

Food Community Networks¹

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Abstract

This paper discusses the concept of Food Community Network (FCN) in credence transactions. A FCN could be defined as a governance structure where consumers and producers strongly integrate their functions (goals) by organizing a “club”. It is based on pooling specific resources and using membership to assign decision and property rights: consumers provide time, information, knowledge and financial resources by participating directly in the organization of production process. They receive leisure, credence foods and decrease the costs of monitoring; producers reduce their decision rights but also part of production and transaction costs, uncertainty of specific investments and income instability.

Based on this concept, the study proposes an inductive “grounded theory” method to explore how FCNs evolve from traditional relationships between producers and consumers and, in turn, under which conditions FCNs can be a competitive governance structure to carry out credence food transactions. Comparing and contrasting examples of embryonic forms of FCNs from North America and Europe provide the instrumental cases for this investigation.

Keyword: community network, credence good, adverse selection, time allocation model.

1. Introduction

Quality in the international agribusiness arena is becoming an increasingly relevant issue. When talking about food quality scholars use to think about either safety concerns or “niches”, such as traditional and local productions, organic and environmental-friendly foods, fair-trade products, functional foods. However it can be argued that nowadays almost all food productions are increasingly affected by quality issues as soon as they get closer to final consumers along the supply chain. For instance even typical agricultural commodities such as soya beans, corns or wheat are affected by quality issues as soon as they are processed by food companies and entered in a labeling system. Even more important to notice is that traders and final consumers concerns about quality are increasingly focused on credence characteristics. Therefore credence food transactions shouldn't be consider as a marginal component of global food transactions but more and more as a core component of the agribusiness.

As firstly stated by Darby and Karni (1973) a credence good refers to a product whose characteristics or quality attributes (or at least one of them) cannot be verified even after consumption (Vetter and Karantininis, 2002). For example when dealing with organic productions many attributes are difficult (technological constrained) or too costly (economical constrained) to be monitored because many actors are involved in different stages of the supply chain. Moreover credence food transactions are also related to the use of “immaterial” or “intangible” items such as ethical issues. Therefore credence food transactions are affected by severe problems of information asymmetry which reduce the gain from trade of all trading parties. Indeed, dealing with credence attributes implies to be increasingly subject to a number of

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challenging issues. Examples are the use of more complex monitoring and certification system, an increase of high specific investments, an increase of uncertainty for example due to moral hazard behaviors. This requires that stakeholders have to be more and more aware of the alignment between governance structures (GS) and quality devices used in the food supply chain (Raynaud et al. 2005). In these circumstances spot markets are unlikely to be used as governance structure while hybrids, vertical integration and public monitoring are the most suitable solutions (Vetter and Karantininis, 2002; Ménard, 2004).

In recent years, a new type of governance structure is emerging in the context of credence food transactions. Pascucci (2010) defined this governance structure as food community network (FCN). Following this definition a FCN can be described as an institutional arrangement where consumers and producers strongly integrate their functions (goals) by organizing a “club” (Pascucci, 2010). It is also based on pooling specific resources and using membership to assign decision and property rights: consumers provide time, information, knowledge and financial resources by participating directly in the organization of production process (Pascucci, 2010). They receive leisure, credence foods and decrease the costs of monitoring; producers reduce their decision rights but also part of production and transaction costs, uncertainty of specific investments and income instability (Pascucci, 2010).

In this paper we further analyse FCN characteristics and (potential) competitive advantages in credence food transactions. In section 2 the research methodology is described. More specifically this study proposes an inductive “grounded theory” method to explore how FCNs evolve from traditional relationships between producers and consumers and, in turn, under which conditions FCNs create value. Based on this approach in section 3 comparing and contrasting examples of embryonic forms of FCNs from North America and Europe provide the instrumental cases for the empirical investigation. In section 4 the baseline theoretical framework for analysing the FCN is provided. In section 5 we present further empirical evidence to explore FCN competitive advantages while in the final section provides a brief discussion and concluding remarks.

2. Grounded theory approach

The idea of considering FCN as a new GS in the context of credence food transactions is based on the observation of an extensive set of empirical examples. A first attempt to analyse and classify FCNs has been recently done by Pascucci (2010). However a clear and crystallized definition of the phenomenon is far to be achieved. In order to further analyse FCNs, in this paper a “grounded theory” approach has been adopted. “Grounded theory”, in fact, can be considered as a methodology that prefers an inductive approach focused toward theory development as opposed to deductive theory testing (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1994). Therefore “grounded theory” is more and more recognized as an effective method for studying complex issues where still limited quantitative information are available (Westgren and Zering, 1998). This methods implies that information gathering and theoretical conceptualization of a given phenomenon evolve through a continuous interplay between analysis and data collection (Strauss and Corbin, 1994). The iterative process usually starts from the observation of the phenomenon and preliminary data collection. In this case the initial data collection is still based on basic and unstructured theoretical argumentations. However as the process continues, the data collection and analysis becomes more narrowed and selective, and, at the same time, more and more focused on specific issues. The mechanism is based on the capacity of the research (or research team) to critically and responsibly select items during the data collections that progressively constitutes the theoretical framework for analysing the phenomenon. In repeated rounds of investigation each item is evaluated against new empirical evidence in a confirmatory/contrasting perspective. Therefore during the process, the researcher(s) must think conceptually and constantly analyse the relationships between their data. The critical point underlined by grounded theorists is the difficulty to transform information into

solid interpretation therefore forcing the researcher(s) towards an intense and delicate interpretative work (Strauss and Corbin, 1994). As soon as the core elements of the “emerged” theory has been defined, large-scale based data collection can be performed in order to provide a more solid and wider theory-testing process.

In this paper we started by investigating different empirical case studies worldwide, mainly using internet-based sources and literature review. In this way we could select a first set of examples of FCNs in both North America and Europe. Afterwards we went back to the main theoretical argumentations used by Pascucci (2010) to further analyse the concept of FCN in the light of new empirical evidence. By comparing and contrasting empirical evidence with these theoretical argumentations we have selected a number of concepts and used them as key-words for further empirical investigations. Several rounds of data and information collection and conceptualization have been performed. In this way a more detailed analysis of the organizational features and comparative advantages of FCNs have been identified.

3. Embryonic food community networks in credence food transactions

We initially selected a number of key-words to be used in a web-based investigation to gather embryonic examples of FCNs. Pascucci (2010) signalled two main typologies of FCNs and four organizational models (table1). The difference between the two main groups could be summarized by the type of technology and scale used for networking. A first group of local and non-ICT based communities can be distinguished from a more global and ICT based one. The difference is not trivial: while local communities originated in a specific socio-geographical context are more oriented in building social ties based on direct and personal interactions, global and ICT based communities use internet and technological devices to build and develop ties virtually. This doesn't mean that local-based communities are not using technological devices (i.e. websites, blogs and social networks) in their organizational model nor that global-based communities are not organizing initiatives or projects (i.e. summer schools, local-based initiatives, etc.) implying personal interactions. However these issues are (still) not part of their core activities and identities respectively.

In the first group of FCNs, different organizational models are represented by Community Supported Agriculture (CSA), Farmers' Markets (FM) and Consumer Buying Group (CBG). Different examples of such FCNs have been reported all over the world but mainly in North America (mainly CSA and FM) and Western Europe (mainly FM and CBG) (Hendrickson and Heffernan, 2002; Friedman 2006; Fonte and Grando, 2006; Pascucci, 2010).

CSA are mainly a North American type of organization even if similar experiences could be found in Asia (e.g. the Japanese teike) (Adam, 2006). Up to now CSA are probably the most famous and studied farmer-consumer type of network². Within the CSA definition it is possible to find a variety of specific local-based community networks which have in common the direct involvement and participation of consumers in food productions.

CBGs represent a different organizational model mainly emerging in Europe (Renting et al., 2003; Carbone et al. 2006; 2007; Aguglia et al., 2008). As for CSA, in this model the community is mainly constituted by consumers and organized to coordinate more the marketing phase rather than the food production phase. However also direct linkages between marketing and production decisions can be observed. The difference between CBGs and CSAs is mainly related to the decision making mechanism which is in the first case mainly driven by farmers and farming processes, while in the latter is related to consumption and consumer-related patterns.

²An interesting frontrunner paper on this issue was written by Paul Fieldhouse in 1996. More recently an overview of studies on CSAs was provided by Bougherara and colleagues (2009).

Finally FM constitute another distinct group of FCNs where farmer-consumer interactions are still direct but “limited” only to the marketing phase while no production-decisions are shared (Pascucci, 2010).

The second group of FCNs is more organized around the idea of managing local-based credence productions on a global-scale. This is for example the case of the Fair Trade, Slow Food and FAIREA³ (Fonte, 2006; Pascucci, 2010). All this initiatives have started from local community based movements, and then developed much more on global/international scale, for example by implementing ICT-based labelling and certification. The main idea behind ICT-based communities is to build up “virtual” networks around issues such as fair-trade, eco-gastronomy, food culture, life styles. By informing and promoting local food traditions and people’s dwindling interest they intend to increase consumers’ awareness in food choices (i.e. location, environmental and social effects, taste, etc.) and try to connect producers and consumers worldwide. In many cases the consumer-producer interaction is still “mediated” by a third party but direct consumer-producer interactions are also stimulated at local level. Many of these initiatives act as a (communication/marketing) platform where consumers and producers can start to recognize each other and where they can start learning how to transact both locally and globally.

Table 1. Examples of Food Community Networks

Technology	Scale of action	Aims	Stakeholders involved	Key-resources	Type of community
Non ICT based community	Local (and mainly urban)	Connecting consumers to food productions	Urban consumers and land managers	Land, food, values, leisure time	Community Supported Agriculture (CSA)
	Local	Promoting critical consumptions and sustainable productions	Consumers and local farmers	Food values and	Consumer Buying Groups (CBG)
	Local	Provide marketing alternatives to farmers	Local farmers and consumers		Farmers` Markets (FM)
ICT-based community	Global	Promoting a reduction of inequality in the international trade of food commodities	Farmers from LDCs and consumers in DCs	Food values and	FairTrade
	“Glocal”	Promoting sustainable development, defending traditions and local productions	Local and global communities		Slowfood
	Local		Local communities		FAIREA

Source: adapted from Pascucci, 2010

4. The baseline theoretical framework for analysing Food Community Networks

³<http://www.gut-so.at/>

In this paper we argue that FCN is an emerging GS which in some cases is substituting while in other cases is complementing already existing and functioning GS. Indeed, along a credence food supply chain we typically have several legally independent organizations, like food companies, farms, public agencies and consumers (or households) which interact to coordinate food quantity with a specific focus on credence attributes (Raynaud et al. 2005). At any stage of the supply chain transactions can be carried out by using different type of GS, such as *bilateral contracts*, *networks*, *alliances* and/or *vertical integration* between the parties (Ménard and Valceschini, 2005; Pascucci, 2010). The question is to understand which features make FCN different and distinct from the already existing GS.

According to preliminary empirical evidence, FCN have been described as based on a group of interested consumers and a (group of) producer(s) that decide to vertically coordinate and partially integrate on the base of a long-term relationship to produce and transact credence foods (Pascucci, 2010). To characterize FCN we can look at different dimensions of the governance mechanism and namely the degree of *resource pooling*, type of *coordination mechanism* and type of internal and external *competition* (Ménard, 2004; Karantininis, 2007; Pascucci, 2010). The governance mechanism used in the FCN is based on intense resource pooling, while contracting is based on limited authority and relational contracts. Moreover limited competition among the members is present while external competition with other GS is very high.

FCN can be seen as a form of vertical integration between consumers and producers leading to the constitution of a hybrid such as a formalized network. The integration process is based on using *membership* to assign decision and property rights and driven by the need of sharing and pooling resources which are specific for the members. When membership is strongly formalized then the network assumes the form of a club which in some cases can lead to the legal form of a producer-consumer cooperative. Resource pooling and sharing is slightly different between consumer and producer members: (1) consumers provide time, information, knowledge and financial resources by participating directly in the organization of production process; (2) farmers provide land and capital assets but also specific skills and knowledge. They also transfer decision rights to consumers.

On one hand consumers receive as pay-offs leisure and credence foods while decreasing transaction costs (i.e. the costs of monitoring). The key element here is that consumers maximise their pay-offs not only by transacting credence foods but also by participating in the organization of the production process, simply because it provides them leisure. The time spent by consumers in the production process is assumed to be leisure time. The time allocated in the production process is either related to manual working and to its organization (managerial tasks). The time allocated by consumers is also used to monitor the process, and therefore, to reduce the risk of producers moral hazard. Since consumers can coordinate participation (i.e. by turning the visits) and their time spending in participation is not a cost but an utility-enhancing activity, we can assume that the overall monitoring costs of the process can be considerably reduced by this mechanism.

On the other hand farmers reduce part of production and transaction costs (i.e. labour costs, certification costs, etc.), uncertainty of specific investments and income instability (Pascucci, 2010). Producers reduce their production or transaction costs by allowing consumers to direct participate to the organization of production process. They also limited uncertainty and can reduce lock-in problems of investing in specific assets related to the credence food production.

5. Further empirical investigations: FCN competitive advantages

Given FCN main features the question is to understand under which circumstances FCNs can be more competitive than other GS for transacting credence foods. According to NIE we might observe the use of a specific GS which is the most cost-economizing within the spectrum of all the different typologies of GS (Williamson 1991; Ménard, 2004; Ménard and Valceschini,

2005; Karantininis, 2007). Within this approach, the choice of a GS is mainly driven by transaction attributes such as specificity, frequency and uncertainty (Williamson, 1991). In this perspective the main disadvantage of FCN is that participation of consumers within the organization of the food production process also implies additional transaction costs mainly due to strategic management issues. For example the organizational costs increase because even if the use of authority and formal contracting is limited within the network, they still require a bureaucratic and legal structure. Moreover transfer of decision rights can affect uncertainty on specific investments and decrease long-term profitability of FCN. This is similar to the investment problems faced by cooperatives and collective organizations.

However if the reduction of monitoring costs and the increase of consumers' wellbeing (due to the leisure time allocation) compensate the increased organizational costs then a community network can be an alternative "competitive" GS for credence food transactions. More specifically competitive advantages for FCNs can derive from specific issues such as a better *risk sharing, decision making, quality checking* and *resource pooling*. We have further investigated all these issues using case studies from both North America and Western Europe (see Appendix).

Risk sharing refers to the capacity of reducing transaction costs due to uncertainty of the credence food production. For consumers uncertainty is mainly related to the quality of productions and to a certain extent to quantity in terms of seasonal availability. Farmers face uncertainty mainly due to potential volatility of the demand, which is also related to credence quality issues. Usually third party certification and formal contracting are the two main tools used to avoid uncertainty in credence food productions (Raynaud et al., 2005). According to our empirical investigation the main tool to lower uncertainty in FCNs is the use of a formalized membership, especially for CSA and CBGs. Only FM are less prone in formalizing membership for both farmers and consumers. According to our investigation one way to use a formalized membership is to collect a fixed fee at the beginning of the production season (or once a year). This fee corresponds to the entire expenditure consumers can potentially have in that given season. Afterwards, when the production will be ready, they won't pay any extra-price regardless the overall market conditions of the specific product(s). In this way members' fees are used as capital to finance the FCN activities. Residual profits or losses are completely transferred to the farmers belonging to the FCN. In some cases members' fees incorporate also part of the capital needed for specific activities (i.e. marketing activities) and "extra investments" (i.e. building a warehouse or storage facilities). Fixed and anticipated fees also imply establishing the duration of the membership (for example few weeks, a year, more than one year), the quantity and the type of products (composition) to be delivered to the members. In almost all cases consumers cannot choose just one product but a basket of seasonal products. Also quantity is fixed with only two or three alternatives (i.e. 5, 10 or 15 kilos per delivery). Delivery time is fixed as well, and usually it is arranged once per week or twice per month. Interestingly it can be noticed that safeguard clauses, for example in case products are not delivered or quality is lowered due to adverse weather conditions, are not explicitly settled within the membership contract.

When analysing the *decision making* process we looked at the following items: consumer decision rights on production quality, quantity, composition, use of inputs (including land) and price. Our empirical evidence seem to highlight that decision making is substantially limited to some general issues and it occurs during special assemblies and meetings. Consumers make a decision when choosing the type of membership to adopt (if more alternatives are present) and therefore limited decision making is possible afterwards, in terms of quantity, quality, composition of the basket of products and price. Almost none of the FCNs we have examined really allowed consumers to decide on land use, while decisions on production techniques are usually discussed and shared.

Quality check is the third issue we have investigated in the analysis of the case studies. Two alternative systems of quality detection have been analysed: on one hand the presence of formalized certification and on the other hand the presence of certification systems based on a

more active participation of the members. As expected formal certification is limited (mainly in North America) while active participation of members is extensively used. More specifically members are allowed to participate to all the phases of production and almost in all the FCNs we have examined. Moreover consumers have access to the fields and farms conditional to a schedule which is established by members. Finally many FCNs use blogs and websites to discuss production quality issues and debate eventual quality breakdowns.

Finally we have considered more in detail how *resources are pooled and shared* within FCNs. We have looked at issues such as knowledge, time, capital and labour. When looking at knowledge sharing we distinguished between three different mechanisms and namely producer-consumer, consumer-consumer and consumer-producer interactions. We have found that in almost all the FCNs knowledge sharing refers mainly to producer-consumer interactions. This means that FCNs stimulate transfer of knowledge from farmers toward final consumers. However the other two types of mechanisms are also relevant, especially if we look at CBGs.

Regarding time and labour we have analysed whether or not consumers are directly involved in specific activities of the FCNs, such as harvesting, marketing, advertising etc. In many cases we found that at least part of the members are active in such type of activities mainly on a voluntary base. While labour and time provided by members is very common in the FCNs, extremely limited is sharing resources such as members' physical capital such as vans, tracks, buildings, computers and so on. In all cases we have examined when resource sharing is presented it is always based on voluntarily principles.

6. Discussion and conclusions

In this paper we briefly discuss an emerging type of governance structure in credence food transactions. We define it as food community network. In this governance structure consumers and producers integrate their functions by using combination of cooperation and resource pooling. Example of emerging community networks can be observed especially in the domain of consumers-farmers interactions.

We have studied several case studies which have highlighted specific features of FCNs. We have found that FCNs use formalized membership to definite not only the type of "delivering" service consumers would receive but also to share risks and transfer relevant decision rights. However we found that consumers decision rights on the production phase is often limited especially if we look at the allocation of land to different uses.

An important outcome of our analysis is that FCNs extensively rely on trust as substitute to formalize safeguards both in terms of general risks and specific quality inspections. The use of trust can be consider as the main component at the base of FCNs worldwide and one of the most important asset which can make FCN potentially more competitive than other GS in credence food transactions. However because such an extensive use of trust mainly occurs in the very beginning of the relationship between consumers and farmers it also works as an entry barrier for consumers that need to develop trust in a longer timespan.

We think this could be the main reason why FCNs are still so used by strongly motivated and ideologically oriented consumers who probably already share common values. In our empirical investigation we found that almost all CSA and CBGs are strongly politically oriented for example belonging or being linked to an ecologist movement. In this respect we also think that more flexible entry-mechanisms, perhaps based on more formalized contracting in the initial phases, can help in broadening FCNs towards less "ideology-driven" consumers and producers. In this way trust-building mechanisms can be used in following phases of the consumer-producer relationship, inducing a less formalised contracting in later phases. Moreover we believe that in this way FCNs can move from niche and local-based products to a more global scale. In this sense there are already evidence that the development of both new Information Communication Technologies (ICT) and social networking can be the base for the evolution of

FCNs. For example virtual communities can be a new frontier in this domain. Moreover virtual community networks can serve global transactions, can be used also by food companies for innovative and introduce more participative certification systems. In a virtual community consumers can experience the participation in the production process without physically moving but using ICT opportunities and facilities (Pascucci, 2010).

We also believe that the development of (internet-based) social networking and the increasing interconnections of consumers at a global level represent a formidable opportunity for food companies interested in innovative credence food transactions. Of course this will require further analyses and conceptualization of the phenomenon with a more systematic approach. Also the use of more quantitative methods based on larger and more representative samples is needed. This will represents the direction we will follow for our future research in this domain.

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Appendix

Table A –Risk sharing

Country	Name ⁴	Type	Type of products	Formalized membership		Fee/share	Duration	Fixed quantity	Safeguard conditions
				Yes/No	Only consumers (Yes/No)				
USA	Case A	CSA	Vegetables, fruits, meat (lamb, pork, beef), chicken	Yes	Yes	513 - 595\$/year vegetable-share: (+100\$ winter share) Meat-fee: 115\$	22-25 weeks	Yes	No
	Case B	CSA	Vegetables, fruits, eggs, poultry	Yes	Yes	500\$ vegetable-share; 180\$ poultry share; egg share(\$88 for 1 dozen/week, \$48 for 6 eggs/week); 150\$ fruit share	22 weeks or 20 weeks for fruit shares	Yes	No
	Case C	CSA	Vegetables, flowers and plants	Yes	Yes	600\$ full share; 350\$ half share	20 weeks	Yes	No
	Case D	CSA	Vegetables, herbs, flowers, eggs, fruits, fresh–baked breads, cheeses, wines, salmon and berries	Yes	Yes	650\$ full share; 500 split share	22 weeks	No	No
	Case E	CSA	Vegetables and fruits	Yes	No	10\$/delivery	No	Yes	No
	Case F	CSA/ FM	Vegetables, fruits, eggs, meat, seafood	No	No	No	No (only on-line order)	Yes	Limited (low quality and delivery failures)
	Case G	CSA	Vegetables, fruits, herbs and flowers	Yes	Yes	735\$ full share; 485\$ half share; 400\$ (to rent a plot of 15x30 m2)	22 weeks	No	No

⁴ Name and location of the case studies are not reported to guarantee anonymity. Further information can be asked to the authors.

Canada	Case H	CSA	Vegetables, fruits, meat (chicken, pork and beef)	Yes	Yes	570\$ weekly full share; 330\$ bi-weekly half share; (+fidelity card option)	18-9 weeks	No-Yes (+ fidelity card)	No
	Case I	CSA	Vegetables, fruits and fresh herbs	Yes	Yes	460\$ full share*	18 weeks	No	No
France	Case J	CSA/FM	Vegetables, fruits	Yes	Yes	Not reported	1 year	No	No
	Case K	CSA/CBG	Vegetables, fresh fruits and herbs	Yes	Yes	14,50 euro large weekly basket; 9,50 euro small weekly basket	6 months	Not defined	No
The Netherlands	Case L	CSA/CBG	Vegetables, small fruits (berries), flowers and herbs	Not reported	Not reported	14,50 euro large weekly basket; 9,50 euro weekly medium basket; 6.50 euro small weekly basket	Not reported	No	No
	Case M	CSA/CBG	Vegetables and flowers	Yes	Yes	170 euro share/year	1 Year	No	No
Spain	Case N	CBG	Vegetables	Yes	Yes	66,78 euro (full share), 40 euro (only to contribute marketing activities), 8 euro/weekly delivery (Not defined	Yes	No
Italy	Case O	CSA/CBG	Vegetables, legumes, fruits	Yes	Yes	350euro annual share; 6,73 euro/ weekly basket	1 year or seasonal (13 deliveries)	Yes	No
UK	Case P	CSA/CBG	Vegetables, meat, eggs, poultry	Yes	Yes	614 euro annual share (large) 614; 372 euro annual (small) 12,80 euro (large share weekly share); 7,80 euro (small weekly share)	weekly or annual	No	No

Source: our investigation

Table B – Decision Making

Country	Name	PRODUCT QUALITY		IMPUT USE	QUANTITY	Composition
		Tangible attributes	Intangible attributes		Yes/No	Yes/No
USA	Case A	No	No	No	No	No
	Case B	No	No	No	No	No
	Case C	No	No	No	No	No
	Case D	No	No	No	No	No
	Case E	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
	Case F	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
	Case G	No	No	No	No	No
Canada	Case H	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
	Case I	No	No	No	No	No
France	Case J	No	No	Not reported	No	No
The Netherlands	Case K	No	No	Not reported	No	No
	Case L	No	No	No	No	No
	Case M	No	No	Not reported	No	No
Spain	Case N	Yes	Yes	Not reported	Yes	Yes
Italy	Case O	Yes	Yes	Not reported	Yes	Yes
UK	Case P	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Source: our investigation

Table C – Quality Check

Country	Name	Participation production process	Certification		Direct visit		Information sharing
			Public type (Yes/No)	Participated (Yes/No)	Yes/No	Free/ scheduled	YES
USA	Case A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Not reported	Yes
	Case B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Scheduled	Yes (Facebook)
	Case C	Not reported	No	Yes	Yes	Scheduled	Yes (Facebook)
	Case D	Not reported	No	Yes	Yes	Free (members); Scheduled (others)	Yes (Meeting)
	Case E	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes (Facebook, Twitter)
	Case F	No	No	No	Yes	Scheduled	Yes (Facebook)
	Case G	Yes	No	No	Yes	Free	Yes (Facebook)
Canada	Case H	Yes	Not reported	Not reported	Yes	Scheduled	No
	Case I	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Not reported	Yes (Facebook)
France	Case J	Not reported	Not reported	Not reported	Yes	Not reported	Yes (Facebook)
The Netherlands	Case K	Yes	Not reported	Not reported	Yes	Scheduled	Not reported
	Case L	Yes	Not reported	Not reported	Yes	Not reported	Yes (Meeting)
	Case M	Yes	Not reported	Not reported	Yes	Not reported	Yes (Meeting)
Spain	Case N	Not reported	Not reported	Not reported	Not reported	Not reported	Not reported
Italy	Case O	Not reported	No	No	Yes	Scheduled	Yes (blog)
UK	Case P	No	No	Yes	Yes	Sched./Free	Yes (Facebook, Twitter)

Source: our investigation

Table D – Resource pooling and sharing

Country	Name	Knowledge			Time/Labour		Capital
		P.T.C	C.T.C	C.T.P	Yes/no	Voluntary	
USA	Case A	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
	Case B	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
	Case C	Yes	No	No	Not reported	Not reported	Not reported
	Case D	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Case E	Not reported	Not reported	Not reported	Yes	Not reported	Yes
	Case F	Yes	Yes	Not reported	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Case G	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Canada	Case H	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
	Case I	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
France	Case J	Not reported	Not reported	Not reported	Not reported	Not reported	Not reported
	Case K	Yes	No	No	Yes	Not reported	Not reported
The Netherlands	Case L	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Not reported	No
	Case M	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Not reported
Spain	Case N	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Not reported	Not reported
Italy	Case O	Yes	No	No	No	Not reported	No
UK	Case P	Not reported	Not reported	Not reported	Yes	Yes	No

Source: our investigation