Msc. Thesis

# FRAMING OF RESOURCE USE CONFLICTS IN LOLIONDO GAME CONTROLED AREA- TANZANIA

## Wildlife Tourism, Conservation and Pastoralism interface

Student's name: Masegeri Rurai (Reg. Number: 751218717080)

MSc. Leisure, Tourism and Environment (GEO.80436)

Supervisor:  Professor Dr. Rene' van der Duim (Cultural Geography).

Wageningen University-HOLLAND

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By:

Masegeri Rurai (Reg. Number: 751218717080)

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Thesis code: GEO.80436

Examiner1: Professor Dr. Rene' van Der Duim

Examiner 2: Dr. Martijn Duineveld

Cultural Geography

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## PREFACE

It has been my dream to go to study abroad and get the experience of what other world has to offer. I am very glad that this dream finally came true. It was after several years of applications for scholarships when the year 2010 became one of my most exciting years in my life. On 15th June 2010, I remember had received the email from Nuffic informing that I have been awarded the Netherland Fellowship Programme (NFP) scholarship to study Master Degree at  Wageningen University in Holland. Indeed, I have experienced a different world from which I was born. Time management by Dutch people has been the most impressive culture I ever experienced. The two years of study in which almost one year was spent working on this master thesis has made me learn a lot of things not only about the topic that I am going to discuss in the following 80 pages, but something more general about how to conduct a social scientific research, which may allow me to understand the world better.  Also besides excellent academic orientation in Wageningen University, I also have a chance to visit various European mega cities such as Amsterdam, Paris, Brussels, Hannover and Barcelona. Two years of study in Wageningen has just passed so quickly and now it has come to an end but confidently I know that I am a better person than before.

In reflecting the two years of my study and life in Holland, I feel so obliged for all so much I have learnt and experienced. Foremost, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the people and government of the Kingdom of Netherlands for granting me a financial scholarship which enabled me to come to Netherlands. In developing and writing this master thesis, I would like to express my appreciation to my supervisor Prof.Dr. Rene'van der Duim of Cultural Geography department for his encouragement, gentle advices and critical but constructive criticism. More importantly I thank him for his kindly respect and understanding towards my personal schedules.

Also I  thank my employer, District Executive Director (DED), Ngorongoro District Council for granting me the study leave. Sincere thanks should also go to those people in the study village who gave their valuable time for interviews during field study. Further thanks go to the government officials, NGOs, and all the tour operators who participated in this study. Also special thanks go to my classmates and new friends I met in Holland. In particular I thank Jordy Groffen for being a great friend.

In a special way I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to my wife Onike James Mboye and our son Nelson, for their patience, understanding and love for me. It was very hard to leave home when our baby was only six months old, but for her being a strong woman and a committed wife, she was able to make everything go alright and hence made my study abroad go smoothly.

Last but not the least; I would like to thank all the other  individuals, friends and families who I have not mentioned here, for their loves and supports during my study.

Masegeri Rurai

August, 2012

# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| NDC | = | Ngorongoro District Council |
| GCA | = | Game Controlled Area |
| TANAPA | = | Tanzania Nationa Parks |
| SNP | = | Serengeti National Park |
| NCA | = | Ngorongoro Conservatio Area |
| NCAA | = | Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority |
| UCRT | = | Ujamaa Community Resource Team |
| PWC | = | Pastoral Women Council |
| OBC | = | Orttelo Bussiness Corporation |
| MNRT | = | Ministry of Natural resources and Tourism |
| URT | = | United Republic of Tanzania |
| TNRF | = | Tanzania Natural Resource Forum |
| NGONET | = | Ngorongoro NGO Network |
| LADO | = | Laramatak Development Association |
| PALSEP | = | Pastoral livelihood and Empowerment Programme |
| IUCN | = | International Union for Conservation of Nature |

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the framing of the resource use conflicts in Loliondo Game Controlled Area, Tanzania and applied case study approach as a research strategy. Different economic land uses and extent to which community benefits from tourism ventures were investigated in the study area. Although pastoralism remained to be the major livelihood system for the Maasai community in the study area, tourism has become an important development catalyst to the community. Nevertheless, the community share of benefits from tourism is still minimal and larger part goes to district and central governments. To maximize the benefits the communities engaged in photographic tourism while the government maintained hunting tourism on the same area. This situation led to developments of conflicts due to incompatibilities of the different land uses. The Maasai communities which are traditionally found to be heterogeneous also performed tourism based on their pre-historic differences which made conflicts to intensify and resonates.

Framing of the conflicts by different stakeholders to suit their demands and interests has been a rule of the game. Frames analysis revealed that divergent frames held by the stakeholders led to the protraction of the conflicts. The main issue/problem frames identified are *land security and ownership*, *unequal tourism benefit sharing* and *contradicting government policies*. In particular, the community held and maintained damaging frames such as "our land is sold to Arabs" which consolidated the community's efforts and struggles to protect their grazing lands from the hunting company-OBC and the government. Other frames: identity, characterization, power and loss/gain frames were constructed in such a way to reinforce the issue/problem frames. The conflict management process did not succeed in creating a new reality that would enable the deconstruction of the stakeholder's held frames which led to escalation of the conflicts. The recommendation from this study is that when planning for any tourism investment projects it is pivotal to consider the cultural aspects and identities of the surrounding community in order to ensure support and sustainability of project and resources in the area. The proposed way to solving this conflicts would be to involve a neutral mediator and eventually carry out a participatory community based land use plans for the area.

**Key words:**

Wildlife tourism, Maasai pastoralists, resource use conflicts, framing theory, Loliondo GCA.

# CHAPTER ONE

# 1. INTRODUCTION

This study takes place in Tanzania, a country which is abundantly endowed with magnificent wildlife resources. Across Africa and in Tanzania, surging competition over land and resources amongst local, national, and international groups of people is threatening to deprive local rural communities of control over and access to the territories and natural resources upon which their livelihoods depend (UCTR, 2010).Taking the case of Loliondo Game Controlled Area (GCA), framing of the resource use conflicts is contextualized and analyzed throughout this thesis.

The first chapter presents the background information and set the purpose for this study. In the second chapter the theoretical approach to framing of the environmental conflicts in presented. The methodology and research design is the topic of chapter three. In addressing the research questions, the economic land uses, stakeholder analysis and tourism benefits in Loliondo GCA are presented in chapter four and chapter five focuses on frames analysis of the conflicts under study. The last part of the thesis is chapter six which presents the discussion by bringing together different parts of the findings and linking it to the theory and hence proposing the way forward.

## 1.1 Overview

People in rural Africa depend heavily on various natural resources, and any decline in these, whether through restricted access or a diminishing resource base, is likely to affect local livelihoods negatively .Competing interests over resources constitute a threat to availability and access, and thus to livelihood security (Dahlberg,2005). Also Ferraro and Kramer (1997 In: Archibald and Naughton-Treves,2002) comments that  throughout the tropics, people residing near national parks bear disproportionate costs of wildlife conservation, whether they lose crops and livestock to raiding wildlife, or must forgo access to natural resources. The image of decline and marginalization of African pastoralists is almost universally acknowledged (Thompson and Homewood, 2002). As a result, pastoralists are diversifying their livelihood into strategies other than livestock based economies (Fratkin 1993; Fratkin, Roth et al. 1999; Little, Smith et al. 2001 In: Sachedina, 2006). Loliondo Game Controlled Area (GCA) in Ngorongoro district Tanzania is one of the places where pastoralism has been a main livelihood strategy for a long time. This pastoral land use strategies have historically co-existed with wildlife, but pressures to diversify livestock based economies in recent years have increased conflicts between different land uses. In response to this challenge conservationists and developmental practioners all over the world struggle to design programmes that could effectively benefit diverse groups of stakeholders all of whom feel entitled to benefits. Wildlife tourism is one of the emerged economic alternatives in Loliondo pastoral area where wildlife are abundant.

## 1.2 Pastoralism, conservation and land tenure in Tanzania

Pastoralism is a subsistence pattern of life in which people make their living by tending herds of livestock. Blench (2001) defines pastoralism as the use of extensive grazing in rangelands for livestock production. It is one of the key production systems in the world's drylands. Usually pastoral nomads follow a seasonal migratory pattern that can vary from year to year.  The timing and destinations of migrations are determined primarily by the needs of the herd animals for water and fodder.  These nomadic societies do not create permanent settlements, but rather they live in relatively easily constructed dwellings the year round.  Pastoral nomads are usually self-sufficient in terms of food and most other necessities (Ojalammi, 2006).

However the formal Land tenure system in Tanzania and elsewhere in Africa has created problems to pastoralism. In Tanzania formal land tenure has a long history since colonial era. In areas with abundant

wildlife resources, preservation ordinances were governed by the conservation ideology of controlling wildlife and nature in conservation units (Ojalammi, 2006). The author further indicated that it was until 1940's when land tenure introduced by the then colonial government started to impact on pastoralist's life. In the 1940s the British passed the *Game Ordinance* of 1940 and the *National Parks Ordinance* of 1948. Both Ordinances were of significance to the demarcation of conservation areas and the preservation of wildlife in rangelands. The Serengeti National Park (SNP) and Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) both in northern Tanzania were established in 1959 in the areas traditionally used by pastoralists Maasai for grazing their livestock. Later Tanzanian government formulated the 1974 Wildlife Act which also inherited a lot from colonial legislation including existence of Game Controlled Areas (GCAs) outside core wildlife Protected Areas. In Tanzania the entire pastoralist's areas were under GCA category of wildlife protection especially in north eastern part of the country encompassing all the Loliondo areas.

Pastoralists in Loliondo GCA, as throughout much of northern Tanzania, carry out regular movements based on an annual cycle of dry season and wet season grazing areas (TNRF, 2011). Maasai pastoralism as a form of land-use in the area relies on access to various patches of grazing resources across the larger ecosystem throughout the year (Homewood and Rodgers 1991).Dry season grazing areas are set aside until the middle of the dry season arrives (this tends to be around July) and elders meet to decide when the community may begin to use those areas. This practice protects both dry season and wet season pastures from overgrazing by moving cattle to different areas and taking advantage of good grazing conditions following periods of rainfall or other seasonal changes. The ecological rationale of these seasonal movements is the same as the factors that cause wildlife to move between the Serengeti plains and the Maasai Mara every year: that different resource become available during periods of rainfall, with different quality grazing areas located in different parts of the landscape (Western and Gichohi 1993). This similarity is one of the main reasons pastoralists and wildlife has co-existed in the Serengeti ecosystem, including outside the National Park, for more than 200 years (TNRF, 2011). Another reason why wildlife is so abundant such areas like in Loliondo is that the land management practiced by the pastoralists for livestock production (seasonal grazing rotations, seasonal burning of grass for disease control) is also beneficial to wildlife, and central to the current abundance of wildlife is the cultural curse of killing or eating wild animals. In this respect, the Maasai had developed and use organized systems of land-use management to coordinate migrations, grazing and watering patterns (Igoe and Brockington 1998).However, the creation of conservation areas has to some extent disrupted this system, forcing Maasai to re-structure their movements accordingly( LEAT 1998). The creation of Serengeti National Park removed important grazing and water resources, including early wet season grazing areas, permanent water sources (the Gurmeti and Pololet rivers) and drought refuge sites, from use by Maasai pastoralists in Loliondo. This caused distortions in the utilization of resources throughout the Maasai rangelands.

## 1.3 Background to the problem

The Loliondo GCA with an area of about 4,000 km$^2$ falls within the Greater Serengeti Ecosystem (fig.2), and traditionally this area is inhabited by pastoralists Maasai who grass their livestock alongside with wildlife. In terms of biodiversity value, Loliondo is considered to be one of the wildlife rich areas in the country. This is due to the fact that it borders important protected areas in eastern Africa. For that reason in the last two decades, Loliondo GCA has become potentially important for wildlife based tourism such as trophy hunting, wildlife viewing and photographic tourism.

In the advent of economic liberalization in Tanzania in late 1980, private businesses were promoted and the state withdrew itself from doing businesses. Before 1990, Loliondo GCA was designated as high class hunting block under state owned company called Tanzania Wildlife Company (TAWICO).Also at this time the country witnessed major policy reforms from state run economy to market based economy. Therefore, from early 1990s private investors were allowed to engage in wildlife related businesses in Tanzania such trophy hunting. It was at this time when the government owned parastatal which

monopolized hunting industry in the country stopped its operations and hence all the hunting blocks leased to private company in the form concession for 5 years terms. The Loliondo hunting block were given to Arab owned firm called Oterllo Bussiness Corporation (OBC) from 1992 todate under five year term renewable. As mentioned above, Loliondo area is also the home of Maasai pastoralists who wonder around with their livestock in entire Loliondo GCA and without any restrictions. Moreover the land in Loliondo is divided among different villages and each village government manages village land under its jurisdiction for its development. With this mandate, and due to growth of community base tourism in the country from 1990s, numerous tour operators saw opportunities in Loliondo and therefore went and signed agreement with the village government to conduct wildlife viewing and photographic tourism (camping and wildlife viewing safari) in their areas .Also some private investors secured land from village governments to construct tourist lodges with special agreement to pay part of tourism revenues to villages. As mentioned earlier Loliondo GCA is also a high quality hunting block controlled by the Central Government and is issued to OBC which is Arab based company. In Tanzania usually hunting season start from July through December every year and during this time the area designated for hunting block must be free from other human activities to give way for hunting operations (URT 2009). However, in Loliondo GCA, the area which is wildlife rich during dry season is also an important area used by villages for grazing their livestock especially during dry season. The same area is also being allocated to tours operator companies by village authorities to conduct photographic tourism such as wildlife viewing and camping. The double allocations of one area to different users by different authorities result into confrontations and conflicts. Also climatically the months of June through November is the dry season in Loliondo GCA and therefore Maasai pastoralists at this time of the year migrate their livestock to search for good pastures and water in this areas. Another coincidence is that this area with permanent water source and good pastures during dry season is where plenty of wildlife is available during hunting activities. This situation results into fierce conflict between hunting company and Maasai communities who utilize the area traditionally for their livelihood, in fact for their life survival.

The conflict between the hunting company and the communities started right from the first time when the company started its businesses in the area but it was modest and slowly grew up as years passed. In the period of ten years many demographic factors changed in the communities surrounding the area like population and number of livestock increased. Also in recent years weather conditions has been unpredictable with severe drought happening more frequent than before. This has led poor growth and availability of pastures and also water for livestock during dry season. For example in 2007, 2008 and 2009 there has been a continuous drought in the whole of northern region of Tanzania which led to pastoralists losing half of their livestock. In 2009 the conflicts escalated because the government ordered the pastoralists to be removed forcefully in the area to allow hunting activities to take place. This action of the government made the already long standing conflict between the hunting company and the community to even become extremely severe where by one Maasai individual was shot dead by police defending the hunting company and in retaliation the Maasai community attacked the  vehicles belong to hunting company. The conflict was heightened by the media whereby these events of Loliondo received high media coverage nationally and international.

In support of the community human rights activists groups and local NGOs/CBOs in Loliondo and the foreign donor organizations in the country raised their voices to condemn the government action to evict pastoralists in their traditional land.

In the efforts to resolve the problem, in early 2010 the government of Tanzania through the Ministry of land, Housing and settlements in collaboration with the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism decided to undertake a land use plan for the entire Loliondo GCA with the intention to demarcate and separate the area for human activities and wildlife conservation. This is accordance with the new Wildlife Act (URT, 2009) which states that no human activities will be allowed in the new Game Controlled Area. The communities opposed this plan because they suspected that it was the strategy for the government to

divide their village land for the interests of the hunting company. Nevertheless, the government went on with the aim to conduct the land use plans to all the villages in Loliondo GCA including the 6 villages with imminent conflict with hunting company. In the meantime the conflict is on stalemate and the government is conducting the opposed land use plans. In March 2011 the proposed new land use plan was ready to be presented to the stakeholders meeting at district council general assembly where by the councilors who are the community representative rejected the government proposed plan outright.

Another important issue to note is that the Maasai pastoralists who are residing in Loliondo GCA some of them were those who were evicted to give way to establishment of the famous Serengeti National Park in 1959. Today they have the reminiscence of losing their land for wildlife and today after 50 years the government is coming with the similar plan to take another area from the Maasai community which is already small for their pastoralist activities.

The efforts to resolve these conflicts has been going on for a long time without success and a lot of financial resources has been used but ending in failure. The new land use plan for the entire Loliondo GCA proposed by the government has stirred up the anger among the local communities, political leaders in the area, local NGOs/CBOs and tour operators. There is a claim by the communities that the government is favouring the hunting company and therefore it is setting aside the community land prerogative for hunting purposes for this company. The communities don't accept the proposal of setting a new  Game Controlled Area but they accept to set land and  manage wildlife themselves in their land own village land as they have been doing in the ages. The government on the other hand is claiming that the Maasai communities are no longer protecting the environment as they were used to be in the past instead they are now being involved in activities which are not friendly to conservation like agriculture and establishing permanent settlement in fragile wildlife area. The government therefore conducted operation in the name of protecting environment for conducive wildlife habitats. To support this, the wildlife scientists in Serengeti National Park are arguing that Loliondo GCA is the important migratory route and wildlife corridor from Maasai Mara in Kenya in the north and Ngorongoro Conservation Area in the south. In this conflict everyone is accusing the other side and there is a lot of mistrust of the government and skepticism for whatever the government is planning for the area.

## 1.4 Problem statement and justification

Maasai pastoralists living around protected savanna areas in East Africa have until recent past depended largely on livestock herding. The Maasai pastoralism has for centuries co-existed alongside spectacular wildlife populations in and around the world-famous Serengeti-Mara Ecosystem (Thompson and Homewood, 2002). In recent years wildlife tourism in Loliondo GCA has grown to be important economic activities not only to the local villages but also to district and central government. The area has attracted national and international investors in wildlife tourism and consequently the revenues accrued from wildlife tourism at local and national level has increased tremendously. With this promising story the area now faces future blink due to long standing conflict between different stakeholders over the resource uses in Loliondo area. Government efforts to resolve the conflicts have not made any significant achievement. To this date the conflict is on stalemates already endangering the tourism industry and the resource base upon which it depends. The conflicts over resources uses in Loliondo has been reported and fairly studied (Nelson, 2003; Ojalammi, 2006; TNRF, 2011).However none of these studies focused on framing of the conflicts in Loliondo. This research is aiming to explore the resource use conflict in Loliondo GCA by looking at framing of the conflict by different stakeholders. Frames and framing concepts are particular relevant for researchers studying conflicts (Gray, 2003 In; Idrissou et al., 2011). The findings from this research will add more insights to general body of knowledge in understanding framing of conflicts in wildlife based tourism areas. Also the findings from this research will contribute to finding the long term solution to end this long standing conflict by reframing the frames and hence enable sustainable tourism industry in Loliondo GCA.

## 1.5 Objective of the study

The overall objective of this study was to examine framing of the resource use conflict in Loliondo GCA and hence contribute insights to resolution strategies for this conflict. To achieve the overall objective four research questions were formulated for investigation.

1. What are the main economic land uses in Loliondo GCA?
2. Who are the stakeholders involved in Loliondo GCA conflicts?
3. How/what are frames used by stakeholders in Loliondo GCA conflicts?

## 1.6 Significance of the study.

Conflicts are among the major hindrances to achievements of development initiatives in many parts of the world. In that case the attainment of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) especially in poverty alleviation is highly compromised. Therefore it is envisaged that this study will add to a scientific understanding of the relatively unknown aspects of resource use conflicts in Loliondo GCA. The study will form a basis for discussions among the stakeholders of wildlife tourism and communities of Loliondo GCA. The outcome of the study will assist in resolving the protracted resource use conflicts in Loliondo GCA and therefore ensure sustainable wildlife tourism for both conservation and community developments in the area. Putnam and Holmer (1992) hold that framing and reframing are vital to the negotiation process and are tied to information processing, message patterns, linguistic cues, and socially constructed meanings. Knowing what types of frames are in use and how they are constructed allows one to draw conclusions about how they affect the development of a conflict, and can be used to influence it. Thus, analyzing the frames people use in a given conflict provides fresh insight and better understanding of the conflict dynamics and development. With such insight, and with the help of reframing, stakeholders may find new ways to reach agreements

Overall this study will have implications for future wildlife tourism in the greater Serengeti ecosystem, conservation and community development debate in the area and other similar areas in the country

# CHAPTER TWO

## 2. FRAMING CONFLICTS

In order to develop a theoretical understanding of the topic to be investigated in this study, this chapter presents the current literatures and discussions on framing theory.

### 2.1 Theoretical framework

This study intended to explore the conflicts in Loliondo GCA as constructed by different stakeholders. The Framing Theory will be used to analyze the conflict under study which is based on environmental conflict and wildlife tourism in Loliondo Game Controlled Area (GCA). It is argued that increasing scarcities produced through resource enclosure or appropriation by state, private firms or social elites accelerates conflicts between groups such as class, investors or ethnicity (Robbins, 2004). Also control of resources and landscapes has been wrested from local communities through the implementation of efforts to preserve nature. In the process, local systems of livelihood, production and socio-political organization have been disabled by governmental authorities and global interests seeking to preserve and use the environmental resources in this case tourism. In particular, development plans tend to imagine the subjects of development such as local herders with assumptions about their outlook, behavior and interest that reflect the socially situated imaginaries of the planner and this tendency has potential to cause environmental conflict (Robbins, 2004). Fig. 1 illustrates the roles frames and framing play in the dynamics of conflict development. It demonstrates how a frame change (or reframing) may cause a shift in conflict development, towards conflict management and/or resolution. Types and frame categories are numerous and coined differently by researchers in various fields. The categories cited in this diagram are: *Issue/problem* (reframing that affects how one views the world today or potential future states of the world), *identity and characterization* (reframing that allows parties to clarify the relationship between values and interests for both themselves and for other parties) and *process* (reframing that affects how one interacts with others in the dispute).Also *power* and *loss/gain* frames are important in this conflict analysis as it influences how stakeholders weigh and decides the progress of the conflicts.

### 2.2 Framing Theory

The major premise of Framing Theory is that an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and be construed as having implications for multiple values or considerations (Chong and Druckman, 2007). Framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue (Chong and Druckman, 2007). That is to say that framing is a process whereby communicators, consciously or unconsciously, act to construct a point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be interpreted by others in a particular manner. Frames are "cognitive" structures held in memory and used to guide interpretation of new experience (Gray, 1997). Frames are also defined as collections of perceptions and thoughts that people use to define a situation, organize information, and determine what is important and what is not. We create frames to name a situation in which we find ourselves, to identify and interpret specific aspects that seem key to us in understanding the situation, and to communicate that interpretation to others (Kaufman et al., 2003). Processes of framing are linked to people's specific sets of values, norms, objectives, interests, convictions, and knowledge at a certain moment (Van Lieshout and Aarts, 2008.) Therefore people do select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (Entman 1993 in: Van Lieshout and Aarts, 2008).Usually people do not have the frames that they put forward in interaction readily available beforehand; rather, they construct frames in interaction by linking text to contexts taking into account possible reactions of the audience (Chenail,1995). The specific frames they construct integrate the past (experiences), future (expectations, goals), and present (the direct context in which the utterance takes

place). By recognizing and analyzing the frames people produce in interaction, their experiences, expectations, and interests concerning the issue at stake and the people involved can be discovered (Van Lieshout and Aarts, 2008).

Current research on framing distinguishes two main approaches: the cognitive approach and the interactional approach (Dewulf et al., 2009). The cognitive approach focuses on cognitive or mental structures that help us organize and interpret incoming perceptual information buy fitting it into pre-existing categories about reality (Dewulf et al., 2009). According to Minsky (1975 in: Dewulf et al., 2009), frames are cognitive representations of knowledge that are stored in memory and then retrieved and applied to new situations. Cognitive frames are memory structures that help us to organize and interpret incoming perceptual information by fitting it into pre-existing categories about reality (Minsky, 1975 in: Dewulf et al., 2009). Situations are framed by matching perceptual inputs with an available repertoire of frames. From this perspective, frames are considered relatively static entities that extend indefinitely in time (Dewulf et al., 2009). On the other hand the interactional approach considers framing as a process of selecting some aspects of perceived reality and to make them more salient in a communicative text in search a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation(Duwelf et al., 2009).The interaction frames are thus communication devices used to understand how participants in interaction negotiate meanings and alignments and it enables us to understand how participants in conflict co-construct meanings and negotiates alignments while interacting. Within this approach, the term *framing* may be more appropriate, since it captures the dynamic processes of negotiators' or disputants' interactions (Duwelf et al., 2009). In this interactional view, frames are 'built up piece-by-piece' and 'constituted of an innumerable number of elements, amalgamated during the ongoing process of interaction' (Gonos, 1977 in: Duwelf et al., 2009). An interactional approach to framing contributes to our understanding of how negotiators and disputants co-construct meanings while they are interacting (Duwelf et al., 2009).

Both framing research are useful to gain insight into conflict dynamics, and each gives a different kind of understanding of how and why frames change. The cognitive approach notes that stakeholders hold multiple frames as knowledge schemas and shifts from one to another when they get new information (Minsky, 1975 in: Idrissou, 2011). The interactional approach links frames shifting by stakeholders to what is going on during interaction. An important difference between the two approaches to framing is that the cognitive approach considers frames to be representations stored in memory (and framing is the process of applying cognitive frames to situations), while the interactional approach considers framing to be the dynamic enactment and shaping of meaning in ongoing interactions (and frames are transient communication structures)( Dewulf et al.,2009).This study will employ both approaches to get more insights on how and why stakeholder's frames evolve in Loliondo GCA conflict situations, however the interactional approach will be given more attention. In the interactional approach, frames are considered as agency used to act on the world and people use frames to perform action (Idrissou, 2011). According to Gray (2003) frames are used to define issues, shape what action should be taken and by whom, protect oneself, justify the stand we are taking on an issue and mobilize people to take or refrain from action on issues.

Thus frames are constructed in interaction and used strategically to persuade others to our point of view, gain advantage in negotiation(Shmueli et al., 2006 in: Idrissou et al., 2011).Thus ,in an interactional framing approach, people co-construct social realities in conservation(Dewulf et al.,2009).Ford et al.,(2002) argues that since constructed realities provides the context in which people act and interact, the nature of these realities establishes the opportunities for action, how people see the world, what actions to take etc. Frames are then iterative; this means they are constructed in a particular reality and influence this reality as well (Ford 1999 in:Latifou,2011).In this framing perspective, conflict is neither a state of the world nor a state of the mind, but a reality that resides in the social interaction among disputants(Ford et al., 2002).So, conflicts arise only because of how people co-construct issues, relationships, and

interactions (Dewulf et al., 2009).To understand the dynamics of the conflicts between the tourism stakeholders and Maasai pastoralists community in relation to Loliondo GCA, the way stakeholders framed the problem will be investigated. Different categories of frames has been identified by various scholars (Kaufman et al., 2003, Gray, 2003; Shmueli et al., 2006, Idrissou, 2011; and Aarts, 2011) which are; issue/problem frames, relationship (identity and characterization) frames, power frames, loss/gain frames and process/conflict management frames.

### 2.2.1 Issue/problem frames

It deals with what the conflict is about Idrissou (2011). Disputants often start talking about the conflict by giving a brief summary of what they believe the conflict is about. Gray (2003) argues that problem frame shed light on which aspects of the conflict are important to each party. It includes causes and solution frames as disputants, by describing the issue, tends to highlight their meanings of the causes and their desired solutions.

### 2.2.2 Identity frames

Refers to how stakeholders in a conflict view themselves as having a particular identity in a specific conflict situation (Kaufman et al., 2003). Parties in conflict take on identities derived from the interplay between their self-conception and interests, and their group affiliations (Rothman, 1997: Shmueli et al., 2006). Identity frames are often salient and part of the polarized discourse in intractable conflicts. They rarely shift dramatically in the short range (Shmueli et al., 2006).

### 2.2.3 Characterization frames

Concerns how group of actors present others. Characterisation frames are also used by parties in conflict to strengthen their own identity and justify their actions towards the others. This kind of frames refers to statements made by individuals about how they characterize someone else (Rinfret, 2011). Characterization Frames account for conflicts in terms of evaluations, often stereotypical, of others' behavior, attitudes, motives or trustworthiness (Pinkley, 1990). While they may develop from direct experience, these frames also draw on media images, reinforced when consistent with existing beliefs and experience. Frequently unchallenged characterizations that shape the subsequent course of conflict include that: environmentalists are extremists always opposing economic development and pursuing the return of all land to its prior natural state.

### 2.2.4 Power frames

Are related to power resources as they are the way actors involved in a conflict, evaluate their own resources and those of the others to influence each (Marfo 2006 In: Idrissou, 2011). Disputants use power frames to characterize the forms of power that are legitimized in the conflict as well as the forms of power that they preferred to comfort their own position(Kaufman et al.,2003). The more intractable the conflict is, the more stakeholders are likely to interpret events as mutually exclusive power struggles, resulting in polarization (Shmueli et al., 2006).

### 2.2.5 Risk/Loss or gain Frames

Reflects views about steps, decision rules and participation in conflicts(Kaufman and Smith,1999).It indicates the way parties judge the implementation of the process, and their preferred management process. Conflict management frames further identifies preferences for how the conflict should be managed or dealt with (i.e., negotiation, resolution, or litigation) (Rinfret,2011).In situations with high levels of procedural uncertainty, citizens may be suspicious of efforts by governments agencies to bring to the negotiations table especially if the process is expected to favor business(Kaufman and Smith,1999). Gray (2003) argues that conflict management in environmental conflict studies may vary from avoidance or passivity to struggle, sabotage or violence

### 2.2.6 Process/conflict management frames

In conflicts, it is common for most parties to the conflict to focus on threats of potential loss rather than on opportunities for gains (Kaufman et al., 2003). People tend to react differently to a proposed action when its expected consequences are framed in terms of losses as opposed to gains, where preventing a perceived loss is often more salient and more highly valued than capturing a commensurate gain (Kaufman et al., 2003).This perceptual asymmetry is manipulable, as the expected consequences of risky choices can often be framed as either a potential loss or a potential gain (Shmueli et al., 2006)

## 2.3 Effect of frames on intractability of conflicts

Frame divergence often contributes to the intractability of conflicts. According to Shmueli et al., (2006), disputants differ not only in interests, beliefs, and values but also in how they perceive the situation at the conscious and preconscious levels. The author further argues that these differences engender divergent interpretations of events, paint parties into negative characters, yield mutually incompatible issues, and focus attention on specific outcomes that impede exploration of alternatives. As conflicts become intractable, frame differences often exacerbate communication difficulties, polarize parties, and escalate strife. In turn, polarization is reflected in the parties' frames, feeding stakeholders' sense that they are in the right and should not compromise. Divergent frames are self-reinforcing because they filter parties' subsequent information intake and color interpretation and because disputants strategically communicate through these frames to strengthen their positions and persuade opponents (Shmueli et al., 2006) Knowing the frames in use and how they were constructed helps us understand and influence conflict dynamics. With framing insight and through reframing, stakeholders may find new ways out of impasse. Interveners can use expressed frames to understand the situation and design interventions. At times, a stakeholder's awareness of others' frames can assist in mutual understanding and reframing of proposals in terms that might be more acceptable to the others. While framing is present in all conflicts, it is particularly prominent when conflicts are long lasting and alienation and escalation drive disputants apart. Therefore, frame insights may be especially useful for understanding, managing, and intervening in intractable conflicts (Shmueli et al., 2006).

## 2.4 Frame Analysis as conflict management tool

The concept of frames has been developed as a tool for analysis in various fields, including psychology and sociology, business management, artificial intelligence, decision-making, negotiation, and environmental conflict management (Kaufman et al., 2003). According to Gray (2003) frames and framing concepts are particularly relevant for researchers studying conflicts. Frame analysis can be used by both third party intervener and by individual stakeholders and conveners to better understand conflict dynamics. Frame analysis has been used both retrospectively (to understand past conflicts) and prospectively (as a tool for better managing an existing conflict). Retrospectively, it seeks to better understand conflict dynamics in order to gather lessons for the future. Prospectively, it advances consensus building in both the conflict assessment and intervention stages (Kaufman et al.,2003). Frame analysis is therefore useful in conflict situations to investigate how frames emerge and their applications after they have been developed (Kretsedemas 2000, In: Idrissou 2011).

Analytic techniques for frame analysis include interviewing the various stakeholders to ascertain their perceptions and interpretations, feeding back to the parties the resulting analysis, and then exploring with the parties the meaning and impact of these frames on the conflict dynamics. Particularly within the framework of conflict assessment (Shmueli, 2000 In: Kaufman et al., 2003). Frame analysis and the resulting understanding of frames can help the stakeholders to better grasp the conflict, including the factors and contexts that can lead to changes within a frame or changes to the frames themselves. In this sense, framing becomes a formative analytic technique.

In intractable conflicts, frames are often quite stable over time, even when specific individuals move in and out of the conflict. This stability comes both because various frames held by an individual tend to be

self-reinforcing and because frames are often shared within a community and therefore socially reinforced through story-telling and shared perspectives. Yet research into intractable conflicts suggests that in at least some conflicts, frames can be altered over time through intentional interventions, and that the shift in frames helps to render disputes more tractable (Elliott, 2003 In: Kaufman et al., 2003). In loliondo GCA conflict if the frames analysis in undertaken it will help in the future process of negotiations through reframing and perhaps enabling the resolution of the conflict which will translate into new era for sustainable tourism industry, conservation of wildlife and local livelihood enhancement.

Figure 2: Frames and their roles in conflict development. Adapted from ( kaufman et al.,2003)

## 2.5 Operationalization of the key issues/frames

The reviewed frame concepts were operationalized as presented in table 1.

**Table 4: Operationalization of the key concepts/frames**

| Frames | Key issues | Interview guide |
|---|---|---|
| Issue/problem | • Issue/problem at stake<br>• Contents of conflicts<br>• Causes of conflicts | • What is the conflict about?<br>• Reasons for conflicts/Why this conflict in Loliondo GCA? |
| Identity | • Personal/group identity<br><br>• Own role in conflicts<br><br>• Own identity in conflicts | • How do you identify yourself in Loliondo conflict?<br><br>• Why are you involved in this conflict?<br><br>• How do you contribute to conflicts |
| Characterisation | • Characterisation of self<br><br>• Characterisation of other stakeholders involved in conflict<br><br>• Affiliations (we/them) | • How do you characterise yourself in this conflict?<br><br>• How do you characterise other players in this conflict? Partners in business/enemy and why? |
| Power | • Power relations<br><br>• Power resources<br><br>• Legal/Policy issues | • Who owns and holds power on the resources(land/wildlifes/water) in Loliondo GCA<br><br>• How decisions on the use of land/water/wildlife resources made?<br><br>• Who has the legal rights of ownership of land in Loliondo GCA?<br><br>• Who do you think have/should have legitimate power to managed and control land and resources in Loliondo GCA? |
| Loss or Gain | • Risk and uncertainties<br><br>• Fear of losses of existing | • What do you benefit from Loliondo resources? |

| | benefits | • What are the risk and loses in Loliondo Conflicts<br><br>• How would you like to settle this conflict/win-lose or win-win situation? why |
|---|---|---|
| Process/conflict management | • Structures/institution involved in conflict management<br><br>• Trust<br><br>• Legitimacy of the process<br><br>• Future expectation of the conflict | • How do you like Loliondo conflict be resolved?<br><br>• Who is involved in conflict management in Loliondo GCA?<br><br>• Do you trust the way this conflict has been managed in the past?<br><br>• What is the role of the government in this conflict?<br><br>• What do you expect in future for this conflict? |

This study has employed framing theory and thus the above frames has been investigated and analyzed in Loliondo GCA conflict.

# CHAPTER THREE

## 3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY.

This chapter describes what research methods have been used to study the resource use conflicts in Loliondo GCA. The description of the study area is given section 3.1 and methods (3.2) which describe research design (3.2.1) and data collection (3.2.2) which involves both primary data (3.2.2.1) and secondary data collection (3.2.2.2.).The analysis of data is presented in section 3.2.3 and limitation of the study in section 3.3.

## 3.1 Study Area

This study was conducted in 6 villages in Loliondo GCA in Ngorongoro district of Arusha region, Tanzania. The six villages are Ololosokwan, Soitsambu, Oloipori, Olorienmagaiduru, Loosoitomaalon and Arash and all the villages borders Serengeti National Park to the west. These villages were purposively selected because they are mostly involved in wildlife tourism activities and also involved in the resource use conflicts for a long time. The location of the study villages in Ngorongoro district is indicated in fig.2.



Figure 2: Location of the study villages in Ngorongoro district-Tanzania (Source: TNRF 2011)

Ngorongoro district with the iconic Ngorongoro crater and the surrounding Loliondo GCA is among the most visited tourist destination in Tanzania. Overall the district has an area of 14,036 km$^2$ under wildlife conservation and pastoralism, and part of it includes the shorter plains of the southern part of the Serengeti National Park and the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, both of which are classified as World Heritage Sites. In addition to large nature conservation units, Ngorongoro district caters to various human activities such as wildlife tourism, settlement, pastoralism and agriculture. Administratively, the district consists of three Divisions which are: Ngorongoro, Loliondo and Sale. Each Division is divided into wards of which are further subdivided into a number of different villages. The Loliondo Divisions which

forms the entire Loliondo GCA lies to the north and in peripheral semi-arid lands occupied by the Maasai pastoralists and the Sonjo agro-pastoralists (who are minority). This study will focus on Maasai pastoralist area where conflicts based on wildlife tourism is dominant

## 3.2 Methods.

### 3.2.1 Research design.

The case study approach was used in this research to explore the resource use conflicts in Loliondo GCA. The case study   approach focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings (Eisendhardt, 1989).The approach is particularly relevant when the researcher intends to carry out an in-depth probe of a subject (Noor, 2008). According to Yin (2002), case studies should be undertaken in situations where the researcher is interested in studying how processes unfold. These processes are indicated when exploring in depth the relations between individuals and institutions, to understand, describe, explain and interpret behaviors and attitudes, as it will be the case in this research (Mettrick, 1994 In: Idrissou et al.2010).

This study further employed the techniques from ethnographic approach in which the researcher spent four months in study villages while collecting research data. Qualitative methods of data collection were mainly used for this study. Miles and Huberman, (1994) argues that a qualitative approach has the potential to reveal the complexity of subjective views and is thus an appropriate approach to investigate the framing of the resource use conflicts. Multiple qualitative techniques were used to collect data to enhance the validity and reliability of findings in the case studied (Noor, 2008). The techniques used to collect data include; interviews with key stakeholders and community members, focus group discussion and participant observation for collecting primary data. Combination of these methods enabled triangulation of the various points of view of individual stakeholders interviewed. These techniques were used because they offer sufficient flexibility to approach different respondents differently while still investigating the same topic (Noor, 2008). Furthermore, secondary data from various sources such as internet, newspapers and documents at village and government offices were collected by thorough reviewing of the existing information on wildlife tourism and resource use conflicts in the study area. This study generally applied deductive-inductive approach in investigating the frames used in the Loliondo GCA conflicts.

### 3.2.2 Data collection

### 3.2.2.1 Primary data

The primary data were collected through in-depth interviews with different stakeholders, focus group discussions with community members and also the researcher attended community meetings in the villages related to resource use conflicts issues. Participant observation was also employed as a means of collecting and cross checking the information gathered.

**Sampling of the respondents**

The selection of the respondents for interviews was done purposive to meet the study objectives. According to Kumar (2005) purposive or nonprobability sampling involves the selection of sampling units (in this case actors and community members) based on the researchers own judgment of who can provide the best information to achieve the objectives of the study. The number of actors (respondents) to be interviewed in this case study was not fixed in order to interview as many respondents as possible within each stakeholder group until a saturation point is reached (Vaus, 2001). However,   Vaske (2008) pointed out that where the researcher makes a subjective judgment to include or exclude certain individuals in a sample, the integrity of selection process may be compromised and it may be difficult to generalize results to a larger population. Since this study is focused on a single case study this techniques

was found relevant. The key stakeholders involved in this study were: Maasai pastoralist community, tour operators, hunting company, tourist lodge/campsites owners, and district and village government officials, NGOs/CBOs. Therefore, since there are no formal limits to the amount of respondents necessary to establish qualitative results in case studies (Patton, 2002), respondents at community level had strategically been selected upon criteria established during fieldwork, namely: *ordinary community members* (men, women, youth who are knowledgeable with issues of wildlife tourism and resource use conflicts), *clan* (to which Maasai sub-clan does the respondent belong to?), *position* (is the respondent a community leader, or member in a village government or part of other organizations).For other stakeholders the interviews was made to the leaders of the organizations or their subordinates.

**In-depth interviews**

In order to gain qualitative data capable of exploring the frames used in a conflict situation an in-depth semi-structured one-to-one interviews with various stakeholders was conducted. Individual interviews (34) were completed with different stakeholders who comprised of community members (24) from all the 6 study villages, tour operators (3), hunting company (1), NGOs (3) and government official (3). On average the interviews lasted for 40-60 minutes, varying between 30 minutes to one and a half hours and on few cases it went up to two hours. Before embarking on actual interviews the pre-test for interview guides was conducted to 5 individuals and some few corrections was made as necessary. Semi-structured interview provides a room for probing and exploring the meaning and areas of interests that emerges during discussion which in turn provides a wider opportunity for different issues to be uncovered and discussed (Phillip and Starawski, 2008). It is further argued that interview provides better understanding, opinions, values, attitudes, feelings and the things that people have in common (Arskey and knight, 1999). During the interviews the conversations was audio tape-recorded and transcribed. However some of the interviewee did not accept to be recorded, so notes of discussion were taken. The interview guides used are attached as annexes I-V

**Focus group discussion**

Focus group discussions were also carried out (1) in each of the six villages under study. The checklist (annex VI) was used to guide the focus group discussion. The participants for focus group discussion were selected from Village government members and other community members. An effort was made to ensure an adequate representation of women and youth members of the community. It is however to mention that it was very difficult to get female representatives as the approval from husband or parents was needed first to have them for interviews. In Maasai culture women are not allowed to make any judgment or expression of any issues without consulting their male counterparts although nowdays the case may be different from place to place due to women emancipation campaigns and globalization in general.   Also involvement in different works of life (pastoralists, businessmen, tourism, and cultivators) will also be considered in the selection of group members to show their involvement in wildlife tourism and concerns over resources use conflict in Loliondo GCA. However, as a critique, it is worth recognizing that small samples sizes and open-ended nature of the questioning often limit the representativeness and generalizability of the findings from the focus group discussion (Vaske, 2008).

**Participant observation/Field observation**

The researcher (I) made a visits to all the six study villages and stayed with the local people and was able to share, participate and interact with community members about various issues of their life including the ongoing resources use conflicts. In this way and with my experience to the area I grasped the general view of the community over the ongoing conflicts. Generally the observations concerned the physical settings and the social environment in which conflicts on resource uses has been occurring.

The three methods together (semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and participant observations) enabled triangulation of the various points of view of individual stakeholders interviewed. This also helps to ensure the quality of validity.

### 3.2.2.2 Secondary data

Thorough review of the documents, local and international reports on media such as newspapers and online sources (internet) was done to see how the Loliondo resource use conflicts has been framed and reported. Also information on the tourism businesses and revenues from tourism was gathered. Information from documents were used to cross validate the information gathered from interviews, conversations and observations as what people say and how they act may be different than what is written (Noor, 2008).

### 3.2.3 Data Analysis

This study employed qualitative techniques of data analysis. The first stage was to open a codebook whereby raw data obtained from field were presented with their priorities determined by their frequencies and relevance to research questions. Thus tape-recorded information were transcribed into a text files and be analyzed according to set of categories in the established codebook. The themes for analysis were developed based on the objective of the study. Framing studies use techniques from discourse and conversation analysis to analyze frames (Dewulf, 2005).Therefore the collected data were analyzed by use of discourse analysis principles. Discourse analysis deals with studying and analyzing language as a social production (de Pinho et al., 2009; Hodges et al., 2008; Punch, 2005 In: Idrissou et al., 2011). From the range of discourse analysis approaches (see Hodges et al., 2008), critical discourse analysis was chosen and used for this analysis. Idrisou et al., (2011) argues that critical discourse analysis studies not only texts and the use of language but also how they are used in social contexts. It shows how the existence of stakeholders and the roles to be played by individuals are made possible by ways of thinking and speaking (de Pinho et al., 2009; Hodges et al., 2008; Punch, 2005 In: Idrissou et al., 2011). Critical discourse analysis makes it possible to understand phenomena such as social practices, individuals and institutions in a certain way and make statements about what is considered to be true (Hodges et al., 2008). This approach has been found relevant for investigating how resource use conflict evolved over time in Loliondo GCA through stakeholder's framing.

The analysis furthermore follows the logic of open, axial and selective coding (Boeijie, 2005).Open coding involves summing up what respondents have answered to these categories. Usually this process involves doing it over and over again where different respondents often talk in similar terms about an issue. The coding for analyses was done manually and no specific computer programme was used. The next was axial coding which involves searching for related concepts amongst different respondents transcripts to create more unification of strong argumentative lines between interviews. Therefore the transcripts of the interviews have been cut into verbatim record fragments that fit into main frame categories of discussion: *Issue/problem frames, identity frames, characterization frames, power frames, Loss/gain frames and process/management frames.*

## 3.3 Limitations of the study

The methodological approach for this study being qualitative study which focused in a case study has a consequence on generalizability and therefore the findings are unique to the study area and could not be generalized. Also sample size could have been increased but due to financial resources constraints and limited time, some of the stakeholders could not be reached for interviews during study period, they includes; central government officials for the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism based in Dar es Salaam which is more than 1000kilometres from the study villages. Also some of the tour operators have their offices in big cities like Arusha and Mwanza and not in Loliondo, so it was difficult to meet them for interview due to distances between the areas. The Conservation Agencies officials could not be reached for interviews due to difficult procedures to get permits to entire in national parks for research purposes.

CHAPTER FOUR

## 4. ECONOMIC LAND USES, STAKEHOLDERS ANALYSIS AND TOURISM BENEFITS IN   LOLIONDO GCA

In order to understand the existing resource use conflicts in Loliondo GCA it is important to understand the issues which lead to conflicts. Therefore this chapter discusses the economic land uses, stakeholders and tourism benefits.

### 4.1 Main economic land uses in Loliondo GCA

This study has revealed that the conflicts in Loliondo GCA are related to different economic land uses which operate in this area. Through interviews with local people and from observation and written records it shows that the main economic land uses which operate in Loliondo GCA are livestock keeping in form of pastoralism (fig.3), conservation of wildlife resources, tourism businesses which includes photographic and hunting tourism, and small agriculture.

### 4.1.1 Livestock keeping

It was clearly observed that livestock keeping is the most dominant and livelihood strategy in all study villages and approximately 90 of the area is used for this purpose. In this case livestock is everything to Maasai family in which cattle are sold to obtain money for other household needs like clothes, sending children to schools, medical expenses and other household utilities. The number of livestock in Ngorongoro district in which Loliondo is part of it is cattle 350,000; goats 300,000; sheep 250,000 and donkey 20,000 (NDC, 2010). "Pastoralists in Loliondo, as throughout much of northern Tanzania, carry out regular movements based on an annual cycle of dry season and wet season grazing areas. Dry season grazing areas are set aside until the middle of the dry season arrives (this tends to be around July) and elders meet to decide when the community may begin to use those areas.



Figure 3: A Maasai villager in Ololosokwan village grazing his livestock: Pastoralism is the main economic land use in Loliondo GCA

This practice protects both dry season and wet season pastures from overgrazing by moving cattle to different areas and taking advantage of good grazing conditions following periods of rainfall or other

seasonal changes. The ecological rationale of these seasonal movements is the same as the factors that cause wildlife to move between the Serengeti plains and the Maasai Mara every year: that different resource become available during periods of rainfall, with different quality grazing areas located in different parts of the landscape. This similarity is one of the main reasons pastoralists and wildlife has co-existed in the Serengeti ecosystem, including outside the National Park, for more than 200 years. Another reason why wildlife is so abundant is that the land management practiced by the pastoralists for livestock production (seasonal grazing rotations, seasonal burning of grass for disease control) is also beneficial to wildlife, and central to the current abundance of wildlife is the cultural anathema of killing or eating wild animals" (TNRF, 2011).

### 4.1.2 Conservation

Loliondo area according to Tanzanian laws governing conservation issues falls under the category called Game Controlled Area (GCA) ( URT,1974;2009).The establishment of the Loliondo GCA dates to the colonial period, when GCAs were created as areas where the utilization (i.e. hunting) of wildlife was regulated under the law. Established in 1959 Loliondo GCA is a part of the Greater Serengeti Ecosystem, which spans more than 25,000 km$^2$ and includes Serengeti National Park (SNP) in Tanzania and the Maasai Mara National Reserve in Kenya.



Figure 4: Location of the Loliondo GCA in relation to other Protected Areas in the Greater Serengeti ecosystem (Source: TANAPA, 2008)

The Serengeti ecosystem is home to the greatest abundance of terrestrial wildlife on earth, with nearly three million wildebeest, zebra, gazelles and antelope moving between the Serengeti plains, the savannahs of the Maasai Mara, and the woodlands of the western Serengeti every year(Sinclair,1995). With the onset of the short rains, the wildebeest head south into Tanzania. During this migration (fig.5) they pass through Loliondo, outside the boundaries of SNP. Many wildebeest also disperse north out of the NCA into the Sale plains to graze and calve during the rainy season (fig. 6)

Figure 5: Wildbeest migration in Serengeti and Loliondo GCA (Source: FZS, 2008)



Figure 6: Migratory pathways of annual wildbeest migration from the Maasai Mara to the Serengeti plains in relation to Loliondo; arrows represent the wildbeest migratory routes and dashed lines represent wet season grazing area for wildebeest and other wildlife on the Loliondo-Salei  plains (Source: TNRF,2011).

Loliondo GCA is also known to be an important catchment area for the Serengeti Park in the west and lake Natron basin in the east. This is due to the presence of the Loliondo highland forests reserves which covers about 15,000 hectares of montaine evergreen forests (NDC, 2009). Major rivers like Gurumet and Pololet rivers flowing through the Serengeti originates from Loliondo highlands. Therefore it makes sense

to suggest that any significant changes of land uses in Loliondo highlands will have serious negative repercussions of the future of the entire Serengeti ecosystem.

### 4.1.3 Agriculture

Although pastoralism is the main form of land use and key to livelihoods in Loliondo, agriculture in form of small farms has been present in the area since at least the 1950s 9O (Malley, 2000). Trading for maize or growing it on small plots is key to pastoralist food security as it complements diets based mainly on milk and butter, and pastoralists in Loliondo have strategically farmed limited areas since that time. However, agricultural cultivation has been limited because farming competes with and destroys the grazing areas that more profitable livestock depend on, and as a result only a small (less than 5%) of Loliondo's land area is farmed(TNRF,2011).



Figure 7: Maasai communities adopting agriculture in Loliondo GCA (Source: Arusha Times, 2010)

In recent years Irish potatoes has been grown by Maasai in Loliondo highlands in a small plots. From 2000s there has been a notable expansion of agriculture in Loliondo GCA and this has raised concerns from conservationists and also the government worrying of the disruption of the buffer zone and migratory routes from Maasai Mara National Reserve in Kenya to Serengeti and Ngorongoro. However, the communities explained that the current expansion in agriculture is partly contributed by the ongoing campaign by the Government in Tanzania known as "kilimo kwanza" meaning "agriculture first" which is meant to make every household in Tanzania to be self-sufficient in food for the family. Generally agriculture is considered to be incompatible with conservation of wildlife.

### 4.1.4 Wildlife tourism

From early 1990s tourism businesses became a new form of getting money for Maasai communities in Loliondo GCA. During this time the commercial tourist hunting activities started and then photographic tourism followed due to a slight improvement of road network in the area. It is also during this time that

there was a rush for land in Loliondo GCA (table 2) by different individual and companies from other parts of the country and also internationally for the intention to invest in tourism businesses. By that time Loliondo area was still is one of the remote part of the country which had single road access and was passable only during the dry season and in rainy season the area becomes almost inaccessible. At present the situation has slight improved and especially after the mobile phone connections was installed in 2008. So the slight improvement in road condition from 1990s onward gave way to interested individuals and companies especially in tourism to look for land in Loliondo GCA.

The arrival of the tourism companies especially of the hunting company - OBC in 1992 opened a new era for the whole of Loliondo area but more importantly for local Maasai pastoralists for which it improved security in the area and hence reduced cattle raiding by the neighboring Sukuma agro-pastoralists. In 1996, another international tour operator company called Conservation Corporation Africa (CCA) now called And Beyond (the owners of Clein's camp) came to Loliondo and got a land lease covering 25,000 acres from Ololosokwan village to operate a tourist lodge, this farm was initially owned by Tanzania Cattle Product and it was meant for Livestock Ranch to help Maasai communities improve their animal breeds, but the plan did work out and the farm was used for hunting tourism for three years before it was turned to a current lucrative tourism business. In another village of Soitsambu, a government owned company known as Tanzania Breweries Limited (TBL) acquired a land covering a total of 12,765 acres in late 1988 to establish Barley farms. After a few years of unsuccessful barley production, the land was sold to an international tour operator company from USA called Thompson Safaris to establish a tourism business. There are other several farms which were acquired in different villages but some of them are not developed and this allows communities to continue using them for grazing their livestock although their owner's reserves right of no trespassing.

**Table 5: Land acquired for tourism businesses in Loliondo GCA in 1990s**

| S/n | Name of the Farm | Year of Acquisition | Size in Acres | Location/ Village | Current Use |
|-----|------------------|---------------------|---------------|-------------------|-------------|
| 1 | And Beyond farm (owner of Clein's Camp) | 1993 | 25,000 | Ololosokwan | High end tourist camp and photographic tourism |
| 2 | Buffalo Luxury tented Camp | 1993 | 60 | Ololosokwan | Luxury Tourist camp |
| 3 | Leisure Holding | 1990 | 497.5 | Ololosokwan | Photographic tourism |
| 4 | John Aitekenhed Farm | 1988 | 52 | Ololosokwan | Photographic tourism |
| 5 | Thomson Safari (former TBL farm) | 1988 | 12,765 | Soitsambu | Tourist camp and photographic tourism |
| 6 | John Aitekenhed Farm | 1988 | 20,586 | Soitsambu | Photographic tourism |
| **Total land leased in Acres** | | | **58,960** | | |

Source: Land Office, NDC ( 2011).

The arrival of especially these three tourism companies (OBC, And Beyond and Thomson Safaris) on one hand has made Loliondo popular nationally and internationally and on the other hand they have been the center of resource use conflicts in Loliondo GCA. Although each case has its own story, all have a

common competitor; the local Maasai communities living in the surrounding villages. The next sub-section will look into tourism benefits in Loliondo GCA.

### 4.1.4.1 Tourism benefits in Loliondo GCA.

The tourism sector in Tanzania contributes about 25% of the country's foreign exchange inflows which makes tourism to be leading sector in generating high foreign exchange. In 2009, the country earned $1.2 billion from tourism and it received a total of 714,367 foreign visitors. Tourism also contributes 17.2% to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs around 200,000 Tanzanians directly (TTB, 2010). Tourists come to Tanzania to enjoy the beaches on its Indian Ocean coastline and the Zanzibar island archipelago, the country's 16 national parks and 31 game reserves such as the Selous game reserve, Ruaha and Katavi in the southeast and the Serengeti, Ngorongoro, Manyara, Tarangire and Mt Kilimanjaro in the north, among others.

Ngorongoro district where Ngorongoro Crater and Loliondo GCA are located is one of the important tourist destinations in Tanzania. In Loliondo GCA tourism has been contributing significantly to both community development in the villages and revenues to local governments. The tourism activity which operates in Loliondo includes the tourist hunting (sport hunting, safari hunting) and the photographic (safari) tourism. However during this study it was learnt that much of the tourism revenues generated from Loliondo area goes to the Central Government and foreign private investors who operate tourism businesses in Loliondo. In the discussion with the DNRO at district council, insisted that the hunting tourism benefits more Central Government which takes 75% of it and the District council gets 25% and the villages has no legal basis to get tourist hunting revenues. From the revenue information in table 1, it can be observed that hunting tourism overall generates more revenues than photographic tourism for example in 2009 the central government received US$560,000, Ngorongoro District Council US$109,000, and to the villages US$150,000 on an annual basis, and hence a total annual revenue of $819,000. However it can also be seen that some villages such as Ololosokwan and Arash benefits far more from the photographic tourism than hunting tourism. It has to be noted that there is no binding law on the amount to be paid by the hunting company to the communities around the hunting block but only depends on discretion of the hunting company to decide how much to give to the villages.

The wildlife Act 1974 which was operational till 2010, only states that the hunting company is required to support and contribute to community developments and wildlife conservation in their hunting blocks but it does not specify the amount which needs to be given to community in support for development. For this reason the hunting company doesn't feel obligated to contribute to community development especially when they have paid all the required fees. As a result every year hunting Company decides on how much to give to community sometimes with or without consultation with village leaders. For example it was learnt that since 1992 to 2006 OBC paid only $3,000 to each village in the hunting area and in 2007 they paid $5,000 to each village and in 2008 and 2009 they paid $25,000 and in 2010 villages didn't receive any money from OBC. The community explained that OBC did not pay money to villages due to the ongoing conflicts between them and OBC.

Besides the direct cash money paid to villages, the OBC continue to support developmental projects in the entire Loliondo GCA. Also table 1 shows that revenues from photographic tourism in 2010 is much higher than the figures for 2009, this could be explained by the fact that in 2009 the Government conducted eviction of the community members and tour operator companies in area more suitable for photographic tourism, consequently few tourists visited Loliondo GCA and hence less revenues from it to the communities, district council and the government. This eviction resulted into high conflicts and therefore tour operators did not take their clients to Loliondo area.

**Table 6: Tourism revenues paid to central government, district council, and villages in 2009 and 2010 in Loliondo GCA**

| S/N | AUTHORITY | PHOTOGRAPHIC TOURISM REVENUE IN US DOLLARS | | HUNTING TOURISM REVENUE IN US DOLLARS | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Year 2009 | Year 2010 | Year 2009 | Year 2010 |
| 1 | Central Government | 82,000 | 142,000 | 560,000 | 632,000 |
| 1 | Ngorongoro District Council | 23,000 | 30,000 | 109,000 | 158,000 |
| 2 | Ololosokwan village | 44,000 | 65,000 | 25,000 | 0 |
| 3 | Oloipiri village | 1,600 | 7,500 | 25,000 | 0 |
| 4 | Soitsambu village | 8,400 | 1,7000 | 25,000 | 0 |
| 5 | Olorienmagaiduru Village | 2,500 | 7,500 | 25,000 | 0 |
| 6 | Loosoitomaalon village | 4,500 | 7,500 | 25,000 | 0 |
| 7 | Arashi village | 21,000 | 38,000 | 25,000 | 0 |
| | **GRAND TOTAL** | **US$187,000** | **US$314,500** | **US$819,000** | **US$790,000** |

Source: Ngorongoro District Council, 2010.

During the time of this research the OBC camp manager was asked about the issue of not paying money to communities, he gave this statement:

> "We have decided not to give money direct to villages because, we feel that the money is not spent for community development as we want, so we decided to use the money to implement development project for the communities with our own supervision. We usually go to the village and ask them what they want, and then we do it, in this way our money is well spent". (Source: Interview with OBC employee, Soitsambu village, December, 2011).

At the village, I found that OBC is constructing a new village government office in Kirtalo sub-village, part of Soitsambu village and a classroom in Mairowa primary school in Ololosokwan and a staff house in Oloipir village. In 2010 the OBC did not pay the US$25,000 to the villages as in 2009 for the reason that the money paid did not be used properly to address community needs. However, most of the village leaders I spoke to expressed with dissatisfaction of OBC not paying the money direct to the villages as they want to decide themselves on how to use the money:

> "We would like to use and manage our own money the way we want, sometimes there are sick people in the village and they don't have money to go to hospital, the village government needs to help them, so if the village has no money these kind of people will not be helped and they will suffer and be in the danger of losing their lives". (Source: Focus group discussion with villagers of Oloipir village, December, 2011).

The photographic revenues in Ololosokwan and Arash villages are higher than in other villages due to the fact that there are more photographic companies operating in those two villages than in other villages. For the case of Ololosokwan it is also partly due to the long term contract with the high end tourist facility of Clein's Camp.

Most community members appreciate the revenues from tourism paid to their villages as this money is used to meet various needs at community level. Much of this money is used to send children to school at secondary level and also contribute to pay for social developments activities such as building education and health infrastructures:

"The money from tourism activities is used to pay school fees in secondary level for children from this village. Also building classrooms, roads, water wells, village office and also they provide employment to few people in the village". (Sources: Focus group discussion in Oloipir village, December, 2011)

With regard to the benefits the surrounding community in Loliondo GCA gets from hunting tourism, the OBC employee commented:

"Every year we provide about 120 permanent and temporary employments to people from all the villages around here. We also support  social services to the community in the whole of Loliondo GCA for example we have constructed one full-fledged secondary school in Loliondo (fig.8), we constructed 7 buildings in Wasso District Hospital(fig.9), built one bridge in Soitsambu village(fig.10) and drilled 25 underground water bore holes for people and livestock in different villages. All these projects cost more than a billion Tanzanian shillings. We also pay obligatory hunting fees to the Central Government and 25% of the concession fees to District Council for community development. At the village we pay certain amount for land rent, for example in 2009 we paid $25,000 to each of the 8 villages" (Source: Interview with OBC employee in Soitsambu village, December, 2011).



Figure 8: Loliondo Secondary school in Loliondo GCA built under the auspices of the OBC in support for community developments. (Source: Own photo, December 2011).

Figure 9: The Out Patient Department building in Wasso hospital donated by OBC in Loliondo GCA.
(Sources: Own photo, 2012)



Figure 10: A bridge at Pololet river in Soitsambu village constructed through support from OBC (Source:
own photo, 2012)

With regard to contribution to conservation of the wildlife resources and environment, it was learnt that
OBC has ant-poaching unit for protecting the wildlife in Loliondo GCA. Other tour operator companies
in Loliondo they don't support directly an anti-poaching activities and therefore OBC thinks that they are

benefiting from the resource which they don't incur costs for its protection. This is what had to say during interview:

> "We have a strong anti-poaching unit which is on patrol in the entire Loliondo GCA 24hours a day for 7 days a week to protect the wildlife under the costs of our company and we also support the Government through Wildlife Division with anti-poaching equipment such as vehicles (fig.4) for patrols. The photographic companies don't do this" (Source: Interview with OBC employee in Soitsambu village, December, 2011).

While observation confirmed the presence of the anti-poaching unit from the OBC, there was a shocking report from the communities and at the district of the increased incidences of illegal elephant killings by poachers in Loliondo GCA.



Figure 2: Vehicle donated by the OBC to Ngorongoro district council to support wildlife conservation in Loliondo GCA (Source: Own photo, 2012)

The District Game Officer informed that between January and December 2011 a total of 17 Elephants were killed by poachers for the Ivory. This situation raises many questions whether the OBC anti-poaching units has a significant contribution to resource conservation in Loliondo GCA.

Although OBC pays a significant more money for hunting than other companies in the country and has supported many developmental projects to the communities in Loliondo GCA, the local Maasai communities are highly skeptical and uninterested with the existence of the OBC in their lands, and they feel that, OBC could use its financial powers to influence the Government of Tanzania to sell to it the land in Loliondo which would lead to loss of grazing land. UCRT and Nelson(2010) argues that the investors in Loliondo and Government decision makers entirely ignore local land use plans and regulations, and unlike the villages, have substantial amounts of power and money. As a result the communities are in constant struggle to protect their land by applying different strategies such as disrupting the hunting activities in Loliondo GCA.

Also during field time, the researcher took efforts to meet some of the tour operators and find their views with regard to what community are benefiting from their tourism businesses. In discussion,the Clein's Camp manager gave this statement;

" We pay land fee of 30,000 US dollars every year and bed fees paid to wildlife division and 40% comes back to the village of Ololosokwan. We employ 60% of our staff from local community. We have a Charity Foundation which supports community developments such as education and health services. Also we have employed medical staff for the village dispensary which we built ourselves and we pay his salary as well. We also have our guests donating to the dispensary and primary school in the village" (Source: Interview with the Clein's Camp manager in Ololosokwan village, December, 2011)

And with regard to support for conservation of the resources, especially wildlife he stated:

"When we took over the Clein's camp we changed the business from hunting to photographic tourism which we belief in and we think is good for sustainable conservation.......we have managed our  area very well and we have amazing game viewing, there is a big difference between the area we operates and the surrounding area. We also have an anti-poaching unit which patrols in our area every day to protect wildlife" (Source: Interview with the Clein's Camp manager in Ololosokwan village, December, 2011)

On his part the manager of the Enashiva Nature Refuge Camp run by Thomson safaris explained that the company has been very supportive to community development in the surrounding villages:

"Yes, we have supported a number of development projects in villages and some of them are two classrooms and teacher's house in Sukenya primary school, a teacher's house in Soitsambu primary school and recently we just completed a teacher's house in Orkyu primary school. We also drilled a bore hole in 2009 just down there to help solve the water problem in this area but unfortunately due to the existing conflicts within Maasai community the bore hole which costs $10,000  was vandalized" (Source: interview with Enashiva Nature Refuge camp, in Sukenya sub-village in December 2011).

In another tourism venture called Buffalo Luxury Tented camp it was learnt that the village of Ololosokwan where it is located does not benefit much from it except for few Maasai women who bring their traditional hand crafts such as Maasai beads to be displayed at our curio shop here in the camp for the tourists to buy as the acting camp manager explained:

"We have a curio shop in our lodge where local women can sell their handcrafts to tourists. Also our clients visit Maasai cultural boma where they also buy some traditional products from local people. Our clients donates to villages various equipment to support social services like health by providing equipment such as microscope  for diseases investigations and in education by providing books" (Source: interview with the Acting manager of Buffalo Luxury Tented Camp, in Ololosokwan village, December, 2011).

The Buffalo Luxury Tented Camp don't make land rent payments to the village of Ololosokwan where it is located because this venture operates on the land which is privately owned, so they only pay obligatory levies to the Central Government and district council in accordance with the wildlife regulations. This could also be the reason why the relationship between the village and tourism venture was find to be not good.

With regard to contribution for conservation of the resources in Loliondo GCA, the acting camp manager explained that within the 60 acres of land where they operate the tented camp they ensure and keep the natural environment and scenery intact (fig.12) so that to preserve nature:

"Our area is well managed and protected, we have tried to retain the natural environments so that our clients can feel the nature, as you can see our tents, it is all harmonious with the surrounding natural environment" (Source: interview with the Acting manager of Buffalo Luxury Tented Camp, in Ololosokwan village, December, 2011).



Figure 12: One of the tourist tent at Buffalo Luxury Tented Camp showing a natural environment and scenery preserved well in Ololosokwan village, Loliondo GCA(Source: own photo,December,2011)

There are other tour operators in villages that were not available during the time of this research but operate in the study villages and other areas in Loliondo GCA. It was learnt these companies pays tourism revenues at the village and district council. Usually they pay land rent which differs from village to village and a regular tourism fees to the Wildlife Division whereby 40% of the amount (which could be between US$500-1,000 per month) is paid back to villages and 20% goes to District Council and the remaining 40% is retained by Wildlife Division to contribute to Tanzania Wildlife Protection Fund (MNRT, 2008) for wider conservation activities in the country. The bed-night fee is US$10 per guest per night spend in the camp in all villages. In Oloipiri village it was found that Dorobo Safaris pays US$1,500 as land rent fee per year .Other form of benefits is through donations from the clients. It was leant that at the village level the system of record keeping is so poor that the amounts paid monthly or annually could not be established during the time of research and also none of the representative from these companies was available for interview.

Although tourism seems to benefit communities in Loliondo GCA, some individuals in the community and NGOS have the view that these benefits are not enough. During discussion with the NGOs representative, he has the view that communities in Loliondo are benefiting from tourism but to a smaller extent while much goes to the government.

"Communities are benefiting but not enough, it is small. The reason why they don't benefit enough is that communities in Loliondo GCA are not organized to do the tourism business instead they are struggling to safeguard their rights to survive, they are busy with the issue of land, and they are worried that their land rights are not secure" (Source: Interview with NGONET coordinator in Loliondo, December, 2011)

This argument is supported by the fact that all the tourism businesses operating in Loliondo are mainly owned by foreigners and people from other places in big cities of the Country. However, the lack of education and necessary skills for the Maasai youth is the reason which puts them out of consideration in tourism sector. Also community members interviewed expressed their opinions that the benefits currently obtained from tourism are small and could be raised. However, the hunting company and other tour operators are comfortable that the communities are benefitting enough from tourism.

With regard to which is the most suitable wildlife tourism activity in Loliondo GCA the DNRO commented gave the following statement:

> " Both hunting and photographic tourism are suitable in this area, however, photographic tourism is more sustainable and even better compatible to pastoralism practiced in this area". (Source: Interview with DNRO in Loliondo, December, 2011).

In study villages, most people in the Maasai community supports photographic tourism than hunting tourism. This could be attributed to the fact that photographic tourism is more compatible with livestock grazing and also it does not involves killing of animals which is an important part of Maasai culture:

> "Photographic tourism is good because it conserves wildlife while hunting it kills animals. Maasai people do not like to see wild animals be killed, it is against our tradition and also during hunting we are told to move out". (Source: Interview with elder at Oloipiri village, December, 2011)

Tour operators also supports for photographic tourism as they think that it is more sustainable for wildlife and also economically viable to the communities and the government:

> "I belief in photographic safari and is much more sustainable here in Loliondo than anything else". (Source: Interview with the Clein's Camp manager in Ololosokwan village, December, 2011).

Also the  idea that Photographic tourism is good in Loliondo GCA is supported by NGOs and CBOs operating in Loliondo by arguing that hunting leads to killing and losses of precious wild animals and that hunting is incompatible to Maasai culture and identity of co-existence with wildlife:

> "Photographic tourism is good to this place because it does not endanger the life of wild animals. Also photographic tourism is most compatible to pastoralism as the two are not mutually exclusive but hunting excludes livestock and not interested in social part of the community. Hunters are only interested to kill animals and are not interested to visit communities in the villages while photographic tourists want to see community life as well. The photographic companies have good collaboration with communities so they are connected socially to communities in the villages than hunting company. Another reason is that hunting activities is highly centralized at central government level while photographic tourism is decentralized at village level". (Source: Interview with NGONET coordinator in Loliondo, December, 2011)

The fact that  hunting tourism is highly centralized it contributes for communities in most villages to support for photographic tourism more than hunting tourism although financial benefits shows that hunting tourism generates more revenues to the Central and District Governments as indicated in table 1.

On the other hand the hunting company supports hunting tourism because it is allowed by the laws and also generates a lot of money which contributes to conservations of wildlife against poaching and also generates money for community development. The hunting company further argues that hunting is good because it helps to control the number of wildlife which if allowed to grow in big numbers it will

endanger human life and creates because great damage to human properties. Therefore hunting helps to control and put wild animals in good numbers:

> "Hunting is legal and allowed by the government in Tanzania. And of course hunting brings a lot of money to both government and communities". (Source: Interview with the OBC employee in Soitsambu village, December, 2011).

The next subsection will discuss on compatibility of the land uses in Loliondo GCA.

## 4.1. 5 Compatibility of land uses

During the colonial period and under the Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974, which remained in force until 2010, GCAs only regulated the utilization of wildlife and did not govern or regulate any land use activities related to human economic activities or settlements (TNRF,2011) . A major change occurred with the new Wildlife Conservation Act of 2009, which came into force in June 2010, and that prohibits both agriculture and livestock grazing in GCAs. The new Act also requires the Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism to "*ensure that no land falling under the village land is included in the game controlled areas*," (URT, 2009) and to do this within one year of the Act coming into force. As the population of Loliondo continues to increase also the available land becomes smaller and scarcer. Apart from wildlife conservation in Loliondo GCA, there are four land uses competition: cultivation, grazing, hunting, and photographic tourism. The compatibility of these activities is an important issue which requires careful consideration.



Figure 13: Compatibility of different land uses in Loliondo GCA as suggested by Malpas (2005)

In the past it has been considered that since grazing is seasonal, with some areas only used as reserves during the dry season (and possibly only in the driest years), it can co-exist with hunting or photographic tourism, if the appropriate arrangements are made with the tour operatorsHunting is also seasonal; however, its seasons coincide with the peak of tourist seasons, so it is deemed to be incompatible with photographic tourism. Cultivation is locally incompatible with all other uses. This means that patches of land which have been cultivated cannot be used for anything else. However, cultivation and grazing can, and do, co-exist on a larger scale, with patches of crops on the more arable bits of rangeland. Technically, this is not compatibility, since each hectare is available only for one or the other use, but within a larger area, say a kilometer square, both uses could exist. And in fact, since cultivation provides more food per ha than grazing, it can be expected that the density of these small patches of agriculture within rangelands of Loliondo will increase (Malpas, 2005).

Since cultivation destroys the scenic value of land, and also the habitat of wildlife it is incompatible (fig.13) with both safari hunting and photographic tourism in areas like Loliondo. Now situation in Loliondo is not as reflected in this model as the stakeholders did not have any agreed arrangements on the uses of the area. Agricultural activities are expanding in the area and due to prolonged and frequent droughts, the normal traditional grazing patterns of the Maasai has been disrupted. This has resulted into conflicts and difficulties in coexistence of these activities. However photographic tourism seems to be more favored by communities than hunting tourism.

## 4.2 Stakeholders involved in Loliondo GCA conflicts

Through visiting study villages and studying the available document at District council offices a number of key stakeholders were identified to be involved directly or indirectly with the Loliondo resource use conflicts. Then through a stakeholders analysis it came out that there are five main categories of stakeholders which are; 1) communities, 2) tour operator companies, 3) the hunting company, 4) Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and 5) the Government and the Protected Area agencies. In order to understand these stakeholders, a short description is given below in relation to Loliondo resource use conflicts.

### 4.2.1 The community

The community in this study refers to indigenous Maasai pastoralists and agro-pastoralists that live in Loliondo GCA including the six villages involved in this study. Although from the eye of an outsider it might look that the Maasai community is a homogenous society, in reality it is a very heterogeneous society. In Loliondo GCA, Maasai communities differentiate themselves in three sub-clans who live in one or different villages. The sub-clans identified were; Loita, Purko and Loitayok. These Maasai sub-clans have settled with their livestock in Loliondo GCA at different times many years ago. Each of the sub-clan has its known territorial boundaries for grazing and water for their livestock which are important resources for them to survive. It was learnt that these Maasai sub-clans have internal and traditional conflicts which involves cattle raiding and land boundary disputes. It is for this reason that one sub-clan doesn't mix with another sub-clan in the same locality. Therefore, traditionally, it has been practice that each sub-clan defends its land and water resources from being used by members from other sub-clans. In the study villlages it was found that the Purko sub-clan lives in Ololosokwan and Soitsambu villages, Loitayok sub-clan lives in Oloipir village and Sukenya-subvillage, Loita sub-clan lives in Olorienmagaiduru, Loosoitomaalon and Arash villages. With regard to uses of resources, especially water during the dry season, members from the same sub-clan share and protect commonly their resources and if other people from a different sub-clan want to use it then they are first obligated to seek permission from the Elders of the owner's sub-clan. Using the resources (grazing land and water) of other sub-clans without first seeking permission is considered an offence and it may lead to conflicts and clashes between the involved sub-clans.

In recent times, tourism related investments and incomes in Loliondo GCA has become an important economic alternative not only for foreign investors but also for local Maasai communities. UCRT and Nelson (2010) reported that Loliondo has become a focus for wildlife-based investments in tourism camps and lodges since the early 1990s, which has brought both threats and opportunities for the resident local communities. Consequently the issue of land ownership among different Maasai sub-clans has become important and a major concern. The key strategic areas suitable for tourist facility investments such as camping sites, lodge construction sites and other areas with potential for tourist attraction has most of the time led to occasional conflicts between different Maasai sub-clans. The conflicts arise because of the benefits expected from the tourism investment, due to the fact that, the more tourism investment is in the village, the more benefits are expected to the sub-clan which owns the land. This is usually done through a sort of formal agreements between the village government and the investors to pay not only certain fees but also developmental support to the community. Therefore the more the sub-clan owns potential sites for tourism investments the more it is likely to benefit from it and this leads to struggle over ownership of the resources among the communities.

### 4.2.2 The Hunting Company: Ortello Business Corporation (OBC)

There is only one hunting company licensed by the Government to conduct hunting activities in Loliondo GCA and this is the OBC. This company was granted hunting rights in 1992 for a period of ten years thereafter with possible renewable in 5 years terms in an area covering a total of 4,000 km$^2$ which is virtually the entire Loliondo GCA. The company set its camp in Soitsambu village close to Serengeti National Park border. This international company is owned by the Royal family from United Arabs Emirates in the Middle East injected a lot of money in improving local roads and air strips which enabled its aircrafts (fig.14) to operate private flights from the Kilimanjaro International Airport in Arusha/Moshi to Loliondo. Many young people from the nearby town of Loliondo got temporary and permanent 120 jobs in this company during hunting season and were paid in US dollars which translated to be a lot of money for them. However, only few Maasai youth (moran) from surrounding villages managed to find a job in this company, most of them got a job to maintain security around the camp as they lack necessary skills needed in other specialized jobs. Many more people were attracted from large cities like Arusha who flew to Loliondo hoping to get the "Arabs Oil dollars" as it was nicknamed locally. From that time the life in Loliondo started to change significantly due to flows of "Arabs oil dollars" every year.

But not everyone is happy. During the hunting season which is usually from July through December, a serious problem started to emerge, the Maasai livestock need to be removed in the area to give way for hunting activities to take place. Normally the Maasai communities in Loliondo GCA have developed a traditional system of grazing their livestock in a system involving movement between wet and dry seasons of the year. UCRT and Nelson (2010) in their study on land use planning in Loliondo GCA revealed that the western portion of the villages, which border Serengeti National Park, have traditionally been set aside for grazing during the middle of the long dry season that generally spans June-October every year.

As mentioned earlier the hunting season usually begin July till December every year and therefore problems emerged right from the beginning of the hunting company era but it wasn't so big in the early years and slowly the problem got bigger and bigger as the number of people and livestock increased in the surrounding villages. In 2009 the problem had grown to its worst stage whereby the communities had to be evicted forcibly by the Central Government of Tanzania to allow hunting activities to take place:

> "The conflict between OBC and communities in Loliondo GCA reached a climax on July 4, 2009, when Tanzanian police set fire to the Maasai homestead in Loliondo to evict them. Eight Maasai villages were burned down, leaving 3000 people without food, water, or shelter, 54,000 head of cattle were also displaced without water or grazing land in acute drought conditions" (Hayakawa, 2011).

However, the Government claimed to undertake the eviction based on the environmental protection reasons. This eviction attracted huge attention of the media in the country (newspapers and TV channels) and civil societies defending the indigenous people's rights as these statements shows:

> "The eviction of pastoralists from their homes was conducted by Tanzanian police (field force unit) with assistance of the anti-poaching unit and the OBC from 4th July 2009. Communities are still suffering, violation of human rights is still going on, Maasai bomas and houses are still burning, sticking of innocent people, communities began to become poorer because of the loss of their livestock/cattle due to lack of water and pasture" (Mbatianny,2009).

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**BOX 1: OTERLLO BUSINESS CORPORATION**

The Oterllo Business Corporation (OBC) is a private hunting company which is owned by the Brigadier Mohammed Abdulrahim Al-Ali who is believed to be a member of the royal family of Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In 1992, the Government of Tanzania granted the entire Loliondo Game Controlled Area (LGCA) with an area of 4,000 km$^2$ as a Hunting concession to the OBC. The Government issued a 10-year Hunting permit, under the controversial agreement, which resulted into one of the country's biggest scandal known as "Loliondo gate scandal". The scandal involved how the concession was granted and the controversial 10 years hunting permits instead of 5 years term which is prescribed in the law. At community level this scandal was regarded as indigenous land grabbing by the Government and sold to Arabs. As a hunting company OBC is different from other hunting companies as it does not conduct hunting for a business but the Kingdom of UAE has been the client hunting in the Loliondo Game Controlled Area since 1992. "Otterlo is not a tourist hunting company in the traditional sense; it provides hunting safaris only to its own members and is not run for a profit. However, in order to assure good relations with the Department of Wildlife, it pays 100% of its quota of game fees each year regardless of the actual number of animals taken" Malpas (2005). The royal family enjoys the exclusive hunting rights for leisure and only few animals are hunted for trophies for private uses. Every year the most luxurious caravans are made ready to host the Royal family entourage comprising of 50 to 100 people which last between four to seven days. There can be two to three rounds of trips involving different members of the Royal family in the period of six months allocated as hunting season. Every year preparations to host these highly regarded guests in Loliondo GCA continue year round and it involves all the diplomatic arrangements and the presence of the Tanzanian Government machinery for high level of security in the area is insured. The end of one trip for the Royal family from UEA marks the start for preparation for the next year's hunting season.

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Most stakeholders and reports from media (local newspapers and TV channels) reported that the eviction was made to protect the interests of the hunting company, the OBC:

> "The 2009 eviction campaign was carried out on behalf of private companies claiming that they owned the Maasai lands. The companies included the OBC – a United Arab Emirates registered business – and the Royal Family of Dubai. Hunters from the Arab nations, but also the wealthy from Europe and America, descend on the area once the hunting season starts in July. The excuse

given for the evictions was that the Maasai was destroying wildlife habitat and encroaching on the wildlife corridors". (Heath, 2011)



Figure 14: The OBC aircraft off-loading cargo in Loliondo Airstrip (Lima) in preparation for hunting season in Loliondo GCA (Source: Own photo, July 2009).

Another similar report appeared on social media:

> "Pressure is mounting on the Tanzanian government following the recent violent evictions of Maasai from their land in Loliondo, Northern Tanzania, to make way for the hunting company, OBC".(Source: Survival for Tribal people, 2009. http://www.survivalinternational.org/news/4974 visited on June 10, 2012).

At all levels, it has been observed that the OBC enjoys much support from the Government official at District and National levels as this report from associated press testify:

> "Col. A.G.N. Msangi, the District Commissioner for Ngorongoro District, said all applicable rules are enforced. He accused the Maasai of rumor-mongering in an effort to discredit Ortello (OBC). "The company is following the system the government wants," Msangi said. "OBC has invested more money here than any other company in the district." Msangi further said that hunting companies request permission to kill a certain number of animals. Once the request is approved by wildlife experts at the Ministry of the Natural Resources, the company pays a fee based on that number whether they actually kill the animals or not, he said. "We have police and ministry people making sure that they don't exceed what they have paid for," Msangi said. The hunting companies are also required to employ professional hunters to ensure no female or young animals are killed, he added. He also emphasized that not only does hunting revenue finance wildlife conservation, but Ortello, like most tourism companies, also makes charitable donations

to help pay for schools and development projects and it provides badly needed jobs" (Tomlinson, 2002).

### 4.2.3 The Tour Operators

These are important and key stakeholders in tourism industry in every country. Tour operators help in moving tourists to their interested destinations. Some of these companies also operate and own tourist accommodation facilities such as tourist lodges and camping sites in destination areas. In Loliondo GCA different tour operator companies were identified to be involved in resource use conflicts. These companies are; And Beyond, Unique safari, Thomson safari, Dorobo Tours, Nomads Tours and Wildlife explorers

**And Beyond**: This is a foreign company which runs a tourist lodge famously known as Clein's camp in Ololosokwan village since 1998. This company has a land lease agreement of 25,000 acres with the village for 15years with possible renewable agreement. This area traditionally has been a grazing land during dry season for the Maasai pastoralists before it was scraped by the government for intention to establish a well-managed cattle ranch for production of good cattle breeds for the Maasai community in Loliondo. The farm was owned and ran by a company called Tanzania Cattle Products. The initial idea of running a livestock farm project didn't work and the company decided to operate hunting tourism business until 1996 when the farm was sold to Conservation Corporation Africa (CCA) now known as And Beyond. After acquisition of the farm, this company decided to change the business from hunting to photographic tourism and the Clein's Camp became a tourist lodge. There has been a long standing court case between the village of Ololosokwan and the then CCA with regard to land ownership. Although the president of the United Republic of Tanzania by then Benjamin William Mkapa revoked the ownership of Tanzania Cattle Product and returned the farm land to the Ololosokwan village, the CCA appealed to the issue to higher court and the revocation was cancelled with ownership reinstated to CCA. This situation made things to become worse and finally the two decided to end the case amicably outside the court by the company agreeing to pay the land rent fee of 30,000 US dollars annually to the Ololosokwan village and hand over the land certificate to the village but with the condition that no livestock grazing will be allowed in this piece of land.

Nelson (2003) reported that the tourism venture between Ololosokwan village and And Beyond generates a total $55,000 annually for the village. However, this situation has led to reduced grazing area for the Maasai community in Ololosokwan village and therefore Maasai of Ololosokwan village are impelled to take their livestock somewhere else in neighboring villages to seek grazing land which ends up creating conflicts with members of those villages.

**Thomson Safari:** This Company runs a tourist tented camp called Enashiva Refuge situated in 5,000 hectares of land in Sukenya sub-village, part of Soitsambu village. This company bought this highly disputed land from the then state owned company known as Tanzania Breweries Limited (TBL) which later was privatized. The communities were against the acquisition of this land by the state and when the land was sold the fight passed on to the current owner and therefore there has been a long standing conflict between the surrounding communities and the current investor. The Maasai sub-clans which lives adjacent to the Sukenya farm has different interest with regard to the land owned by the Thomson Safari, in which case it results into conflicts. There are four sub-villages which borders the farm namely; Sukenya, Mondorosi, Enadoshooke and Orkyu. The Sukenya sub-village is important because this is where the most people live and belong to Loitayok sub-clan and they strongly support the investor-Thomson safaris. In Mondoros and Enadoshooke sub-villages are dominantly occupied by Purko sub-clan and they strongly oppose the investor's presence. The people from Orkyu sub-village are members of Loita sub-clan and were against the investor but in recent months they have changed and support the investor.

During field observation and informal talks to people it was learnt that the Thomson Safaris has donated to build a teacher's house in Orkyu primary school to evidence good relations between them and probably this was the reason that made them to change their behavior towards the company. The Purko sub-clan is still demanding the investor to go away and return the land to the community. By the fact that the Purko sub-clan are majority in Soitsambu village, they also have more representatives in the village government and they use this advantage to influence the decisions of the village council meetings to meet their interests and consequently the Soitsambu village has filed a court case against the Thomson Safaris requesting the court to order the investor to give back farm land to the community. In this case there are clear conflicts of interest among the communities surrounding the farm and the investor

In conversation with the chairperson of the Sukenya sub-villages who is from Loitayok sub-clan about the relationship between communities and the Thomson Safari he explained that all members from the Loitayok sub-clan supports the investor except the people from the other two sub-clans who has been in constant conflicts with the Thomson Safari. The chairperson acknowledged that Thomson safari has supported various developmental projects in their area although in most cases they have been discouraged by irresponsible acts from Purko and Loita sub-clans:

> "We live very well with Thomson safari and they have helped us with school project where they have constructed two classes and on teacher's house. But people from Purko are harassing and disrupting a lot the activities of the investor, for example they destroyed at night the water bore hole (fig.15) drilled by the Thomson Safari so that we don't benefit the water and the investor to have no credit in support for community development in this area". (Source: Interview with the Chairperson of the Sukenya sub-village in Soitsambu, December, 2012



Figure 15: The Chairperson (in red) of the Sukenya sub-village monitoring the drilling of the water bore hole for community use in auspices of the Thomson Safari in Loliondo GCA. The borehole was vandalized two weeks after its completion. (Source: Own Photo, 2010)

**-Dorobo tours, Nomad safaris and Wildlife Explorers:** These companies have their main offices in the city of Arusha (400km away) but bring their clients to Loliondo while on safari to Serengeti National Park. Each of these has a contract with one or several villages in Loliondo to conduct photographic tourism for their clients. Therefore they mainly operate temporary camps for short periods. Dorobo tours

usually operate in Oloipiri and Olorienmagaiduru villages and Wildlife Explorer operates in Arash and Piyaya villages while Nomad Safaris operate in Ololosokwan. The contract is usually signed with the village governments and the companies pay agreed amount for the land rent and the fees for each tourist staying in their camps. The land rent fee differs from one to another depending on negotiations and quality of the area for tourism..

However, the area given to these companies by the village authorities is the same area which the hunting company OBC uses for hunting activities with the license from the Central Government. And due to poor road infrastructures Loliondo is only accessible during the dry season which is from June to December of which it is the hunting season as well. This overlap results into conflicts between the hunting company and these tour operators on the one hand and the hunting company and communities on other hand. The communities blame the hunting company for disturbing their clients while the hunting company blames tour operators and communities for interfering their hunting activities. Furthermore the hunting company claims that the presence of tour operators in the area is illegal because they are not licensed by the Central Government to operate in Loliondo GCA. The OBC also claim that the communities have no legal power to give wildlife user rights to anyone. Conversely, the communities claim that the land belongs to them and they have rights to allocate different uses for their land for the benefits of their communities. The conflict scene starts to form.

**Buffalo Luxury Tented Camp:** This is newly constructed lodge which started its operations in 2010 in Ololosokwan village. This lodge is built in a privately owned land covering a total of 60 acres which was acquired in 1993 (table 2). Before the construction of the lodge the said land was in dispute between the current owner and the Ololosokwan village who provided the land. The issue was that the village had planned to give out 60 acres of land which was requested by the applicant, but during the survey and boundary demarcation for unknown reasons the size of the land given to this company was inflated from 60 acres to 697 acres. The village government of Ololosokwan didn't agree with it and decided to file a case in the court to reclaim its grabbed land. In 2007 the issue was resolved amicably outside the court with the company agreeing to give back the extra land taken from village and in return the village government decided to end the conflict.

Now there is a new conflict which has emerged that the company is blaming the communities for bringing their livestock close to the lodge which creates disturbances to the tourists and also distract wild animals around the lodge. Also they have a conflict with their neighbor Clein's Camp which is just 5 kilometers apart. The Clein's Camp is against and do not agree on sharing the area of 25,000 acres which they pay $30,000 annually to Ololosokwan under the contract they have signed. Also the Ololosokwan village is unhappy with Buffalo Luxury Tented Camp to utilizing the area outside its 60 acres given to them by the Village.

In this case it shows that tour operators like Buffalo Luxury Tented Camp believes that Loliondo GCA is an area where everyone can go and do business without considering that the permission need to be requested from Director of Wildlife.

### 4.2.4 The Government

There are two levels of government involvement in Loliondo GCA resource use conflicts. On the side there is the Central Government responsible for policy formulation and implementation of the wildlife management laws, in this case Wildlife Act of 2009.On one side there is the local government authorities which comprises of different levels of decision making from Village level, Ward level to the District level. As noted earlier Loliondo GCA was established in 1959 and according to the Wildlife Act 1974 in Game Controlled Areas no person shall without the written permission of the Director of the Wildlife Division, hunt, capture, kill, wound or molest any animal. For this reason the Wildlife Director has set Loliondo GCA as hunting block where OBC has been licensed for hunting rights (URT, 1974).The Local government at the village and the district levels also needs financial resources for local development

programs and therefore make decisions on how communities can use the land and other resources for their social and economic developments. Consequently the village governments have to find various ways to generate funds for village development plans and that is when it gets into contracts with the interested investors mainly in tourism sectors to operate photographic tourism business in their areas. This has happened in all the study villages as already explained and in most cases it has resulted into conflicts with the hunting company (OBC) licensed by the Central Government to conduct hunting activities. In this situation the District Council is left on crossroad as it has the obligation to implement all the Central Government policies and directives at community level while it is also mandated to spearhead and promote developments to the same local communities.

### 4.2.5 Conservation Agencies

As figure 12 shows the Loliondo GCA is part of the Greater Serengeti Ecosystem for it is surrounded by Protected Areas in all its sides. To the west it borders Serengeti National Park (SNP) which is managed by the Tanzania National Parks Authority (TANAPA), to the South it borders Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) managed by Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority (NCAA) and it borders Maasai Mara Game Reserve in Kenya to the North. To the East it also borders Lake Natron Game Controlled Area under Wildlife Division in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT). This makes Loliondo GCA an important partner with the Conservation Agencies in these PAs. Also on the other side it creates a kind of controlled environment for Loliondo residence as they don't have much freedom to move around which in most cases creates conflicts with PA authorities. It was learnt that during severe dry seasons as it was in 2009, pastoralists are compelled to take their livestock inside the Serengeti National Park where there is a good grazing pastures for their livestock but they end up having their livestock seized and confiscated by SNP management and the owners of livestock jailed. This situation creates a very hostile atmosphere between local communities and PA authorities.

Although no interview was made to the PA authorities it was leant that at community level, the PA authorities do provide some support for community development projects through their program called Community Conservation programs where they extend the benefits of tourism to the communities adjacent to PAs. For example in Soitsambu village, SNP has constructed a dispensary building, a teacher's house and one classroom at the Sukenya primary school. Also TANAPA provides some compensation for the loss of property caused by wildlife and helps to assist in combating poaching practices in Loliondo GCA but only when requested. However, Snyder and Sulle (2011), argue that the approach of the TANAPA has reputedly been very top-down and not participatory in delivery. Although, the TANAPA funds development projects and pays compensation for the loss of livestock caused by wildlife, there is discontent from the villagers that this compensation is too little and projects funded are unsustainable. There are no other direct benefits that communities get from these PAs authorities.

During the study period it was learnt that there is a heightened animosity from communities in Loliondo for TANAPA and Maasai Mara Game Reserve authorities in Kenya as they are fiercely opposing to the proposed Arusha- Loliondo-Musoma highway which will be cutting through the Northern part of the Serengeti for the allegedly having negative impacts to the annual migrations of the wildlife. There are local and international mobilization against the proposed highway and the campaign is run through different social media outlets such as Facebook. This controversial project has drawn higher attention from all over the world currently with more than 46,000 people signed for petition against the road. The Government of Tanzania has not started the project which is set to commence in 2012 although preliminary survey is already done. However overall it has drifted apart the relationship between the Conservation authorities and local communities in Loliondo GCA.

## 4.2.6 The Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

In Loliondo there are several active NGOs but most of them work under the umbrella organization known as Ngorongoro District NGOs Network (NGONET). The most active NGOs which operates in Loliondo GCA are Ujamaa Community Resource Team (UCRT), Pastoralists Women Council (PWC), Pastoralist Livelihood and Sustainable Environmnet programme (PALISEP) and Laramatak Development Organisation (LADO) and KIDUPO. The interesting thing about NGOs in Loliondo is that they are established based on Maasai sub-clans so that to defend the rights of its members.For example UCRT and PWC belongs to Purko sub-clan, PALISEP and LADO belongs to Loita and KIDUPO belong to Loitayok. During this research an in-depth interview was held with the NGONET coordinator to talk about how NGOs in Loliondo GCA are involved in resource use conflicts. There has been a general view especially by the Government and public in Loliondo that the NGOs do contributes to long time existence of conflicts in the area; that they get money out of conflicts by making conflicts the main agenda for funds applications from various national and international donors.

CHAPTER FIVE

## 5. FRAMES ANALYSES IN LOLIONDO GCA CONFLICTS

Understanding frames in a resource use conflicts may help all parties involved in resources use decisions to focus on case-specific issues rather than relying on their frame counterparts (Kaufman and smith, 1999). This chapter provides the analyses of frames used by different stakeholders in Loliondo GCA resource use conflicts.

### 5.1 Frames Analysis

As explained elsewhere in this thesis, wildlife tourism in Loliondo GCA started about two decades ago by hunting tourism first in early 1990s and in early 2000s photographic tourism became a main focus through community conservation programs advocated through Wildlife Policy of 1998. In the period between 1990 and 2000 the conflicts related to tourism was not much observed partly because photographic tourism was not yet well established in Loliondo. The District Natural Resource Officer (DNRO) describes the emergence of the conflicts:

> "Mostly from early 2000s is when many of the photographic companies started to engage contracts with villages to operate tourist camps and wildlife viewing safari in Loliondo, then grazing land started to get smaller and conflicts started with hunting company". (Sources: Interview with DNRO in Loliondo, December, 2011).

As villages started to offer land for tourism investors the grazing land became squeezed and confrontations with hunting company started to emerge for both with communities and photographic companies. The interview with OBC camp employee provided the idea of how conflicts started:

> "We have been here in Loliondo for almost twenty year now, but the first ten years there was no much problems or major conflicts, the conflicts started when more tour operators came in this area around 2000, since then there has been no peace". (Source; Interview with OBC employee, December 2011)

The analysis of frames which people use in a given conflicts provides fresh insight and better understanding of the conflict dynamics and development and hence with such insight, and with the help of reframing, stakeholders may find new ways to reach agreements (Kaufman et al., 2003). The analyzed frames are issue/problem frames, identity frames, characterization frames, power frames, loss/gain frames and process/conflict management frames. Each of these frames has been investigated to see how it is used in the case of Loliondo GCA conflicts.

### 5.1.1 Issue/problem frames.

Issue or problem frames refers to what is regarded as a problem in a particular conflict. It sheds light on which aspects of the conflict are important to each party (Gray, 2003). As already explained Loliondo GCA resource use conflicts has existed for nearly two decades now and it involved different stakeholders with varying interests. Consequently each stakeholder has own perception towards the root causes of this conflicts and also on why it has not been resolved for long time. The findings from this study revealed that, generally the stakeholders identified three main issues as the root causes of the conflicts which are land security and ownership, contradicting government policies and an unequal benefit sharing from the tourism sector. These three issues have formed the problem frames in Loliondo GCA conflicts.

*Land security and Ownership*: This is the most expressed concern by the community members in all the study villages. The communities are worried that their land will be turned into Protected Area by the Government for the interest of the hunting company and other tourism investors. The problem has been

termed as "our land is sold to Arabs" and is a popular frame to mobilize community members to defend their land against the hunting company:

> "These people (Arabs) are coming all the way from Arabia and are using our land for their leisure while we are suffering, this is unethical and we cannot allow this anymore". (Source: Focus group discussion in Olorienmagaiduru village, December, 2011).

Another one added:

> "Security of our land is very uncertain; we are so much worried of our future grazing land. We are not sure if it is already sold to the Arabs or not". (Source: Focus group discussion in Olorien Magaiduru village, December, 2011).

The traditional leader in Ololosokwan also uttered his worries on the land security and blames the poor cooperation between stakeholders:

> "Our land is very important for our lives, we are worried of our grazing lands being taken away and this causes poor cooperation between three of us: the government, communities and the investors specifically the hunting company-OBC". (Source: Interview with traditional elder in Ololosokwan village, December, 2011).

Duwelf et al., (2006) argues that situations are labeled as problems (named), their causes are discussed (blamed) and those responsible are confronted (claimed).

Also the same view was shared by the political leader (Ward Councillor) representing the Soitsambu ward:

> "Land security is a very big problem, communities think and are worried that the investors like Arabs will take away and own their grazing land, those are main causes of the conflicts in this area". (Source: Interview with the Councilor of Soitsambu Ward in Soitsambu village, December, 2011).

The District Natural Resource Officer (DNRO) at district council also agrees that, lack of proper land use plans which leads to land insecurity for community members is a problem:

> "Lack of proper land use plans in this area is the main cause of the conflicts. However local politics and lack of awareness among communities in Loliondo GCA exacerbates the situations and it contributed to failure in implementation of proper land use plans". (Source: Interview with DNRO in Loliondo, December 2011).

The NGOs also framed the problem in Loliondo in terms of land ownership:

> "The real issue is land ownership against the hunting activities: The 2009 eviction was translated as land alienation and not for environmental conservation as the Government claimed". (Source: Interview with NGONET coordinator in Loliondo, December, 2011)

Further discussions with the NGONET coordinator on Loliondo conflicts revealed that NGOs have different opinions and perceptions towards the management of the natural resources in Loliondo GCA:

> " We have different opinions and perceptions towards the management of this area. For us NGOs we do advocacy and lobbying to ensure that the natural resources in Loliondo do benefit more the local communities and through this we are seen as conflict creators by the Government and other stakeholders". (Source: Interview with NGONET coordinator in Loliondo, December, 2011)

This kind of views was also reported by Nordlund, (2010) when commented that Tanzanian Government blames all problems in Loliondo on NGOs, while investors like Thomson Safaris and OBC say that the NGOs make up lies about them to create problems in order to attract more donor funding for their projects

The NGOs also blames to what they referred as outdated type of conservation approach in the form of "preservation" instead of "conservation" and that it is another reason contributing to existence of conflicts in Loliondo GCA for a long time:

"Compartmentalization kind of conservation ideologies maintained by our leaders in the government and conservation authorities is a problem. Still many people are seeing conservation as preservation (conservation without involving people) instead of conservation with people. The Government is not coming to the realities on the ground" (Source: Interview with NGONET coordinator in Loliondo, December, 2011)

In this view, NGOs have the feeling that the whole Greater Serengeti Ecosystem needs to be managed as one unit unlike the current system of compartmentalization in which different authorities operates and manage different parts of the ecosystem. These includes TANAPA managing the Serengeti National Park, Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority(NCAA) managing Ngorongoro Conservation Area and Loliondo GCA co-managed by the Wildlife Division in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism and the communities living in Loliondo GCA. The NGOs argue that single system approach could bring more benefits to everyone in the ecosystem but the current system benefits only the authorities mandated by the law leaving out the communities. This view is shared by Goldman (2001) when commented that communities appear in the conservation objectives of the policy in Tanzania only when they are geographically relevant to pre-existing PAs. They are not recognized as assemblages of individual decision makers and resource users, but are reduced to a single dimension of beneficiaries, and thereby supporters of conservation.

Likewise the Government official perceived the real issue to be the lack of proper land use plans in the entire Loliondo GCA which also relate to security of land:

"The problem in Loliondo is the lack of proper land use plans and it is the main cause of the conflicts." (Source: Interview with DNRO in Loliondo, December, 2011).

The tourism investors in Loliondo GCA did not mention security of land as major problem. This could be explained by the fact that the whole of Loliondo is a Game Controlled Area and therefore investors consider it to be a protected area.

As it is shown in later sections of this thesis the problem of land ownership in Loliondo is associated and contributes largely to second order conflicts (the intra-stakeholder conflicts) among the Maasai community whereby different sub-clans fail to agree on their village land boundaries which result into conflicts. Also within the government departments and ministries, there are tensions among personnel at District and Ministerial levels on the implementation of the policies related to Wildlife Act and Land Acts and when problem occurs during implementations of the policies, these people accuse and blame on each other as a cause of problems. Also as there are cases of communities competing on land issues with other stakeholders (hunting and tour operators) it is an evidence of land ownership to contribute in first order conflicts as well.

*Unequal benefit sharing:* Although tourism is generating a lot of money in Loliondo only small part of it goes back to communities (table 1). This is another concern contributing to Loliondo conflicts:

"The investors have acquired large areas of our grazing land and they get a lot of money but what we are getting in return is very small, these tourism benefits are not shared equally, we are the losers of everything". (Source: Interview with villager in Arash village, December, 2011)

The ward Councilor from Soistambu also made this statement:

> "There is a big problem in tourism benefits sharing. The government is taking bigger share and communities get very little as compared to what investors and the Government get (Councilor of Soitsambu ward, December, 2011).

The hunting company (OBC) also holds this frame by blaming other tourism investors as not paying all the required Government and community revenues:

> "Other resource users don't pay the Government fees at central level but go direct to the village offices and pay little money in poorly agreed contracts with village leaders. But in our case we think that we are giving enough to communities". (Source: Interview with OBC employee in Soitsambu village, December, 2011).

The benefit sharing issue contributes to both first order and second order conflicts. In the case of the first order conflicts this occurs when the communities are blaming the Central Government and the investors for not paying enough back to communities from the tourism businesses in community's land. Also it was learnt that District councils are in most of the time in confrontation with Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism regarding the 25% of the hunting fees which needs to be remitted to the District of which sometimes no or only part of it is remitted. For example Ngorongoro District Council did not receive any of this money in 2007. At community level there is competition between different Maasai sub-clans on accessing the tourism revenues from investors in tourism businesses which in most of the time result into conflicts. For example in Soitsambu village the Purko sub-clan doesn't support the Thomson Safari who runs Enashiva Nature Refuge tourist camp but Thomson Safari is highly supported and embraced by the Loitayok sub-clan. It is the same case with Oloipir which is dominantly a Loitayok area, they support the hunting company OBC, while other villages like Ololosokwan and Arash which are purely Loita and Purko sub-clans are against the OBC. Therefore, each sub-clan competes and struggles to expand their areas in order to have more areas and potential sites suitable for tourism investments and obviously it ends up in conflicts between different sub-clans.

*Contradicting government policies:* There is a confusion who manages the land in the Game Controlled Area and this confusion emanates from the fact that, the Wildlife Acts of 1974 and 2009 empowers the Director of Wildlife to control and manage all the wildlife resources outside the core PAs, while the Land Acts of 1999 mandates the registered villages in the country to manage and control their lands. As a result each of the two authorities allocates uses of land on the same area. The investors framed the problem to be associated with the existing government policies and laws which contradicts each other:

> There are contradictions between the Land Act and the Wildlife Act on who manages the Loliondo GCA, is it the communities or the central government? It is not clear and this is a real problem. The government needs to work on this issue". (Source: Interview with OBC employee in Soitsambu village, December, 2011).

The same grievances on conflicting government policies were given by the Clein's Camp manager:

> "Contradicting government policies is the major problem here in Loliondo which causes one area to be allocated for different users. The government needs to zone the area and give every stakeholder its area of operation. Meaning that they should allocate for example this area for hunting activities and another for photographic and area for grazing livestock etc. So if proper land use plan is done I think the problem will be solved". (Source: Interview with Clein's camp manager, December, 2011)

Also the NGOs blames on conflicting government policies and the issue of climate change is aggravating the conflict situation:

"Conflicting government policies such as Wildlife Act and Land Act, contributes to conflicts in Loliondo GCA. Also in recent years climate change has been a big problem here and is exacerbating the conflicts by bring instabilities in the area as rains have become not only less but also very unpredictable and unreliable". (Source: Interview with NGONET coordinator in Loliondo, December, 2011)

The Policies, Laws and Regulations on the management and utilization of Wildlife resources in Tanzania rests all the powers to the Central Government (URT, 1998), while communities are only expected to be involved and considered as beneficiaries:

"It is the aim of this policy to allow rural communities and private land holders to manage wildlife on their land for their own benefit" (MNRT, 1998: sec. 3.3.4)

However, the powers to grant wildlife user rights are still conferred to the Director of Wildlife (URT, 1998).

In contrary the Village Land Act No.5 of 1999 defines the rural land in Tanzania, falling under one or another village to be classified as village land. The definition of village land in the Act includes the following:

(1). Land within the boundaries of villages registered according to the Local Government Act, 1982. (2) Land demarcated as village land under any administrative procedure or in accord with any statutory or customary law. (3) General land that villagers have been using for the twelve years preceding the enactment of the Village Land Act. This includes land customarily used for grazing cattle or passage of cattle. Based on all three of the above definitions, any one of which is sufficient to define an area as Village Land, all of the area of Loliondo GCA and specifically in the 6 study villages is Village Land (TNRF, 2011). It is on this basis that the community in Loliondo claims to own the land traditionally as well as by the virtue of the existing government land Laws and policies. Agrawal and Ribot (1999) assert that when devolution is only administrative in effect, it is not devolution at all, but rather a de-concentration of central power. The authors further argue that providing the power to create and refute these rules brings claims of participation, devolution and democratization into question.

Although the Village Land Act NO.5 of 1999 gives powers to the communities in the registered villages to manage their lands, this seems not applicable to the Maasai pastoralists in Loliondo in which regardless of having a registered villages they do not control the lands within their jurisdiction. This is true because the Director of Wildlife allocated hunting block for the OBC in an area of 4,000 km$^2$ encompassing the entire land areas of the 6 villages involved in this study without consulting the village authorities. Even though the government has repealed the Old 1974 Wildlife Act by excluding GCA from the village land in the new Wildlife Act of 2009, still the problem exists. The New Wildlife Act of 2009, is deemed problematic due to the fact that it does not consider the interest of the pastoral Maasai and their life systems of moving around with their livestock by giving powers to the Government to split part of the community grazing land and turn it into GCA which has the same definition and status as Game Reserves. If implemented it means that, in the new GCAs no human activities including grazing of the livestock will be allowed except tourism. To the Maasai pastoralists, this is a catastrophe for their lives as they will not be able to endure with their livestock anymore as they have been doing for many generations.

According to Dewulf et al., (2009) when disputants cast the issues in incompatible ways and fail to create an acceptable joint framing, conflict is often perpetuated. This is true in Loliondo GCA conflicts where each actor has different meanings of the causes of the conflicts. The conflicting Government Policies (Wildlife Act and Land Acts) contributes to the first order conflicts whereby the Government and the

hunting company (OBC) find themselves in conflicts with communities, NGOs and the photographic tourism companies. The policy contradictions contribute to first order conflicts.

## 5.1.2 Identity frames

Identity frames capture how an individual conceives of herself and her membership in social groups (Lewicki et al., 2003 in: Dewulf et al., 2003).The identity frames used in Loliondo conflicts are mostly those affirming the affiliations of the groups together; these are We/Us/Ours-group frames. As the findings from this study reveals, the communities are identifying themselves as "oppressed" by the investors and the government while investors are identifying themselves as "innocent" and treated unfairly by communities. In we-groups communities in Loliondo are describing investors as people who have come to creates problems in their traditional lands and identify themselves as owners of the land:

> **"**This is our traditional grazing land, our home and we have been living here for many generations". (Source: Focus group discussion with villagers of Olorienmagaiduru, November, 2011).

The same feeling is shared by the traditional elder in Oloipir village:

> "I am born here and I have lived here for many years. I am indigenous to this place than those investors. Our system for livestock grazing involves moving from one place to another, this is our culture". *(*Source: Interview with villager in Oloipiri village, November 2011).

The statement "I am born here…….this is our culture" signifies a strong attachment to a sense of place and refers to the cognitive approach to framing (Dewulf et al., 2009)

A villager from Arash village gave this grievance:

> "I am very unhappy and oppressed, the hunting company doesn't want anyone to graze livestock in the area we usually take our livestock in the dry season". (Source: Interview with villager from Arash village, December 2011)

Another villager from Arash uttered:

> "We just see these Arabs coming and do hunting, killing animals like poachers". (Source: Interview with villager from Arash, December, 2011

On the other hand the investors, both hunting company and the photographic tour operators argue that they are "innocent" people in which their existence in Loliondo is legal. They blame both communities and the Government for not obeying the contracts signed with Village Government or Central Government:

> *"*We are not the cause of these conflicts; we are innocent but just find ourselves in circumstances of conflict because we operate here". (Source: Interview with Clein's Camp manager in Ololosokwan village*,* December 2011*).*

Likewise the OBC identifies themselves as so "kind" but not "appreciated" by the community:

> "We are giving a lot to support community development in this area but our contribution is not appreciated. What else I can say, we are just good people". (Source: Interview with OBC employee, Soitsambu Village, December, 2011)

In this case the community members are identifying themselves as "oppressed" while labeling investors as oppressors. This is in line with Dewulf et al., (2003) argument that individuals may frame themselves as champions of a particular cause or as victims of others' actions.

Although the government identifies itself as neutral player, the communities blame it for favouring the investors:

> "The government is not fair, it keep bringing investors in thi place and favoring them such as OBC because they have money". (Source: Interview with Ward councilor of Soitsambu, December, 2011)

Rothman, (1997, In: Shmueli et al., 2006) argues that parties in conflict take on identities derived from the interplay between their self-conception and interests, and their group affiliations.

In this case we see each stakeholder trying to affiliate themselves with the like partners for example the hunting company associates itself with the government and hence blaming other stakeholders. Kaufman, (2003) commented that typical responses to threats to identity include ignoring information and perspectives that threaten the core identity, reinforcing affiliations with like-minded groups.

In Loliondo conflicts the identity frames contribute to both the first and second order conflicts. In the case of first order conflicts the two main coalitions come into play. That is communities joined by the NGOs and photographic companies and forms the one "We" group against the hunting company and the Government. Likewise the hunting company supported by the Government systems tries to fight back against the other coalitions. In the same vein within the communities there are also "we" groups formed from different Maasai sub-clans who competes each other on various issues on resources uses, benefits sharing and decisions making.

### 5.1.3 Characterisation frames

Characterization frames are reductionist labels, associating positive or negative characteristics with individuals or groups (Shmueli et al., 2006). In Loliondo GCA conflicts the characterization frames used are those related to They/Them/Other -groups. The community members in Loliondo GCA are blaming the investors and the government by regarding them as bad people and oppressors. The following excerpt shows this characterization frames:

> "These investors are bad people because they are denying us our rights while they know that the land and resources in this area belong to us; and the Government favours them because of their money". (Source: Interview with the villager in Ololosokwan, December 2011).

In a group discussion at Olorienmagaiduru village same views was given in the discussion as this statement:

> "They (referring to investors) just come here to make money with our wildlife and now bringing problems to us, they are bad people". (Source: Focus group discussion with villagers of Olorienmagaiduru village, December, 2011).

Another villager had this to say:

> "The investors like OBC are after their own benefits or leisure, they don't care about our lives, they are interested to make money and go away while we are suffering". (Source: Interview with villager from Olorienmagaiduru village, January, 2012)

As Kaufman et al., (2003) commented, parties in a conflict construct characterization frames for others that significantly differ from how the other parties view themselves. Such characterizations often undermine the others' legitimacy, cast doubt on their motivations, or exploit their sensitivity. The statement by the hunting company employee testifies:

"Other stakeholders are interfering the interests and rights of our company; they are the cause of these conflicts. But our company respects every person". *(*Source: Interview with OBC employee, December 2011).

Also the OBC representative blames other stakeholders as the creators of the conflicts while legitimizing their presence:

"There are conflicts, but the conflicts are caused by these other stakeholders not us. The communities are giving land permits to tour operators to conduct photographic tourism in the area already which is already allocated for our hunting activities by the government. They are ignorant and misled by tour operators". (Source: Interview with the OBC employee in Soitsambu village, December, 2011).

Other stakeholders like Buffalo Luxury Tented Camp view communities as ignorant and lacking the understanding of the values of resources in their areas and which leads them not to value the investors as well:

"I think communities have low understanding of the value of these resources, they are ignorant and need to be educated". (Source: Interview with acting manager of Buffalo Luxury Tented Camp, Ololosokwan, December, 2011)

This view was also shared by the government officials blaming the communities of not appreciating the value of the resources in their areas of which it is the main attraction for the investors in the area.

"There is a need to create more awareness among community members on importance of these resources for their developments, without these resources no investor will come to this place". (Source: Interview with DNRO, December 2011)

In this case we see each stakeholder stereotyping and blaming other stakeholders others as source of conflicts. Shmueli et al., (2006) argues that disputants usually formulate frames that are consistent with their interests. The government and the investors characterize communities as ignorant and not valuing their resources while communities characterize investors as bad people who are just interested with their own benefits. In Loliondo GCA the characterization frames like identity frames contributes to both first and second order conflicts where group of affiliated stakeholders form a coalitions to challenge the others/ they group as indicated above.

## 5.1.4 Power frames

Power relations have been one of the issues of concern in Loliondo conflicts. Consequently the uses of power frames to influence the situation frames has also been evident. Power frames helps the disputant determine not only which forms of power are legitimate but also the forms of power that are likely to advance one's own position (Kaufman et al., 2003). In Loliondo conflicts, the identified power frames mostly used by the stakeholders are those associated with land ownership and resource control, legal powers through government policies, laws and regulations and financial resources. Also the power of the media has been observed.

The community by the virtue of traditional existence in Loliondo claims to be the real owners of the land and other resources. Therefore they use this aspect of land ownership as power to pursue their rights. The government and investors on the other hands rely on formal rules and policies governing the resources which empower the government to control the resources in GCAs. The investors have money therefore they can manipulate community leaders and government official to get their interests met. In some cases the government also uses military powers to silence the communities and steer its interests.

During interview, the DNRO revealed the powers of the Government on the issue of management of resources in Game Controlled Areas (GCAs) in the following statement:

> "In the GCAs the decisions on the uses of land and wildlife resources are made at the ministry level with certain level of consultations to Local Government Authorities mainly District Councils". (Source: Interview with DNRO in Loliondo, December, 2012).

The excerpts from focus group discussion with villagers in Ololosokwan also show how villagers refer to previous events   and policies as power frames:

> "We were first moved out during establishment of the Serengeti National Park (in 1959) and now the government is ordering us to move out to allow hunting activities, this is not acceptable. This is our traditional land and our legal village land according to Village Land Act, I think they are just after creating another Protected Area". (Source: Focus group discussion with villagers in Ololosokwan villager, December, 2011).

The reminiscence of evictions of Maasai in Serengeti National Park in 1959 shows how the cognitive approach to framing can reveal a hidden representation of the situation as Minsky, (1975) defined frames as a memory structures that helps people to organize and interpret incoming perceptual information by fitting it into pre-existing categories about reality. In this case situations are framed by matching perceptual inputs with an available repertoire of frames:

> "We will not sit down and let our Land be taken by Arabs; we will defend our land even if the Government wants to kill us" (Source: Focus group discussion with villagers in Ololosokwan villager, December, 2011).

Communities also expressed their distrust to the government especially when it uses force to remove them from their lands:

> "The government uses the police forces to protect OBC and deprive our rights because OBC corrupts the government officials with its money". (Source: Interview with villager in Loositomaalon, December 2012).

Here the communities are referring to financial powers of the OBC as the factor for conflicts in the area, that the OBC is corrupting the government officials in order to have its interests protected.

Another strategy employed by the communities is the use of various media channels to communicate their issues to the wider audience at national and international stage. It was learnt that community access the media through the indirect support from NGOs and tour operators. In June 2009 one of the popular newspapers in United Kingdom(UK)  known as "The Observer" published an article with title *'tourism is a curse to us*' by Alex Renton explaining how tourism is affecting the lives of the Maasai in Loliondo GCA:

> "People in the villages tell us about "the Arabs" and their bizarre colonization of Loliondo GCA. For six months every year, they say, they have to submit to the Arab's orders about where and how they take their herds. If there are disputes with OBC over the land, Tanzanian policemen punish the villagers with beating and arrest" (Renton, 2009)

This allegations of the Government supporting the hunting company were also reported by the investigation team from Feminist Activists Coalition (FEMACT) which established a close link between the police conducting the evictions and OBC and that the evictions were aimed at protecting the Corporation and clearing the fields for hunting. (Source: http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/advocacy/58956 visited on 25/05/2012).

The communities took more actions by engaging the local NGOs to form coalition to speak for the communities. This was explained by the NGONET coordinator during interview:

> "We support the interests of the pastoralist communities and sustainable management of the resources. Especially we want to safeguard the interest of the communities on land rights". (Source: Interview with NGONET coordinator in Loliondo, December, 2011)

All these testimonies show that there are power struggles which have been going on in the study area and each party uses different strategies to substantiate its legitimacies. Shmueli et al., (2006) argues that the more intractable the conflict is, the more stakeholders are likely to interpret events as mutually exclusive power struggles, resulting in polarization. In Loliondo GCA the community disobedience to the government orders constitute a deep rooted identity frames such as "I am indigenous to this place than those investors favored by the government" as given above which has drifted the relationships far apart. In 2010 the government officially commissioned a land use plan for entire Loliondo GCA with the aim to separate wildlife area with the community land but still the communities rejected the plan of being not participatory and calling it as a "government ploy to grab the land for the interest of the hunting company".

The power frames contribute a lot more on first order conflicts where communities backed by photographic companies and NGOs revolts against the OBC and the government.

## 5.1. 5 Loss/gain frames

In conflict situation it is common for most parties involved in the conflict to focus on threats of potential loss rather than on opportunities for gain (Kaufman et al, .2003).The most salient loss/ gain frames in Loliondo conflicts are loss of grazing lands for the communities, loss/gaining of revenues by the government and communities, loss of good image and reputation for the Loliondo as a safe tourist destination and loss of wildlife habitats.

As one of the conflict management process, in 2004 the government proposed to establish Wildlife Management Area (WMA) in Loliondo GCA as a way to empower communities to manage and benefit from wildlife resources through tourism ventures, however the communities in Loliondo GCA rejected the idea of WMA on the basis that the government intended to turn the land into the Protected Area. Although the WMA was meant to benefit the communities but still the communities rejected it because the communities framed it as loss of land and not as opportunity to benefit from tourism. Again, in 2010 the government brought up a proposal to undertake the proper land use plan for the entire Loliondo GCA in order to allow proper management and utilization of the available natural resources and hence end the conflicts, still the communities rejected the proposed land use plan on the reason that the plan was not participatory during its formulation and that it aimed at setting the land for investors especially for the hunting company OBC. In this case it shows that communities have framed the problem in terms of losses of their grazing land and tourism revenues from photographic tourism:

> "We don't accept the proposed land use plans because it sets the WMA for the existing foreign companies and not for our benefits; people worry that if they accept it that means they also accept the investors to take their land, for example these Arabs (referring to OBC) and Thomson safari which are already blocking our traditional grazing system". (Source: Focus group discussion with villager in Ololosokwan, December.2011).

Interview with villager at Soitsambu village shares the same loss of land frame:

> "I am very much worried that, these investors might take our land for longer lease period of 99 years and leave us in poverty. We have lost many cows due to lack of grazing areas during dry season". (Source: Interview with villager in Soitsambu village, December, 2011).

Kaufman et al., (2003) further emphasizes that people tend to react differently to a proposed action when its expected consequences are framed in terms of losses (WMA = Protected land) as opposed to gains, where preventing a perceived loss is often more salient and more highly valued than capturing a commensurate gains.

A villager in Arash explained that his cattle died during eviction from hunting area which resulted into lack of water and grazing land:

> "My cattle died due to lack of grazing areas and water in dry season because the place we reserved for grazing during dry season is taken by investors. It is very bad that they don't allow us to use our traditional land. That is the reason we don't want this land use plan made by the Government". (Source: Interview with village in Arash village, December, 2011).

Here it is interesting to note that the land use plan is named as "made by the government" suggesting that they were not involved in the process of preparing the said land use plan.

On the other hand the investor perceives the conflicts in terms of the losses of their businesses and habitats for wildlife which enables their business to flourish. The statement made by OBC employee supports this claim:

> "There are disruptions of the wildlife habitats caused by human activities from surrounding local communities and this has resulted in decline of wild animals and therefore in future probably hunting activities will no longer be possible in this area". (Source: Interview with OBC employee in Soitsambu village, 2011)

Also the Clein's camp manager feared losing the business if a conflict continues:

> "Nobody would want to come in area with conflicts, so we are worried to lose our business, Loliondo is losing its reputation as the area to visit, we would like to see the area is in peace so that not to affect our reputation as a company and the business". (Source: Interview with Clein's camp manager, in Ololosokwan village, December, 2011).

The government official also have the view that the conflicts in the area are threatening the wildlife habitats which may lead to disappearance of wildlife and hence affect the tourism businesses will lead to losses of revenues for the Government:

> "Declining of wildlife habitats is the greatest risks due to this conflicts and also some investors in this area might go away if the conflict continues and hence loss of government revenues from tourism". (Source: Interview with DNRO in Loliondo, December 2011).

The loss/gain frames concerns direct with the interests and identities of each of the stakeholder and therefore it is mostly linked to second order conflicts. In this case the communities evaluates the situation with regards to their sub-clans and this is why you find Maasai one sub-clan aligning with certain investor so that to protect its interests. Also in the government offices each department is more concern with its gains and therefore supports the policies which ensure their interests within the government systems.

### 5.1.6 Process/conflict management frames

In long standing disputes, conflict over how best to manage or resolve a difference is central issue. Kaufman et al., (2003) argues that depending on disputants' identity, characterization of other disputants, perceived power, and perception of the available options, conflict frames may impel parties to seek very different remedies in response to common problems. In Loliondo conflicts there has been differing approaches by stakeholders in managing/resolving the conflicts. The main conflict management frames held by stakeholders are the lack of participation in decision making, use of moderators in conflict

management, negotiations among the stakeholders and getting a proper land use plans in place with establishment of the Wildlife Management Area (WMA) in Loliondo GCA.

In the process of conflict management inclusive participation of all relevant stakeholders is pivotal. The community feels that they are left out in the process of decision making about the uses of their area which is a very important issue to them; that they have no control and cannot make decisions for their lands and because of that, they usually don't know what is happening as these statements shows:

> "All the decisions are made from the top by the central government and at the district council; we had never been consulted to establish a hunting block in our areas and we had never requested the Government to bring any hunting company here". *(*Source: Interview with Councilor of Soitsambu Ward, November 2011).

And during focus group discussion villagers expressed lack of involvement:

> "We are not involved in decision making of our lands, we just see these Arabs coming and do hunting, and this is why conflicts occur". (Source: Focus group discussion with villagers in Olorienmagaiduru village, December, 2011).

Another one added:

> "Some few politicians are usually selected by the government officials to attend the conflicts resolution meetings and normally held at the district, and I think these politicians are bribed by OBC because they don't protect our interests and after the meeting they don't even bring the feedback to us".(Source: Focus group discussion with Soitsambu villagers).

There was an indication that the political leaders in the communities are not trusted to represent the community effectively as in most cases they make close relationship with the OBC officials for a personal gains. The fact communities are not involved in allocating hunting blocks and even choosing the hunting company in their areas makes them feels that they are neglected and put aside in decision making. This has resulted into power struggle episode.

The NGOs blames the government that it has not been able to manage the conflicts due to excessive use of force and therefore suggests a moderator:

> "The management of the conflicts has not been good; the government has been leading on this and sometimes by use of force which has made situations to be even worse. There has been excessive use of force and top-down decisions. People are tired with this conflict and if the conflict is not settled, there is going to be far reaching negative implications in this region. I think we need a moderator". (Source: Interview with NGONET coordinator in Loliondo, December 2011).

However, the government officials thinks that NGOs in Loliondo contributes to failure in conflict management efforts by instigating the communities against the investors through their capacity building and sensitization projects aimed at empowering the communities to demand more rights and benefits from the resources in their areas. The government beliefs that the NGOs resonates wrong messages to communities with regards to civil rights and obligations. For example when women held demonstrations in Loliondo alleging the ruling party of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) for not supporting and solving the land problems, some of the NGOs leaders were arrested with allegation that they instigated the protest:

> "At least three non-governmental organisation representatives were arrested in Loliondo, Ngorongoro district on Monday for allegedly instigating over 1,500 Maasai women to rally and return their membership cards to the ruling party". (Mwalongo, 2010)

The NGOs officials in Loliondo explained further that they had received intimidation at different occasions from the government that they will be deregistered to operate in Loliondo if they keep misinforming the communities about the government and investors:

"We face intimidation from the government by threatening to de-register our organization on the claims that we are causing the conflicts in this area". *(*Source: Interview with NGONET coordinator in Loliondo, December 2011).

The community members also support the use of moderator to facilitate the conflict resolution:

"All the effort to solve these conflicts has not helped much, we need a moderator to facilitate in solving this problem" *(*Source: Interview with Soitsambu ward Councilor in Soitsambu, November 2011).

Another villager in Loosoitomaalon suggests:

"I don't think we can solve these conflicts ourselves; we need someone to help like judicial adjudicator but should not be the Government". (Source: Interview with villager in Loosoitomaaloni, December, 2012)

The above statement shows that there is a high mistrust on side of the Government in facilitating the conflicts as the villager emphasizes "*we need someone to help….. but not the government"*. This is due to the fact that the government has been leading in the process of solving the conflicts and in all cases the talks failed or worked just for temporary period of time. Also the communities and NGOs made efforts to influence the conflict management by engaging a wider networks of NGOs and human right activist organizations in Tanzania which sent investigation team to Loliondo with members from seven representatives of the FEMACT network from Dar es salaam, three pastoralist CSOs from Arusha and four media persons(Source: http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/advocacy/58956 visited on 25/05/2012).Then due to involvement of this influential and powerful NGOs it drew attention of the donor countries like Denmark which intervened on the issue by demanding the Tanzanian government to stop the conflicts and eviction and also demanded thorough investigation to be undertaken(Source: http://allafrica.com/stories/200909140049.html visited on 25/05/2011). In response to the mounting pressure on the government in November 2009 the Tanzania House of Parliaments  ordered the investigation on the Loliondo conflicts to be undertaken by the Parliamentary Committee of Land, Environment, Natural Resources and Tourism(Source: http://allafrica.com/stories/200911260573.html visited on 25/05/2011). Unfortunately to this date the findings of the Parliamentary Committee  which investigated the Loliondo conflicts  specifically the evictions of 2009 has never been made public and this just added the mistrust to the government bodies and even raise the suspicion that the Parliamentary Committee was also corrupted by the OBC. These have been various processes for each party trying to win its side. Box 2 just shows how conflicts management efforts have been evolving and reported in Loliondo GCA. Also negotiation among stakeholders to discuss their problems and reach consensus was seen as good way to solve the conflicts:

"Negotiation in round table is good way of solving conflicts everybody speaks freely and eventually you all agree on way forward, but this does not happen, it is  the government official who comes with the already predetermined decisions, which we don't like". (Source: Focus group discussion with villagers in Oloipir, December, 2011).

Most community members have clearly indicated that they prefer a win-lose situation in which they want first to have a full control of their land and choose the investors whom they want in their areas through open negotiations. However, other stakeholders in the area including the government would like a win-

win scenario and proposes the area to be zoned (land use plans) to allow different interest and uses for all the stakeholders

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**BOX 2: Extract from the letter written by Navaya Ole Ndaskoi to the President of the United Republic of Tanzania about Loliondo Conflicts on 02.01.2003.**
Title: Stop the killing fields of Loliondo

*Maasai elders in Loliondo, Arusha Region, who recently declared a land dispute against OBC Ltd, a foreign game-hunting firm, have accused some top Government officials of corrupt practices, saying the conflict is not political. The Arusha Regional Commissioner, Daniel ole Njoolay, recently described the simmering land dispute between the Maasai pastoralists and OBC, as a political issue.*

*Francis Shomet [the former Chairman for Ngorongoro District Council] claimed that Njoolay had misled Tanzanians to believe that the allegations recently raised by Maasai elders were unfounded and baseless. Fidelis Kashe, Ngorongoro District Council Chairman maintained, "We cannot stand idle to see our land being taken away by Arabs. We will kill all the animals in the area as these are the ones attracting the Arabs into our land" (The Guardian May 30, 2000).*

The next morning Government officials were reported to have said the following:
*The Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism, Zakia Meghji, yesterday assured Loliondo residents that no land has been sold or grabbed by Arabs in Loliondo. Flanked by the Arusha Regional Commissioner, Daniel ole Njoolay and the Director of Wildlife, Emanuel Severre, Meghji commented, "There is no clause on the sale of land in the contract signed between OBC and the six villages of Ololosokwan, Arash, Maaloni, Oloirien, Oloipiri and Soitsambu."*
*However an inquiry conducted by The Guardian in Loliondo last week established that the Maasai elders were not involved in the re-lease of the hunting block to the company. According to Megji, her probe established that the building has been constructed about 400 metres from the water source, 200 metres more than the distance recommended by law. But The Guardian investigation shows that the structures are less than 50 metres from a spring. And another spring has dried up (The Guardian May 31, 2000).*
(….The OBC operates like a separate arm of the Government. Many people in Loliondo believe that OBC is even more powerful than the Government. The Maasai word for "the Arab", *Olarrabui*, is often used to refer Brigadier Al Ali, and by extension OBC. The word *Olarrabui* has become synonymous with power, authority, brutality, fear, and entities larger than life…….). As to lands lost in Loliondo, the Government is advised to return this to its owners. Land should not be grabbed senselessly. The Government, should at once, re-look into the whole matter.
*Navaya Ole ndaskoi is a Maasai right's activist*

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The following excerpts from government official and tour operators give the details of how the conflict management process has been in the past:

> "In solving the conflicts usually the stakeholders involved in conflict come together under the lead of government and try to solve the problem. However, in most cases the decisions reached are not productive as no follow up are made afterward due to various reasons such as lack of funds in government budgets to deal with conflict issues. There have been some policy challenges as well which cause the problems repeatedly. For example some of the crucial decisions on management and utilizations of the resources at local level like hunting areas are made at the top

level of the government which in most cases conflicts with the reality at the grounds. The land use plan being undertaken by the government if implemented and adopted by the communities it could be a breakthrough towards the end of the conflicts in Loliondo". (Sources: Interview with DNRO in Loliondo, December, 2011).

The interview with Clein's Camp manager also gave similar opinions:

"The past process to solve this conflicts has not been successful, I think the government need to make proper land use plans so that to set the area exclusive for wildlife and tourism and the other area for community developments" (Source: Interview with Clein's Camp manager in Ololosokwan village,December,2011)

Gardner (2003) argues that conflict management frames tend to limit an individual's ability to examine alternative options fairly and to determine which are most likely to be effective in particular situations. In this case communities in Loliondo have lost trust in government efforts and strategies to resolve the conflicts as they believe that the Government favors the investors, consequently polarization has grown among stakeholders. The interlocutors in this study further reported that the top officials of the hunting company (OBC) and some the photographic companies are not interested in meeting the communities even when requested to do so in order to discuss and resolve the emerging issues but mostly they are seen in government offices. This is interpreted as neglect and that the investors value government officials than the communities.

The above analysis has indicated different frames have been used by different stakeholders to perpetuate conflicts in Loliondo GCA. The next section will show how these frames have led to manifestation of the conflicts at different levels.

## 5.2 Manifestation of the Conflicts

By looking into interests of the stakeholders, there are two major coalitions which could be identified in Loliondo conflicts. The first group involves communities comprised of different Maasai sub-clans, photographic companies and NGOs and the second group involves the government which comprises of district and central governments, hunting company (OBC) and conservation agencies. These two coalitions form a conflict at first order or the surface conflicts and this kind of conflicts is the one which is mostly covered and reported in media such new papers (Mwananchi daily newspaper, 15th June, 2009), Televisions and internet sources and it dominates the daily talks of people on the streets. However, there is a second order



First order conflicts: connected to Coalitions

Second order conflicts: intra-conflicts based on identity and character frames

or under surface conflicts which do exist in Loliondo. This is a conflict which exists in the individual stakeholder such as community (involving different Maasai sub-clans), conflicts in the governments at different levels (District and Central levels) and conflicts between the investors. The second order conflicts although it is sometime severe and detrimental but in most cases it is not reported or taken seriously and no efforts are made to deal with it. Looking closely into these intra-community, governmental and investor conflicts you realize that they are connected directly to the first order conflicts. Now I will turn to discuss how these two coalitional conflicts occur and explain how they influence each other.

### 5.2.1 The First Order Conflict

This is also the conflicts usually on the surface and it involves two coalitions mentioned above. It all started when the government of Tanzania inherited the colonial laws which established Game Controlled Area as part of the Protected Areas under Wildlife Act 1974.The period between establishments of GCA in 1959 till 1980s there was no problems and Maasai pastoralist lived freely grazing their livestock in Loliondo GCAs. The idea behind establishment of GCAs was that to protect wildlife falling outside the core Protected Areas (PA) by partially restricting human activities. In other words it means that in all GCAs human settlements were allowed to co-exist with wildlife but with close control by the state over the environment and use of wildlife.

Towards end of 1980s the government of Tanzania took major structural adjustments whereby the country changed its policies from state owned economy to market based economy. The state owned parastatals were completely privatized and others run in joint ventures with private sector. The government embraced the policy to promote the private sector to lead the country's economy. Consequently major changes also happened in wildlife and tourism sectors. The once state owned and run tourist hotels and lodges in National Parks were solid to foreign private investors. The wave of privatization also went through to the hunting tourism industry which was being conducted by the state owned company called Tanzania Wildlife Company (TAWICO), then hunting activities were privatized and the hunting blocks were given to private companies most of them foreign owned.

Loliondo GCA being part of the Greater Serengeti Ecosystem (fig.3) is one of the well-known wildlife rich areas outside the PAs (TNRF, 2011). In partitioning of the hunting blocks the central government allocated the whole of Loliondo GCA (4,000 km$^2$ ) as a single hunting block and was offered to OBC. In the meantime the Maasai communities have been living for many years with their livestock in the whole area of Loliondo GCA. In designating hunting block, the Government didn't take into consideration that the hunting activities may interfere with livestock grazing activities of the local Maasai communities and vice versa.

The OBC started its hunting activities with the license from the central government in the whole area of Loliondo GCA. During the hunting season (July to December) every year; livestock has to be moved in some areas in order to allow hunting to take place. This is a new experience for Maasai communities who are used to wonder freely with their cattle and therefore resistance against OBC started to show up. Also the growth of tourism sector in in the country in early 1990s, which attracted tours operators in Loliondo such And Beyond, Thomson Safari and others to secure land (see table 1) for tourism, it resulted into shrinking of the grazing areas for the local communities.

The village government leaders in all the six villages have voluntarily signed contracts with the photographic companies to operate tourism in their areas. Although the OBC operates in the same area but the villages have no any binding agreement with the hunting company (OBC) which is licensed by the Central Government. During the hunting season the photographic companies are not allowed to operate in Loliondo GCA, so that to give way for hunting activities. But these people have permission from the village authorities and have signed contracts with them, so in most cases they don't move out, which ends up creating conflicts. Usually the game scouts from hunting company (OBC) will visit to the photographic tourism campsites and tell them to move out of the area, at the same time reports the issue to the game offices in district council. As tour operators have fixed schedules with their clients and also incur huge costs to bring their clients to Loliondo, they try not to go away and instead they meet with community leaders and persuade them not to move their livestock from the hunting area which will give them more time to spend in the area. Also this tactic helps to divert attention from tour operators to the communities for not removing their livestock. For this reason, the conflicts between photographic tourism companies and tourist hunting have been persistent in that area for the past ten years, and have caused controversy, protests, and recriminations among parties throughout this period (see Masara, 2000; Anon,

2002; MNRT, 2002a; Ndoinyo, 2002; and Thomlinson, 2002) as reported by Nelson (2003).Then you find the district and central government intervening by ordering the tour operators to get out of the place:

> "Several of the tour operators using the village lands received letters from the government informing them to cease operations and remove themselves from the Loliondo area because of the conflict with tourist hunting activities and the prohibitions on tourism under the Tourist Hunting Regulations" (Nelson, 2003).

The local NGOs which some are reported to have close relationship with photographic companies engage in mobilizing the communities against the hunting company while defending the Photographic tourism it is friendly and that it does not disturb the community's grazing practices. Moreover it was learnt that each of photographic company has formed a charity organization where their clients could donate money to support community development projects but there is a report that the money is used to support NGOs help to spread the negative messages against the hunting company and the Government which supports it.

The popular message spread to communities which also reported in frames analysis was that their land has been "*sold to the Arabs"* (the hunting company -OBC) and call upon communities to join efforts to protect their traditional lands. Consequently the communities respond by not removing their livestock in the hunting area for intention to disrupt the hunting activities. For almost three years from 2007, 2008 and 2009 the hunting company had its hunting activities seriously interrupted:

> "Since 20O8 to date our hunting activities have been seriously affected and hampered by spread of livestock everywhere in this area. Also the agriculture is growing so rapidly around this place". *(*Source: Interview with the OBC employee in Soitsambu village, December, 2011*).*

On the other hand the hunting company has been paying all the obligatory fees to the district and central governments and also supports conservation activities in Loliondo and in the country. In 2009, there were all signs that the communities are not going to remove their livestock to allow hunting activities to take place due to prevailed severe and prolonged drought condition at the time. By mid May 2009 the central government through the Ngorongoro District Commissioner (DC) issued the notice ordering communities in the seven villages to have their livestock removed in the hunting area by 1st July 2009 for the reason to protect the environment and wildlife habitat. The communities didn't comply with the government order and on 4rd July the central government ordered a forced eviction by use of its Field Force Unit and police forces. The eviction was said to be supported by the hunting company (OBC) in terms of financial and materials such as vehicles. This eviction resulted into huge losses to communities and several villagers being arrested:

> "Maasai herding cattle within the OBC hunting area are being arrested. Five people have already been tried without access to legal defense or bail, and have been imprisoned for six months. A further ten Maasai are due to appear in court on 24 August". (Source: Survival for tribal peoples, 2009: http://www.survivalinternational.org/news/4884) visited on 20th May 2012

Another similar report:

> "The eviction of pastoralists in Loliondo GCA has taken a new form where one to two people are taken by police every day and locked up. The numbers of people arrested from 11th August to 17th August 2009 are twenty-seven" (Mbattiany, 2009)

And all the Maasai bomas which were in the intended area were all burnt to ashes (Schertow,2009. http://intercontinentalcry.org/loliondo-is-burning/). Also about more than 10,000 livestock were reported died due to lack of grazing pastures and water during the severe drought which prevailed during and after eviction. The evictions attracted huge media nationally (http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/index.php?l=15575) and internationally (see:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/06/masai-tribesman-tanzania-tourism#history-byline and (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/maasai-women-protest-land-seizure-tanzania-2009). The NGOs and human rights activists condemned the eviction as human right abuse. Overall, this eviction was seen as the ultimate aim of the government in collaboration with the hunting company (OBC) to apportion the community's land for the hunting activities. This was justified by the decision of the Government to undertake a land use plan for the entire Loliondo GCA which could finally separate the land for GCA which could be used as hunting area and the community land for grazing and other uses. This was also covered by local media in the country and other organizations with negative reactions:

> "Following land controversies that have reigned around the Loliondo GCA in Ngorongoro District for two decades now, the state has resolved to survey the area and come up with proper land use plan so as to avert future conflicts. However, more than 50 civil organizations under the Feminist Activist Coalition (FEMACT) network as well as the Tanzania Land Alliance (TALA) who recently met in Arusha are not sure if the current land-use plan is being executed with consideration of local people's affairs". (Source: Arusha Times Newspaper, June 4-10, 2011)

However, the government continued with its mission and issued the National Land use Plan Commission (NLUPC) to undertake the land use plan for Loliondo GCA. The final report was presented to the stakeholders meeting in February 2011. In the stakeholders meeting Community members and NGOs representative criticized presented Land use plans especially on the proposed establishment of the proposed "New Game Controlled Area" (fig. 16) with the size of 1,500 km$^2$ from the village land and therefore rejected the plan on the basis that it was not participatory and it favors the interests of the hunting company, OBC:

> "The newly established land use plan for Loliondo Game Controlled Area from the year 2010 to 2030 poses a threat to the livelihoods of Maasai communities living in the area. Speaking to reporters in Arusha, Ngorongoro District Council chairman, Mr. Elias Ngorisa said that the villagers were not involved in any stage of the land use plan formulation, which allegedly showed that there was a hidden agenda against the Maasai community. We, as the voice of the Loliondo people, do not bless this land use plan. We strongly condemn it and ask our government to view our people as 'bona fide' citizens of this country, Ngorisa said" (Ngereza, 2011).

The allegations were also that the same proposed land use plan was supported financially by the hunting company (OBC) whereby it provided a total of $100,000 for the job. During the time of the research the new land use plan report was still not implemented and it is not known what is going to happen with it in the future. At the time of field work of this study in some villages like Ololosokwan and Soitsambu there was a report that the agreement has been reached between the hunting company (OBC) and the communities on the way of utilizing the area for both grazing and hunting and hence the situation was relatively peaceful but most people seem it just as temporary:

> "Now there is a bit of peace after the mutual agreement with OBC and community was reached on how to have both grazing and hunting without affecting anyone but it is only temporary. We need a long lasting solution to this conflict by letting our land free of hunting activities" (Source: Focus group discussion with villagers in Ololosokwan, December, 2011).

Figure 17. Loliondo GCA showing a new proposed GCA area (in grey) which will cover 1500km$^2$ and separate village land from hunting area.(Source: NDC,2011)

It has been clear that the communities demand freedom to manage and control their own land and to have more benefits from the wildlife resources in their lands. As indicated in frames analysis the first order conflicts relates to mainly power frames

### 5.1.2 The Second Order conflicts

Beside of what is always reported by the Government and on other sources regarding the conflicts between tourism investors and communities in Loliondo GCA, there have been unreported internal conflicts within the communities as well as within different the Government levels and also within the investors. On the part of conflicts within the Maasai community it was learnt these kinds of conflicts are entrenched and evolved along traditional narratives and have been detrimental to community developments and wellbeing in the area. It involves different sub-clans among the Maasai communities and also with Sonjo agro-pastoralists in the nearby villages. As explained earlier, within Maasai communities in Loliondo GCA there are three sub-clans which are Loita, Purko and Loitayok. These sub-clans have historical differences and stereotypes among themselves, for example Loita sub-clan feels themselves as superior to other sub-clans and therefore they can conquer other sub-clan's land and cattle raiding which makes them to go to war against each other.

The history of the Maasai lands is well-known for the conflicts that have existed for centuries between different people (Ojalammi, 2006). Most of the land and natural resource-based strategic conflicts among

the Maasai have not been only inter-tribal but also intra-tribal. Ojalammi (2006) further comments that up to the early 1890s, by the onset of colonial rule, there was still constant warfare and raiding between the Maa-speaking people themselves as well as between Maa-speaking groups and non-Maa-speaking people. This kind of conflict still exists today in pastoralists areas like Loliondo GCA. The three Maasai sub-clans are on constant competition of the grazing lands, and in recent years the competition shifted towards the strategic tourism investment areas. This territorial conflict among the Maasai sub-clans has resulted into investor's-community conflicts. Nelson, (2011) reported that tourism ventures have expanded rapidly in Loliondo GCA during the past 20 years as a form of land use and communal income and that the this rising value of the land increases villages' interests in securing their own areas.

In Soitsambu village, at the Sukenya area the Thomson Safari which operated tourist tented lodge (Enashiva Nature Refuge) in 5,000 acres of land is well supported by Laitayok sub-clan but fiercely opposed by Purko and Loita sub-clans. The Loitayok sub-clan claims that the area owned by Thomson safari belongs to them and accuses the Purko and Loita sub-clans that they are not indigenous to that area and even to entire Loliondo area but they are just migrants from neighboring country of Kenya. This argument is supported by Forsbrooke (1948, In: Ojalami 2006) when commented on the histories of the Maasai in Loliondo that in the 1920s, the Purko section of the Maasai from Kenya migrated to the Loliondo area, after they had been evicted from the Naivasha area in Kenya. Likewise in Oloipiri village which is predominantly Loitayok base the hunting company OBC is also well supported but opposed in other villages where Purko and Loita sub-clans are dominant. It was also learnt that during forced evictions no damage was sustained by the people from Oloipiri village as they removed their livestock in support for hunting activities to take place but people from the other two sub-clans refused to remove their cattle which compelled the Government to evict them forcibly. During interviews inter-clan conflicts were revealed as one of the reasons for long-standing conflict in Loliondo:

> "The village land boundary conflicts is one of the problem in this area and the government need to solve this if it want this area to be in peace, the problem is this sub-clan issue in Maasai community, each sub-clan is trying to expand its land boundaries which result into conflicts " (Source: Interview with villager in Soitsambu village, December,2011).

This argument is supported by Nelson (2011) when commented that tensions over village boundary demarcation in Loliondo have been exacerbated by the growing importance of local tourism ventures, which involve negotiated contracts with tourism companies. In these sub-clans territorial conflicts, one sub-clan, the Loitayok, which claims to be indigenous to Loliondo area, considers the other two sub-clans as immigrants from neighboring country as given in this statement:

> "These people from Kenya (referring to Purko and Loita sub-clans) are the once bringing problems in our lands, they don't want us to benefit from our resources". (Source: Interview with traditional elder also former village chairman of Oloipir village, December, 2011)

Another claim from Loitayok sub-clan was that the other two sub-clans (Loita and Purko) are already benefiting a lot from tourism ventures by leasing their grazing land to investors as the case for Ololosokwan village which has leased 25,000 acres to And Beyond company for photographic tourism. The Loitayok feels that other sub-clans are hindering and discouraging the investors in Loitayok's territory in order to find grazing lands for their livestock in Loitayok's land which in return Loitayok don't agree and fight back.

It was also learnt that since much of the grazing land is also set for either hunting or photographic tourism, some members of the Loita sub-clans decide to take their livestock in areas which traditionally belonged to Sonjo agro-pastoralists. This also results into very severe and destructive conflicts. At the time of data collection of this research in October 2011, the conflict erupted in one of the study village of Olorienmagaiduru which resulted into 7 people being killed during three days of brutal clashes between

Loita sub-clan and Sonjo (also known as Batemi) agro-pastoralist from the neighboring village of Mgongomageri:

> "Tension and fears are mounting in Ngorongoro District, Arusha Region, after fresh clashes between Sonjo and Maasai tribesmen over land left two people dead and dozens injured. This is a real war. We have failed to contain the situation. Many of our young men have gone to the Maasai communities for revenge and we don't know what will be the repercussion," Joseph Zakayo, a Mgongo Mageri villager" (Source: The Guardian newspaper, 13 June 2012)

Although this conflict was based on village land boundary conflicts between Loita Maasai sub-clan and the Sonjo agro-pastoralists, shortage of grazing lands in Maasai villages  which in part tourism has a contribution to it has a greater role to these conflicts.

Much as conflicts occur within the Maasai community, there has been evident of resistance and conflicting actions within different government levels. The conflict within the government occurs between the District Council and the Central Governments levels and also within different Government Ministries. It was learnt that at District level the District Assembly has rejected the proposed land use plans for Loliondo GCA which was prepared and presented with the supervision from both the Ministry of Land and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. This happened due to the fact that the District has to defend the interest of the local people although this has to be done in accordance with the policies and laws from the central Government. In particular the District Councils blames the Central Government for the poor policies formulations for example the contradicting policies and laws such as wildlife laws and the land laws. Likewise at the Central Government, the two ministries of Land and that of Natural Resources and Tourism blame on each other about the causes of problems at district and village levels.

For the case of investors it was learnt that there are conflicts of interests not only between hunters and photographic companies but also between different photographic companies. Generally, all the photographic companies are against hunting practices and they think that hunting tourism is not sustainable. However, photographic operators have differences as well which results into conflicts between them due to competition of areas in the villages. Normally each company wants to have exclusive rights to operate in the area and doesn't like to see other companies conducting tourism activities nearby:

> "Yes, there is conflict between us and our neighbor Clein's camp who don't want us to conduct game drive in the area where they operate while this is the area for everyone. One day they blocked our vehicle with our clients doing game drive". (Source: Interview with acting manager of Buffalo Luxury Tented Camp in Ololosokwan village, December 2011).

As indicated in this study conflicts are occurring at different multi-levels and therefore it is important that any efforts to resolve the conflicts should take into consideration of all these levels in order to have inclusive and long term conflicts resolutions.

## 5.3 Conclusion

The analysis of frames has revealed various frames used by stakeholders in Loliondo GCA conflicts. The land security and ownership, benefit sharing and contradicting government policies has been the main issue/problem frames. The community is mainly concern with land access and benefit sharing from tourism while other stakeholders are more concern with inadequacy of the government policies governing the resources in Game Controlled Area. The identity frames used include those of affiliation to "we/us/ours groups" in community identifies themselves as the "oppressed" while investors identifies themselves as "innocent but unappreciated" community benefactor. The characterization frames relates to identity frames and involves the "they/them/other groups". The community charaterise some investors

and the government as "oppressors and bad people" while the investor characterize community as "ignorant". The power frames used are related to legal resources, financial resources and coalition resources. The investors and government have financial resources and therefore can influence situation to their favor while the community relay on support and coalitions with NGOs. It is also seen that the community has framed the situation in terms of losses of grazing land and tourism revenues while the government and investors frame situation in terms of tourism gains and resources abundance. The conflict management frames held by stakeholders related to failure of the past processes in which community and investors don't trust the government to handle the conflict in Loliondo. The moderator and mutual negotiations in round table are the common held frames by communities and some investors while the government and hunting company framed the conflict management process in term of having a proper land use plan in order to separate different land uses.

These frames led to manifestation of conflicts at two levels; the first and second order conflicts. The first order conflicts is the one widely known and involves the two major coalitions; the community, NGO and Tour operators in one hand and government and hunting company on the other hand. The second order conflicts occur within the individual stakeholder such as conflict between different Maasai sub-clans or different tour operators. This kind of conflicts is not dealt with and has direct influence to the first order conflict. This kind of conflicts is connected to identity and characterization frames. The lack of proper mechanisms to deal with second order conflicts in Loliondo GCA contributes to existing long standing resources use conflicts in the area. Overall it can be concluded that the use of various and divergent frames by stakeholders in Loliondo conflicts led to occurrence of multi-level conflicts in which weaknesses to manage these conflicts at different levels has resulted into protraction of the conflicts.

# CHAPTER SIX

## 6. DISCUSSION AND WAY FOWARD

### 6.1 Discussion

The purpose of this study was to examine framing and identify the frames used by stakeholders in the resources use conflicts in Loliondo GCA. In this regard, it was also important to identify different economic land use activities and the key stakeholders involved in the conflicts and their perceptions towards root causes of the conflicts.

#### 6.1.1 Resource use conflicts in Loliondo GCA

Although pastoralism and wildlife conservation have existed harmoniously for many years, the emergence of other forms of land uses such as tourism has created conflicts between local community, investors and government institutions. Also, despite the success of tourism in contributing to significant community developments in Loliondo GCA and in generating foreign currencies highly needed by the government, conflicts emerged and communities opposed the tourism businesses specifically the hunting tourism. The disputes began when the hunting company (OBC) came into the area and started to restrict communities from grassing their livestock in in the areas of their village land which they have been using for many generations. The restrictions of access to grassing lands for the Maasai are enforced in order to allow hunting activities to take place which incidentally coincides with dry season for the pastoralists Maasai. From the beginning the communities framed this situation as land alienation and as a threat because they felt that the OBC wanted to own their grazing land. Retrospectively, the communities started to blame on the government for allocating their land as a hunting block and the OBC for not involving them during acquisition of the hunting block. In general terms, conflicts in Loliondo in based on economic resource uses which involve stakeholders with competing interests. These conflicting economic resource uses are elaborated further to understand how it causes conflicts.

*Livestock grassing against tourism (hunting and photographic):* The Loliondo area is traditionally a grassing lands for pastoralists Maasai but also the area is part of the Serengeti ecosystem and therefore there are plenty of wildlife which co-exist side by side livestock of nomadic Maasai. There has never been a serious conflict between Maasai and wildlife except few cases of losses of livestock due to attack by big carnivores such as Lions and wild dogs. In revenge Maasai warriors kills the Lions, although this practice does not endanger the Lions population as it happens rarely. This has been a traditional system of life in the area. However, due to external pressure and influence from government systems and policies, other economic activities emerged as early as colonial times where conservation of wildlife was pioneered by the colonial governments. In the last two decades a new economic alternatives emerged in many parts of the Maasai lands and among them are tourism businesses and agriculture. Demands for relaxation and enjoyment places especially in the nature areas for the people from western-industrial developed world (Europe and North America), the tourism grew worldwide and Loliondo GCA was not exception. Different forms of tourism came to Loliondo which includes spot hunting and photographic tourism. Spot hunting is a form of tourism which involves hunting of wild animals for leisure, trophy or wild meat while photographic tourism involve wildlife viewing and taking pictures without harming the animal. Photographic tourism has become popular in Loliondo due to presence of wild animals throughout the year. As a result numerous tour operators have signed contracts with village governments to operate tourism facilities in the area. It is claimed that photographic tourism does co-exists well with livestock grassing in the area and communities supports it but it was learnt from the tour operators that the presence of many livestock in area decreases tourist experience. In all the three visited tourist camps and lodges for photographic tourism they complained of many livestock in their surroundings which they don't like and they admitted that it creates conflicts with the communities. For example Ololosokwan village it was

learnt that one section of the contract between the village and Clein's Camp is that no grassing of livestock is allowed within the area of 25,000 acres in which the camp operates. Incase community violates and allows livestock into the area the company has the right not to pay the agreed annual amount of 30,000US$ for the land rent.

With regard to spot hunting, usually when undertaking this activity the area needs to be free of other human activities so that it does not cause harm to people and property. This is exactly what has been happening in Loliondo and it has been identified as the core of the ongoing conflicts. The reality is that Maasai communities need the area used for hunting to use it for grassing their livestock especially during dry season when pastures becomes scarce in other places. As explained earlier, usually the Maasai pastoralists has their traditional system of grassing their livestock in which some areas are used for grassing during rainy season and others are reserved for dry season which starts from June to December every year. In Loliondo, it happens that the area which reserved by communities for grassing during dry season is the prime area earmarked by the government for hunting license in which hunting season starts July to December every year. As it can be observed, the area has two important functions; it is the hunting area for the government and it is the grassing area during dry season for the Maasai. Unfortunately both activities need to take place at the same period of the year that is June to December. Due to this competition the Maasai communities now occupies the area from May and towards July they are informed by the government to move out. This applies also the photographic tourism activities which operate in the area. Depending on the situation of availability of the grassing pastures Maasai choose to move or not to move. This result into threatening and use of force in some cases from both sides, the government and the hunting company (OBC) on one side and Maasai community and photographic tour operators on other side. Sometimes the situation ends with compromises from both sides by each side allowing some activities to take place from other side, but in some cases it results into severe conflicts like the case in 2009 when the government decided to use military force to evict Maasai pastoralists from the area to allow hunting activities to take place.

*Cultivation and settlements against wildlife conservation:* The Loliondo GCA established in 1959 although provides settlement areas for the evicted Maasai pastoralists during establishment for the Serengeti Park, the area was also meant to protect the wildlife resources outside the core protected Serengeti Park. Since 1959 there has been significant increase in population demographics in Loliondo which led to adoption of various economic activities besides livestock keeping. The cultivation of crops mainly maize to supplement livestock products and coupled with a semi-sedentary settlements are among the new changes in the Maasai communities. Today it is common that every Maasai family own a cultivated maize field as way to cope diminishing livestock products due to changing environmental conditions including climate change which threatens the health of the livestock herds. In this situation expanding agriculture in Loliondo GCA is considered by the government and conservation agencies such as TANAPA as unfavorable activity for wildlife conservation. The government argues that cultivation is incompatible to any conservation aims and therefore it should not be allowed in Loliondo GCA as it will have negative impacts on the entire Serengeti ecosystem. Likewise, the hunting company and also the tour operators don't support agriculture as they fear that the wildlife will abandon the area. For these reasons and others the communities in Loliondo have been directed not to carry out agricultural activities in some areas of Loliondo GCA especially the entire western corridor which borders Serengeti National Park to the east. The community on their part still finds agriculture important as support to their livelihood when livestock are not producing enough. The competition and overlaps of various economic activities resulted into conflicts between stakeholders in Loliondo.

Turning into stakeholders involved in the conflicts, the stakeholder analysis served to identify who and how each stakeholder is involved in Loliondo GCA conflicts. These stakeholders' falls into five categories: Maasai community, tourism investors comprising the tour operators and the hunting company,

NGOs, conservation agencies and the government. It was learnt that there are differences not only between the stakeholders but also within the stakeholder groups. The most contentious stakeholder has been the hunting company- OBC due to the nature of its activities of hunting wildlife which contradicts with the community's identity and values. The findings further revealed that Maasai community in the study villages is not a homogenous one but it is made up of three sub-clans namely; Loita, Loitayok and Purko. These sub-clans have historical rooted differences which also show up and influence the way tourism is performed in the area. It was observed that the investors make strategic choices when engaging to collaborate with communities in tourism businesses. Generally, investors who choose to collaborate with only one sub-clan has more chances to run smoothly and succeed in the business than to engage with two different sub-clans. It was learnt that different Maasai sub-clans has a tendency of committing sabotage against each other. This internal conflict to some extent has undermined success for the tourism sector in the area due to lack of the security assurance to the investor's properties.

With regard to tourism companies there are two categories as well which are those involves in photographic tourism (non-consumptive wildlife use) and the one involved with hunting tourism (consumptive wildlife use). The two activities are said to be mutually exclusive but it happens not to be the case sometimes as both hunting and photographic companies claim to have legitimacies to operate in the area. It was further found that the struggle for power of existence in the area emanates from the weaknesses which exist in the government laws governing lands and wildlife in GCAs. This confusion of the government laws has allowed every stakeholder to maneuver and be able to exist in the area while forming allies with others having the same interests to defend their rights. On the other hand the government and the conservation agencies have not been able to solve the problems certainly due to the policy difficulties which exist. The role of NGOs in Loliondo conflicts as far as the government is concerned is considered to be inciting the communities to defy against the Government and investors aspirations although the officials from the NGOs denied this claim. However, it was learnt among other activities the NGOs are involved in, it is the creation of awareness and capacity building to community members on issues of land rights and sustainable resources management. In the implementation of these activities is when they are being misunderstood and considered that they are inciting the communities to defy government directives. The important conclusion on this part is that when dealing with conflicts in Loliondo GCA it is important not only to consider all the interests of the stakeholders involved but also all the sub-clans of the Maasai community need to be fully involved.

The findings further revealed that these factors resulted into creation of coalitions among stakeholders in order to defend their interests in the conflicts. The two identified coalitions form the first order (surface) conflicts. As pointed out, the conflicts involving these coalitions are widely known and normally dealt with in the efforts to find solutions but no success yet to resolve it. However, there is second order (under-surface) conflicts identified which evolve and exist within the groups of stakeholder. This kind of conflicts is not dealt with in the process of managing the conflicts. The findings also showed that there is a link between the first and the second order conflicts. This means that even if the first order conflict is successfully resolved the problem still exists because the second order conflict is unresolved. This could be one of the reasons for recurrence of the conflicts in Loliondo GCA and failure to be resolved for a long time.

### 6.1.2 Framing the conflicts.
The findings from this study has shown that the stakeholders framed the conflicts in Loliondo GCA in relation to the three main factors which are land security and ownership, contradicting government policies and unequal benefit sharing from tourism. However, it is important to note that not all the stakeholders agree in each of the factor above as the main causes of the conflicts, there are differences in perceptions, as will be describing here under;

*Land security and ownership*: The issue of land ownership among Maasai communities in Loliondo creates fear and insecurity. In one hand the community claims and believes that traditionally the land belongs to them and therefore they have the right to use it according to their common and individual needs. The local land use plans by the community indicated that every area in Loliondo GCA has specific uses allocated to it, being grassing area for wet or dry season or set aside as area for young and small livestock.  The community also believes that they can use the land and its resources to foster the development of their villages by engaging in beneficial economic ventures with local or foreign investors who are interested in doing businesses especially tourism in their areas. It was evident that all the six study villages has engaged contracts with investors to operate tourism businesses in their areas. Conversely the government considers that the entire Loliondo GCA as part of the Serengeti ecosystem is a reserved land for the purpose of protecting wildlife resources while allowing minimal human activities in the area. In this case the government also set this area as one of the valuable hunting block where it can trade the lucrative hunting business to generate foreign currency for the country. Indeed the government has offered the hunting block in Loliondo to the wealthy family in the UAE which in return pays back significant amount of foreign money to the government and district council and also support of community developments in the area. In the same vein the conservation agencies and the hunting company (OBC) don't agree that the land in Loliondo GCA is owned by the communities living in the villages but by the government.

*Contradicting government policies and laws:* It was learnt that each stakeholder in the conflicts is using the government policy and laws to legitimize their presence in the area. The Maasai communities justify their  claims on  land ownership  their by the village Land Act number 5 of 1999 which gives mandates village authorities to manage all lands within the legally registered village. The communities are supported by the photographic companies and the local NGOs owned and run by Maasai elites.  The government, conservation agencies and the hunting company (OBC) are mainly basing their arguments on Wildlife Act, 1974 and now the  new  Wildlife Act,2009 which became to operational in 2010 both of which gives mandate the government to allocate hunting block in the existed GCA without necessarily getting consent from the local community. However the new Act has made clear that no part of the GCA land should fall under village land.

*Benefit sharing from tourism:* The information for tourism revenues obtained from the district offices indicated that there is unequal distribution of the revenues from tourism between the local Maasai communities and the government. While most of the revenues are generated from hunting tourism it was found that the communities have no supporting legal framework to benefit from it and the payment to community only based on the discretion and the token amount which the hunting company is willingly ready to give to communities. The central government takes 75% of the hunting revenues and the remaining 25% goes to the district council which is supposedly required to share it with the villages but in practice none reaches the villages. It can be argued that the policy disregard on community to benefit direct from tourist hunting business in their areas made communities to seeking other available alternatives of generating money from the abundant wildlife in their areas and hence engage in photographic tourism with incoming tour operators. As illustrated in the findings, photographic tourism generates substantial amount of money directly to the communities and in some villages at higher amount than the amount willingly paid by the hunting company. It is important to emphasize here that, although the OBC has supported numerous and valuable developmental projects to the communities, when there is no money paid directly to the village government, the value of the developmental projects donated is not appreciated accordingly. The reason is that the village government leader's need the money for various recurrent expenditures in their offices but due to alleged misappropriation of the funds by the village leaders, the hunting company (OBC) decided no longer to give direct money, instead the money is used and managed by OBC themselves to support some social developmental services needed by the community at village level. Although the motive itself is in good faith, but this situation makes the village

leaders to engage and support photographic tourism ventures which generates direct money to their offices and in turn result into conflicts with the hunting operation.

By analyzing and connecting different interviews and conversation contexts between different stakeholders this study has further revealed various frames used by stakeholders to portray issues based on identities, characterizations, power struggles and their conflict management aspirations. The issue/problem frame commonly held by community members is land security and ownership and denoted as "our *land is sold to Arabs"* is connected to protecting the common livelihood strategy of livestock grazing and also the benefits from tourism. In the social movement's literature, individuals overcome collective action problems by developing shared frames about their predicament and agreeing on the best course of action (Chong and Druckman, 2007). The policy contradictions as a problem seem to favour the government and the investors as it gives them legal opportunity to operate in Loliondo GCA. It is argued that in the case of a perceived threat, individuals not only stick to their own frames, but they reinforce them, resulting in frozen frames (Aarts & van Woerkum, 2002 In: Dewulf et al., 2003).This is a situation when community in Loliondo claims that the government is intending to apportion their land for the interests of the hunting company. It is also seen that the community members are identifying themselves as land owners and oppressed by the investors and the government. Conversely, the investors identify themselves as innocent and perceives communities as ignorant which in turn polarizes the situation. According to Wetherell, (1998) when parties disagree about identity construction, contested identities remain in tension in any conversation. It resulted into negative characterization among the stakeholders such as this statement "*communities have low understanding of the value of these resources; they are ignorant and need to be educated*". It is argued that challenges to one's identity frame generally produce vigorous defenses (Rothman, 1997; Tetlock et al., 2000) and contribute to the perpetuation of already difficult conflicts (Gray, 2004).The community reacted by threatening to do what it takes to protect their land *"we cannot sit down and let our land be taken by Arabs; we will defend our land even if the government wants to kill us"*.

Also community characterized hunters as poachers as this practice is contrary to their values. Sniderman and Theriault (2004) argue that when citizens receive different views of an issue, they choose the alternative that is consistent with their values or principles. In this case the government needed to take into consideration the life style and identity of the community in particular area before allocating the hunting blocks so that to avoid unnecessary conflicts. These frames accounted the fact that negotiations which most of the time was led by the government did not result into stakeholders reframing the situation but rather ended in distrusts, accusations and threats which escalated the conflicts. In their study of intractable conflict, Lewicki et al., (2003) identified several process frames that captured disputants' preferences for how a conflict should be managed. They found that individuals form a predisposition or bias for particular approaches to a conflict and this bias frames options that they see as possible as well as those they ignore. In Loliondo the community proposes mutual negotiation with a neutral moderator but the government chose to undertake land use plan in order to separate village land from GCA land, this action was strongly opposed and criticized by community. These process frames held by each stakeholder often limit the potential for resolution of conflicts because the parties fail to agree on an appropriate or legitimate forum for conflict resolution (Gray, 2003).

During the period of allocation of the Loliondo hunting block to OBC, the government has considered that the communities had been well informed by their representatives who approved the OBC application for the hunting area in Loliondo. The government at that time didn't take into consideration of the community's representative to give the feedback of hunting block allocation to their constituency. Idrissou et al., (2011) argues that the support of stakeholder constituencies is critical to participatory management and conflict resolution. This means that meetings and discussions should not be limited to stakeholder's representatives but also should involve the wider stakeholder population

The conflict was constructed, interpreted, enacted and maintained through stakeholders discourses and through which they emphasized different realities and had different sense of themselves and their world (Ford et al.,2002).As in other conflicts situations, frames uttered in different ways consisting of stereotyping, blaming, stigmatizing and which resulted into divergence and distancing among stakeholders (Aarts et al.,2011).Every stakeholder portrayed their opponents negatively and projected responsibility for the conflict to the other, while at the same time they presented themselves as being the victims of the others behaviors. Frames were constructed by stakeholders in "we" group conversations, recognizing and affirming each other. Idrissou et al., (2011) argues that in "We" versus "they" interactions, depending on their framing of power positions and interdependence, stakeholder's uses denial and disapproval to attack each other or to start positional bargaining and in public they refer to frames constructed in we-group conversations, to look for support from powerful outsider. In Loliondo this was evident when communities are well supported by NGOs and some of the photographic companies forming a one we-group.

Furthermore the conflict management process did not succeed in creating a new reality that would enable the deconstruction of the stakeholder's held frames as no efforts was made to exchange and critically discuss about these we-groups to trigger integrative reframing (Ford et al., 2002).The explanation for this could be that all the parties involved had a stake in a conflicts. There is no neutral party has been involved in resolving the Loliondo conflicts and all the time the government and the hunting company has been facilitating the conflict management process. Even the appeal of the community during the match to the President to ask him to intervene the Loliondo conflicts did not succeed. As suggested, in conflict management frames; most parties want the involvement of the mediators as the communities do not trust the government. In this case I agree with Gray (2003:32) who argues that "since reframing requires perspective taking, it is often difficult for parties to reframe without the help of the neutral third party or someone who does not have a direct stake in the conflict". Therefore one way of solving the conflicts in Loliondo GCA maybe to involve a neutral mediator such as adjudicator from judicial system or any other independent organ. The adjudicator from judicial is more preferred especially by the community because judicial system is mandated to protect and grant the fair and equal rights of the individuals. Shmuel et al., (2006) pointed out that the main role of the mediator would be to bring together all the stakeholders to discuss their frames with regard to the problem, including the causes and solutions they have in mind, with the aim of creating mutual understanding which may trigger common reframing.

## 6.2 Way Forward

In has become imperative that in tourism like any other economic ventures there is no shortages of power struggle between stakeholders. This research has indicated that conflict was constructed by means of conversations through framing both within we-group and with all the other stakeholders involved. Through conscious and unconscious, explicit and implicit accusations it destroyed the relationship between the stakeholders, reinforcing the distance and hence reducing the chances for changing the situations. To understand the evolution of a conflict both cognitive and interactional framing approach to show how conflict emerge, evolve and persist seems to be effective. This study has shown that in tourism ventures which involve different stakeholders if potential problems are not properly dealt with at the beginning, conflicts emerge and poses potential threats to the sustainable growth of tourism in the area. In Loliondo GCA, the need for community grazing lands is undisputable as it is the main bread winner for the Maasai communities. Equally important the need for equal and fair tourism benefits distribution between the community and the government need to be insured in all tourism developments especially on hunting tourism. To enable this happen there is a need for policy harmonization to accommodate the community needs in securing fair share for their land and also from tourism businesses in their areas. For the future sustainability of the resource to support all the components; the community needs, conservation and tourism in the area, a proper land use plan is pivotal

The recommendation from this study is that the government should take into consideration the culture and identity of the surrounding community when planning for tourism investment projects in order to ensure support and sustainability of project and resources in the area. The proposed way to solving this conflicts would be to involve a neutral mediator and eventually carry out a participatory community based land use plans for the area. The Maasai community as a traditional inhabitants of the area should be given chance to decide how they want the area to be managed and utilized with their interests given highest priority. The neutral mediator preferably from judicial system has support from majority of the stakeholders in the area and could help to reach agreement on the issue of land ownership. With the participatory land use plans which take into consideration of the existing traditional land use practices will be supported and implemented by the community.

Further research in Loliondo GCA could investigate on what cultural elements of the society (pastoralists Maasai) used in framing strategies to get more insights of the conflicts. Also a research on the relationship between different frame types and their effects on the process and outcomes of the tourism ventures. Another relevant research area will be to conduct an in-depth study on the issues of tourism benefit sharing in the context of Tanzania Policy Arrangements as one of the strategies to reduce conflicts in the future.

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# LIST OF ANNEXES

## ANNEX I: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL:- COMMUNITY MEMBERS

**A: Basic Information**

1. What is your name……………………………………………………………………..
2. Age……………………………………………………………
3. Sex………………………………………………………………………………
4. Village……………………………………………………………………………………

**B: Economic land use activities in Loliondo GCA**

5. What are main economic land uses in Loliondo GCA?

   • …………………………………………………………………..
   • …………………………………………………………………
   • …………………………………………………………………..
   • …………………………………………………………………..

6. Which economic land use is the most important for community in this village?...................................................................................

7. Do you think the village is benefiting from wildlife tourism operating in this area? : Yes/No. Explain……………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………

8. Currently what are the benefits do you think village is getting from wildlife tourism activities ……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………

9. What is the most preferred wildlife tourism activity in this village: Photographic tourism or hunting tourism? Why ?
...........................................................................................................................................

10. Does village has approved village land use plan for the above economic activities YES/NO. If NO,why?………………………………………………………………………………

11. Is there a conflict between the above mentioned economic land uses in this village? YES/NO. Explain……………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………….

12. What are the different types of land use/resources use conflict existing in this village?

   a. …………………………………………………………………………………………
   b. …………………………………………………………………………………………
   c. …………………………………………………………………………………………
   d. …………………………………………………………………………………………
   e. …………………………………………………………………………………………

**C: Stakeholders involved in Loliondo GCA conflict**

13. Who are the stakeholders involved in land use conflicts in this villages?

    1. ……………………………………………………………………………………………

    2. ……………………………………………………………………………………………

    3. ……………………………………………………………………………………………

    4. ……………………………………………………………………………………………

    5. ……………………………………………………………………………………………

**D: Perceptions towards the root causes of the conflicts**

14. In your opinion what is the root causes of the land use conflicts in this
village……………………………………………………………………………………………

**E: Conflict Framing;**

**Issue/problem**

15. **What is the issue or main problem in Loliondo conflicts?.................................................**

**Identity**

16. Why the resource use conflict in this village and in Loliondo GCA has not been resolved for a long
time…………....................................................................................................................

17. Who are you in this conflict?.......................................................................................

18. Why are you involved in this conflict ?
....................................................................................................................................

19. Who owns the resources (land/wildlifes/water) in village?........................
……………………………………………………………………………………………………

**Characterisation**

20. How do you see/characterize yourself in this conflict?......................................
……………………………………………………………………………………………………

21. How do you characterized other players in this conflict? good/bad people or partners in business/enemy and why?.......................................................................................
.................................................................................................

**Power**

22. Who hold power on the use of the resources in this
village?......................……………………………………………………………………………

23. How decision on the use of land/water/wildlife resources are made?
…………………………………………………………………….…………………

24. Who has the legal rights of ownership of land in this area/Loliondo GCA and why?
…………………………………………….................................................................................

25. Who do you think have/should have legitimate power to managed and control land and resources in the village?.........................................................................................................................

**Risk/Loss or gain.**

26. How do you personally benefit from land/wildlife resources invillage?.................................................................................................................................................
27. How is your benefits affected by the existing conflicts in Loliondo GCA?.................................................................................................................................................
28. What are the risks/loses you face due to this Conflicts……………………………………………………………..

29. How would you like to settle this conflict/win-lose or win-win situation? Why?
    …………………………………………………………………………………………………

**Process/conflict management**

30. How would you like the conflict be resolved?
    …………………………………………………………….………….
    ..........................................…………………………………………………………………………
31. Who is involved in conflict management in the village?
    ..........................…………………………………………………………………………………
    Do you trust the way this conflict has been managed in the past? Explain
    ..........................…………………………………………………………………………………
32. What is the role of government in this conflict?
    ..........................…………………………………………………………………………………
33. What do you expect in future for this conflict?
    ..........................................……………………………………………………………………………
    ………………………………
34. Do you have any other issue you would like to add in this discussion with regard to resource use conflict in your village?.............................................................................................
    …………………………………………………………………………………………………

*Thank you for your time and cooperation in this interview!!!*

## ANNEX II: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL:- TOUR OPERATORS/HUNTING COMPANY PERSONELL IN LOLIONDO GCA

**Name of the Company……………………………………………………………………**

**A: Involvement in Tourism activities in Loliondo GCA**

1. How long you have been operating in Loliondo GCA?.........................................................
2. What are tourism activities do you conduct in Loliondo GCA?
    * ………………………………………………………………………..
    * …………………………………………………………………………
    * ………………………………………………………………………..
    * ………………………………………………………………………….
3. Which villages in Loliondo GCA do you conduct your activities?

   ......................................................................................................................................

4. How did you get access to conduct your tourism activities in Loliondo GCA?

   .......................................................................................................................................

5. How does village/communities benefits from your tourism activities in Loliondo GCA?

   ......................................................................................................................................

6. How does your company support conservation activities in Loliondo GCA?

   .......................................................................................................................................

7. Is there  conflict between your company and other resource users in Loliondo GCA? YES/NO,Explain……………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………….

8. What are the different types of land use/resources use conflict exist in Loliondo GCA?

   a.………………………………………………………………………………………………

   b.………………………………………………………………………………………………

   c.………………………………………………………………………………………………

   d.………………………………………………………………………………………………

**B: Knowledge on other stakeholder involved in Loliondo GCA conflict**

9. Who are the other stakeholders involved in land/resources use conflicts in this villages?

   1.………………………………………………………………………………………………

   2.………………………………………………………………………………………………

3……………………………………………………………………………………………………

4……………………………………………………………………………………………………

5……………………………………………………………………………………………………

6……………………………………………………………………………………………………

**D: Perceptions towards the root causes of the conflicts**

10. In your opinion what are the root causes of the land/resource use conflicts in this Loliondo GCA?
…………………………………………………………………………………………………

11. Do you think the communities in Loliondo GCA are benefiting enough from wildlife tourism? : Yes/No. Explain your answer
…………………………………………………………………………………………………

12. What other benefits do you think communities are getting from wildlife tourism activities in Loliondo GCA
…………………………………………………………………………………………………

13. In your opinion what is the most suitable wildlife tourism activity in Loliondo GCA and why?
....................................................................................................................................

**E: Conflict Framing;**

**Issue/Problem**

14. **What is the issue or main problem in Loliondo conflicts?...............................................**

**Identity**

15. What is your role/position in Loliondo GCA conflict..............................................................

16. Why are you involved in Loliondo GCA conflict?..……………………………………………………………………

17. In your opinion why the Loliondo GCA conflict has not been resolved for a long time?......................................................................……………………………………

18. Who owns and has control of the resources (land/wildlife/water) in Loliondo GCA and why?..........................................................……………………………………………………

**Characterisation**

19. How do your company characterize itself in Loliondo GCA conflict?
…………………………………………………………………………………………………

20. How do you characterize other players in this conflict? good/bad people or partners in business/enemy and why?
....................................................................................................................................

**Power**

21. Who hold power on the use of the resources in Loliondo GCA and why?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
22. How decision on the use of land/water/wildlife resources are made in Loliondo GCA?
   ………………………………………………………………………………………………
23. Who has the legal rights of ownership of land in Loliondo GCA and
   why?......................................................................................................................................

24. Who do you think should have legitimate power to manage and control land and resources in
   the village?...........................................................................................................

**Risk/Loss or gain.**

25. What do your company benefit from land/wildlife resources in  Loliondo GCA?
...........................................................................................................................................................
26. What are the risks and loses you face due to this
   Conflicts…………………………………………………….
   ………………………………………………………………………………………………………
27. How would you like to settle this conflict/win-lose or win-win situation and why
   ………………………………………………………………………………………………………

**Process/conflict management**

28. Who is involved in conflict management in Loliondo GCA?
   ………………………………………………………………………………………………………
29. How would you like the conflict be resolved?.........................................................................
   ………………………………………………………………………………………………………
30. Do you trust the way the Loliondo conflict has been managed in the past?
   Explain......................................................................................................................................
31. What do you expect in future for the Loliondo conflict?.............................................................
   ………………………………………………………………………………………………………
   …………………………………………………
32. Do you have any other issue you would like to add in this discussion with regard to resource
   use conflict in Loliondo
   GCA………………………………………......................................................


*Thank you for your time and cooperation in this interview!!!*

# ANNEX III: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL: GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL IN NGORONGORO DISTRICT

**Capacity: District Natural Resources Officer**

**A: Economic land use activities in Loliondo GCA**

1. What are the main economic land uses in the Loliondo GCA?
   - ……………………………………………………………………………………………
   - ……………………………………………………………………………………………
   - ……………………………………………………………………………………………
   - ……………………………………………………………………………………………
   - ……………………………………………………………………………………………
2. Which economic land use is the most important for community livelihood in  Loliondo GCA?.......................................................................................................................
3. Do you think the village is benefiting from wildlife tourism operating in this area? : Yes/No. Explain……………………………………………………………………………………
4. Currently what are the benefits do you think villages are getting  from wildlife tourism activitie…………………………………………………………………………………
5. What is the most suitable wildlife tourism activity in the Loliondo GCA : Photographic tourism or hunting tourism and Why?
   .......................................................................................................................................
6. Does  village has approved village land use plan for the above economic activities YES/NO. If NO,why?……………………………………………………………………………

7. Is there a conflict between the above mentioned economic land uses in this Loliondo GCA? YES/NO.
   Explain…………………………………………………………………………………

8. What are the different types of land use/resources use conflict exist in Loliondo GCA?

   i.…………………………………………………………………………………………

   ii.…………………………………………………………………………………………

   iii.…………………………………………………………………………………………

   iv.…………………………………………………………………………………………

   v.…………………………………………………………………………………………

**C: Stakeholders involved in Loliondo GCA conflict**

9. Who are the stakeholders involved in land use conflicts in the Loliondo GCA?

   i ……………………………………………………………………………………………

ii.…………………………………………………………………………………………………

iii.………………………………………………………………………………………………

iv.………………………………………………………………………………………………

v.…………………………………………………………………………………………………

**D: Perceptions towards the root causes of the conflicts**

10. In your opinion what is the root causes of the land use conflicts in the  Loliondo GCA?
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………

**E: Conflict Framing;**

**Issue/problem**

11. **What is the issue or main problem in Loliondo conflicts?..............................................**

**Identity**

12. What is your role/position of the government in Loliondo GCA conflict
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………

13. Why is the government  involved in Loliondo GCA conflict?
..………………………………………………………………………………………………………

14. In your opinion why  the Loliondo GCA conflict has not been resolved for a long time?.........................................................................................…………………………………

15. Who owns and has control of the resources (land/wildlife/water) in Loliondo GCA  and why?........................................................................................................................................

**Characterisation**

16. How do government characterize itself in Loliondo GCA conflict?........................................................................................................................

17. How do government  characterize other players in this conflict? good/bad people or partners in business/enemy and why
 ........................................................................................................................................

**Power**

18. Who hold power on the use of the resources in Loliondo GCA?
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………

19. How decision on the use of land/water/wildlife resources are made in Loliondo GCA?
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………

20. Who has the legal rights of ownership of land in Loliondo GCA and why?
........................................................................................................................................

21. Who do you think should have legitimate power to manage and control land and resources in the village?.................................................................................................................................

**Risk/Loss or gain.**

22. What do the government benefit from wildlife resources in Loliondo GCA?
.......................................................................................................................................................

23. How is the government's benefits affected by the existing conflicts in Loliondo GCA?
………………………………………………………………………………………………

24. What are the risks and loses government faces due to the Loliondo GCA Conflicts
………………………………………………………………………………………………

25. How would you like to settle the Loliondo conflict: win-lose or win-win situation? Why ?
………………………………………………………………………………………………

**Process/conflict management**

26. Who is involved in conflict management in Loliondo GCA?
.......................................................................................................................................................

27. How would you like the Loliondo conflict be resolved?............................................................
………………………………………………………………………………………………

28. Do you trust the way the Loliondo conflict has been managed in the past? Explain
………………………………………………………………………………………………

29. What do you expect in future for the Loliondo conflict?............................................................

30. Do you have any other issue you would like to add in this discussion with regard to resource use conflict in Loliondo GCA……………………………………….......................................

*Thank you for your time and cooperation in this interview!!!*

## ANNEX IV: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL:- NGOs/CBOs

**Name of the NGO/CBO……………………………………………………………………………**

**A:Involvement in advocacy  activities in Loliondo GCA**

1. How long you have been operating in Loliondo GCA?.............................................................
2. What are main issues you are interested in Loliondo GCA?

    • ……………………………………………………………………………………………
    • ……………………………………………………………………………………………
    • ……………………………………………………………………………………………
    • ……………………………………………………………………………………………
3. Which villages in Loliondo GCA do you conduct your activities? …………………………….
4. How did you get access to conduct your  activities in Loliondo GCA? ……………………….
5. How does village/communities benefits from your activities…………………………..……….
6. What is  your views on the resource use conflict in Loliondo GCA ………………………….
7. Is there  any conflict between your NGO/CBO and other stakeholders in Loliondo GCA? YES/NO. If Yes how are you are involved …………………………………………...
8. Who are the other stakeholders involved in land/resources use conflicts in this villages?

    1……………………………………………………………………………………………
    2……………………………………………………………………………………………
    3……………………………………………………………………………………………
    4……………………………………………………………………………………………

**D: Perceptions towards the root causes of the conflicts**

9. In your opinion what are the root causes of the land/resource use conflicts in this Loliondo GCA? ………………………………………………………………
10. Do you think the communities in Loliondo GCA are benefiting enough from the existing wildlife tourism? : Yes/No. Explain your answer ………………………………………………
11. What other benefits do you think communities are getting  from wildlife tourism activities in Loliondo GCA ………………………………………………………………………
12. In your opinion what is the most suitable wildlife tourism activity in Loliondo GCA: Photographic tourism or hunting tourism and why?.........................................................

**E: Conflict Framing;**

 **Issue/Problem**

13. **What is the issue or main problem in Loliondo conflicts?..................................................**

**Identity**

14. What is your role/position in Loliondo GCA conflict....................................................................

15. Why are you involved in Loliondo GCA conflict? ……………………………………………

16. In your opinion why the Loliondo GCA conflict has not been resolved for a long time? ……………………………………………………………………………………………………

17. Who owns and has control of the resources (land/wildlife/water) in Loliondo GCA  and why?......................................................................................................................................

## Characterisation

18. How do your NGO/CBO  characterize itself in Loliondo GCA conflict? ……………………..

19. How do you characterize other players in this conflict? good/bad people or partners in business/enemy and why?......................................................................................................

## Power

20. Who hold power on the use of the resources in Loliondo GCA ……………………………….
21. How decision on the use of land/water/wildlife resources are made in Loliondo GCA? ....................................................................................................................................……
22. Who has the legal rights of ownership of land in Loliondo GCA and why? …………………………………………………………………………………………………..
23. Who do you think should have legitimate power to manage and control land and resources in the village and why? …………………………………………………………………………..

## Risk/Loss or gain.

24. What do your company benefit from land/wildlife resources in  Loliondo GCA? ....................................................................................................................................................
25. What are the risks and loses you face due to Loliondo GCA Conflicts ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
26. How would you like to the Loliondo conflict be settled; win-lose or win-win situation? Explain………………………………………………………………………………………….

## Process/conflict management

27. Who is involved in conflict management in Loliondo GCA? …………………………………
28. How would you like the conflict be resolved?........................................................................
29. Do you trust the way the Loliondo conflict has been managed in the past?Explain ....................................................................................................................................................
30. What do you expect in future for the Loliondo conflict?........................................................
31. Do you have any other issue you would like to add in this discussion with regard to resource use conflict in Loliondo GCA…………………………………………...............................

*Thank you for your time and cooperation in this interview!!!*

# ANNEX V: CHECKLIST FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

Discussions with Village Government Council members of the study villages.

**Themes:**

1. **Land use management and resources in the village**
   -How is the traditional land uses works; traditional grazing lands and water resources
   -Other economic activities
   -Village land act 1999 implementation in the village
   -Village land use plans; Importance?

2. **Wildlife tourism**
   -Photographic investors; camping sites, lodges
   -Sport hunting
   -Approvals
   -Benefit sharing; photographic vs hunting
   -Competitions

3. Conflict in resources uses
   -Why conflicts?
   -Who is involved in the conflicts?
   - Treatment among the stakeholders; *language used*
   -Consequences of the conflicts
   -Who is to blame?
   -Efforts to resolve conflicts!!
   -Why NOT resolved

4. **Role of the government/NGO/CBOs**
   -What support needed from government s
   -What government should do and not do
   -What could be offered by NGOs/CBOs