Legitimation Processes of Humanitarian Organisations to regain, create and maintain Humanitarian Space, and the influence of Civil-Military Cooperation on these processes

BSc thesis

I do not envy their position!

Mark de Koning

From the report 'CIMIC, Civiel-Militaire Relaties en PSO. De verschillende realiteiten van CIMIC en Civiel-Militaire Relaties.' from the PSO

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Foreword

Thesis concerns the legitimation processes of humanitarian organisations and the role of civil-military cooperation in these processes. I have chosen this subject, because in the future I want to commit myself for people who are in need because of a disaster or conflict. During the work for this thesis I learned a lot of things, which I can use for the master program 'International Humanitarian Action', for which I'm honoured to be selected.

In this thesis I will focus particularly on the civil-military cooperation, partly because recently there has been started a big discussion about this between humanitarian organisations and the Dutch military, together with the Dutch government. The two complete different worlds, of the military and of aid organisations, fascinates me. However, it also frustrates me. Not only because the conflict in itself is very annoying. Probably both organisations are not free from own interests, but they also do have their good intentions, and these intentions are becoming increasingly difficult by this discussion. Both worlds and the corresponding opinions are understandable. But, is there really no solution?

This thesis will not be, or give, a solution for the problem. I focused only on the way in which humanitarian organisation try to get and maintain recognition from all the relevant stakeholders, like governments, international organisations, donors, but also aid receivers. This thesis will show which means they use for this, and how they use the means. The case study will explain which role the government and the military play in these legitimation processes, and how they try to legitimate their opinion. Although this will not be a solution, it will show that the opinions which are made publically, are based on much more factors than the problem an sich. For example, when organisations say that the cooperation with militaries will have negative consequences, it is possible that there is no problem with this civil-military cooperation in practice. Their 'publical opinion' can be based on the opinion of donors of which the organisations are financial dependent. Beside the influence of donors, the publical opinion' of organisations are dependent on many more people and factors.

I have learned a lot of the readings, and of the process of writing. It was hard to structure the information and to make the text understandable. I want to thank my supervisor Michiel Köhne for his help and patience while leading me during the process. Above all I want to thank my biggest supporters, namely my father, mother and brother.

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Summary

This thesis concerns a literature research about the legitimation processes of humanitarian organisations, in particularly about civil-military cooperation. Legitimacy is seen as acceptance which exists in different degrees. It is to a large extent socially constructed by culture and discourses. Legitimation processes, in turn, shape also culture and discourses. This is a continuously constructing process. During crises all stakeholders mutually construct each other's image in top-down processes, as well as bottom-up processes, which include power struggles. All stakeholders have different interests in these processes, and therefore, value different aspects.

In recent years, this fact of different interests caused even more difficulties, because the number of stakeholders increased. Furthermore, currently, there are a lot of different kinds of crises, which are mostly intrastate conflicts with many different groups involved, with all their different kinds of interests. All these factors make the work of humanitarian organisations more complex. They have to deal with many different situations and stakeholders. When an organisation want to meet the needs, it has to know and understand this local situation. Therefore, getting support from different actors, like donors or the local population became very difficult.

Furthermore, the humanitarian principles are reformulated and extended. The established Code of Conduct became criticised because it shows inconsistency, and because it is very open for different interpretations. Because of this criticism, the status of the Code of Conduct is reduced, which makes it a less useful instrument in the fight for support. The usefulness of this instrument became even worse because of the current world polarisation. Although international organisations claim to work in an universal way, often they are seen as part of the Western world. Because of re-identification processes in neo-colonial countries, and because of the happenings on 9/11, the world is divided in a Western and non-Western part. Western organisations and international organisations are accused, and even attacked, because they would follow Western agendas or act in a neo-colonial way.

Not only different actors have different interests, all actors can also influence the image of others. Aid receivers, for example, or no passive victims, but active actors in the process of aid provision, who try to become qualified for aid. Donors can steer the action of organisations, because of their power to stop the flow of finances. Also, both donors and the media can steer the process of aid provision. Both aid providers as aid receivers do use the media for their own interests. However, the media is never neutral, and is not seen as such. So by using it actors can also lose support. Furthermore, the organisations can be distrusted by links to certain donors, because donors are also seldom seen as neutral.

Beside the media and donors, also the international society and the government of the country in which the humanitarian organisation intervenes have influence on the support given to the organisation. Both parties have a lot of power, in financial, regulatory, and campaigning sense, they can have a lot of positive or negative influence on the capacity of humanitarian organisations, depending on their own interests.

Because of all these demands of stakeholders organisations easily loose the focus on their main objective to help people. Pressure from outsiders, like donors, leads to a focus on transparency and accountability among the organisations. Sometimes organisations

have to, because otherwise they would not survive. However, sometimes it is part of a hidden political agenda.

Acceptance and support also depend on the way of working of an organisation. Consistency between mandate and practice, no competition with other organisations, attention to the people in need, a good attitude, and a good quality of aid, are all factors which can contribute to a greater acceptance and support for the organisation. Some stakeholders will, however, only focus on the things which organisations say, while others will focus on the real practices of the organisation.

The humanitarian principles are not always known or valued on local level, which make them unusable as instrument to gain support and acceptance. Awareness of local structures can be much more useful. Often organisations work around local organisations and local initiatives. However, when organisations do involve local people, this happens often in a way that also leads to offensive local people. For example, because the organisation hires only Western-minded people.

According to several Ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, complex modern crises demand an integrated security approach. The Ministries work together towards interventions which are focused on security as well as development. This approach, called the 3D (Defence, Diplomacy and Development) approach, is reflected by the establishment of a new military component, called CIMIC. CIMIC supports civil-military cooperation by its activities.

Both the humanitarian organisations and the military have their own opinion about civil-military cooperation. The opinions of both parties are contrasting, however, both defendable. Both parties are trying to get legitimacy for their own opinion, and try to de-legitimate the opinion of the other. During this fight, they do not only focus on possible opinions about the issue of civil-military cooperation, but they also try to construct each other's image, because the legitimacy for the organisation itself is strongly related to the legitimacy it gets for its opinions.

CIMIC makes the legitimation processes of humanitarian organisations more difficult to control by the organisations themselves, because it adds another factor for which organisations have to fight for legitimacy.

The government, military and MSF-N, all use mainly their own website to inform other relevant stakeholder, like the Dutch population and donors, about their visions on civil-military cooperation. MSF-N uses also the media to respond directly towards certain claims or critics. However, the government and the military do not directly respond to criticism towards CIMIC. They do answer questions by explaining their policy on their own websites, in brochures and reports, in documents with questions of the parliament, and occasionally during individual interviews with an employee. The government and military realises they also have to fight continuously for their legitimacy.

Although on global level still the discourse prevails that humanitarian organisations work on a moral base, increasing criticism towards humanitarian work can damage this discourse. The humanitarian organisations try to steer this new discourse. They want people to believe that aid workers and aid are victims of people who use them as a means for their own interests.

For example, MSF-N tries to convince local people that they, as MSF-N, are independent of the Western world. Furthermore, MSF-N tries to convince the Dutch government, militaries, donors, and the Dutch population that they are seen as Western because of the mixing of civil and military roles.

The relevant part of the Dutch government, together with the military, however, try to steer the new discourse into another direction. They want to convince people that all stakeholders are subject to larger external changes of security and conflicts, and that indeed aid should be given in another way; an integrated way.

The local population and local organisations, however, think that the discussion about civil-military cooperation is a Western luxury problem. They do not care about this issue, and do not want it to hinder the provision of aid.

Power relations in legitimation processes are formed by meetings and documents, as well as by informal interactions. So, this kind of power depends on negotiation and argumentation skills, as well as skills to use the media and other instruments to present things in a certain way.

List of abbreviations

3D	Diplomacy, Defence, and Development
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MSF-N	Dutch component of Médecins sans Frontières
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	UN High Commission for Refugees
US	United States

PART 1

INTRODUCTION WITH RESEARCH OUTLINE AND THEORY

1. Introduction with research outline

This thesis concerns a literature research about the legitimation processes of humanitarian organisations. The focus will be on civil-military cooperation. The aim of the thesis is to inform the reader about the legitimacy processes on which humanitarian organisations base their position in the discussion about civil-military cooperation. The thesis is written for everyone who is interested in the way of working and thinking of humanitarian organisations with regard to legitimacy, and/or everyone who is interested in civil-military cooperation.

This chapter will explain on which problem this thesis will focus, how the research is approached and why, which research questions are chosen, which methodology is used, and, finally, how the content of this thesis is ordered.

1.1 History of humanitarian principles and establishment of the 'Defence, Diplomacy and Development' approach & problem statement

From 1960 to 1994 there has been a rise in the number of on-going wars: from 10 to around 50. These wars are mainly civil wars instead of interstate wars. The United Nations (UN) defines "major wars" as military conflicts which causes 1,000 battlefield deaths per year. In the 1960s there were 10 major wars, in the midst of 2005 there were eight Major Wars, and 15 at the end of 2003. However, there are at least two dozen other conflicts on-going with varying degrees of intensity. Most victims, however, are civilians, which is a characteristic of modern conflicts. Also, wars last longer, in general. Battle violence has declined due to a decline in major interstate conflict and large internationalised civil conflicts. However, many conflicts are characterised by numbers of non-violent deaths due to humanitarian crisis that far surpass the lives lost in combat (Duffield, 1994; Lacina and Gleditsch, 2003).

These humanitarian crises demand humanitarian aid. However, there are many stakeholders involved in humanitarian activities. Humanitarian organisations try to legitimate their work within this humanitarian space, which is filled with many stakeholders who also try to gain legitimacy for their selves (and their humanitarian work), which sometimes happens at the costs of the legitimacy of these humanitarian organisations. Furthermore, the new policy of the Dutch government to enlarge the cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Ministry of Development included, and the Ministry of Defence, makes the role of the military in these legitimation processes bigger. Because of this bigger influence of the military on these legitimation processes, humanitarian workers fear for their safety, because of the possibility of mixing roles of combatants and non-combatants, and for an declined humanitarian space in the sense of financial support and accessibility of some areas (Homan, 2010).

First of all, we will go back to the history of humanitarian aid and the humanitarian principles, which is for many humanitarian organisations an important instrument which is used to gain legitimacy.

When talking about the first attempts to execute humanitarian activities coordinated by an organisation, many researchers trace these attempts back to the establishment of the Red Cross. The Swiss Henry Dunant established the Red Cross as a response to the military suffering on the battlefield during the battle of Solferino (1859), which was the

nationalist struggle to unify Italy, which was long divided between France, Austria, Spain and numerous small Italian principalities (Gourlay, 2000). His ideas contributed to the provision of rules for war to protect combatants as well as non-combatants, embodied by the first Geneva Convention, which is extended by another three conventions and three protocols, later (Dijkzeul, 2010). Based on these rules, the International Red Cross established four traditional humanitarian principles, which are: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independency. This principles together would determine the humanitarian space. Furthermore, the humanitarian aid was, and is, meant to alleviate human suffering caused by disasters or conflicts. According to Dijkzeul (2010: II): "The traditional humanitarian aid consists out of short term activities and is focused on saving people by providing basic needs, like food, water, medicines and shelter". These short term activities distinguishes humanitarian aid from development aid which is structural long-term aid, and is not particularly linked to a disaster or conflict. A further distinction is made by the UN, which made a difference between humanitarian aid, socio-economic development, and security, when it was established after the Second World War (Ibid).

However, this changed during the 1990s. Then, people started to think that humanitarian aid could also play a role by the prevention and resolution of conflicts, and peace building. Therefore, the separation between acute humanitarian aid, reconstruction, and the more structural development aid, and the separation of humanitarian action and political-military action became less clear. The latter is partly due to the fact that militaries and governments used humanitarian aid more and more as an instrument in their policy. Therefore humanitarian aid became increasingly politicized (Homan, 2010).

Currently, in the Netherlands, the majority of the politicians and militaries see security and development as inevitable connected with each other. Only the CU and SGP do not talk about this link, and the PVV does not support development cooperation at all. The majority of the political parties, however, can also be divided between parties which see security as supporting development, and parties who think that development is needed for security. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Major General Homan, researcher for the Clingendael, Netherlands Institute for International Relations and former director of the Netherlands Defence College, security will lead to stability, which is needed to bring economic and social development (Homan, 2010; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). For years security was not in the picture within the development policy of the Netherlands. Today, countries in conflict, or post-conflict countries, show the importance of this connection. Therefore, for former minister of Development Cooperation, Ardenne, security became one of the major focuses in development countries. According to former minister Pronk, "the delivery of humanitarian aid in conflict situations is only effective when a certain amount of security conditions are fulfilled and when at the same time people are working towards political solutions of the relevant conflict. The different aspects of preventing, controlling and the solution of armed conflicts require therefore a coordinated effort of foreign-political, defence-political, and development-political instruments" (Homan, 2010: pp. 259).

Since the end of the Cold War, the army became to a much greater extent an active instrument of the foreign policy of the Netherlands, and the rule that the army should also be deployed to maintain and improve the international law and order, was added to the constitution. Furthermore, the 'Defence, Diplomacy and Development' (3D)

approach was created, which is focused on both the improvement of security and the improvement of sustainable development. This approach is part of the policy which the Dutch government has with regard to (post) conflict areas. With this policy, the government wants to pursue more cooperation between the ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Development - currently, the latter is included in the ministry of Foreign Affairs - to work more effective in conflict areas. Development and humanitarian organisations, together with the military, will join integrated interventions, and execute activities, like creating or improving the systems of justice, governance and security, reconstruction of public services, and the provision of economic aid. Counterinsurgency is also included, because the activities are often hindered by hostile actors. However, this counterinsurgency is not focused on the elimination of these actors, but rather on the winning of the hearts and minds of a population. The objective of all these activities is "to make reconstruction of the country possible and to prevent it against falling back in a situation of war", according to Homan (2010: pp. 259). From August 2006, the Dutch army is present for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in the province Uruzgan in Afghanistan to provide safety and stability. Based on the above called 3D-approach, diplomatic and humanitarian aid is also used to achieve this goal (Jansen et al., 2007).

The 3D-approach of the government has led to the extension of the assisting tasks of the army, namely in the form of CIMIC. CIMIC stands for "Civil-Military Cooperation" by which is meant "the coordination of the cooperation between military commanders and the civil population, including national and local authorities, but also international and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and institutions which support the military mission" (Ministerie van Defensie, 2010: par.1). The army works together with civil actors in the mission areas to make the military mission more effective. "CIMIC can be used by the commander to adjust military plans and activities with civil actors, to gain information about the consequences of the actions for the local population and civil organisations, and to work together with civil actors to created safety and stability in the mission area. Furthermore, during the military mission, reconstruction and aid provision to the local population can be initiated. The goal is an integrated approach in which diplomacy, defence, and reconstruction, lead to a mission which is successful." (Ministry of Defence, 2010: par. 2&3). Although it seems that, within CIMIC the goal of helping people, - which ought to be the objective of the humanitarian organisations -, is becoming a mean for a successful military mission; the stability and security brought by the military mission is seen to be necessary for development, given the new policy.

Attention to the relation between humanitarian aid and development aid is growing, because of increased occurrence of complex humanitarian crises. Humanitarian aid is ought to be neutral, which is in contrast with development aid which is focused on social and political changes. However, this difference is no longer very clear, as explained above. The relation became also important, because of the large amounts of money which is given to humanitarian aid operations, which is claimed to happen at the expense of development projects which focus on a long-term effect. Therefore, different actors tried to align the two ways of aid provision.

The result was, that many aid organisations became multi-mandated[1] organisations. They have humanitarian as well as development programmes. The decision which aid is

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[1] A mandate is a written command of an organization. It states certain objectives and tasks, and a course of action (Amnesty International, 2010).

given is often based on political and financial considerations, instead of on the basis of need. The current domination of integrated missions and the centralisation in the decision making of UN agencies, gave NGOs the choice to work within the system, with a limited autonomy with regard to decision-making, or to work without the system, or to leave the operation area (Homan, 2010). The Dutch component of the international aid organisation Médecins Sans Frontières, namely Artsen zonder Grenzen (MSF-N), for example, decided to leave Afghanistan after an assassination on five employees. According to the organisation, the security situation makes it almost impossible to give independent aid to the Afghan people. According to them, the integrated policy makes that the fighting parties in Afghanistan mix the different parties which work in Afghanistan; non-combatants are grouped under combatants (ANP, 2004).

What the example of the MSF-N already indicated, the current integrated focus has led to a tension, or better to say "conflict", between the army and the NGOs. Although the military does not very much see a problem, the NGOs do. The main point of struggle is that NGOs see these mixing of military and civil roles as going against their principles of neutrality and impartiality, which will cause danger for aid workers, because of the mixing up of combatants and non-combatants by fighters. Furthermore, they are afraid that the money they use to get, will be given to these military activities. In short, they are afraid of the reduction of the humanitarian space, by which is meant the capacity and ability to execute humanitarian activities (Jansen et al., 2007).

During the 1970s and 1980s, the humanitarian principles were not questioned. This changed from the 1990s. The principles were seen as too open for many interpretations; they would only deal with the consequences of conflict, and therefore, are often in conflict with the commitment to sustainability by others; they would put the responsibility of human suffering on humanitarian organisations, instead of on the party who initiated war; discovery of violations of human rights were not made public, because of the principle of neutrality - the Red Cross was criticised, because they knew about concentration camps, but did not bring it to attention because it would violated the principle of neutrality and therefore make their access to the Third Reich probably worse - (Dijkzeul, 2010; Vlassenroot, Romkema and Dijkzeul, 2010).
Furthermore, when decolonisation was initiated, humanitarian organisations recognised that underdevelopment is a long term crisis, and therefore, they became more and more focused on development aid, and with that more focused on the causes of conflict. However, this focus demands a vision on the direction of development in a country, which is a socio-political question, and therefore, contradicts with the traditional humanitarian principles. Also, the use of media to influence the broader public and governments, and the violation of sovereignty, became activities of humanitarian organisations, which both caused more tension between neutrality towards the fighting parties, and the solidarity with the victims. Furthermore, from the beginning of the 1980s, the number and the activities of international NGOs increased rapidly, but the organisations did not have enough capacity to work on the basis of the traditional humanitarian principles (Dijkzeul, 2010).

Therefore, during the 1990s, the principles are used in a more operational way, which means that, the decision to make the behaviour of offenders public, depends on the situation. So, the principle of neutrality did no longer entails absolute confidentiality or passivity. Furthermore, although the influence of humanitarian organisations grew and

the role of governments decreased, the genocide in Rwanda and Srebrenica, and the violence in Somalia, caused the establishment of an extension and reformulation of the traditional humanitarian. In, 1991, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (a partnership of big NGOs), made the Code of Conduct, which included beside the traditional humanitarian principles, also principles which are more focused on development and sustainability (Dijkzeul, 2010). The Code of Conduct is showed in the Appendix.

In general, many humanitarian organisations claim that humanitarian NGOs should be the only ones who execute humanitarian activities during a crisis. Despite of the difficulties of working according to the humanitarian principles, as explained above, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the MSF mainly use these principles in their fight for legitimacy. Not only these organisations, but all stakeholders within the humanitarian space use such normative instruments to gain legitimacy (Dijkzeul, 2010).

Therefore, it is interesting to know how the humanitarian organisations try to legitimate their work within this humanitarian space, which is filled with many stakeholders who also try to gain legitimacy for their selves (and their humanitarian work) and sometimes try to de-legitimate the humanitarian organisations. How do these humanitarian organisations legitimate their statement against cooperation with militaries. What influence has this new way of working of the military on the legitimation processes of these humanitarian organisations? Does this influence have negative consequences for the safety and financial support of aid workers, and the accessibility of certain areas? Is there still a conflict between the humanitarian organisations and the military during the real activities in Afghanistan, like NGOs claim in the Netherlands? This knowledge is important when one wants to know *which* problem should be solved *where*.

1.2 Conceptual framework

The research for this thesis will be a literature research. The conflict between the army and the NGOs, where this research is based on, can be approached by research in many different ways. The approach used for this research is an empirical approach of the legitimation processes in which humanitarian organisations are involved. This focus is chosen because the conflict, which is caused by the new way of working of the military, is actually based on the claims of traditional humanitarian organisations that they are the only actors who should be given legitimacy for humanitarian aid activities in the humanitarian space, because of their traditional humanitarian principles. They see this space as only reserved for them. When looking at the legitimacy processes in which humanitarian organisations play a role, it is possible to look whether this claim is tenable and effective in their fight to gain legitimacy. This is useful, because the humanitarian organisations base their statement against the new way of working of the military on these principles.

The next three paragraphs will deal with the concepts of "legitimacy" and "legitimation processes", and explain how different authors use these concepts in different ways. With these views, one comprehensive view of legitimacy is constructed. Legitimacy shall be seen as a form of acceptance. The final paragraph will explain why such an empirical approach of these concepts is relevant.

1.2.1 Legitimacy

There are several authors who wrote about legitimacy. Bodansky (1999: p. 600), for example, talks about legitimacy as "a quality that leads people (or states) to accept authority-independent of coercion, self-interest, or rational persuasion-because of a general sense that the authority is justified". So, according to him, legitimacy is something which is not subjective to interests and can be seen as objective and independent. However, people, in general, are not easily impressed by authorities. A government often only gets legitimacy by people when the people are satisfied with the role and decisions of the government, and therefore, accept it. So, not only humanitarian organisations, which are not seen as authorities, but also governments should take action to be seen as legitimate.

Furthermore, Bodansky beliefs that there exist objective sources for people's acceptance, and that this acceptance is objective as well. However, Comaroff and Comaroff (1992) see legitimacy as strongly connected to culture, which makes people's acceptance subjective. According to them, culture can be seen as a field of meaning, and power is part of the construction of this meaning. Meaning is expressed by signs and practices both explicit and implicit. While a field of meaning is polyvalent and exists out of contestable images, messages and actions, human beings understand themselves and others in it. Power influences meaning and meaning can be seen as a source of power. It is possible that discourses based on the Islamic culture makes that the Taliban distrusts not only Western militaries, but also Western humanitarian organisations. Furthermore, it is possible that discourses based on the Dutch culture makes, based on the Dutch liberal, tolerant and humanity-focused culture, rather another distinction, namely that of a hard, partially, political, inhumane military and the humane, impartially, neutral humanitarian organisations.

Bodansky distinguishes between different sources of legitimacy, namely: 1) the origin of power, namely: God, custom, and/or consent; 2) procedures of decision-making; 3) effects of the exercises of power, namely the focus on desired outcomes. With the first he means that an authority or organisation has legitimacy given by people who think that such an authority is given authority by God or that it is tradition to give legitimacy to an authority. The second source of decision-making means that the fixed ad determined way in which authorities make decisions is for people a reason to give the authority legitimacy. Finally, according to Bodansky, when authorities work towards desired outcomes, they are also given legitimacy. However, the latter, namely the effects of the exercises of power, seems to be subject to interest, which is in contrast with his statement that legitimacy is free from interests. As said before, often, not custom and procedures, but mainly the desired outcome is one of the factors which people use to make their choices to vote or to donate money to certain organisations. It would be interesting to look at which reasons people base their decision to give legitimacy to humanitarian organisations.

According to Bodansky, the decision's authority requires legitimacy, not the particular content of the decision. However, according to Boxenbaum (2008), legitimacy is only given when the values of the humanitarian activities are to a large extent equal to the widely accepted norms in the larger social system. So, legitimacy is more about norms and values, than about fixed positions and procedures. Furthermore, she thinks, that ideas can be legitimate. According to her, an idea is legitimate if it is not in contrast

to the institutional order and widespread beliefs in the organizational field. So, in contrast to Bodansky, Boxenbaum talks about the legitimacy of ideas instead of the legitimacy of an organization itself.

This thought of Boxenbaum, that legitimacy strongly depends on existing thoughts about values in the organisational field and the larger social regime, can be compared to the ideas of Comaroff and Comaroff about legitimacy. Comaroff and Comaroff, also, look at wider society with its norms, when talking about legitimacy. According to them, legitimacy is part of the prevailing culture. Therefore, for this research, it is important realize that the legitimacy of the organization depends heavily on the norms and values in the broader society, and that it is not about people who objectively decide to accept an organization, because of, for example tradition, but about people who are also influenced by these prevailing norms and values within the society within their choice to legitimate an origination.

Comaroff and Comaroff (1992), see legitimacy as both an ideology and hegemony. They see ideology as a more or less systematic worldview. There exist dominant ideologies and counter-ideologies towards these dominant ones. Ideology is seen as something which originates from acts of particular people or groups. Hegemony, in turn, is something that is naturalised, universal, eternal, and true. It puts things beyond the thinkable, seems to be independent of agentive power, and is based on control. It has become invisible through repetition, habituated, and therefore, unnoticed. According to them, the more successful a regime, the more of its ideology will become hegemonical. However, hegemony is never total and it needs constantly to be build; it is a process. Legitimacy is, according to them, something visible in a form of struggle of meanings (ideology), and something invisible, because of its characteristics of coherence, consensus, and authority (hegemony). So, like Boxenbaum, Comaroff and Comaroff, also, see legitimacy as something which can be given to meaning and ideas instead of an organisation itself. Furthermore, this shows that the norms and values on the wider society are also constructed by the humanitarian organizations themselves. So, not only the organizations should adapt to the wider society, they also try to steer the norms and values of this society themselves into the direction of their own norms and values, on which they base their claim to deserve legitimacy.

In this research both the organisations themselves, as well as their work and ideas can be seen as legitimate, which is based on the following. Bodansky, sees legitimacy as criterion of good government. However, for this research legitimacy is seen as a form of acceptance, what implies that given legitimacy does not always have to point at good governance of the authority or organisation to which legitimacy is given. When a dictator does not govern a country very well, he and/or his work can still be seen as legitimate, because people do not know better or simply do not have an alternative, and therefore, accept him and/or his work. So, a government can be seen as legitimate, and therefore, often also its decisions. But the decisions can also be seen as legitimate themselves, because of their desired outcomes, and in this way contribute to the legitimacy of the government. However, when a government has legitimacy, this can be damaged by activities which are not supported by the population. So, the legitimacy of the organisations and the legitimacy of its ideas and work are related: both exists and can be mutual reinforcing, but also weaken each other. In this research, there will be looked at the way in which humanitarian organisations try to let their ideas, role, work, and their organisation itself be seen as legitimate, because when this is seen as

legitimate, they will gain humanitarian space, by which is meant the capacity and safety to act, and possibly more influence on acceptance in the debate about the aid giving military and civil-military cooperation.

Boxenbaum says that an idea is not simply legitimate or illegitimate; it can be slightly legitimate, somewhat legitimate, or highly legitimate. This can be explained by the view of legitimacy as acceptance, because acceptance has also different levels. For example, some people do not completely agree with the ideas or activities of an humanitarian organisation. So, with regard to this research, both the ideas of the humanitarian organisations and the military can be seen as legitimate, but the ideas of the one can be seen as more legitimate then the ideas of the other.

Also, legitimacy varies among groups, for different people have different interest, and therefore, value different elements of an organisation differently. So, for this research it is important not to focus on only one, for example, political way, in which ideas, practices and decisions of an organisation are assessed by people, but also look at assessments based on, for instant, morality. Furthermore, there will be carefully taken into account which groups, organisations and bodies value what. Only then it is possible to know whether this group assigned legitimacy, of course, in different degrees, to the relevant organisation or its work.

1.2.2 Legitimation processes

Beside different dimensions, there exist also different mechanisms for gaining, maintaining and restoring legitimacy, which is the topic of this paragraph. These processes of gaining, maintaining and restoring legitimacy, are called legitimation processes. According to M. Köhne (Lecture, March 20th, 2012), legitimation can take place in different forms, including narratives, practices and symbols. Humanitarian workers can tell stories about their organisation to convince people that the organisation should be seen as highly legitimate. The work which is really done by the humanitarian workers can also incite people to recognise the relevant humanitarian organisation as highly legitimate. Furthermore, humanitarian workers can also use symbols to convince people of this. Examples of symbols are concepts which point at certain norms and values, like 'impartiality' and 'participation', but other symbols can be emblems, or clothes, etc.

The rest of this paragraph will give a closer look at these ways of legitimation. First of all, there will be explained in which way the mechanism of narratives, and implicitly the mechanism of practices, can be effective in the fight for legitimacy. There will be made distinction between hegemonic narratives and subversive narratives, there will be talked about the relation between narratives and power relations, the context of narratives will be discussed, the relation between narratives and discourses will be explained, and finally, the different natures of legitimacy are shown.

Secondly, the mechanism of symbols is discussed. First of all, different ways in which symbols can be used are discussed. Secondly, there will be explained how actors can hide behind symbols.

Ewick and Silbey (1995: 197), make a difference between hegemonic narratives and subversive narratives. According to them, the first are "stories that reproduce existing relations of power and inequity", and the latter are "narratives that challenge the taken-for-granted hegemony by making visible and explicit the connections between particular

lives and social organisation". Besides the statement that narratives reproduce existing relations of power, Comaroff and Comaroff state, that power is used to produce truths. In that case, when you have more power, you probably have also more influence on: which narrative becomes legitimate or even a hegemony; on the process in which a certain narrative becomes accepted; and on the level of acceptance. Acceptance can be, in this way, a result of the legitimation process.

Comaroff and Comaroff, who draw on a Marxist tradition as well as on Michel Foucault, define hegemony as "that order of signs and practices, relations and distinctions, images and epistemologies—drawn from a historically situated cultural field—that come to be taken-for-granted as the natural and received shape of the world and everything that inhabits it." (Comaroff and Comarof cit. in Merry, 2003: p ..). When these signs and practices are recognised and emphasised by, for example, narratives, they belong to the domain of ideology, and are more vulnerable towards criticism than a hegemony. The boundary between hegemony and ideology is dynamic and fluid, and is characterised by constantly passing ideas and practices from the level of individual consciousness and to the level of collective cultural practice, and the other way around. Hegemony makes domination seem natural, and prevents and suppresses forms of resistance. However, according to Merry (2003: par.6): "an individual may have experiences that make him or her aware of hegemonic relations of power, which then immediately become contested". So, it is a continuing process, in which hegemony is made and unmade (Merry, 2003). So, the legitimating processes in which humanitarian organisations play a role, consist out of power struggles, performed by different stakeholders who fight to make their ideas and practices (part of) the dominant hegemony.

According to Ewick and Silbey (1995: 206), "stories are always told within particular historical, institutional, and interactional contexts that shape their telling, its meanings and effects. They are told with particular interests, motives, and purposes in mind". So, according to them, narratives are socially constructed. Furthermore, according to them, the storyteller is bound by certain rules and norms when telling tales." These rules for narratives can also be the limiting influence of mutual social constructing of different parties, in this case the humanitarian organisations and the military. Both parties cannot say everything about the other, simply because it can damage their image, and therefore, their legitimacy. However, these stories also shape norms and rules.

Lister (2003), who uses an anthropological perspective, wrote in her article "NGO Legitimacy, Technical Issue or Social Construct?" about NGO legitimacy as socially constructed. According to her, the definition of legitimacy given by earlier writers on development and NGOs, like Edwards' (qtd. in Lister: 176), namely "having the right to be and do something in society – a sense that an organisation is lawful, proper, admissible and justified in doing what it does, and saying what it says, and that it continues to enjoy the support of an identifiable constituency", lack something important. Although, they consider legitimacy as complex and dependent on several aspects, like legal compliance, and consistency between values and actual behaviour, there are three aspects which are dominating within these literature, namely: accountability, representativeness and performance, what shows that it ignores "the legitimating environment; the multifaceted nature of legitimacy; and enhancement of legitimacy through identification with symbols", which is the focus of institutional theory. According to her, this technical approach will obstructs the view on the question to whom and for what an organization is legitimate. Attempts to improve structure, and

execute right activities and procedures, will not ensure legitimacy, it depends strongly on the dynamic environment of the organization.

Suchman's (1995) definition, which includes social construction of legitimacy could be usefully supplemented with the focus of the institutional theory. So, like many other authors named above, Lister also says, that legitimacy is dependent on the environment of a (in this case) humanitarian organisation. People might think they accept an organisation in an objective way, as assumed by Bodansky, but their opinion is subject to the prevailing culture of the larger social society, and their own interests.

Lister goes further, because, according to her, the legitimizing environment of an organisation is indeed socially constructed, but instead of focussing on values or norms, the focus should be on "taken-for-granted scripts, rules and classifications", which she associates with the term 'discourse', which constitutes organisations and is central to the legitimacy of them. She explains the term 'discourse' as "an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena (...) and by which certain problems are framed: that is, they distinguish some aspects of a situation rather than others"(Lister, 2003: 188). So, humanitarian organisations can gain legitimacy when they do conform to, or construct, dominant discourses and approaches to humanitarian action.

According to Richards (2006), discourse is produced and reproduced, which implies that it is ever changing. So, beside the difficulty of creating legitimacy, it is also extremely hard for humanitarian organisations and the military to maintain legitimacy given by certain people. Furthermore, the legitimacy environments are not homogenous, which implies that beside the fact that different organisations operate within different environments, the environments also consist out of different stakeholders with their own interests. So, as explained above, in contrast to the ideas of Bodanksy, there is interest in the game.

Lister gives the different views of legitimacy, called above, their own names, like: regulatory legitimacy, which is focused on conformity with regulatory institutions; normative legitimacy, which depends on the congruence between the values pursued by the organisations and wider 'societal' values; cognitive legitimacy, which is focused on the congruence between the organisation and cognitive structures in society, which are taken for granted; pragmatic legitimacy, which depends on the self-interest of the organisation's environment. With this she underlines the complexity within legitimation processes in which NGO's play a role: "many different factors which contribute to different types of legitimacy with different stakeholders" (Lister, 2003: 179). As said above, different stakeholders focus on different aspects of the organisation, which implies that not the organisation, but the stakeholders determine which characteristics contribute to its legitimacy. However, Lister adds the fact that "legitimacy with different stakeholders may have different levels of importance for an organisation" (p.184). When an organisation wants to be seen as having a certain level of legitimate given by its donors, it will focus on the things the donors value highly. But, when organisations do think that it is not important to have a certain degree of legitimacy in the eyes of local governments, than they will have a less incentive to focus on the wants of these governments.

This all shows, that legitimation processes do certainly not only consist out of top-down processes, but also, out of bottom-up processes.

As said before, beside narratives and practices, legitimation processes can also embody the use of symbols. Lister says that organisations identify with certain symbols, by using legitimated vocabulary, in order to enhance their legitimacy. Terms like 'North' and 'South', 'local', and 'partners' are very popular within NGOs. 'Local', for example, can be close to the discourse of 'participation'. Symbols are, according the her, defined by dominant discourses in the field. So, when humanitarian organisations say that they are more focused on the local problems than the military, they are seen as more caring for the local people. This way of using symbols overlaps the use of narratives. However, other symbols can be, for example, the emblems used by the organisations, like the added symbol of the red crescent to the International Red Cross.

Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) also talk about symbols with regard to legitimacy. They distinguish two general means by which organisations try to gain legitimacy, namely: substantive management, which is the approach which "involves real, material change in organisational goals, structures, and processes or socially institutionalized practices"; and symbolic management, by which "rather than actually change its ways, the organization might simply portray-or symbolically manage-them so as to appear consistent with social values and expectations". The last is related to the meaning of acts (Richardson, in: Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). So, symbols do not always reflect the real practices and roles of an organisation. Actually an organisation can hide behind symbols. This is a useful perspective of Richardson, however, he focuses too much on top-down legitimation processes.

1.2.3 Legitimacy and legitimation processes in this research

All views discussed above contribute to a more comprehensive view on legitimacy and legitimation processes. As shown by the examples used above, many views can be used for research about the legitimation processes of humanitarian organisations and the military. Most of these views, except the ones which are rejected as explained above, will be taken into account in the comprehensive approach of this thesis. Legitimacy is seen as socially constructed and it can be given in different levels. By a legitimating process, legitimacy can be lost (de-legitimacy), (re)gained and maintained. This can be done by telling narratives, execute certain practices, and using certain symbols. Certain factors has to be taken into account when analysing legitimation processes: 1) legitimacy is strongly related to the prevailing culture (with its norms and values) and discourse in the broader society, which are both ever changing; 2) legitimacy is a continuous construct, but, in turn, also construct the wider culture and discourse of the society; 3) different stakeholders focus on other factors by giving legitimacy to organisations; 4) legitimacy is part of social structures and power struggles; 5) legitimacy varies among groups, because different people have different interests, and therefore, value different elements differently. It might be clear that legitimation processes include top-down and bottom-up processes. Interesting is to look at what happens in processes, who the actors are and their interests, what the prevailing culture and discourse is, and who the most power has in this discourse. This will be done for this thesis.

1.2.4 Empirical approach of the humanitarian space

As said above, the approach used for this research is an empirical approach of the legitimation processes in which humanitarian organisations are involved. This

paragraph will explain what this way of research means and why it is chosen for this thesis.

The concept humanitarian space points, according to Dijkzeul, at the "complete set of possibilities to provide humanitarian aid" (Dijkzeul, 2010: XIII). However, as said before, humanitarian organisations try to create an exception situation which is only for humanitarian activities, and they base these attempts on their principles. So, in this case, the humanitarian space only exists during humanitarian activities, and they try to gain legitimacy by normative instruments, namely their principles.
Researchers distinguish ways in which the humanitarian space is linked to humanitarian principles. There exists a normative Dunantic perception of the humanitarian space by which the concept is only used for independent, neutrally, and impartially humanitarian work, which is used by many humanitarian organisations as normative instrument to gain legitimacy. However, there exists also more empirical interpretations of this space, by which the humanitarian space is seen as a space with a large number of actors, and these actors can be civil workers as well as militaries (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010). Hilhorst and Jansen, who use this empirical approach, do not want to define at fore hand which kind of actions earn a humanitarian label. First they ask which people do protect and assist. This literature research will approach the normative instruments, used by organisations to claim legitimacy, by such an empirical analysis, because it gives space to all stakeholders of humanitarian crises which all use their own normative instruments in the competition for legitimacy, and it shows the influence of the fight of other stakeholders on the legitimation processes of the humanitarian organisations. The empirical approach is focused on what the possibilities are for humanitarian aid, and does not determine at for hand *who* and *what* can be labelled as "humanitarian". This makes it possible for other actors and factors to be part of the humanitarian space; even actors who try to solve the conflict (Dijkzeul, 2010).

1.3 Research questions

The main research question of this thesis is as follow: "What influence does the introduced component of the Dutch military, namely Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), have on the legitimation processes of humanitarian organisations?"

To answer the main research question there are different things where have to be looked at. First of all, it is useful to investigate what legitimation mechanisms humanitarian organisations used through the years and use nowadays to legitimate themselves and their work, with the aim to (re)gain and maintain humanitarian space. However, as explained above, a legitimation process not only consists out of top-down process, but also of a bottom-up process. So, all other actors and factors, which influence the legitimation processes of these organisations, should be taken into account. There will be focused on the competition between humanitarian organisations and the military, but it is useful to look not only at the relationship between these two parties, but also at the relations between humanitarian organisations and all other actors in the humanitarian space, because these actors influence, with their fight for legitimacy, also the legitimation processes of both the humanitarian organisations and the military, and the relationship between these two parties.

Finally, research will be done about the new way of working of the military and about the influence of this on the legitimation processes of the humanitarian organisations. When doing this, there will be looked at the civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan.

The sub questions, therefore, will be as follow:
1. What does the legitimation processes of humanitarian organisations look like?
    a. What legitimation mechanisms do humanitarian organisations use to keep the humanitarian space open for them, and closed for others?
    b. Which actors and factors, including discourses, play a role within these legitimacy processes of humanitarian organisations?
2. How does the 3D-approach influence the legitimation processes in which humanitarian organisations play a role with respect to the conflicts in Afghanistan?
    a. What kind of ideas and activities for the military does the 3D-approach entail?
    b. Which ideas and activities of the military influence the humanitarian organisations in their fight for legitimacy?
    c. How do both the humanitarian organisations and the military react on this possible influence?

The first sub question will be answered in chapter 3, 4 and 5. The second sub question will be answered by chapter 6. The answers on both questions will be elaborated by the analysis in chapter 7.

1.4 Methodology

To answer the sub questions and with these the main question, literature is consulted. Via the online library of the Wageningen University scientific literature is searched. Furthermore, because the army and NGOs also communicate through the media to achieve legitimacy, this during this research also non-scientific sources like newspapers, were consulted. So, beside a literature study, also a text analysis is executed.

Because the case study in this thesis will focus on MSF-N and the way in which this organisation acts in legitimation processes, newspapers from the year 1984, which is the year in which MSF-N became established, till now, August 2012, are consulted. These newspapers will be national newspapers of the Netherlands, because foreign papers discuss all bodies of MSF together and when they talk about civil-military cooperation, they will lack a specific focus on the Dutch military. Also, the websites, brochures, reports, and papers of the relevant Dutch Ministries, the military, and MSF-N from the same period of time are consulted, because this will give a more comprehensive view on the means and arguments of the relevant parties in the legitimation processes. Although the use of local Afghan newspapers from the provinces were the Dutch military and/or MSF-N is located, would be a valuable addition, because it shows the way in which both the military and MSF-N try to gain legitimacy among the Afghan people and because this newspapers show the opinion of the Afghans, because of a lack of knowledge about the languages which are use in Afghanistan, this was not possible.

Because this research focuses on the legitimating processes by two different parties, it is important to know *who* is saying *what*. So, during research the sources of literature has been carefully considered.

Chapter 8 will discuss the limits of the methods which are used for this thesis.

PART 2

DESCRIPTION OF THE LEGITIMATION PROCESSES OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS

2. Changed humanitarian principles and humanitarian crises

This chapter will focus on the changed humanitarian principles and the changed nature of conflicts. As explained in chapter 2, the traditional humanitarian principles became reformulated and extended, and formed together with the new principles the Code of Conduct. First of all, this chapter will focus on these changed humanitarian principles. This first paragraph will show the role of the Code of Conduct in the legitimation processes of humanitarian organisations.

Beside the changed humanitarian conflicts, the nature of crises has also changed, and has its own role in the legitimation processes of humanitarian organisations. This topic will be discussed in the second paragraph of this chapter. The humanitarian organisations have to deal with increasingly complex crisis situations, with all kinds of armed groups and other stakeholders spread, not only among the relevant country, but among the whole world.

2.1 The Code of Conduct

This paragraph will be about the Code of Conduct, which, as explained in chapter 2, is an extension of the traditional principles, and consists of the traditional humanitarian principles, as well as the principles which are more focused on development and human rights. The Code of Conduct can be viewed in appendix 1. Although not binding, the Code of Conduct can contribute to the acceptance of humanitarian organisations, because it also includes a focus on sustainability of aid interventions. However, because of the inconsistency between the traditional and development principles and the possibility for many different interpretations of the principles, tension rises between organisations. Furthermore, new difficulties rise for these organisations with regard to their fight to get support.

First of all, because the traditional humanitarian principles were extended by principles which are more focused on development and human rights, and the traditional humanitarian principles were re-formulated, the Code of Conduct can be seen as a compromise between traditional humanitarian organisations and the organisations which are more focused on development and international justice. The code brings together the classical humanitarian principles of humanity, independence, neutrality (although not explicitly, see below) and impartiality, along with modern principles derived from development: accountability, partnership, participation and even sustainability. Furthermore, as said, the traditional principles became re-formulated. For example, the principle of neutrality does no longer entails absolute confidentiality or passivity (Dijkzeul, 2010). The Code of Conduct was launched just after the Rwanda genocide of April 1994, a disaster which was caused by too much passivity (Hilhorst, 2005).

However, the Code of Conduct became criticised by aid organisations and donors, because there seems to be a lack of consistency between these two different kinds of principles. For instance, the UN Operation Lifeline Sudan was initiated to build capacity (which is in line with principle 8 of the code of conduct), but also had to be impartial and neutral. Capacity-building is equal to development assistance, and does imply making

decisions about the legitimacy and desirability of different institutions (Macrae, et al., 1997), which is in contrast to the principles of neutrality and impartiality.

One of the reasons why the traditional principles became extended, is that the traditional principles are less focused on the consequences of aid than the other principles. However, the strong focus of the ICRC and the MSF on the traditional humanitarian principles makes that their ideas, and therefore their practices, are often in conflict with the commitment to sustainability by other actors, like development aid workers and peacekeepers (Dijkzeul, 2010). An example of the lack of commitment to sustainability, is that short term aid can make conflicts take longer, which will be explained in the next chapter. However, the degree of support given to an organisation depends on opinion of relevant people. For instance, people who believe that aid should contribute to stability or development, see aid provision only as effective when it really contributes to stability and development.

The humanitarian principles are very open for different interpretations of the aid workers themselves, but also by the people from which they desire support. Organisations can claim that they work according to the principles. However, also when they really try to do so, they can be accused by people who think they do not work according to the principles. Both parties interpret the principles is differently.

Because of all these critics on the Code of Conduct, the status of the humanitarian principles became undermined. Hilhorst (2005) even talks about a deadly document, when talking about the Code of Conduct.

Finally, another consequence of the creation of the Code of Conduct, is that the view on aid changed, in the sense that it became a right. This means that people in need have the right to be helped (Herman, 2010). As will be explained in the next chapter, aid receivers started to claim help, when they start to know about the rights and when they know how to use them in their fight to become qualified for aid. Organisations can be accused by people in need for not helping them, because aid is no longer a favour, but a duty. As said before, in the next chapter, the role of aid receivers is further explained.

In conclusion, the principles of the Code of Conduct are criticised because it shows inconsistency, and because it is very open for different interpretations. Because of this criticism, the status of the Code of Conduct is reduced. Furthermore, with the extension of the traditional principles, aid became a right which gives more responsibility to humanitarian organisations.

2.2 Complexity of crises

History not only shows the change in humanitarian principles, but also the change in the nature of conflicts. This paragraph will show the complexity of current crises, and they way in which organisations try to deal with this complexity during their work and how they fight for support.

2.2.1 Different crises and many stakeholders

After the Cold War, many countries had just become independent and had weak governments. Because conflicts were not suppressed by the authorities, new conflicts started within these countries (Dijkzeul, 2010). Before the Cold War, the most conflicts

were interstate conflicts, however, after the Cold War the most conflicts are intrastate conflicts.

There are a lot of different kinds of humanitarian crises and there exist many forms of armed conflict. Dijkzeul and Herman (2010: 325) mention the following kinds of conflicts: "war between states, civil wars, guerrilla, terrorism, the global war on terror, coups, large urban violence, ethnic cleansing, religious disputes, armed crimes, chronically crises, piracy and skirmishes". These different kinds of conflict, all need a different approach when providing aid. For instance, when organisations give shelter to refugees who fly for ethnic cleansing in one big camp within the country, they will make them more vulnerable towards the attacking party. However, when people fly from a city in which a civil war takes plays, the refugees will be save in another part of the country. It is for an organisation easier to have one big camp, than smaller camps spread over the country.

Beside the difficulty for humanitarian organisations to adapt to different kinds of crises, there is also the difficulty of dealing with the conflict parties and their different ways of fighting. For instance, traditional humanitarian organisations want to show that they are neutral and impartial, and therefore, they try to show that they help all conflict parties. It is much more difficult to do this in a conflict with fragmented guerrilla groups, than in a war like the Second World War, which had parties of war which were easily to distinguish. Current crisis situations can be very complex.
An example is given by the crises within Sudan. During the conflict, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was established. This was a unique partnership between the government in the North, the de-facto government in the South, humanitarian organisations and the rebels. This was the first time by which such organisations, the rebels and the government worked together on such a large scale within a conflict. Although all parties agreed that something had to be done for the citizens, because of the famine, the different actors active within the OLS had all their own agenda: the government wanted, beside humanitarian aid, more attention for the development; the donor governments wanted to confront the Sudanese government with the fact that it did not pursue the well-being of its population; international organisations wanted more support for the Sudanese government; the Sudanese government wanted a greater involvement of the national NGOs; finally, the de-facto government in the South wanted to be clear that the Sudanese government was deficient and wanted to get more attention for their political agenda. Because of all these different interest of the other parties, it was probably hard for the humanitarian organisations to be seen as legitimate by the other parties (Janssen, 2010).

Another change is that their work became further complicated by the fact that the distinction between citizens and fighting parties became increasingly unclear, and because they have to deal with more than two fighting parties. In current conflicts fixed armies with their disciplinary rules, are replaced by rebel groups, in which hierarchy and discipline is hard to find. Therefore, these groups often fragment a lot, and the resulting smaller groups all pursue their own gain. This makes also the distinction between different kinds of groups, like criminal gangs or militias, increasingly vague.
The difficulty, is related to the fact that humanitarian organisations have to negotiate with groups to get access to certain areas. Due to this increased number of different parties in a crisis area, the organisations have to negotiate with much more groups to be

recognised and accepted. This is very difficult, because it is hard to know about the existence of every group, because it is very unclear which fighter belongs to which group, and which groups work together. Furthermore, every group demands its own way of dealing. Also, often there is only moderate compliance by conflict parties, or no compliance at all, to the outcomes of negotiations. This is partly caused by the fragmentation of groups. New groups do not always see the agreements as legitimate, and therefore, do not comply with it (Dijkzeul and Salomons, 2010; Janssen, 2010).

There are two consequences of these complex situations. First of all, humanitarian organisations are quickly distrusted when one war party thinks that the organisations work on the side of the enemy. Another way in which the organisations are made part of the conflict by parties, is that they are seen as a support group of the enemy. Therefore, they are attacked (Janssen, 2010).

Secondly, because of different crises and differently acting conflict parties, it depends on the context, whether humanitarian organisations are seen as proper for a certain situation. When an organisation is praised by donors for its way of working in one situation, it is possible that within another situation its way of working is seen as less useful with respect of alleviating human suffering, by the same donors.

2.2.2 Growing need for humanitarian actors

Most humanitarian crises are in areas where states are weak. Sometimes even the government is a party of war (Dijkzeul and Salomons, 2010). During conflicts in such areas, the fighting parties do not want to overcome, or take-over, state bodies. They try to gain natural resources and personal possessions of victims, by looting and even ethnic cleansing. This gain is used for fighting again. In this way conflicts become chronically.

In this case, the offensive war party, who gains from the conflict, will prefer organisations which do not interfere in, and try to solve, the conflict. Traditional humanitarian organisations, for example, focus on aid provision and not on conflict solutions. The offensive war party does not like the work of multi-mandated organisations or the military, which focus on long-term developments and try to solve the conflict.

Also, when governments are not a party of war they often neglect their responsibility to govern and to protect the population. After 1990, the visibility of conflicts, as well as the impotence or unwillingness of some states to protect their citizens is increased. Human rights are largely violated by governments, or by other people because of a lack of punishment by the government. This is one of the reasons that victims are mostly civilians instead of combatants, which is a feature that distinguishes modern conflicts from former ones. Therefore, humanitarian organisations started to take over the tasks of governments. For example, protecting citizens against food insecurity. This increased responsibility led to an extension of the tasks of the humanitarian organisations, and made that more situations were seen as a reason for donors or international organisations to appeal to humanitarian organisations for help.

Beside the increased responsibility, the need for humanitarian organisations also grew, because the distribution of powerful and accurate weapons became easier, which made humanitarian crises worse. This increased need for humanitarian actors, is one factor that contributed to the increased number of these actors. However, this increased number of aid workers, all with their own interests, caused competition for humanitarian space and public favour (Herman, 2010; Homan, 2010).

2.2.3 Lack of situational awareness

So, the local security situations can have influence on the way in which humanitarian organisations are assessed. Mostly, it is more difficult to reach people in need during a conflict than during a period of peace. For example, when there was peace between the South and North of Sudan, but still a conflict in Darfur, there was less access to Darfur for the humanitarian aid workers, than to the rest of Sudan (Janssen, 2010). When looked superficially to this fact, one can think that access, or better to say acceptance of intervention, thus only depends on the conflict situation and not on the use of the normative instrument of humanitarian principles. However, when looked deeper, it is possible to say that the principles indeed play a larger role within conflicts, because the existing tension is very sensitive for partiality.

It is important for humanitarian organisations to be informed about the specific security situation of the area where they want to work, because otherwise the humanitarian programs would not align to the needs of people (Vlassenroot, Romkema, and Dijkzeul, 2010). However, also, when the situation is known, it is for humanitarian organisations, particularly in chronically crises, often very difficult to respond to all the needs. Moreover, as explained, it is difficult to respond on such a network of stakeholders and their partially hidden interests.

Although they traditionally focus on the identification and meeting of needs, the humanitarian organisations, also have to focus on the political and economic game around it, for example, to understand the strategies of people in need. The latter, because aid receivers do not passively wait for aid, but use strategies to get aid and also sometimes misuse aid. This topic, namely that of the assertiveness of aid receivers, will be discussed to a broader extent in the next chapter.

Being informed about these strategies, organisations are more able to support the strategies of the people in need, who do not cause harm, and to respond to the strategies of those who manipulate crises and aid. However, the identification and understanding of such strategies is difficult, and costs time and financial means which cannot be used for aid itself. Although these efforts can be linked to political activities, and therefore make people distrust organisations who say to work according to the principle of neutrality, it makes aid more effective by reaching the real people in need. Furthermore, it avoids that the aid does not support the conflict. These both factors can have a positive effect on the acceptance of the organisations among the people in need – except, of course, the fighting parties which want to continue the conflict (Dijkzeul and Herman, 2010).

2.2.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, it is important for humanitarian organisations to know what the local situation is, when they want to meet the needs of the local populations. Meeting the needs and getting support became very difficult, because the crisis situations became increasingly complex. This paragraph showed that, currently, there exist more intrastate wars than interstate wars, that there are a lot of different kinds of crises, that there are many different groups involved, with many different kinds of interests. All these factors make the work of humanitarian organisations more complex. To do their work, they have to deal with many different situations and stakeholders; including active aid receivers. Furthermore, the fight for support became increasingly difficult, because all

these stakeholders have their own interests. The current crisis situations demands a lot from the humanitarian organisations.

2.3 World polarisation and local polarisation

Another problem which humanitarian organisations has to face during current crises, is the increased violence particularly against Western and international aid organisations (Cordier, 2010). This paragraph will show in which way the world is polarised into a Western and a non-Western part, and which reasons the non-Western actors have to resist the aid given by Western or international organisations. Also, because of the fragmentation of groups on the local , the organisations also have to deal with polarisation on the local level.

Western humanitarian aid is, despite of the principles they work according to, controversial, particularly in Islamic countries (Dijkzeul, 2010). When international humanitarian organisations claim to be universal, strongest protest is currently given by radical Islamic countries, which see their interpretation of their religion as universal. According to them the humanitarian principles are made by the Western people, which want to extent their power with it. This reduces the meaning of the principles to deception. According to Dijkzeul and Salomons (2010: 43): "At their best, humanitarian organisations are the gentle face of the globalisation on Western conditions".
Western organisations and international organisations are also criticised by Islamic group, because of non-sustainable Western influenced development models.

The view of a division of the world in a Western and non-Western part is based on a big re-identification process. According to De Cordier (2010: 284): "(...) this – humanitarian action - takes place in parts of the global periphery, where the last decennia, the population is confronted with profound social changes pursuant urbanisation, modernisation, conflict, the generalisation of new communication technologies, the erosion of traditional norms and values and ideologies and finally, in certain segments of the involved societies, a re-identification process on the base of world religions, in particularly the Islam and Christianity". Citizens of weak states faced and faces a lot of developments, and search for a stable identity. Mostly they base this identity on their religion, which is one of few remaining fixed aspects of their countries. By this identification, people see themselves as part of the Islamic world, and see the Western world as against it. This polarisation of the world, can also be explained by the happenings on 9/11 and its consequences (De Cordier, 2010).

The best indicator for the fact that the world is divided into a Western and non-Western part, or Islamic part and a non-Islamic part, is the number of incidents of violence against these Western or international organisations.
However, not only in Islamic countries, but also in non-Islamic ones, there exists an increasing distrust and hostility towards Western aid organisations and UN-structures. Many non-Islamic people share the growing perception of aid as a promotion of Western political agendas. Traditional humanitarian organisations like MSF and ICRC, however, think that this trend is caused by the blurred dividing lines between humanitarian and military activities, which makes it in the field increasingly hard for the population to distinguish all parties (De Cordier, 2010).

Not only Western NGOs and UN organisations, but also Islamic aid organisations face the effects of this changing world climate. They face troubles in the form of negative imaging by some Western or international media and research.

Also, polarisation between groups on local level cause trouble for organisations. The involvement of local employees have influence on the acceptance of humanitarian organisations among local people. For instance, according to the Islamic Relief Worldwide, there is a strong polarisation between Shiites and Sunnis within Iraq, which makes it impossible to work with everybody. When an organisation has worked with one side or in one certain area, the other party becomes hostile towards the organisation. Organisations are quickly placed in the camp of the other party (De Cordier, 2010). Another example, is that local people become suspicious when organisations get access to an area controlled by, for example, rebels. The people start to think that the organisations league with the latter (Dijkzeul and Salomons, 2010).

Also, sometimes Western countries are accused from acting like neo-colonialist. After the tsunami, the government of Sri Lanka accused said that NGOs pursued Western goals. The deputy minister of Foreign Affairs said about this: "I have to tell you that all these NGOs have a political agenda. I would call these organisations slaves of the Western. Some NGOs come out openly for their service to their neo-colonial masters" (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010: 136). This political lobby led to dissatisfaction of people about the work of NGOs.

In conclusion, although international organisations claim to work in an universal way, often they are seen as part of the Western world. Because of re-identification processes in neo-colonial countries, and because of the happenings on 9/11, the world is divided in a Western and non-Western, or an Islamic and non-Islamic part. Western organisations and international organisations are accused from acting according to Western agendas or in a neo-colonial way. This all led to an increase of violence against Western and international organisations.

2.4 Conclusion

In recent years, the humanitarian principles are reformulated and extended, and the humanitarian crises themselves became extremely complex. Both factors make it hard for humanitarian organisations to gain acceptance and support.
The established Code of Conduct became criticised because it shows inconsistency, and because it is very open for different interpretations. Because of this criticism, the status of the Code of Conduct is reduced, which makes it a less useful instrument in the fight for support.
Currently, most conflicts are intrastate conflicts, there are a lot of different kinds of crises, there are many different groups involved, with many different kinds of interests. All these factors make the work of humanitarian organisations more complex. To do their work, they have to deal with many different situations and stakeholders. Furthermore, the fight for support became increasingly difficult, because all these stakeholders have their own interests. Getting support of donors and the local population became also very difficult, because when an organisation want to meet the needs, it has to know and understand the local situation.

Furthermore, humanitarian organisations should take the current world polarisation into account, as well as polarisation between different groups in a country, when they want to understand the attitude of some non-Western people towards the organisations. Although international organisations claim to work in an universal way, often they are seen as part of the Western world. Because of re-identification processes in neo-colonial countries, and because of the happenings on 9/11, the world is divided in a Western and non-Western part. Western organisations and international organisations are accused, and even attacked, because they would follow Western agendas or act in a neo-colonial way.

This all shows the complexity of the work of humanitarian organisations, and their fight for support and acceptance, during current crises.

3. Stakeholders in humanitarian crises

As explained in the former chapter, the number of relevant stakeholders during crises increased. Humanitarian organisations have to deal with a lot more actors while doing their work and searching for support. This chapter will discuss the main stakeholders, and show the role of these stakeholders in the legitimation processes of humanitarian organisations. It will turn out that not only the stakeholders shape the images of humanitarian organisations, but also the humanitarian organisations themselves shape the images of others.

The first paragraph will show that aid receivers are active actors, instead of passive actors in the process of aid provision. Humanitarian workers as well as aid receivers, both fight for legitimacy. However, both actors do not have complete control over this legitimation process, because the mutually construct each other's image. The second paragraph will show the importance of the media to get aid and to get support for giving aid. However, the role of the media is overshadowed by the fact that media is never neutral, and is not seen as such. The next paragraph, will explain the role of donors. Donors can have influence on the work of humanitarian organisations, because of the financial and political pressure they put on the organisations. Also, humanitarian organisations can experience negative consequences when they are associated by certain donors. The fourth paragraph will focus on the international society, which can also have financial and political influence on the work of humanitarian organisations. However, this can also happen indirectly, when certain international organisations make agreements, or whether the International Criminal Court gives arrest warrants to local leaders, etc. The following paragraph will discuss the influence of the government of the country in which intervention takes place. This government does, or does not, accept the intervention of humanitarian organisations. And like the international society, this stakeholder has a lot of power, in financial, regulatory, and campaigning sense. The relevant government can have a lot of positive or negative influence - depending on their own interests - on the capacity of humanitarian organisations. The sixth paragraph will show that it is difficult for humanitarian organisations not to be associated by other stakeholders in crisis situations, particularly the Security Council. Because of its widespread presence, power, and universal character, it is hard to keep distant from it the Security Council. In general, when humanitarian organisations are associated with certain actors or even become mixed with them, they can lose acceptance. The final paragraph will conclude the chapter.

3.1 Assertiveness of aid receivers

Local people are often very critical about the usefulness and the quality of aid. They are not passive watching how aid is given to them. Aid receivers are active and can even set the process of aid providence. Moreover, not only humanitarian organisations are trying to legitimate themselves, but also aid receivers try to legitimate themselves in different ways (Dijkzeul, 2010; Hilhorst and Janssen, 2010). Moreover, both parties mutually construct each other's image. This paragraph will show this interface of humanitarian workers and aid receivers.

First of all, aid receivers try to legitimate themselves by showing that they are in need. The main picture of aid receivers is that of needing victims, which is a picture which can extent the legitimacy of both parties; for aid receivers it makes plausible that they should be helped, and for aid providers because it supports their role. An example, is that of victims of the Tsunami of 2004, who refused to exchange their tents for better housing, because their complaints towards visiting media and tourists that they never got help, was a gainful business, (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010).

Secondly, aid receivers are not only strategically active to get aid, according to the seventh principle of the Code of Conduct, they should also be involved in the process of aid provision where possible. However, this is not only useful for the aid receivers, but also for the aid providers. An example of this comes from the situation in Sri Lanka after the tsunami in 2004. In the context of competition for humanitarian space, humanitarian organizations used the participation of the local population as an instrument to show their good behaviour. It was common that NGO representatives said, that their organization was the only one who took the aid receivers seriously and who let them participate. However, there was actually too much participation done and in a wrong way. Participative needs assessment, for example, created often expectations, which could not made true (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010).

These both aspects of active aid receivers, namely their strategic attitude and their participation in the process of aid provision, is linked to the way in which aid is seen nowadays; namely as a right, like explained in the former chapter. Aid receivers try to defend their right by participating strategically. For example, in the refugee camp in Buyankiri, in Keya, refugees are informed about human rights and many things are promised to them, like democracy and participation. However, because of security measures many of such human rights are violated within the camp by the same people, in this case the UNCHR. Therefore, the refugees accuse the UNCHR for not supporting their right, and try to participate with other organizations.
Also, aid receivers have a big influence on the distribution of aid. Therefore, the distribution depends on social negotiation. So, in contrast to what organizations claim, namely that they work according to the principle of non-discrimination, distribution is not based on a systematic procedure for the allocation of aid on the basis of need (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010).

Because of this assertiveness of aid receivers, there exists among many humanitarian organisations negative perspectives on aid receivers. They see aid receivers as political and conspiring individuals, and sometimes even as fraudsters. Therefore, aid provision is often led by distrust in aid receivers. Practice shows that organisations try to exclude people who are not eligible for aid, which is actually in line with the principle of impartiality, which demands to focus on people who need aid the most. The discovery and the action against the maneuver of refugees, however, costs time, personnel, and instruments which humanitarian organizations often lack; which is also the case with the above mentioned organization UNCHR (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010).

Not only aid organisations picture aid receivers, but also aid receivers themselves make images of organisations, like the image that organisations follow self-interest. So, the variety of images of these two parties can only partially be controlled by both parties themselves. Both parties create each other by their mutual images, which have big

consequences for the support given to them by relevant stakeholders. They can even be attacked, because of the constructed bad image. In general, organizations are vulnerable for labeling and coercive conditions set by the local population, in the sense that it changes their identity (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010).

So, in conclusion, the often used assumption of aid receivers who are dependent on aid providers, who in turn are dependent on political actors, does not equal reality. In reality these relations are more flexible and mutual. All actors can influence the image of others. As explained in the second chapter, the most powerful actor has the most influence on the formation of the dominant ideology, called hegemony. According to Hilhorst and Jansen (2010: 130): "Aid providers are often even vulnerable for manipulation by local actors as aid receivers are dependent to the aid providers". These power relations are formed by meetings and documents, as well as by informal interactions.

3.2 Influence of media

This paragraph will show the role of the media in the legitimation processes of humanitarian organisations, because one of the main factors which determines the degree of emergency assistance a humanitarian crisis attracts is media coverage (Olsen et al., 2003). An example of this is given by a handwritten letter out of the besieged Southern Sudanese town Juba from 1992 (Ibid: p.109).

> Lucky are the people of Yugoslavia and Somalia as the world's eyes rest on them. Condemned are the people of Juba for the world is denied access to the town and even does not seem to care anyway. It may be a blessing to die in front of a camera — then at least the world will get to know about it. But it is painful to die or be killed without anybody knowing it.

The quotation shows the importance of media attention to get help. The media play a big role in the financial support for humanitarian organisations, because many people are influenced by the stories they hear about, and the pictures they see of, humanitarian crises, which move them to donate and to see the importance of the work of humanitarian organisations. Furthermore, the work humanitarian organisations can do because of this attention and support of donors, of course, is also a promotion for the organisation when the media report good work of the organisation. However, although the media show the miserable situations in certain areas, it also often highlights only the things which go wrong by the activities of organisations.
The media also function as watchdog. Although, this could be seen as positive, in the sense that quality can become ensured, in reality, it works the other way around. The media harassed aid organisations to work faster, which sometimes leads to the infringement of the quality. (Hilhorts and Jansen, 2010).

However, currently, more and more organisations act like the publicity of the reality is more important than their commitment to the humanitarian principles. Probably, because the first means is more effective to use in the fight for recognition and support. However, there are still situations in which parties distrust organisations because they do not work according to their principles or their mandate (Janssen, 2010), which implies that commitment to the principles is still useful in the fight for legitimacy.

Furthermore, another negative effect with regard to the media is, that it is also possible that the organisations are not seen as neutral anymore, because they use media by themselves. Media never give information in a neutral way, so it is seen as a non-objective instrument. Advocacy campaigns to get the public opinion in motion and to put pressure on governments of rich countries, is a political activity, and therefore, it would probably be rejected. However, these campaigning activities take often place outside the crisis area, which implies that the local people in a crisis area do not see the humanitarian principles as violated (Dijkzeul and Herman 2010).

In short, this paragraph explained that the media are seen by the aid receivers and aid givers as important respectively to get aid and to get support for giving aid. However, the media is never neutral neither be seen as such, so when organisations themselves use the media, it is possible that they lose trust among certain people. Also, the risk exists that media themselves show a picture of humanitarian situations, which can be a very negative picture of a humanitarian organisation.

3.3 Influence of donors

Not only people are shocked by pictures and stories from the media, and therefore, stimulated to donate, but the media also pushes governments and organisations to do something by showing them their responsibility. This paragraph will look at the influence of these donors on the legitimation processes of humanitarian organisations.

From the 1980s, humanitarian organisations got more and more money from donor countries. These countries hoped that the organisations could take over the role of corrupt and incompetent governments, namely to protect citizens against food and health insecurity, and to function as watchdog to look whether the rights of people are met. Because of media pressure and the expectations of donors, many organisations are increasingly dependent on finances. This leads to a way in which donors can have influence on, and even steer, the organisations. They have the power to stop financial support, which can be fatal (Dijkzeul, 2010).

Furthermore, donors choose between different crises, which makes the financial support differ a lot among these crises. Therefore, the aid given to the relevant countries differs also a lot. To level the fluctuations in aid the UN established a trust fund in 2003. UN organisations and NGOs which sign a contract, which says that they will be the supplier, can use this fund. The fund is not subject to conditions. Furthermore, the local humanitarian coordinator has responsibility over the money, which is given for the crises in that area. There are critics, however, who say that the trust fund is leading money, which first was given to the NGOs, to the UN. Also, the trust fund is only meant for pure life-saving action. Therefore, it is possible that, beside the fact that the organisations are not seen as neutral and independent by their link with the UN, the organisations are also criticised for non-compliance of the principle impartiality (Dijkzeul and Salomons, 2010).

Beside financial pressure of donors, humanitarian organisations can also experience political pressure from donors. Political pressure means that organisations can be held responsible when donors push the organisation or aid in a certain direction. Donor

governments can use humanitarian aid to take distance form crises, and only use it as an excuse for diplomatic or economical inertia. In this way the government shows that it does something, without losing popularity because of fallen soldiers, which makes it a political non-risky act, and without losing much money for long term peace operations (Dijkzeul, 2010). Humanitarian organisations got a big responsibility within conflict areas, which make the organisations increasingly part of the processes of war and peace (Dijkzeul and Salomons, 2010). With the consequence to be seen as party of war, and therefore be seen as an enemy by some other parties.

In conclusion, donors can have influence on organisations, because of their power to stop the flow of finances. Furthermore, organisations should also be careful in their choice of donors when they want to gain support, because of possible conflicts with the humanitarian principles, because of the political status of a donor. When donors push humanitarian organisations or their work in a certain direction, they will lose even more control in their fight for acceptance and support from other stakeholders.

3.4 Influence of international society

Humanitarian intervention in far away countries increased a lot, when the international society[2] became increasingly powerful. History showed that with the changing rules of states by globalisation, certain actors - including international organisations and international confederations - entered as care takers as a response to the impotence or unwillingness of some states to protect their citizens (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010). This paragraph will show the influence of this international society on the work of humanitarian organisations, and will focus on the support given by this international society to humanitarian action.

So, the international society is an important player in the field of humanitarian intervention. As said before, the influence of the international society is not always positive in the eyes of aid workers. For instance, the international society, in its role as donor, can reduce the acting capacity of humanitarian organisations by reducing financial support. But also, the international society can have negative influence on the actions of humanitarian organisations by causing conflicts between the international society and the government of the intervened country, for example, by violations of sovereignty. For instance, when the ICC gave an arrest warrant to the president of Sudan, Al-Bashir, the president ordered that all international humanitarian organisations had to leave Sudan (Janssen, 2010).
However, the international society can also have a positive influence on humanitarian action by making agreements with the involved government. This happened also in Sudan. In 2004, there was an explosive increase of aid workers, because of an agreement between the international society and the government of Sudan, to extent the work of aid workers (Dijkzeul and Salomons, 2010).

In recent years, the internal policy showed increased humanitarian considerations, and attention was given to the humanitarian principles. However, politicians are just

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[2] In this thesis, the international society includes international organisations, but also national governments.

playing games with the principles and use them for their own interest; humanitarian arguments, became even instruments to justify war (Dijkzeul and Herman, 2010).

Since the midst of the 1990s, regional aid organisations became more and more active, and also many ad-hoc bodies were established. However, the need is still big and this variety of initiatives rather points at a lack of structural attention for crises. Furthermore, new multilateral initiatives get little support from the international society, which makes them developing very slowly. Also, many states prefer economic profit above all, so that they continue trade – even trade in weapons - with states in which human rights are violated on large scale. It is remarkable, that economic development of crisis areas is hindered by import restrictions and subsidies, while there are no international rules which can deal with trade of weapons (Duijn, 2010).

In conclusion, many states and international organisations, use aid and aid organisations mainly for their own interests; often they do not support humanitarian organisations in their objectives.

3.5 Influence of relevant national government

As said above, history showed that with the changing rules of states by globalisation, certain actors entered as care takers as a response to the impotence or unwillingness of some states to protect their citizens. Beside international governmental authorities and even multinationals, humanitarian organisations are also amongst these new care takers, as said before (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010). However, the national governments of the intervened countries are not always glad with this interference. The legitimacy given by states to these intervening actors, depends partially on the legitimacy which is given by these states to the power of the rule-making international society. When states do not recognise the authority of the international society, they probably do not want international actors to intervene in their country.

As seen by the example about the arrest warrant for the president of Sudan, beside the international society, the national governments have also influence on the legitimation processes of humanitarian organisations. When organisations want to provide humanitarian aid, it is important for them that national governments are able and want to co-opt with humanitarian aid provision, and that they are not one of the main parties of war. Hindering of aid by the government is very hard to avoid (Janssen, 2010). The rest of the paragraph will explain the possible difficulties humanitarian organisations can have with regard to the governments of countries in which they intervene.

First of all, the government of the country in which humanitarian organisations intervene, can think that an aid organisation is working together with groups who fight against the government itself. For instance, according to the humanitarian organisation Islamic Relief Worldwide, their employees and partners were ill-treated by Anglo-American and Iraqi government troops, when they were providing food to citizens in a rebel area. This happened because the aid workers were accused of supporting the rebels (De Cordier, 2010). Another example of this comes from the year rapport of the MSF-N. The rapport mentions that MSF-N was absent in Nepal for a long period of time, because of problems with the government of Nepal. The government suspected the MSF-

N of belonging to the side of the rebels, because it only attempted to serve a health post outside the range of the Nepalese government. Therefore, the government stopped the activities of MSF-N during certain situations (Duijn, 2010).

Secondly, a government can be jealous or offended by the intervention of humanitarian organisations. An example of resistance by a national government is given by the government of Sri Lanka, after the tsunami in 2004. The government accused NGOs of grabbing money, which otherwise would be given to the government. Furthermore, they said that NGOs pursued Western goals and were acting like neo-colonialists (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010). However, it was clear that the government only shaped a bad image of the organisations, because it felt itself excluded from the humanitarian arena, particularly in financial sense.

This political lobby, however led to dissatisfaction of people, which had the form of complaints about the lack of action by NGOs. It was true that there were problems with the implementation of aid projects, but it was not true that aid organisations did nothing, because there was an enormous amount of aid given in the country, which advantages anyone. However, this negative imaging limited the interaction between aid workers and the population, and together with the competition among the humanitarian organisations decreased the humanitarian space to work according to their principles, which led even to a worse image. This all forced the organisations into roles they never wished to have, which frustrated themselves, but also led to an critical external response (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010).

Beside the dissatisfaction of aid receivers, in general, when a government do not want to work with an organisation, it is difficult for this organisation to work with organisations which are linked to the government (Duijn, 2010).

Thirdly, as shown above it is important for humanitarian organisations to cooperate with the government, or at least have permission for humanitarian intervention. However, organisations which carry out projects in cooperation with the local authorities, are pressured by their government partners to employ people who have linkages to the members of local authorities. These people often do not have the right skills and/or motivation (De Cordier, 2010). This pressure is showed by threatening to reduce the humanitarian space by regulations. The government of Sudan made the access to people in need more difficult by restricted regulations (Janssen, 2010). Also, cooperating with the government, or regulations for aid working, can be cause distrust among local parties, because they get the impression that aid organisations work closely together with the government or represent the government.

Fourthly, organisations try to move their course of action into the direction of the projects which are valued and essential in the eyes of the fighting parties (Duijn, 2010). They make this attempt, because space for their activities can be extended when projects can get social-political support.

However, the question rises whether such organisations can still use the principles of neutrally and independency in their fight for legitimacy. Furthermore, extending their task is not as easy as it seems, because success is not guaranteed. Changing an image among fighting parties, is a long-term process. Because of the changed direction, organisations are going to work in sectors of which they have no expertise. Furthermore, ethical questions arise when aid organisations (indirectly) provide fighting groups material and financial gifts because they suffer from the crisis, or give it

to people who suffer, to get support. This latter can make other groups, like donors, distrust the organisations (Duijn, 2010).

In conclusion, this paragraph explained that the government of the country in which intervention takes place, have influence on the acceptance of humanitarian organisations. The national governments have a lot of power, in financial, regulatory, and campaigning sense. They can have a lot of positive or negative influence on the capacity of humanitarian organisations, depending on their own interests.

3.6 Interest and influence of Security Council

As turned out, humanitarian aid is often used for the interests of donor countries. It is also made part of the security politics of these countries. For example, during the conflict in Kosovo many NATO countries used humanitarian aid for their political goal to bring stabilisation. They saw it as a friendly instrument. They tried to show that they wanted to deal with the consequences of their interventions, and they realised that aid could also be used to improve their image. The military, therefore, got more and more involved in the provision of humanitarian aid, because it was believed that it could bring order and rest. In Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, they use aid to win the hearts and minds of the local population to decrease resistance (Dijkzeul and Herman, 2010). This paragraph will deal with the use of aid in security politics, and this will be particularly focused on the UN Security Council.

After the Second World War, the UN was established. One of the bodies of the UN is the Security Council, which became officially thé international body which would deal with peace and security issues. Although the Security Council was first focused on states, under pressure of humanitarian organisations a broader concept of security was developed, after the Cold War. This broader view of security took also the individual into account. Moreover, the individual became more important than states. Therefore, since then, sovereignty was only respected when the state would take care well for its citizens, otherwise other countries had the right to intervene. This led to an increased number of interventions; civil as well as military. The Security Council began to meet more with international NGOs, and in the end of the 1990s, the humanitarian topics became even part of the agenda of the council (Dijkzeul and Salomons, 2010).

New kind of interventions took place, which were unthinkable before. This was also caused by the view of the council on civil wars. The council saw them as treats to the international peace, because of the increasingly blurring of lines between internal (domestic) and external (foreign) security; a trend which is enforced by new communication techniques, like internet. Because civil wars and crisis are seen as mutual re-enforcing, the humanitarian organisations got more recognition of the Security Council. However, these trends did not lead to more finances or other forms of involvement in crises. Most of the attention of the council was given to crises, which had much media attention. Many weak states got only very limited attention during a very short period. It seems that rich countries used the humanitarian aid only to limit the consequences of crises, instead of solving them; and did this probably for the sake of global peace, (Dijkzeul and Salomons, 2010). Also, the member states often differ in opinion about which kind of intervention is most appropriate in a certain situation.

Beside the problems mentioned above, the UN became even more marginalised after the genocide in Rwanda and Srebrenica, and the situation in Somalia. During the Cold War, most UN operations existed out of neutral peacekeepers who only could use their weapon out of self-defence, while diplomats tried to establish a peace agreement. However, the genocides learned that it was impossible to combine operations which meant to be neutral, with activities like the maintenance of safety havens, which demanded the use of violence. In later conflicts, the UN operations became to include more, namely: maintaining order, providing of humanitarian aid, and first attempts to build up the state, which makes the UN talk about "peace building" instead of "peacekeeping". To be more effective, the UN started to work according to mandates which allowed more violence, which shapes distance from the humanitarian principles. This led to tension between humanitarian organisations of the UN and organisations which work together with them. Dijkzeul and Salomons (2010: 39) even say that: "(...) the security council of the UN is a political body and bases its work seldom on the humanitarian principles".

However, because of the universal character, and therefore, the global legitimacy it has, the humanitarian organisations still want to work with UN resolutions. However, the global war on terror, lead to more unilateral politics. Many governments try to hide their own violations of human rights behind the argument that conflicts in their countries are caused by terrorists. Furthermore, the Coalition of the Willing worked around the Security Council when they intervened in Iraq. Therefore, unintentionally, the UN has to focus on crises on which their powerful members do not focus. The international acceptance of unilateral policies is decreased, however, because of the little success of the Coalition of the Willing (Dijkzeul and Salomons, 2010).

Although the above discussion explains that the UN believes that UN operations should include more than only maintaining order, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) thought that NATO could not make war and provide humanitarian aid at the same time, which they did in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania. However, the UNCHR was unable to take over the lead, because of insufficient capacity. NATO was recently established, and therefore, wanted to prove itself. It wanted to be successful, so that the NATO would be seen as effective. This way of working, together with the increasingly demanding donors, led to a fear among humanitarian organisations to become part of geopolitical strategies. Aid became militarised and politicised, which increased in Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11. These trends reduce the acceptance of humanitarian action (Dijkzeul and Jansen, 2010).

Another example of the difficulty to stay away from political and military influences, was caused when the peacekeeping force of the UN, which works towards stability, became supported by NATO troops. For humanitarian organisations, which were dependent on the troops for their safety, it became very hard to keep distance from them, which, in turn, caused more risks. This, because when they are associated with the troops they will be distrusted, or even killed, by parties who are enemies of the troops, even when the troops suppose to be neutral. Also, humanitarian organisations feared that local people could not distinguish the activities executed by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams of the military, from their activities, which could make the local people confused about the roles and principles – who is neutral? - of the different parties (Dijkzeul and Jansen, 2010; Janssen, 2010). According to Dijkzeul and Jansen (p..): "The

attitude of the Bush administration – "you're with us or you're against us" – made a nuanced NGO position even harder".

Although, it seems that the presence of military has always a bad influence on humanitarian activities of the humanitarian organisations, there also exist examples of situations in which military presences has the opposite effect. For instance, when the African Union decreased the number of patrols, because of personnel and supply shortages, the number of aid workers decreased, because they felt unsafe in uncontrolled areas (Jansen, 2010). When troops took position it led to increased security in Darfur, in 2007. Also, in Nepal, the ability to work of MSF-N was limited, because the MSF-N did not had to count on the protection of the police and the army, when the local population would use violence against them (Duijn, 2010).

As said above, it is for a population sometimes difficult to distinguish aid providers. However, this is not only difficult for them, it is also difficult for an army to see the difference between rebels and the local population. For example, the Nepalese army made relatively many innocent victims, because of this problem, and this damaged its image among the population (Duijn, 2010).
The trust given to, and security of, a humanitarian organisation depends on which troops are used for the protection of humanitarian activities. When troops are distrusted or even seen as enemies by certain people, humanitarian organisations will also lose trust among the population when working with these troops.

In short, this paragraph showed that it is difficult for humanitarian organisations not to be associated with other stakeholders in crisis situations. When humanitarian organisations are associated with, or even mixed with, the UN Security Council which could be distrusted because of the accusation of its focus on own interests, and with military troops, they themselves can also lose acceptance.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter showed that the working field of humanitarian organisations became complex by the large amount of stakeholders involved. All actors can influence the image of others.

First of all, aid receivers are not passive, but actively involved in the process of aid provision. They use strategies to become qualified for aid. Both the aid workers and the aid receivers construct each other's image. Also, both the media and donors can steer the process of aid provision. The media are seen by the aid receivers as important to get aid, and by aid givers as important to get support for giving aid. However, the media is never neutral, and is not seen as such. Furthermore, the media is free to tell other things than humanitarian organisations want them to tell. Also, donors can have influence on organisations, because of their power to stop the flow of finances. Furthermore, the organisations can be distrusted by links to certain donors, because donors are seldom seen as neutral.

Humanitarian organisations want to get this trust from i.a. the international society and the government of the country in which intervention takes place, and when they are

backed by this trust, they hope to get trust of others. Both parties have a lot of power, in financial, regulatory, and campaigning sense, they can have a lot of positive or negative influence on the capacity of humanitarian organisations, depending on their own interests.

Like the danger of being associated with certain donors, in general, it is difficult for humanitarian organisations not to be associated with other stakeholders in crisis situations. When humanitarian organisations are associated with, or even mixed with military troops and/or the UN Security Council, which could be distrusted because of the accusation of its focus on own interests, they themselves can also lose acceptance.

So, crises involve many stakeholders with all their own interests and with their ability to construct each other's image.

4. Conduct of humanitarian organisations

This chapter will show the ways in which organisations themselves steer the legitimation process, by choosing on which decision-making model they base their work, and how they work. The first paragraph will focus on the decision-making processes and organisational structure of the organisations. It shows that organisations lose their focus on their objective to help people, by focussing too much on, for example, accountability or solidarity. The second paragraph, will show the influence of the way of working of organisations on their legitimation processes. Self-interest and independency, for example, can damage the trust given to them. The way in which organisations try to involve local people, and the consequences of this, will be explained in the next chapter. It will also focus on the effects of the way of working of organisations on the local situation. The fourth paragraph will show the effects of the way in which organisations use the humanitarian principles on their legitimation processes.

4.1 Professionalization and decision-making

Although the image and acceptance of humanitarian organisations can be negatively influenced by their political environment, also the organisations themselves can contribute to this negative influence. This paragraph will look at the possible effects of certain ways of working and decision-making.

Many NGOs were voluntary organisations in origin. They had a loose organisation structure, which gave much space for public participation. The growing popularity of NGOs led to increasing financial support and a growing number of personnel. The organisation structures, however, did not follow this growth, which led to difficulties in the coordination of activities, and resulted in a lack of transparency. Therefore, there was a call for restructuring and professionalization. However, this encountered resistance, because organisations feared bureaucratising and reification, which is seen as contrary to the values of humanitarian action (Heyse, 2010).

Still, in recent years there is a growth of attention for a more transparent, professional way of working in humanitarian NGOs. However, these trends indeed cause tension. A transparent decision-making process needs a lot of time which is not there during a deep crisis. Accountability can also hinder organisations to use certain methods to gain access to affected groups, for example, via negotiations with local warlords. This way of working is difficult to justify in the public arena, which is characterised by many stakeholders. Donors, political actors, the media, and aid receivers, all have their own expectations and interests with regard to the work of humanitarian organisations. Sometimes they even have the power to force their will on organisations, as explained above (Heyse, 2010).

According to Hulmes (qtd. in Heyse, 2010: 94), demands towards the characteristics and way of working of humanitarian organisations include:

> Large-scale service standardised delivery mechanisms (to reduce unit costs), structures which can handle large amounts of external funding, and systems for speedy, and often hierarchical, decision-making; effective performance as an agent of democratisation rests on organisational independence, closeness to the poor, representative structures, and a willingness to spend large amounts of time in awareness-raising and dialogue.

This situation shows that it is very difficult for organisations to fulfil all the demands given by the outside world, including donors.

A mandate, however, can be an useful means in the competition for support, because it has besides its instrumental function, as a translation of goals and the way of working, also a symbolic function. By this function, people inside and outside the organisation are bind to the work of the organisation. It helps to distinguish the organisation from other organisations.
However, this symbolic function can be at odds with the instrumental one. When an organisation wants to distinguish itself from other organisations, it leads to the possibility that its mandate states that the organisation has clearly another position than other organisations, while in practice there is less difference. This latter, because it is, for example, too difficult to live by its principles (Heyse, 2010).

This difference between words on paper and real practices is also reality by management structures, which also has a symbolic function. Heyse (p.97) says about this: "the existence of it on paper can be a reflection of the extern pressure to transparency, accountability, and professionalism, but does not say that these structures by definition guides the acts in organisations". This citation shows the organisations dependence on the acceptance of certain outsiders, and the continuing of this practice, of distinguishing oneself from others on false grounds, implies that this practice is still useful for humanitarian organisations to gain support.

The way of decision-making of humanitarian organisations also has influence on the acceptance of these organisations. Heyse (2010) mentions three ways of decision-making, namely: goal focused decision-making, propriety decision-making, and the garbage model of decision-making.
The first way of decision-making, is based on the collection of information of the crises. Organisations try to face the pressure of stakeholders by this statistical evidence for the need of their work. However, aid is only given when situations are in line with the mandate and policy of the organisation. In other situations the organisation will be less inclined to decide. This can lead to critical questions by donors. Furthermore, getting information demands money and time, and sometimes it is not even possible to find information. Also, conflicts about the interpretation of information can arise. This all can lead to a too late initiated intervention or a lack of intervention at all.
The second method, namely the propriety decision-making method, focuses on known situations. This method will lead to the tending to take action in situations which are known to the organisation. Therefore, the risk exists that aid is given in an ineffective and inefficient way, because of a focus on the known and the emphasize on solidarity. It is hard to sever ties with organisations which turn out to work very inefficient. However, as showed by the situation of Heyse, donors demand efficiency from organisations.
The third method, namely the garbage model, differs from the other methods, because it does not have consecutive phases of decision-making. People in the organisation, continuously search for alternatives for action, and try to link these alternatives to the goals of the organisation. However, this might make the organisation unpredictably, and therefore, it can lose support among stakeholders, like donors.
Currently, because of pressure from the many stakeholders which are involved in crises, the goal focused decision-making method is used by many organisations (Heyse, 2010).

However, focusing on decision-making can become a goal per se, which moves the final goal of providing aid to people in need to the background.

In short, in order to work in a professional way in the eyes of outsiders, humanitarian organisations risk to lose their focus on the goal of helping people in need. The control of outsiders is possible by transparency and accountability from the organisations, however, the quality is also threatened because this demanded transparency and accountability costs a lot of time, money, and possible controversial working methods. Also, different methods of decision-making, namely decision making methods based on statistical evidence, known situations, or coincidence, have different influences on their work and the acceptance and support of outsiders.

4.2 Way of working

Beside the decision-making process and structure of an organisation, sticking to intervention models and being inflexible also limits available humanitarian space, and support given to them. Organisations can act too early or too late, and too little or too much. Also, when organisations deny or exploit the conflict it limits own and other's space (Duijn, 2010). This paragraph will talk about the way of working of humanitarian organisations, in general, and the influence of this on their image.

It is possible to distinguish two ways of working among humanitarian organisations: organisations which send own people to help, like the MSF and UNCHR do, and organisations which focus on local capacity-building. The first group stays as long as necessary, so they have a short term perspective. The second group, which includes KerkinAktie and Oxfam, has a more development perspective which is more focused on the long term. They have links with local organisations, which are responsible for humanitarian action, and support them financially and organisationally. The first group has a disadvantage with respect to the second group. The first has to prove itself again and again, because it does not have such a history in an area as development organisations (Duijn, 2010; Heyse, 2010).

Although often governments and donors are accused of their focus on own interests, organisations can also work on the basis of own organisational interests. Humanitarian organisation have namely also their own political and economical agenda's, and can desire organisational growth. Humanitarian aid is reactive when the humanitarian principles are followed. This implies that the aid should be given, only when the conflict is already started. It also means that these organisations need conflicts to survive. It is possible, therefore, that they do not change their activities when this activities contribute to the continuing of conflicts, or that they even deliberately contribute to the conflict.

An example of the focus on one's own interest is given by the crisis in Iraq. Right after the moment that American and British militaries started their intervention in Iraq, humanitarian organisations followed them to Iraq, partially because they could get money and media attention. Local people saw these organisations as part of the Western fighting parties, which possibly caused the wave of violence which hit many humanitarian organisations later, in Iraq (Dijkzeul and Herman, 2010). Aid can be manipulated and given in a sincere way at the same time. Furthermore, measures to

improve aid can also be used for own interests. For example, local participation, which is often seen as an improvement of a humanitarian organisation, can be used as a symbol which does not reflects reality at all.

An organisation can get a bad image, when it only deals with the consequences of a crisis and not with the causes of it, and when it is too much focused on its own existence (Dijkzeul and Salomons, 2010).

However, it is logical that a humanitarian organisation wants to survive as organisation, and that it has to make decisions in difficult contexts with political and economical tension with regard to other stakeholders. Even organisations with an a-political attitude, actually also represent a form of politics. However, this can be politics in favour of people in need or in favour of own interests. According to Dijkzeul and Herman (2010: 335): "the compliance of the principles means that pure humanitarian organisations often have to be very versed in politics, but may never be political driven". However, this inevitable political way of working in this big network of political actors, still, seems to be in contrast to the principle of neutrality, and therefore, can create distrust.

However, organisations can please donors and fighting parties by using certain symbols, like vague words as "consequential ethics" to remain in favour by donors and fighting parties. In this way, aid provision can be continued and the organisation is not hindered by all conflicting interests. Another example, is that humanitarian actors can say that they provide humanitarian aid based on the humanitarian principles, but, only go to most easy accessible areas, which is in contrast to their principles.

Another note which should be made with respect to the way of working of humanitarian organisations, is their independent way of working. Although many actors are involved in aid giving, joint priorities are seldom made. Every organisation chooses by itself what it is going to do, and this decision is seldom based on research. In contrast, it is often based on the preference of the staff and driven by defective capacity in the field, which could be prevented by cooperation.

This lack of cooperation is often based on the commitment to the humanitarian principles. The ICRC and MSF, for instance, want to stay neutral and impartial, and think they would violate these principles when working together with organisations which do not work according to the traditional principles, and the UN.

To make coordination stronger among organisations, a cluster approach is established. According to this approach, every aid sector has one organisation which takes the lead, and has contacts with all organisations in the field. Often, the ICRC and MSF do not participate to protect the humanitarian principles (Dijkzeul and Salomons, 2010). However, it is precisely partnership what helps to commit to the humanitarian principles. Because when many different organisations work within a partnership, there is no clear program owner. Therefore, the program will have more chance to get support by different conflict parties (Duijn, 2010).

This lack of cooperation is not only about the lack of cooperation between the different organisations, but also, the opinion of the people in need is seldom asked. Often there is a lack of data to estimate needs. This data can be information about the situation before the crisis, and about the accessibility of certain areas (Dijkzeul and Salomons, 2010). Also, when there is more cooperation, there will be less competition for support.

Not only organisations should focus their activities on the local population when thet want to get support from them, but also it is important that organisations keep visiting an area in which they cannot execute certain activities because of fighting groups. This will show their solidarity (Dijkzeul, 2010).

The way of working of organisations has also influence on the degree of trust among other actors involved in crises. As said before, because MSF-N only attempted to serve a health post outside the range of the Nepalese government, made local governmental actors suspicious. Furthermore, organisations had to negotiate with the army - which had the task to stop all the materials which could be used by rebels - to get permission for their work. However, some organisations, like MSF, did not do this, which damaged the possible trust the government had towards the organisation (Duijn, 2010).

Also the degree in which an organisation thinks strategically about the local situation can have influence on the impact of this humanitarian work on the conflict, and therefore, the support it gets.

Currently, many organisations offer services to 'elite' organisations. This all happens on the basis of vague symbolical concepts, like "good governance". However, donors are more and more aware of the possible negative effects of the activities of humanitarian organisations. The focus on more powerful organisations, which belong to higher levels of the society can prolong the conflict, because the elite can profit from these services of humanitarian organisations. This will also offend the local population (Duijn, 2010).

Also, a wrong attitude of some employees can offend local people. So, even when humanitarian aid is wanted, alcohol consumption, a low sexual moral, etc., even when only a small number of employees are guilty of it, can damage the image of the organisation and its activities (De Cordier, 2010: 301). De Cordier says about this image: "much depends on the quality of recruiting, the training, a clear staff regulation, and, particularly, the willingness and possibility to apply in case of problematic behaviour".

But also, the competition among organisations shape a bad image of them among aid receivers. For instance, after the tsunami in 2004, many people saw how the competition between international and local NGOs seem to be more important that the provision of aid to the victims (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010).

Furthermore, local people can be offended, because of a poor implementation of aid projects, or a low quality of aid. Humanitarian aid lacks a market mechanism, which would help to increase the quality of aid and the quality of the provision of aid. Humanitarian organisations have to be accountable by themselves, which is hard for the organisations, because they must also take donor demands into account, as explained above. Although organisations often think that their principles and goals would justify their work, a better explanation of their activities and professional behaviour, are also needed for a good image (Dijkzeul and Salomons, 2010).

Finally, different organisations have their own interpretation of the operation areas, for example, the interpretation of the safety. Some organisations think – or want to believe– that a certain area is too dangerous to work in, while others do not think it is too dangerous (Vlassenroot, Romkema, and Dijkzeul, 2010). People who live in that area prefer the way of working of the last group, even when they do understand the choice of the first group.

Even when the organisations do their work in a way they want to, problems occur. One of these problems is, that it is almost always unknown how much aid disappears in the hands of fighting parties. The organisations sometimes makes conflicts last longer or support indirectly fighting parties by helping refugees, which are recruited by the fighting parties. Conflicts provide often economic profit for certain parties, partly because of the money and aid, which is provided. This money, in turn, could be used for the maintenance of the conflict. There are ways in which aid is misused directly. For example, aid can be stolen and governments can set high exchange rates. Furthermore, there is the indirect problem of the substitution-effects of aid. When aid is provided money comes free, which can be used for other things, including the purchase of weapons.

Nowadays, humanitarian organisations provide more often long term aid, because of the chronicle nature of many. This, however, makes the possibilities for other actors to manipulate the aid bigger. Furthermore, it is possible that they disagree with the long term goals (Dijkzeul and Herman, 2010).

In conclusion, the way of working of a humanitarian organisation has a lot of influence on the image of an organisation. However, this paragraph showed a part of the different ways in which organisations can work, and what their effects are on the image of the organisation. Long-term relations with actors in the operation field does not demand to prove yourself over and over again, however, it can lead to ineffectiveness. Focussing on self-interests or other kinds of political interests, and saying things, but doing other things, can also lead to a bad image. Furthermore, cooperation is important to give in a more effective way. Attention to the people in need, a good attitude, and a good quality of aid also give a good signal.

4.3 Lack of attention to local initiatives and processes

This paragraph will show that image of organisations can be damaged when they are not aware of local processes. The paragraph will show in which way organisations work around local organisations and local initiatives. When organisations do involve local people, however, this also causes troubles, because of a lack of local structures. This lack of awareness of local structures is also shown by the effects of the work of humanitarian organisations on the local economy.

Currently, after a disaster a lot of money is given to humanitarian aid, because of media attention. This happened, for example, after the tsunami in 2004. However, after the tsunami, international organisations got into conflict about territories and humanitarian space, in general. Furthermore, they were inclined to work around local organisations, which could not win the competition about space, because they have often less financial means and power (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010). However, during conflicts, the way in which organisations can get recognition for their work, is to work very close with local structures and leaders to win the trust of the most important political and military actors in the area, and to meet the needs of the local people. Although the latter seems logic, many organisations are often not successful in this, because of limited mandates, which, for example, only focus on health care, or because of biased employees (Vlassenroot, Romkema, and Dijkzeul, 2010).

However, there are always groups who are very difficult to convince by the humanitarian organisations that the organisation does not have a hidden agenda. Confusion and suspicion rise, when an organisation is trusted by the other (fighting) party. But it is still possible that, when the projects meet the needs of local people, the (fighting) parties are still convinced. Direct contact and good relationships with all fighting parties is very important, when organisations want to win acceptance. Groups will even protect organisations which they trust. Furthermore, organisation have to let all the parties know that they help everybody. For example, when an organisation is seen together with rebels and has to deal with critics from, for example, the national government, the organisation has to show that it does not want to be part of the conflict, but only wants to help all people in need.

Unknown, unloved, can be used for organisations which use the principle of neutrality in a too passive way. More people will be helped, when aid actors are more pragmatic. When they do not want to work with, or are not able to convince, rebels, they are not able to work in an area controlled by these rebels, because they are not trusted by them. This in turn, let to the accusation by rebels that these aid actors are not neutral.

In short, organisations who do not have relations with fighting parties, in order to obey their principle of neutrality, are seen as not neutral by these parties, and therefore, lose acceptance among these groups (Vlassenroot, Romkema, and Dijkzeul, 2010). Again, it is shown that organisations have to work in a political way.

Organisations not only need to work together with local leaders, they also have to adapt to the local context and to work with the local population in need, when they want to gain support. According to a research in Central-Africa, numerous projects to improve food security are not successful. There was hardly looked at the real causes of food scarcity. The focus was primarily on the fighting of symptoms, and the effects of these projects were not evaluated regularly. Furthermore, these evaluations were based on general principles, which are not adapted to the local context. Beside that they indeed have a short-term focus, these failures can also be partially explained by the pressure of donors and the media, which demand a certain speed in which organisations have to intervene. (Hilhorts and Jansen, 2010; Vlassenroot, Romkema, and Dijkzeul, 2010).

Food aid can also disturb the economic development of a country, as mentioned before. During the conflict in Congo, for example, it had an inhibitory effect on the economic reconstruction. International organisations barely tried to buy food on local markets, which gave no chance for, or even disordered, existing local strategies to ensure food security. Furthermore, local actors where limited involved in the planning and execution of the projects of the international actors. This top-down approach, and the distortion of the local markets, can offend the local population (Vlassenroot, Romkema, and Dijkzeul, 2010).

In Congo, most of the local initiatives were noticed very late by the international organisations. However, even when they were seen, suggestions by these local actors became seldom supported. The local actors were only involved in the execution of projects, but not by the planning of these projects. This top-down approach, made it also difficult to meet the real local needs. The chance of success, will be bigger when organisations reason from local needs, and when local people are involved by the planning and execution (Vlassenroot, Romkema, and Dijkzeul, 2010). Moreover, local workers know the local situation better, and are often more able to negotiate with

people in the area. The situation in Darfur showed, that when the number of international aid workers decreased, the number of local aid workers and volunteers increased after only one and a half year. Local aid workers are discouraged by international aid workers, but they are certainly able to intervene (Janssen, 2010). However, a high degree of informality and personality caused by local aid workers, can lead to troubles with regard to the transparency of local organisations or international organisations with local workers (De Cordier, 2010).

However, when Western organisations do involve local people, they are often inclined to employ people who have the same way of life, are part of the elite because they have certain skills, and have the same discourse. Although these employees are local people, they often share the culture with, and are mentally closer to, their western bosses an colleagues. They often look down on, and are not interested in, other locals. They use the job to make a career, to go abroad, and to make big money, because the organisations often pay them too much wage. These people damage the image and the credibility of the organisation.

The local people have much more difficulty with nationals who try to do like westerners and who let them feel that they are less important, than with foreign workers. Because the latter actors are seen as outsiders, and therefore, they adapt their expectations and are more tolerant. It is also a problem that the local elite knows almost nothing about the local context and language – only the former colonial language - outside their privileged environment. So, local participation is not always useful in the fight for legitimacy (De Cordier, 2010).

In short, participation of locals within humanitarian aid provision can be useful, because locals mostly know more about the local context than foreigners. However, although local participation is a concept with a positive symbol meaning within the Western world, it often causes offence by the local population, because often only a Western-mind elite is chosen to participate, which often does not know very much of the rest of the population. Furthermore, organisations should not discourage local based initiatives when they want support from the local population.

4.4 Use of principles

Not only participation is used by organisations to get support, but also their focus on the humanitarian principles. This paragraph will focus on the way in which organisations use the principles, and how different groups are influenced by this instrument.

As explained earlier, the humanitarian organisations have difficulties with following the principles, because of external pressure by, for example, donors. This is remarkable. The organisations use the principles to get acceptance from stakeholders, who in turn make it impossible for the organisations to live by these principles.

However, also without pressure from outside, the humanitarian organisation do not live by the traditional humanitarian principles. Lack of good estimates of people's need is an example of this. For instance, during the conflict in Congo, refugees needed health and education, but not food, because they could provide themselves food by harvesting crops. However, they lacked these things about ten years. This happened because almost

all Congolese's were seen as victims and the humanitarian organisations were not steered by the government or the rebels, which led to free choice among areas by the aid workers. The aid workers have chosen mostly the most accessible and safe areas; instead of the areas where the people suffer the most (Vlassenroot, Romkema, and Dijkzeul, 2010). However, practice is not always known by all stakeholders. Donors often only know the mandate of an organisation and the information given by the organisations themselves through the media. However, when organisations want to have support from the local population by using these principles, the organisation should work according to the principles.

What exactly is commitment to the humanitarian principles? As said before, the lack of consistency between the traditional and development principles leads to many different ways in which the principles are combined and used. Both traditional ways as more development-oriented ways are possible. So, the use of principles is highly dependent on outside factors and actors, which is indeed in contrast with the principles themselves.

In case of local participation, international guidelines are sometimes not even known by the field staff - the attitude of the head office can be very different from that of the field workers -, staff does not know what to do with it, or the people who sign it do not always live by it.
Furthermore, international guidelines and principles are not always directly clear among main groups within a country. The MSF-N in Nepal, had only after seven months, a conversation with the local security council, in which they could explain what their mission is and by which principles they work. Before this explanation, the local security council could only base their opinion about the MSF-N on stories of other people (Duijn, 2010).

To maintain the humanitarian space in Nepal, the MSF-N tried to get recognition by pointing at the Geneva Conventions and their status of Nobel Price winner. However, it is hard to explain the conventions to the sometimes analphabetic rebels, and to convince them what should be done based on these unknown rules.
The reference of MSF-N towards their status damaged their image, however. The Dutch project manager of a TB- and leper clinic in Nepal, points at the logic used by the MSF-N, when he says: "We are of the MSF, we are Nobel Price winners, we have the Geneva Conventions behind us, therefore, we may come everywhere, regardless the opinion of the army and other fighting parties, the government, and the consequences for the population and other organisations (which tried to reach the population with more success)". The Nepalese government did not like such headstrong behaviour, and therefore, where not impressed by the presentation of the MSF-N. The government only recognised, and only wanted to work together with, organisations which would take the rules of the country into account. MSF-N started a project without agreement with the Nepalese government (Duijn, 2010).

This example showed that getting support is not always depending on the claim to abide by the humanitarian principles. Besides the focus on the principles, there are also other ways in which organisations can gain trust and legitimacy and support. For instance, being transparent, providing good work, and using negotiation- and diplomatic capacities. However, during conflicts trust is systematically undermined. An

organisation can be reliable, while other stakeholders try to use its work for their own interests, which finally, probably lead to a distrust of the organisation (Vlassenroot, Romkema, and Dijkzeul, 2010).

In conclusion, this paragraph showed that it does not always matter whether organisations abide by the humanitarian principles. Saying to be committed to them is sometimes enough to gain a certain degree of legitimacy. However, this paragraph also shows that the principles are not always known or valued on local level. The assessment of humanitarian organisations can be based on a lot of other capacities of an organisation.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter showed that organisations easily loose the focus on their main objective to help people. Pressure from outsiders, like donors, leads to a focus on transparency and accountability among the organisations. Sometimes organisations have to, because otherwise they would not survive. However, organisations are not only forced to focus on strategies to get acceptance and support, it can also be a hidden objective on their own political agenda.

Acceptance and support also depend on the way of working of an organisation. Consistency between mandate and practice, cooperation, attention to the people in need, a good attitude, and a good quality of aid, can all contribute to a greater acceptance and support for the organisation. However, like the use of principles, consistency between mandate and practice, is not always needed. Some stakeholders only focus on the things which organisations say. Others focus on the practice.
The humanitarian principles are not always known or valued on local level. However, indeed, the assessment of humanitarian organisations can be based on a lot of other capacities of an organisation.
Awareness of local structures can be an example of this. Stakeholders who focus on practice will see that humanitarian organisations often lack understanding of local structures. The image of organisations can be damaged when they are not aware of local processes. Often organisations work around local organisations and local initiatives. However, when organisations do involve local people, this also leads to an offensive population.

In short, the chapter showed that organisations have to be very careful in choosing their course of action. However, it might be clear that not every course of action will be supported by every stakeholder.

5. Civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan

This chapter includes a case study about civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan. This case study will focus on the Dutch component of the humanitarian organisation Medicines Sans Frontières (MSF-N). This focus is chosen, because the organisation is strongly against cooperation with the military, because of its focus on the traditional humanitarian principles. They do not want to be associated with the military, because the military is partial.

The Dutch government follows the 3D policy, which led to the establishment of a new component of the military, called CIMIC, which stands for 'Civil-Military Cooperation'. The country Afghanistan is chosen because the Dutch CIMIC-battalion became the core of the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) working in Afghanistan. PRTs are a good example of the 3D-approach of the Dutch government.

The deployment of CIMIC led to an increased (visible) involvement of the military in the humanitarian field. The case study will show the struggle of the MSF-N to create and maintain legitimacy for their way of working, which is, according to the organisation, neutral, impartial, and independent work. They even stopped their work in Afghanistan for four years, because of this military involvement. Furthermore, beside its strong position with regard to this issue, the MSF-N is also chosen because much can be found about their opinion of this civil-military cooperation via the media.

First of all, the mandate of the MSF is discussed, which shows already implicitly their position in the issue of civil-military cooperation. Chapter 2 of this thesis explained the changes in the policy of the Dutch government, and showed that the government started to use a 3D-approach. The second paragraph of this chapter will continue this by explaining the effect of this approach on the way of working of the Dutch Armed Forces. The military established a new body, called CIMIC. This change is strongly related to the change of crises and their contexts, as explained in chapter 3. The next chapter will show the mandate and structure of CIMIC, which will show concrete tasks which emanate from the changed policy. The fourth chapter will describe the struggles between the government, together with the military, and MSF-N, in getting legitimacy for their own opinion with regard to civil-military cooperation. The final paragraph will give a conclusion of the chapter.

5.1 MSF-N

Medicines Sans Frontières (MSF) is a medical-humanitarian organisation, which is established by Bernard Koucher, in France in 1971. The Dutch variant is established in 1984. MSF-N is an independent organisation, but still works closely together with MSF. This paragraph will focus on the mandate and structure of this Dutch component.

MSF-N is an international, independent, medical humanitarian organisation that delivers emergency aid to people affected by armed conflict, epidemics, natural disasters and exclusion from healthcare. MSF-N works with rapid response teams to help people in need during crises (Dijkzeul, 2010; Duijn, 2010). Besides giving medical humanitarian aid, the organisation also reports human right abuses. Witnessing abuses, however, seems to be a political task, which would be in tension with the principle of neutrality. But according to the organisations it is done to underline the principle of humanity, and

probably it is also done to respond to the critics towards the Red Cross's passive attitude during the Second World War. The organisation is focused on short-term medical action, and only stays as long as necessary in the relevant area. As soon as possible, their activities are transferred to other organisations. MSF-N uses a goal-focused decision-making model, which is also shown by the role of witness of the organisation (Dijkzeul, Herman; Heyse, 2010).

MSF-N consciously focuses mainly on humanitarian aid and is together with the ICRC the strongest defender of the humanitarian principles. The principles of MSF-N are: medical ethics, particularly providing care without causing harm to individuals or groups; independence; impartiality; neutrality; bearing witness of human right abuses; accountability.
Although MSF-N makes reports of human right abuses, the organisation does not intervene in, and does not make statements about, the solving of conflicts or about development cooperation. Furthermore, MSF-N bases the right for humanitarian intervention on the IHL (Dijkzeul, 2010).

In conclusion, MSF-N is a medical humanitarian organisation and base their work on the IHL; mainly on the traditional humanitarian principles which are part of this IHL, namely independency, humanity, neutrality and impartiality. Beside of these humanitarian principles they also abide a general medical ethics principle, bear witness of human rights, and wants to be accountable.

5.2 Changing Dutch Armed Forces

This paragraph will explain the change of tasks of the Dutch Armed Forces. Current conflicts would demand a more integrated security approach, which implies that the military has to focus more on the civil side of the conflict.
Also, the main causes of this change will be discussed. Causes which are already discussed in chapter one, will not, or only shortly, be repeated.

The traditional tasks of the Dutch military are: 1) defending the Dutch territory; and when a situation cannot be dealt by only NGOs, because of great danger or because of its big size: 2) providing emergency aid, for example, reconstruction of roads and bridges; 3) securing of aid supplies; and 4) supporting evacuation.
However, the military faced some big changes. The task of defending its own territory has changed, and is now focused on the creation or maintenance of the safety for citizens and the protection of human rights all over the world (NEAG, 2012). Current warfare, can be characterised as counterinsurgency warfare, which shifts the focus of the military from the focus on control of territory to the control of populations. Insurgents, not need to occupy territory. Their strength comes from their ability to hide among the population and to conduct operations against counterinsurgency forces (Artsen Zonder Grenzen, 2010).

Also, currently, more actors can appeal to national armies. The number of international players, who appeal the military increased. The strong division between the military and international organisations, has changed and the two come together in common operations. Peace and a safety environment would not be achieved without the

military (Mallens, 2011). For instance, Dutch militaries can be deployed at the request of the UN, the NATO, The EU, or the OVSE, but also bilateral. The American declaration of war towards terrorism, made the boundaries vague with respect to the question how and where militaries can be deployed.

The military is not only asked more often, also much more is asked from them. According to researchers of the Dutch Institute for International Relations, Frerks et al. (2006), since the end of the Cold War there is a broadening of the security concept. There has become more attention to the safety of the individual and for the unhindered functioning of societies on all fields (economics, milieu, public health, politics, etc.). Because of the changes in warfare, whereby intra-state conflicts and complex peace operations became more important, and armies got a new role on the area of reconstruction and humanitarian aid.
This new understanding demanded an integrated approach of security problems. Part of this approach is the so-called 3D-approach, which is applied during the Dutch mission in Uruzgan in Afghanistan.

Nowadays, the tasks of the Dutch military are: 1) the protection of the own territory and the territory of allies, including the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba; 2) the maintenance and improvement of international justice and stability; and 3) the support of civil authorities by enforcement of justice, fight against disasters, and the provision of humanitarian aid, national as well as international. In 2000, the third task became officially a main task. Before that, it was only a safety net function. Mainly because of terrorist threat and the increased blurring of intern and extern security the importance of this task has increased.
The division between domestic and foreign security is in the security policy increasingly unclear. The terrorist attacks in New York where prepared in Hamburg, financed by people in Arab Countries, and the threat became real in America. Modern communication means, like internet, make it possible that terrorist and criminals can have contact in relative anonymity. Also, the foreign policy has more and more domestic consequences. For instance, the presence of Spanish troops in Iraq, led to terrorist attacks in Madrid. But also, the domestic policy can threaten interests in foreign countries. The prohibition of headscarves on schools in France, for example, made France a specific target of Al Qaeda (Hellema et al., 2011).

Furthermore, the discourse that security and development are indissoluble connected, which is expressed in by the increased importance of the third task of the military, became introduced in a new policy notion, called "reconstruction after armed conflict", which was initiated in 2005. The notion states that in this reconstruction work the military would also have a task; particularly for the reformation of the security sector and for disarmament and demobilisation.
Nowadays, according to the governmental website of the Ministry of Development Cooperation (sub-component of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), development includes also security and humanitarian aid (Hellema et al., 2011).

To fulfil the expectations of the government with regard to the new focus of their tasks, namely the focus on civil-military cooperation, and the strong focus on humanitarian aid and reconstruction, the military established a new military component, called CIMIC, in 2003. A letter from the ministers of Foreign Affairs and

Defence towards the parliament explained where this new component is about: "The policy of CIMIC distinguishes the following four objectives of CIMIC. In the first place, civil-military cooperation supports the peace process and the security ("force protection"). Secondly, CIMIC offers support to the population in the context of "force acceptance" and gives it a signal to the international society that the (peace) operation is supportive for the process of reconstruction. Finally, CIMIC contributes – on limited scale – to the actual restoration of the conflict area" (NEAG, 2003). So, although more focus is on the civil side of conflicts, the new way of working is still focused on the succeeding of the military mission.

Closer cooperation between military and civil actors (donors, international organisations and NGOs) is a logical consequence of the current developments in the international arena, like reforms within the UN, the attendance of integrated approaches (whereby instruments of the security, politics, and development become combined), the changing nature of warfare and peace maintenance, and the "war against terrorism". The latter, because terrorism is actually an attempt to get political attention (Smyth, 2007). Finally, the closer cooperation reflects some recent trends in humanitarian and development interventions, like the growth of organisations with multiple mandates and conflict sensitive approaches. According to Frerks et al. (2006: 7): "the involved actors can have only little influence on these external and quite autonomous processes, which take place on a global level. Moreover, it is relative undisputed that the problems which are faced, demand a combination, or even an integration, of military and civil activities and expertise. So, the question is not, *whether* there should be anticipated to these changes, but *how* should be anticipated this." So, aid organisations, donors and militaries should get grip on these contextual developments. They should think themselves about the complications of their position in this new security approach.

Government donors and military actors, in general, have welcomed closer cooperation, and stimulated it within the framework of their integrated policy. Important humanitarian and development actors, like MSF-N, however, have shown objections with regard to these trends. They fear that aid will be made subjective to political-military objectives and logic.
However, according to the NATO, Civil-Military Cooperation is as old as warfare. They like to point at the Chinese general Ssu Ma Jang Chu, who was working on it five hundred years before Christ, but real work was made only the recent sixteen years. As NATO country, the Netherlands is notable on the forefront. Soldiers, is the increasing strong thought, benefit from helping the local population during their foreign mission (Volkskrant, 2006).

It is difficult to indicate activities in conflict crises as pure 'civil' or 'military'. There is a different grayscale. The recommended division of task or role between military and civil actors depends on the context, according to a study of conflict researchers working at the University of Utrecht. This study showed that the work can be done on the basis of a more or less traditional task division. In other cases, however, more coordinated approaches are desirable, even whole integrated or joint activities. In some cases militaries have entered the civil domain without good reasons, therefore, they it is better that they withdraw (Frerks et al. 2006). MSF-N, however, wishes that the military should never enter the civil domain, to maintain the clear division of roles.

In conclusion, current warfare demands, according to the government and the military, a new security approach, namely an integrated approach which focuses on people instead of territories, and which is focused on civil-military cooperation. Part of the new global integrated security approach is the 3D-approach of the Dutch government, which is reflected by the new civil-focused tasks of the military.

5.3 CIMIC

The change of tasks of the Dutch military is expressed in the establishment of the new component of the military, named CIMIC, which stands for "Civil-Military-Cooperation". This new focus of the military, by which the military is increasingly involved in the working field of these civil actors, caused the conflict between the military and many humanitarian organisations. This conflict will be elaborated in the next paragraph. This paragraph will show the mandate and structure of the new body of CIMIC.

In 2007, the CIMIC-battalion was established (Ministerie van Defensie, 2007). The Dutch CIMIC is part of the Dutch command structure. The CIMIC battalion exists of a small staff, professional militaries from CIMIC support units, and reservists. These reservists are functional specialists, who have a job outside the military and have specific expertise and experience in the civil sector. The reservists work within one of the following expertise networks of CIMIC: Civil Infrastructure, Economy & Employment, Civil Administration, Humanitarian Affairs, Cultural & Education, and IDEA (Ministerie van Defensie, 2010: par. 9). They are judges, surgeons, farmers, bankers, journalists, road and water specialists, entrepeneurs, planners, administrators, etc. (Volkskrant, 2006). These Reservists are active when there is a need of specific knowledge in the mission area (Ministerie van Defensie, 2009-2).

The tasks of the Dutch CIMIC include making assessments of the civil environment and informing the commander about the society; making and maintaining contacts with civil actors and agencies, advising and assisting local authorities and/or aid organizations; carrying out projects for reconstruction and support of the local people. The latter is only done when these projects cannot be carried out by international organizations (Ministerie van Defensie, 2010). For example, recently a Dutch battle group in Iraq got tasks with regard to the improvement of living conditions of the local population, because there were not enough aid organisations for these tasks after a big attack on the UN office in Bagdad. As soon as possible, the militaries passed the projects over to NGOs and international organisations, because of the rule 'as civil as possible, as military as necessary'. Militaries will not execute activities which can be done by civil bodies. Reconstruction projects, which are called "hearts-and-minds projects", are small and support only the military mission. Depending on the situation, CIMIC can also fulfil governing and police tasks for a while (Homan, 2005).

Before the operation is started, CIMIC staff prepares militaries with regard to the civilian actors and conditions they have to deal with during the mission. During the operation CIMIC staff is concerned with an effective cooperation between civil and military actors, and in the end of the operation, CIMIC assists the transition of the civil activities to the civil authorities (Rehse, 2004). The reservists are staying as short as possible in the area. However, before the militaries leave, the reservists talk with

possible partners, regular development organisations, which can take over the project, when the security situation allows so (Scheltema, 2006).

In short, the CIMIC battalion forms an important link between military units, the population en humanitarian organisations. The goals is to adapt the military mission to the civil environment, and to improve the security of the troops by arouse sympathy among the local population (winning the hearts and minds) (Ministerie van Defensie, 2009-2; Scheltema, 2006).

5.4 Civil-Military Cooperation in Afghanistan

This paragraph will describe the struggles between the government, together with the military, and MSF-N, for getting legitimacy for their own opinion with regard to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan.
First of all, the way of working of the militaries in Afghanistan is explained. Then, the role of MSF-N in legitimation processes linked to civil-military cooperation will be discussed. According to MSF-N the military should not be involved in the civil field, because that would cause danger for aid workers and aid receivers. Thirdly, the role of the government and the military in legitimation processes linked to civil-military cooperation is explained. Finally, the view of the Afghan local population and Afghan local organisations on this struggle will be discussed.
The chapter will shown the arguments used the different parties, and also the means they use to make their position and arguments known to relevant parties, like donors.

5.4.1 Military action in Afghanistan
In 2001, the US government started the 'War on terror', and invaded Afghanistan. This offensive action of the coalition led by the US, is called "Operation Enduring Freedom" (OEF). In 2003, the NATO-led International Stability Assistance Force (ISAF) started their mission in Afghanistan, with the consent of the government in Kabul. ISAF is a reflexion of the above described changes in the global security policy. The focus of ISAF is an integrated approach of reconstruction and security. The ISAF mission consists of operations which are executed to reduce the possibility and will to revolt, to support the growth in capacity and ability of the Afghan national security troops, and to facilitate the improvements in governmental and socio-economical development to create a safe environment for sustainable stability which is observable by the population (ISAF, 2012; Mallens, 2011).

Unable to establish a major military presence in all the provinces, NATO deployed smaller teams intended to avoid power vacuums. Through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), ISAF 1) supports reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, 2) supports humanitarian assistance efforts conducted by Afghan government organizations, international organizations, and NGOs. And executing limited aid operations under certain circumstances, 3) secures areas in which reconstruction work is conducted by other national and international actors, and 4) helps the Afghan Authorities strengthen the institutions required to fully establish good governance and rule of law and to promote human rights. It helps to enforce the legitimacy of the government in the region (ISAF, 2012).

PRTs are made up of militaries, but also diplomats and development experts (Frerks et al., 2006). Until 2009, the interventions executed by CIMIC, where always individual missions. Now, the CIMIC battalion will fill the core of the PRT. So, CIMIC units operate as component of these PRTs (Ministerie van Defensie, 2009-1). Within the PRT there is knowledge about the civil environment and about the way of working and culture of non-governmental organisations and local governmental organisations. A PRT supports the Dutch Commander by maintaining contacts with the local authorities and civil organisations in the interest of the military operation, to support the security and the military (force protection) and to get acceptance for the military presence (force acceptance) (Middelkoop, 2010-1). In Afghanistan it is very common that militaries contract aid organisations, mainly local organisations, for the execution of small projects. In theory, NGOs and militaries do not cooperate with regard to the development and execution of projects. Cooperation between diplomats and donors (who stay on the PRT base) is intensive, however (Frerks, et al., 2006).

According to Koenders, the minister of Development, there is no mere military solution for the problems in Afghanistan. Military action can and should go together with better governance of the Afghan government, more consultation with different groups in Afghanistan, and the execution of development programs. He thinks there should be made more clear agreements with the UN, and other international organisations, about more cooperation with the Afghan government, mainly on the area of police, human rights, poverty and corruption. There should be more invested in civil and political reconstruction of Afghanistan (Koenders, 2007).

5.4.2 MSF-N in legitimation processes linked to civil-military cooperation

MSF-N is against the involvement of the military in the field of humanitarian action. The organisation uses several arguments to defend its opinion, and uses several means to make these arguments known to the relevant stakeholders within the field of humanitarian actors, like donors, national governments, and international organisations. This sub paragraph will focus on these arguments and means.

In the year report of the MSF-N (Artsen zonder Grenzen, 2010), the organisation points at the manipulation of humanitarian aid, and focuses on the people in need who are excluded from aid. The amount of humanitarian aid given over the world has grown a lot. While this trend seems to be a positive one, it also causes a threat. There is an increased risk for misuse and manipulation of aid, as shown in earlier chapters. According to MSF-N, 25 years after their establishment, giving medical aid became a means of power for politicians, armies and warlords; the respect for humanitarian aid and aid workers is reducing. Therefore, working for the organisation is becoming dangerous, the employees say. Sometimes the situation is that worse, that they have to stop their activities. For instance, MSF faced the kidnapping of six employees in Tsjaad, Darfur, Pakistan and Somalia. They were released unharmed, but the message was clear: the security of aid providers and the people in need, are of no importance for certain groups with criminal and political agendas.
According to MSF-N, beside warlords or authoritarian states, also Western powers damage humanitarian aid. They use it as an instrument in political and military strategies, like the NATO in Afghanistan. Because military objectives become mingled with diplomatic and development goals, the situation of independent aid organisations

became particularly unsafe. MSF-N adds: "(Ibid: 4) more important: people are excluded from medical assistance, which they need".

In 2004, five employees of MSF-N were killed after a consultation with local leaders (Trouw, 2004). Therefore, MSF-N stopped their activities in Afghanistan for five years. MSF-N said at the website NU.nl (2012: par.2): ".. in a situation in which we as humanitarian organisation do not get the minimum of recognition and respect for independency and neutrality, it would be irresponsible to keep going; it would be irresponsible to expose our volunteers to this."
According to the newspaper Trouw, the car could be associated with a car of the UN, but the newspaper directly added that Al Qaeda said to be responsible for the attack, and that they knew that it was not a car of the UN, but a car from an organisation (Trouw, 2004). The newspaper differs from the statement of the MSF-N itself. MSF-N said, that the Taliban claimed to be responsible for the attack. Later the Taliban said, that they see organisations like the MSF as legitimate target, because the organisation would be working for American interests. MSF-N responded to the Taliban by saying that this accusation was false and particularly unjust (NU.nl, 2012).

The example shows, that it is actually impossible for aid organisations to act in a non-political way. Even, when an organisation wants to be seen as neutral, it has to use a certain political strategy. Some comments on newspapers state that the choice to withdraw from Afghanistan is a political choice focused on the organisation's own interest, instead of a choice which is in the interest of the people in need.
To get support for their decision MSF-N points at the risk for their volunteers. The question rises whether this a sustainable claim to withdraw from the country. The website of the MSF-N says, in general, that all employees can choose by themselves, whether they will participate in certain projects or not. So, the organisation does not expose people to danger, the volunteers can choose for themselves to participate or not. Furthermore, in the newspaper Trouw the MSF-N states that it is able to work under difficult conditions (Marijnissen, 1998). This claim will lose its power, when the organisation avoids to work under difficult conditions.

MSF-N also uses news articles on their own website, to promote their opinion about the involvement of military in the civil field. In an article from 2010, MSF-N responses fierce against a statement of NATO secretary-general A. F. Rasmussen. According to Rasmussen, aid organisations should be the so called "soft power"-component of a military strategy. MSF-N responded that they will never cooperate with a military strategy. They said: "Due to our complete independent and neutral position, we have access to the people who need medical emergency aid. Statements, like the one of NATO, increase the risks for our patients and employees, by suggesting that medical work is part of a military strategy." MSF-N adds that it tries to avert weapons in hospitals where they work. According to the organisation, only in case of absence of weapons, people who need medical aid, do feel safe enough to be threatened, because the hospital will not be attacked. MSF-N stated that the statement of Rasmussen is a threat to the neutral position of MSF-N, and that it makes hospitals, patients and medic personnel an easy target (Artsen zonder Grenzen, 2011-1).

Beside news articles on their own websites, MSF-N promote their vision also by articles in newspapers. Even in 1998, they elaborated their neutral position in the

newspaper Trouw (Marijnissen, 1998). They suggest that the military lost its goal, because the militaries lost their enemy. MSF-N thought that the military and the government, therefore, used a broad social discussion to steer the military organisation to a new direction; the direction of the humanitarian field. According to MSF-N, however, the army is a political instrument. Therefore, it cannot be neutral and is dependent of long term decision-making processes; in particularly when they operate as component of the UN. MSF-N sees itself as the opposite of such a political instrument. They are civil, independent, impartial, and can operate quickly. When MSF-N would be associated by troops, they will lose their neutral position. Also, when the troops leave the country you are not able to work anymore. They point at the power of their weakness, by which they are not seen as a threat.

Frerks et all (2006), show with their research that militaries are not able to protect the means they use and the people they help. He points at the burning of schools and killing of teachers. Aid providers increase the risk of being attacked when they are associated with militaries. However, this was mainly the case in the South of Afghanistan, where the security situation was worse than in the North. Aid organisations will be seen as agents of the West, and become a target. However, Frerks et all, explain that the attacks on aid organisations are primarily a consequence of the whole context and not because of the increased unclearness of the division between aid workers and militaries. With this whole context he probably means the polarisation of the world by the War on Terror, as explained in chapter 2. Still, aid organisations try to keep publically away from the military. They are not cooperating in the field, and try not to be associated to militaries by the means they use for their work. For example, they change the colour of their cars, or change the appearance of their offices.

Not only MSF-N fears danger for themselves and the people they help, in the same article in Trouw, MSF-N states that in some crisis areas, militaries who give aid are distrusted by the aid receivers. It uses the example of refugees who are fleeing for fighting parties. In contrast to Dutch people who do not fear a helping soldier, aid receivers do not always trust unknown uniformed persons. They point at possible local resistance, and use the example of the aid operation of the Americans in Somalia. This aid operation became a situation of war. When MSF-N would be associated by these troops, they will also be distrusted. (Marijnissen, 1998).

MSF-N admits that sometimes the two organisations cannot without each other. However, it would be "disastrous" when they would take over each other's job. MSF-N only informs the military about the aid provision and local situations, but does not want more contact. According to MSF-N, the military should not deal with things they do not know about. Only when there is no war situations and the area is too inaccessible, aid organisations can use logistical support from the military. However, when they can do it by themselves, they prefer to stay independent. MSF-N claims that they seldom needs such logistical support.
However, they emphasise that they do not want to say that the NATO and UN are not important actors in crisis situations. Even the MSF-N lobbies towards the UN to start a military intervention. However, they should focus on security, so that aid organisations, like MSF-N, can do their job of giving aid in a neutral way (Marijnissen, 1998).

As said before, the MSF-N thinks that the involvement and support of the military, only is offered, because of a lack of activities for the military, and because it gives a good feeling to give aid. MSF-N explains: "Building a school is not wrong, but it is probably built on military strategic place and not on a place where it is really needed by the population. The project is only meant to get sympathy from the population, it should not be called a humanitarian action" (Marijnissen, 1998).

The concept of humanitarian action would be a new point of discussion, which goes beyond the topic of this thesis. However, shortly there can be said that, in the 19th century, humanitarian intervention meant in the first place, military intervention. Still, regularly, the concept humanitarian intervention is used for military intervention for peace and security (Dijkzeul and Herman, 2010).

About the quality of aid given by militaries, Frerks et al. (2006) say, that there are good and bad examples. However, Frerks et all, did their research before 2006 and published the article in 2006. The use of the new component CIMIC, with its experts was still quite new in 2006, and had to build up experience. The statement there are limits for militaries with regard to aid provision because of the precautions and short-term schemes, and the statement that the military is expensive, and therefore ineffective, is probably still the case.

Notable, is that often the accusations about the quality of aid are towards the military in general, not specifically focused on the Dutch military. For example, on their website the MSF-N tells the reader that there was a hospital which was "piling up with advanced medical equipment donated by a range of states including the US, China, Iran, and India or through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). This equipment is usually dropped off with little explanation and no anticipation of maintenance". This example shows that MSF-N is very vague about who they accuse. In this way, the way of working of Dutch militaries can indirectly lose support because of the low quality of the aid provision of other militaries (Artsen zonder Grenzen, 2010).

Beside differences between the way of working of militaries of different countries, also differences exist between humanitarian organisations themselves, and how they deal with these new way of working of the military. In June 2003, more than 80 organizations – including major US aid agencies – asked the international society for the expansion of ISAF and to provide the resources needed for democracy, peace and stability for the Afghan people. Therefore, the majority of the international aid organisations aligned its efforts with the security agenda of the Western countries.

These happenings, contributed to the view that all aid organisations aligned with the Afghan government and international coalition forces, which fight against insurgency. Together with the context of the War on Terror, it led to an increased polarisation of armed opposition groups and aid organisations from countries which support the Afghan government. MSF-N even suggest that the fact that international organisations were aligned with the West during the Cold War, can contribute to this polarisation. According to CARE, another international aid organisation, the common practice of donor countries, to give more aid to provinces in which their troops are stationed, has also contributed to the belief that aid-giving is a partisan act (NRC, 2006).

According to MSF-N it is not possible for an organisation to give aid and to solve the conflict at the same time (Artsen zonder Grenzen, 2010). Cordaid, another international aid organisation, explains in the NRC, that the coherence of security and development

does not imply that security activities and development activities should be executed by one and the same organisation (NRC, 2006).

Because of these trends aid becomes "treat-based" rather than "needs-based", according to MSF. With this, the organisation means that aid is given according to military goals and not according to humanitarian needs. MSF says literally: "Assistance thus becomes just another weapon at the service of the military, which can condition, deny or reward relief to those who fall in or out of line with its larger security agenda." It is remarkable that the MSF themselves use the example of a US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, which can make the suspect against aid organisations even bigger. This representative confirmed that most of the information about Afghanistan and Pakistan comes from aid organizations on the ground. This outraged many in the aid community as it reinforced the perception that they spy for the US. Probably MSF still uses the example, to take openly distance from the statement of the Representative. However, the question rises whether the circulation of this statement makes the whole situation of aid provision in Afghanistan worse.

Despite the risk of being used for military strategies, MSF-N re-started their work in Afghanistan in 2009. The year 2009, was the most violent year since 2001. MSF-N saw hospitals which were under fire, because they were occupied by one war party, while another party was attacking the hospital. MSF-N uses this example to defend their statement that independent humanitarian aid should never be made subjective to strategic objectives of parties in a conflict. They point at women, men and children, who become excluded from aid, which they need. This is an example, of the in chapter 3 mentioned image of aid receivers as victim, which is used by organisations to underline the need of their work and, moreover, the way they work.
According to them, aid is not only a means of power, but it became even a target (Artsen zonder Grenzen, 2009). This illustrated by an example showed on their website. Hospitals and medical personnel have been targeted by armed opposition groups, while Afghan government and international forces have repeatedly raided and occupied health structures. Here, the same argument was used: this situation was partly caused by the co-optation of the aid system by the international coalition, which made it hard to distinguish aid provision from political and military action. Again the link with the vulnerable population is made, and the position of MSF-N is explained: when MSF-N started working again in Afghanistan, it did not give any of the fighting parties access to the hospitals where they work, a policy which they always use (Artsen zonder Grenzen, 2004).

However, the same website the MSF-N also shows examples of other countries, like Libya, in which hospitals and clinics became attacked (Artsen zonder Grenzen, 2011-2). These attacks are not linked to civil-military cooperation, or to international troops which were in the hospital during the attack. Furthermore, the question rises whether the international troops in Afghanistan, where not in the hospital because some groups already began to attack the hospital.
Although the ICRC also do not want militaries to intervene in the field of aid provision, they see attacks on hospitals as part of changes in conflicts. According to them: "..the theatre of conflict is changing, with belligerents increasingly undertaking military operations in densely populated urban areas, with resulting high levels of civilian casualties, disruption of basic services and damage to civilian infrastructure."

(International Committee of the Red Cross, 2011: 1) Although they do not mention the civil-military cooperation as cause, they do say that these trends show the need for greater accountability for violations of IHL, including the Code of Conduct.

However, one could also say, that when organisations are linked to the military anyway, it is better that the military continue to 'do good' for the people, because in that way it would damage the image of cooperating NGOs less.

The rest of the paragraph will include some arguments and strategies which other aid organisations use in legitimation processes linked to civil-military cooperation. This is done to complement the possible claims coming from the civil site of the issue.

For example, beside the MSF-N also other organisations use all kinds of symbols to touch people, like donors, international organisations, etc. and steer them into the direction of their vision. Healthnet says: It is still a very strange picture to see Western troops with all their material, shard vests, and weapons, handing pencils. About themselves they say: "We do not give away presents, but give them [the Afghan population] work, so that they have something which is worth to defend against groups like the Taliban." (Volkskrant, 2006: par.15) In reality, this view turns out to be one-sided, because CIMIC also helps the population with getting employment, by establishing small enterprises. It is possible that Heathnet does not know this – which would rise questions about the explanation from governments and militaries -, it is also possible that the knowledge is there, but that Healthnet wants to shape a certain picture of the situation.

Some organisations let the reader even think that this new way of working of the military is a secret strategy. They say that people would think that the military executes this aid projects for the people in need, and when they looked closer, they will discover that these projects are executed to support the military mission. This information, however, can be found openly at the website of the Ministry of Defence and on the website of the Land Forces. Furthermore, by saying this, they suggest that the military mission is not in favour of the people in need.

Furthermore, others think that the local population will never trust the military when they still carry weapons. They will still be seen as intruders with an own agenda. Furthermore, this resistance against this double attitude of the militaries, will also turn against the humanitarian aid workers (Kerk en Vrede, 2005).

Other Dutch aid organisations accuse the government for using the Development budget for military activities and say that it is done at the costs of people in need. About the small scale projects of militaries in Afghanistan one organisation says: "'Our boys and girls', the way in which professional soldiers are affectionately called, are going to the Afghan province Uruzgan to help and not to fight. This picture conceals a fundamental problem. In fact, by doing this, the military aid providers make the work of professional development workers impossible, because without a weapon, professional aid providers become easy targets for local rebels." They point at the blurring of the traditional division of roles between the military and aid organizations. They even say: "Half a century of professionalising of development and reconstruction is being thrown away, because the militaries, who are deployed by us, execute aid projects to win the hearts and minds of the population. This strategy does not work, which is shown obviously by the increased number of attacks on humanitarian ánd military aid workers." Although they do not show a causality between these two trends, their claims

can convince people to see the new way of working as destructive. They enforce their claim by using words like 'half a century', 'thrown away' (Kerk en Vrede, 2005).

The organisation Kerk en Vrede thinks that rather development brings security than the other way around. They use the argument that conflicts are often caused by an uneven distribution. When distribution is more equally due to development work, the change that an conflict arises is smaller They point at the European unification, which they see as a peace project. According ot them, this should be an example. It makes clear that economical development is a better means to get peace and security in the Third World than the establishment of military infrastructure (Kerk en Vrede, 2005)

In conclusion, MSF-N uses newspapers, and their own website with its news articles to make their vision on civil-military cooperation known. To enforce their view, they suggest that they are doing good by helping people in need, and that militaries use their work as a means for achieving political goals. For this view, they words which are value-charged with a certain negative or positive feeling, like "military strategy". Furthermore, this sub paragraph showed that MSF-N also uses symbols during their work in Afghanistan. They paint their cars and offices to avoid that they will be associated by militaries.

5.4.3 Role of government and the military in legitimation processes linked to civil-military cooperation

➤ *5.4.3.1 Integrated security approach*

In 2008, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FA) published a brochure about development goals, which was based on an earlier brochure about international cooperation from 2007. In this brochure former minister of Development Cooperation Koenders explains that he wants to invest more in fragile states (Koenders, 2007: 4). By fragile states, he means post-conflict countries of which "we may and should not accept that they fall back in chaos and war". The website of the ministry of Development Cooperation - placed under FA -, states that the Dutch government focuses on 4 main development points, namely: water, food security, sexual health, and security and law and order. Remarkable is that development also includes humanitarian (emergency) aid, according to the explanation of the rest of the website. This paragraph will deal with the security part of this development policy, which is probably even more remarkable.

FA explains on the website about development cooperation, that security, and law and order are included, because states with a weak law and order and a weak governance, will face lawlessness, insecurity and conflicts. This lawlessness and insecurity of a certain country will also be felt in other countries. The Dutch government uses the examples of trade of weapons and drugs, or piracy. So, according to the government, the insecurity of one land, can cause international insecurity. The Dutch government enforces this statement by saying that it can even has consequences for the security and law and order in the Netherlands. They list many examples of possible consequences, including the growth of extremist groups. According to FA, conflicts will lead to human suffering, and hinder socio-economical development and efforts towards the millennium goals (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2012).
In a conflict people become disproportionately affected, and therefore, their arrear with regard to the millennium goals is the largest. Koenders admitted that investing in these

countries is not without risk, but the change of getting results is bigger, according to the him. He thinks that peace and security are related with all the millennium goals; security and stability are conditions for, for instance, sustainable poverty reduction. When there is a conflict in a country, it is very hard for this country to fight poverty. Often also good governance lacks. In turn, scarcity and a lack of development makes the change that conflicts start, or will be maintained, also bigger (Koenders, 2008).

The Dutch government wants to improve states with a weak governance, and with that the security in the world. The law and order of such a state should be at least strong enough to secure the basis security (police and justice). When a society becomes more stable, it will gain immediately, like employment for the population. This is called peace dividend; the economic benefit of a decrease in defense spending.

In Afghanistan the Netherlands uses the 3D-approach. The government explains that, with help of this approach, the government will contribute to the security ánd to the development of Afghanistan in a coordinated way. Because, it means that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Security and justice, and the Ministry of Economical Issues, Agriculture and Innovation are working together. Beside the mutual cooperation within the government, the Ministries also work together with other organizations, like universities and NGOs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2012).

According to the Secretary of FA, Knapen, this integrated approach is needed, because humanitarian efforts cannot be seen as something isolated. Furthermore, a humanitarian crisis cannot be effectively fought without dealing with other issues, like fighting piracy and terrorism, and providing livelihood facilities, etc, at the same time. This integrated approach would reduce the fragmentation of aid, and it would make new partnerships with donors and the private sector. According to the website of FA, this approach is broadly supported (Knapen 2011).

According to Koenders: "In general, this policy includes the support of peace dialogues, participation in crisis management operations, the provision of humanitarian aid, and the support of good governance, human rights and socio-economical reconstruction (Koenders, 2007: 4).

So, within such an integrated approach, the military is one of the players. The military is primarily an instrument of violence, but in the integrated approach, the military is mainly – however, not only – supportive. The military will create the conditions by which civil actors can do their work (Frerks et al., 2006). Furthermore, the success of the integrated approach in stabilisation operations not only depends on the cooperation between the three D's, but also depends on the involvement of the local population. According to researchers of the Dutch Institute of International Relations, it is very difficult to win a military mission, without a successful hearts-and-minds-champagne, which is focused on getting and maintaining support of the population to isolate insurgents. In Afghanistan the insurgency of the Taliban is not only a military, but also a social and political problem. Although the military power of the NATO is by far superior to the power of the insurgents, the soldier has to know the relative value of violence. According to the new security approach, he/she has to realise that excessive violence, even when it is justifiable, can easily undermine the support of the population. Therefore, the military should think less in terms of fight, and should focus on the political effects of its action, and the perspective of the population on these effects. So, the new approach demands, beside diplomatic and development skills, also social and political qualities, from the military. In the new complex peace operations, militaries

operate in the same area as civil actors. Therefore, the need has risen to cooperate in certain ways.

➢ 5.4.3.2 Mission Afghanistan

In Uruzgan the focus of this approach is on the improvement of the access to markets for farmers, the establishment of small business and companies, and other projects which generate the income of the population. This all stimulates the economical growth, so that the population can improve their livelihood independently. Also the Netherlands helps the provincial and district governors with the execution of their tasks, whereby better basic facilities for the population become established. In this way, the Netherlands provides in certain regions basic safety and, despite of the difficult circumstances, it has started reconstruction projects (Koenders, 2008).

In a letter to the parliament, former minister of Defence, Middelkoop, explains that the coherence between military and civil efforts is very important for an effective and successful execution of operations. The planning, preparation and execution of the military operation, therefore, should be coordinated with civil activities. Within the military organisation which is deployed, there should be knowledge about the civil environment and about the way of working and culture of NGOs and local governmental organisations. The new component of the Dutch Military, namely CIMIC, aims to meet this need, and to support the commander in his contacts with the civil organisations. The CIMIC personnel keeps contact with the local authorities and civil organisations, to support the safety of the militaries (force protection) and to get acceptance for the presence of the military in the operation area (force acceptance). For this purpose, also small reconstruction projects can be executed. While these short-term projects are executed, the employees of FA focus on the sustainable development projects. In this way, they can complement each other (Middelkoop, 2010-1).

As said before, the way of working in integrated operations is a quite new way of working, therefore, much remains to be learned. Middelkoop admitted this when he said that the training for these jobs will be further improved with experiences of earlier missions.
In Uruzgan, CIMIC is used in a flexible way. Among some groups of the population the support for the local governance is limited. Therefore, it is sometimes needed that the CIMIC personnel focuses more on the enlargement of the support for the local governance, and less on the support for the international military presence. The CIMIC capacity is, and will be, used in a way which is best for the relevant mission.
According to Middelkoop, until the year of writing, namely 2010, specialists of CIMIC have executed tasks with regard to agriculture, advice, operational analysis, and the coordination of CIMIC activities (Middelkoop, 2010-2). Although still much remain to be learned, Middelkoop adds: "particularly in Uruzgan the deployment of CIMIC personnel has proved to be crucial for the success of the mission".

However, as said before, different countries have different ways of working. When the money for the PRT comes directly from the national capital, the PRT is more likely to follow the instructions from their own country than that it meets the wishes of the commander of ISAF or the government in Kabul. Beside of this, areas in Afghanistan are very various, in the sense of geographical, ethnic, economical, political, so uniformity of

the PRTs is not very practical. The different PRT models are, however, often the result of different views of the various countries, instead of local factors (Homan, 2010).

The Taliban accused MSF-N of working for the Americans. This argument can be based on the bigger context, namely the polarisation between America and the Taliban, because of the War on Terror. However, it can also be based on the different way of working of the American PRTs. American PRTs work much more publically together with American aid organisations. However, MSF-N, logically fears the work of all PRTs, because all the PRTs deal with civil affairs. However, when the Netherlands, or another country tries to show that a PRT can be successful for both parties, it does not get the change, because there image is already damaged by the work of other PRTs.

The same is happening, when MSF-N accuse militaries of arresting people in hospitals. All militaries are accused, the coalition forces and ISAF, while it is possible that only the coalition forces did this.

An example of the way of working of the Dutch military can be found in the newspaper de Volkskrant (2006), which included an interview with Van der Woerdt, who is a reservist in the CIMIC battalion. When he visited Afghans, he did his helmet off and pulled out his scarf jacket, because, according to him: "you cannot just walk in with a drawn weapon". He and his colleagues repaired schools, reconstructed bridges, etc. According to him these projects are hearts-and-minds projects, and not real reconstruction. It is only a little boost to it. He says that the only cases in which they do real reconstruction and development work, is when there is no one else who can do this for the population. The policy states: "As civil as possible, as military as needed". Van der Woerdt explains, that the population may have some expectations that something concrete will be established. Therefore, when NGOs are absent, the military sometimes even execute development activities like socio-economic reconstruction. This can lead to more acceptance among the population, and it can be a start of new projects (Mallens, 2011).

He admits that reconstruction is also an argument for politicians to accede with dangerous missions, like the one in Uruzgan. Therefore, civilian experts become more and more important for the military. At the beginning, there were some adventurers among them, according to Van der Woerdt, but now they are all serious professionals. However, these adventurers can damage the image of CIMIC.

Till 2006, mainly water, road and irrigation specialists became deployed, because supporting the local governance is much more difficult. A helpful governor in a uniform gives people bad associations, says Van der Woerdt. According to him, there has been a discussion, whether they should wear a uniform or not. They should, he said, because deployed soldiers are obliged to wear a uniform. Another reservist said that it would also be better for the reservist, because they would be protected by the Geneva Conventions. This is an interesting discussion topic. When they wear a uniform, they can be seen as partial or even as a threat, but when they do not wear a uniform they contribute even more to the mixing of roles (nobody without a uniform will be trusted anymore) (Volkskrant, 2006).

Although, the policy states that the projects are only done to support the military mission, and the militaries are accused of not caring about the Afghan people, the following example shows something else. Kronenberg, another reservist, asked the Afghans a lot about their way of working and explained them that they could use money

also as an asset. So, he is not giving things, to be liked, but really tries to share something which will help the Afghans to have a sustainable livelihood. He and his colleagues let the Afghans do the work in their own way, also when this way seemed strange to them as Westerners. He said that they learned a lot themselves. The Afghans are very studious with regard to the Western way of enterprising. They hope to make more change to get a job in the labour market.

Another reservist explained that, someone who focuses on the growth of his company and tries to gain money, will not throw bombs. Militaries cannot execute their mission in an area without aid organisations which improve the conditions of the population. He says: "When no perspective is offered to the population, they want to go back to the former situation. So, security and development go hand in hand. Without security no development, without development no security" (Volkskrant, 2006: par.2).

➢ *5.4.3.3 Support for military and mission*

   According to politician P. Scheffer, the military cannot assume to have a solid basis of international solidarity and engagement in the Netherlands, by which he means that the Dutch population will only support international interventions, when the military have arguments which are in favour of them, or which can convince them of the need to intervene. The military should, for example, always make a link between foreign activities and domestic security (Hellema, 2011).

Former Secretary J. de Vries, explained that during the military presence in Uruzgan the support for the mission among the Dutch population decreased, also because of the increasing number of killed militaries. When support of own people is whished, one should make clear to these people that the mission is in the interest of these people. The Dutch government and military have to make clear that the mission in Afghanistan is in the interest of the Netherlands. The mission is initiated to bring peace and democracy in a country which suffered for 40 years under war, but it is also initiated to make us free from terrorism and to play an important role in the world; a world which serves our interest as trade nation (Kleinreesink, 2012).

Currently it seems that the military only execute international missions, which is a small basis for legitimacy among the Dutch population. To enlarge the acceptance of the population civil-military cooperation is enlarged in the own country. However, support for the military does not automatically means, support for certain missions. The use of CIMIC during international missions can also used to enlarge the support for the mission (Hellema, 2011).

   Although the Parliament only consented the mission in Uruzgan when it would be a reconstruction mission, in practice, it seems to be more like a fighting mission. Former Minister of Defence, H. Kamp, already pointed at this by saying that the first phase of the mission would be focused on the stabilisation of the security situation, in which later reconstruction could take place. The confusion about the character of the mission is caused by the discussion which took place before the mission in the Netherlands. In that discussion much emphasis was given to the concept 'reconstruction' (Mallens, 2011). During the decision-making about the mission there was continuously confusion whether the mission would be about fighting or about reconstruction. The then-minister of Defence, stated: "We do not go to fight, we go to help". Furthermore, recruitment films on TV of the divers military components showed thankful Afghan people with proud posing soldiers.

> *5.4.3.4 Financial support*

The criticism about the use of the Development budget for military mission is responded by a paper. The government explains that there are certain criteria for the field of peace, security and development, which are leading in the assessment whether activities are Official Development Assistance (ODA) or not. Activities which meet the criteria do not affect the Development budget, but are qualified to be financed by it. The government explains that it has a Stability Fund that includes an ODA as well as non-ODA component, which can be quickly used for military activities in the field of peace, security and development. For example, activities like demining and demobilisation, and supporting the police, are qualified as ODA. Dutch embassies can make proposals for projects in the country where they themselves are located. Mostly, international organisations, like the UN, execute these activities. But development countries execute the activities also sometimes by itself. For other activities in the same fields, which are not qualified as ODA, other means will be used, not the Development budget (Overheid.nl, 2012). The additional expenditures for the Dutch participation in crisis management operations is financed by the HGIS-provision[3] "executing crisis management operations" from the Defence budget; only a small part of these expenditures are qualified as ODA, according to the government.

This way of responding to criticism, namely writing a paper, is an example of the indirect way in which the government and the military answer questions from organisations or the rest of the Dutch population. They do not directly answer criticism and questions, but answer questions by explaining their policy on their own websites, in brochures, reports, and papers, in documents with questions of the parliament, and occasionally during individual interviews with an employee, like Van Der Woerdt. They do answer questions which are frequently asked or respond on comments which are repeatedly given through the media, because, as explained above, the government and military continuously have to fight for acceptance.

5.4.4 Local population and local organisations

The discussion so far, has been about the intervention of two parties who influence the lives of millions of Afghan people by their work. Both the military and MSF-N claim to work in a right way; the way which is focused on own objectives. However, the question rises whether the population and local organisations are as much involved in the discussions about the way of working, as in the real working practice of both parties. Do they support only one party, or both parties partially; do they actually care about the discussion?

About the North of Afghanistan it is known that local NGOs, as well as some of the staff of INGOs which work on the field level, tend to cooperate with the military. They think that the head quarters lose themselves in an academic discussion about principles and ideal-typical perspectives which can hinder effective aid provision. They think that a principal position is a luxury, which can only be afforded by rich organisations. They are thankful for every support, whether this is provided by the military or not (Klem and Laar, 2008).

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[3] HGIS stands for Homogenous Group International Cooperation; in Dutch this is: Homogene Groep Internationale Samenwerking.

About the whole of Afghanistan it is known that NGOs continue to be a relatively distinct group, but many of them collaborated closely with military actors. In fact, because of the close link of the military with bilateral and UN aid agencies, it is hard for NGOs to remain completely separate from the military. It is hard to circumvent militaries, for example, because of certain meetings.

Furthermore, often there is no abidance to the policy statement 'as civil as possible, as military as needed', because militaries provide also aid which could be given by NGOs. However, in reality, the needs are too big, which make the efforts of NGOs insufficient, at least in the eyes of the militaries. Also, among the military the opinion dominates that when personnel and material is already in the area, it might as well be used. Furthermore, some of these activities show that militaries are not deaf for development principles and strategies (Klem and Laar, 2008).

In some cases people laugh when they hear about the allegations that NGOs should keep away from military. "How will you do your work if you're not protected?" someone asked (Klem and Laar, 2008: 142). According to the independent researcher in conflict and development issues, Bart Klem, and Stefan van Laar who works for the Emergency Aid and Reconstruction Sector of the development organisation Cordaid, for many people, it does not matter who gives aid. Remarkably, in general, peacekeepers are more popular than NGOs. The population is grateful towards the soldiers, because they give them security, they demobilise fighters, and they give very visible aid. On the other hand, complaints about ineffective, inefficient, unreliable and self-interested aid agencies are quite common. Many NGOs are in fact private companies. A NGO perception assessment, done in late 2004, states that only a small minority expressed a positive view of NGOs while the vast majority expressed negative comments. Communities complain about unmet promises and requests or more help are an everyday reality. Likewise, the field data suggest that ISAF is more popular than NGOs in major parts of the country.

Also the local organisations are quite critical of INGOs propagating principled objections against working with military actors. An often-heard complaint of Afghan NGOs is that most INGOs criticize organisations that work with PRTs in these areas. "INGOs are not capable of doing assessments in high risk areas" an Afghan NGO representative observed. "They do not know what the needs are of the people in those areas. They are not allowed to go into the insecure areas and let local organisations do the job." He knew about INGOs which claim to be impartial. However this seemed very hypocritical to him, because these organisations do accept funding from NATO governments. "If you really want to be impartial you must refuse the money from your government and stop reporting to your embassy," one person stated.

It s true that MSF-N asks for financing for specific projects from (emergency) aid funds of the European Union and national governments. However, for certain projects they decide not to ask project subsidies from institutional donors; this applies to countries or areas by which big donors are highly involved in the conflict (Ministerie van Buitnelandse Zaken, 2011). While the military seems to be more popular, why do NGOs not link with them? Do they really believe they enlarge the risk of attacks on themselves and the people they help? Or would this suggest that NGOs want to be accepted by donors and the international society, rather than by the Afghan population?

INGOs attach more weight to humanitarian principles than Afghan NGOs when presenting themselves. Mostly also during their work in real practice. There is little

cooperation with the military, because the number of objections is perceived to be larger than the number of opportunities. Objections are, for instance, the high staff turnover of PRTs and the apparent ineffectiveness of PRTs with regard to the provision of security and development work.

That most INGOs are solidarity with regard to cooperation with the military, invokes fierce critics from donors and UN representatives. This critics are fed by other factors, like the large number of organisations, lack of transparency and lack of coordination (Klem and Laar, 2008).

Afghan NGOs consider the debate on civil-military relationships to be not only a philosophical academic discussion, but also as a Western issue. According to some of them, humanitarian aid is just about giving aid to people in need, irrespective of with whom you cooperate. In the south of the country, however, the security situation is worse for the NGOs. Attacks on staff and projects and intimidating letters are very common. These incidents, however, are not necessarily a response to civil-military cooperation, because many attacks occur in the absence of this. One respondent said: "The Taliban just want to stop progress. They even attack purely civilian projects that have nothing to do with the military. They burn down schools. They just want to keep people away from the government." Indeed, the military intervention is a state-building project and is therefore hard to separate from the government. So, for NGOs, avoiding ISAF while cooperating with the Afghan government makes little sense (Klem and Laar, 2008).

For many Afghan NGOs, Taliban opposition is no reason to stop cooperating with the military. Particularly the Afghan NGOs maintain close ties. They avoid discussions about principles which would hinder optimal aid provision to the people in need.

Even in areas with a very worse security situation, there is often no evidence that an agency's interaction with militaries is the determining factor for the safety of aid workers. Finally, the claim that militaries are bad at providing aid is undermined by widespread criticism against the work of NGOs, while some activities executed by ISAF were applauded.

NGO criticism towards the military intervention and their unwillingness be associated with PRTs is disapproved among the population. "humanitarian principles do not work in this country", one person said. Furthermore, using them is not seen as in the interest of the target population. "Rather, they should join ranks and collectively help these people as best as they can", this person felt (Klem and Laar, 2008: 138).

Probably the person meant that people look at the real practices of organisations, instead of listening to the principles they claim to abide to. However, as shown, the international society with its donors do listen to the visions and arguments of the organisations.

The debate circles to a large extent around local perceptions and interpretations. However, people's perceptions matter. Contrary to the assumption that "they are all Westerners to the people," many people do know the difference between the various actors. Even relatively uneducated people often know that the OEF and ISAF troops are not the same, that there are differences between the PRTs, and between armed and unarmed actors. Only the names of individual aid organisations are less known. Sometimes the people do not even know who implemented a certain project in their village.

However, even when people have much knowledge of the international players, it is questionable that they care much about which of these players gives aid. Most people are surprised to find out that there is a conflict about the division of labour between the military and humanitarian organisation. They are surprised that some aid organisations do not want to cooperate with the military.

In the North of Afghanistan, ISAF is popular and people do not have concerns with regard to a possible mix of roles with NGOs. They rather like ISAF to do more, than they do now. For Afghans it is normal that militaries provide aid. Much less is known about views of people in the South, because of a lack of access because of insurgents, and because people are less open because of the worse security situation.

NGOs have an image problem. Although people are thankful, almost everywhere people complain about aid provision failures by aid organisations. However, NGOs do not collectively respond to this problem, they have a competition in which they contest each other's legitimacy. ISAF is a better public diplomat. It propagate its views in newspapers, on the radio and by other means (Klem and Laar, 2008).

Much of the controversy around civil-military relationships in Afghanistan is not a result of interaction between militaries and aid organisations per se, but a result of much broader trends. According to Klem and Van Laar (2008), Afghanistan is a striking example of "contemporary conflicts in which traditional distinctions – economic/political, state/non-state, civil/military, domestic/international, partisan/neutral, war/peace – do not hold". The Afghan population is concerned about their survival. Expectations are high among towards all international players, so they become frustrated when the government and international actors do not perform well in their eyes. They are less worried about the mixing of roles aid organisations and the military.

So, in Afghanistan, mostly in the South, local organisations and the local population do not care about militaries cooperating with civil actors. They want help, no matter from who. They see the conflict between the two parties as a Western luxury problem.

5.5 Conclusion

The government, military and MSF-N, all use mainly their own website to inform other relevant stakeholder, like the Dutch population and donors, about their visions on civil-military cooperation. MSF-N uses also the media to respond directly towards certain claims or critics. However, the government and the military do not directly respond to criticism towards CIMIC. They do answer questions by explaining their policy on their own websites, in brochures and reports, in documents with questions of the parliament, and occasionally during individual interviews with an employee. They do answer questions which are frequently asked or respond on comments which are repeatedly given through the media, because not only aid organisations have to fight for acceptance, but also the government and military continuously have to fight for it.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains that the complex modern crises demand an integrated security approach. A number of Ministries work together towards interventions which are focused on security as well as development. This approach is reflected by the use of PRTs and CIMIC in Afghanistan. The tasks of the PRTs are focused

on state-building. The FA claims actually that the new approach of the military is needed for the succeeding of the military mission, which serves the Dutch population, but also the Afghan population.

MSF-N, however, let the reader think that civil-military cooperation is a means by which the government and the military try to get grip on aid organisations and aid itself, and to use it as a means to achieve a political-military objective. Of course the media show things, of which both parties do not have control.

The local population and local organisations, however, think that the discussion about civil-military cooperation is a Western luxury problem. They do not care about this issue, and do not want it to hinder the provision of aid.

PART 3

ANALYSIS

6. Analysis

This chapter will analyse chapter 3, 4, 5, and 6 on the basis of the concepts legitimacy and legitimation processes. The focus will be on the case about civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan.
As said before, legitimacy is seen as acceptance which is socially constructed and which can occur in different degrees. Culture and discourses construct legitimacy, as well as the other way around. This is a continuously constructing process. Humanitarian organisations try to gain legitimacy. However, all relevant stakeholders try to do the same. All actors mutually construct each other's image in top-down processes, as well as bottom-up processes, which include power struggles. All stakeholders have different interests in these processes, and therefore, value different aspects.

Among the Dutch ministries of Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation (as a component of the first), Defence, Security and justice, and the Ministry of Economical Issues, Agriculture and Innovation, and among the Dutch military, the prevailing discourse is that security and development are strongly related. This discourse is expressed by the new policy of the ministries by which they work closer together, and by the increased importance of the third task of the military. NATO shares this opinion and showed this by starting the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Also the majority of international organisations and aid organisations, join this comprehensive view on development and express this by their support to ISAF. According to this joint perspective, already during the conflict the population should be given an alternative for fighting, so development projects should start already during the conflict. Because there are not always enough aid organisations in certain areas during a conflict, the military should start with the provision of aid.
However, the military emphasises that they are not doing development work. They just execute small reconstruction activities to show solidarity with the population and to avoid an aid vacuum, while giving a little boost towards real development activities. According to the relevant ministries and the military, the military is only supportive, and builds the stability and security which is needed for the work of aid organisations. CIMIC is only there to coordinate the relationship between military and civil actors, and to coordinate the small reconstruction activities.
The government and the military experience a hegemonic discourse, that the world's security situation is changing, as explained in chapter 2, and that the involved actors have only little influence on these external and quite autonomous processes which take place on a global level. They would only be able to adapt to these external trends.

MSF-N knows the power of governments, international organisations, and the military. Therefore, it tries to use an instrument which is seen as universal at global level, at least in the eyes of big Western powers, namely the IHL, to convince the Dutch population and the governments and military who join this approach (which are mainly Western), that the claim that such an integrated approach is needed, does not deserves legitimacy. They say that the way in which the other party works is against the humanitarian principles. In this way they try to gain legitimacy for their opinion about this new approach.
They also point at the possible consequences of this integrated security approach, mainly to gain legitimacy among the Dutch and Afghan population, but also other populations from countries of which the government supports or uses this integrated

approach. They try to establish a certain discourse by which aid receivers, who already suffer, will suffer even more, because aid and aid workers are so-called misused and manipulated by politicians and militaries in order to achieve political-military objectives. As explained in chapter 4, aid organisations can use the image of aid receivers as victims in their legitimation processes.

MSF-N uses very often the concepts 'political strategy', 'misuse' or 'disrespect', to enforce their statement. They try to let people believe that the people in need, and humanitarian organisations like themselves, are victims of many power states and international organisations, who use aid and aid organisations mainly for their own interests. They present themselves as actors who only want to help people in need on the basis of morality. They present the civil-military-cooperation-approach as a means by which the government and the military try to get grip on aid organisations and aid itself, to use it as a means to achieve a political-military objective; suggesting that political and military objectives are less worthy to follow.

Furthermore, MSF-N suggests that the military lost its goal, because the militaries lost their enemy. MSF-N says via an interview in a newspaper, that the military and the government, therefore, used a broad social discussion to steer the military organisation to a new direction. Namely the direction of the humanitarian field, which probably also would lead to more legitimacy for the work of the military.

The question rises, why did the government still want to have a military organisation? Maybe they wanted indeed the military, because of the control the government has over this organisation and its activities. Or did and do they value the civil-military cooperation really as something important? Also, the reasons presented by the MSF-N to take such an opposite position can differ from the real reasons on which they base this position. Maybe the real reason is that they are afraid of being superfluous or afraid to lose money. Anyway, they enforced their position by saying that the military should not begin with civil action of which they do not have knowledge.

Both parties, the military and the aid organisations, including MSF-N, got more responsibility. MSF-N, because of the broadened principles, because of the new discourse that people in need have the right to get aid, and because of the discourse that the UN and humanitarian organisations should intervene and take over the tasks of a governments which lack to care for their people. Therefore, more situations are a reason for donors or international organisations to call on humanitarian organisations for help. Furthermore, the military and aid organisations broadened their tasks because of the new 3D-approach, which is based on the discourse about the need for an integrated security approach.

The hegemonic discourse that development is connected with security is also reflected in the trend that aid organisations focus more and more on human rights and security issues. This trend might be enforced by the broadening of the principles. However, the principles could also be broadened because of this discourse, which in turn gave more freedom to organisations. Anyway, these conflict-focused aid organisations are more and more involved in the military terrain.

That there are even certain organisations which do work together with the military can be explained by the fact that different organisations have different interests, and because of this difference of focus between organisations - some focus only on humanitarian aid, others focus more on development aid, or even conflict issues. Many

aid organisations need the money and facilities of the military, or just support ISAF because they have conflict solving objectives themselves. Some just not care about the principles, or experience that they get more legitimacy from the population when they work together with the military. MSF-N does not need money, beside the money of donors who want MSF-N to be neutral and impartial.

It is remarkable that MSF-N does not blame other organisations of working on the military side, while they do blame the involvement of the military on the civil side. MSF-N is not critical, at least not openly, towards organisations which are involved in the military terrain, while they also blur the lines between civil and military roles, which can contribute to the danger for aid workers and aid receivers. This would question their claim about the relation between the mixing of roles and the increased risk for themselves and for aid receivers. When they do not speak out clearly against these conflict focused organisations, and distinguish itself from these kind of organisations, populations will not make a difference between the aid organisations and accuse MSF-N together with the other organisations also from blurring the lines between civil and military roles. In that case, MSF-N will lose legitimacy for their claims against the civil-military cooperation.

Maybe MSF-N uses all these claims which are only directed towards the military and the government, not because of the danger of mixed roles, but only because they do not want to be used by other actors; the way in which they explain the civil-military cooperation. The fact that governments pay more attention to humanitarian action, is presented by MSF-N as reducing respect for humanitarian aid and aid workers, because military objectives become mingled with diplomatic and development goals. The organisation uses the prevailing discourse that 'political' is something negative; something strongly related to self-interest.
The government will not deny that it follows political goals, just as an aid organisation will not deny that it follows their own organisation's objectives. Both parties can hide behind their claims that they make choices, and do things, for the well being of others. The government and the military admit that they need the support of the population, to execute a mission which should bring stability. As explained, research points at a relation between extern and intern security. This claim can be used by the government, to argue that this stability, but also the effect of the stability, namely the improvement of the security of the people in the Netherlands, also are moral objectives.

However, according to the government, many people do not see the relation between extern and intern security, therefore, the government has to use other arguments to start a mission. So, they use the argument that such a mission will enforce their status as trade nation, and the argument that the mission will be a reconstruction mission, instead of a fighting mission. Security is presented by government documents as related to all Millennium Goals, and the documents state that a humanitarian crisis cannot be effectively fought without dealing with other issues, like fighting piracy and terrorism, and providing livelihood facilities, etc.
The government and military act like they care indeed about the well-being of the Afghans and the Dutch people. However, it is unclear whether this aid is a goal itself, or only a mean to achieve another goal. As explained in chapter 4, some governments used aid to show that they were prepared to deal with the consequences of their

interventions. In this way they could get legitimacy for their mission, and they realised that aid could also be used to improve their image.

An example of such an accusation towards the government about following another goal, can be the following. NATO wants to maintain its status and gain legitimacy, therefore, they deploy militaries for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The Dutch government wants to be seen as an active and reliable ally, and tries to achieve this by participating in this ISAF mission. They want to be sure, that the Dutch people will be helped by their allies of NATO, when they are attacked in the future. So, actually again this would be in favour of the Dutch population. Although the highest military commander uses this argument, the government does not. Probably because it fears that people will only look at the first part: getting in favour by NATO to achieve a certain status, a reason which will not contribute to the legitimacy of the government, and maybe even de-legitimate the government.

The military and the government claim against the aid organisations, that they do not take over the roles of civil organisations, but that their mission is only supportive: they will bring security and stability, which will give the civil organisations the possibility to execute their tasks. Against the Dutch population, however, they claim that they are in Afghanistan for reconstruction not for fighting. This can be seen as an attempt of the government to gain legitimacy from both parties by a manipulation of the reflection of the real practices in Afghanistan.
However, although these arguments are indeed attempts to gain legitimacy, it is not based on a false reflection of the reality, but based on the real reality. Bringing stability does not imply that the military are fighting in Afghanistan. Bringing stability is, in the case of the mission in Afghanistan, state-building, which is focused on the establishment of good functioning governments and a good functioning police. However, the military admits that they will fight when they are hindered in their activities by attacks.
The stability is indeed supportive for the activities of civil organisations. Although state-building can be seen as a task of civil aid organisations, state-building is already a political and impartial task, and is therefore different from 'neutral' humanitarian aid. The problem is, however, that the hearts-and-mind-activities of the military are much closer to humanitarian activities, which can de-legitimate the claim of the government and the military.

Obviously MSF-N does not agree with the involvement of the military in the civil field, and uses mainly its own website to inform other relevant stakeholder, like the Dutch population and donors, about their visions on civil-military cooperation. MSF-N uses also the media to respond directly towards certain claims or critics.
MSF-N sees itself as an independent international organisation, which would imply that the legitimation processes between the Dutch government and MSF-N are horizontal. However, the Dutch government has a lot of power, which makes the processes vertical. Government and military will follow their will – whether they want it themselves, or whether they are pushed by external trends of changing security issues and conflicts. However, despite of their power, they still explain their policy and react on critical questions, because they realise that they are also depended on bottom-up processes of legitimation.

The way in which they answer questions about civil-military cooperation, however, shows the power status of the government and the military. Both do not respond directly to criticism towards CIMIC. They do answer questions by explaining their policy on their own websites, in brochures and reports, in documents with questions of the parliament, and occasionally during individual interviews via the media. They do answer questions which are frequently asked or respond on comments which are repeatedly given through the media. Although information on a website does not seems to be a defence to their opinion – in this way they can uphold their status, it is indeed a fight to get legitimacy.

Although governments and donors are accused of their focus on own interests, organisations can also work on the basis of own organisational interests, as explained earlier. Humanitarian organisation have namely also their own political and economical agenda's, to survive or just because of the desire to grow. Although some militaries do, high commanders and the government do not criticise NGOs publically about this.

To hide this self-interest, and to gain legitimacy, MSF-N, and aid organisations in general, focus on other goals in their mandate. As explained, the mandate is often used to distinguish the organisation from other organisations. It is possible that the mandate states that the organisation has clearly another position than other organisations, while in practice there is less difference.

Furthermore, when an organisation tries to avoid self-interest and thinks it does act in accordance to their principles, it is possible that other actors asses this from another perspective. For example, MSF-N decided to withdraw from Afghanistan, and explained through the media and its website that the organisation could not give aid in an neutral and independent way, which would bring themselves, but also the aid receivers in danger. However, there are Dutch people who see this act as a political choice, which is focused on the organisation's own interest. According to these people, MSF-N wanted to make a statement against military involvement in the civil areas to try to legitimate their independent work, and made this choice instead of a choice which is in the interest of the people in need.

Beside the difficulty to control interpretations, it is difficult for MSF-N to control the associations which are made between the organisation and other parties. Organisations can be held responsible when donors push the organisation or aid in a certain direction. This shows that beside the association with the military, the organisations can also be associated by certain donors through which they lose legitimacy. The association with the military, would possibly lead to de-legitimation by both the donors and fighting parties, and the political pressure from the donors would de-legitimate the organisation among the local population and fighting parties.

According to MSF, they have access to the people who need medical emergency aid, due to their complete independent and neutral position. However, it is sometimes too difficult for an organisation to live by its mandate. Donors can demand transparency and accountability, which costs a lot of time, money, which could be used for giving aid. Furthermore, because of this transparency some controversial ways of working, have to be stopped, because it would de-legitimate the organisation among donors. Negotiating with rebels could be an example of this.

Beside the difference of focus on humanitarian organisations by donors and local populations, namely the focus on transparency and accountability, and the focus on the amount and quality of aid, both parties also differ when it comes to social negotiation of the humanitarian organisations in local areas. As shown by the example about the rebels, the donors do not like the association between humanitarian organisations and rebels. However, the population likes a more pragmatic way of commitment to the principles of neutrality and impartiality.

Organisations can gain legitimacy for their work when they work very close with local structures and leaders to win the trust of the most important political and military actors in the area, which makes that they can meet the needs of the local people. Often the local population does not even know about the principles, or do not care about them. For example, it is hard to explain the international conventions to the sometimes analphabetic rebels, and to convince them what should be done based on these unknown rules. Also, this claim of working in accordance to so-called universal rules and principles can give the organisations an arrogant attitude, which will not contribute to a good image of the organisation.

One of the major reasons why organisations, which claim to work in an universal way when working in accordance to the humanitarian principles, are not given legitimacy, is because of the discourse of a Western and non-Western polarised world, which prevails all over the world. Because of this polarisation, based on the 'War on Terror' and the re-identification processes on the basis religion, not only Western organisations, but also international organisations are often seen as part of the Western world. According to many people of the non-Western world – in the case of Afghanistan mostly the non-Western parties of war -, humanitarian principles are made by the Western people, who want to extent their power with it. The organisations are sometimes also accused of working in a neo-colonial way. This reduces the meaning of the principles to deception.

So, getting legitimacy, at least among the local population, is not always depending on the claim to abide by the humanitarian principles. The degree of support given to an organisation depends on the opinion of relevant stakeholders. Besides the focus on the principles, there are also other ways in which organisations can gain trust, support, and moreover, legitimacy.

As explained, this trust also depends on the attitude of employees of the organisations, their solidarity towards the population, the quality of aid, and the moment on which aid is given (organisations can act too early or too late, and too little or too much). Furthermore, the effects of giving aid will be also taken into account by the population, but also by donors and the whole international society. For example, humanitarian aid can prolong the conflict, because the elite can profit from these services. Probably, the international society, donors, and the local population do not want to continuing of the conflict.

Also, the competition among aid organisations shape a bad image of them among aid, because the competition seems to be more important than giving aid. So, cooperation would give a better picture, and because there is no clear program owner, the chance to be seen as impartial will also be smaller.

International guidelines are sometimes not even known by the field staff - the attitude of the head office can be very different from that of the field workers -, staff does not know what to do with it, or the people who sign it do not always live by it. And when

they do know, international guidelines and principles are not always directly clear among main groups within a country.

The following question has arise: 'What exactly is commitment to the humanitarian principles?' As said before, the lack of consistency between the traditional and development principles leads to many different ways in which the principles are combined and used. Both traditional ways as more development-oriented ways are possible. So, the use of principles is highly dependent on outside factors and view of actors, which is indeed in contrast with the principles themselves.

Because the Code of Conduct became increasingly criticised, the status of the Code of Conduct is reduced. However, there are still situations in which parties distrust organisations, because the organisations do not work according to the humanitarian principles. Because in practice, distrust can exist because of impartiality. The status of the Code of Conduct can be reduced on paper, however, in practice in local areas, this status does not have to be reduced.

The increased complexity of crises made it increasingly difficult for organisations to gain legitimacy. Beside the difficulty for humanitarian organisations to adapt to different kinds of crises, there is also the difficulty of dealing with the conflict parties and their different ways of fighting. Furthermore, the increased number of aid workers, all with their own interests, caused competition for humanitarian space and public favour. As shown, different stakeholders prefer different aspects. An offensive war party who gains from the conflict, for example, will prefer organisations who do not interfere in, and try to solve, the conflict.

Traditional humanitarian organisations, like ICRC and MSF-N, try to distinguish themselves from the rest by their commitment to the traditional humanitarian principles, as explained. Nowadays, however, humanitarian organisations provide more often long term aid, because of the chronicle nature of many crises. This makes the possibilities for other actors to manipulate the aid bigger. MSF-N wants to protect their way of working from this, and avoiding militaries is an example of this.

However, among the Afghan population this discourse of a manipulating military is not shared. The Afghan population undermines this discourse by bottom-up processes of legitimation. In Afghanistan, mostly in the South, local organisations and the local population do not care about militaries cooperating with civil actors. They want help, no matter from who. They see the conflict between the two parties as a Western luxury problem. They do not care about this issue, and do not want it to hinder the provision of aid.

Although the local population is less critical about the cooperation between civil aid workers and militaries, they do focus on other aspects of organisations. Both the aid givers and aid receivers can create each other by their mutual images, which have big consequences for the support given to them by relevant stakeholders. The variety of images of these two parties can only partially be controlled by both parties themselves. Aid receivers try to legitimate themselves by showing that they are in need, and they can protest via the media that they do not get sufficient help. The identification and understanding of such strategies is difficult for organisations, and costs time and financial means which cannot be used for aid provision itself.

As said before, the population is focused on the provision of aid. So, to get in favour by the population the humanitarian organisation should meet the needs of them. This is almost impossible when local structures and security situations are not known, and even when the situation is known, it is for humanitarian organisations, particularly in chronically crises, often very difficult to respond to all the needs.

Participation of locals within humanitarian aid provision can be useful, because locals mostly know more about the local context than foreigners. However, although local participation is a concept with a positive symbol meaning within the Western world, it often causes offence by the local population, because often only a Western-mind elite is chosen to participate, which often does not know very much of the rest of the population.

Furthermore, organisations often work around local organisations and initiatives. Organisations should not discourage local based initiatives, when they want to gain legitimacy from the local population.

In interviews, MSF does say, that the organisation is focused on local people. According to MSF-N, it is the military who work only in a top-down way, and are focused on their own goals. Furthermore, militaries would not be appropriate to give aid, according to MSF-N. The militaries, however, try to maintain legitimacy for their new approach, by saying that it is still a quite new way of working of which still much has to be learned. Also, although they do not really point at it, the militaries use experts for their work which know about the way in which aid organisations work and know about the civil context of the crises. Specialists themselves explain, trough interviews in the media, however, that their work with the local population, is not only a top-down way of working, but a mutual learning process.

This fight for legitimacy of the militaries and humanitarian organisations shows that, beside the mutual imaging of aid givers and aid receivers, also militaries and aid givers construct each other's image. Actually all actors can influence the image of others.

While MSF-N is not the only player in these processes who is used by others for legitimacy, they use this fight - in which many power states and international organisations, who use aid and aid organisations mainly for their own interests - in their presentation in which they present the organisation as being a victim. However, they do not only *use* this view of being a victim, among MSF-N employees really prevails the discourse of being used by many actors, because they have to deal with many stakeholders, which all have their different interests.

For example, on local level, the organisations have to negotiate with much more groups to be recognised and accepted. This is very difficult, because it is hard to know about the existence of every group, because it is very unclear which fighter belongs to which group, and which groups work together. Furthermore, every group demands its own way of dealing

Also, hindering of aid by the government is very hard to avoid, and organisations are easily placed on the side of the other war party. A government can be jealous or offended by the intervention of humanitarian organisations. The government has the power to create a discourse among the local people, which can damage the image of an organisation among the population. However, cooperating with the government, or regulations for aid working, can cause distrust among local parties, because they get the impression that aid organisations work closely together with the government or

represent the government, when the government is a party of war. The national governments have a lot of power, in financial, regulatory, and campaigning sense. They can have a lot of positive or negative influence on the capacity of humanitarian organisations, depending on their own interests.

Humanitarian organisations also have to deal with the media. Although it can give attention to their work, and can promote their work, the organisations cannot have control over the media. The media can also shape a bad image of an organisation among local level and global level. Also, when organisations use the media themselves, they can lose legitimacy, because the media is never neutral, and is not seen as such.

The media also function as watchdog. Although, this could be seen as positive, in the sense that quality can become ensured, in reality, it works the other way around. The media harassed aid organisations to work faster, which sometimes leads to the infringement of the quality.

As explained, although the fight for legitimacy is done to meet the needs populations, this fight for legitimacy, keeps organisations also away from their goals. However, it is possible that their goal is indeed getting legitimacy for own interests, like money. It is possible that organisations focus only on the wants of donors, because they will give them money. Certain acts like painting cars and offices to distinguish itself from the militaries or the UN, can be done for a lot of reasons. It can be done to show that they are not related to other groups, in order to get legitimacy among fighting parties and among the local population. Also, this can be done to please donors which want the organisation to be neutral, in order to get money.

To conclude, although on global level still the discourse prevails that humanitarian organisations work on a moral base and are doing good work, increasing criticism towards humanitarian work can damage this discourse. The humanitarian organisations try to steer this new discourse. They want people to believe that aid workers and aid are victims of people who use them as a means for their own interests.

For example, MSF-N tries to convince local people that they, as MSF-N, are independent of the Western world. Furthermore, MSF-N tries to convince the Dutch government, militaries, donors, and the Dutch population that they are only seen as Western because of the blurred dividing lines between humanitarian and military activities, which makes it in the field increasingly hard for the population to distinguish all parties. This argument will be hard to make, when it is broadly known that aid workers are also attacked in other countries.

The relevant part of the Dutch government, together with the military, however, try to steer the new discourse into another direction. They want to convince people that all stakeholders are subject to larger external changes of security and conflicts, and that indeed aid should be given in another way; an integrated way.

The most powerful actor has the most influence on the formation of the dominant ideology, called hegemony. These power relations are formed by meetings and documents, as well as by informal interactions. So, this kind of power depends on negotiation and argumentation skills, as well as skills to use the media and other instruments to present things in a certain way.

When the humanitarian organisations want to fight for legitimacy in order to reduce the risk of themselves and the local population, it seems that they have to make a decision whether they should avoid cooperation with the military, which demands a lot of time and money, and probably also coordination, or whether they should work

together and deal with a greater risk of being attacked; a risk which is already there because of the polarisation of the world.

PART 4

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

7. Conclusion

Both the humanitarian organisations and the military have their own opinion about civil-military cooperation, which is a result of the 3D-approach of the Dutch government, and is supported by the introduced military component CIMIC. The opinions of both parties are contrasting, however, both defendable, and defending their opinion is exactly what these parties do. Both are trying to get legitimacy for their own opinion. However, a party's gain of legitimacy, can be another party's loss of legitimacy. Not only they try to legitimate their own opinion, but also they try to de-legitimate the other's opinion. During this fight, they do not only focus on possible opinions about the issue of civil-military cooperation, but they also try to construct each other's image. The legitimacy for the organisation itself is strongly related to the legitimacy it gets for its opinions.

Humanitarian organisations are in a dense network of all kinds of stakeholders which continuously construct each other's image. CIMIC makes the legitimation processes of humanitarian organisations more difficult to control by the organisations themselves, because it adds another factor for which organisations have to fight for legitimacy. They have to fight for the legitimacy of their opinion about this issue of civil-military cooperation.
Although traditional humanitarian organisations claim to be independent, this research about civil-military cooperation and the legitimation processes in which the discussion about this issue takes place, show that they are actually dependent on all these constructing stakeholders. Humanitarian organisations fight in bottom-up as well as top-down processes for their legitimacy.

This fight is increasingly difficult, because the number of constructing stakeholders increased a lot in recent years, and still is increasing. To overcome the power status of the government, humanitarian organisations use all kinds of means and arguments within these legitimation processes. Their main argument is the following: they themselves are working on a moral base and give aid in a neutral and impartial way. The government and the military, however, are pursuing political-military goals, and are impartial. When humanitarian organisations are associated with the military, they will be seen as impartial, which will cause danger for aid workers and the one's they help. Civil-military cooperation will enforce such an association between the military and the humanitarian organisations. Therefore, for the sake, of people in need, the new component CIMIC should be eliminated.

To show that they really believe this, they paint cars and offices as a symbol that they do not want to be associated by the military. Furthermore, they use newspapers, their own websites, and interviews with journalists to tell international organisations and donors that military are using aid for their own political goals, and that the military really put them in danger.
Because all stakeholders have different interests, the humanitarian organisations have to use different arguments for different stakeholders to gain legitimacy from as many as possible stakeholders. Donors, rather than big international organisations, like the UN, will care about the neutrality and impartiality of the humanitarian organisations. International organisations and the local population will care more about the efficiency and quality of the aid provision.

As said above, CIMIC makes the legitimation processes of humanitarian organisations more difficult to control by the organisations themselves, because it adds another factor for which organisations have to fight for legitimacy. The legitimation processes, however, also became increasingly difficult, because the fight for legitimacy for their opinion about this issue might hinder their fight for legitimacy for other issues. For example, when the humanitarian organisations want to come in favour by the UN, and the UN supports civil-military cooperation during peacekeeping operations, the organisations should not oppose this way of working.

This fight for legitimacy among humanitarian organisations, can have negative consequences for the quality of aid, because the fight for legitimacy costs time and money. An interesting question is whether this fight has a larger negative influence than cooperating with the military. Both can costs lives.

8. Discussion

This chapter will discuss the way in which the research is executed. It will focus on the weaknesses of the research methods and its influence on the results of the research. Also it will point at the need for further research.

First of all, there is of course the weakness of the use of secondary sources during a literature research. Most literature which is consulted for the first chapters is from people who wrote about the ways in which humanitarian organisations work and how they deal with other actors. However, for chapter 7, also the own websites, reports, and brochures of the organisations were consulted, on which their own arguments where visible, and beside the content of these texts, the texts itself already were a means by which organisations try to get legitimacy.

Secondly, however, the information about the opinion of Afghans is all from secondary sources. Even no Afghan newspapers are used, because of a lack of knowledge of the local languages. MSF-N talks about Afghans when they talk about the attack on schools and hospitals. They talk only *about* Afghans, but they do not give Afghans a voice. They do not show the opinion of the Afghans, but only portrays them as victims. It is possible that this research had other outcomes, when Afghans where interviewed directly. Still the complex legitmation processes would exist, however, when Afghans would oppose the civil-military cooperation. However, it could change the balance in power in legitimation processes of the government together with the military and humanitarian organisations.

Thirdly, Afghanistan is the first country in which the Dutch CIMIC-battalion operates. However, during the conflicts in Kosovo and Liberia, CIMIC activities were already executed, although it was not done by a specific battalion. Furthermore, nowadays missions in Kenya and Burundi also include CIMIC activities of battalions, however, it is unclear whether the Dutch CIMIC is also represented. It is possible that a focus on one of these countries will give other results. It would be interesting to know whether the people in these other countries also experience a polarised world. When they do not, it would be interesting to see whether humanitarian organisations are attacked of not, when civil and military roles are becoming mixed. When there are no problems with working together with the militaries, humanitarian organisations have to use other arguments against the cooperation, when they want legitimacy from donors. Or maybe they do not even oppose cooperation. Furthermore, it would be interesting to see whether humanitarian organisations are also critical about CIMIC, when the Dutch CIMIC is the only one in a certain country. In Afghanistan there are many different CIMIC groups and PRTs, which shape each other's image. The image of the Dutch CIMIC, therefore, highly depends on the other CIMIC battalions.

Fourthly, the focus of this thesis was too broad. There exists very much information about the legitimation processes of humanitarian organisations. Therefore, every topic discussed in the paragraphs of chapter 2-4 is explained very briefly. Furthermore, The case is rather an example of the legitimation processes to explain the information in chapter2-4, than an case apart, which is the main part of the thesis and which is explained by the other three chapters. This makes that not all information is equally useful for the case about civil-military cooperation.

Field research is recommended, to have primary information. Furthermore, it is recommended to look at cases in several countries, to get a comprehensive view on the issue of civil-military cooperation.

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Appendix 1

The Code of Conduct

Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes:

1. The Humanitarian imperative comes first
2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint
4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy
5. We shall respect culture and custom
6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities
7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid
8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs
9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources
10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects

(International Committee of the Red Cross, 2003)