chiefs and church leaders may appropriate projects, we found that these elites are often motivated to work for the community interest. This may not be an expression of interest in the public good *per se*, but a realisation that development projects enhance their power. Churches are interested to have projects for their membership. There is also a material interest in building a good school. Once a school meets certain standards, it gets recognised by the central government, that will pay the salaries of the teachers. Church leaders then expect 10% of an employee’s salary from the government as a tithe to the church. Supporting projects may thus be in the interests of elites. This was also expressed by the *Mwami* when he stated that one of his reasons to intervene in the project was to safeguard the relation with the IRC to secure future, and bigger, projects.

A key element of CDR is the transparency of the process. Our findings corroborate that transparency plays a role in CDR, but not in the way envisioned. While the population at large seems to be accepting a certain misappropriation of funds by authorities, correction may come about by competing elites rather than the population. In the case of Ciriri, the field staff had built up rapport with the *Mwami* and was able to have him intervene in the process, even if this meant he had to sanction his own chief. This use of ‘power over power’, in this case positively influenced the outcome of the project. Dasgupta and Beard state that not all powerful elites are corrupt and that a distinction between elite control and elite capture should be made.\(^{111}\) Similarly, Booth argues that Africa’s own institutional resources and historical legacies might be harnessed for developmental purposes, rather than be viewed merely as barriers to change.\(^{112}\) Lund, moreover, demonstrates that even where elites capture development, this may change in the course of programmes.\(^{113}\) This idea is supported by Kelsall who has stated that people feel act honestly and fairly within the extended family in

\(^{111}\) See A. Das Gupta and V. Beard, *op cit*, p. 244.

\(^{112}\) D. Booth, *op cit*, p. 3

Africa and that beyond it, religious foundation is likely the most developmental institution. In the case of Ciriri, the field staff of IRC had adopted this strategy as a working strategy, based on their own knowledge of the social dynamics of project intervention, even though this was not part of the programme’s design.

Our observations about the actual role played by elites in the CDR programme, whereby the selection and execution of reconstruction projects is less the outcome of the democratic process whereby local people freely express a preference for the public good and freely participate in its execution. It is rather the outcome of existing power holders actions where one form of elite is worse than another. This makes us reconsider the successes and failures of community-driven reconstruction. It would be important for CDR to take these into account and aim for a positive involvement of local power holders in CDR.

Finally, we asked the question which authority is dominant – in the context of institutional development. Our findings suggest that the dominance of education-related projects in CDR in Eastern DRC are a token of the influence of churches over chieftaincies. Most development programmes seeking to improve governance focus on state institutions and are framed in an objective of state building. In Eastern DRC it would be worthwhile to bring churches into the equation of governance and invest in understanding better the working and accountability of churches for development.

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CHAPTER 5: Power holders and social dynamics

Photo 5. 2: 5th CELPA (protestant) church in Kakwende-Burhinyi (sign of church power in the area)

Photo 5. 3: Catholic church at Luhwindja parish (sign of church power in the area)
Photo 5.4: Cibanda II groupement chief supervising community local road construction in Cibanda, Luhwindja

Photo 5.5: DRC’s flag (sign of chieftaincy-state power) at the Birhala groupement chief in Burhinyi
6. Labour mobilization: the case of Tushiriki

This chapter has been submitted for publication as:

CHAPTER 6: Labour mobilization

ABSTRACT

Community-driven reconstruction (CDR) has become one of the growing approaches to reconstruction in conflict affected areas. Community participation in these programmes takes in practice the form of labour or volunteer work, which may be viewed differently by participants. We examined the effectiveness of the CDR approach, specifically the mobilization of voluntary manual labour for public works in the Tushiriki programme. We found that overall, people’s participation was lower than expected, that their motivation depended on the type of work related to the selected project and there was common unwillingness to perform manual labour for free. We argue that people’s behaviour regarding labour is influenced by repetitive cycles of forced manual labour in the area. In addition, people lacked motivation because of the contested notion of public goods such as road and education in the area.

Keywords: labour; incentive; community-driven reconstruction; conflict affected-area; Democratic Republic of Congo

6.1. Introduction

After post-conflict reconstruction was criticised in the 1990s for its top-down character, the last decade has seen an increasing trend towards so-called community-driven reconstruction (CDR) projects (Hilhorst et al., 2010; Kyamusugulwa, 2013b:1267). In theory, CDR is characterised by the fact that local stakeholders are not only involved in the implementation of post-conflict reconstruction projects but also in the latter’s design and planning (Agrawal and Yadama, 1997:457; Cliffe, Guggenheim et al. 2003:2; Kyamusugulwa, 2013a:364). This involvement, which is often described as community participation or public participation, has become one of the principal conditions of bilateral and multilateral donors financing reconstruction interventions (Buchya and Hovermanb, 2000:15). In practice, community participation often takes the form of labour or ‘volunteer work’. There is a tendency among donors to consider this ‘volunteer work’ as the main yardstick for measuring local communities’ contribution and commitment to post-conflict reconstruction projects (Hickey and Kothari, 2009: 82; Richards, 2006:2).

The aim of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of the CDR approach in terms of stimulating local communities’ participation in public goods provision, with a particular focus on the mobilization of voluntary manual labour for public works. This will be done through an analysis of a CDR programme called Tushiriki, which was implemented between
2008 and 2010 in various communities in the province of South Kivu, situated in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Our research findings show that, overall, the level of participation in Tushiriki was lower than expected, and that people’s preparedness and motivation to take part in the programme depended to a very large extent on the type of work they were expected to do. The greatest problem the programme faced was a widespread unwillingness on the part of the project participants to perform manual labour for free. In our view, this reluctance is probably due to eastern DRC’s labour history, which has been characterized by repetitive cycles of coercive labour recruitment for public works.

The paper is structured as follows. In the first part, we provide some background information on the context in which the Tushiriki programme was implemented. We give a short overview of the conflict in eastern DRC, we explain the main components of the Tushiriki programme, and we zoom in on the logic behind it. We argue that the assumptions of CDR with regard to labour mobilization are unjustified, especially because of the troubled labour history of eastern DRC. In the second part of the paper, we move on to discuss two case studies from the Tushiriki programme, paying particular attention to the way local people responded to calls for community participation. Finally, in the conclusion of the paper, we attempt to draw a general lesson for the future of CDR projects in conflict-affected regions with a well-known history of forced labour recruitment.

6.2. Setting the scene: Factors influencing the dynamics of labour mobilization in Eastern DRC

6.2.1. Reconstruction in a situation of no-war-no-peace

Congo has been the theatre of fighting between rebel movements and the Government of Kinshasa since the second half of the 1990s, when the Mobutu regime was no longer able to cope with the consequences of more than thirty years of political and economic misrule. In the literature, a distinction is usually made between two phases in the conflict: the first and the second Congo war. During the first war, the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL), a rebel movement led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila and supported by Rwanda and Uganda, fought against and eventually toppled the Mobutu regime in May 1997.
The second Congo war, which started in August 1998 and ended in July 2003, pitted the Kinshasa regime against its former allies Rwanda and Uganda. In addition to sending out troops of their own, both the Rwandan government and the Ugandan government were instrumental in the creation, training and military provisioning of various Congolese rebel movements who were all fighting the Kinshasa government. Kinshasa, for its part, received military assistance from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, three fellow members of the Southern African Development Community, while it was also able to secure support from Chad, Libya and Sudan (see Prunier, 2009; Reyntjens, 2009; Stearns, 2011).

Although the second Congo war officially came to an end with the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement in Sun City in December 2002, and although two democratic elections have been held since then (in 2006 and 2011, respectively), fighting in eastern DRC has continued unabated until November 2013. At the time of writing, the Kinshasa government has lost control over substantial parts of North and South Kivu and was faced with fierce resistance from the Rwandan-supported M23 rebel movement, the FDLR and various local militias and self-defence groups (see Larmer, Laudati et al., 2013; UN, 2012; Verweijen, 2013).

Despite the continuation of armed violence in various parts of eastern DRC, the international community has tried to promote economic development and social stability by injecting millions of dollars in post-conflict reconstruction efforts (Trefon, 2010). This paper focuses on one such programme called Tushiriki, a Swahili expression meaning ‘let’s all be involved together. Tushiriki took place from 2008 until the end of 2010, was funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs via Stichting Vluchteling, and was implemented by the International Rescue Committee (SV and IRC, 2007).

Aiming to contribute to poverty alleviation and post-conflict rehabilitation, Tushiriki consisted of two components: one dealing with community development and another one dealing with civil society. With regard to the community development component, it is important to note that the programme created a governance structure – the so-called Village Development Committee (VDC) – in every target village, in which ten members representing

115 Stichting Vluchteling: The Netherlands Foundation for Refugees is a Dutch agency based in the Hague that funded the programme, while the International Rescue Committee implemented it. For more information about Stichting Vluchteling, please go to http://www.vluchteling.org/pagina/home_nl
residents were democratically elected. Tushiriki adopted a participatory approach and tried to make sure that at least 40 per cent of the adult population of each target village was involved in key activities, such as the approval of the project budget, the election of committee members and the participation in regular meetings about the on-going project. The selected project per village that needed effective reconstruction was either a school, a classroom, a local road or a water system.

The second component of the programme consisted of strengthening capacity of local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) for good governance and advocacy practices on behalf of local communities. During the project execution, participants were asked by actors of both of the two components to contribute with labour in terms of unskilled tasks of carrying raw and local material to the reconstruction site. At the same time, local technicians (also inhabitants of the same area) contributed with skilled labour, which was reasonably paid (i.e a bit below a normal wage). The VDC members managing the project were at the same time involved in both mobilisation, reporting and community work with other villagers.

6.2.2. The logic behind the labour contribution of community-driven reconstruction programmes

People in DRC and in other post-conflict environments have become used to participate in food for work or cash for work schemes. In these schemes, food aid or cash relief is given to people in exchange for a labour contribution to public works (Clay, 1986). These schemes are highly popular within humanitarian programmes, with a double rationale: the public works can make a beginning to post-conflict reconstruction and the introduction of a counterpart for relief would prevent the development of a dependency syndrome. Food or cash for work programmes have not been without problems: they often result in roads that wash away or lead to nowhere, and it is the question whether poor people can free the labour to extend to the project (Dagnachew, 2013). On the other hand, what is important to emphasize for this paper is that in these schemes people get paid (in cash or in kind) for their labour contribution to public works.

The CDR follows a different rationale. In these programmes it is assumed that people are motivated to provide labour for the production of public goods. The motivation is supposed to rest on two pillars. It is supposed that people will profit from the public goods and hence should have an incentive to contribute to their production. Secondly, it is supposed
that when citizens control the decisions leading to the project, this will enthuse them to participate in its realisation. Both these suppositions are questionable.

The supposition that people should be motivated because they can profit from the public goods can be put into question. In DRC, where state institutions have been considered predatory for decades, the concept of public goods may not be highly developed: public office for example is more likely to be considered as a private enterprise than a service to the public. The public works that are subject to community reconstruction overwhelmingly concern school and roads. Roads, it can be argued, have little utility for the poor who cannot afford to pay fees for transportation, and schools in DRC can be considered private more than public, as the school fees cover all expenses incurred.

The second supposition - that people are likely to be motivated for projects they control - is also questionable. As early as 1969, Arnstein introduced a ladder of participation that denoted that the label of community participation can hide very different realities, ranging from manipulation to citizen control (Arnstein, 1969). These can result from different project designs, where participation is built in instrumental ways or with objectives to transform community relations. At the same time, there is a concern that participation in communities is differential and that there is a risk that poor people pay the prize while elites enjoy the benefits. What programmes call participation can – from the perspective of local people – sometimes be more appropriately dubbed as ‘forced labour’. Mansuri refers to such a case in Indonesia, where under the guise of participation everybody was expected to provide free labour, or face social, political, material and even physical sanctions (Mansuri, 2004). White points out that despite the rhetoric, it is usually women and poor men who provide the labour in community projects because others can call on their status or buy out their duties (White, 1996). The labour contribution of poor people to development is further complicated because of the long colonial and post-colonial history with forced community labour.

6.2.3. Eastern DRC’s history of forced labour
Since the second half of the nineteenth century, eastern DRC has witnessed several waves of coercive labour recruitment. Between 1865 and 1892, the Zanzibar trader Tippu Tip introduced a system of slavery. Large numbers of men were captured in the Congolese interior with the aim of forcing them to work as ivory porters for the Zanzibari trade caravans, or to work as servants or soldiers for the Zanzibari armed forces. Later on,
CHAPTER 6: Labour mobilization

following the military conquest of the region by the Belgians in 1892-94, the Kivus came under the control of King Leopold II’s Congo Free State. Although the Belgian king prided himself on taking the lead in the struggle against the Zanzibari slave trade, the Congo Free State used the slave-labour system created by Tippu Tip as the basis of its own labour system. The law of 6 October 1891 stipulated that, every time an African chief was certified and invested by the colonial authorities, a list of so-called prestations\textsuperscript{116} had to be drafted, which gave an overview of all the goods and services the newly installed local ruler would have to deliver to the Free State. The services consisted mainly of the furnishing of labourers and labour services.\textsuperscript{117}

After the Belgian takeover of Congo in 1908, there was a slight improvement in the labour conditions for the African population. Yet, overall, the colonial administration preferred to continue sustaining its labour force through taxation and compulsion rather than through the provision of attractive wages to African workers (Northrup, 1988).\textsuperscript{118} Corvée labour remained one of the key features of Belgian colonialism. Congolese could be forced to work up to 60 days a year, with a distinction being made between two types of forced labour: on the one hand, manual labour on special projects such as the maintenance of roads, bridges and ferries, and, on the other hand, the forced cultivation of both food crops and export crops such as cotton (Callaghy, 1984:299).

In January 1973, the population was faced with a new form of forced labour called Salongo. After a visit to China, where he witnessed how Mao Zedong forced the population to do various types of jobs to promote national development, Mobutu decided to apply the

\textsuperscript{116} The system of prestations was meant, on the one hand, to provide the public servants of the Free State with food, shelter and transport, and, on the other hand, to organize the collection of wild rubber and ivory for the personal benefit of King Leopold II (Northrup, 1988:46).

\textsuperscript{117} Faced with rising protest in Europe and growing unrest in Congo in response to the system of the prestations, the Free State tried to silence its critics by announcing a series of reforms, which gave the impression of creating a less coercive labour climate. However, in reality, people in eastern DRC did not see any differences in their everyday lives: they continued to be put under huge pressure to meet the authorities’ demands for rubber, porterage, food, building materials and labour corvées for the maintenance of roads and telegraph routes, amongst other things.

\textsuperscript{118} During World War I, the population of eastern DRC was forced to contribute to Belgium’s war effort. When, in 1916, plans were made for an invasion of German East Africa, the population of the Kivus was confronted with forced recruitment for the Force Publique and with demands for porters transporting ammo, supplies and food for the armed forces. While it has to be admitted that, during the 1920s and 1930s, the colonial authorities introduced a series of restrictions on the use of African labour (including, amongst other things, a refusal to authorize forced labour for railroad construction purposes), low-level members of the colonial administration were still under enormous pressure to supply African labour at low wages to colonists, missions, private companies and government agencies.
same system in Zaire. He gave orders to show the Chinese propaganda movie 'Esprit de Yukung' on national television and made provisions for the creation of the Zairian television series 'Esprit de Salongo' which was meant to illustrate the virtues of Salongo (Pype, 2008:59-60). In theory, Salongo was supposed to be a voluntary method of civic education: people were expected to participate in projects of public interest by their own free will, cleaning up streets and repairing bridges or roads without being paid for it. Yet, in practice, very few Zairians were prepared to take part in Salongo on a voluntary basis, and, very often, Mobutu’s administration saw no other option than to call out the police and army to ensure active participation (Kabwit, 1979:390; Schatzberg, 1980:80). A good illustration of the forced nature of Salongo is a decree issued by the Kivu regional commissioner in June 1975, which stated that ‘all Zairian citizens living in Kivu region are obliged to respond to the civic work of Salongo’ (see Callaghy, 1984:300). The decree made it clear that whoever refused to follow the rules of the Salongo system would face sanctions of 8 to 30 days imprisonment and/or the payment of a fine of 5 Zaire (ibidem).119

Strikingly, in some areas of eastern DRC, the salongo practice has continued to exist after the end of the Mobutu state, albeit in slightly different forms. A first example concerns the mining sector. In July 2009, the British NGO Global Witness reported that networks within the Congolese army had introduced a system of Salongo or forced labour in some of the artisanal mines under its control:

(…) in some mines, a system has been set up in which particular days of the week are allocated for working for the soldiers. This is sometimes referred to as salongo (…). An activist from South Kivu said: ‘In Shabunda, Mwenga and Kamituga, specific days are designated. For example, every Saturday, people go to work in a particular commander’s plot. It is like Salongo. (…) The workers are not paid.’ Other days are dedicated to working for local authorities or traditional chiefs, as some of these civilian officials take a cut of the mineral production (Global Witness, 2009:26-27).120

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119 Similarly to the way the colonial authorities had made a distinction between two types of corvée labour, the Mobutu regime distinguished two basic types of Salongo: agricultural Salongo or the forced cultivation of crops, and, general salongo or manual labour on projects of (supposed) public interest. In the mid-1970s, Salongo usually took place on Saturday afternoons. Everyone – with the sole exception of doctors, gendarmes and foreigners - was expected to carry out the activities that were dictated by the local administration (see Callaghy, 1984:299-303).

120 Similar observations were also made by the UN Panel of Experts on the DRC. In a report that was published in October 2010, the Panel stated that, in the Obaye tin mine, ‘Colonel Abati Albert and his deputy Colonel Dido Jacques deploy a unit from the base at Obaye (…) to enforce a tax of 5 kg per
Another context in which the practice of *Salongo* has continued to exist is that of road maintenance. In September 2013, the Congolese newspaper *La Référence Plus* ran a remarkable story about a deal between a Mai Mai commander and local state authorities in the area around Lowa, a locality in the territory of Ubundu in the province Orientale. Apparently, the rebel commander had succeeded in mobilizing the population for an extensive campaign of community labour, which consisted of repairing and clearing roads. According to the newspaper, the state authorities were very enthusiastic about the fact that the rebel commander had assisted them in ensuring the population’s active participation in public works.\textsuperscript{121} If one takes into account that the commander’s Mai Mai militia had previously terrorized the region for several months, however, it is not really surprising that people thought it was necessary to participate in the rebel commander’s *Salongo* campaign. Cases like these are not exceptional. According to Oxfam, the continuing instability in eastern DRC has led to a situation in which ordinary citizens are extremely vulnerable to various types of abuse from government soldiers, armed rebels, police and civilian authorities. Evidence gathered by the NGO shows that there have been several cases of people being forced to perform certain types of labour such as carrying food, military equipment and goods (Oxfam, 2012:8).

From the preceding account, it is clear there are strong continuities in the way labour has been mobilized in eastern DRC in the past 150 years. Ever since the arrival of Tippu Tip in the region, the Kivus have witnessed several campaigns of coercive labour recruitment, and the population has repeatedly been confronted with various forms of forced labour. One of the most striking features of eastern DRC’s labour history is that different generations of rulers have all developed the habit of using force to solve problems of labour shortage and to compel people to participate in projects of (supposed) public interest, which usually involved a considerable amount of hard manual labour.

Given the history of forced labour, this may be easily associated with practices of *salongo*, both by project managers and labourers. A striking example of this was found in a project in the village of Ciriri (Kyamusugulwa & Hilhorst, forthcoming), where the senior pastor despaired over the lack of attendance in labour for the construction of a school. One of

\textsuperscript{121} ‘*Fi des rumeurs d’un contrôle du poste de Lowa en Province Orientale par un nouveau chef Mai Mai du nom de Thom’s*’, (La Référence Plus, 21.09.2013).
the residents explained: “Even if we transport material for reconstruction, there will not be exemption for school fees for our kids. So I prefer to go to my field rather than spend time for this project”. To enable completion of the project, the senior pastor distributed exercise books to the chiefs so that they could write down names of people who carried out or not everyday stones and sand. The lists were given to the chief of the groupement, but to the disappointment of the church leader: “The groupement chief received the list of people who did not the job, he did not punish them. Forced participation I think is the solution”.

As the following sections will show, the long history of forced labour is probably one of the reasons why the Tushiriki project was not as successful as its initiators would have wished.

6.3. Case studies

6.3.1. Road and school reconstruction in the community of Birhala

As the capital of the Burhinyi chiefdom, Birhala harbours the residence of the paramount chief, the headquarters of the public administration (over which the paramount chief presides) and the office of the Chef de Poste d’Encadrement Administratif (CPEA) of Mwenga territory based in Burhinyi. In addition to this, it also has a local police force and a tribunal. It is important to note that the chiefdom of Burhinyi already existed during pre-colonial times, long before the conquest of eastern DRC by Belgian colonial forces between 1892 and 1894. For the people of Burhinyi (the so-called Barhinyirhinyi) the paramount chief is an important symbol of their unity and identity.

In Birhala premier, one of the four villages in Birhala, local people took part in the rehabilitation of a road. Although, initially, plans had been made to build a guesthouse for the chiefdom, in the end, it was decided to give priority to road repair. The main reason for this change of plans was that many people in Birhala were impressed by the positive outcomes of a similar road rehabilitation project in the neighbouring community of Budaha. There was a lot of enthusiasm about the fact that a rehabilitated road would probably make it considerably

122 Interview on 20 April 2009 with Jusua, the senior pastor of Ciriri 5e CELPA church (also former Ciriri groupement chief) in Ciriri village.

123 Birhala comprises four sub-communities which are also administrative villages: Birhala premier, located at the heart of the Burhinyi chiefdom; harbours a population of 1500 inhabitants; Ciriri, situated to the southwest of Birhala, more rural by nature, 1089 inhabitants; Bwishasha, situated to the north of Birhala, along the main road, 2156 inhabitants; Muli, situated to the west of Birhala, 1712 inhabitants.
easier to transport local goods to Bukavu, the provincial capital of South Kivu. In late April 2009, at the beginning of the project, there were fifteen male workers, divided over two sites. Using rudimentary tools such as jumpers, three-pronged forks, pickaxes, wheelbarrows and spades, they worked from Monday to Saturday, from 8 a.m. to 3 p.m.

Unfortunately, several factors slowed down the execution of the project: the work was hard and physically demanding, the number of workers was limited, and it proved to be quite difficult to negotiate with the owners of the land and of the trees that lay on the line of the road under construction. Initially planned for one month, the road rehabilitation project took nearly four months in total; that is, until end of August 2009. To speed up the process, it was decided to multiply the teams of workers and to start paying the road workers. Promises were made to continue the payments until the completion of the road.

When the project money was finished, the paramount chief tried to convince workers to continue the task as volunteers. Nevertheless, due to a lack of payment, the workers did not finish the road as planned. A final strip of 500 metres, which was supposed to reach the building of the Protestant Church, was left unaccomplished.

This example of the rehabilitation of a road in Birhala premier highlights the continued pivotal role of customary chiefs in the mobilization and motivation of labourers for public works. Just like his predecessors during colonial times and during the Mobutu era, the paramount chief of Burhinyi did his best to convince his subjects to work on the road for free, arguing that it would be to the benefit of the community. He soon discovered, however, that, similarly to what had happened in the past, people were very reluctant to perform hard manual labour on projects of public interest without receiving any financial compensation for it. Apparently, working under such conditions still had a ring of coercion to it, at least in the opinion of the local population.

Volunteer work was not only used for the rehabilitation of a road, but also for the (re)construction of classrooms in the primary schools of Bwishasha and Muli, two other villages in the community of Birhala. In Bwishasha, the reconstruction of the local primary school took place between April and August 2009. The reconstruction project required two types of work: technical work, which had to be carried out by skilled technicians and which

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124 Two segments of the road were targeted: one of three kilometres in length, situated to the southeast of Birhala premier, and another one of two kilometres in length, situated to the west of Birhala premier.
would be financially remunerated, and manual labour, for which no financial compensation would be offered and which could be carried out by workers without any specific skills or training. The group of skilled technicians consisted of two masons and two helpers, who were expected to build two additional classrooms.

Although this group did not like the fact that they were sometimes faced with a shortage of local material such as sand, and that there proved to be strong discrepancies between the project estimates and the real costs, overall, they were quite motivated to participate in the project. Unfortunately, the same did not hold true for the group of manual labourers. Having been mobilized for the project through the network of the 8th CELPA Protestant Church, they were dissatisfied with the lack of transparency and accountability on the part of the local leader of the Tushiriki intervention, a senior pastor who also worked as a schoolmaster in the school under construction. Moreover, they complained about the fact that parents performing manual labour for the project were not given any guarantees about the future reduction of their children’s school fees. Finally, there was a great deal of disappointment about the complete absence of any form of financial compensation for the manual labour carried out in the context of the project. One of the masons, a resident of Bwishasha, said:

We could vote for seed distribution as a local project of farming. Project selection was done by them [Tushiriki staff], rather than by local people; we did not understand why that was so. You can really see how your family is gaining interest; therefore, you pay school fees for kids. We agree that the school building is for community interest. One of the difficulties we face is the shortage of stones and sand. What you see there was carried out by a few family members and children who study there, because even after transporting the stones, they will have to pay the same amount of school fees and construction fees as those who did not do anything. This is a sort of social injustice!

Similarly, another resident who was a gold digger and farmer said, “We are aware of the Tushiriki project. The problem is that we are not much involved in such local contribution, because we often contribute to only such things as Salongo [forced work] from which we don’t benefit anything”.

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125 The latter problem was a result of the fact that the technicians had not been involved in the approval of the project. Additionally, they faced shortage of sand in order to build walls, which affected somehow the duration of their work. Finally, the quantity of wood was sometimes not enough because of the price change into the local market.
The case of the construction works at the primary school of Bwishasha once again shows that the communities in which the Tushiriki programme was implemented were not happy to engage in manual labour for free. They did not understand why Tushiriki refused to pay them for their work, and why the program did not even consider giving them an alternative kind of reward. That said, the example of Bwishasha also points at a difference in attitude between two groups of participants in the Tushiriki programme: whereas the unskilled workers were highly dissatisfied with their working conditions, the skilled workers did not appear to have any complaints about it. This seems to indicate that it is especially unremunerated manual work which carries the connotation of forced labour.

The experiences in Muli, however, were quite different, and the construction of the school was highly successful despite the use of free labour. In Muli, the construction of the local primary school lasted from April until July 2009. Most of the people taking part in the construction works belonged to the 5th CELPA Protestant Church. They were asked to carry sand and stones from the river to the school two or three times a week, before leaving the village to work on their land (i.e. from 6 a.m. to 7 a.m.). Several factors were responsible for turning Muli into a success story. First of all, the Tushiriki intervention was able to build on an earlier effort by the local church to establish a school. Consequently, in the eyes of the local population, the Tushiriki intervention was an excellent opportunity to finish a job that had already been started. Second, local women were very much in favour of the construction of a school closer to their homes, because they were concerned about the risks their children faced when they had to travel to far-away schools during the rainy season.

Third, there was a strong positive involvement in the Tushiriki intervention of local church leaders and traditional authorities. The senior pastor of the church and the village chief of Muli played an important role in making the local population aware of the value of the project, while they also supervised the construction works. In his double capacity of head of the village and member of the church taking the lead in the execution of the Tushiriki intervention, the village chief found it very important to set a good example. Expressing his idea on the project, the chief of Muli locality said: “I am happy with Tushiriki project because this school is one of the schools of my locality, although it is initiated and managed by 5e CELPA church. I am also 5e CELPA member”.126 Instead of limiting himself to the issuing and signing of authorization letters, he wanted to contribute to the project in the same

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126 Interview on the first day of July 2009 with Gustave a 69-year-old man, the chief of Cishukwe-Muli locality.
way as the other participants. So, thanks to the commitment of the village chief and the leadership of the local church, the population of Muli was very motivated to participate in the project. By July 2009, the construction of the 3-classroom building had reached the stage of completion. The case of Muli shows that the past history with salongo need not to be determinant for current development. Because the village head took part in the labour, there was no sense of injustice and people were indeed more motivated to contribute to a public good, because the project had already started earlier and because of the motivation efforts by the village leadership.

6.3.2. School reconstruction in the community of Luduha

Luduha is a groupement in the chiefdom of Luhwindja. It is a mountainous area, which is impossible to access by car and which can only be reached by foot. While, in the villages of Tchonga I, Tchonga II and Byazi, people constructed classrooms, in the village of Mujindi, the local population built a schoolmaster’s office. In what follows we describe sub-communities of Byazi and Mujindi.

The reconstruction of the primary school in Byazi, which had been established in 1957, at the end of the colonial period, required two types of work. The technical work was carried out by a group of carpenters, who took care of the replacement of a number of metal sheets (which made up the roof of the school building), while the manual labour, which was carried out by other members of the local community, consisted of carrying metal sheets from the suburb to the construction site. During our visit to Byazi, we were able to establish that the local community was very enthusiastic about the project and prepared to continue contributing to it in the future. Parfait a 40-year-old man, who represented the local catholic church mentioned: “Look, we are a Catholic area. I am the leader of this church. I must tell you that Luduha people are very enthusiastic about their local contribution. If there is a donor, people here really like development”. Like in the above case of Muli, the long presence of the school in the area and the dedication of the leadership were instrumental in motivating people to contribute to ‘their’ school, where a sense of community and public good was fostered.

127 As a Tushiriki community, Luduha is composed of four villages: Tchonga I (1000 inhabitants), Tchonga II (1394 inhabitants), Mujindi (1001 inhabitants) and Byazi (1185 inhabitants). In the context of the Tushiriki project, the population of Luduha decided to rehabilitate a number of school buildings in the area.
Mujindi is a contrasting case. The Tushiriki intervention in this area was focused on the construction of a schoolmaster’s office. This was due to the limited level of funding: with only US$ 3000 available for reconstruction works, it was impossible to rehabilitate the classrooms, even though all six of them were in dire need of renewal. Just like in the cases we discussed earlier, the project in Mujindi was divided in two types of work: technical work, carried out by two locally recruited masons, and manual labour, carried out by the rest of the community. The problems in Mujindi were also similar to those witnessed elsewhere: there was a lack of local building material such as sand and water and it proved to be very hard to transport cement and metal sheets from the suburb to the construction site.

One of the issues that deserve closer attention is the existence of different ideas and expectations with regard to the roles of the different groups of project participants. The members of the Village Development Committees who managed the project were disappointed about the lack of payment. Many of them had hoped to receive some form of remuneration for the meetings they attended and the supervision work they did. In training sessions organized by the Tushiriki staff, they frequently complained about this. Germain, who worked as a teacher in the Kamagaga primary school and held the position of treasurer in the local VDC, expressed his indignation over the way things were organised in a meeting of 29 August 2009:

I heard that Tushiriki staff members are being paid, but we, the VDC members, are not. Why is that? You know, this is the negative side of Tushiriki. How can we also get paid? I never see anyone who works for free as a volunteer. We thought we were recruited as workers in the Tushiriki movement. Right now, we are really disappointed about it.

The Tushiriki staff members tried to justify their approach by emphasizing the voluntary nature of the work carried out by VDC members. They did their best to convince committee members of the fact that it was absolutely normal and natural to do unpaid work for the benefit of the community, even if this work consisted of managerial tasks such as supervising and monitoring other workers. Several comparisons and metaphors were used to make this principle more understandable and acceptable. VDC members were, for instance, invited to compare themselves to pastors, ‘who also work for free since they know they will be offered a reward in Heaven’, or to the owners of a house and a plot of land, ‘who should be glad that someone helps them build a fence around their property’. However, the discourse of the Tushiriki staff failed to convince the members of the VDC. Françoise, a 28-
year old teacher who had been elected to serve as the VDC secretary for Byazi and as female co-president for Luduha CDC, explained her point of view as follows:

"It is not like that. We have been elected. We received money from you. Those who are not elected are doing their work in the field, rather than holding meetings/getting money at the local bank, supervising work. We represent your organisation among the population. We are seen as Tushiriki (workers) here, rather than volunteers who are working for free. Of course, what we do is in the interest of the community. Look, we have kids, families. We should survive, but how?"

So, according to Françoise, members of the VDC distinguished themselves from the other participants in the project through their status as elected community representatives and the set of responsibilities entrusted to them. On the basis of this distinction, it would only be fair, in her opinion, if VDC members would receive some form of financial compensation for their work.

The VDC members were not the only ones frustrated with the way things were going. The people performing manual labour, particularly in Mujindi village, were also dissatisfied with the manner in which the Tushiriki staff rewarded different groups of project participants. Having noticed that, every time VDC members attended a training session, they received a daily fee of US$4. Although VDC members did not perceive of this payment as a salary, residents assumed that this fee was meant as a form of payment. Labourers did not understand why they had never received a similar type of financial compensation, especially since the work they were doing was physically a lot harder than the one carried out by the VDC.

Adding to the frustration was the fact that they were well aware of the money that had been allocated to the various villages in the context of the project: the Tushiriki management had made no secret of the fact that each village had received US$ 3,000. The manual labourers found it hard to believe that a group of people who had been asked to manage such a large amount of money did not earn a salary. Finally, there was a great deal of disgruntlement about the composition of the VDC. Some critics said that the people running the VDC had previously been members of the board of directors of a Community-Based Organization that was already working in the area before the Tushiriki intervention. They had the impression that these VDC members had taken advantage of the reputation of their previous employer to become elected and to obtain a new job (and source of income).
The example of Mujindi offers further proof of the fact that there was a considerable degree of frustration among several groups of participants in the Tushiriki programme. The VDC members were not highly motivated as they had hoped to earn a salary from the project and hence were not in a position to engender enthusiasm about the project among the population. The mistrust about the VDC members among the population, on the other hand, coupled with their assumption that the VDC was indeed paid for their work created a sense of injustice and thwarted their motivation to provide free labour for the reconstruction of the schoolmaster office.

6.4. Conclusion

This paper has taken issue with one of the key assumptions of the CDR approach, namely that people can be reasonably expected to be motivated to contribute to public goods provision by offering their labour for free, because, first of all, they will be able to enjoy the benefits of these public goods in the future, and, secondly, they are directly involved in the decision-making process and are thus capable of fixing their own priorities. Our research on the Tushiriki programme has shown that people’s preparedness and motivation to participate in the provision of public goods should not be taken for granted.

The case studies presented in this paper indicate that, in eastern DRC, there is a widespread distrust vis-à-vis projects of public interest that are based on unpaid and largely manual community labour (Cfr. Table 6.1). Our case studies provide evidence that this distrust is caused by the long history of forced community labour in the region. Due to this history, some village leaders resort to forcing participation, while the population is likely to associate the voluntary labour with injustices from the past.

Table 6.1: Types of labour in Tushiriki programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Manual= unskilled</th>
<th>Technical=skilled</th>
<th>Managerial= organizational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>residents</td>
<td>craft men</td>
<td>Village committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub/types</td>
<td>carry out sand, bricks, stones, wood, etc.</td>
<td>masonry</td>
<td>Lead public meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>carry out cement, metal sheets</td>
<td>carpentry,</td>
<td>Mobilize &amp; supervise residents in community work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>road workers</td>
<td>water connection</td>
<td>Report back to the agency staff &amp; residents on on-going project</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The case studies also illustrate that this history of forced labour does not determine current experiences with development. Two more elements are important: the contested
notion of public goods in DRC and the attitude of the local elite in charge of the management of the project.

Voluntary labour for development rests on the assumption that people find an incentive in contributing to a public good. But what is a public good? In DRC, as explained in the paper, there is a history of treating public office as a private business. Moreover, it is the question how public the roads and schools are that people provide their labour for? In the case of roads, these are more in the interest of elites who can afford to use the roads than in the interest of the poor villagers who have not provided the back-breaking labour to construct the roads. In the case of schools, education in DRC is organised on the basis of complete cost-recovery. As a result, schools are not seen as a public good, and people complained a lot that their contribution to the construction of the school did not result in a reduction of school fees, which would have formed a form of economic incentive, where the social incentive of contributing to a public good was clearly inappropriate.

The second incentive believed to underpin the voluntary labour components of projects is the idea of ownership: as people have selected the projects they are expected to be motivated to contribute. However, reality is different. As we have showed elsewhere, the selection of projects was much more driven by the elite than by the population at large (Kyamusugulwa et al, forthcoming). In the practice of project implementation, it mattered how the elite treated the project. When the elite was seen to restrict itself to (untiring) management of the project, people felt there was injustice rather than ownership. Only in those cases where the project had a history prior to Tushiriki and where the leadership was dedicated to motivate people by actually engaging in the manual labour, did a sense of ownership evolve and were projects successfully completed.

The case of the Tushiriki programme in eastern DRC thus offers an important lesson for CDR programmes in conflict-affected areas with a troubled labour history: prior to the project’s implementation, thorough research should be done on local views and ideas about different types of work, and about the most appropriate and acceptable ways of stimulating people’s participation in them.
6.5. References


CHAPTER 6: Labour mobilization


CHAPTER 6: Labour mobilization

Photo 6.1: Author with Cishali primary school students carrying stones for classroom reconstruction

Photo 6.2: Cironge primary school students carrying burnt bricks for classroom construction, Luhwindja
Photo 6.3: Author with 2 masons constructing classroom walls in Bwishasha primary school, Burhinyi

Photo 6.4: Masons performing classroom construction as technical labour in Mulama, Luhwindja
7. Local ownership

This chapter has been published as:

CHAPTER 7: Local ownership

ABSTRACT

“Local ownership” has taken a particular position in the policies of bilateral and multilateral agencies as one of the principles of effective development. It can be improved in community-driven reconstruction (CDR) where certain conditions are met. This paper analyzes whether participants within such a program developed local ownership during its execution. Data were collected by participant observation and semi-structured interviews during the project implementation. The study observed that where existing institutions such as the chieftaincy and local church played a positive role in involving residents in decision-making and project execution, and where transparency and accountability contributed to a relative success of the intervention, people felt a sense of project ownership. This article argues that local ownership of a CDR project can be enhanced in programs that create a space for it, and where existing institutions favor it. Attention is called to programs that use participatory reconstruction/development and that may improve the ability of potential beneficiaries to own a project.

Keywords: local ownership; community-driven reconstruction; Democratic Republic of Congo

7.1. Introduction

Strategies relating to rural development have started adopting more commonly a democratic “bottom-up” approach following the failure of “top-down” approach (Motteux, Binns, Nel, & Rowntree, 1999). For augmenting the power of beneficiaries in development, there has been a shift since the 1980s and 1990s from community-based development (CBD) to community-driven development (CDD). Whereas CBD tends to involve the beneficiaries in project execution, CDD involves them in project design also (Dasgupta & Berad, 2007; Mansuri & Rao, 2003; Onyach-Olaa, Namara, & Lubanga, 2003). Critiques of the CDD approach, however, repeatedly point out villagers’ inability for financial management and problematic power relations as some of the limitations of that approach (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Mansuri & Rao, 2003; Platteau, 2004; Platteau & Gaspart, 2003; Richards, Bah, & Vincent, 2004).

Concerning reconstruction, it is executed according to the Marshall tradition.¹ In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in particular, reconstruction means rebuilding not only the basic infrastructure destroyed during wars, but also creating space for peace, reconciliation, and social cohesion (Hilhorst, 2007).

Since the mid-1990s, “local ownership” has been positioned as a precondition to effective and sustainable development (Kuehne, Pietz, Carlowitz, & Gienanth, 2008; Saxby, 2003).
Three observations come to the fore in this regard. First, it is commonly mentioned in reports or policy statements that there should be “government ownership” or “stakeholder ownership” for the success of a development program. It is believed that the first prerequisite to development, and perhaps the most important one, is “ownership,” because a country must drive its own development, needs, and priorities (Nafios, 2005). Second, the degree of local ownership is frequently cited as one of the factors responsible for either success or failure of post-conflict reconstruction or development.

At the same time, the main weakness of structurally adjusted programs is that they fail to create a sense of ownership within the recipient government (Weeks et al., 2002). Finally, there are donors like the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency that commit themselves to providing program assistance by facilitating and promoting partner-country ownership (Weeks et al., 2002). However, for most programs, even with local ownership in development/reconstruction, translating their concept into practice may be challenging (Weeks et al., 2002).

This paper first analyzes whether the participants of a community-driven reconstruction (CDR) project developed a sense of ownership during its implementation. It then argues that such sense of ownership of a CDR project can be enhanced among local people through programs that create a space for it or where existing institutions favor such a sense of ownership. In doing so, priority has to be given to programs that use participatory reconstruction/development that improves the prospects of potential beneficiaries to develop a sense of owning a project.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the background of ownership, and outlines the context of conflict in the DRC. The following section deals with project settings, description, and methods, followed by case studies, including the viewpoints of officials and program staff. The last section discusses the findings and presents the conclusions of this study.

7.2. Background on local ownership

“Ownership” has been a debatable issue in development discourse, because of lower levels of ownership in various countries that depend on aid (Bräutigam, 2000, p. 31).

“Local ownership” means that the beneficiaries of a certain project, funded through international technical cooperation, feel that the project is theirs. It also refers to the abilities
of different stakeholders, their power or ability to set and take responsibility for a development agenda and to muster support and sustain it, because development interventions are vulnerable, to some extent, to shaping and reshaping by local actors (Funder, 2010, p.1710). Local ownership also denotes control over the project or program and the commitment of the beneficiaries to the success of the undertaking (Hannah, 2006; Saxby, 2003; Weeks et al., 2002). Having defined local ownership, it follows that an approach such as CDR, which provides a choice to the people in designing and executing a project, may contribute to local ownership and poverty alleviation, in terms of access to education, safe water, and health care, which are similar to some of the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (UN, 2009).

Critiques of ownership repeatedly point out that: (1) ownership is a mere buzzword, whose meaning is unclear, and (2) it is intended to confuse those who are unfamiliar and imprudent (Buiter, 2004). Notwithstanding the criticism, ownership continued to be applied in a variety of fields: land, business, banking, security, peace building, and development assistance/post-conflict reconstruction (Majee & Hoyt, 2010; Weeks et al., 2002). The last domain is of interest to this paper, considering the fact that the eastern DRC has been experiencing a transition from post-conflict reconstruction to development in some areas, and a period of conflict in other areas.

The question that arises here is what does “local” refer to in “local ownership”? Two points deserve special attention. First, for the donor government, “local” refers to the recipient government or the counterpart government that receives aid. Other related terms are used, such as “country ownership,” “state ownership,” and “national ownership” to signify a medley of programs, processes, plans, and strategies involving both domestic and foreign parties (Buiter, 2004). Second, “local” ownership, in contrast to “national” ownership, refers to grassroots communities, stakeholders, or beneficiaries, rather than to the Ministry or the Central Government. This paper adopts the second meaning, as it is concerned with CDR that cannot be understood without paying attention to local ownership of the intervention.

7.3. Context of conflict in the DRC

This section briefly highlights the socioeconomic status and history of the DRC. The DRC can be considered as one of the poorest countries in the world. According to the 2009 United Nations Development Program’s report on human development index (HDI), the DRC ranks
176 among countries with a low rate of human development, as the following statistics reveal. Life expectancy is about 47.6 years; adult literacy rate (age 15 and above) is about 67.2%; combined gross school enrollment ratio is 48.2%; GDP per capita (PPP US $) is 298; the human poverty index (HP-1) is 38; people not using an improved water source is 54%; and the gender development index (as % of HDI) is about 95.1 (United Nations Development Program UNDP, 2009). In rural areas, where the current study was carried out, the main source of livelihood for a majority of the population is agriculture and livestock production.

As for the historical record, the DRC became independent from Belgium on 30 June 1960. The problems that affected the country from 1996 through 2003 had their origin in the conflicts that occurred in neighboring countries (the 1993 massacre in Burundi, and 1994 genocide in Rwanda), and in the weakness of Mobutu’s regime and his army. With the involvement of more than five African countries in the conflict, either on the side of the government or on the side of the rebels, the conflict culminated as one of the most devastating events in the region since the end of World War II (Lemarchand, 2001; Reyntjens, 2005).

Four main events are worth recalling here. (1) In May 1997, the Mobutu regime was overthrown by the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo movement, led by Laurent Désiré Kabila, who later became the president of the country until his assassination in 2001. Then, his son, Joseph Kabila, took over as president. (2) From 1998 through 2003, under Kabila and Kabila’s son, two main rebel movements controlled the eastern part of the country until an agreement was reached through the Sun City Dialog for peace and transitional government. These rebel movements were the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, based in North- Kivu province, and the Mouvement de Libération du Congo in Equateur province. (3) From 2003 through 2006, the DRC was under the transitional government led by President Joseph Kabila, who was assisted by four vice-presidents, among whom two represented the main belligerent movements. (4) The first so called democratic presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 2006; that is, nearly after 40 years of dictatorship and chaos since independence(Merckx & Vander Weyden, 2007).

During this conflict in the country, eastern DRC and particularly South-Kivu province were the worst affected. For instance, a report by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) estimated that 5.4 million deaths occurred between August 1998 and April 2007 in the DRC
(Coghlan et al., 2007). Also, basic infrastructure, such as hospitals, bridges, roads, schools, factories, and food stocks, were destroyed by repeated assaults, particularly in the eastern part of the country, necessitating rapid socioeconomic recovery (Balemba, 2004). However, notwithstanding the peaceful conditions brought about by the elections of 2006, different armed groups continued to perpetrate killings, massacres, and rapes in South-Kivu, as was also the case in other eastern provinces of the country (IRIN, 2008).

7.4. Project description, setting, and methods

7.4.1. Project description

Tushiriki, meaning “let us become involved together.” This is one of the IRC CDR programs. IRC is an American international agency based in New York, which has been operating in eastern DRC since 1996 (D’Onofrio & Sage, 2007). It received a contribution of $US 2 million from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs through Stichting Vluchteling (SV), that is, The Netherlands Foundation for Refugees based in the Hague. This program is aimed at: (1) alleviating poverty by improving socioeconomic conditions, (2) facilitating the understanding of the principles and practices of good governance, and (3) advocacy efforts on behalf of communities and towards policymakers (SV & IRC, 2007). The program was in force from 2008 through 2010 in South-Kivu province in the DRC.

The core idea of the approach is that by involving local communities in both decision-making and project execution, it is possible to promote local governance of reconstruction through participatory processes (Maynard & Jodi, 2007; McBride & Patel, 2007). One way to do this is to create a local committee in each of the 34 villages targeted to be covered by the program in such a way that the committee members are responsible for project management with technical assistance of field program staff. A village committee – consisting of five men and five women for the five positions of president, treasurer, secretary, mobilizer, and inclusion officer – organized regular public meetings to familiarize residents with the democratic exercise of social accountability.

The committee received money for project execution, hired local technicians to build the selected infrastructure such as classroom and water system, mobilized residents to participate in its construction, and reported to the IRC-Tushiriki staff and the people. In addition to the VDC structure, another body of two members (one man and one woman), whose role was to watch-dog project execution by the village committee, served as liaison between the
committee and the people. From the grant-block’s side, an amount of $US 3000 was allocated per village, and an amount of $US 50,000–$US 70,000 per community (IRC & CARE, 2009). Finally, other international and national agencies, such as Catholic Relief Services, Malteser International, and the United Nations International Children and Emergency Fund (UNICEF)/Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale (AVSI), adopting reconstruction approaches different from that of IRC-Tushiriki, were active in the area.

7.4.2. Settings
The study took place in the Burhinyi and Luhwindja chiefdoms in South-Kivu province of DRC. Barhinyirhinyi (people of Burhinyi) and Bawhindjawhindja (people of Luhwindja), both belonging to the Shi ethnic group, constitute the vast majority of the inhabitants of those areas. At the time of data collection, a smaller group of Hutu combatants lived in the Itudu groupement of the Burhinyi chiefdom until the Kimia II operation. The administrative structure of a chiefdom consists of a set of groupements, each of which, in turn, consists of a set of villages. Each village is headed by a chief nominated by the king, who is well known as Mwami (chief of chiefdom).

Burhinyi and Luhwindja were heavily affected by war, as were other more remote areas of South-Kivu province. Hutu combatants fled to the area in 1996, following which a series of fights broke out involving the AFDL and the RCD rebel movements from 1996 through 1997, and from 1998 through 2003, respectively. In those fights, the military forces, who were occupying the area, engaged militia elements formed by the former Rwandese Army, sometimes called the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), which was also known as Interahamwe or Hutu combatants. As a result, if residents did not flee from the area during the waves of fighting, they were completely looted by armed groups, which included the FDLR and the Mai-Mai. The fighting ended in 2009 when the Congolese army engaged the Interahamwe, under the Kimia II operation, which was backed by Mission des Nations Unies au Congo, the UN mission in the DRC.

As the target population for the Tushiriki program, four communities were randomly selected from 17 villages in each chiefdom. Random selection was chosen as it ensures transparency of the program, which is necessary for good governance. One of the selection criteria was population size, as the entities were classified into Tushiriki communities (nearly 6000 inhabitants each) and into Tushiriki villages (nearly 1200 inhabitants each). According to the chiefdom’s office report of 2008, the selected communities comprised 22,948
residents, chosen from 55,993 people of Burhinyi, and 21,225 residents from 47,073 people of Luhwindja. The people in the selected communities were located similarly in relation to those of nonselected communities, in that they were all living closer to the main road and centers and in more remote areas.

7.4.3. Methods

As ontological position relates to nature and essence of things in the social world, it is proposed to first show the reality that is being dealt within this study, which is how residents viewed the IRC-Tushiriki project: whether the project was theirs or not. Similarly, ownership, unlike relief aid, has to deal with reconstruction/development in which residents are invited to identify the village’s priority needs and participate in project execution. However, such reconstruction/development may be conceived and implemented in different ways by different beneficiaries. As epistemological position relates to knowledge and evidence, it is considered necessary to highlight how to collect data and demonstrate social phenomena. Therefore, what follows is a description of how the data were collected from residents and officials in the capital city as well as from agency staff.

This study was based on four case studies that involved four of the 34 villages covered by the IRC-Tushiriki program in the two chiefdoms of Burhinyi and Luhwindja. According to Yin (cited by Gray, 2006), a case study is an empirical inquiry into a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clear. The case study approach is considered appropriate for analyzing the merits of adopting participatory methodology in reconstruction, particularly the manner in which the residents socially construct the intervention, whether as theirs or not (Sneddom & Fox, 2007). Moreover, the case study method was chosen, because it was found suitable when confronted with “how” questions concerning the phenomena being studied (Gray, 2006, p. 124). The cases were selected randomly using a simple random sample of four villages from the list of 34 target villages; that is, all the 34 villages were numbered, from which four villages were selected in the two chiefdoms, using a random table. However, the selection of the participants in the study was not random. They were residents met at the reconstruction sites and/or at their homes.

The selected cases shared many of the characteristics required for the target villages. One was that the majority of the case study villages had their classrooms reconstructed (three out of four, 75%), because the residents valued children’s education as their priority. Another
was that the two chiefdoms were represented by selecting two villages from each region. Finally, the case study villages included those which were farthest from the centers of the chiefdom and those which were closest to the main road. For instance, while Byazi is the remotest in Luhwindja, Mushugula is the closest to the main road. In each case, where possible, a complete description is given about the location, the tribe that residents belong to, the administrative/political structure, the existing institutions and infrastructure, and the thoughts of the residents before and during project execution, especially whether they felt that the project selected was theirs and whether they were socially constructing it in such a way that motivated them to participate in and sustain it (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2). These two last variables held the key to assessing whether the participants felt they owned the project or not. Similarly, where possible, it is explained why a village project was seen as a success or failure. The administrative and political structure of the area is that every village is headed by a village chief, led by a groupement chief, who is in turn led by a chief of chiefdom (that is, the Mwami or the king of the chiefdom). Most of the inhabitants of these chiefdoms were originally from such chiefdoms; for example, Barhinyirhinyi are from Burhinyi and Bawhindjawhindja are from Luhwindja (see Figure 7.1).

Table 7.1: Definition of concepts that describe a village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Administrative/political structure</th>
<th>Existing institutions and infrastructure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitions</td>
<td>- Geographic location of a village in a groupement and a chiefdom. - Whether or not it is accessible by car.</td>
<td>- Population size at the beginning of the data collection for this study, i.e. September 2008.</td>
<td>- Dominant tribe that belongs to a dominant ethnic group in a village. In Burhinyi as well as in Luhwindja, residents are more homogenous.</td>
<td>- Structure that governs an entity from a village to a groupement and from a groupement to a chiefdom.</td>
<td>- Institutions such as chieftaincy and local churches that shape people’s social norms and behaviors. - Infrastructure for social services such as school/classroom, health center, bridge/local road, water system, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*groupement*: an intermediate entity between a chiefdom and a village or a locality. It is led by a chief of the groupement nominated by the chiefdom’s chief (a king or a Mwami).
### Table 7.2: Definition of concepts that describe local ownership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>Type of reconstruction / of project selected</th>
<th>Residents’ thoughts at the start of project implementation</th>
<th>Residents’ thoughts during project implementation</th>
<th>Residents’ participation in project execution</th>
<th>Residents’ thoughts at the end of project execution</th>
<th>Other: For example, VDC thoughts on project budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Sort of infrastructure for social service to construct / to reconstruct under the IRC-Tushiriki intervention. This includes classrooms/school, water system/water taps, bridge/local road, etc. - Mode of project selection with or without involvement of village residents. - Whether or not specific existing institution was dominant in project selection processes. This may be chieftancy (village chief, his advisors) or church (Catholic, Protestant: 5e CELPA or 8e CEPAC). - Which institution initiated the selected project before the conflict. For instance, schools were initiated by churches while local road was initiated by chief(s). - Whether or not residents felt that their leaders were transparent and accountable in processes leading to village project selection.</td>
<td>- Whether or not they believed in the effectiveness of the IRC-Tushiriki as funding agency to disburse money to their village as promised. - Whether or not they felt that they were much involved in project choice and that it reflected their highest need. - Whether or not they felt that reconstruction to take place was for the development of their village. - Whether they felt ready to participate in local contribution in project execution.</td>
<td>- Whether or not they felt that they contributed enough in local participation about the selected project. - Whether or not they felt they were active in project execution because the infrastructure selected was theirs. - Whether or not they felt they would gain direct reward once the selected infrastructure is rebuilt. For instance, exemption of school fees for those who contributed in classroom reconstruction. - Whether or not they felt that the allocating grant to their village was well managed for reconstruction project by the village committee. - Whether or not they felt that quality of construction/reconstruction was better as a result of better management of the project.</td>
<td>- Nature of residents’ participation (unskilled work) such as carrying out sand, stones, bricks, cement, water, metal sheets, wood for classroom, water system, health center reconstruction/construction. - Whether or not the majority of residents did the job, i.e. took part in community work. - Whether or not residents took part in technical participation (skilled work) such as masons to build walls for a classroom and were willing to do so because they were originally from the same village and because they received wages for it. - Whether or not local material such as burnt bricks was bought from the same village.</td>
<td>- Whether or not they felt the intervention failed to involve residents in both project selection and project execution. As a result, residents felt or not owning the project processes and outcome. - Whether or not they described reasons why they thought so (of project failure or success). - Whether or not residents became more willing to contribute locally in a similar project or any village reconstruction project if another donor funding is available. - Whether or not residents felt proud of having contributed in project execution. - Whether or not residents witnessed the ability of the village committee to better manage the project. - Whether or not residents felt ready to contribute in project maintenance as they felt it was theirs.</td>
<td>- Whether or not committee members felt there was difference between the project budget planned and the project budget executed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IRC: International Rescue Committee; VDC: Village Development Committee; 5e CELPA: Communauté des Eglises Libres de Pentecôte en Afrique/Free Pentecostal Churches in Africa; 8e CEPAC: Communauté des Eglises de Pentecôte en Afrique Centrale/Pentecostal Churches in Central Africa.
The data for this study were collected from September 2008 through April 2010, where the author was viewed by some participants as a researcher seeking to understand reconstruction dynamics in their area, and by others as a friend or an academician living in the provincial capital city (Bukavu). The author’s fluency in Swahili greatly facilitated his interaction with the informants. The first visit, made from 23 September to 5 October 2008, was devoted to exploring the area’s history of conflict, its homogeneity and social and ethnic composition, the remoteness and closeness of target villages, the administrative structure, and interaction with other agencies in the area. Later, the visits were regular and devoted to participant observation while implementing different elements of the project. For instance, the author attended, as an observer, public meetings about project approval and project execution activities by residents, as well as church services (in which information about the intervention was, to a great extent, provided). Also, semi-structured interviews were conducted with stakeholders, who were residents (male and female, young and adult, literate and illiterate, elite and non-elite, committee members, and non-committee members) of the area. In total, 88 participants were interviewed either individually or collectively, and 39 participant
observations were conducted in regard to meetings and infrastructure reconstruction. To complement the data, an official at the Ministry of Rural Development in the capital city Kinshasa and the senior staff of the IRC-Tushiriki program were interviewed to elicit their opinion on whether a participatory approach to reconstruction/development can lead people to own reconstruction projects. To avoid possible bias, only those participants who were directly or indirectly involved in project execution during intervention were interviewed. This approach served to assure the author that the participants were talking only about Tushiriki program, and not any previous or parallel intervention in the same area.

The following descriptions will address who made the decisions in the social reconstruction process of the project, how they were made, and how people viewed them. Similarly, it will be shown what people felt about their contribution during their intervention in the project. Finally, the factors that contributed to the success or failure of the project will be outlined in contrasting situations: where the residents developed a feeling of ownership of the project, and where they hardly developed such a feeling. For instance, where the chieftaincy institution was more influential in decision-making, with subdued involvement of the residents, as in Mushugula, residents were unlikely to be keen on making any contribution or fee payment for water system maintenance. On the other hand, the residents of Muli felt that school reconstruction, initiated and managed by a local church, was their highest priority, and they were ready to participate in its reconstruction.

7.5. Case studies

7.5.1. Bwishasha

Bwishasha village is in the Birhala groupement that belongs to the Burhinyi chiefdom. It takes half an hour’s walk to reach there from the suburb of Luvungi in Birhala-center, the main market of the chiefdom. The village has two main churches (8è CEPAC, a French acronym of Pentecostal churches in Central Africa, and the Roman Catholic church), each having a primary school in the same village. The Catholic primary school was fully reconstructed in 2008 by AVSI/UNICEF, whereas the Protestant school was only partially rebuilt under IRC-Tushiriki funding from 2008 to 2009. As it is situated alongside the main road leading to Burhinyi, the village is accessible by car from both the Catholic and the Protestant churches. Its population in 2008 was 2156, all of which were Barhinyirhinyi.
In 2008, when the IRC-Tushiriki project was to be taken up in this village, the leaders thought of diverting the project to the Protestant school, as AVSI/UNICEF had by then rebuilt the Catholic school. However, this Protestant school was fully constructed with six classrooms and one schoolmaster’s office. Therefore, with this new grant, it was planned to build two new classrooms, one of which could serve as the meeting room or teachers’ room, because the existing room of the school did not satisfy the standards of the Ministry of Education (i.e. 5x6m, rather than 7x6 m). The schoolmaster, who was also the senior pastor of the church, commented thus: “Because it is for free, I will use it as the meeting room for teachers.” This statement shows that in executing the project, the norms of the ministry were not strictly followed because of disagreement between the schoolmaster and the project’s committee members. Before executing the project, however, the senior pastor, who was also one among the local elite, could swing the decision in favor of rebuilding the school, because the Catholic school had already benefited from AVSI/UNICEF funding. This created a sense of involvement at lower level of the residents in the project, because many were resentful that they were not involved in decision-making, despite the fact that the decision was said to be in the community’s interest. One of the masons, a resident of Bwishasha, said:

We could vote for seed distribution as a local project of farming. Project selection was done by them [Tushiriki staff], rather than by local people; we did not understand why that was so. You can really see how your family is gaining interest; therefore, you pay school fees for kids. We agree that the school building is for community interest. One of the difficulties we face is the shortage of stones and sand. What you see there was carried out by a few family members and children who study there, because even after transporting the stones, they will have to pay the same amount of school fees and construction fees as those who did not do anything. This is a sort of social injustice!

Similarly, another resident who was a gold digger and farmer said, “We are aware of the Tushiriki project. The problem is that we are not much involved in such local contribution, because we often contribute to only such things as Salongo [forced work] from which we don’t benefit anything.” Last, another resident, a secondary school student mentioned, “People told us about it, but I don’t know what they are doing here. I don’t know what they speak of.” These quotes reveal two things. One is that there was a problem with project selection; the majority of residents were not fully involved in it. They still had a humanitarian approach to distribution of seeds, because they felt that providing seeds was a better choice for them and it could benefit every household equitably. The space allowed for people to ask questions and express their ideas was not sufficient to make them think that they needed a
reconstruction project to which they had a right to contribute and to sustain for a long time. The other issue is that the people did not feel that the school was theirs. Rather, they believed it belonged to the 8e CEPAC church and to its pastor, who happened to be its schoolmaster also. This disregard for local residents on the side of the church and the school management explains why it was hard for the residents to feel they owned the Bwishasha village project.

Nonetheless, the residents, particularly the masons, appreciated two things. First, technicians were hired from the village. Second, local materials such as burnt bricks were used in construction. These observations were made only in the case of IRC-Tushiriki project, and the residents saw no other such reconstruction project (be it AVSI/ UNICEF in the same village or CAB/ICCO in a neighboring village). In short, despite the construction of the two classrooms at the 8e CEPAC primary school, this project failed to involve enough residents either in project selection or in local contribution relating to it. People felt they did not own the project, and thus the infrastructure constructed. One of the reasons for such a situation was lack of social accountability on the part of local leaders, which included both church leaders and chiefs.

7.5.2. Byazi

Byazi is a village in the Luduha groupement that belongs to the Luhwindja chiefdom. It is not accessible by car, and one needs to walk around three hours to reach there from the suburb of Luhwindja (that is, Kibuti) and from the Ifendula district hospital, in the northern side of the chiefdom, not far from Ngweshe chiefdom. In 2008, Byazi village, also known as Kamagaga, had a population of 1185 residents who were Bahwindjahwindja. Byazi has one primary school, the Kamagaga primary school, which was built in 1957 during the Belgian colonial period; the school is currently under the management of the Catholic church. Recently, the same church established a secondary school with an agri-veterinary option, for admission into which one needs to go through first and second-year secondary classes. In addition to schools, the village has a health center initiated and managed by the Catholic church. It was only in 1972 that the first solid building of the Kamagaga school was built.

In 2008, when the IRC-Tushiriki program was to be taken up in the village, the residents, led by the senior local church leader and the village chief, opted to renovate the roof of their primary school by fixing new metal sheets. During the public meetings, the residents could not believe that Tushiriki would ever provide funds for school reconstruction. Later, they became not only enthusiastic about it, but also confident that their village committee’s
representatives could judiciously utilize the funds given to the village. For example, one resident, a male teacher at the Kamagaga secondary school, said:

We are happy with the Tushiriki program, because it is the first international agency to intervene here. Tushiriki staff took time to climb mountains to reach here. They are really committed to help us. Their approach placed people at the center of decision-making as we have to decide which project that can be funded by them is our highest priority. This is why I attend their meetings and involve myself in their activities.

Another resident added:

We are happy with Tushiriki. You know, people told us that this program can neither give money nor can it achieve these projects. Today, we witness just the opposite of it. Look, here, Tushiriki has replaced metal sheets for three classrooms and for the schoolmaster’s office. We know that the whole amount given for this program, that is SUS 3000, was spent.

Similarly, commenting on the same issue, the church local leader said, “Look, we are in a Catholic area. I am the church leader. I must tell you that the Luduha people are very enthusiastic about local contribution. If there is a donor, people here really like development.”

One reason for the success of the project is that the residents appreciated the transparency and accountability of the Tushiriki village project. One resident said, “They [committee members] revealed the amounts of money received and spent, though I do not remember the figures. In general, we are happy with it.” As the project involved replacing the old roof with metal sheets, the local contribution required transporting metal sheets from the suburb of Luhwindja to the village. This was accomplished by the local church members, who were also residents of the village, utilizing the influence of the church leader. One of the female participants said, “We are happy with the Tushiriki project because it belongs to the school and our contribution was to carry metal sheets.”

In short, at the end of the project, the village got its school roof partially reconstructed, and the people who were skeptical about the project were ultimately pleased with the project and were ready to contribute more to a similar project. The Byazi case shows that in very remote areas, if people are involved in the processes of choosing the project and its execution, they can develop a sense of ownership of the project infrastructure and positive feelings about participatory reconstruction project if their leaders are fully engaged in it.
7.5.3. Muli

Muli is a village in the Birhala groupement that is part of the Burhinyi chiefdom, which is half an hour’s walk from the Luvungi market (that is, the suburb of the chiefdom) on the west. As the village chief is a believer of the local church (that is, 5e CELPA, French acronym of Free Pentecostal churches in Africa), the majority of the inhabitants are members of the same Protestant church. In 2008, Muli was inhabited by 1712 people, who were Barhinyirhinyi. With the idea of having a school closer to the village, particularly for kids, this church has been managing the Muli primary school, but it could not complete the construction of three classrooms, which was started just before the conflict of 1998–2003, and hence there is a need to complete it. The village administration is structured so that its chiefs and church leaders are from the local elite, including schoolmaster and teachers (that is, the sub-elite). For decision-making, the non-elite, that is the other residents, depend on the elite, as the former are socially tied to the latter by strong patronage and kinship relations.

In 2008, when the IRC-Tushiriki program was to be taken up in Muli village, all public meetings were held in the church building where the senior pastor and other church elders influenced, to some extent, the decision about the priority of the village project. Not surprisingly, during the assembly of residents, a decision was taken to reconstruct two classrooms. However, as there were three classrooms whose construction had been left incomplete, the residents and their leaders seized this opportunity to have these three classrooms constructed, rather than only two. They felt that the block grant of $US 3000 was adequate to meet the construction expenses, if the funds were properly managed. Having known this, the program’s management held another public meeting to confirm the decision of the residents for reconstruction of three classrooms, instead of two. The participants unanimously voted for three classrooms. In fact, the leaders utilized the Sunday church service to marshal information and to influence their people. It was also at the Sunday church service where the male treasurer, one of the influential village development members whose duty was to collect taxes at the chiefdom level, usually sensitized residents about it. For instance, at one meeting he said:

The first thing is that, next week up to 5 April, women and men are required to carry stones and sand from the river to the construction site to build the wall before taking up carpentry work. We would like to invite everybody to do it. We do it two to three times a week in the morning between 6.00 and 7.00. The second thing is that we plan to demolish the existing two classrooms and
rebuild them right from the foundation. But now, we have chosen to construct three classrooms, and this decision will have to be approved in another GA, scheduled for next Tuesday at 7.00.

When asked about the effectiveness of this local contribution, other residents, especially the women, such as the spouse of the senior pastor, who was the female relais qualité (Requa) of the village, answered in the affirmative. It was evident during public meetings that the residents were enthusiastic about decision-making and execution of the project, as they felt it was theirs. When compared with incompletely constructed classrooms in other villages, these three non-covered classrooms of Muli, known as Cishukwe village, were solidly built (double-burnt-brick wall), adhering to the standards of the Ministry of Education (i.e. 7m x 6 m). During the approval meeting, residents pleaded for more classrooms, because their children were forced to study in the church building owing to shortage of classrooms. Moreover, there was no problem with local contribution, as the inhabitants were ready to work. They were prepared to adapt to any adjustments of project budget to achieve their objective.

From Tushiriki staff’s perspective, there was a need for people to agree to this idea so that even the project’s budget could be revised as necessary, without changing the amount of the grant. This resulted in residents’ concurrence to the program. The carpentry and the roof construction work were supervised by either one church leader (that is, the evangelist) or the village chief or both of them, implying that these two institutions exist there. Nonetheless, the budget was underestimated to the extent that there were not enough metal sheets for completing the roof reconstruction work.

Finally, even the women and the village chief were happy with the Tushiriki project; they were proud of having rebuilt three classrooms for the children’s first primary school in their village. Also, the people believed in the ability of the VDC members to manage the project, as they saw the building completed according to the standards of the area. Transparency and accountability, besides active involvement of village leaders, and thus of the residents, were indeed among the factors that facilitated the success of the project and its ownership.

7.5.4. Mushugula

Mushugula is a village in the Karhundu groupement, which forms part of the Luhwindja chiefdom. It takes about half an hour’s walk to reach there from the main road Kaziba-Luhwindja on the south-eastern side of Luhwindja. In 2008, Mushugula was inhabited by 936 people, the Bahwindjahwindja. One of the recurrent problems of Mushugula was access to
safe water. There were only two water sources – wide apart – on the western side of the mountain, which were not well constructed and can be reached only after a long walk. The village does not have any school or health center and, therefore, its residents have to rely on the infrastructure of neighboring villages. However, it has a 5e CELPA church, though the villagers prefer to attend the churches in neighboring villages, either the 5e CELPA or the 8e CEPAC church in Cironge village.

In 2008, when the Tushiriki project was to be taken up in Mushugula, the residents, guided by their village chief, opted for extension of the water supply system, constructed under the Banro Mining–Bureau Diocesan de Développement (Banro-BDD) project in 2008. When that project was implemented, the village requirements for water distribution were not given due consideration by the implementing agency. Therefore, the idea was to connect the existing water system to one of the main water tanks situated closer to the village.

Explaining the issue, the village chief, assisted by one of his advisors, said, “When the Tushiriki staff arrived here, we managed to get it selected as our priority.” But, even after its execution, the problem of getting water to the village persisted, as no negotiations were carried out with the owners of the system, particularly the chief of the groupement, for necessary permission to go ahead. The plan was to have three water taps constructed in the village; one of those taps, which would be at the village chief’s place, would be connected to the system. However, even three weeks after the connection, Mushugula did not get safe water. One resident said:

> Since then, our water points did not provide any water. We, right then, returned to our previous non-constructed wells. They asked us to contribute 200 CF [that is, SUS $2.41]. How can you pay for something that you do not get? Is it possible for us to do that? No! Look, even a non-built well gives the same quality of water. The only advantage is to have water closer to households. If they ask us money for the water point, I prefer to send my kids to a non-constructed well. We worked for nothing in the local contribution, carrying stones and sand.

Two points emerge from this quote. One is that the residents were not much involved in decision-making of this project, and their contribution to project execution was little, although very few people were needed to transport sand and stones to construct three water taps. The second point is that the residents did not feel that they owned the project, because they could hardly understand the difference between water from a non-constructed well and water from a well-built water system. As a result, people had little enthusiasm in contributing
money to the project management, which could have been a solution to ensure access to safe water in the village.

One month later, to the utmost satisfaction of the residents, water was available at the water taps. However, a closer look at the water points showed that the water taps were not well constructed, as they were leaking even when locked. This can be explained in two ways. First, the connection of the pipe to the water tap was bad; second, the cementing of the armature was not done properly. There was a clear difference between the water tap built under the Banro-BDD project (the better one) and that the one under the Tushiriki project. Also, water pressure was high, as the village is located alongside a mountain. This, combined with no regular contribution toward maintenance fees by the locals, threatened the project’s sustainability. Among the three water taps, only two provided water, because the third one broke down in no time owing to poor quality of construction. Even so, two female residents acknowledged the usefulness of the project, because it reduced their distance of carrying water. Besides, the idea of the project was that residents had to take care of the water system, as they felt it was a Tushiriki project. For example, someone said:

The pipe has been damaged. We do not know who has to repair it. May be, the Tushiriki staff, because it is their project. In theory, each household planned to contribute 200 Congolese Francs monthly. It has not started yet. So we do not know. About the management of funds, we do not know. It would be better to talk to committee members. They might be knowing.

This quote shows clearly that the residents, in spite of enjoying the project’s outcome, did not feel they owned the project. Instead, they viewed it as the program’s or committee’s project. In short, Mushugula epitomizes a water project that failed to involve local people in decision-making or project execution, besides encountering many technical problems in project implementation. As a consequence, there was no feeling of ownership, and thus the sustainability of the project became doubtful.

7.6. Officials’ viewpoint and Tushiriki staff’s opinion

The chef de division in charge of action research and development, who was considered the technician in community development at the Ministry of Rural Development, stated:

The people are the motor of development; if they refuse to see their interest in the project, they will decline; they will fail. You should start by identifying people’s needs; this is the basis. You should associate the people; you should involve them. When it is about a wanted action, aspired by the people, and when the people have understood their interest [in the project], it works well.
This statement shows that at the national level, at least at the Ministry of Rural Development, the generally agreed opinion is that if people’s needs are taken into account and if people are associated with project processes, they can contribute to its execution, as they may consider the project as theirs. In other words, the more the people are involved in the project’s decision-making, the more they may be involved in its execution. When interviewed on the same issue, the territory supervisor, who was one of the senior staff of the program, added:

One of the strengths of this approach is that people, who are poor, are ready to participate in the program, because they do it for the development of their area. The local elite sensitizes and involves ordinary people in the project. The presence of outside aid such as the IRC-Tushiriki one, motivates residents to participate.

This statement shows the expectation that local people will participate in a project only if they feel that the project is about reconstruction/development of their area. As regards the feeling of ownership by local people, one can infer that only when the residents feel that the selected project is theirs are they likely to participate in it fully.

7.7. Discussion and conclusion

This research examines the Tushiriki intervention, a CDR intervention implemented by the IRC, in the DRC from 2008 to 2010. It analyzes if the participants of a CDR project developed a feeling of ownership during its execution. The findings show that in some of the villages, as illustrated by the Byazi and Muli cases, there has been an improvement in people’s perceptions vis-à-vis the intervention. Conversely, in few villages, as illustrated by the Bwishasha and Mushugula cases, no such improvement was observed. Several issues deserve attention here.

Before the Tushiriki program was implemented in the area, people perceived development/reconstruction aid as a kind of help from outside, without which they would not have been invited to participate. They identified themselves as passive beneficiaries receiving food, shelter, salt, oil, etc. This mindset can be understood in the context of relief aid, which dominated assistance in the aftermath of conflict in the eastern DRC. Until then, most organizations that operated in the area provided humanitarian aid, rather than development/reconstruction aid.

However, after the intervention, people viewed development/reconstruction aid, not surprisingly, as a combination of outside aid and local efforts to move forward. In some
villages, as in Byazi, there has been a shift in terms of people’s readiness (especially among Catholic church members) to contribute to a village reconstruction project in case of aid availability; indeed, the officials’ viewpoint and the Tushiriki staff’s opinion substantiate this impression. This change in the people’s mindset may be attributed to the role of ability building and facilitation by the program frontline staff, who assisted beneficiaries in ways that allowed the beneficiaries to be involved in all phases of intervention: identification of needs, planning, and execution. This viewpoint is supported by Chambers (cited by Blakburn & Holland, 1999, p.212), who states that, “we, the development workers, are the first ones that have to change for facilitating people’s participation.” Then he argues that, whether “we” change or not, people’s self-driven genuine participation in decision-making and implementation will continue to be the driving force behind their sustainable development (Blackburn & Holland, 1999).

In addition to the fact that development actors have to first change, “development” as defined by Ngunjiri (1988) is about people becoming, or being helped to become, conscious about themselves and their environment, after which plans and actions are expected to follow. The involvement of people in the process of helping themselves, he argues, is the cornerstone of good development, and their awareness of this explains why development organizations have attached so much importance to participatory methodologies (Ngunjiri, 1998). Here, it is proposed to enlarge Ngunjiri’s definition by adding that people not only become conscious about themselves and their environment, but more importantly they can develop a feeling of “ownership” toward the infrastructure reconstructed through the intervention, depending on how it is facilitated and how it is favored by existing institutions.

Perceptions about being involved in decision-making and community work relating to the reconstructed infrastructure have also changed along with intervention. People have shown satisfaction and happiness after the Tushiriki program, because they identified rehabilitation of both the school and the water system as their main priorities; they participated in the execution of those projects and benefited themselves by the outcome of the projects. As a result, people felt they owned those projects. Other authors have supported the notion, contrary to the orthodox view of development being primarily economic, that development is a process of transformation, which permeates the entire web of human life. Moreover, the key to influencing it is participation of the intended beneficiaries in planning and implementing development programs and sharing the dividends that accrue (Wanga & Chibuta, 1999). Along the same lines, Alasah draws attention to the emerging consensus that development is
best achieved if the people are intrinsically involved in the plans and objectives and when they can clearly see the benefits (Alasah, 2011).

However, the findings suggest that despite the overall good impression of local people about the Tushiriki project, little has changed in some villages regarding people’s readiness to contribute by providing local materials and unskilled labor or by way of participating in project maintenance. One reason is lack of trust in committee members, who were considered more as agency staff than as people’s representatives. This view was reinforced by the fact that, in the areas concerned, people did not show any enthusiasm in volunteerism, because they believed that nobody would work for free. As a result, the elected body was not seen to be benevolent. Cornwall (2008) distinguishes between “exclusion” and “self-exclusion” in participatory activities. He argues that exclusion may result from a failure to make space for the participation of less vocal groups, whereas self-exclusion can result from people’s previous experiences, which can be associated with lack of confidence, or with experience of having been silenced by more powerful voices or fear of reprisals.

Another reason for active involvement of committee members in community work is that they received more training than anyone else in the village and thus understood better than anyone else the approach based on local contribution. As a result, they carried local materials and were present at the construction site to supervise workers more actively than anyone else in the village. Otherwise, the intervention would have run the risk of failure. Also, they felt as if they owned the infrastructure that was being reconstructed. Similarly, a situation where people were reluctant to contribute to maintenance of the water system or to providing local materials, may be seen as the result of poor involvement in decision-making and lack of accountability on the part of those who were asked to manage this payment.

Nonetheless, despite the strong appeal by the Tushiriki staff for working together in the reconstruction of the village, the inhabitants repeatedly claimed tangible incentives in the form of food or money for active participation in the work. Their demand remained unfulfilled, because of the insufficient money ($US 3000) granted to each village. Overall, this difference in the points of views between the Tushiriki frontline staff and the target population was undoubtedly an additional reason for poor involvement of local people in community contribution.

The intervention did not affect the sense of community interest. Before and after the program, the participants felt they were part of the community, which needs to reconstruct
public utilities such as schools, roads, and water systems. Literature suggests that where people have little sense of belonging to community, they may have little inclination to spend time in community affairs (Cornwall, 2008). In most villages, residents showed a sense of community interest by participating, for instance in public meetings, because they believed in the relevance of rebuilding the infrastructure for the common good of everyone.

The Muli case illustrates that the ability of committee members to manage funds allocated to the village improved under Tushiriki intervention. The committee members received money at the Cooperative d’Epargne et de Crédit (a local bank). They bought construction materials, such as metal sheets, wood, bricks, and cement, besides contracting masons and technicians to build infrastructure. They were accountable to local people in public meetings as required by the Tushiriki frontline staff. In the end, all the projects were completed as planned in most of the villages targeted. It is not certain, however, if the committee members would have been successful without any technical and management assistance from the Tushiriki field staff.

Exploring how development aid contributed to social cohesion after civil war in Liberia, it is argued that with the creation of new local-level institutions, social cooperation patterns can change even after the end of the program (Fearon, Humphreys, & Weinstein, 2009). The villages covered by a CDR program for this study reveal higher levels of social cooperation than the comparative villages. It further reveals that changes can take place in a community in response to outside intervention, and not necessarily to fundamental changes in structure of economic relations and macro-level political processes. Nonetheless, other factors, such as funding, duration, and the amount of space created for people to express their ideas, can contribute to what is labeled “the culture of development or post-conflict reconstruction intervention.”

Finally, mention should be made of the connectedness between the Tushiriki intervention and poverty alleviation. The intervention created space that motivated local people to involve themselves in both decision-making and project execution. It thus empowered the beneficiaries, especially the committee members in rebuilding infrastructure in the areas of transport, education, and water. From these achievements, people gained access to transport by car or motorbike to school in terms of distance and finance, and to safe water closer to their households. While the relevant literature suggests that poverty alleviation (poverty
reduction to some) is a complex and multifaceted concept (Vedeld, 2003; Jutting et al., 2005), researchers and practitioners generally agree that it can be defined as (Vedeld, 2003, p. 162),

(1) empowerment of the poor – understood as effective participation and voice – met by some degree of responsiveness on the government’s part (hence, it complements “democracy”); (2) social or human capacity development through, for example, better access to health, education, water, and infrastructure; (3) economic gains by the poor through pro-poor growth or improved economic opportunities; and (4) social inequality reduction through income redistribution.

This author adopts the second dimension, as people viewed Tushiriki as a program that improved their accessibility to education, water, and infrastructure such as local roads. In each of the two chiefdoms studied here, 17 Tushiriki villages achieved small-scale projects in the fields of education, road/bridge, and water. As a result, an estimated 44,573 people benefited directly or indirectly from those utilities. Another reason for favoring the second dimension is that development, as a process of transformation, is more a social phenomenon (Wanga & Chibuta, 1999) than a merely economic one. This dimension is important in the context of reconstruction in post-conflict years, when millions of people returning to their villages badly needed access to basic necessities and public services.

This study was motivated by the fact that local ownership plays an important role in formulating the policies of bilateral and multilateral agencies for effective and sustainable development, though it proves to be challenging in practice. It analyzes whether the participants of a CDR program in the DRC have developed a feeling of ownership to the program when it was executed in the post-conflict period, from 2008 through 2010. The author then argues that local feeling of ownership for a CDR project can be enhanced through programs that create a space for ownership and where existing institutions favor it. Indeed, two cases (that is, Byazi and Muli) illustrate how people felt that the village project was theirs, while the other two (Bwishasha and Mushugula) demonstrate the opposite.

One of the main reasons for this is that some institutions, such as the chieftaincy in Mushugula village in the Luhwindja chiefdom and the Protestant church in Bwishasha in the Burhinyi chiefdom, influenced decision-making in such a negative manner that residents were not very interested in the project. Where such institutions played a positive role, however, the residents were much more involved in the project. Similarly, transparency and accountability of the Tushiriki program contributed to the relative success of the village project, and hence the feeling of ownership. Both officials and senior Tushiriki staff support
the idea that if residents are involved in all processes of the project, then they are likely to participate in the project’s execution and eventually to own it. What the present study shows is that where social homogeneity, in terms of ethnicity, exists and where good collaboration exists between institutions, such as chieftaincy and local church(es), and where local leaders are more transparent and accountable vis-à-vis the people engaged in reconstruction project processes, the chances of succeeding are more, and thus the likelihood of developing a feeling of ownership in the local residents.

This idea supports the interaction between the people involved in participation and network building, and those involved in decision-making and execution of project, and project ownership (Majee & Hoyt, 2010). In addition, when the residents interact among themselves for the welfare of the community, the interaction may define the community, and as has been found in this study, it may lead to project ownership too (Korsching, Lasley, Sápp, Titchner, & Gruber, 2010, p. 458). One point that needs to be stressed here is that the people in the target villages have showed interest in owning only those projects that were identified, planned, and executed by themselves. The Tushiriki project clearly shows that not all international agencies operating in Burhinyi and Luhwindja in post-conflict reconstruction activities could promote the feeling of local ownership, because not all of them could generate the space needed for training and technical and management assistance.

This author is skeptical if the local people would continue to show interest in owning those projects, as the intervention ended. Despite the shift in people’s beliefs vis-à-vis the intervention, it is not certain that people will remain attached to projects as theirs in the future, because other actors with different approaches would continue to operate and influence people’s beliefs. This divergence in the approaches of different agencies operating in the same area nullifies what people gained in earlier interventions.

Finally, this author is cautious of the relationship between local ownership of Tushiriki intervention as a participatory reconstruction approach on one hand and poverty alleviation on the other. Because people looked at the Tushiriki intervention as a project that contributed, to some extent, to improving access to education, safe water, and transport, enhancing simultaneously local ownership of the infrastructure, its impact on poverty alleviation was positive, at least in terms of social transformation rather than economic gains. This author has not discussed here, though is well aware of the limitations of Tushiriki intervention in terms of time and budget and other issues relating to power relations, capacity building, and labor.
The author suggests that donor agencies promote only those programs that provide space for developing a feeling of ownership in local people, or providing post-conflict reconstruction assistance to them, and where feasible, the program must motivate more agencies (that is, church or government-oriented) to create such space by involving more recipients and institutions (chieftaincy and church institutions) in decision-making of projects, and therefore in their execution. Doing so improves the ability not only to own more projects and programs, but also to sustain them through assistance by local communities.

Notes
1. The Marshall tradition refers to the speech given by former US Secretary of State George Catlett Marshall on 5 June 1947 at Harvard University. This speech initiated the post-war European aid program commonly known as the Marshall Plan. It was about the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. This European recovery program brought Europe out of the chaos, hunger, poverty, desperation, and the ashes of World War II.

2. The Declaration gave birth to a set of concrete and measurable development objectives known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). A commitment was made to achieve these objectives by 2015, specifically: (1) an end to poverty and hunger, (2) universal education, (3) gender equality, (4) child health, (5) maternal health, (6) combating HIV/AIDS, (7) environmental sustainability, and (8) global partnership. This paper refers to almost all the MDGs, because projects executed under the Tushiriki program aim towards access to education, safe water, and health care, the involvement of women, partnership among stakeholders, and other similar areas of interest.

7.8. References


CHAPTER 7: Local ownership

Photo 7.1: 2-classrooms construction under Tushiriki used 5e CELPA local church in Ciriri, Burhinyi

Photo 7.2: Burhinyi chiefdom chief in campaign for national parliamentary place, Mwenga territory
8. Conclusion
8.1. Introduction

In this thesis, I have analysed the Community-Driven Reconstruction (CDR) approach implemented by the International Rescue Committee under the name Tushiriki, a programme that has been funded by the Dutch-based nongovernmental organization, the Stichting Vluchteling (SV & IRC 2007). The thesis focused on six main issues of CDR: participatory development/reconstruction, power relations, capacity building, labour and incentive structure, accountability, and local ownership.

CDR originates from Community-Driven Development (CDD), which was initiated by the World Bank, and receives extensive support by both donors and those who promote participatory reconstruction/development. CDR/CDD has become one of the multimillion even multibillion dollar programs (Mansuri & Rao 2003:2; Platteau 2004:223; Dasgupta & Beard 2007:229; Labonne & Chase 2007:1).

CDR has become popular because it claims to combine poverty alleviation with the promotion of governance. It is expected to have a positive effect on community cohesion, democratization, capacities for collective action, and it suits with policies of decentralization particularly in post-conflict settings (Swaminthan 2001:4; Tanaka, Singh et al. 2006:2; Dasgupta & Beard 2007:230; Labonne & Chase 2007:1; Sneddon & Fox 2007:2161; Fearon, Humphreys et al. 2009:291). There are, however, recurrent challenges to the approach in areas such as power relations, sustainability of the approach, which is interconnected to the inability of local people to manage financial and other inputs, the concept of ‘community’, and ‘parallel structures’ (Zakus & Lysack 1998; Buchya & Hoverman 2000; Cooke & Kothari 2001; Dasgupta & Beard 2007; Ingamells 2007; Labonne & Chase 2007).

In view of these concerns and the contradicting experiences with CDR, this thesis aimed to provide an ethnographic account of the inner working and local implementing realities of the Tushiriki programme. I wanted to step away from the claims of CDR and open the black box of outcomes to see what the underlying dynamics are that explain these outcomes. The main research question is: how do local people and IRC staff shape development through their everyday practice in the communities of Burhinyi and Luhwindja and how do social dynamics and power relations influence decision making and implementation of the CDR from 2008 to 2010?
From this main research question, I constructed the following sub research questions:

1. **What are the social dynamics and power relations in the areas of implementation?**
2. **How do these social dynamics play out in individual and community-level decision making?**
3. **How are the objectives of the CDR (good governance and reconstruction) and the programme activities (formation of committees and implementation of projects) translated in practice and responded to by the community members and local staff of the IRC?**
4. **How do other reconstruction interventions that happened in the past or at the same time affect the working of CDR in the communities?**
5. **What are the implications of the findings for the assumptions, policies, and practices of the CDR in general?**

In seeking to answer these question I have adopted an actor-oriented approach to the analysis of the inner working and local dynamics of the Tushiriki intervention. I view the Tushiriki programme as an arena. In fact, this is an arena or sub arenas where multiple realities interplay, interact, and are socially constructed, and where the complexity of the field is being socially negotiated between actors in the project not only at field level but also at institutional level (Biggs & Matsaert 1999:237; Long 2001; Nyamu-Musembi 2002:1; Hilhorst 2003; Hilhorst & Jansen 2010). It is an actor-oriented approach applied to committee members as key actors through local institutions that were established within a typical CDR approach (i.e., the Tushiriki programme).

Here, the actor-orientation approach means that people reflected upon both their past and current experiences, and what they saw in their setting, even as they were inclined to use their understanding of the intervention and their abilities to react to their environment. Furthermore, the actor-oriented approach means to look at interventions as social interfaces between the staff of the implementing agency and the beneficiary population. It is about understanding a reality informed by concrete experiences of actors with regard to a particular programme (Biggs & Matsaert 1999:237; Long 2001; Nyamu-Musembi 2002:1, Hilhorst 2003 Hilhorst & Jansen 2010).

The first two questions are addressed throughout the five empirical chapters of this thesis, and their specific contribution to these questions will be outlined in 8.2. Section 8.3 deals with the third question. It details the role of different groups of actors: IRC staff, VDC members, local elites and the recipient population, with reference to findings from the
different chapters. Section 8.4 highlights key findings that address question 4. After the general conclusions, section five outlines some limitations and ways forward for future research.

8.2. Social dynamics of local decision making and implementation processes.

1. What are the social dynamics and power relations in the areas of implementation?
2. How do these social dynamics play out in individual and community-level decision making?

My first two research questions concern the social dynamics of the decision making processes and the implementation of the reconstruction projects in the communities.

Chapter two has set the agenda for the study of social dynamics by providing a literature review on participatory development/reconstruction with a focus on the relations of power between elites and non-elites in a community. While acknowledging the potential of participatory approaches for reconstruction, it brings out that the social negotiation between elites and non-elites over power is a key concern for further research.

The two questions are addressed throughout the empirical chapters of the thesis.

Chapter three analysed the social dynamics of capacity building, which is a major objective as well as an important vehicle for the CDR intervention. Capacity building for governance in CDR is one of the main activities of the approach (Tanaka, Singh et al. 2006:6). The reality here is that developing a chain of capacity development may, but not necessarily, have long-lasting changes in the area. We argue that there were drawbacks in the content of training modules as well as drawbacks in knowledge transfer from trainees to other actors of communities, specifically to elites and non-elites. Importantly, we found that field staff lacked incentives to promote accountability as a value that residents could internalize and apply in their social life. Rather, they were more inclined to promote the hardware of reconstructing infrastructure. This forms an explanation of the mechanisms by which the soft side of the intervention reaped less results than anticipated. A more coordinated action for capacity building for governance among different stakeholders would have been suitable.

Chapter four focuses on the dynamics of accountability as one of governance principles promoted within the Tushiriki programme. Governance and accountability have become one of the popular themes among donor interventions in reconstruction in conflict-affected areas (Vlassenroot & Romkema 2007:7). The chapter shows that the concept of accountability is
seen differently according to the context. Beneficiaries are more interested in concrete outputs such as school reconstruction than in abstract concepts such as accountability and there are multiple existing accountabilities that differ from the Tushiriki one. The chapter shows that the envisaged accountability mechanisms do not work as planned. This does not mean that there is no accountability. Local accountability mechanisms operate in ways that are informal, indirect and often between different actors than foreseen. These lack answerability and transparency, yet they have a role to play, and the staff often knows how to use them to enhance the project implementation.

Chapter five takes up the issue of power over projects for the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and analyses the role of elites in the social dynamics of the CDR in this post-conflict setting. It shows that social dynamics at individual level are based on relations of trust between elites and non-elites, while dynamics at community level are based on negotiating action among power holders around a village project. This chapter argues that existing institutions such as churches and chieftaincy are more influential than the committee members in both decision making and project execution within Tushiriki. Democratic processes are the emanation of these existing power holders, packaged in the programme governance structures. While the programme of Tushiriki tried to by-pass local power holders, these were often crucial in the success of projects. The chapter thus questions whether elite capture is always negative for development.

Moreover, in local reconstruction project such as education and health in eastern DRC, churches are more powerful than chiefs and that in order to reinforce their power base in the community, these power holders were interested to promote better project execution frequently. This leads to a conclusion that attention needs to be paid to better understanding of accountability of churches for development.

Chapter six, which analyses labour and incentive structure within the programme, was motivated by the observation that there was a lot of discussion about people’s labour participation in the projects. Specifically, there was the dilemma about whether to pay or not pay local labour, when local people contribute to the reconstruction programme. It deals with the reality of determining what motivates people to participate in a reconstruction project; that is, what are the local perceptions of costs or efforts vis-à-vis benefits they expected to gain from a project reconstruction. People’s responses are understood by placing them in the context of a history of forced labour, and by taking up the local perception of ‘public goods’.
Finally, chapter seven highlights local ownership in the Tushiriki programme. The aim of analysing this topic stems from the idea that local ownership in development/reconstruction is seen as a prerequisite for effective and sustainable development/reconstruction. What is striking is that despite this popular leaning toward local ownership, translating this concept into practice may prove to be difficult in development/reconstruction programmes.

We argue that local ownership can be enhanced among local people where existing institutions such as churches and chieftaincy favour it and where programmes create a space for it. Additionally, participatory development/reconstruction programmes need to improve the prospects of potential development/reconstruction aid recipients to own a project.

8.3. Findings-assumptions in CDR processes and research questions

This section addresses the question how the objectives of the CDR (good governance and reconstruction) and the programme activities (formation of committees and implementation of projects) are translated in practice and responded to by the community members and local staff of the IRC? The section distinguishes three categories of community members: the elected members of the Village Development Committee, representatives of the elite or local power holders and the recipient population.

8.3.1. CDR staff

CDR staff both field and senior influenced the Tushiriki programme in several ways. Firstly, I have shown in chapter three that capacity building depended on the quality of the facilitators, who were mostly fieldworkers, and that there was a need to determine how staff translated these objectives into programme practices (Hilhorst & Schmiemann 2002). CDR staff took the reconstruction objective more serious than the governance objectives, partly because their performance was measured against the number of projects they completed while change in terms of governance would not be visible.

In the remaining chapters, it has become clear that staff nonetheless plays a major role in the governance of the project, but often in ways that were different from the roles that the programme expected them to play. I have shown in chapter five that where power holders competed with each other over project resources, the game took the form of strong involvement of agency staff, both senior and field staff. Yet, in the metaphor of power struggle seen as a game, agency staff played the role of referee between two teams fighting for a championship. Rather than focusing on the interface between the VDC and the
population, agency staff, particularly those who were permanently in the field, knew who were the real players and were in touch with committee members and influential members such as the King, the Chef de Poste d’Encadrement Administratif, the curé of the Catholic parish, or the influential senior pastor.

As a result, they found out a way to minimize the struggle either by domination, what I term in this thesis the ‘use of power over power’ or by synergy, that is, through negotiation or agreement. Because domination and synergy were used positively in social dynamics at community level, they fell into what Dasgupta & Beard (2007:244) have called elite control rather than elite capture. As I have said in chapter three, field staff, especially those who were originally from the same or the neighbouring chiefdom were involved in informal talks among power holders either to get the project properly implemented, for which they were judged and paid, or to contribute in their manner to the reconstruction of their terrain.

All in all, the Tushiriki senior staff was quite positive about the approach of the programme. As I have said in chapter four, the agency senior staff saw it as one of the best approaches to development/reconstruction as it addresses issues related to corruption and governance, one of the main problems that the country faces since decades. Furthermore, the Tushiriki programme was seen as a very sensitive intervention, because the amount of grant per community and sub-community was announced publicly, and because field staff were in a position to engage with issues about power relations.

While the staff was very positive about the programme, they often acted in accordance with their own knowledge of the context, instead of following the rules of the project. Instead of embarking on the long route of building people’s capacity to hold the leaders of the community accountable, they often preferred the short route and intervened – informally rather than in open confrontation – to ensure that the project was implemented according to the objectives. In short, the role played by CDR staff in influencing the Tushiriki programme can be seen in facilitation processes and in the ways they favoured domination or synergy among power holders. As a result, they hardly changed people’s behaviour on governance in their daily life.

8.3.2. Committee members

Committee members responded in diverse ways to Tushiriki programme. Firstly, as I have shown in chapter three, committee members viewed positively capacity building package that comprised trainings, management, and technical assistance, because they learnt how to better
manage a project and also were motivated by knowledge gained from it. In other words, committee members, rather than the entire population, were empowered by the programme about transparency and accountability, for they had opportunity to put these principles in practice. This would have a positive effect in the area in terms of governance, because being mostly sub elite, they were likely to become the next generation of power holders in the area, where they will have the opportunity, one may hope, to apply these principles in their social life.

With regard to motivation of committee members, there was a conflicting view between themselves and the agency field staff on the one hand, and between committee and local people on the other hand. Even as local people viewed the four US dollars given to every committee member at lunch time during training sessions as a wage, agency staff considered them a pastors or volunteers, who would not need any salary as they were seen as contributing to the reconstruction of their area.

These views were completely refuted by committee members arguing that although being elected, they were working for the programme, and should be seen as employees who deserved wages or other forms of motivation. Findings are consistent with Ariely, Bracha et al. (2008:18), who have mentioned that there are societies where volunteering may not be perceived as honourable, such as in other societies like the United States of America. Nonetheless, committee members continued to participate in project activities despite their misgivings of not being paid for efforts and time devoted in these activities.

The Tushiriki programme was based on the assumption that “the more local people have a sense of common identity and interest, when project funding is available, the more they are willing to volunteer in both decision making and project execution”. As stated above, however, VDC members saw themselves not as volunteers but as workers. The VDC members were elected from the community. That did not meant that there was a common interest and identity with the remainder of the population, or that the VDC members were prepared to do their work as volunteers just like the other members of the community were asked to provide their manual labour for free. It is worthwhile to recognize that even when people are living in one area and originally from the same ethnic group (i.e., the same culture), there are multiple divisions in terms of religion, social class, and literacy. Even among women, these differences may range from socioeconomic class to religion, from marital status to education, and from age to interests or priorities (Sequeira & Warner 2007).
These differences, as Wood (2003:457) has mentioned, result into a sort of unaccountable power for some and an exclusion of those who are under an institutional and relational risk for others. This is related to the observation made in the post-war context of Sierra Leone, where the rural community was typically divided between leading lineages and the rest (Richards, Bah et al. 2004).

Therefore, being located in the same village and being from the same ethnic group is not the only factor to obtain people’s involvement in a common-good activity. What also matters is the type of activity, the amount of time and effort invested, and the reward expected from project activity both directly and indirectly. Where people do not have experience of true volunteering, they tend to consider it as an employment, therefore, expecting a monetary payment.

Finally, I have shown in chapter three that although men and women were in parity in a committee, women showed lower change in knowledge about local governance as they were less active than men. Indeed, their passivity was because of illiteracy and the weight of customary laws. This is consistent with Datta (2007), who has asserted that despite this useful way of empowering women, their participation remains lower, because of illiteracy and because of poor self-confidence.

In short, as committee members benefited from capacity building on governance within Tushiriki, they were more empowered on governance than the population at large. In addition, committee members saw themselves as employees who deserved wages rather than volunteers. Last, because women were less active than men in committee processes, they were less empowered than men, despite the committee being in parity.

8.3.3. Elites
The Tushiriki programme tried to exclude the elite from decision-making in the project, because it was feared that this would result in elite capture. Instead, the programme aimed to capacitate the population to execute control over the project and their leaders. The annual plan of Tushiriki read, for example, “CDR programme allows the empowerment of community impacted by conflict and enables them to be drivers and owners of their own reconstruction by establishing community governance structures that stress community priorities and accountability” (SV & IRC 2007:6). My analysis shows that in reality there is no doubt that existing elites played a crucial role in influencing the programme in several ways. Firstly, in chapter five, I have shown that two networks or institutions of chiefs and
church leaders were influential during the intervention, and that the intellectual elite, as an intermediate layer between power holders on the one hand, and between these leaders and the population on the other hand, played a crucial role in it. It could even be stated that where projects were successful, this was due to the motivation and mobilization by the elite.

Moreover, I have shown from the same chapter that church leaders were likely more powerful than chiefs given the number of villages that selected schools reconstruction (25 out of 34, 73.5%), which were more a church-related project than road/bridge, which were initiated and supported by chiefs (5 out of 34, 14.7%).

Although the project protocol did not provide space to the elite, the local staff of IRC was well aware of the role of the elite and actively tried to enrol them to assist in the project. The staff would often say things like “The more a village chief is stronger, the more he will sensitize his people about a reconstruction project; therefore, the project is likely to succeed in both decision making and execution”. This was the case for the chief, but also for the church leaders. Once a chief was motivated for the project, he would send his advisors to meet residents personally, house by house, to inform them about a public meeting to be held or a community work to be done. Alternatively, the message was announced during a Sunday church service, where it has a chance of reaching the vast majority of residents. As I have argued in chapter five, church leaders were committed to sensitize and to mobilize residents about either meetings or community work. Thirdly, in chapter six, I have mentioned that these power holders whose pre-existing projects were executed as Tushiriki projects were more active than anybody else when supervising the execution of these projects and to ensure that the work proceeded as expected. At the same time, I have shown in chapter seven that where these power holders were very committed to the project, often because they had started the project before IRC, residents were also likely to develop a sense of ownership over the project.

We also saw the influence of the elite over the village development committee. Its composition by five men and five women, did not ensure that its members were disconnected to existing power holders. Rather, they were either part of the dominant institutions of churches or part of strong kinship ties, and in some cases, they were themselves church leaders. As a result, committee members acted according to pre-existing social norms and tended to have an attitude of answering to the elite more than to the general assembly. For instance, I have shown in chapter five that both chiefs and church heads exerted influence on a project getting selected, as the highest need of the village, either a pre-identified project by
the former, or initiated schools by the latter. Nonetheless, because projects were of public utility, they were accepted and voted by the majority of residents, who were in reality linked to the same institutions. Similarly, I have shown in the same chapter that one of the ways the chiefs and church heads influenced the intervention is by getting their relatives voted into the committee.

In chapter four I have shown that officials, specifically at chiefdom level, had a common ground of being in favour of participatory reconstruction. There was much value on people’s involvement in the project reconstruction, both for contributing to the future of the area, and for earning money to survive. Even when they knew that accountability was brought in Tushiriki as a new value; however, they were not able to change committee members and people’s behavior about it, specifically outside the programme.

In short, throughout the thesis it appeared that multiple power holders, including chiefs and church leaders were influential in the area. Church leaders were more influential than chiefs, as we have shown with an analysis of the project portfolio of the Tushiriki and the (similar and more large scale) Tuungane programme I found that existing elites have interest to have development work for strengthening their power base in the community and for the community interest, rather than necessarily stealing the project funding or destabilising the process for their own interest. The IRC-CDR-Manual states: “Where traditional/elite/religious community leaders are considered respected members of the community or members who can subvert the process, they can be given an advisory but not voting/signatory role on committees” (McBride & Patel 2007:22). Even though the elite was formally excluded from membership in the committee, this thesis has shown that a local elite (chief and church leader) may nonetheless be influential in a direct or indirect manner on the project processes, and therefore, on its outcomes.

8.3.4. Village people
Residents responded to Tushiriki programme in several ways. I have shown in chapter four that people’s views were more for concrete outputs than accountability. Additionally, I have argued in the same chapter that the concept of accountability had its own context-specific meaning and that there were multiple forms of accountability that did not match the Tushiriki one. This idea is consistent with Vlassenroot & Romkema (2007:10), who have noted that ‘governance and democracy’ in the eastern DRC were seen as abstract terms and associated with western countries. People’s demands resonated more with the needs for reconstruction
than for the needs for democratic accountability. In other words, people’s demand for aid is more about school/road reconstruction than for democratic accountability.

Secondly, I have mentioned in chapter three that despite the positive view and empowerment of committee members in local governance, efforts to change governance values did not have a tangible impact outside the programme, because values of governance of existing institutions (church-based/government-based) were not similar in the same area. This is consistent with Humphreys, Sanchez et al. (2012) who have found that despite the fact that the programme succeeded in implementing considerable number of projects, of which residents expressed high levels of satisfaction with the outcomes, little could be said about people’s behaviour change regarding governance.

In the same vein, capacity building as one of the main activities executed within the programme was received differently by the local people. As I have said in chapter three, the population at large was not involved in training sessions. Rather, people were sensitized by civil society organizations, partners to the Tushiriki programme, and this sensitization was not practical, because it mostly took place in some suburban area for a short duration. As a result, most people viewed trainings and sensitization activities as useless. Moreover, some residents were even reluctant to engage in the project, because they thought the committee was paid for this activity. Information and mobilization of local people is important and residents can indeed actively take part in project activities. But, it is important to bear in mind that capacity building (whatever better it may be) cannot have lasting effects unless other actors operating in the same area are engaged for the same objective. As I have mentioned in chapter six, spontaneous or naive participation does not exist, if people do not balance effort and time they invest in programme activities, and if people do not weigh the payback they get from their project contribution in whatever form (be it material or nonmaterial). Indeed, the understanding of this balance is the key for people’s involvement in any reconstruction programme, especially in the context of the DRC or similar conflict-affected area.

As I have said in chapter four, people’s involvement in meetings raised expectations at the beginning of the programme in the sense that the first meetings were more crowded than those held later, because people thought they would receive relief aid rather than reconstruction aid. Despite this perception, people participated in public meetings, often at the instigation or pressure of the elites (church leaders or/and chiefs). In addition, I have shown in chapter three that project prioritization often took the form of validation of the pre-
existing or preselected projects by power holders of the area, rather than as a result of public meeting *per se*.

The participation of the local population in the manual labour of the projects was more problematic, as I have shown in chapter six. Because of an association with forced labour (*Salongo*) and because residents did not have an idea that they were contributing to a public good, people were reluctant to participate voluntarily, especially when this concerned hard manual labour. They were only prepared to do this, when they were being paid or when there was a lot of pressure from the elite. Only in exceptional cases, where the elite was very well committed to a project which pre-existed before the IRC intervention, we found that people could develop a sense of ownership to the project.

In short, people’s responses about the Tushiriki programme were more positive about the infrastructure being rebuilt and less about training, governance, and advocacy activities. The IRC programme: did empower committee members more than the community, whose participation depended largely on the respect they had for the elite and the motivation the elite had in pursuing the project. Public meetings and participation were thus influenced by the existing social culture and by dynamics at individual and community levels of relations of trustworthiness between residents and their leaders.

### 8.4 The influence of other programmes in the same area.

The fourth research question concerns other programmes that are implemented in the same area. There were other nongovernmental organizations operating in the area such as CAB/ICCO and, as I have mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, they focused on the hard part rather than on the soft part of reconstruction. They engaged in rebuilding schools, health centres, and water systems without any training and assistance about governance. I have also shown in chapter four that AVSI/UNICEF did not organise any public meeting for accountability purpose and that it became hard for people to accommodate themselves to this accountability mechanism within Tushiriki, as they were not used to it in the past. These agencies other than IRC-Tushiriki agreed with the chief of chiefdom to choose infrastructures to reconstruct, and needed merely local contribution in terms of manual labour from residents. Yet, in schools that were targeted by both Tushiriki and CAB/ICCO such as in Ciriri village, this thesis has shown in chapter five that the context was more about competition than of synergy between actors’ objectives. That is, whereas one focused on
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governance through reconstruction, another focused on the infrastructure reconstruction. It resulted in the divergence of outcomes between the past/parallel interventions and Tushiriki that came from divergence of agencies’ objectives.

In chapter three, I argued that the diversity in objectives for reconstruction, and the parallel projects by different agencies was a major reason why the capacity building efforts of IRC did not result in changing attitudes on accountability. People saw accountability more as a specific demand or rule from Tushiriki, than as a value to be introduced in other projects or events. I concluded that unless development interventions are better coordinated, it is difficult to achieve objectives on changing attitudes towards governance and accountability.

Overall, it can be stated that the community-driven programme failed to a large extent to reach its governance objectives, even though it succeeded in the construction of reconstruction projects. The programme’s strategies to involve different actors and the mechanisms to enhance accountability were little suited to the existing social relations and practices of accountability. The reason why the project often succeeded was that the staff adapted the programme to local realities. The local elite, rather than being excluded was able to play a large and often decisive role in mobilizing people for meetings and to contribute with their labour. Accountability relations that evolved were more between elites and the staff than directed to the population, a phenomenon which I called ‘power over power’.

8.5. Key findings and some implications with regard to a CDR programme

This thesis has found that:

(a) Capacity building itself is not enough to bring about change beyond technical assistance. Unless capacity building is explicitly designed to meet the ultimate goal of enhancing governance, and takes into account external actors and factors to the intervention, change cannot be expected to take place.

(b) Programme beneficiaries value concrete outputs such as rebuilding school/road more than accountability and other abstract concepts.

(c) If people do not adhere to the accountability mechanisms prescribed in the programme, it does not necessarily mean that there is no accountability. Accountability can take its own context-specific shape and meaning. Development practitioners need to pay attention to this.
(d) Chiefs and church leaders are the main power holders in the area where the programme was implemented. For successful programme implementation, it is important to understand and take into consideration the local context of institutional multiplicity and the landscape of powers.

(e) Local participation in the form of manual labour in project execution is influenced by the coercive history of labour and whether or not to be paid. There is a need to balance people’s views on cost and time invested in development and reconstruction vis-à-vis people’s expected motivation.

(f) A sense of local ownership of a participatory development and reconstruction project can take place in a CDR programme where the existing institutions favour it, where processes of accountability are properly instituted and where a space is created for it.

8.6. Limitations and future research

With regard to limitations, the current research focused only on three chiefdoms of the South-Kivu province in the DRC. It would be better for future research to target northern, central, western, and southern provinces of the DRC, and in other countries where a CDR programme is being implemented. This is because not only the institutional history of kingship might be different, but also the experience with conflict might vary from one area to another.

Another limitation of the current study is that I did not look into the second echelon of the approach, that is the community level, as I noticed at first glance that it looked much more contractor-driven than community-driven. As such, the dynamics of power relations described in the current thesis (i.e., village level) might be different to those that may occur at this second level. Further research on CDR regarding this aspect, on tendering and procurement processes at the second echelon of a CDR programme would be of importance to complement our research.

Once the governance cluster is established at various levels, it would be interesting to learn more about how they function and how they are translated into everyday practices in the target rural areas by various actors intervening there. In addition, it would be worthy to investigate how local people cope with maintenance of the infrastructures after they are rebuilt.
Finally, it would be worthwhile to investigate the effectiveness of a governance programme through reconstruction in a context of decentralization in the DRC, which is expected to take place in 2014.

8.7. References


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Photo 8.1: Local road reconstructed under Tushirki in use, Karwera, Budaha, Burhinyi

Photo 8.2: Roof of 3 classrooms completely rebuilt under Tushiriki project in Byazi, Luhwindja
Photo 8.3: Water tap damaged at one water point constructed under Tushiriki in Mushugula, Luhwindja

Photo 8.4: Ciriri primary school fully rebuilt under ICCO/Anti-Bwaki, Ciriri village, Burhinyi
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SUMMARY

Participatory development and reconstruction has become one of the popular approaches not just for poverty alleviation, but for strengthening accountability in post-conflict and post-disaster settings. It receives much support from the international agencies, donors and advocates of collective action. Multi-million programmes for development/reconstruction are supported by both the bilateral donors and the international agencies, such as the World Bank, the International Labour Organization, the World Health Organization and the United Nations Development Programmes. Adding strength to the approach is its potential to support decentralization in post-conflict settings. At the same time; however, critiques of the approach raise questions about its effectiveness in bringing about changes in governance, the complexities of power relations, the tricky concept of community and challenges with regard to sustainability. This thesis presents an in-depth case study of one CDR programme, in Eastern DRC, in order to shed light on these questions. It analyses issues related to capacity building and its supposed outcome of capacity development of local communities; and looks at techniques used for accountability and how these work in practice. The thesis also highlights issues of power and labour and how these dynamics evolve in a CDR programme, and examines the level of local ownership the population felt about the projects.

This thesis wants to contribute to the debates on community-driven reconstruction by offering a detailed case study into one CDR programme in Eastern DRC: the Stichting Vluchteling (SV)-supported Tushiriki programme that was implemented by the International Rescue Committee (IRC). It unravels the realities of who drives the process, how are social relations constructed around the intervention, what is the source of legitimacy of those who drive it, what are the mechanisms to enhance local accountability in the context of post-conflict, how capacity building has been undertaken and shaped by actors, and what are the types of labour and the incentive structure in the dynamics of the programme. Through this case study, the black box of community driven reconstruction can be opened to reveal the inner working of the programme, in order to arrive at a better understanding of the contradicting experiences with the approach.

The purpose of the research is to understand the social dynamics around and meanings attached to the Community-Driven Reconstruction programme called Tushiriki in target communities in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This, in order to inform the assumptions and approaches underlying the CDR programme's design and
implementation. The programme was run by SV-IRC. The main research question is how do local people and IRC staff shape development through their everyday practice in the communities of Burhinyi, Luhwindja, and Kaziba and how do social dynamics and power relations influence decision making and implementation of the CDR from 2008 to 2010?

1. What are the social dynamics and power relations in the areas of implementation?
2. How do they play out in individual and community-level decision making?
3. How are the objectives of the CDR (good governance and reconstruction) and the programme activities (formation of committees and implementation of projects) translated in practice and responded to by the community members and local staff of the IRC?
4. How do other reconstruction interventions that happened in the past or at the same time affect the working of CDR in the communities?
5. What are the implications of the findings for the assumptions, policies, and practices of the CDR in general?

This is a qualitative study based on ethnographic research that I undertook in two chiefdoms (Burhinyi and Luhwindja) in South-Kivu province in the eastern DRC. I have used as techniques for data collection participant observation, in-depth semi-structured interviews and desk review of secondary data. The study was executed at the request of Stichting Vluchteling, who sponsored the programme, in order to have an independent qualitative monitoring of their programme. Throughout the research period, I have provided feedback to staff and management at different occasions and I have been part of three evaluation teams looking into the programme.

In chapter 2 I present a literature review on participatory development/reconstruction. I assess its value and show its potential to transformation, its advantages and disadvantages. I argue that though its leading to development/reconstruction, one of its main drawbacks is that the inequality engrained in power relations between elites and non-elites remains. One way forward for research would be to look more at the way in which changes are induced through negotiations taking place within the power arena of local politics. Another way ahead revolves around an urgent need for anthropology of development to view development/reconstruction as processes; that is, to look at discourses, institutions and practices and the way they are shaped. And, last but not least, it is necessary for practitioners to find ways to balance bottom-up control and top-down authority. For this, it is important to share new
positive and negative experiences regarding participatory development/reconstruction and its methods.

In chapter 3 I discuss capacity builders for governance within the Tushiriki programme. We show that the lack of impact on governance, raised by the recent robust evaluation on a similar CDR programme, originates from the capacity building processes. There are significant pitfalls in the content of the educational messages, incentive of the staff delivering the training and the interface between trainers and trainees. Other difficulties are related to existing power relations on the ground and the existing types of accountabilities in the areas, that do not match with the types of accountability prescribed in the CDR programmes.

These findings lead us to argue that there was inconsistency in the content of the training for capacity development. Training was little connected to people’s social life. Yet, training was to some extent effective, but was not transferred to the most powerful actors who could, in turn, transfer it to local people. It means there is considerable room for improvement to enhance governance practices in the Tushiriki and similar programmes, but existing community dynamics need to be considered as well as existing accountability norms and practices. Additionally, training content needs to be adjusted to local realities, including better translation into local language of the main concepts of the training message. Besides, there is a need to better coordinate with other actors promoting governance practices in the same setting.

Chapter 4 deals with the institutional engineering in the eastern DRC. It discusses the general assembly report, the watch-dog role of civil society and the display of reports as techniques for accountability and how these mechanisms are viewed by residents. We argue that programme beneficiaries are more interested in concrete outputs than in abstract concepts such as accountability, which has its own context-specific meaning. Also, locally existing types of accountabilities are conflicting with the democratic accountability prescribed by the programme. As ways forward, we suggest that attention has to be paid to how beneficiaries regard the demand side of both accountability and reconstruction. Additionally, as public meetings are embedded in the local culture, a particular place should be given to these meetings as a mechanism to boost public and downward accountability.

Chapter 5 examines the concept of ‘power relations’, often described as a key variable responsible for the ineffectiveness of participatory approaches. We aim to understand the dynamics between power holders and others in the target communities of the Tushiriki
programme. We argue that the implication of chiefs and church leaders in reconstruction adds to its achievement in the context of inter-elite competition to control external funding where one form of power holder is worse than another. Also, we show that project selection and execution is more dependent on the existing institutions rather than the result of democratic processes. Chieftaincy and churches are existing institutions that are based on the same identity and culture. They are networks to which one can connect a development/reconstruction action in a conflict-affected area or similar context of the rural DRC. Lastly, as churches replaced the state in education and health provision, they are often more powerful than chiefs.

Agencies that use participatory development/reconstruction such as CDR need to better identify and understand existing institutions through which relations of power operate. They also need to work with them and -when feasible-, perform what we term “power over power” through any of the existing lines of power. Finally, these agencies need to stop competing each other while they should learn to cooperate in order to improve accountability practices in the same target area.

Chapter 6 concerns the labour participation of the population. Community participation in community-driven reconstruction programmes takes in practice the form of labour or volunteer work, which may be viewed differently by participants. We examined the effectiveness of the CDR approach, specifically the mobilization of voluntary manual labour for public works in the Tushiriki programme. We found that overall, people’s participation was lower than expected, that their motivation depended on the type of work related to the selected project and there was common unwillingness to perform manual labour for free. We argue that people’s behaviour regarding labour is influenced by repetitive cycles of forced manual labour in the area. In addition, people lacked motivation because of the contested notion of public goods such as road and education in the area.

Looking at four cases described in chapter 7 about local ownership in the Tushiriki programme, we have observed that where the existing institutions favour the sense of local ownership or where a programme creates a space for such sense of ownership, beneficiaries can develop it. We then bring to the attention that programmes need to improve the views of residents to own a project while implementing a participatory development/reconstruction intervention.
These different chapters together convey the social dynamics of Tushiriki. In the conclusion, the insights are captured to analyse the role of different actors in the programme. Overall, it can be stated that the community-driven programme failed to a large extent to reach its governance objectives, even though it succeeded in the construction of reconstruction projects. The programme’s strategies to involve different actors and the mechanisms to enhance accountability were little suited to the existing social relations and practices of accountability. The reason why the project often succeeded was that the staff adapted the programme to local realities. The local elite, rather than being excluded was able to play a large and often decisive role in mobilizing people for meetings and to contribute with their labour. Accountability relations that evolved were more between elites and the staff than directed to the population, a phenomenon which I called ‘power over power’. The conclusion ends with some implications with regard to a CDR programme and emphasises key findings and key lessons. Finally it discusses some limitations of the research and provides suggestions for future research.
RESUME (SUMMARY IN FRENCH)

Le développement/reconstruction participatif(ve) est devenu(e) une des approches populaires non seulement pour la réduction de la pauvreté, mais aussi pour le renforcement du fait de rendre compte dans les zones post-conflit et post-désastre. Cette approche fait l’objet de beaucoup de popularités de la part d’agences internationales, de donateurs et de ceux qui plaident pour l’action collective. Il s’agit d’une collection allant de plusieurs millions à plusieurs milliards de dollars pour le développement/reconstruction par les donateurs bilatéraux et les agences internationales. Parmi ces agences, il y a lieu de citer la Banque Mondiale, l’Organisation Internationale de Travail, l’Organisation Mondiale de la Santé et le Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement. Un atout additionnel de l’approche est son potentiel d’appuyer la décentralisation en zones post-conflit.

Par contre, les critiques de l’approche sont diverses. Elles vont de l’effectivité à apporter des changements en termes de gouvernance, de la complexité des relations de pouvoir, du concept problématique de « communauté » et du doute à propos de sa prédisposition à la durabilité. Cette thèse présente l’étude de cas en profondeur d’un programme CDR à l’Est de la RDC, en vue de donner la lumière sur ces questions. Elle analyse les questions relatives au renforcement de capacité et ses résultats attendus du développement de capacité des communautés locales; aussi bien qu’elle jette un regard sur les techniques utilisées pour rendre compte et comment celles-ci fonctionnent en pratique. La thèse met aussi en lumière les questions relatives au pouvoir et au labeur et comment ces dynamiques changent dans un programme CDR, et examine le niveau d’appropriation que la population pensait avoir à propos de projets.

Cette thèse voudrait contribuer aux débats sur la Reconstruction Dirigée par la Communauté (CDR) en offrant une étude de cas détaillée dans un programme CDR à l’Est de la RDC : le programme Tushiriki financé par SV qui a été implémenté par IRC. Elle clarifie les réalités de qui dirige les processus, comment les relations sociales sont construites autour de l’intervention, quelle est la source de légitimité de ceux qui la dirige, quels sont les mécanismes d’améliorer le rendre compte local dans le contexte post-conflit. Mais aussi comment le renforcement de capacité a été entrepris et formé par les acteurs, et quels sont les types de labeur et de structure incitative dans les dynamiques du programme. A travers cette étude de cas, la boîte noire de la reconstruction dirigée par la communauté peut être ouverte.
Résumé

pour révéler le fonctionnement interne de ce programme, en vue d’arriver à une meilleure compréhension des réalités contradictoires avec l’approche.

L’objectif de cette recherche est de comprendre les dynamiques sociales autour et les significations attachées au programme de Reconstruction Dirigée par la Communauté appelé Tushiriki dans les communautés ciblées de la partie Est de la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC). Ceci, en vue d’informer les suppositions et approches qui soulignent la conception et l’implémentation du programme CDR. Le programme a été géré par SV-IRC (Stichting Vluchteling-International Rescue Committee). Ma principale question de recherche est comment les populations locales et le staff IRC arrangent le développement à travers leur pratique de tous les jours dans les communautés de Burhinyi, Luhwindja et Kaziba et comment les dynamiques sociales et les relations de pouvoir influencent-elles la prise de décision et l’implémentation du programme CDR, de 2008 à 2010?

1. Quelles sont les dynamiques sociales et relations de pouvoir dans les zones d’implémentation?

2. Comment ces dynamiques sont-elles engagées dans la prise de décision au niveau individuel et communautaire?

3. Comment les objectifs de CDR (bonne gouvernance et reconstruction) et les activités du programme (formation des comités et implémentation de projets) sont traduits en pratique et comment les communautés membres et le staff local de l’IRC y ont-ils répondu?

4. Comment d’autres interventions de reconstruction exécutées dans le passé ou au même moment affectent le fonctionnement de CDR dans les communautés?

5. Quelles sont les implications des résultats au regard des suppositions, politiques, et pratiques de CDR en général?

Il s’agit d’une étude qualitative basée sur l’ethnographie que j’ai entreprise dans trois chefferies (Burhinyi, Luhwindja et Kaziba) au Sud-Kivu à l’est de la RDC. J’ai utilisé comme techniques de collecte de données l’observation participante, les interviews semi-structurées et la revue de données secondaires. L’étude a été exécutée à la demande de Stichting Vluchteling, qui avait financé le programme en vue d’avoir un suivi qualitatif indépendant de ce programme. Durant la période de recherche, j’ai donné le feedback au management et au staff du programme et j’ai fait partie de trois équipes d’évaluation en relation avec ce programme.

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Dans le chapitre 2, je présente la revue de la littérature sur le développement/reconstruction participatif(ve). Je mesure sa valeur et montre son potentiel de transformation, ses avantages et ses inconvénients. J’argumente alors que malgré sa contribution au développement/reconstruction, un de ses aspects négatifs reste la persistance de l’inégalité des relations de pouvoir entre élites et non-élites. Une voie pour la recherche future serait de regarder plus sur la manière dont les changements sont induits à travers les négociations qui prennent place dans l’arène de pouvoir de politique locale. Une autre voie pour le futur tourne autour d’un besoin urgent de l’anthropologie de développement à regarder le développement/reconstruction comme processus; c’est-à-dire, regarder aux discours, aux institutions et aux pratiques et la manière dont ils sont ordonnés. Et finalement, d’autres voies, non les moindres, il est nécessaire aux praticiens de trouver des options pour balancer le contrôle de bas en haut avec l’autorité de haut en bas. Pour ceci, il est important de partager des nouvelles expériences positives et négatives au regard du développement/reconstruction participatif(ve) et ses méthodes.

Dans le chapitre 3, je discute les acteurs du renforcement de capacité pour la gouvernance dans le programme Tushiriki. Nous montrons que l’absence d’impact en matière de gouvernance, mentionnée par la récente évaluation robuste sur un programme similaire de CDR, tient aux processus de renforcement de capacité. Il y a des aspects négatifs importants dans le contenu des messages éducationnels, à l’incitation du staff délivrant la formation et à l’interface entre les formateurs et les formés. Les autres difficultés sont liées à l’existence des relations de pouvoir sur le terrain et les types des comptabilités existantes dans ces zones, qui ne coïncident pas aux types de comptabilité prescrite dans les programmes CDR.

Ces résultats nous amènent à argumenter qu’il y avait une inconsistence dans le contenu de formations pour le développement de capacité. La formation était peu connectée à la vie sociale de la population. Il peut être surprenant, que la formation a été dans une certaine mesure effective, mais non transférée aux tenants de pouvoir qui pouvaient, à leur tour, la transférer à la population locale dans les communautés. Ceci signifie qu’il y a moyen d’améliorer les pratiques de gouvernance dans Tushiriki et programmes similaires, mais les dynamiques communautaires existantes ont besoin d’être considérées, ainsi que les pratiques et normes de comptabilité existantes. En plus, le contenu de formation a besoin d’être ajusté aux réalités locales, incluant la bonne traduction dans la langue locale des principaux concepts du message de formation. Bien plus, il y a besoin de bien coordonner avec d’autres acteurs œuvrant pour la promotion des pratiques de bonne gouvernance dans le même milieu.
Le chapitre 4 concerne l’arrangement institutionnel à l’est de la RDC. Il discute l’assemblée générale rapport, le rôle watch-dog de la société civile et le postage des rapports comme techniques pour rendre compte et comment ces mécanismes sont vus par les résidents. Nous argumentons que les bénéficiaires du programme sont plus intéressés par les réalisations concrètes que par les concepts abstraits telle que la comptabilité, qui a sa signification spécifique selon le contexte. Aussi, il existe les types des comptabilités localement existantes qui sont en conflit avec la comptabilité démocratique prescrite par le programme. Comme voies pour le futur, nous suggérons qu’une attention soit faite sur la manière dont les bénéficiaires regardent l’aspect demande de la comptabilité et de la reconstruction. Bien plus, comme les réunions publiques sont ancrées dans la culture locale, une place particulière devrait être réservée à celles-ci comme mécanisme pour accroître la comptabilité à la fois publique et vers le bas.

Le chapitre 5 examine le concept de « relations de pouvoir », souvent décrit comme la variable clé responsable de l’échec des approches participatives. Nous avons voulu comprendre les dynamiques entre les tenants du pouvoir et les autres dans les communautés ciblées par le programme Tushiriki. Nous argumentons que l’implication des chefs et leaders religieux dans la reconstruction contribue à son achèvement dans le contexte de compétition inter-élite pour contrôler les fonds venant de l’extérieur et où une forme d’élite est mauvaise qu’une autre. Aussi, la sélection et l’exécution du projet est plus l’effet d’institutions existantes plutôt que l’effet des processus démocratiques. La chefferie et les églises sont des institutions existantes qui sont basées sur la même identité et culture. Elles sont des réseaux auxquels on peut connecter une action de développement/reconstruction dans une zone affectée par le conflit ou dans un contexte similaire du milieu rural de la RDC. Finalement, comme les églises avaient remplacé l’Etat dans la provision de l’éducation et la santé, elles sont souvent plus puissantes que les chefs.

Les agences qui utilisent le développement/reconstruction participatif(ve) tel que le CDR ont besoin de bien identifier et comprendre les institutions existantes à travers lesquelles les relations de pouvoir opèrent. Elles ont aussi besoin de travailler avec et là où c’est faisable, d’appliquer ce que nous appelons « pouvoir sur pouvoir » à travers n’importe quelles lignes existantes de pouvoir. Finalement, ces agences ont besoin de stopper la compétition pendant qu’elles devront apprendre à coopérer dans le but d’améliorer les pratiques de rendre compte dans la même zone cible.
Résumé

Le chapitre 6 analyse la mobilisation de la contribution locale dans le programme Tushiriki. La participation communautaire dans les programmes de reconstruction dirigée par la communauté prend en pratique la forme de labour ou travail volontaire, qui peut être vu différemment par les participants. Nous avons examiné l’effectivité de l’approche CDR, spécifiquement le labour manuel volontaire pour les travaux publics dans le programme Tushiriki. Nous avons trouvé, en général, que la participation populaire a été plutôt faible qu’espérée, que la motivation dépendait du type de travail relatif au projet sélectionné et qu’il y avait un manque commun de volonté de réaliser le labour manuel gratuitement. Nous argumentons que le comportement des gens au regard du labour est influencé par les cycles répétitifs du labour manuel forcé dans le pays.

Au regard de quatre cas décrits dans le chapitre 7 à propos de l’appropriation locale dans le programme Tushiriki, nous avons observé que là où les institutions existantes sont en faveur du sens de l’appropriation locale ou là où le programme crée un espace pour ce sens, les bénéficiaires peuvent le développer. Nous en appelons ainsi à l’attention que les programmes ont besoin de booster les représentations des résidents à s’approprier un projet en implémentant une intervention basée sur le développement /reconstruction participatif(ve).

Ces différents chapitres, pris ensemble, expriment les dynamiques sociales de Tushiriki. Dans la conclusion, les compréhensions sont capturées pour analyser le rôle de différents acteurs dans le programme. En général, il peut être dit que le programme de reconstruction dirigée par la communauté a échoué, dans une grande mesure, d’atteindre ses objectifs de gouvernance, bien qu’il a réussi dans la reconstruction des projets. Les stratégies du programme d’impliquer les différents acteurs et les mécanismes pour améliorer le rendre compte ont été peu appropriés aux relations sociales et pratiques existantes de rendre compte. La raison pour laquelle le projet a souvent réussi est que le staff a adapté le programme aux réalités locales. L’élite locale, au lieu d’être exclue, a été capable de jouer un important rôle souvent décisif en mobilisant les habitants aux réunions et aux contributions locales. Les relations de rendre compte développées les ont été plus entre l’élite et le staff plutôt que dirigée vers la population, un phénomène que nous avons dénommé « pouvoir sur pouvoir ». La conclusion se termine par quelques implications au regard du programme CDR et met l’accent sur les résultats et leçons clés. Finalement, elle discute quelques limitations de cette recherche et trace quelques pistes pour la recherche future.
SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH)

Participatieve ontwikkeling in wederopbouw is tegenwoordig een van de belangrijkste benaderingen, niet enkel voor armoedebestrijding, maar ook om er voor te zorgen dat er betere verantwoording wordt afgelegd over gedane uitgaven in de opbouwfase na conflicten en rampen. Er is veel aandacht en steun voor vanuit internationale organisaties en donoren. De steun varieert van enkele miljoenen tot zelfs miljarden die beschikbaar worden gesteld door bilaterale donoren en internationale instanties, zoals de Wereldbank, de Internationale Arbeidsorganisatie, de Wereldgezondheidsorganisatie en het Ontwikkelingsprogramma van de Verenigde Naties. Een belangrijk pluspunt van de benadering is de mogelijkheid die het biedt om steun te geven aan processen van decentralisering in de naoorlogse context. Er is echter ook kritiek; de benadering roept vragen op over de effectiviteit waar het gaat om het teweegbrengen van veranderingen in beleid, de complexiteit van machtsrelaties, het lastige concept ‘gemeenschap’ en de hang naar duurzaamheid. Dit proefschrift presenteert een uitvoerige case studie van een programma van gemeenschapsgedreven wederopbouw (community-driven reconstruction; CDR) in Oost-Congo, waarbij ingegaan wordt op bovengenoemde onderwerpen. Het proefschrift analyseert vraagstukken rondom capaciteitsopbouw en hoe dit leidt tot capaciteitsontwikkeling van lokale gemeenschappen; het kijkt naar technieken die gebruikt worden om verantwoording af te leggen en hoe die werken in de praktijk. Verder belicht het de dynamiek van macht en arbeidsverdeling binnen een CDR-programma, en onderzoekt het de mate waarin de lokale bevolking zich eigenaar voelt van de projecten (en daarmee ook verantwoordelijk).

Dit proefschrift wil bijdragen aan debatten over wederopbouw aangestuurd door gemeenschappen middels een gedetailleerde case studie van een CDR programma in Oost-Congo; het mede door Stichting Vluchteling gefinancierde Tushiriki programma, dat werd uitgevoerd door IRC (International Rescue Committee). Het ontrafelt de praktijk van het programma: wie stuurt het proces aan; hoe zijn sociale relaties rondom de interventie opgebouwd; wat is de bron van legitimititeit voor degenen die het proces aansturen; welke mechanismen worden gebruikt om tot betere lokale verantwoording te komen in de naoorlogse context; hoe wordt capaciteit verbeterd en vormgegeven door verschillende actoren; welk vormen van arbeid zijn en welke beloningsstructuur dragen bij aan de dynamiek van het programma? Middels een case studie komen we meer te weten over de
manier waarop een gemeenschapsgedreven wederopbouw programma werkt. Dit helpt om tot een beter begrip te komen van de tegenstrijdige ervaringen die er zijn met de benadering.

Doel van dit onderzoek is om de sociale dynamiek in de doelgroepen van het CDR-programma *Tushiriki* in het oosten van de Democratische Republiek Congo (DRC) te begrijpen, alsmede de betekenis die in de doelgemeenschappen aan het programma wordt gegeven. Op die manier maakt het onderzoek meer duidelijk omtrent de veronderstellingen en benaderingen die ten grondslag liggen aan ontwerp en uitvoering van het CDR programma. Het programma was een samenwerking van Stichting Vluchteling met het International Rescue Committee (SV-IRC). De hoofdvraag van het onderzoek is: *Hoe geven lokale mensen en IRC personeel vorm aan ontwikkeling in hun dagelijkse praktijk in de gemeenschappen Burhinyi, Luhwindja en Kaziba, en wat is de invloed van machtsrelaties en andere sociale processen op besluitvorming en uitvoering van het CDR programma in de periode 2008-2010?*

Deelvragen:

1. *Hoe werken machtsrelaties en andere sociale processen in de dorpen waar het programma wordt uitgevoerd?*
2. *Welke invloed hebben deze sociale processen en relaties op besluitvorming op individueel- en gemeenschapsniveau?*
3. *Hoe worden de doelstellingen van CDR (goed bestuur en wederopbouw) en de programma activiteiten (training van comités en uitvoering van projecten) vertaald naar de praktijk en hoe reageren dorpsbewoners en lokaal personeel van IRC hier op?*
4. *Welke invloed hebben andere wederopbouw interventies uit verleden of heden op de werking van CDR in de dorpen?*
5. *Welke implicaties hebben de bevindingen voor de veronderstellingen, beleid, en uitvoering van CDR in het algemeen?*

Dit is een kwalitatief onderzoek –gebaseerd op etnografisch veldwerk- uitgevoerd in twee chiefdoms (Burhinyi en Luhwindja) in de provincie Zuid-Kivu in het oosten van de DRC. Als methodes van dataverzameling heb ik gebruik gemaakt van participatieve observatie, semi-gestructureerde diepte-interviews, en een literatuurstudie van secondaire bronnen. De studie is uitgevoerd op verzoek van Stichting Vluchteling als een onafhankelijke, kwalitatieve monitoring van het programma. Stichting Vluchteling heeft het onderzoek gefinancierd.
Gedurende de onderzoeksperiode heb ik verschillende keren feedback gegeven aan personeel en management team. Daarnaast heb ik deel uitgemaakt van drie evaluatieteam van het programma.

In hoofdstuk 2 geef ik een overzicht van de literatuur over participatieve ontwikkeling en wederopbouw. Ik beoordeel de waarde hiervan, en laat de mogelijkheden tot transformatie zien die participatieve ontwikkeling biedt, de voordelen, maar ook de nadelen. Op basis daarvan beargumenteer ik dat participatie weliswaar helpt om tot ontwikkeling/wederopbouw te komen, maar dat er ook een schaduwkant aan zit; namelijk de ongelijke machtsverhoudingen tussen elite en niet-elite die ondanks de interventie in stand blijven. Het zou kunnen helpen als er in onderzoek beter wordt gekkeken naar de manier waarop onderhandelingen in de lokale machtsarena tot veranderingen kunnen leiden. Een andere stap vooruit voor ontwikkelingsantropologie is door meer naar ontwikkeling en wederopbouw als processen te kijken; dus kijken naar het discours dat er wordt gebruikt, naar instituties, en naar de praktijken en hoe die gezamenlijk tot verandering leiden. Tenslotte is het noodzakelijk voor de uitvoerende organisaties om een optimale balans te vinden tussen controle van onderaf en gezag van boven. Het is daarvoor belangrijk om nieuwe positieve en negatieve ervaringen met participatieve ontwikkeling en wederopbouw -en de methodes die daarbij horen- te delen.

In hoofdstuk 3 bespreek ik hoe er binnen het Tushiriki programma wordt gewerkt aan het verbeteren van de bestuurscapaciteit. Een recente, robuuste evaluatie van een vergelijkbaar CDR programma laat zien dat er vrijwel geen impact is op bestuur. Ik laat hier zien dat dit gebrek aan impact te maken heeft met de manier waarop capaciteitsopbouw plaatsvindt. Er zijn behoorlijk wat valkuilen; in de inhoud van de educatieve boodschappen; in de motivatie van het personeel dat de training geeft; en in het contact tussen trainers en degenen die getraind worden. Andere problemen zijn gerelateerd aan de lokaal bestaande machtsrelaties en manieren waarop er verantwoording wordt afgelegd. Deze komen niet overeen met de vormen van verantwoording die zijn voorgeschreven in de CDR programma’s. Op basis van deze bevindingen stellen we dat de inhoud van de training voor capaciteitsontwikkeling inconsistenties bevatte. De training was maar weinig aangepast aan de sociale werkelijkheid. Desondanks bleek de training toch nog wel enig effect te hebben, maar omdat de training zich niet richtte op de meest invloedrijke personen, vond er geen overdracht plaats naar de rest van de bevolking. Er is dus behoorlijk wat ruimte om de bestuurspraktijken te verbeteren, zowel binnen Tushiriki als in vergelijkbare programma’s, maar dan moet er wel aandacht worden
geschonken aan bestaande gemeenschapsdynamiek en aan bestaande normen en praktijken van verantwoording. Daarnaast moet de inhoud van de training worden aangepast aan de lokale realiteit. Daarbij hoort ook een juiste vertaling in de lokale taal van de belangrijkste boodschap van de training. Tenslotte moet er beter gecoördineerd worden met andere actoren die goed bestuur willen bevorderen in dezelfde setting.

Hoofdstuk 4 gaat over de interventietechnieken van het programma in Oost Congo. Het bespreekt de verslagen van de algemene dorpsvergadering, de rol van waakhond die is weggelegd voor het maatschappelijk middenveld, en het ophangen van verslagen als technieken om verantwoording af te leggen. Het laat zien hoe deze mechanismes worden gezien door de bevolking. We stellen dat begunstigden van het programma meer geïnteresseerd zijn in concrete resultaten dan in abstracte concepten zoals ‘verantwoording’. Daarnaast heeft deze term z’n eigen context-specifieke betekenis. Lokaal bestaande vormen van verantwoording conflicteren met de democratische verantwoording die het programma voorschrijft. Een stap vooruit kan worden gezet door meer aandacht te schenken aan hoe de begunstigden aankijken tegen de vraagzijde van zowel verantwoording als van wederopbouw. Publieke bijeenkomsten bijvoorbeeld, zijn al ingebed in de lokale cultuur en zouden een meer prominente plek kunnen krijgen als mechanisme om publieke verantwoording af te leggen aan de bevolking.

Hoofdstuk 5 gaat in op machtsrelaties. Machtsrelaties worden vaak gezien als primaire oorzaak voor de ineffectiviteit van participatieve benaderingen. Ons doel is het de dynamiek beter te begrijpen tussen machtshebbers en andere mensen in de dorpen waar het Tushiriki programma wordt uitgevoerd. We laten zien dat de betrokkenheid van lokale chefs en kerkelijk leiders bij wederopbouw leidt tot betere resultaten op het moment dat er lokale competitie is tussen machthebbers waarbij de ene machthebber zich verantwoordelijk voelt voor het controleren van de ander. Ook laten we zien dat de selectie en uitvoering van een project meer afhangt van de bestaande instituties dan dat het ’t resultaat is van democratische processen. Lokale chefs en kerken zijn bestaande instituties, die gebaseerd zijn op dezelfde identiteit en cultuur. Het zijn netwerken waaraan een bepaalde ontwikkelings- of wederopbouwactiviteit zich kan verbinden in een conflictgebied, of in een vergelijkbare context zoals ruraal Congo. Tenslotte laten we zien dat kerken vaak meer macht hebben dan lokale chefs. Dit komt voor een deel omdat kerken de rol van de staat hebben overgenomen als het gaat over voorzieningen zoals onderwijs en gezondheid. Tenslotte laten we zien dat
kerken vaak meer macht hebben dan lokale chefs. Dit komt mede doordat kerken de rol van de staat hebben overgenomen in de onderwijs- en gezondheidssector.

Het is van belang dat instanties die een benadering van participatieve ontwikkeling/wederopbouw (zoals CDR) toepassen meer doen om machtsrelaties tussen bestaande instituties te identifieren en begrijpen. Ze moeten er samenwerking mee zoeken en –wanneer dit mogelijk is- gebruik maken van ‘macht over macht’, ofwel de bestaande machtslijnen. Tenslotte moeten deze instanties stoppen te concurreren met anderen, maar samenwerken om er voor te zorgen dat er beter verantwoording wordt afgelegd over programma’s die in dezelfde gebieden worden uitgevoerd.

Hoofdstuk 6 gaat in op de arbeidsdeelname van de bevolking. Deelname van de bevolking in wederopbouw programma’s komt in de praktijk neer op arbeid of vrijwilligerswerk. Deelnemers hebben hier verschillende meningen over. We hebben de effectiviteit van de CDR benadering bekeken, met name wat betreft de manier waarop vrijwillige handarbeid wordt gemobiliseerd voor publieke werken in het Tushiriki programma. We hebben gevonden dat participatie in het algemeen lager is dan verwacht, dat motivatie afhangt van het soort werk dat er gedaan moet worden, en dat mensen in het algemeen niet bereid zijn om voor niks te werken. We stellen dat de houding van deelnemers ten aanzien van de arbeid die zij in moeten zetten wordt beïnvloed door herhaaldelijke cycli van gedwongen arbeid in het gebied in het verleden. Daarnaast was er een gebrek aan motivatie omdat de notie van publieke goederen zoals wegen en onderwijs omstreden was.

In hoofdstuk 7 beschrijf ik 4 cases die gaan over de manier waarop mensen zich lokaal zien als ‘eigenaar’ binnen het Tushiriki programma. We laten zien dat waar de bestaande instituties mensen aanmoedigen zichzelf als eigenaar van een project te zien, -of waar het programma ruimte geeft aan mensen om zichzelf zo te zien - dat dit gevoel van ‘eigenaar’ zijn zich ook kan ontwikkelen. Ik vestig er de aandacht op dat het belangrijk is dat programma’s er aan werken dat de bevolking zichzelf ook eigenaar voelt van – en dus verantwoordelijk voor- een project bij een interventie die zich richt op participatieve ontwikkeling/wederopbouw.

De verschillende hoofdstukken samen laten de sociale dynamiek van Tushiriki zien. In de conclusie worden deze inzichten samengebracht om de rol van de verschillende actoren in het programma te analyseren. In het algemeen kan worden gesteld dat het gemeenschapsgedreven programma er grotendeels niet in slaagde zijn bestuursdoelstellingen
te halen, al slaagde het wel in het opzetten van de wederopbouwprojecten. De strategie van het programma om verschillende actoren te betrekken, en de verantwoordingsmechanismen die werden gebruikt strookten niet met de bestaande sociale relaties en vormen van verantwoording. De reden waarom een project vaak toch slaagde, was dat het personeel het programma aanpaste aan de lokale realiteit. In plaats van uitgesloten te worden, kon de lokale elite zo juist een grote en vaak beslissende rol spelen bij het mobiliseren van mensen voor bijeenkomsten of voor arbeid. De relatie van verantwoording liep vaak meer tussen lokale elite en programma medewerkers, dan richting de bevolking. In mijn proefschrift noem ik dit ‘macht over macht’. De conclusie eindigt met enkele suggesties voor CDR programma’s en benadrukt de belangrijkste bevindingen en lessen die er getrokken kunnen worden. Tenslotte bespreek ik enkele beperkingen van het onderzoek en doe ik suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa (1967) was born in Mugala in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 2000, he achieved the degree of bachelor in public health at the Institut Supérieur des Techniques Médicales de Bukavu (ISTM-Bukavu) with honour. He was employed by the same institution as assistant, and was leading the department of public health in 2003. At the same time, from 2001 through 2005, he coordinated the medical department of the Communauté des Eglises de Grace au Congo.

From 2003 through 2005, Patrick Milabyo obtained a Master’s degree in public health at the Rwanda School of Public Health, National University of Rwanda (which partnered with Tulane School of Public Health, Tulane University, USA), which he completed with honour. Afterwards, he became lecturer and supervisor of numerous bachelor theses in public health at ISTM-Bukavu, while teaching as visiting lecturer at the Institut Supérieur d’Informatique et de Gestion in Goma. Meanwhile, he was involved in two research activities: on health insurance in the great lakes region (Burundi, eastern DRC and Rwanda), and a household survey in four health zones in the province of South Kivu (the zones of Kabare, Katana, Idjwi and Kalehe). Additionally, in February and June 2006, he conducted the baseline study and the final evaluation of the first pilot project on community development for the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Bukavu. From September 2006 through August 2007, he was employed by IRC-Bukavu as Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor, working on three programmes: Community Development (called Tuungane), Gender-Based Violence and Civil Society (Ushirika).

In September 2007, Patrick Milabyo started his current PhD research, while participating in several evaluations (mid-term reviews and a final evaluation) both in eastern DRC and Burundi, for both the Tuungane and Tushiriki IRC-CDR programmes. He has published both locally and internationally on health topics, community participation and community-driven reconstruction.
## Completed Training and Supervision Plan

**Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa**  
**Wageningen School of Social Sciences (WASS)**

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<td>World Conference of Humanitarian Studies, University of Groningen, The Netherlands</td>
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<td>‘Relations de pouvoir et dynamiques sociales dans le programme de reconstruction dirigée par la communauté : cas de Kaziba, Luhwindja et Burhinyi à l’Est de la République Démocratique du Congo’</td>
<td>Conference-workshop: Development Initiatives and Rural Transformations, Institut Supérieur de Développement Rural Bukavu, Congo</td>
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*One credit according to ECTS is on average equivalent to 28 hours of study load*
The research described in this thesis was financially supported by Stichting Vluchteling (SV) 
The Netherlands Foundation for Refugees