Community-Managed Disaster Risk Reduction: Investing in Resilience

Community-Managed Disaster Risk Reduction / Drought Cycle Management: Its Added Value in the Recent (2011) Drought Situation in the Horn of Africa

A report prepared for Cordaid by Ann Gordon

Research Report
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Ann Gordon

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Gordon, Ann
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Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research Centre

Cordaid has been supporting community-managed disaster risk reduction (CMDRR) and drought cycle management (DCM) in the Horn of Africa for eight years. Many evaluations have pointed to successful outcomes but quantitative data are scarce. The aim of this study was to verify the extent to which Cordaid’s CMDRR/DCM work has contributed to building more resilient communities. Cordaid wanted to know more precisely what its added value is, compared to relief assistance. This was considered particularly timely given the recent (severe) drought situation in the Horn of Africa.

This report is based on work undertaken in Kenya and Ethiopia in late 2011 and early 2012. A wealth of largely qualitative evidence is presented to support the finding that CMDRR can indeed build resilience. Importantly, many CMDRR communities themselves attest to being more resilient as a result of CMDRR. However, measuring those results is difficult. In common with other approaches, CMDRR helps communities strengthen physical assets for resilience (water development, pastures, animal health care etc.) but its “edge” may be in the emphasis it places on intangible assets (capacity-building in “soft” skills such as representative process for community organisation and planning) – as the means by which to ensure that interventions are demand-led, well-managed by the community and hence sustainable. Measuring the potentially far-reaching impacts of those “process” assets requires the development of robust monitoring systems to follow communities over a number of years.

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Special mention is due to the two national consultants who conducted field work in November and December 2011: Gezu Bekele (Ethiopia) and Mike Wekesa (Kenya). Mike’s experience and thoughtful reflection on pastoralism was particularly valued. In Wageningen, the advice of Thea Hilhorst (Wageningen University) and Ferko Bodnar (consultant, for suggestions when the work was being planned) is also gratefully acknowledged.

Any unintended errors in the report are, however, the responsibility of the author alone.
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................... iii

Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................... v

List of Abbreviations and Glossary ........................................................................................................ vii

1  Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1

2  Community Resilience ........................................................................................................................... 7

3  Partner Organisation Preparedness ......................................................................................................... 21

4  Coordination Among Development Actors .......................................................................................... 27

5  Is CMDRR a Good Investment? ............................................................................................................. 31

6  Conclusions, Discussion and Recommendations .................................................................................. 37

References and Resources .......................................................................................................................... 43

Appendix 1  Terms of reference
Appendix 2  Itineraries for team leader and national consultants
Appendix 3  List of contacts
Appendix 4  List of communities visited
Appendix 5  Arero - selected quantitative indicators
Appendix 6  Liban - selected quantitative indicators
Appendix 7  Recent Cordaid CMDRR and emergency ECHO funding in Kenya and Ethiopia
Appendix 8  Ethiopia workshop notes
Appendix 9  Nairobi workshop notes
Executive Summary

Cordaid has been supporting community-managed disaster risk reduction (CMDRR) and drought cycle management (DCM) in the Horn of Africa for eight years. Many evaluations have pointed to successful outcomes but quantitative data are scarce. The aim of this study was to verify the extent to which Cordaid’s CMDRR/DCM work has contributed to building more resilient communities. Cordaid wanted to know more precisely what its added value is, compared to relief assistance. This was considered particularly timely given the recent (severe) drought situation in the Horn of Africa.

This report is based on field work in Kenya and Ethiopia in November/December 2011, stakeholder interviews, review of documents and data, and feedback from stakeholder workshops conducted in early 2012. A wealth of largely qualitative evidence is presented to support the finding that CMDRR can indeed build resilience. Importantly, many CMDRR communities themselves attest to being more resilient as a result of CMDRR. If the capacities, long-term assets and livelihoods it promotes are successful and sustainable, then CMDRR could reduce the need for external relief assistance, lead to quicker recovery after the emergency, reduce suffering and save lives, whilst strengthening and improving rural livelihoods over the long-term. It can also provide empirical evidence for advocacy and policy change. CMDRR does much more than deliver short-term assistance (relief).

However, measuring those results is difficult. In common with other approaches, CMDRR helps communities strengthen physical assets for resilience (water development, pastures, animal health care etc.) but its “edge” may be in the emphasis it places on intangible assets (capacity-building in “soft” skills such as representative process for community organisation and planning) – as the means by which to ensure that interventions are demand-led, well-managed by the community and hence sustainable. Measuring the potentially far-reaching impacts of those “process” assets requires robust monitoring systems to follow communities over a number of years – and those are not in place.

The study used a multi-faceted approach to probe the quantitative evidence on resilience. First, the communities themselves score the process highly. Second, for two districts in Ethiopia, secondary data at community-level (proxies for resilience such as the number of “at-risk” people needing food aid, extent of acute malnutrition and scores for “water status” drawn from drought assessment reports) were analysed to identify differences between CMDRR and non-CMDRR communities. That analysis revealed no significant differences between the two groups. (Note, though, that there is no inference of causality here – their starting points may have been quite different). Third, the cost of a CMDRR project was compared with relief costs. The more successful CMDRR communities reported that they were resilient for 3-4 months longer than they would have been without CMDRR, so if those costs are less than 3-4 months relief assistance, the approach would seem to be a good investment – even if only judged on those short-term benefits. Additional benefits would just strengthen the case. The results are slightly ambiguous but for the more successful communities, there is a strong argument in support of CMDRR. However, where the results have been slower to emerge and communities have achieved less resilience, in the short run at least, it is not so clear that this is the best investment, particularly if the costs are actually higher than used in the analysis (cumulative over a number of recent projects). Fourth (and finally), a narrower comparison of CMDRR water projects (prioritised in community action plans) with the costs of emergency trucked water tends to support a finding that this component of CMDRR represents better “value for money” than relief only. The latter (relief), though, really misses the point of CMDRR – because CMDRR’s essence is long-term and focused on capacities.

The most important and urgent change recommended to obtain better resilience is more focus on monitoring, evaluation and learning, coupled with a structured process (of milestones and timelines) that allows the communities and NGOs to “move ahead / move along” and “graduate” to different levels of
assistance. This would help identify what works and why, enable resources to be directed to those activities/avenues – and hence increase the success rate from the current 30%-40% (suggested in Kenya, at the workshop).

The second recommendation relates to finding ways to scale-up/scale-out and deliver CMDRR or parts of it through other channels or actors, where it is cost-effective to do so. At present, the shift has actually concentrated CMDRR in fewer “model” communities, which may allow for a more thorough process (which must be accompanied by more structured learning) but works against reducing the costs of delivery. A view expressed by some stakeholders in both countries is that CMDRR advocates are sometimes too “purist” and do not recognise the strengths in other approaches, some of which are similar. More open debate and collaboration might help deliver a larger “quantum” of sustainable DRR.

Two final sets of recommendations focus on (a) the (generally) more operational lessons that emerge (see box below); and (b) a number of broader issues, on which Cordaid may want to reflect and consider whether these lie within its (or its partners’) core competences or merit being pursued via other collaboration. These broader issues relate to: illiteracy in CMDRR communities; the analysis of resilience at a broader geographical level (not instead of a community focus, but perhaps as a complement); how CMDRR affects the mobility of communities (noting that mobility is traditionally key to resilience); whether there is more that can be learnt or harnessed, particularly for livelihood diversification, from absent CMDRR community members (temporary schooling in towns or pursuit of other livelihoods); and scope for more linkages and influence over dry lands policy and infrastructure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lessons and recommendations relating to community resilience, partner drought preparedness and stakeholder co-ordination</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Community resilience</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Recognise that good facilitation is highly skilled...and critical</td>
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<tr>
<td>- CMDRR is not consistently applied ...for better, for worse</td>
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<tr>
<td>- M&amp;E – the (unfulfilled) focus has been at community-level but the pressing need is at project/programme/partner-level</td>
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<tr>
<td>- A more structured approach to timelines and milestones is needed – and progressive “graduation” to different types of community support</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Timely follow-up is critical to community motivation and positive outcomes</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The CMDRR process is not well-served by short-term projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Reflect on illiteracy - is it a key constraint to CMDRR? Some argue it is...</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Women are undoubtedly under-represented in the field teams...</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NGO drought relief preparedness</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Training for the relief phase may be useful for some NGOs</td>
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<td>- Trying to ensure that resources are in the right place at the right time</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Reserve fund? – is there scope for this before the main funds arrives?</td>
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<td>- Funding flexibility can be very helpful</td>
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<td>- Scenario planning may be useful in CMDRR communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Encourage communities set aside their own resources</td>
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<td>- Link emergency activity so that it builds fair-weather capacities too</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Co-ordination among stakeholders</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Scope to improve the quality of exchange with government at field/level</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Cordaid should seek closer co-ordination with the other funding sources.</td>
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<td>- community-county level interface is still weak in Kenya – strengthening this may improve prospects for leveraging additional community funds</td>
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<tr>
<td>- more exchange between communities – useful for learning and motivating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- implementing partners (field staff) – to share experiences and learning</td>
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<td>- collaboration with different development actors to address adult literacy?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Consider where there might be more scope to embrace other approaches too..</td>
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List of Abbreviations and Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACORD</td>
<td>Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development (partner in Ethiopia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFD</td>
<td>Action for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Community Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIFA</td>
<td>Community Initiative Facilitation and Assistance (NGO partner in Kenya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMDRR</td>
<td>Community-managed disaster risk reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCM</td>
<td>Drought Cycle Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Euro</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEWSNET</td>
<td>Famine Early Warning System Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBP</td>
<td>Pound sterling (Pound, Great Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency virus / acquired immune deficiency syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIRR</td>
<td>International Institute of Rural Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JECCDODD</td>
<td>Jerusalem Children and Community Development Organisation, Dire Dawe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kebele</td>
<td>a community (also known as pastoralist association) - Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K Sh</td>
<td>Kenya shilling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGS</td>
<td>Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PISP</td>
<td>Pastoralist Integrated Support Programme (NGO partner in Kenya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHO</td>
<td>Dutch acronym meaning “core-operating humanitarian organisations”</td>
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<tr>
<td>SoS – Sahel</td>
<td>an NGO implementing partner in Ethiopia (sometimes referred to SoS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNISDR</td>
<td>United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESCOORD</td>
<td>Water Environment and Sanitation Co-ordination (Kenya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woreda</td>
<td>an administrative area in Ethiopia, equivalent to district</td>
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</table>
1 Introduction

Background

Cordaid has supported development and relief programmes among the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists of Kenya and Ethiopia for over thirty years. Progress has been made to improve the lives and livelihoods of these communities, but one constant challenge, drought, has continued to erode gains made over the years. Drought episodes are now becoming more frequent and prolonged and their impact more devastating. Climate change, the nature of the dryland ecosystem, the erosion of the authorities of traditional resource management institutions, population growth, conflict and unfavourable policies exacerbate the drought impact in the (agro-)pastoralist regions. (Cordaid, 2011, terms of reference, present study).

In response, over the past eight years, Cordaid, with support from the International Institute for Rural Reconstruction (IIRR), developed and implemented (via NGO field implementing partners) the Drought Cycle Management (DCM) approach and Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction (CMDRR), to link relief, rehabilitation and development. (Ibid.)

In 2011, both Kenya and Ethiopia were involved in a serious drought situation. There was almost no rainfall between May 2010 and September 2011. ECHO has provided funds (to Cordaid and others) for relief aid since March 2011 and an additional SHO initiative also raised funds for relief aid in the Horn of Africa.

These events meant that Cordaid considered it timely to verify whether its work of the last 8 years has contributed to more resilient communities. Evaluations indicate that the DCM / CMDRR programmes are contributing positively. There are many good practice case studies in support of this finding. However, quantitative measures of this resilience are scant (e.g., how many people can survive how many months longer?).

Resilience – a central concept

It is useful to reflect on the meaning of resilience, because the concept is central to CMDRR. The UNISDR definition (also used by Cordaid) is:

“The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions.

Comment: Resilience means the ability to “resile from” or “spring back from” a shock. The resilience of a community in respect to potential hazard events is determined by the

1 More detail can be found in the Term of Reference which are attached at Appendix 1.

2 SHO: the English translation for this Dutch acronym is something like “core-operating humanitarian organisations”. 9 such organisations (including Cordaid) are involved in joint fund-raising.
Elements of this definition are widely understood. In the workshop conducted in Nairobi in March 2012, as part of the present study, participants identified key words or concepts that they associated with resilience: ability to cope, bouncing back, adaptability, sustainable livelihoods, surviving. During field work in late 2011, the CMDRR communities tended to define resilience more in relation to activities or tangible assets that help them cope (see Box 1).

Box 1: Community perceptions of resilience: A focus on assets

The Ethiopian consultant identified a set of indicators for drought resilience and changes attributable to CMDRR, based on a participatory assessment in five CMDRR communities. These related to: (reduced) distress sale of livestock, and firewood and charcoal; changes in pasture carrying capacity and density; women's workload (reduced distance travelled to collect water); the availability and durability of groundwater obtained from wells or with hand pumps; the likelihood of new water and pasture projects being well-managed and sustained; and (improved) knowledge of transmission and prevention of HIV/AIDS.

A similar emphasis emerged in Kenya.

For example in Rawan, a community which admired the CMDRR work of a neighbouring community, residents associated resilience with: proper water supply management; well-managed pasture and livestock; diversified livelihoods; sales and banking – for the future; no conflict; roof catchment water harvesting; a “good number of people” receiving salaries or remittances; and good leadership at local and national-level.

In Turbi, considered a “model” CMDRR community by Cordaid staff in Kenya, the following were listed as evidence of greater drought resilience: reliable, long-lasting water supplies; carefully planned pastures; reduced conflict; leveraging funds from external sources; pro-active actions by individuals to use their own resources to improve drought resilience with respect to, e.g., feeds and water storage; and cohesiveness within the community fostered by community organisation and the CMDRR implementation committee.

Communities and practitioners alike recognise that building resilience (even if building on an existing cultural foundation) is challenging. In stakeholder workshops conducted in Addis Ababa and Nairobi, many participants said “building resilience takes forever” or “it takes a lifetime” (although many indicated a shorter time-frame of 3-10 years too).

Purpose of the present study

The overall research question is:

“To what extent has the CMDRR / DCM approach contributed positively to more drought resilient communities in the light of the current drought, and what can still be done to further increase their resilience?”

Cordaid posits that “the CMDRR/DCM approach is the most economic and sustainable approach to build the resilience of communities in areas suffering from recurrent droughts”. It asks: “what is the added value of the CMDRR/DCM approach in the current drought situation in the Horn of Africa?”

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The terms of reference include an initial question relating to cost-effectiveness:

- To what extent is the funding invested in CMDRR/DCM at community-level (approximately Euros 3 million annually over the last eight years) a good investment compared to only relief funding?

In this paper, further specific questions (covered in later sections of this report and listed in Appendix 1) are explored first, before returning to “good investment” question. These relate to:

- Community resilience
- Partner organisation preparedness, and
- Co-ordination among development actors.

This paper presents the findings of this research study. A prior interim report served as a basis for initial feedback. The findings of that report have been further elaborated with reference to validation workshops conducted in Ethiopia and Kenya (in February and March 2012), as well as further interviews and collection of secondary data in Ethiopia.

**Field programme**

The study was undertaken by a team of three consultants. The Ethiopian and Kenyan consultants were both pastoralist experts and the team leader an agricultural economist.

In summary, the field work commenced late November 2011, involving one week in the field spent partly in Kenya and partly in Ethiopia (the full team i.e., lead consultant and two national consultants), to develop and field-test the approach and community-level questions. The national consultants then continued for approximately 11 days, each in his own country. In addition, the lead consultant conducted meetings in Nairobi and Addis Ababa (with Cordaid, partners and other stakeholders) at the beginning and end of the visit, respectively. (Meetings with Cordaid head office staff were also held in the Netherlands in November).

Stakeholder workshops were held in February and March in Ethiopia and Kenya, to solicit further feedback on the preliminary findings. These also provided an opportunity for some additional meetings in Nairobi and Addis Ababa and short field visits in Ethiopia. (A day trip was made to Dire Dawa to learn more about the potential for the CMDRR associations to operate independently. A four-day trip was made to Liban, Arero and Yabello – focused principally on obtaining secondary data from woreda (district) and zonal-level offices).

The study was to cover only those CMDRR activities of implementing partners AFD, ACORD and SoS-Sahel (in Ethiopia) and CIFA and PISP (in Kenya). Box 2 below provides a full list of the communities covered by the CMDRR programmes of those organisations and indicates (with “√”) which ones were visited for the present study.

During field work (28th November to mid-December 2011) there were extreme flood conditions. This caused significant disruption to travel plans, compounded in part (particularly in Ethiopia) because of the

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4 The two workshops followed a broadly similar format. Notes of the Ethiopian and Kenyan workshops are attached at Appendices 8 and 9 respectively.

5 Communities were inaccessible or travel ill-advised because more rain was forecast; in Kenya, 4X4 operators were not always willing to travel in such conditions; time was lost when plans were aborted due to unexpected floods (e.g., the main road south from Moyale in Kenya, was found to be un-passable about 2.5 hours from Moyale, and a visit to a village near Moyale took the best part of a day, when the vehicle got stuck obliging the team to walk back to the main road to find alternative transport); in Ethiopia, circuitous routes were necessary and there were also breakdown problems.
need to take more circuitous routes on account of tribal tensions. (OCHA, 2011). Further field work in Ethiopia in February helped provide some additional information but this was not possible in Kenya, where tribal tensions had again surfaced, causing many NGOs to withdraw their staff from affected areas.

Box 2: CMDRR communities in Ethiopia and Kenya

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<td>Did-Jarsa</td>
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<td>ACORD</td>
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<td>Milbana</td>
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<td>Cheriliche</td>
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<td>Kawa</td>
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<td>Dhkhaqala</td>
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<td>Liben</td>
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<td>Godaloni</td>
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<td>Badanrero</td>
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<td>Elle Bora</td>
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<td>Turbi</td>
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<td>PISP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Namarei</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>PISP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hurri Hills</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>PISP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dirib Gombo</td>
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<td>PISP</td>
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(6 non-CMDRR communities were also visited in Kenya: three receiving other types of assistance and three receiving relief only)

Detailed itineraries, a list of contacts and a full list of the communities visited are attached at Appendices 2, 3 and 4.

Note that in Ethiopia the transliterated spelling of community names is not always consistent (but is phonetically similar). In addition some communities have changed their names (e.g., Negelle Borana is now Liban). The present report is consistent on names but there may be some instances of different spellings.
Approach and Methodology – as planned and adapted

Key elements of the proposed approach and methodology included:
– review of documents and secondary data, stakeholder meetings (in Nairobi, Addis Ababa and in the field) and field visits to communities, conducted together with implementing partners;
– comparison with communities that received relief only and with communities that received relief and other types of development assistance;
– a focus, as far as possible, on quantification of outcomes and impacts;
– the use of participatory methods at community-level (focus group meetings, semi-structured interviews with key informants, direct observation), whilst also seeking as much quantification of the CMDRR outcomes they highlighted (through e.g., proportional piling exercises, where appropriate, or based on their records and information).

Whilst all the above aspects were covered, the agreed approach had to be adapted in the light of the severely limiting travel conditions. The Ethiopian consultant therefore focused on visiting CMDRR communities only and relied heavily on their participatory assessments of the added value they acquired from CMDRR. Secondary data obtained principally from Government offices permitted subsequent comparison of CMDRR and non-CMDRR communities but the proposed 3-way comparison (CMDRR+relief, other types of development assistance+relief, and relief only) was not undertaken because Ethiopian Government officials in the relevant drought-affected woredas reported that all communities were covered by some development interventions and hence there were apparently no communities in the “relief only” category.

In Kenya, the consultant visited communities in all three categories, but it was not possible to do this in the systematic manner originally intended (groups of three broadly similar proximate communities, which differed only in the types of relief and development assistance received). However, he adhered as far as possible to the questions that were formulated during the initial field work7, which were intended to probe potential differences in community actions relating to drought preparedness. These included questions relating to:
– patterns of de-stocking
– access to and management of water sources
– pasture management
– conflict resolution and effect on access to pastures and survival of livestock
– empowerment, as evidenced by ability to leverage external funding for projects identified by the community
– the empowerment or involvement of disadvantaged groups within the community, and
– training of community animal health workers.

In the event, the travel conditions, the different ways in which the national consultants adapted the approach, and the difficulty in measuring the “soft skill” dimensions of the CMDRR, meant that the Terms of Reference were addressed using a combination of techniques – combining both qualitative and quantitative measures, and supporting the findings with reference to secondary data wherever appropriate/available.

7 He indicated, for example, that non-CMDRR communities were not always willing to answer a planned question on funds saved in the water source account (intended as a measure of ability to manage); and the de-stocking questions were problematic both because this is a slightly vexed issue (communities have been recommended to destock early, in the event of a drought, for many years but observance of this is patchy) and because communities reflected on it with different time periods in mind (not necessarily the calendar year) and the comparison became confused.
Layout of this report

The layout of this report, closely follows the specific questions posed by Cordaid. After this introduction, there are sections that present evidence and lessons relating to:

– Community resilience
– Partner organisation preparedness
– Co-ordination among development actors, and
– Is CMDRR a good investment?

A final section re-visits the central question (has CMDRR contributed to building resilience at community-level?). That section continues with a discussion of (a) monitoring, evaluation and learning and (b) a number of broader issues that at present seem to fall outside the CMDRR “net” / approach. Recommendations follow this discussion.
2 Community Resilience

In this section, key questions relating to community resilience are covered, closely following the community resilience questions 1-3 in the Terms of Reference (see Appendix 1). An analysis of secondary data, from Liban and Arero woredas in Ethiopia (where nine of the 20 Ethiopian CMDRR communities potentially covered by this study are located) is presented. The section concludes with key lessons and suggestions on how the approach could be strengthened (relating to the 4th community resilience question in the terms of reference).

Q1. To what extent are trained CMDRR/DCM communities in Kenya and Ethiopia more resilient / better able to cope with drought than others and why?

In exploring this question, first some overview comments are made. Reference is then made to the different components of Drought Cycle Management (DCM) and CMDRR. The section concludes with contextual consideration of how non-CMDRR communities perform.

The field work conducted for this study in Kenya and Ethiopia, as well as other studies (e.g., Kinfu and Jirma, 2011, Binas and Savi, 2010, Cosgrave and Wata, 2009), indicate that communities trained in CMDRR are better able to cope with drought and those communities recognise the role of the CMDRR training and interventions in improving their resilience. Communities refer particularly to community organisation, water and rangeland interventions (especially where cash for work is provided) in helping them become more resilient.

Furthermore, some CMDRR-neighbouring communities are also requesting CMDRR assistance, having seen what it offers. For example, Rawan, in Moyale district, Kenya, despite its relatively strong asset base and well-managed community rangeland and water sources, would nonetheless like to receive CMDRR training and assistance because of what they admire in neighbouring CMDRR-trained FunaniQumbi:

- CMDRR training has transformed the village – they note the iron sheet roofs and plastic tanks provided for roof catchment water harvesting;
- Re-stocking with camels, considered sensible because they are more resilient to drought;
- A good school;
- A large area of rangeland reclamation and improved carrying capacity; and
- “the community spirit of “oneness” and wanting to make life better”.

Two implementing NGOs remarked that during the relief phase it is easier to work with CMDRR communities, because of: the trust already established between the community and the NGO; the existing community plans that can be operationalised quickly; and because the communities can mobilise quickly (“they know their part”) and have the structures to manage and monitor relief interventions. In non-CMDRR communities, it is harder to implement relief programmes, because they need to create appropriate community structures.

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8 They mention other interventions but these are the broad categories they mention first.

9 These were their comments, based on their perceptions, irrespective of whether these assets are directly attributable to, or undertaken as part of, a CMDRR project.
This finding is echoed by Zwaagstra et al., 2010, in their assessment of the response to the 2008-2009 drought in Kenya (p74):

- “...few [drought management] interventions involved the community in design or implementation. Those that did tended to have better outcomes than those that did not.
- Recommendation: involve the communities before the drought in the design of drought contingency plans.”

Although the training and facilitation, resulting in community analysis and planning, is clearly critical to community buy-in and commitment, and hence the success of subsequent activities, in practice (and understandably) most communities interviewed emphasise tangible benefits rather than the process or capacities by which these were achieved. The importance of the “soft skills” acquired is reflected more in CMDRR-community references to peace-building capacities (e.g., Turbi, FunanQumbi), in the admiring comments of Rawan looking at its CMDRR neighbour’s achievements (“community spirit of “oneness””) and in the ability to develop and manage community resources (such as water and rangeland).

Activities relating to each of the DCM phases (see Terms of Reference, Appendix 1) were evident in all the CMDRR communities surveyed. However, it was not always clear how they should be categorised. Some activities occur in several phases (e.g., water source development could and does occur as mitigation, preparedness or reconstruction); the timing of some activities differed from the plan, apparently because of delays in disbursement (e.g., distribution of subsidised veterinary medicines in Ethiopia – intended for vulnerable households during the relief phase but occurring towards the end of 3 months rainfall, in December 2011); and because, although the drought had ended, some food aid was still required and in the areas visited, drought had given way to extreme flood conditions. However, categorising in terms of the role these activities seem to play, the following were noted:

Examples of mitigation activities were the initial training and facilitation, the establishment of CMDRR committees, the development of community action and contingency plans, infrastructure development (e.g., water sources, schools and community information centres), conflict resolution, enclosures to preserve pastures and/or protect particular animals, and livelihood diversification (focused on vulnerable groups); the importance of these activities was apparent largely in the way in which they help communities anticipate and plan together, in the “soft skills” mentioned above, and the emphasis communities placed particularly on water, pasture and livelihood interventions; (early warning systems were discussed with NGO partners but generally were not emphasised by the communities themselves; these seem to be more of a focus in Ethiopia than in Kenya; this is re-visited in the section below re partner preparedness);

Examples of preparedness activities were pre-drought purchase of grain (Ethiopia), rehabilitation of water sources, and (to a variable extent) prior sale of livestock;

Examples of relief activities were food aid, targeted food aid for vulnerable groups, emergency water distribution and subsidised veterinary medicines for vulnerable households;

Examples of reconstruction activities were restocking, food for work and cash for work activities to rebuild or re-invest in community infrastructure and natural resource management.

10 Although the communities did not point this out, the information presented (by year) would seem to provide a community record that would not otherwise be available and might be quite difficult to construct retrospectively. This can help them monitor change. In practice, at present, the committees tend to use this record to assist in planning (and to introduce their communities to outsiders).
The five critical steps in CMDRR are (a) the sensitisation and training of implementing partners and (b) the four “minimums”:

- community managed disaster risk assessment and analysis;
- community action plans;
- people’s organisation;
- participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning system.

The CMDRR agents with which the study team interacted all seemed to have a good grasp of the steps in the process and a training event for CMDRR staff was being organised in Kenya during the consultants’ visit. In Ethiopia, however, field staff commented on how difficult it is to manage community expectations – particularly with respect to the more popular inputs that inject cash or other inputs into the community. In Kenya, workshop participants noted that it is easier to implement CMDRR work in remote communities, compared with those which are more accustomed to development projects. In Ethiopia, it was noted that there are sometimes meetings between the three implementing NGOs in Dire Woreda, but there does not appear to be any systematic attempt to capture cross-learning among partners and feed that back into the CMDRR process. Other commentators have also noted the need to strengthen field partner capacities and capture opportunities for cross-learning (e.g., Cosgrave and Wata, 2009, Binas and Savi, 2010, Kinfu and Jirma, 2011).

CMDRR communities all undertake the first three “minimums” (above) but implementation of and capacities for participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning is much more patchy. Certainly there is some evidence of empowerment and capacities in communities calling NGOs to account (seen in Ethiopia in community impatience to go ahead with planned activities, when unexpected disbursement delays occur, and noted in Kenya, when a community measured the emergency water provided by a tanker and, on finding it less than contracted, only signing for the amount delivered). In general, however, this component of the CMDRR approach is still being developed. Binas and Savi (2010) comment on opportunities for cross-learning between communities; FAO staff in Nairobi have observed the potential for CMDRR-community involvement in pastoralist field schools. Certainly more opportunities for structured community-level reflection on achievements and lessons would help reinforce key messages and consolidate learning to further strengthen the approach.

(The topic of monitoring, evaluation and learning at the project-(not community-) level is taken-up in the discussion and recommendations).

A further point is worth stressing here. It was evident during field work that the amount of time devoted to training (actually facilitation) of CMDRR communities is quite variable and in some instances appears to be too short. In Kenya, for instance, some communities had only two or three days training, whilst others had seven days. Those that experienced the latter had clearly internalised more of the process and content. One Kenyan CMDRR officer noted that the initial training is often “too squeezed – about five days, but really two weeks is needed”. Cosgrave and Wata (2009) also comment on the differences among implementing partners in Ethiopia (p17):

“The level of understanding of the approach varied between partners, influenced by the extent to which the staff in question had participated in training in the method, and in their basic approach.”

11 This was also confirmed in the Nairobi and Addis Ababa workshops when CMDRR-practising participants gave a wide range of answers in response to a question on the duration of the initial substantive interaction with communities (be it called training or facilitation or awareness raising).
It was very difficult to gauge how far the understanding of CMDRR went beyond the CMDRR committee in some communities. In many village meetings attended by the study team, committee members were quite dominant in the discussion and were articulate in their CMDRR commentary. In one (short notice) meeting in Ethiopia, when the consultants’ visit coincided with the absence of the committee at another meeting, the meeting had to be aborted because of strong disagreements among the participants – but during field work (always in the presence of partner organisation staff) that experience was exceptional.

All of this gives quite a nuanced picture. CMDRR communities are clearly gaining capacities and assets that will help them cope with drought but progress towards resilience is not uniform. Communities without CMDRR were also considered and there the picture was similar – examples of both stronger and weaker communities, in places where there had been only relief assistance and in places that had received relief as well as other development assistance. (A number of other capacity development approaches are used in Kenya and Ethiopia including Participatory Integrated Community Development, Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment, and Participatory Natural Resource Mapping. One CMDRR officer commented that this type of facilitation, irrespective of the specific model, is the most important differentiator of community capacities – though he also felt that CMDRR had the edge, because of its four minimums). Clearly, no two communities are identical in their starting points – and droughts too have variable impacts on different communities depending on factors that are outside the control of the CMDRR process (e.g., geography, natural water sources, distance from the road etc.).

Whilst some may argue that the CMDRR communities are however set on a sustainable development trajectory, this is unlikely to be true for all CMDRR communities. Cordaid’s partners have now shifted to a concerted focus on a smaller number of CMDRR communities (with an apparently strong focus on so-called “model” communities) – but even so, the time for development and change has been short: many communities visited in Kenya only established their CMDRR committees in early or mid-2010, just before the rains failed. (The short rains failed in October-December 2010 and the long rains failed in March-June 2011 – leading to one of the worst droughts in 60 years12. The abundant short rains in late-2011 then resulted in flooding (OCHA, 2011)). Appendix 4 indicates when the CMDRR programme began in each of the communities visited.

**Q2. For how long (for how many months) are the CMDRR communities more resilient to drought and which interventions have contributed most to this resilience and why?**

As noted above, the recent drought was extremely severe so community achievements need to be set within that context. ACORD noted that during the recent drought, only one of the four CMDRR communities in Dire woreda (Ethiopia), where ACORD had worked for three years, had to truck water - but in Mio, where ACORD started CMDRR activities only in 2010, trucking was necessary. In Dire, CMDRR communities had been able to rehabilitate (de-silt) ponds and dig new ponds. (This achievement is all the more notable since Dire was one of a small number of woredas where in general there was a need for additional water trucking towards the end of the drought (Ethiopian Red Cross Society, August 2011 Oromiya drought assessment report)).

The more successful CMDRR communities in Kenya consider they improved their resilience by 3-4 months (compared with how they think they'd have been in the absence of CMDRR) and one (Funanqumbi) was confident that it had gained 6-7 months additional resilience (on account of peace-building, stored water and improved pastures – made possible by an exceptionally strong CMDRR committee with wide community support).

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The interventions that have contributed most to this resilience are:

- Community-based water supply and management;
- Pasture improvement through bush-clearing and reserved grazing;
- Conflict management and peace-building initiatives;
- Training of community animal health workers.

Water availability and access determines the survival of pastoralists in a drought - but water is not enough. There may be plenty of water but the pastures may be insufficient. Pastoralists must have drought grazing reserves for them to survive. Conflicts constrain movement and access to critical natural resources in certain locations. Being able to negotiate the use of such resources with neighbours is a very important strategy. Finally animal diseases affect the resilience of those animals to drought stress. A weakened animal as a result of disease is already vulnerable to the slightest stress from drought. Research shows that the mere de-worming of small stock at the on-set of a drought gives the animal a 40% greater chance of surviving the drought (UNESCO in Turkana, 1988). Therefore, another important intervention has been the training of Community Animal Health Workers.

In Ethiopia, communities identified a number of ways in which their resilience had improved as a result of CMDRR:

- Cash for work had reduced distress sales of livestock, fuel wood and charcoal;
- Bush-clearing and enclosures had improved pasture carrying capacity;
- Women spent less time collecting water as a result of water supply interventions;
- Communities considered that the water and pasture resources developed as a result of CMDRR were more likely to be sustained and properly used than those resulting from previous interventions; and
- Improved understanding of transmission of HIV/AIDS and more people being tested.

However, it was noted in Ethiopia that a number of ponds that had been rehabilitated prior to the drought (sometimes after many years of dis-use) had been critically damaged in the late 2011 floods. This was not limited to the CMDRR communities; it was noted more broadly in e.g. the drought assessment reports for Liban woreda.

Q3. To what extent is there a difference in resilience between different groups among (within) these communities (gender-based groups, old versus young people, able/disabled/chronically ill, crop producers versus livestock keepers versus others...)?

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13 Discussions in the field suggested that some of the large ponds may have been developed initially under earlier projects supported by the World Bank and others. See Flintan et al., 2011, for a discussion of how such water points, when located in wet season grazing areas, sometimes encouraged communities to become more sedentary, leading to over-grazing, exploitation of local resources and conflict between land users.
Clearly, different groups have different levels of resilience depending on their asset base. In focus group discussions with communities (CMDRR communities and other communities), these groups were commonly identified as: women (particularly widows), the elderly and infirm, children, especially young children from poor families (with reference to supplementary feeding) and households whose main or only source of income is small (unviable) herds.

Unprompted, such discussions at community-level were less likely to identify “pastoralist drop-outs” (sometimes referred to as “pastoralists in transition”) as another vulnerable group – or indeed any other community members not involved in pastoralism/agro-pastoralism. However, this point was raised in meetings by other stakeholders and in the Nairobi workshop (where one participant commented that CMDRR focuses on people practising the main livelihoods, but overlooks others including the “pastoralist drop-outs”). Male youths cannot be considered vulnerable in any conventional sense, but many youths face a very uncertain future in terms of livelihoods and lack the skills, capacities and confidence to migrate. Some are undoubtedly on the way to becoming pastoralist drop-outs.

CMDRR does in principle include the identification of the most vulnerable groups, facilitate their participation in the analysis and planning, and ensure that those groups benefit from, or are targeted by, some interventions such that their ability to withstand shocks (such as drought) is strengthened. The needs of the more vulnerable groups in the communities had clearly been given some consideration – partly because traditional cohesive communities would “look after their own” anyway and partly because of the additional push from the CMDRR process. This was evident in targeted interventions such as women’s (mostly widows) self-help and micro-credit groups (Ethiopia); targeted distribution of subsidised veterinary medicines (Ethiopia); food aid targeted to the children and/or the poorest households; in provisions to make sure they benefit from access to community pasture enclosures; and as recipients of meat from emergency government or NGO animal purchase, slaughter and meat distribution interventions. It was not clear whether they are particularly targeted with cash for work or food for work interventions, which in any case tend to involve quite a lot of participants. Women’s workload is also reduced when nearer water sources are developed, even if that was not the primary motivation for the intervention. Thus, a mix of charitable and “development” interventions were targeted to some of the vulnerable (the “obviously vulnerable”) to improve their resilience.

Given the rather rapid training process for many communities (see discussion above), combined with the difficulty generally experienced in eliciting the meaningful involvement of poorer and lower status community members in community-level discussions and planning, as well as the time needed to explore the nuances that define capacities and vulnerability, this part of the CMDRR process could be strengthened, with a particular focus on livelihood diversification.

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14 The sustainable livelihoods approach would describe this with reference to financial capital, natural capital (e.g., land, water), physical capital (e.g., infrastructure), human capital (skills, education, health) and social capital (e.g., personal and business networks, friends and family, membership of organisations etc).

15 In non-CMDRR communities too, discussions revealed deliberate interventions and strategies to improve the resilience of the most vulnerable. (In Qate, Moyale district, Kenya, an informal group that gathered to talk with the consultants, quickly identified female-headed households (especially those with inadequate labour and few or no livestock) as vulnerable. They referred to a proposal submitted to CIFA by a women’s group for a small milk-processing facility).
Furthermore, discussions with women might sometimes be better facilitated by women – but the consultants met no women CMDRR officers. The CMDRR process does however involve separate facilitated discussions with different community groups e.g., separate discussions with women and men. The lack of women field staff was discussed in both workshops, in Addis Ababa and Nairobi. Everyone emphasised that it is difficult to recruit women for field positions and there was a consensus that women’s views are nonetheless adequately considered in the CMDRR process. However, the representative for Jeccdodd in Ethiopia argued that it is possible to recruit women community facilitators, citing their own experience.

By definition, pastoralists who have migrated with their herds are left out of the discussion. Those could be people who are less vulnerable because they have more viable herds, but that is not necessarily the case. To some extent the CMDRR process overlooks this group – so little is known (explicitly) about their vulnerability – nor the “solutions” they may offer. This is also true of other (temporary) migrants – such as older children at school in towns. Whilst absent pastoralist perspectives may be reflected in the wider discussion on pastoralist livelihoods, there appears to be relatively little emphasis on avenues to out-migration and other livelihoods, including the opportunities that might open up as a consequence of schooling in other towns.

To sum up, it is clear that consideration of the more vulnerable members of the community is prioritised in the CMDRR process and translated into interventions that benefit these groups (see examples above). It was not possible, in the short time available, to make a proper assessment of whether certain (less obvious) vulnerable groups are overlooked despite this emphasis – nor to assess the extent to which the resilience of the targeted vulnerable groups has been improved in general. In the workshop in Addis Ababa, it was felt that the chronically ill and disabled benefit less from CMDRR and, in Nairobi, participants identified women and youth as benefitting less.

Such targeting, though, is not unique to CMDRR communities. All communities in Arero and Liban woredas in Ethiopia had to identify vulnerable households who needed assistance with food aid. In Kenya, Qate (near Moyale – an “other assistance + relief” community) had identified and leveraged funding for a cheese-making enterprise for women (considered by those present to be more vulnerable and less easily able to diversify their livelihoods).

**Analysis of secondary data on community resilience from Arero and Liban woredas in Ethiopia**

*Arero woreda, Ethiopia, where 6 of 21 communities are CMDRR communities*  
*Arero - secondary data availability.*

Six of the twenty CMDRR targeted communities in Ethiopia (i.e., those reached by AFD, SoS-Sahel and ACORD, with support from Cordaid and therefore potentially covered by the present study) are in Arero woreda (two supported by SoS-Sahel and four supported by AFD). All six are classified as pastoralist communities (not agro-pastoralist). In Arero, five NGOs were said to be active: Gaia Pastoral Development; Save the Children-USA; AFD; SoS-Sahel and Mercy Corps. Save the Children - USA has

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16 The consultants are aware that it is not always easy to recruit women for this work. A discussion with women in Mani-Soda, Ethiopia, focused on the lack of women facilitators. Those women were articulate and argued forcefully that, for them, it did not matter that the facilitator was male.

17 Yet it is clear that such targeting is not always easy. In Fuldowa the community meeting broke down in discord as participants complained of unfair distribution of veterinary drug vouchers. At the meeting in Melbana, some participants argued that interventions should be targeted to those that lose most in absolute rather than proportionate terms (e.g., large herders who lose large numbers of animals).
activities (including emergency programming) in every kebele. The administration tries to ensure that all communities are covered by the work of at least one NGO or Government project).

The woreda (district) had a total estimated population of 58.9 thousand in 2012, of which roughly 80% belong to pastoralist communities. The woreda has 21 kebeles (communities) and it was possible to obtain selected community-level data from the woreda administration offices in its administrative centre, Metagefersa. Those six CMDRR communities represent one third of the district’s population, so Arero provides a good case for further analysis – where CMDRR communities can be compared with other communities in the same woreda.

Of particular interest were any data that could be used as proxies for “resilience”. Community-level data were available on numbers of “at-risk” food aid beneficiaries as of mid-February 2012 (i.e., not including a wider group that is eligible for Food-for-Work) as well as livestock deaths in 2011 (dry season, wet season and as a result of disease) - but not pre-drought livestock numbers. In addition, qualitative assessments, including scoring, were available from officials involved in the periodic drought assessment exercises (i.e., as discussed during follow-up field work in February 2012 or as noted in official 2011 reports), These covered issues such as perceived overall drought “coping” (poor, medium, better) and the availability of water and pasture.

Arero – what the secondary data indicate about CMDRR community resilience

The six CMDRR communities that fall within Arero woreda are: Fuldowa and Kawa (covered by SoS) and Web, Kaffara, Gedda and Hallona (covered by AFD). Whilst data on livestock deaths and at-risk populations are available for all kebeles in the woreda, it is difficult to compare these in any meaningful way, since the communities differ in size – so kebele population data (2012) were used to standardise the data on a per capita basis.

Proxy variables for resilience for the CMDRR communities can be compared with non-CMDRR communities (see Table 1 below). Averages can be compared for each of these groups (taking the average of the community-level data), or averages weighted by population size can be compared. In practice, whilst these yield slightly different values, the overall findings are not materially different:

- The CMDRR communities (and people living in CMDRR communities) on average have lower rates of at-risk people than non-CMDRR communities (and people living in non-CMDRR communities); however, this result does not hold for all the CMDRR communities since Kawa and Hallona both have higher rates of at-risk people than the non-CMDRR communities; moreover, given the small sample size (6 CMDRR communities) and variability in results, the difference between the two groups is not statistically significant;
- in general, livestock deaths seem to be higher in CMDRR communities but these results are hard to interpret since pre-drought livestock numbers are not known; nor are these differences statistically significant.

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18 Data were missing for one kebele which had been subject to conflict: K/Guumaata.

19 i.e., when this status would still be considered to relate to the prolonged drought. These individuals are identified by the community themselves in discussion with NGOs or Government staff.

20 Cattle, camels and “shoats” (sheep and goats); data on deaths of donkeys or horses were excluded from the present analysis because these were negligible.

21 Hungry animals can die in the wet season, either before the growth of new pastures or as a result of eating on empty stomachs.
A table showing the Arero woreda data is attached at Appendix 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>&quot;at-risk&quot; people</th>
<th>Cattle deaths</th>
<th>Camel deaths</th>
<th>Shoat deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community averages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDRR (6)</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>0.549</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-CMDRR (15)</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Averages weighted by population size</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDRR (33% of population)</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.532</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-CMDRR (67% of population)</td>
<td>0.359</td>
<td>0.503</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When comparing the scores used in the Arero woreda 2011 drought assessment reports (for water and pasture, and the assessment of a food security officer re the overall effect of the drought), it appears that overall and in terms of pasture, the CMDRR communities fared worse than the average (67% of the CMDRR communities had the lowest score, which was higher than the all-woreda probability (40%) and the non-CMDRR community probability (29%), whilst the water situation in the CMDRR communities is more balanced across all 3 performance levels (see Table 2 below).

An official in the woreda food security office remarked that Gedda and Hallona coped better because of [drought] "awareness" – though for Hallona that seems to contradict the numbers of at-risk people (above).

Some caveats should be emphasised. 6 CMDRR kebeles is a small sample size and small differences between these communities and non-CMDRR communities are not statistically significant. The other key point is that there is no inference of causality in such results: each community may be quite different in terms of access to water and pasture, and the numbers and distribution of different types of livestock.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Effect of drought</th>
<th>Water situation</th>
<th>Pasture situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMDRR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuldowa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaffara</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gedda</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hallona</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All woreda (20 kebeles – showing distribution of scores 1/2/3)</td>
<td>8/7/5</td>
<td>6/9/5</td>
<td>6/9/5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 This is an assessment of how hard the drought hit various communities, taking into consideration the extent to which it was able to cope (as a result of natural endowment or through acquired coping mechanisms).
Arero woreda – what the CMDRR communities said about their own resilience

The Ethiopian researcher visited three of the CMDRR communities in Arero woreda. In focus group discussions he asked community members to rate several different indicators of resilience – comparing their situation before CMDRR facilitation and after. (He used a technique known as proportional piling – where those present are asked to distribute 100 objects (stones, seed etc.) to show how the situation compared pre- and post-intervention – see Table 3 below).

Clearly these respondents felt that the CMDRR assistance was very positive – and this is not necessarily contradictory to the secondary data analysis. Whilst the latter enables comparison between CMDRR and non-CMDRR communities, it does not take account of pre-drought community resource endowments.

### Table 3: Arero woreda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CMDRR community assessments of changes brought about by CMDRR</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced livestock sell-off take*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charcoal and fire wood sales*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasture carrying capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water availability &amp; quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work load on women from fetching water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The questions marked * related to how the cash-for-work activities had affected “forced” sales.

Arero woreda – what these data mean overall

In sum, the Arero woreda secondary data reveal no statistically significant differences in the number of at-risk people in CMDRR communities compared with non-CMDRR communities. On average, CMDRR communities have slightly fewer at-risk people, but generalisations are problematic because (a) this does not hold for all CMDRR communities and (b) the differences are quite small and not statistically significant. Other indicators including livestock deaths (albeit somewhat problematic because of the lack of information on pre-drought numbers) and the more qualitative scoring methods used by the woreda authorities tend to suggest that the CMDRR communities were more challenged by the drought than the non-CMDRR communities.

However, the communities themselves value highly the CMDRR assistance as indicated in their “before” and “after” assessments of various resilience-related indicators.

These findings need not be contradictory and could be explained by differing community resource endowments (water sources, livestock numbers etc.). The selection of CMDRR communities may also be important: implementing partners indicate that they undertake a survey and make recommendations to the woreda-level administration, who make the final decision. The administration tries to ensure that every community is covered by the interventions of at least one NGO or the Government.

Liban woreda, Ethiopia, where 3 of 17 communities are CMDRR communities

Liban – secondary data availability

Liban woreda has a total of 17 kebeles of which 3 are receiving CMDRR assistance from SoS-Sahel. Those three (Hadhesse, Quersamele and Dhaka Kala) represent 17% of the population of the woreda. Akin to Arero, the local administration tries to ensure that every community is covered by the interventions of at least one NGO or the Government. In Liban, five NGOs were said to be active: SoS, Save the Children-USA, Mercy Corps, Coopi, and Pastoralist LPD.
The data available for Liban woreda differed from those available for Arero. Population data for 2009 were available by kebele, so an annual growth rate of 3.194% was applied to estimate the mid-2011 population. A June 2011 survey identified vulnerable people already receiving food assistance as well as additional people that needed it. Malnutrition data were also available by kebele (separating child malnutrition (various types) from malnutrition among pregnant and lactating women). In both cases, the results reported below are based on the totals of these groups (i.e., total numbers judged to need food assistance in June 2011 and total numbers of malnourished people).

Again, data of a more qualitative nature was available in reports describing water access and livestock status.

**Liban – what the secondary data indicate about CMDRR community resilience**

As with the Arero data, comparisons were made between CMDRR communities and non CMDRR communities (standardised on a per capita basis) – using the averages for each of the two groups of communities, and averages weighted by population size (see Table 4 below). The results suggest that the three CMDRR communities have slightly lower numbers of at-risk people but slightly higher rates of malnutrition. However, the differences are small and not statistically significant, given a sample size of 3 CMDRR communities. A table showing the Liban woreda data is attached at Appendix 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Liban woreda, 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A comparison of kebele drought resilience using proxy variables on a per capita basis</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community averages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDRR (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-CMDRR (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Averages weighted by population size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDRR (16% of population)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-CMDRR (84% of population)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nor do the more qualitative assessments made by district officials present a very clear picture. Hadhesse (one of the CMDRR communities) is listed as one of 7 communities where the lack of rainfall was most acute (Liban woreda drought assessment June 2011). Kersamele is named as one of several places where water points (three hand pumps) "have not been maintained because of insufficient local capacity". “Unusual migration” from Kersamele to Gorodola district was reported, as well in-coming migrants from other districts to Hadhesse (also a CMDRR community) with a large concentration of livestock there because its recently rehabilitated pond had collected small amounts of water. Ten communities are listed as needing emergency water rationing, including two CMDRR communities (Hadhesse and Dhekekel). Both those communities are also in a list of 11 communities where further maintenance of cisterns and gutters was needed.

In discussion, the district water officer judged the effect of the drought to have been particularly bad in Dhekakale and Kersemale (and in 2 other communities) and quite bad in two other communities, including Hadhesse, where there were apparently a lot of livestock deaths – suggesting that the three CMDRR communities were among the six most drought-affected communities in Liban woreda. However, in discussion, the local Drought Prevention and Preparedness Officer named three different communities as
the worst-affected. He also commented that SoS-Sahel was late in acting, nonetheless acknowledging that the appeal was late.\footnote{It is understood that in both Kenya and Ethiopia, the NGOs were advocating for the Governments to declare an emergency for some time before those official declarations were forthcoming.}

The researcher tried to probe the extent of variable capacities to organise for the drought and the emergency response, at community-level. The vice-administrator of the Liban district suggested only that differences in capacity reflected the capability of the government officer in the community. In closing however, possibly in deference to the presence of the SoS-Sahel officer in the meeting, his assistant commented that some communities had coping mechanisms “..because of the example set by SoS-Sahel (enclosures, water projects etc.)…”

**Liban woreda – what the CMDRR communities said about their own resilience**

The Ethiopian researcher visited two of the three CMDRR communities in Liban woreda. In focus group discussions he asked community members to rate several different indicators of resilience – comparing their situation before CMDRR facilitation and after. (He used proportional piling, as described above). See Table 5 below.

As in Arero, these respondents clearly felt that the CMDRR assistance was very positive – and this is not necessarily contradictory to the secondary data analysis. Whilst the latter enables comparison between CMDRR and non-CMDRR communities, it does not take account of pre-drought community resource endowments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Dhakaqala</th>
<th>Qarsamale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forced livestock sell-off take *</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charcoal and fire wood sales *</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasture carrying capacity</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range condition</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water availability &amp; quality</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work load on women from fetching water</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The questions marked * related to how the cash-for-work activities had affected “forced” sales.

**Liban woreda – what these data mean overall**

As in Arero, the data reveal no obvious difference between CMDRR and non-CMDRR communities (since the small differences observed are not statistically significant). The more qualitative commentary by officials reveals that CMDRR communities were badly affected by the drought and in need of remedial measures and maintenance of water infrastructure, in common with non-CMDRR communities.

Nevertheless, the communities themselves value highly the CMDRR assistance as indicated in their “before” and “after” assessments of various resilience-related indicators.
Q4. What lessons can be drawn (with reference to the CMDRR approach) and what can be improved to further increase communities’ resilience?

Good community facilitation is a highly skilled activity; the initial training required and the need for an ongoing process of top-up training and shared learning can serve to develop and motivate key field staff and encourage critical thinking that will help strengthen CMDRR.

Related to this is the finding that the CMDRR approach (and time allocated) is not standard across all implementing partners. Although the delivery of the training and the whole of the CMDRR process is very important, some communities in Kenya went through the training for two days, others three and others seven days. It was clear that those who had seven days training could remember the content and process very well, whilst those who had two or three days could not. In both countries, in community meetings, it often felt as if the CMDRR committee were getting capacity-building, but it was not necessarily evident that this went further. Consideration should be given to a more standardised approach. As Mike Wekesa (the Kenyan consultant) said:

“For example, LEGS (Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards) has a standardized approach and materials to be used by all trainers. The duration and material to be covered is well-defined and the trainers accredited by the LEGS project. There are no shortcuts. A person in Turkana will have undergone the same training as one who trained in Moyale or Marsabit with a different trainer. It is important to achieve greater standardisation of the CMDRR training, training materials, methodology, duration and trainers.”

Monitoring, evaluation and shared learning seems to be the “weak link” in the CMDRR process – particularly at project (Cordaid/partner) level. More robust learning mechanisms would strengthen the approach and its results by helping identify (and therefore focus on) the interventions and intervention strategies that are most sustainable and most effective, and identifying the conditions for success. Discussions with Cordaid staff and partners indicate an unfulfilled intention to develop monitoring and evaluation processes within target communities – but apparently relatively little consideration of the importance of doing this at programme level. Also, the “soft skills” aspect of capacity-building (with positive spin-offs in multiple directions and over time) requires particularly thoughtful monitoring if impact is to be demonstrated unambiguously. As the quantitative analysis above demonstrates, although there is little question that the communities value the CMDRR process, it is difficult to demonstrate a clear link between CMDRR and reduced need for food aid.

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23 In Mike Wekesa’s view, some quite major changes would substantially improve the CMDRR process. Noting that the right process will lead to the right outcome, he suggested that 7 days training should not result in the development of a Community Action Plan. Rather, it should just be the beginning of working with the community. A more coherent and standardized process of follow-up training and capacity building should last at least 6 months before the action plan is formulated and any financial or physical investments injected into the community. There are two advantages to this. First, community strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats can be identified. If they lose interest in the capacity building, then it will be clear that they were more driven by the resources they could attract than by a genuine interest in changing the way they do things pertaining to risk reduction. A second possible advantage is that the capacities will be there before they receive resources, so they will be in a better position to reflect on exactly what they want to do. The Action Plan would come after six months of capacity build and training. A counter-argument to this approach might be that the communities actually “learn by doing” (rather than learn first, “do” later) and the CAPs are probably quite motivating for the communities. Moreover, the scarcest resources are in fact the facilitation skills and time spent by the NGO in the community, which with this approach would be in even greater demand. Nevertheless the approach has some merits and some elements of it could be considered. The Nairobi and Addis Ababa meetings certainly confirmed that the approach is not uniform. In Nairobi, participants confirmed this openly, whilst in Addis Ababa, participants strongly denied that the CMDRR approach was applied inconsistently, but the range of answers they gave to a closed question (no conferring permitted) on time spent with communities, showed that, indeed, in practice, the application of CMDRR varies widely.
Linked to monitoring is the observation that there is sometimes scope for considerably more timely follow-up by the NGO with the community. The entire CMDRR process is about coaching/mentoring and facilitation but sometimes this is absent at critical junctures. One such time is when inputs are being acquired to implement community plans. Sometimes the inputs are delivered but the project is not completed within the planned timeframe; more follow-up at this point could avert such a situation.

There is no question that building resilience takes time. However, the study reveals that there is considerable scope for a more structured approach to timelines and milestones (there seem to be no norms and standards for what community-level achievements should be expected within a given timeframe) – and progressive “graduation” of communities to different types of assistance. Such a process would link closely with the monitoring system. (See a fuller discussion of this in final section of report).

The CMDRR process is not well-served by short-term projects. A lot of the recent CMDRR funding in both countries has taken the form of 12-18 month projects. Longer term funding is required and a strategic process which allows for longer term capacity-building of partners and communities, more reflection, and a community, once “enrolled”, to be followed²⁴.

Some partners argued that illiteracy is a key constraint to the development of community capacities – though others argued that communities were able to adequately plan and call to account on the basis of their diagrams and pictures. AFD in Ethiopia has funding from other sources for work on functional literacy. Kenya has a policy on education in pastoralist communities but apparently limited funding. Some stakeholders view it as an issue that will disappear with time, as the younger generation receive better schooling. In the view of the author, Cordaid and its partners should link with other organisations, if the opportunity arises, to address this issue – both because of its potential effect on how CMDRR is used and owned within the community, but also because of the way it links critically to livelihood diversification opportunities and empowerment more broadly.

Women are undoubtedly under-represented in the field teams. Again, there were mixed views on how important this is, but it is generally held that women facilitators will be more effective in facilitating the participation of women in community programmes, particularly in relatively conservative communities. Building on Jeccodd’s experience in Ethiopia, the present author suggests that Cordaid and its partners seek to redress this.

²⁴ This point seems to have been recognised since it is understood that the funding proposal under consideration at present is for a five year programme.
3 Partner Organisation Preparedness

This section addresses key questions relating to partner organisations’ preparedness (see the partner organisation questions 1-5 in the Terms of Reference at Appendix 1).

Q1. To what extent are the CMDRR/DCM partner organisations better able to deal with the drought relief situation?

Everyone to whom this question was put – whether field or “head office” based - gave a very similar and resoundingly positive response. As one NGO officer said:

“Our capacity to respond comes from the strength of the community.”

The prior contact with the communities (the drought mitigation phase of drought cycle management) means that the implementing partners are well-connected with the communities. Several people responded by saying “there is trust” and “we are all working on drought, discussing emergencies and hazards”, so working together is easier and natural, compared with an NGO commencing relief work in a community where there has been little or no prior contact. The facilitation process fosters community ownership and acceptance – and the communities take more responsibility themselves. In the CMDRR work in Ethiopia there is considerable emphasis on forecasting and the committees have their own forecasters. So in the preparedness phase, there is synergy between the efforts and perspectives of different stakeholders (stemming from the prior analysis and planning) and the community plans can be activated, with strong community commitment. Again, this is much easier than in communities where the planning only begins once a drought is forewarned. Partners in Kenya estimated that this degree of “preparedness” meant that they were able to mobilise much quicker, with a lead time of 3-4 months over other organisations.

When the drought comes, moving into the relief phase of the DCM, the organisational structures are already in place to manage and monitor the relief assistance (“...they know their part” as one NGO officer put it). The more vulnerable members of the community have already been identified. The committees feel empowered – sufficiently (in one example) to actually measure the amount of trucked water delivered (they knew the size of their storage tanks) and then only sign for the amount delivered (which was less than contracted). The more successful communities in Kenya indicated that they are drought resilient for longer – so presumably need less relief assistance, enabling the NGOs to allocate resources to those who have been harder hit.

Similarly, when the time comes to re-build after the drought, the stronger CMDRR communities have already planned what needs to done – and if those plans need to be changed, then there is already the experience and habit of co-review and co-planning. This again makes the NGO’s task easier.

Q2. To what extent have the partner organisations’ early warning mechanisms provided timely warnings for the government?

The partner organisations do not have their own early warning systems – they work with both the traditional systems and the government systems. To some extent the NGO partners play a valuable mediating role in making sure the communities with which they work are aware of the “official” forecast (or other prior information available) and can help them interpret this alongside their own traditional forecasts. In Ethiopia, it was noted that the early warning information flow was more from communities “upwards” rather than from federal-level down. In both countries, it is understood that Cordaid and the implementing partners were advocating for the declaration of an emergency before the official declaration was made.
In Ethiopia, there are local committees that bring together different stakeholders and allow for sharing of information between the traditional systems and government systems. However, in many areas these committees are not functioning very well and in general, the traditional early warning systems do not carry much weight within the public administration. This is also the case in Kenya. The original intention to facilitate a process by which the traditional forecasts might contribute to the government forecast has thus not been possible.

In Kenya, the NGOs participate in joint district-level needs assessments with government officers, but this follows a standard check-list and questionnaire.

Nonetheless the inclusion of this early warning component in the CMDRR process is useful – because in general the NGOs are able to raise the alert earlier and help the communities interpret the various different signals.

The only mechanism where the community/partner informed government was the Conflict Early Warning System being practiced by the FunanQumbi and Turbi communities (Kenya) in close collaboration with the Provincial Administration and police force based in Turbi. The community has field monitors who look out for strangers in the rangelands who either want to raid or make illegal use of community pastures. These monitors report any suspicious movements to the CMDRR committee which in turn relays this message to Turbi. The Turbi CMDRR committee will quickly liaise with the administration, who then send police to the area. This has helped keep the communities alert at all times and reduced criminal activity in the rangelands.  

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**Q 3. How have the organisations been able to prepare themselves and the communities they work with for the drought phase?**

In Kenya, implementing partners listed a number of preparatory actions, described below.  

- Hazard analysis and early warning: CIFA noted that the original hazard analysis undertaken at community-level is then supplemented by information from the government early warning system and FEWSNET, and used in a facilitated participatory review of other signals and frequencies, to help alert the community to the impending drought.  

- Intensified communication and information sharing: the partner organizations intensified communication and information sharing with the communities they work with as well as other partners working in the same communities. Information on how the situation is unfolding and what needs to be done is exchanged more regularly than in normal times. During this period also, there are more regular District Steering Group meetings (government-convened) to discuss how to turn the district contingency plans into action.  

- Reviewing the Community Action Plan (CAP)/Contingency Plan with the communities: during the preparedness phase the Community Action Plan is reviewed with communities and an action plan to address the impending drought developed.  

- Appointing a reference point within the organization: this ensured that all organizations and community members knew who to link up with in the organization to avoid confusion.

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25 In Dire Dawe there is also an extremely effective community-based early warning system focused on flash floods.
- Resource Audit: this was undertaken within the organization and at the community level. For example if water was to be trucked to a community, does the community have storage? If CIFA or PISP’s lorry was not in good condition, can it be put back on the road and at what cost? Who else would participate in the implementation of the CAP or contingency plan? What gaps has the audit identified and how can they be filled so that the requisite resources to be in place in good time?

In Ethiopia, although the impending drought may be recognised, some of the consequent actions depend on the timing of the government declaration of an emergency situation.

- Before the emergency is declared, a consortium of NGOs will call a management meeting to share information about the drought and plan special measures to raise funds and make donor visits. This helps to ensure that funding is timely\(^\text{26}\).

- In a severe drought, the Ethiopian Government establishes a national task force, which is then echoed at zonal- and district-level. With participation from government and civil society, this assists with information sharing and co-ordination among development actors. During the emergency, the Government is closely involved and the NGOs are able to provide CMDRR training to government officers. (NGO partners had mixed views, however, on the functionality and timeliness of the task force system, suggesting some variability in its performance in different places).

- Ideally, in the CMDRR communities, there will have been prior preparations such as construction or repair of water harvesting structures, preparation of local co-operative stores or co-operative purchase of grain before the prices escalate. However, no relief water or food can be moved until the official declaration of an emergency. (In addition, water trucking must reflect government recommendations, based on priority-setting. The role of the zonal task force is central to this).

**Q4. How are the partner organisations performing in the relief phase?**

In both countries, despite its stresses, partners felt that they had coped in a timely fashion with the requirements of the relief phase and, on balance, communities were satisfied.

Predictably, there were some similarities in the issues faced by partners in both Ethiopia and Kenya. These included the sourcing and/or mobilisation of the necessary finance, staff and logistics to support the relief operation. At times the task seemed quite overwhelming with staff resources severely stretched to cover logistics, community-level support, co-ordination with other development actors, dealing with contractors, complying with the requirements of different procurement systems for different interventions, and so on. In Ethiopia, partners reported that recruitment in areas outside the NGOs’ core competence was quite a challenge (i.e., recruiting to run relief operations, whereas these NGOs are primarily development actors), as was the need to work with new partners and agencies. In Kenya, community-level work (pushing the communities to reflect on what were there highest priorities) helped ensure that only the most appropriate, timely and effective interventions were implemented.

NGO partners in Ethiopia commented that there were some delays relating to raising and disbursing funds, the official declaration of the emergency and sourcing food purchases and transport. It was suggested too that more resources for water and food relief would have been helpful (though this observation should

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\(^{26}\) See later discussion on this. Some of the NGO partners in Ethiopia commented that there had been repeated delays in receipt of CMDRR funding and some of the relief funds, but in a meeting in Addis Ababa with the consultant (5th December 2011), the NGOs said the relief funds were largely received on time.
perhaps be weighed against the extent to which the NGOs’ relief implementation capacities were severely stretched, by their own account).

**Q 5. What lessons can be drawn and what can be improved to further increase their preparedness?**

The partner organisations found themselves very stretched during the drought – and were acutely aware that they were working in an area outside their core competence. Timeliness was of the essence – the requirements were urgent. There was recruitment to cover these new tasks but this could have happened to a greater extent, leaving other staff free to continue, e.g., community-level work, where the need was still pressing. Although most of the learning will inevitably be “learning by doing”, the author suggests that there may be scope for some prior training / sensitisation to help the NGOs develop strategies earlier for a rather different way of working during the emergency. (The NGOs themselves would undoubtedly have suggestions on the issues that should covered). This seems to apply more in Ethiopia than in Kenya. In the Nairobi workshop, participants felt strongly that the NGOs were all accustomed to emergency operations.

In both countries, having the resources in the right place at the right time was critical during the drought. In some cases, more could have been done earlier to identify/screen contractors, repair vehicles and so on.

In Ethiopia, partners commented that FAO had warned of the El Nino effect significantly earlier but the international funds came only once the drought had hit. They suggested that a reserve fund, to draw on before the main funding arrived, would have been helpful.

More flexibility in funding was also requested by partners – partly because drought conditions rapidly gave way to floods in the last quarter of 2011. (Apparently this aspect has been addressed in the new SHO – funded project). Partners in Ethiopia commented that additional funding for food and water relief would have been helpful.

In Ethiopia, field partners noted some funding delays – both for CMDRR and the emergency programme. This can be quite de-motivating for communities who are expected to implement their plans and in an emergency, it may be critical. It can also result in inappropriate timing and use of resources (e.g., the late distribution of subsidised veterinary drugs taking place, at the end of the rainy season during the study team’s visit). This in turn can lead to “mixed messages” (support in cash or in-kind, intended for relief, being delivered after the emergency, potentially undermining the “self-help” ethos). 27

The way in which the partners help the communities prepare for drought could also be strengthened. Mike Wekesa, the Kenyan consultant, commented that CMDRR committees ought to lead community members to review different scenarios pertaining to the drought. For example, what is the status of the borehole? Will the water be enough for both humans and livestock? What is the status of the rangeland? For how long will those pastures last? Ideally this process should be undertaken in the absence of the partner

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27 A related point concerns the observation that even when activities go to schedule, the NGO finds itself being donor, whilst also promoting “self-help”. In many situations this would be very challenging, notably in relation to managing community expectations (are they interested because of the cash or input injections or because of the capacity-building?). When asked about this in Ethiopia, one partner said these different roles are very clear to the communities, who understand when and why the NGO is “wearing these different hats”. However, it was also noted that NGO field staff in Ethiopia emphasised that they really struggled with community expectations, particularly in respect of the more popular direct physical or cash benefits. This issue perhaps needs to be explored a little more – because it does strike at the heart of the process and its sustainability if community interest is more focused on short-term benefits. On the other hand, the pressure experienced by the facilitators was felt in part during a severe drought situation when relief assistance is the norm (though it was present at an earlier stage too).
organization so that the community is free to reflect and analyse its own situation, but certainly this should be encouraged. (Some of this occurs with the resource audit – but the detail at community-level is quite varied.) In fact, at this stage, the NGOs were to some extent drawn away from the communities and into their own drought preparedness activities. Mike Wekesa suggested that scenario planning would enhance preparedness.

Linked to this is the importance of encouraging communities to put aside their own resources during good times so that they can start their own interventions early, while they still look for external support. There were examples of this in the better resourced communities such as Turbi. Community members there invested in the purchase of plastic jerry cans ahead of time in order to be able to maintain mobility during the drought. They would buy water at a borehole, load this on to camels and move to where pasture would be available.

Finally, consideration should be given to how preparedness or emergency interventions can be linked to, or strengthen community access to, “fair-weather” activities and institutions. For example, is it possible to implement de-stocking (and meat distribution activities) in a way that gives the community more exposure to commercial markets and marketing options? This is not likely to be the highest priority immediately prior to or during a drought – but strategies for this could be developed in advance.
Coordination Among Development Actors

In this section, key questions relating to co-ordination among different development actors are covered, closely following the community organisation questions 1-2 posed in the Terms of Reference (see Appendix 1).

Q 1. How have the community DRR groups and partner organisations been able to co-ordinate/co-operate with the government and other NGOs in the drought preparedness/drought relief implementation?

The CMDRR process accords considerable importance to community empowerment to interact effectively with other development actors. In both Kenya and Ethiopia, there were numerous examples of how communities had managed to leverage funds from other agencies to support their development proposals (though this was also true of non-CMDRR communities\(^{28}\)). In both countries care is also taken to avoid duplication – and to co-ordinate to make sure that any identified critical gaps are filled during the drought phase. Many such examples have been highlighted in the earlier sections.

In Kenya the following co-ordination and co-operation activities take place:

- stakeholder mapping – which agency is in working where? what are they doing or plan to do there? and with whom will they do this?
- to prepare for a drought, a resource audit is conducted at district level, based on contingency plans, to assess what more is required;
- joint needs assessments are undertaken at the request of the District Steering Group with Arid Lands Resource Management Project as the lead agency; in Moyale, CIFA led the animal health and food security components; in Marsabit, PISP co-chairs the Water & Environmental Coordination (WESCOORD) meetings and participates in the food security sub-committee of the District Steering Group; CIFA also participates in the Moyale District Steering Group;
- representatives from 20 ministries in both districts attended a 10-day CMDRR Training of Trainers event in early 2010, funded by Cordaid and conducted by IIRR; this seems to have drawn favourable comment from the government staff involved;
- there also seems to be close co-ordination with other NGOs. For example, in Rawan, CIFA took over the food voucher scheme from CCS, without any hitch. In Hurri Hills PISP worked with several other NGOs including Maikona Prish, Globetree, PACIDA and others in the same village and there was good co-ordination and collaboration.

In Ethiopia there is particularly strong and officially supported interaction with Government, seen particularly in complementary public funding for community-led CMDRR proposals. ACORD field staff indicated that they provide CMDRR training to local government officers. Other examples of co-ordination among development actors in Ethiopia include:

- zonal task force and co-ordination committees to avoid duplication;
- collating data;

\(^{28}\) In 3 of the 4 CMDRR communities visited in Kenya, external funds had been leveraged (and in the 4th, they had mobilised community resources for a school). In 2 of the 6 non-CMDRR communities, they had also mobilised external resources for community projects. The remaining four communities had received assistance but had not been pro-active in seeking support for particular community-prioritised projects. In Ethiopia, the situation is different, as Government funding is available for community projects as an explicit complement to NGO support.
– arriving at agreed prices for cash-for-work, de-stocking etc (to avoid tensions arising from the different practices of different organisations); and
– lobbying at regional and federal level for the timely declaration of an emergency.

Q2. What lessons can be drawn and what can be improved?

There is clearly an explicit and largely successful emphasis on collaboration, co-ordination and information sharing between the implementing partners, other NGOs and government – with the objective of avoiding duplication and making sure that gaps are plugged. The communities are actively encouraged to lobby for the community project support from other development actors – and there are many examples of this (see previous footnote). There are local structured committee systems in place to assure co-ordination during the emergency. At the local (district) level, there appears to be a constructive rather than competitive relationship between the NGOs and a generally good relationship with government. In both countries, there is scope to improve the quality of the exchange with government at field-level – particularly with respect to CMDRR training and subsequent follow-up. (There is training of government staff but it is not clear how much follow-up there is – nor how much this is tailored to the most appropriate roles for government – which will differ in Kenya and Ethiopia and may differ between locations, depending on the government resources and priorities there. This would contribute to improved co-ordination by improving the understanding of CMDRR and may allow, in a sense, more resources (i.e., public resources) to be channelled to CMDRR).

One of the study team members noted that the various different funding sources available to NGOs working in the drought-affected areas do not work well for coordination and collaboration because each agency has its own budget and priorities/interests and can implement its plans regardless of other stakeholders. Cordaid’s regional director also commented on the plethora of funding sources and associated field programmes with which the implementing partners are engaged. A solution might lie in the creation of a common pot of funds e.g. the District Drought Contingency Fund. However, there are arguments for and against such an approach. NGOs might argue that independent funding has significant advantages where it allows for more rapid mobilisation of resources or more flexible (responsive) actions. Cordaid’s regional director suggested that Cordaid should seek closer co-ordination with the other funders supporting the same NGOs.

In Kenya, the community-county level interface is still weak and the CMDRR process may be one way of bringing different communities together and then linking them to the district or county level. This link is important especially when it comes to leveraging funds from different stakeholders.

Relating less to co-ordination per se and more to effectiveness, there is certainly scope for facilitating more exchange between communities (among CMDRR communities and perhaps between CMDRR communities and other communities too). This would promote lesson learning, may lead to some different types of interventions, help reinforce key messages and motivate CMDRR communities. There seems to be scope to do more of this within districts or zones, and between different areas with different experiences (for instance between Dire Dawa, in eastern Ethiopia and CMDRR communities in southern Ethiopia).

(There is also more scope for implementing partners – particularly field staff – to share experiences and learning. Response to a questions put in the Addis Ababa workshop suggest that some such exchange
takes place but not all field staff have benefitted (particularly where there is rapid staff turnover). There may also be scope for more of such exchange between country teams, including field staff.29)

Similarly, there may be scope for collaboration with some different development agencies to explore ways to address adult literacy (initially as a pilot). If there are not specialist providers (in government or the NGO sector) in the project area, this issue could be explored first in Nairobi or Addis Ababa (by the NGOs or by Cordaid) to see what options there might be and what delivery models have worked elsewhere. Whilst not making this a core focus, there may be ways to collaborate with other organisations on this.

An additional philosophical point that arises stems from (a) the observation that (as one commentator put it)30) “each NGO creates its own committee in the community” and (b) the apparently strong loyalties to the CMDRR approach by the NGO partners, but the observation by one that whilst CMDRR may “have the edge” many other approaches also help build community capacities to organise, plan, manage and ultimately take more responsibility for community development and DRR. In thinking about how to scale-up this rather intensive process (a topic that is discussed further in the final section of the report), the question arises as to whether there is not more scope to build on other structures and processes.

29 In the workshop in Addis Ababa, participants were keen to have Ethiopia-specific results and recommendations. However, in the view of the author, there is much to be learnt from more exchange between different groups and situations. Sometimes, a problem can seem immutable – particularly when everyone tackling it seems to have the same experience – until a completely different example is provided and the enabling conditions analysed.

30 This point was made by a government officer in Kenya. However, Kenya partners stressed that they try to build on existing organisations.
5  Is CMDRR a Good Investment?

This section addresses the key question of whether CMDRR is a good investment compared to relief (see terms of reference attached at Appendix 1). The section includes an analysis of two specific project examples, one of an overall CMDRR project and one on water supply activities.

To what extent is the funding invested in the CMDRR/DCM programmes at community-level (approximately 3 million Euro annually, for the last eight years) a good investment, compared to only relief funding?

This was Cordaid’s first question, but is discussed only now because the other questions (above) contribute to the answer.

Logic would indicate that if the CMDRR strategies to build resilience through capacities, assets and livelihoods are successful and sustainable, then CMDRR would reduce the need for external relief assistance, lead to quicker recovery after the emergency, reduce suffering and save lives, whilst strengthening and improving rural livelihoods over the long-term. It can also provide empirical evidence for advocacy and policy change, regarding the importance and promotion of CMDRR. It does much more than deliver short-term assistance (relief).

A positive answer to this question hinges on the achievement, effectiveness and sustainability of planned outputs and outcomes, as well as the ability to (a) measure or value the outcomes and impacts and (b) attribute those outcomes and impacts to CMDRR.

Many dimensions of resilience are real and important, but in practice difficult to measure:

- some dimensions of resilience are intangible\(^{31}\) (e.g., a community’s cohesiveness and its ability to plan, prioritise, manage, implement, and monitor and evaluate);
- some tangible dimensions are nonetheless very difficult to measure (e.g., the need for emergency assistance, because although the assistance received can be measured reasonably accurately this is not necessarily a very precise reflection of need at community-level\(^{32}\));
- resilience develops incrementally but may “show itself” only at irregular, unexpected and/or critical junctures (e.g., in the confidence of the community that measured the trucked water it received, or the determination of the community which can fix its flood-damaged pond); at a single point in time, it may be very difficult to observe resilience enough to have some indication of the extent of resilience;
- although effort focused on building resilience implies an improving trajectory, in practice resilience can increase or decrease (e.g., the capacity to organise and plan may improve for a while, but be insufficiently embedded to withstand the departure of some key members of the community); some

\(^{31}\) Wikipedia provides a legal definition of intangible assets as: identifiable non-monetary assets that cannot be seen, touched or physically measured, which are created through time and/or effort and that are identifiable as a separate asset. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intangible_asset](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intangible_asset) Last accessed 15th January 2012.

\(^{32}\) When the study team asked about using emergency assistance data, the general view from many different stakeholders in both countries was that (a) although available, it would be difficult to obtain community-level data, but (b) more importantly, they would not necessarily give a precise indication of community-level needs. Similarly, nutritional data by community would be difficult to obtain (and not consistently available) and interpret (time lags, the influence of other health issues etc.). In practice (as explored in the section on community resilience), it was possible to obtain data on the number of at-risk people (to receive food aid for Liban and Arero woredas, in Ethiopia – but this did not reveal any clear relationship between CMDRR and reduced food aid needs.)
dimensions of resilience may improve, whilst others worsen (e.g., new livelihood opportunities may help diversify the local economy, whilst water access may deteriorate because of a falling water-table, caused by numerous factors), making it difficult to discern the net effect; or communities may become polarised with different resilience trajectories (some members engaging in “new” livelihoods may become more resilient, whilst others – often the poorest – may see their resilience further weakened); and

- resilience takes time to develop and in a short timeframe of 1-2 years (particularly if severely tested by a drought in this period), some foundations may be there, but there may be very few indicators of resilience to drought.

In trying to answer the question of whether CMDRR is a good investment, compared to just relief funding, the focus has necessarily been on measureable factors. A narrow consideration of whether food aid needs are reduced in the light of CMDRR (see the analysis of data from Liban and Arero in the section on community resilience) revealed no clear differences. (The observed differences, based on a small sample size, were small and not statistically significant). A cost comparison based on specific interventions (e.g., water source development and management) is possible but, in many senses this misses the point, because some of the most important dimensions of CMDRR are those that are hardest to measure. Indeed, some of the “soft skills” that are hard to measure, are critical to the successful management of the more visible community investments. However, if the impact / effect of the CMDRR approach can be “proven” on those tangible components, other benefits are additional and only strengthen the CMDRR case.

First (see Example 1 below), the cost of a recent CMDRR programme was taken and compared with what that amount would “buy” in relief assistance. Successful communities in Kenya estimate that they gained 3-4 months drought resilience\(^{33}\) as a result of CMDRR. If the CMDRR programme cost is equal to the cost of 3-4 months relief assistance (assuming that additional resilience translates into less need for relief assistance), this means that CMDRR is at least as cost-effective as “relief only”. If it costs less than 3-4 months relief assistance, then the approach is more cost-effective than “relief only”.

Next, the cost of a single component of a CMDRR programme was taken and compared with the cost of providing that service (water supply, see Example 2 below) by other means.

In both cases, if the number of beneficiaries is achieved (in Example 1, a deliberately more conservative number was used than that mentioned in the project reports and proposals), then it appears that the investments in the more successful communities are at least as cost-effective as relief and most probably (taking account of other benefits not measured, or which develop over time) more cost-effective. Expressed differently, over a short period and based only on the short-run outcomes, during which a direct comparison with “relief only” is possible (because a drought occurred), the investments appear to be cost-effective in the more successful communities (i.e., those in Kenya that claimed to be resilient for 3-4 months longer\(^{34}\)).

Although this approach seems to ignore some of the most important “soft skill” development aspects of resilience, in practice (and as noted above) what it means is that any additional benefits not captured in this rather short timeframe approach will improve the result (i.e., strengthen the case for CMDRR).

\(^{33}\) See the introductory section on how communities (and others) define resilience.

\(^{34}\) Of the 4 CMDRR communities visited in Kenya, one claimed that it had gained 6-7 months more resilience (FunanQumbi). Turbi and Namerei seemed to have gained an additional 3-4 months resilience, whilst performance in Hurri Hills was much weaker.
However, it is not clear how cost-effective the cumulative investments have been. If past projects and their tangible outputs have performed as well (and been tested by a drought situation in which savings were made in relief operations as a result of the CMDRR “resilience”), then similar results might obtain. But if investment in capacity-building occurred over several years and projects, and its benefits were only reaped in the most recent drought, then the cost-effectiveness equation might look a little different – particularly as some of the earlier projects were quite large. In this case, it will take longer (and require much richer data) to show a positive return on those larger and cumulative investments. Also, in the workshop in Nairobi, participants suggested (with the agreement of the Cordaid CMDRR programme coordinator) that 30-40% of CMDRR projects work very well (“were successful” – with the remainder “having potential for resilience or just beginning”) if this is indeed the case, then this reduces the cost-effectiveness of the investment in CMDRR.

The switch to a focus on fewer communities (in order to “intensively implement the findings of the [Binas and Savi 2010] report”) seems to be an acknowledgement of the need for a more concerted community-level approach, suggesting that earlier investments were not meeting expectations. Cordaid’s report to ECHO (September 2010, p52) refers to an external evaluation which stressed:

- the need to allow more time and “work at the pace of the community”;
- “implementation of DRR requires a relatively longer time”, and
- “...[creating] resilient communities...requires work and a lot of effort on behavioural and attitude change and skills development. All the communities and partners visited indicated it was a challenging task to accomplish within the given project period.”
- so, the answer to the “good investment” question is rather nuanced:
- some of the investment seems to have been successful (as weighed against support for relief only), but that is not evident in all cases; a more systematic focus on monitoring, evaluation and learning, linked to timelines and milestones (see final section) would help the CMDRR project to remain focused on the most effective and sustainable interventions, whilst allowing communities to “graduate” to different types of assistance as they progress, thereby permitting resources to be directed to the more successful interventions and intervention strategies;
- a focus on the word “investment” is useful – CMDRR is a long-term capacity-building process and the investment may only “pay-off” over the long-term;
- nevertheless, there seems to be considerable consensus and some evidence that the approach has some important merits; a stronger focus on learning (above) would yield a stronger (measurable) return on the investment; similarly, this can also be promoted by giving more consideration to how CMDRR might be scaled-up / scaled-out (notwithstanding the existing strong emphasis by Cordaid on CMDRR profiling, networking and publications).

Note that the study has not investigated the performance of CMDRR compared with investments in other community-facilitating, capacity-building approaches. Although these were widely evident and had been introduced into some of the communities visited by the study team, the costs and benefits of these

35 Two ECHO-funded projects totalling nearly Euros 5 million in 2008 and 2009. See Appendix 7.


37 There is also an understandable tendency on the part of CMDRR advocates to show-case some dramatic successes. E.g., during the Nairobi workshop, a low cost facilitation intervention (360,000 Ksh) was highlighted, having enabled access to grazing lands that had been off-limits since 1967, thereby saving 53,000 head of cattle (worth Euro 10 million). This was complemented by increasing the capacity for a borehole emergency tank (at a cost 800,000 Ksh). Examples such as these are very powerful, but the costs are inappropriate because (a) they ignore all the cumulative programme costs and support that made the “low-cost” intervention possible and (b) they are, by definition, the exceptions (CMDRR funding is also directed to activities with more modest results).
approaches were not a major focus. As noted above, however, they certainly have elements in common with CMDRR – both in terms of facilitation and the focus on community-level capacities and investments.

**Example 1: overall CMDRR project**

The 18-month CMDRR project funded by ECHO, starting mid-2010, had planned costs of Euros 1.88 million, for 25 communities in Kenya and Ethiopia (July 2011 Cordaid report). To avoid problems of double-counting beneficiaries (the report presents beneficiary numbers for each type of intervention), a simplifying assumption is made that average community size is 2000 and within each community, 50% benefit from the CMDRR project. That means that the cost of intervening is about Euros 75 per beneficiary or Euros 75,000 per community.

How does this compare with the cost of providing relief assistance? Oxfam-GB (Horn of Africa Emergency Appeal[^38]) states that the cost of feeding a family of 6 for 2 weeks is GBP 50 (Euros 60) – roughly E 0.7 per person per day. The World Food Program, in its East Africa appeal[^39], states that US$0.5 (E 0.4) will feed a hungry woman or child for one day. (It is not clear if these costs include full administrative costs[^40].

So the cost per beneficiary for 18 months of CMDRR support is equivalent to the cost of food aid for one person for somewhere between 3 and 6 months (or less if administrative costs are not included in the food aid costs). Emergency assistance costs, moreover, are more than just food aid. Water is often needed too – and medicines for people or animals. This means that the CMDRR investment would cost less than the cost of delivering between 3 and 6 months relief assistance.

CMDRR interventions do not obviate the need for emergency assistance in very severe conditions (such as the recent drought). Indeed, subsequent emergency proposals were made in 2011 by Cordaid to ECHO for 9 and 6 months for Kenya and Ethiopia respectively. However, the more successful communities report that they were resilient for longer (3-4 months in Kenya) as a result of CMDRR support and if that means that those communities did not need emergency assistance in that period, CMDRR looks like a worthwhile investment. The case is made stronger still, if when emergency assistance was required, the need was less than it would have been in the absence of CMDRR, or if recovery was quicker, CMDRR benefits endured (as intended) or beneficiary numbers were higher than assumed here. Conversely, if the success rate is lower (as participants in the Nairobi workshop indicated), the CMDRR case appears weaker.

Focusing on CMDRR components that build livelihoods, assets and community organisation and management skills – all of which can, in principle, endure beyond the project life – is a key determinant of project success and “value for money”. The implementing partners (and the CMDRR proposal that commenced mid-2010) are now focusing on a smaller number of communities. In basing the above calculations on the costs of the project that began mid-2010, it is assumed that the stated outputs for that particular project were achieved. Those investments seem to have a fairly short pay-back period, but it is noted that the CMDRR assistance has been cumulative, over a number of years and projects – and those earlier costs have not been taken into consideration in the above calculations. (For instance, a larger


[^40]: These organisations, whilst not misrepresenting the data, will probably try to demonstrate low costs, because that is more likely to attract private donations; so it could be assumed that these publicised costs either reflect lower cost delivery situations or average costs. In either case, the cost of delivering food aid to a remote rural community in Kenya or Ethiopia is likely to be higher and the cost of delivering a package of emergency assistance (i.e., not just food aid) higher still.
project for 18 months (both countries) and Euros 3.6 million started mid-2008 – apparently covering a larger group of communities, including some of those still retained in the project that started mid-2010).

**Example 2: water supply**

Cost of planned intervention/ beneficiary (Cordaid report to ECHO, July 2011, p23): Euro 14

Whereas:

- Cost of emergency water trucking (Kenya field work), K Sh 0.5-2.5/litre (E 0.09-0.45 / 20 litre); (costs vary depending on the location of the water source, community and transport)
- Fuel costs of running a borehole (i.e., excluding construction and maintenance): K Sh 2.5/20 litres (Rawan, Moyale District, Kenya) equivalent to E 0.45 / 20 litre;
- Average price (for illustrative purposes only) across urban and peri-urban water vendors in Kenya: K Sh 6.43/20 litre (E 0.06 / 20 litre) and the average price of piped water in urban Kenya: K Sh 3.56 / 20 litre (E 0.03 / 20 litre). (Hailu et al., 2011 – authors’ surveys).

The WHO recommended daily per capita water requirement is 20 litres, so E 14 would “buy”:

- sufficient trucked water for one person for 1 – 5 months (depending on cost)
- sufficient borehole water (fuel costs only) for one person for 1 month
- sufficient purchased water (urban) for one person for nearly 8 months, or
- sufficient piped water (urban) for one person for nearly 16 months.

CMDRR water supply looks like a good buy compared with the costs of trucked or borehole water - particularly if the improved water supply (for instance via pans or rock or roof catchment systems) lasts beyond one season and reaches the intended number of beneficiaries.\(^\text{41}\) (One community explained that cash for work to develop 2 pans would save them 3 months fuel costs for the borehole; another CMDRR community estimated that if they rationed the water from the pan, they could avoid “running” the borehole for 6-7 months).

These costs comparisons are, however, very simplistic. Trucked water is often not available or too costly. In practice, communities with insufficient water for themselves or their animals will often “make do” by walking long distances to fetch water, rationing water at household-level and using poor quality water – adding to work burdens and increasing exposure to disease through poor sanitation or dirty water. Communities with improved water supply experience health and reduced workload benefits (and are able to sustain larger herds). In addition, the community capacities to implement and manage a water project are transferrable skills which, in the best of cases, can be applied to other community development initiatives. Even if the community still needs some subsequent capacity development in organising and managing projects, the marginal costs of subsequent projects should be less.

If the projects are unsuccessful or the work needs to be re-done (as may be the case with some of the Ethiopian ponds), the costs will be higher, underlining the importance of cross-learning and review to identify the more successful water interventions strategies.

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\(^{41}\) Note that this cost comparison does not take account of different accounting periods and discount rates that would usually be used in cost/benefit analysis. This is because the projects are quite short and benefits realised quickly, so discounting will not make a major difference to the results. If benefits endure, then the results will be better.
6 Conclusions, Discussion and Recommendations

This section presents the main conclusions, discussion topics and recommendations coming from the research. These relate both to the overall and specific research questions (“to what extent has the CMDRR / DCM approach contributed positively to more drought resilient communities in the light of the current drought, and what can still be done (by communities, partner organisations, government, Cordaid and others) to further increase the communities’ resilience?”), and to the core thesis of the research (“the CMDRR / DCM approach is the most economic and sustainable approach to build the resilience of communities in areas suffering from recurring droughts”).

Conclusions

Has Cordaid's DCM/CMDRR work contributed to building more resilient communities?

The earlier sections provide examples of how Cordaid's work has contributed to the development of capacities, long-term assets and livelihoods for greater drought resilience at community-level. Initiatives in many of these CMDRR communities are testimony to their:

- capacities to plan, manage, implement and monitor community projects;
- capacities to leverage external funding and assistance;
- capacities to mobilise community resources;
- capacities to identify and protect or develop vulnerable groups;
- capacities to manage payments and funds for community projects;
- capacities for foresight and timely mitigating actions
- capacities to monitor and resolve conflict, to improve access to other pastures;
- development of infrastructure that improves their ability to cope with drought (e.g., water supply projects, including water catchment systems, ponds and wells); and
- development of livelihoods, to reduce dependence on a single income source (e.g., more commercially oriented animal husbandry, women's savings and credit groups, and the development of non-timber forest product enterprise).

Predictably though, performance is not uniform across all communities – reflecting the length of engagement, to some extent, but also other factors that are specific to each community. In some cases there has been quite rapid progress towards greater resilience (e.g., FunanQumbi) whilst in other communities progress has been much slower (e.g., Hurri Hills).

In some cases, it is not clear what would be sustained if support were withdrawn, because all the CMDRR communities visited (11 in total) were still receiving support. Cosgrave and Wata (2009, on Ethiopia, p26) also raise serious concerns about sustainability (“the biggest problem facing many of the Cordaid funded projects”).

42 Cosgrave and Wata, 2009, p 26, noted that a group in Ethiopia described the potential closure of existing NGO programmes as a livelihood shock similar to a bad cattle raid.

43 In February 2012, the possibility of visiting previously supported CMDRR communities was explored. There was insufficient time to visit South Omo, but the lead consultant made a day-trip to Dire Dawa to meet with members of the CMDRR association there, which is considered very strong. Whilst there may be some rather special factors leading to the development of such a strong community organisation in Dire Dawa (particularly dynamic personalities and a common concern in preventing the re-occurrence of the flash floods that happen suddenly with dramatic and tragic consequences – as opposed to gradual on-set drought conditions), the group is inspirational in its example.
There are cases where CMDRR has clearly been the catalyst for the greater community resilience (e.g., turning round poorly managed water supply initiatives so that they are run by committees, enforcing agreed bye-laws, and collecting and banking revenue) – but such achievements, whilst not commonplace, are not unique to the CMDRR communities.

But as one CMDRR facilitator put it: “we see impacts – we just don’t see resilience”. His insights were useful:

- CMDRR is a continuous process, for which long-term funding is needed; you can’t build resilience in a year!
- It’s ambitious – particularly for poor and remote rural communities -but it is do-able
- Resilience needs other inputs too – schools, health centres, telephones and roads
- With complementary inputs and a sustained process, it’s possible to achieve some resilience within 3 years.

These comments seem to sum up the key issues – this takes time, it’s hard, and it needs more than CMDRR to achieve resilience. But there are definitely impacts and progress towards resilience – as earlier sections in this report have illustrated.

**Is CMDRR a cost-effective approach?**

As discussed in the previous section, the answer to this question is quite nuanced: in effect, “it depends...” It depends on the rate of success (numbers of beneficiaries reached and the sustainability of the impacts), the costs (whether sequential projects should be counted cumulatively or just more recent ones) and the value of benefits that are hard to measure in the short-run (capacity-building and its spin-off effects in community resource mobilisation and sustainable demand-led well-managed community projects).

A short duration project whose impacts are quickly realised (through for instance reduced dependence on food aid or water trucking) is clearly cost-effective – but where those achievements took longer (and more resources) to be realised, or where the success rate was lower, the picture is more ambiguous – particularly in the absence of evidence on long-run spin-off benefits.

The 30-40% success rate proposed by the Nairobi workshop participants suggests that a key factor in improving cost-effectiveness is increasing that rate.

It is also perhaps useful to reflect back to Cordaid an oft-expressed sentiment that, again, has implications for cost-effectiveness. Many individuals and organisations working on DRR sometimes express frustration with the way in which CMDRR advocates promote it energetically, without apparently recognising the strengths of other approaches and what those approaches have in common with CMDRR. More willingness to embrace some aspects of those approaches might contribute to greater cost-effectiveness by:

- reducing the present tendency to be rather “purist” about the CMDRR approach, which in turn limits its application – rather than recognising the strengths (some of them shared) of other approaches too;
- permitting more scope for innovation; and
- contributing to the development of some shared “standards” or targets for (more) resilient communities.
More willingness to recognise the strengths in other approaches might contribute to a richer debate and greater critical mass (for DRR) and hence more impact at scale (see below).

**Research thesis:** *The CMDRR / DCM approach is the most economic and sustainable approach to build the resilience of communities in areas suffering from recurring droughts*.

The results support a conclusion that the CMDRR / DCM can help build community resilience but there is insufficient evidence to say if it is the most economic or sustainable approach. Certainly CMDRR focuses on capacities and infrastructure that should contribute to improved resilience. There is also evidence that drought management interventions have better outcomes if the communities are involved in prior planning (particularly preparation of drought contingency plans, see Section II and Zwaagstra et al., 2010) – and this involvement (indeed community ownership and management) is a corner stone of CMDRR.

At present, there is very little evidence on sustainability because little is known about community resilience "post-project". It does appear, though, that CMDRR assistance is required for a long time (several years) and even then, resilience may be elusive. (Most workshop participants considered that it takes a very long time to build resilience – from three years to a lifetime).

There is clearly very strong current interest in DRR approaches as a way to reduce dependence on emergency assistance, coupled with recognition that DRR, where it leads to less need for relief, is a more economic option. This is reflected in, for instance, the recent shift in policy in Ethiopia towards DRR. In the course of the present study, many stakeholders (including those who are closely acquainted with CMDRR and with other DRR approaches) noted that CMDRR and other DRR approaches have much in common. Recognising the strengths of these various approaches (both shared and different strengths) contributes to a richer understanding of what works and why, and helps build a critical mass and community of practice in support of the impacts that DRR en masse can deliver. Conversely, an exclusive focus on one approach may detract from on-going innovation and from a more pragmatic impact-driven joint effort to implement with a broader menu of what works and why, to build resilience at sufficient scale to make a difference.

**Discussion**

**Monitoring, evaluation and learning**

Although Cordaid is an active and substantively contributing member of REGLAP, monitoring, evaluation and learning still needs to be much more embedded in CMDRR – at community-level but particularly at the Cordaid- and partner-levels. Several recent CMDRR reports, as well as field staff, have increasingly underlined the need for more focus on monitoring, evaluation and learning – and some of the most important issues relating to building resilience as cost-effectively and sustainably as possible also centre on the imperative of more robust monitoring, evaluation and learning. Key points here are:

- resilience comes in part from the development of appropriate long-term assets and capacities – monitoring, evaluation and shared learning is needed to identify and focus on (a) the achievements that are showing themselves to be both most sustainable and effective and (b) the process or approach, or enabling conditions, that deliver that sustainability; (the CMDRR experience has clearly not been uniform across all sites, organisations and individuals – a more detailed understanding of what has worked well and why that was so, would be very useful);

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44 Hard evidence is nonetheless relatively scant. Indeed DFID has recently commissioned a study to look at the economics of DRR versus relief.

45 In this regard, re-visiting some of the communities in which CMDRR programming has ended could be very useful. Evaluations, both internal and external (including this study), seem to have focused on current active CMDRR communities.
– a thorough CMDRR process (and thoroughness is required, judging from the recommendations of Binas and Savi, 2010) makes intensive use of highly skilled and scarce facilitation inputs and it takes time; in order to maximise the scope for scaling-up, by making best use of resources, it is really important to be able to distinguish an efficient approach that is producing results from one that it is having less success; a monitoring system is needed to help set time-lines and milestones, beyond which communities “graduate” to a different pattern of assistance or, if they fall short of expectations, engage in remedial work with the NGO (and if performance is still disappointing, there should be some point at which CMDRR assistance is terminated);

– “Not everything that counts can be measured and not everything that can be measured counts” (Einstein); building resilience is critically dependent on the development of assets that are difficult to measure (embedded processes, capacities and soft skills); monitoring such achievements is very difficult but their very intangibility makes it even more important that progress is tracked;\textsuperscript{46}

– opportunities for sharing and cross-learning among communities and partner organisations can generate useful lessons and be motivating; it appears that this does not happen very often at present (and for many communities, does not happen at all)\textsuperscript{47};

– whilst there is much to promote in CMDRR, strengthening a culture of more critical thinking, particularly in the Cordaid field teams, would contribute to increased innovation and adaptation; linked to this is the suggestion that Cordaid should consider making more use of external evaluators or facilitators and that internal processes, including participatory impact assessment, although necessary and useful, rarely substitute for the different perspectives of an appropriate external professional.

Good monitoring, evaluation and learning could have a major effect on the ability to roll-out CMDRR at scale and to ensure that its achievements are sustained, principally by:

(a) highlighting what works best, under which circumstances, such that resources can be directed to those activities/circumstances; and

(b) providing a strong evidence-based case to donors.

\textbf{A broader canvas?}

CMDRR is clearly a valuable process but cannot assure drought resilience on its own. Nor is it reasonable or efficient for the programme to seek to cover too many bases. However, during the course of field work and discussions a number of other issues were raised that are clearly or possibly relevant to CMDRR, on which CMDRR is silent. Some of those are listed below, for reflection and consideration of whether they should and could somehow be addressed within CMDRR or through the actions of the CMDRR implementing NGOs (for instance through alliance building) and whether they have implications for the focus or conduct of some of the CMDRR components or interventions. For consideration:

– illiteracy is a key community-level constraint and hampers capacity development – can (should?) CMDRR do more to address this, perhaps by more pro-actively linking with other organisations

\textsuperscript{46} There is ample scope to adapt indicators and monitoring frameworks developed for other capacity-building processes (in the Nairobi workshop, an example developed for improved governance of coastal zones was used, Olsen et al., 2009) and the Binas and Savi (2010) report includes an annex of proposed resilience indicators.

\textsuperscript{47} The frequency of such events, who participates and particularly whether field staff participate, varies considerably. For example, whilst some field-based staff attended the Nairobi workshop, the Addis Ababa workshop was attended only by staff based in Addis Ababa (Cordaid and partners).
working on this? Feedback from workshop participants on this was mixed (in terms of whether it was a topic with which CMDRR should engage) though most people recognised its importance;

- should there be more consideration of constraints or planning at landscape-level (ecosystem or other wider level)? There was considerable debate on this in the Nairobi workshop because although CMDRR does not ignore the broader context (and often builds links with it) the unit of analysis is the community; perhaps a pragmatic approach to this might be for Cordaid to opportunistically link with other studies at this level, in order to see how (or if) a landscape “lens” would affect the CMDRR approach;

- how do community rangeland enclosures fit into the broader picture of how pastoralists (all communities) use mobility as a resilience strategy? what effect do they have on neighbouring communities and conflict? what are the pressures toward more sedentary pastoralism and to what extent is CMDRR increasing those pressures? Should more attention be paid to the implications of interventions on tendencies to settle or move? When discussed in the workshops, there was a general tendency to recognise that increasing tendencies to more sedentary lifestyles are to some extent inevitable (population pressure and intensification) and contributed to by multiple processes (including public investments). However, CMDRR itself can often assist mobility (through peace-building and because enclosures, or water sources, are not necessarily off-limits to in-coming migrants and their livestock, providing they ask permission);

- which communities or community members are missed out of the CMDRR process? is there sufficient focus on temporarily migrating community members, young men, and pastoralist “drop-outs”? Is enough known about or are there lessons from traditional and evolving patterns of migration and how these might contribute to resilience? Is there perhaps a more explicit role for CMDRR in facilitating out-migration? Although adaptation is central to resilience, is CMDRR somehow biased towards adaptation narrowly defined (locally, pastorally) and is that appropriate? In the workshops, there was recognition that this falls larger outside the focus of CMDRR at present but is potentially important, particularly with respect to livelihood diversification opportunities;

- infrastructure (roads48, telephones, schools, health centres) can contribute to major changes in resilience - should the CMDRR partners forge alliances to lobby for these changes? Is the CMDRR process adequately linked to and able to influence policy? In the Nairobi workshop, one of the participants from FAO identified opportunities to influence funding and policy on arid lands – particularly through needed community involvement in consultative processes. In Ethiopia, there has been a significant shift in policy, towards embracing DRR – though how that will play out, in terms of local government capacities, remains to be seen.

**Recommendations**

Mainly relating to the second part of the overall research question (“...and what can still be done (by communities, partner organisations, government, Cordaid and others) to further increase the communities’ resilience?”), the following recommendations (encapsulated in four groups) are given, based on the research results:

(a) the most important and urgent change that is needed is more focus on monitoring, evaluation and learning, coupled with a structured process that allows the communities and NGO to “move ahead / move along” – as discussed in the previous section; this, as well as the recommendation below, would contribute to a more consistently positive answer to the “good investment relative to relief?” question;

---

48 It was interesting to observe apparently major transformative investments in road infrastructure in southern Ethiopia, ongoing as of February 2012 – including improvements to the main asphalt road to Moyale, a new asphalt road to Liban (from near Dilla) and a new asphalt road to link Arero with Yabello.
(b) the second area concerns ways to scale-up/scale-out and deliver CMDRR or parts of it through other channels or actors, where cost-effective to do so; recently Cordaid has focused CMDRR in fewer communities, for a more thorough process (though the merits of this are unproven unless accompanied by more structured learning) but this works against reducing the costs of delivery; a related issue to explore (re-visit?) concerns the scope to train facilitators from within the communities;

(c) the third group of recommendations focuses on the lessons highlighted earlier (summarised in Box 3 below), which should be reviewed to see if they resonate with Cordaid or its partners, be it on a wide-scale or in particular circumstances; (some of these points relate to operational detail); and

(d) finally, Cordaid may want to reflect on the “broader canvas” issues noted above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 3: summary of lessons/recommendations on community resilience, NGO drought relief preparedness and stakeholder collaboration/co-ordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community resilience (section II)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Recognise that good facilitation is highly skilled…and critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− CMDRR is not consistently applied …for better, for worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− M&amp;E – the (unfulfilled) focus has been at community-level but the pressing need is at project/programme/partner-level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− A more structured approach to timelines and milestones is needed – and progressive “graduation” to different types of community support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Timely follow-up is critical to community motivation and positive outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− The CMDRR process is not well-served by short-term projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Reflect on illiteracy - is it a key constraint to CMDRR? Some argue it is…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Women are undoubtedly under-represented in the field teams….</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NGO drought relief preparedness (section III)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Training for the relief phase may be useful for some NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Trying to ensure that resources are in the right place at the right time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Reserve fund? – is there scope for this before the main funds arrives?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Funding flexibility can be very helpful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Scenario planning may be useful in CMDRR communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Encourage communities set aside their own resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Link emergency activity so that it builds fair-weather capacities too</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Co-ordination among stakeholders (section IV)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Scope to improve the quality of exchange with government at field-level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Cordaid should seek closer co-ordination with the other funding sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− community-county level interface is still weak in Kenya – strengthening this may improve prospects for leveraging additional community funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− more exchange between communities – useful for learning and motivating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− implementing partners (field staff) – to share experiences and learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− collaboration with different development actors to address adult literacy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Consider where there might be scope to embrace other approaches too…</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References and Resources


What is Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction (CMDRR)?

Community Managed Disaster Risk reduction (CMDRR) is a process of bringing people together within the same community to enable them to collectively address a common disaster risk and to collectively pursue common disaster risk reduction measures.

CMDRR is a process that mobilizes a group of people in a systematic way towards achieving a safe and resilient community/group. Its end view is a dynamic community that equalizes power relations, binds the group cohesively in the process of making decisions, deals with conflicts, resolves issues, and manages individual and collective tasks through addressing and bouncing back from hazard events.

As long as disaster risks are not being reduced, achieving poverty reduction, social equity improvement, and sustainable development are in serious jeopardy.

The Disaster Risk Reduction Formula for CMDRR offers a simple and clear and a kind of ‘mathematical’ equation on how to determine the disaster risk. This formula translates into three areas of community managed DRR activities (also see annex 1):

\[
\text{Disaster Risk (DR)} = \frac{\text{Hazard (H) x Vulnerability (V)}}{\text{Capacity (C)}}
\]

This formula translates into three areas of community managed DRR activities:
1. Prevention and mitigation of hazards
2. Reduction of vulnerabilities to hazards
3. Strengthening capacities to cope and bounce back from hazards

If disaster risk is reduced, the probability of the hazard event turning into a disaster is less. This concept is the core idea of (CM) DRR. For an explanation of the five different key elements / components (steps) of the CMDRR process, see annex 2.

Hazards, coupled with vulnerability and a lack of capacity to cope, translate into communities with high levels of risks. It is possible to reduce these risks. Some hazards can be prevented or mitigated. Some hazards defy prevention or mitigation, but communities can be enabled and empowered to cope and bounce back from their impact.

Summary of Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction (CMDRR):

CMDRR is strategically important: its approach has resulted in communities becoming resilient and self-reliant, so that development initiatives are safe, secure and sustainable through time.

CMDRR creates a sustainable intra-community working relationship, geared towards building group and community cohesiveness in achieving the task of risk reduction.

People’s capacity and survivability are enhanced and at the same time, dependence from external support is gradually terminated.

CMDRR builds strong, self-reliant organizations and communities founded on equal power relations in all aspects of organizational and community life. It specifically reduces risk and sustains development.

(Summary of other Cordaid CMDRR documents, MLO, 9/8/2011)
The Basics of (CM)DRR

As said before, hazards can take on different forms: the form of geophysical hazard, climate change related hazard, violent conflict, disease, etc. What these hazards do have in common, however, is that they can be prevented from turning into disasters. This means that the impact they have on people and their livelihoods can be diminished. In other words, hazards can be unavoidable, but disasters are not; disaster risk and impact of disaster can be reduced. Loss of lives and livelihoods can be diminished through prevention, mitigation and preparedness.

In the DRR programme, Cordaid has chosen a Community Managed approach. The Community Managed DRR process intends to build resilience of communities for disasters and increase their voice through community organisation. The CMDRR process contains the following steps:

1. Making partners appreciate CMDRR through explaining what it contains and why it is important. Once enthusiastic, a training of partner staff and facilitators in CMDRR follows. Using the community managed approach in DRR requires often a shift in mindset of partners. They can be trained by people experienced in practicing CMDRR.

2. Community managed disaster risk assessment and analysis: Disaster risk assessments and analysis are conducted in a participatory community setting. Partners facilitate this process, using different tools to analyse hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities of people. Examples of such tools are conducting a hazard history, making a hazard map with local materials (leaves, sticks, stones etc), filming of hazards and vulnerabilities by community members (this is a successful approach in Central America), conducting a problems- and objectives tree (including hazards and vulnerabilities), identifying and ranking of vulnerable groups and a matrix to order individual and community capacity (see table below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Identification of the hazards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Prioritisation of the hazards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Characterisation of the hazards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Taking into account the following aspects: Cause/Origin; Forewarning; Force; Speed of onset; Warning sign &amp; signals frequency; Period of occurrence; Duration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- 2 schools of thought: 1.) Vulnerability = location + time (I.I.R.R.’s definition; also the one Cordaid uses); 2.) Vulnerability = social, economic, political, geographic, physical (used in most scientific literature)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Vulnerability is always related to the hazard identified in the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Identification of (human and non-human) elements at risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Identification and ranking of vulnerable groups within the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Identification of main causes of vulnerability for different categories at risk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 Note: Disaster risk reduction is not necessarily conducted in a community managed way. UNISDR refers to DRR as a conceptual framework that identifies elements with the capacity to minimise vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a society to avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of hazards, within the broad context of sustainable development. (Overview of disaster risk reduction terminology. Accessed via: http://www.unisdr.org/eng/terminology/terminology-2009-eng.html) However, when we talk about mainstreaming DRR in Cordaid, we are talking about Community Managed DRR.

2 For an example, see: Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction (CMDRR) ToT Training for Cordaid Partners in Sudan, 2010, International Institute of Rural Reconstruction.
### Capacity assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard: prevention, mitigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability (human): survivability, community readiness → ability to ‘bounce back’ → livelihood</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Capacity addresses:**
  - Identification of existing coping capacities
  - Identification of the capacity needed by the community to build resilience
  - Identification of capacity gaps

3. **Community action plans** to fill the identified capacity gaps, including contingency and development plans, designed and implemented by community members. By this, disaster risk will be reduced. The intervening NGO takes a facilitating role in this, but is not the main actor, this is the community itself.

4. **People’s organisation**, for instance through DRR forums or committees: one can think of Early Warning Committees, Rescue committees, Health committees, a Savings Group and others.

5. **Participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning** system. The ability to learn from events can further enhance resilience. This last step is still developing; a first pilot to do this has been executed in Kenya in November 2010.³

Because communities do their own assessments, make their own plans and organize themselves, their resilience is strengthened in a way they perceive as needed. Not only through efforts within their own community (for example raising money among community members for rescue or protection items) but also through raising their voice as one united community to other stakeholders (for instance the government) claiming assistance in reducing the risk they live in. In many cases, different stakeholders (such as government and sometimes private sector) are involved. Only by working together, disaster risks can be reduced and resilient communities can be created. This corresponds with Cordaid’s policy of Communities of Change.

There are some points of attention when starting a community managed project. First, there are political and power structures in the community which should be taken into account when entering the community and when working with them. Second, do take into account it is not in everybody’s interest to empower local communities. This is the case in for example in conflict situations, but also in a situation where local communities are suppressed in the advantage of more powerful groups. To prevent that these groups will undermine the CMDRR process, involve those stakeholders with opposite interests in the process, so that they too will have ownership over it (= Community of Change).

Several case studies, available at the Cordaid partners website and on [www.cordaid.com](http://www.cordaid.com), provide a practical insight in the workings of CMDRR. Some examples are the following:

- Building resilience to flash floods and environmental degradation in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia;
- Story of a resilient community in Cementera, Honduras;
- Building resilience to floods in Kallipattu, India;
- Building resilience to droughts, floods and epidemics in Malawi;
- CMDRR before, during and after the eruption of Mount Merapi in Indonesia.

Glossary of key (Community Managed) Disaster Risk Reduction terms

Capacity
Refers to individual and collective strengths and resources that can be enhanced, mobilized and accessed, to allow individuals and communities to shape their future by reducing disaster risks. This includes capacity for prevention and/or mitigation of hazards, and capacity for increasing individual survivability and community readiness regarding disaster risks.

Disaster
A situation in which a hazard is causing significant harm to lives and livelihoods.

Disaster risk
The potential disaster losses in lives, health status, livelihoods, assets and services, which could occur to a particular community or a society over some specified future time period.

Disaster risk management
The systematic process of using administrative directives, organizations, and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster.

Disaster risk reduction
The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events.

Early Warning
The set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning information to enable individuals, communities and organizations threatened by a hazard to prepare and to act appropriately and in time to reduce the possibility of harm or loss.

Exposure
People, property, systems, or other elements present in hazard zones that are thereby subject to potential losses.

Hazard
A phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage.

Preparedness
The knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery organizations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from the impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard events or conditions.

Resilience
The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions.
Vulnerability
The characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard.

Unless mentioned otherwise, the source of definitions is UNISDR’s “On Better Terms A Glance at Key Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Concepts”; http://www.unisdr.org/eng/risk-reduction/climate-change/docs/On-better-terms.pdf
# Appendix 2

## Itineraries for Team Leader, Kenyan Consultant and Ethiopian Consultant

### November/December 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 November</td>
<td><strong>Team Leader</strong> (TL) arrives Nairobi. Contact with Cordaid office. Meetings with FAO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 November</td>
<td>Meeting with Oxfam/REGLAP. Planned ECHO meeting cancelled (ECHO officer had other commitments unexpectedly).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 November</td>
<td>Reading. Contact with Kenyan consultant (KC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 November</td>
<td>Meeting with Lammert Zwaagstra (ex-ECHO). Reading.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November</td>
<td>KC and TL fly to Moyale (Kenya). Joined by Ethiopian consultant (EC). Planning of field work, jointly with CIFA staff (Kenya).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 November</td>
<td>All team. Planned trip to Turbi/Arawan aborted because of flooded road. Visit to Qate (south of Moyale – non-CMDRR). Meeting with Arid Lands (GoK – Arid Lands Resource Management Project).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 November</td>
<td>Team (TL, KC, EC) visit to Mansile near Moyale (CMDRR ToT had been conducted there but otherwise not a CMDRR community). Vehicle abandoned on return because of floods. Meeting with CIFA (Moyale). Team meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 December</td>
<td>Crossed border to Ethiopia. (Delay due to vehicle problem). Planning meeting with ACORD in Mega. Field visit to CMDRR community Mani-soda. (Team stays in Moyale, Ethiopia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 December</td>
<td>Visit to ACORD CMDRR community Melbana. Further discussions with ACORD staff. KC returns to Kenya (see separate itinerary). TL and EC continue to Yabello. Field visit planning with SoS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 December</td>
<td>TL and EC visit SoS CMDRR community Fuldowa. TL departs for Addis Ababa PM (overnight Virga Allem). EC remains in Yabello (see separate itinerary).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 December</td>
<td>TL travels to Addis Ababa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 December</td>
<td>Meetings in Addis Ababa with Cordaid, AFD, SoS-Sahel, ACORD, FAO, World Bank, ILRI. TL departs Ethiopia on overnight flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 December</td>
<td><strong>Kenyan Consultant</strong>. Return to Moyale, Kenya (after programme 28 November – 2 December – see above). Overnight at CIFA guest-house.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 December</td>
<td>Travel to Rawan with CIFA staff. Meeting in Rawan. Overnight in Turbi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 December</td>
<td>Day-trip to Funanqumbi and meeting there. Overnight in Turbi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 December</td>
<td>Turbi community meeting. Return to Moyale by road. Fly to Marsabit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 December</td>
<td>Meeting with PISP staff. Field work planning. Document review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 December</td>
<td>Marsabit meetings with Arid Lands Resource Management Project, Ministry of water, Solidarities International and Concern Worldwide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 December</td>
<td>Travel to LogoLogo for community meeting. Continue to Namerei for meeting and overnight there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 December</td>
<td>Travel to Kargi for community meeting and return to Marsabit Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 December</td>
<td>Travel to Bubisa by for community meeting (and overnight there).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 December</td>
<td>Document review (public holiday in Kenya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 December</td>
<td>Travel to Maikona – overnight in Kalacha Maikona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 December</td>
<td>Continue journey to Hurri Hills for community meeting. Overnight in Maikona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 December</td>
<td>Travel to Marsabit Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 December</td>
<td>Document review and report-writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 December</td>
<td>Document review and report-writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 December</td>
<td>Obtain secondary data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 December</td>
<td>Document review and report-writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 December</td>
<td>Return to Nairobi (no earlier flights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 December</td>
<td><strong>Ethiopian consultant</strong> (see prior programme above with team 28 November - 3 December) – day-trip to Fuldowa for further discussion with CMDRR community (SoS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 December</td>
<td>Community meeting – Anlona (AFD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 December</td>
<td>Community meeting – Geda (AFD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 December</td>
<td>Visit Arero woreda early warning office. Commence travel to Liban via Hagaramarium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 December</td>
<td>Continue journey to Liban. Document review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 December</td>
<td>Planning meeting with SoS-Sahel in Liban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 December</td>
<td>Community meeting – Dhakhlaquala (SoS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 December</td>
<td>Community meeting – Kersemele (SoS). (Vehicle problems).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 December</td>
<td>Document review whilst vehicle repaired in Liban.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 December</td>
<td>Travel to Addis Ababa via Bore (13-14 December)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 December</td>
<td>Return to Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**February / March 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 February</td>
<td><strong>Team leader</strong> arrives Addis Ababa. Meetings with Cordaid, Government Office for Disaster Risk and Food Security and UNDP DRR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 February</td>
<td>One-day workshop. Meetings with FAO and World Bank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 February</td>
<td>Day-trip to Dire Dawe - meetings with JECCDODD &amp; CMDRR association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 February</td>
<td>Depart Addis Ababa. Drive to Liban.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 February</td>
<td>Liban meetings with SoS-Sahel, Save the Children – USA, and Government offices (zonal and district-level). Depart Liban for Yabello. Meeting with AFD, Yabello.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 February</td>
<td>Day-trip to Arero via Fuldowa, accompanied by AFD. Meetings with Government district-level officers and Save the Children – USA. Return to Yabello – evening meeting with Borana zone officers and AFD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 February</td>
<td>Return drive to Addis Ababa. Late night flight to Nairobi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March</td>
<td>Arrive Nairobi. Meetings with Cordaid staff. Workshop planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 March</td>
<td>One-day workshop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 March</td>
<td>Depart Nairobi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 3

### List of Contacts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Contacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kenya – Nairobi</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Didia Mohamed (CMDRR), Hussein Jirma (CMDRR), Safia Abdi (CMDRR), Sophie Randall, Vlora Gojani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emmanuella Olesambu, Jurjen Draaijer, Deborah Duveskog, Paul Opio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vanessa Tilstone, Monica Naggaga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lammert Zwaagstra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lawrence Njoroge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hassan Hulufo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Janet M Miriti, S.N.Njoroge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrick Cantin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catherine Fitzgibbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eunice A Obala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kenya – other</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ibrahim Aden, Tari Doti, Halkano Abkula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrick K Issako</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Isaac Wamugi</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohamoud Dagane</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Umuro R Godana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jospeh Lepariyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Umuro J O (Moyale), Godana Doyo (Marsabit), Sora Molu (Marsabit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leina Mpoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stephen Nzioka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lukas Laborokwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethiopia – Addis Ababa</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ton Haverkort, Woldehanna Kinfu, Moges Abebe, Sinkinish Beyene, Rebeca Dmitri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adrian Cullis, Gjis van’t Klooster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jose Neil Manzano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Haile Tafesse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wolter Soer, Ahmed Alkadir Mohamed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negussie Kefeni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moqes Shiferaw, Yabowerk Haile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yoseph Negassa, Assefa Senbete, Alemu Woyessa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kidist Hailemariam, Lemma Dinku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gemachis Gurdina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Katherine Snyder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethiopia – other</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abebe Mekonnen, Wondwosen Nigus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdela Musu, Mohamed Hussein, Yehanes Tadesse, Gush G-Eoz, Yodit Gezaghq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdullah Ali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdul Khadr, “Liban”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Organization/Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nifalem Kumera</td>
<td>Drought Prevention and Preparedness Zonal Office, Liban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adugna Jote, Desalegn, Miliyared Nenko</td>
<td>ACORD, Mega</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wondiye Haile</td>
<td>SoS-Sahel, Liban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yared Girma (Arero), Ato Sishaw (Arero), Abduba Yacob (Liban)</td>
<td>Save the Children – USA, Arero/Liban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dida Gufu</td>
<td>Arero woreda Water office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqishuma Wagri, Malicha Arero</td>
<td>Arero woreda pastoralist development office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan Jaldeesa</td>
<td>Arero woreda administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duguma Adani, Hussen Mussa</td>
<td>Arero woreda, Food Security office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debela Etana</td>
<td>Disaster Prevention and Preparedness, Borano Zone, Yabello</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abere, Alemayehu Sitotaw, Dibayu Jarso</td>
<td>AFD Yabello</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muleneg Tessema</td>
<td>Cordaid, Yabello</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4  
Communities visited November/December 2011

Kenya  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qate</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Mansile*  |        | 0      | (CIFA)  
| Rawan     |        | R      |  
| Funan Q.  | C - 2010 | CIFA |  
| Turbi     | C - 2009 | PISP |  
| Namarei   | C - 2009 | PISP |  
| Kargi     |        | R      |  
| Loglogo   |        | 0      |  
| Bubisa    |        | R      |  
| Hurri Hills | C - 2011 | PISP |  

Ethiopia  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ManiSoda</td>
<td>C - 2008</td>
<td>ACORD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milbana</td>
<td>C - 2010</td>
<td>ACORD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuldowa</td>
<td>C - 2008</td>
<td>SOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhkhaqala</td>
<td>C - 2008</td>
<td>SOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qarsamale</td>
<td>C - 2008</td>
<td>SOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hallona</td>
<td>C - 2007</td>
<td>AFD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gedda</td>
<td>C - 2008</td>
<td>AFD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C= CMDRR; O=other capacity development; R=relief only  
(Date indicates when CMDRR programme began)  
* Mansile was used for CMDRR training without full follow-up
## Appendix 5

### Arero - selected quantitative indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pop. 2012</th>
<th>Livestock deaths from drought, rains, disease</th>
<th>GFR ben 2012 mid-Feb12</th>
<th>standardised per capita (2012 pop data)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1=bad</td>
<td>2=nr normal 3=nr normal</td>
<td>cattle</td>
<td>camels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/Gatarsaa (centre)</td>
<td>3071</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guutoo</td>
<td>1168</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ardintuu</td>
<td>2347</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oorootoo</td>
<td>2270</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1091</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silala</td>
<td>3358</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K/Gumaataa</td>
<td>3137</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reenji</td>
<td>2456</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boobella</td>
<td>1123</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirmayyee</td>
<td>3903</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2780</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuldowa CMDRR</td>
<td>4302</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madar</td>
<td>2635</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaffara CMDRR</td>
<td>2515</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhidhiilee CMDRR</td>
<td>2083</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hallona CMDRR</td>
<td>3752</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weeb CMDRR</td>
<td>4014</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2454</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadaa CMDRR</td>
<td>3121</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2933</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waachillee</td>
<td>3140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallabaa</td>
<td>2752</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2973</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qaqalo</td>
<td>3270</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2051</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malka Halluu</td>
<td>2381</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3925</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qaawaa CMDRR</td>
<td>2071</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1704</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** data missing because of conflict in the area

### Notes

2011 Livestock and water data obtained from Government woreda offices; food aid beneficiaries and population data obtained from Save the Children-USA; GFR means ‘General Food Ration’
## Appendix 6
### Liban - selected quantitative indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liban</th>
<th>Pop 2011</th>
<th>mid-2011 need food</th>
<th>acute malnutrition</th>
<th>% need food malnutrition</th>
<th>% acute malnutrition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gobicha</td>
<td>7849</td>
<td>4870</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laga Gula</td>
<td>5317</td>
<td>4447</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siminto</td>
<td>5201</td>
<td>4148</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhaka Kala</td>
<td>3485</td>
<td>2700</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bura Dhera</td>
<td>3511</td>
<td>2822</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mugayo</td>
<td>4125</td>
<td>3334</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boba</td>
<td>4007</td>
<td>3184</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulbul</td>
<td>3204</td>
<td>3241</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>101%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m/guba</td>
<td>2345</td>
<td>2270</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadhessa</td>
<td>3404</td>
<td>2403</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qorati</td>
<td>7036</td>
<td>3678</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miésa</td>
<td>6353</td>
<td>4210</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koba-Adi</td>
<td>5123</td>
<td>4384</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardot</td>
<td>2691</td>
<td>2850</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>106%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queramale</td>
<td>6823</td>
<td>5039</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alge</td>
<td>3992</td>
<td>3014</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arde Bururi</td>
<td>8301</td>
<td>5538</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes

2009 population data obtained from Liban woreda office and 2011 estimated using 3.194% annual growth;

Other data obtained from June 2011 Liban woreda drought impact assessment report.
### Appendix 7
Recent Cordaid CMDRR and emergency ECHO funding in Kenya and Ethiopia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>Euros (thous)</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Geog focus</th>
<th># beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/2/08</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>17 months</td>
<td>Gudji, Borena, South Omo (Eth.) Mars., Moy., Sam (Ke)</td>
<td>303,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/7/09</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>Gudji, Borena (Eth.) Mars., Moy., Sam (Ke)</td>
<td>231,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/8/10</td>
<td>1,876</td>
<td>17 months</td>
<td>Gudji, Borena (Eth.) Mars., Moy., Sam (Ke)</td>
<td>155,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2/11</td>
<td>1,631</td>
<td>9 months</td>
<td>Mars., Moy., Sam., Mad., Isio. (Ke)</td>
<td>186,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4/11</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>Gudji, Borena (Eth.)</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 8
Addis Ababa workshop on CMDRR: 24th February 2012

Organised by Cordaid, Addis Ababa and facilitated by Ann Gordon (CMDRR consultant)

Introduction
By way of introduction, the workshop objectives were presented:
- To answer key questions about CMDRR
- To validate the preliminary findings from the study, and thereby, hopefully
- To inform future CMDRR planning and operations.

The workshop continued with an outline programme and self-introduction of participants (eleven people). A brief overview on CMDRR, resilience and the background and focus of the current study was then presented.

Following that, there was group work (2 groups) on community resilience (guided by a set of questions) and discussion and review in plenary (including review of the consultants’ preliminary results). Other topics relating to the study were covered in plenary. Key points discussed are presented below.

At various junctures during the day, participants were also asked to response anonymously to three questions – and these results later fed-back to the group.

Community resilience: group work followed by discussion in plenary

Study questions addressed
1. Are CMDRR-trained communities better able to cope with drought?
2. If so, why? (Be specific – give examples)
3. Compare with other approaches? – most communities get some capacity development..
4. Who in community benefits less from CMDRR?
5. Key lessons?
6. What more can be done at community-level?

Feedback from two groups (presented jointly here)
1. Yes – CMDRR-trained communities are better able to cope with drought
2. Capacity development, mobilisation of resources, assets built, preventive measures and contingency plan
   a. Resources development
      i. Water development
      ii. Rangeland – cut and carry system, kello,
      iii. Catchment, soil and water conservation
   b. Communities are engaged in income diversification
   c. Psychological set-up – paradigm shift from external to internal capacity
   d. Internal Capacity - approaching for gaps to external
   e. Organized action
   f. Information exchange improved – early warning system
   g. Identification of potential hazards –and planning for lean season
   h. Critically looking in to their problems and looking for way-outs to resolve it (prioritization)
3. Compared with other approaches, CMDRR is:

   a. Comprehensive approach to exhaustively encompass addressing problems of all segments of communities
   b. Multi-stakeholder
   c. Community participation is the central focus of the CMDRR – community-owned and managed not just community-based – not implementing on behalf of another organisation
   d. Action plans and contingency plans (though may have plans but no funding)
   e. Multi-hazard specific
   f. Proactive approach
   g. Functional structures and systems are needed within the community – and CMDRR tries to build on existing structures
   h. Allows for participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning
   i. Less expensive
   j. Other approaches – e.g., Productive Safety Net Programme and relief – reactive and prone to corruption

4. The chronically ill and disabled benefit less (one group said no-one benefits less).

5. Key lessons:

   a. Good progress toward utilization of indigenous knowledge
   b. Integration of traditional skills with “modern” skills
   c. CMDRR communities are visionaries - they can see beyond the status quo
   d. You can see immediate impact
   e. Realized communities’ capacity (internal)
   f. Communities are able to network and link with formal institutions..
   g. Communities started to look in to the root causes of their problems ...
   h. Ownership essential
   i. Process needs time – there’s not enough time
   j. Functional organisations required
   k. Collaboration with stakeholders and government required + information; but Ethiopia has more co-ordination and collaboration at ground-level, they think
   l. Harmonisation of approaches required – ie self-help vs other “hand-out” approaches
   m. Paradigm shift not yet complete in Ethiopia

6. What more can be done at community-level:

   a. Strengthening livelihood diversification
   b. Strengthening early warning systems with indigenous knowledge
   c. Strengthening of the CMDRR institution (institutionalization process)
   d. Integration of CMDRR intervention with others
   e. Coordination/Harmonization with other approaches
   f. Community driven- not donor driven
   g. Long-term project duration
   h. more knowledge, skill and capacity-building in CMDRR

      i. Parameters to measure the process and progress of the achievement of CMDRR
      ii. Increase local govt participation in the CMDRR process and programme at all levels – woreda, zone...
      iii. Develop a strategy on CMDRR specific to the Ethiopian context
Preliminary findings from the study re resilience

- Impacts but not resilience?
- Approach applied inconsistently
- Follow-up and support not always timely
- Takes time...but need timetable + milestone
- Mechanisms for sharing and learning? – both among communities and among NGOs
- Illiteracy – key constraint? Address this?
- Women under-represented in field teams and this may affect extent to which women’s voices are heard at community-level

Points arising from the plenary discussion

- Those present felt that CMDRR policies, review etc should be specific to Ethiopia
- Difficult to register community associations and therefore banking is difficult (but Jeccdodd managed to register one CMDRR association)
- Income diversification in CMDRR has worked well – petty trade for self-help groups, animal fattening, small stock (poultry, shoats), horticulture
- Discussion of information flows – and good example from Dire Dawe – but in general there is stronger flow from community upwards and less information received by communities; for the CMDRR system at community-level information flow is good
- CMDRR is still a pilot – focusing on a small number of communities
  - Not taken up by Government
  - Small number of communities because funds lacking
  - Want to work to institutionalise this in Government

- Participants consider CMDRR a less expensive approach because Government “plays its role” and communities also mobilise resources and contribute labour
- Who benefits less? – many present saying no-one, because they look very critically at vulnerabilities. Women? – apparently not disadvantaged in process; discussion re theory vs practice; approach is to protect the most vulnerable – but sometimes cannot address all community issues; Jeccdodd managed to include HIV/AIDS sufferers – got them to speak out – made them feel empowered and confident.
- Discussion of immediate impacts - water systems, pasture development, attitudinal change, analysis and solutions, capacity development; all this complements other approaches. Lots to see compared with other approaches
- Income diversification – need to work on this with Government. CMDRR is developed and growth oriented – over the long-term - compared to other approaches
- Discussion re women field workers – hard to recruit women in the field. Jeccdodd, however, have women facilitators (but not community organisers and project officers).
- Strong views re study finding that CMDRR is not consistently implemented – but this was refuted somewhat by the responses to a prior question on the length of the initial period of interaction with CMDRR communities, which elicited very mixed responses
- Illiteracy – although recognised as an issue, it’s possible to get to get round it – although that’s still problematic for community records, plans, M&E; apparently AFD does some functional literacy work with funds from another project – for children missing school and adults.
- Sustainability: government officers involved, training, legal recognition etc – but there is no CMDRR policy (however, there is a safety net fund available for CMDRR associations). Must demonstrate to Government to get buy-in and scale. Another incidence of the importance of good M&E systems.
- Binash and Savi report of 2010 workshop has annex with resilience indicators.
Plenary: does CMDRR help NGOs in their drought response?

- Contingency plans critical
- Contingency funds injected
- Communities also raising own resources during drought and external funding catalyses community resources

  e.g., Web – well-organised in drought
- Purchase of hay
- Community co-ops bought low price grains from other areas (there was a government subsidy too)
- Communities empowered – didn’t need grains from Government
- Needed additional pastures only later...
- Livestock from other areas came for water
- Community readiness was better – easier to work with

Functional structures – response actions were co-ordinated. Cash-for-work in the response period. CMDRR has voucher based community animal health system which it activates. Preparedness makes the communities resilient for longer so they can buy time for the next actions.

What worked less well?
De-stocking – plans were in place but communities were reluctant before they really feel drought – and then the prices were low.

If drought very long – preparedness may be inadequate and situation compounded. Water structures in place and replenished by “relief” rains.

If there are funding delays and interruptions in funding, there is a loss of continuity at community level. During the emergency, the NGOs were under pressure to work with more communities. In order to reach more communities, more funding is needed.

Although CMDRR has been implemented since 2008, the activity has not been continuous. 2008-2011 has been rather “stop-start” with 3 phases in this period.

Plenary: Co-ordination among stakeholders

1. Wide representation in CMDRR committees – good co-ordination at community-level
2. During implementation too – Government and NGOs each other – complementarity
3. Some exchange visits – AFD organises community to community visits
4. Trying to avoid overlap
5. Consortium approach
6. Less co-ordination between funding organisations
7. Government plays a strong co-ordinating role
8. Guidelines (LEGS) have been accepted and are encouraged by Govt
9. Co-ordination between different levels of Government to be improved.

How are communities selected? Often where Government has fewer staff; Government is key in co-ordinating who works where. AFD conduct survey to choose and then consult with Government. There is mapping of NGO projects to avoid overlap – to see which communities are missed out by Government and by NGOs. Extent of funding also important.

Government plays a leading role in emergency co-ordination. SoS-Sahel includes Government in its training. Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS) are accepted and work everywhere. Participants argued that co-ordination is very good. There are CMDRR committees at kebele-level and these are echoed at woreda-level, with representation from district administration (or kebele government representative), school, extension, elders and NGOs.
Cordaid – and organisations at its level – do not co-ordinate so well and they are all supporting the same NGOs. Better co-ordination among donors might be helpful? Everyone – all agencies – want improved co-ordination.

Local government complements CMDRR eg through GTP (Growth and Transformation Plan). Government very engaged at community level. No national level policy on CMDRR but strong complementarity. AFD said government has big involvement and co-operate (though not necessarily very proactive). Community CMDRR committees include government representation.

Jeccdodd experience: they legalised CMDRR Association with knowledge, support and involvement of Government, and then engaged Government. Government support has been very important for Jeccdodd. Government is developing its disaster risk management policy including DRR. Aligned with CMDRR – ie., risk reduction, risk transfer and prudent risk-taking.

**Present:**

Cordaid: Ton Haverkort, Woldehanna Kinfu, Moges Abebe, Sinkinish Beyene
SoS-Sahel: Lemma Dinku, Kidist Hailemariam
ACORD: Yabowerk Haile
Action for Development: Assefa Senbete, Alemu Woyessa
Jeccdodd: Haile Tafesse
Danish Church Agency (DCA): Gamachis Gudina
Appendix 9
Nairobi workshop on CMDRR: 2nd March 2012 (10 am – 4 pm)

Organised by Cordaid, Nairobi and facilitated by Ann Gordon (CMDRR consultant)

Introduction
By way of introduction, the workshop objectives were presented:

- To answer key questions about CMDRR
- To validate the preliminary findings from the study
- To explore monitoring, evaluation and learning needs; and thereby hopefully
- To inform future CMDRR planning and operations.

The workshop continued with an outline programme and self-introduction of participants (twenty-two people).

A brief overview on CMDRR, resilience and the background and focus of the current study was then presented, before breaking into 4 groups, each of which addressed one of the “thematic” topics of the study:

- Community resilience
- Implementing partners' capacities in terms of drought response
- Co-ordination among stakeholders, and
- Is CMDRR a good investment.

Group work (with randomised participation) on each of these was fed-back into the plenary and for each theme, this was followed by a brief presentation of the preliminary findings from the study – and a plenary discussion.

In the afternoon, plenary discussions continued on selected issues that fall outside CMDRR (“broader canvas”), monitoring, evaluation and learning, and a session on the DRR learning group facilitated by Vanessa Tilstone of REGLAP.

At various junctures during the day, participants were also asked to response anonymously to three questions – and these results later fed-back to the group.

Community resilience

Study questions addressed

1. Are CMDRR-trained communities better able to cope with drought?
2. If so, why? (Be specific – give examples)
3. Compare with other approaches? – most communities get some capacity development..
4. Who in community benefits less from CMDRR?
5. Key lessons?
6. What more can be done at community-level?

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1 A plenary discussion on resilience identified the following key concepts: ability to cope, bouncing back, adaptability, sustainable livelihoods, surviving.
Group presentation

1. Yes
2. Ability to cope is determined by the extent (duration) of the drought; other external may also hinder communities’ ability to cope
3. They are better-off compared to communities that have not gone through the CMDRR process
   a. They have development plans
   b. They can implement themselves
   c. They have water, grazing and improved food security over a longer period than usual
   d. The CMDRR approach helps communities make a choice and implement, compared with other approaches that are more sector restricted
   e. Communities are opening up and more involved than with other approaches
4. As much as the approach benefits everyone in the community, women and youth benefit less depending on the specific community social structures
5. It is not enough to say that communities are resilient; policies and politics make a difference too.
6. Support to implement to achieve total resilience.

Preliminary findings from the study (not presented in relation to each sub-question)

- Impacts but not resilience?
- Approach applied inconsistently
- Follow-up and support not always timely
- Takes time...but need timetable + milestones
- Mechanisms for sharing and learning? – communities and NGOs...
- Illiteracy – key constraint? Address this?
- Women under-represented in field teams and this may affect extent to which women’s voices are heard at community-level

Points arising from the plenary discussion

- Women are represented in all the CMDRR committees
- It is more important women are heard in community issues rather than focusing the number of women who participate in discussions (which is always fewer than men)
- Agreement that approach is inconsistently applied – and no dissenters on this
- It was proposed that the impacts (e.g., on water development) are resilience but the following discussion focused on how this would miss the soft skill (capacity) focus of CMDRR (which may be its “edge” over other approaches)
- Useful if issues of approach and how it is applied in practice are separated in study.

Implementing partners’ capacities

Study questions addressed

1. Does CMDRR help NGO drought response?
2. Early warning systems? How does CMDRR contribute to early warning?
3. What have NGOs done to help communities prepare for drought? What is most effective?
4. What worked well/poorly during the drought?
5. Key lessons
6. Opportunities to improve?
Group presentation

1. Yes
   a. Tool that builds community capacity to response effectively and sustainably
   b. Contingency plan useful in responding
   c. Resource mobilisation
   d. Local population participation and ownership – community-driven process
   e. Expediency in responding as risks are already anticipated

2. CMDRR is a tool through which communities engage in planning – based on known signals relating to e.g., water and pastures.
   a. Planning around available resources and anticipated risk
   b. Hazard characterisation – signs and signals
   c. Communities plan around the hazard – utilise local traditional knowledge and mechanisms

3. Community capacity-building in concretising planning and response mechanisms; technical back-stopping (software and hardware); linking communities with resources and relevant stakeholders. Most effective approach is to build on what communities have already done (e.g., resource development for sustainability – expanding the capacity of a pan etc)

4. Networking and co-ordination worked well

5. ...

6. ...

Preliminary findings from the study (not presented in relation to each sub-question)

- In emergency NGOs stretched...what more can be done to prepare for this phase?
- Need resources in right place at right time...
- Funding delays?
- Funding flexibility useful...modalities??
- Scenario planning at community-level?
- Community reserves, planning well in advance
- How these activities can build “fair-weather” livelihood strategies?

Points arising from the plenary discussion

- In both Kenya and Ethiopia, the early warning information was not a constraint – rather both country governments delayed in declaring an emergency
- So the EWS was in place – but not all stakeholders agreed on severity of drought (?!), and hence some delay in declaration of the emergency
- What was the effect of that delay? The communities moved and needed support from government and NGOs for their animals (feed, disease surveillance, combatting ticks, vaccinations, and water tankering)
- Hussein Jirma sited a low cost facilitation intervention (360,000 Ksh) that enabled access to grazing lands that had been off-limits since 1967, thereby saving 53,000 head of cattle (worth Euro 10 million) - particularly in combination with increased capacity for borehole emergency tank (costing 800,000 Ksh)
- In contrast with Ethiopia, it was felt that all the CMDRR NGOs had emergency programming experience
- The emergency response was tied to funding - there were no contingency funds
- Good emergency practices have been defined and documented in some areas (e.g, LEGS) but are still lacking for e.g., peace-building and water.
Co-ordination among stakeholders

Study questions addressed
1. Between communities and NGOs and Government?
2. What worked well? What worked less well?
3. Lessons?
4. Opportunities for improvement?

Group presentation
1. What happened? – trained Government, partners and communities; plans were presented to DSG and reports shared with other stakeholders and department heads; there was capacity support to CMDRR communities to interact with other stakeholders; and sensitisation of DSG.
2. Worked well: communities own plans can be presented to external actors; government is aware of community needs; there is a harmonised and co-ordinated approach by stakeholders at district level; and stronger, co-ordinated and inclusive community organisation. Worked less well: integration of community plans into district planning; decision-makers in Government were not engaged; no/little evidence presented to some NGOs, donors or government.
3. Opportunities: NDMA wants community input via CMDRR into government planning; use DCM and other funding to bring together impact information; devolution for development planning.

Preliminary findings from the study (not presented in relation to each sub-question)
- Collaboration / co-ordination strong
- Government involvement at field level weak?
- Sharing between communities?
- Work with other partners to address illiteracy?
- How to scale-up / scale-out?

Points arising from the plenary discussion
- co-ordination between organisations in not always good; in Uganda, with many organisations rolling out CMDRR, the same individuals and communities are sometimes targeted twice for training by different partners
- critical partnerships and linkages are discretionary and often weak (national/regional level and cross-border including linkages between national governments)
- literacy is important and requires long-term investment in formal education; Kenya has a policy on education for pastoralist communities but little funding and weak implementation
- need to better link community work to wider issues (including large-scale infrastructure development) – at all levels of government

Is CMDRR a good investment?

Study questions addressed
1. Is it?
2. Which factors are most critical to success?
3. What are its weak points?
4. Evidence?
5. Numbers?
6. What else needs to be done?
**Group presentation**

The group discussed the factors that differentiate CMDRR from DRR – in a sense, the factors that make it successful:

- Community-owned and driven
- Building on existing community institutions
- Community commitment and community resources – should lead to better managed and more sustainable outcomes
- Communities that have had less exposure to NGO projects tend to do better with CMDRR. (Hypothesis that there is more dependency culture in other communities)
- Need 5 years – *minimum*
- A compact between all actors – which specifies roles and commitment of each

So what are the critical differences in costs?

- Staffing (other set-up costs are similar to other DRR approaches) - particularly in relation to the longer time needed (5 years vs. only 1-2 years)
- Some annual capital investment costs – keeping the community motivated by contributing to their projects

What is the success rate?

- 30-40% of CMDRR projects worked very well (no-one disputed this in later discussions) vs. a more “standard” project assumed to have a lower success rate
  - How can the success rate be increased?
  - this success rate does not help make such projects “bankable”
  - there’s inconsistency in the approach – so how can we achieve a consistently better approach to promote a higher success rate?

Reducing the costs of delivery

- Whilst international NGOs can provide important technical input, local NGOs offer lower cost delivery

How can we Government to take this on?

- Logically this would fall to the new Drought Management Authority – but what would be needed for this to happen?
- The group thought this would need 4 staff per division to be allocated to CMDRR and there are 4-5 divisions in each district; at present, the DMA’s MTP envisages 4 staff per district

Need more information and detail on success rates:

- 30-40% for CMDRR projects
- What is it for other DRR projects?

*Preliminary findings from the study* (not presented in relation to each sub-question)

Depends on:

- Whether viewed as short-term or long-term
- Time and resources needed to build capacities
- Whether targets are achieved and capacities sustained
- Evidence - can “count” water sources and animals…but capacities to organise, manage etc.??
- A skills-intensive process? Hard/costly to scale-up?
- For scale – embrace/adapt other approaches vs purism?
- Need stronger M&E to steer inputs and activities...

(Hard to identify evidence in reduced relief needs...)
Points arising from the plenary discussion

- The success rate varies between districts (more successful in more remote areas) so CMDRR (and other projects) is the victim of past failed interventions?
- Quantification? – good cases and information on those cases; plenty of evidence but numbers are missing
- The key to all of this is community organisation and those organisations being able to link effectively with Government
- CMDRR is a community development approach with an emphasis on risk, but there are other approaches too....what are the essentials of CMDRR? Are there other things we can learn from the other approaches?
- Long-term capacity-building for community-level resilience is needed and there are several approaches to this
- Commonalities of those approaches
  - Participatory
  - Community-focused
  - Legitimacy of approach with stakeholders
- The focus is on CMDRR because it is widespread, gets funded and is systematic (in principle)
- How should “community-managed” be defined? There are very different constituencies within communities and different levels of representativeness. How many people need to be involved to call it community-managed (10? 25?)?
- If we visit a community that’s had 5 years of CMDRR assistance, will we find that it is:
  - Organised
  - Making its own decisions, and
  - Largely functioning without external help.
  
  This would constitute “success” and mean that such a community would make better use of any injected funds.
- Is the above better that a “normal” development project (however defined)?

Plenary on the “broader canvas” – potentially relevant issues that fall outside CMDRR

- Who is missed out? Women may not be represented in sufficient numbers but their concerns are taken into consideration
- Policy linkages and infrastructure – there are huge investments planned and it will be a wasted opportunity if community concerns are not fed into those plans – how can we catch up in-time (e.g., proposed World Bank Horn of Africa funding $600 million); there is engagement and consultation – so community concerns could be heard, if they are presented – FAO willing to discuss this further and explore potential to work together on this
- CMDRR is focused on core livelihoods and is missing out those who drop out
- Population growth is part of the equation and is not addressed – more settled communities may be able to support larger populations (through more intensive practices?)
- Leave pastoralists as they are – to exploit natural resources (one participant proposed this)
- Education – and improved access to education – links to out-migration possibilities
- “nested” planning levels: community, landscape (agroecology), national level; plan at the level that is required (recognising that some of this may even be cross-border); REGLAP discussion on this too
- Plan for change and plan for multiple livelihoods (i.e., becoming more complicated..)
- Recent African Union workshop (2012) that focused on very similar mobility issues, with examples from West Africa where this pattern is better accepted officially
Plenary on monitoring, evaluation and learning

- Developing common shared indicators for empowerment (not just for CMDRR projects but for others too) would be helpful; and lend credibility
- Can learn from other projects that address voice, empowerment etc
- Learning group can look at different experiences in PM&E approaches – and get evidence and case studies more rigorously assessed. There has been a lot of joint work (e.g., with ILRI), including a workshop on community-based DRR approaches; there is potential to further explore Cordaid experiences; innovative ways to communicate this information are needed.
- For monitoring, need to “un-pick” what resilience means to different communities
  - What are the resilience “destructors”?
  - What critical linkages are needed to enable resilience?
- Heightened focus on resilience at present and emerging work from Cordaid, ILRI and ODI; PM&E focus demands that more definition of resilience
- There is an important learning agenda around these approaches

Session on DRR learning group, facilitated by Vanessa Tilstone, REGLAP M,E and L.

Closing session: The workshop was closed at 4 pm with a brief wrap-up and a short feedback session. There had been very good discussion with most participants contributing. The anonymous feedback forms indicated that the overwhelming majority had found the day very useful. Interestingly, they highlighted quite diverse topics as of “most interest”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Participant</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Base</th>
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<tbody>
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Cordaid has been supporting community-managed disaster risk reduction (CMDRR) and drought cycle management (DCM) in the Horn of Africa for eight years. Many evaluations have pointed to successful outcomes but quantitative data are scarce. The aim of this study was to verify the extent to which Cordaid’s CMDRR/DCM work has contributed to building more resilient communities. Cordaid wanted to know more precisely what its added value is, compared to relief assistance. This was considered particularly timely given the recent (severe) drought situation in the Horn of Africa.

This report is based on work undertaken in Kenya and Ethiopia in late 2011 and early 2012. A wealth of largely qualitative evidence is presented to support the finding that CMDRR can indeed build resilience. Importantly, many CMDRR communities themselves attest to being more resilient as a result of CMDRR. However, measuring those results is difficult. In common with other approaches, CMDRR helps communities strengthen physical assets for resilience (water development, pastures, animal health care etc.) but its “edge” may be in the emphasis it places on intangible assets (capacity-building in “soft” skills such as representative process for community organisation and planning) – as the means by which to ensure that interventions are demand-led, well-managed by the community and hence sustainable. Measuring the potentially far-reaching impacts of those “process” assets requires the development of robust monitoring systems to follow communities over a number of years.

More information: www.cdi.wur.nl