Network Governance and Post-conflict Narratives: Case studies of Urban Regeneration in Prishtina, Kosovo

Aogán Delaney
841201177050
MSc Thesis (International Development Studies)
Chair Group: Disaster Studies
Supervisors: **Gemma Van Der Haar (Disaster Studies)**
Jan Van Tatenhove (ENP)

Wageningen University,
Wageningen
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List of Abbreviations

CoE	Council of Europe
ECLO	European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo
EDD	Empowered Deliberative Democracy
EU	European Union
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
GLO	Greek Liaison Office
IBL	Institutionalization Before Liberalization
ICO	International Civilian Office
ICR	International Civilian Representative
IMC	Implementation Monitoring Council
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KUT	Kosovo Unity Team
KYE	Kosovo the Young Europeans
LDK	Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (Democratic League of Kosovo)
MOC	Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDK	Partia Demokratike e Kosovës (Democratic Party of Kosovo)
PISG	Provisional Institutions of Self Government
RIC	Reconstruction Implementation Commission for Serbian Orthodox Religious Sites in Kosovo
SOC	Serbian Orthodox Church
UÇK	Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation Army)
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNSC Res 1244	United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Chapter 1 Introduction

Kosovo is at once conceived of as a disputed territory, a warzone, a success story, a stronghold of organised crime, a UN protectorate, a powder keg, a province within the Republic of Serbia, a self-declared Independent Republic, a country of "Young Europeans"[1], and, to the point where it has become a cliché, as "calm but tense"[2]. With a population estimated to comprise 88% ethnic Albanians, 7% Serbs and the remaining 5% composed of Bosniaks, Turks, and Roma[3], the existence and legitimacy of all political arrangements is contested. After 9 years of UN administration, the elected representatives of the territory unilaterally declared Independence in February 2008. However, as yet, Kosovo has only been formally recognised as a country by 85 of the 192 UN member states.[4] After Independence was declared, in response to the prospect of becoming minorities in a newly formed citizenry, many Serb-majority enclaves established parallel municipal governments, answerable to Belgrade rather than to Prishtina. In addition, the legality of this declaration of independence has been challenged in the International Court of Justice. Although a ruling has been made in favour of the legality of the unilateral declaration, the Serbian government continues to dispute this.[5]

With the seemingly chaotic and uncertain context of Kosovo's polity, one might expect similarly chaotic and incoherent development policies. However, this past decade has been characterised by relative stability and consistency with respect to development and reconstruction policies. It has also been characterised by the presence of quite a number of internationally mandated actors on the political landscape, programmes for political inclusion of minorities, and by an emerging trend of governance through networks. The emergence of such governance trends began in the context of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) which was mandated by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSC Res 1244). The mandate of UNMIK was to function as a temporary administrative arrangement to govern the disputed territory, until a sustainable solution could be negotiated between representatives of the province and of the Serbian government in Belgrade. Charged with finding such a solution, Finnish mediator Martti Ahtisaari facilitated discussions between the two sides but in 2007 concluded such agreement was not forthcoming and devised the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (aka the Ahtisaari Plan), which recommended "Independence with international supervision"[6]. After failing to find UN Security Council (UNSC) endorsement of the proposal, in 2008 the elected representatives of the territory unilaterally declared Independence in accordance with the Ahtisaari Plan, and an International Civilian Representative (Pieter Feith) was appointed to supervise the new government, to ensure its commitments to the Ahtisaari Plan were fulfilled.

The rationale behind this intervention and monitoring role of the international community is that of 'peace building'. What is meant by 'peace building' is the establishment and solidification of institutions of democracy and peace, which forms the bases of almost all post-conflict related actions undertaken by the UN. It is expected that the construction of democratic institutions of governance will minimise potential for violence in the region to resume. However it has been pointed out by some (notably Paris (2004)) that this policy is severely under researched. In this thesis I aim to make a contribution to the peace building literature by providing an analysis of emerging forms of governance, viewed through the lens of governance network theory. Focussing on three case studies of urban regeneration in Prishtina, I aim to further

understandings of emerging forms of governance in Kosovo, what effects this has to how the entity can be envisioned, and to identify and promote potentials for deliberative governance.

1.1 Research Objective and Research Questions

Research Objective

The objective of this research is to further understandings of emerging forms of Governance in Kosovo, and how this effects construction and dissemination of post-war narratives and discourses. I aim to do this through conducting exploratory research, which can act as a foundation for further research. The nature of this exploratory research focuses on identifying how emerging forms of governance through networks function, what discourses are produced in such networks, and how network governance mobilises such discourses. This be done through analysing and comparing three case studies of urban regeneration in Prishtina, the capital city of Kosovo.

A further objective is to determine what potentials there are for deliberative governance within this emerging public landscape. This will be done through examining the enabling and constraining factors for deliberation in governance networks around issues of urban regeneration.

Following these objectives has positive contributions for a variety of matters. First of all, this research helps us to get a clearer understanding of the peace-through-democracy thesis that forms the cornerstone of much conflict related intervention by the international community today. While new understandings of governance and democracy can go only part of the way towards a better understanding of the liberal peace thesis, it is a nonetheless essential step. Secondly, identifying enabling and constraining factors for deliberation can aid committed policy makers and international interventionists who seek to promote opportunities for fairer, more deliberative governance.

Additionally this research aims to give insight into the various possibilities for how an ethno-nationally contested region can be envisioned by both domestic and international actors, along with the different opportunities and the necessary resources required to successfully mobilise these respective narratives. Such an exercise will give insight into the contested visioning of the region and also offer opportunities to make discursive deliberation more inclusive.

Finally, following the theme of politics being the continuation of war by other means (Cramer 2006), I hope this research can offer an empirical foothold with which to try to understand the new political landscape. In so doing it can be easier for people, whether they are domestic policy actors, intervening peace-builders, researchers, or ordinary people, to negotiate their way through it.

Research Questions

Q.1 What forms of Governance are emerging around issues of urban regeneration in Kosovo and how do they function?
- s.q.1.1 Who is involved in emerging structures of governance?
- s.q.1.2 What are the linkages between them?

s.q.1.3 What patterns do networked decision-making processes take
s.q.1.4 What methods or sets of methods of social choice are practiced in governance network interactions?

E.g., command, aggregative voting, strategic negotiation, rational deliberation?

s.q.1.5 What are the rules governing network interactions

Q2 How do emerging governance networks influence construction of urban narratives in the reconstruction of Prishtina?

s.q.2.1 What urban narratives are being produced in Prishtina's urban regeneration?
s.q.2.2 How do network governance processes affect urban narratives produced in Prishtina?

Q.3 What are the enabling and constraining factors for deliberation in governance networks in urban regeneration in Kosovo?

s.q.3.1 What methods or sets of methods of social choice are practiced in governance network interactions?

E.g., command, aggregative voting, strategic negotiation, rational deliberation?
s.q.3.2 What sets of factors lead to the practice of deliberation as a particular method of social choice?

1.2 Why Kosovo? Why Urban regeneration? Why Governance Networks?

I choose to study Kosovar urban regeneration through governance networks because this topic lies on an intersection of a number of important fields of study. Post-conflict urban design, allows the designers to narrate a particular end to conflict, with such a narrative often shaping and informing direction of the political future for many generations to come. The Statue of Liberty and l'Arc du Triomphe are two historical examples of monuments marking a war's end that still have resonance today. While both examples seek to signify the sovereign triumph over an external enemy, in the context of what are described as today's 'new wars' concepts of 'external enemy', and 'sovereign victory' are not so clear (Hippler 2008). Indeed many of today's violent conflicts are characterised by a plurality of warring parties, varying degrees of state effectiveness, and with periods of fluctuating interest from the 'international community', all of which combine to make the end of armed conflict highly complex (ibid). In some cases, such as Kosovo, but also Bosnia and Afghanistan, civil-wars have been brought to an end through the intervention of strong, external actors such as the UN, who seek to foster peace through a process of state building and democratisation (Hippler 2008; Paris 2004).

In recent years, theorists of peace and democracy building have come to advocate policies that prioritise longer-term involvement of non-domestic institution builders, and the delaying of democratisation (Paris 2004). However, it could be argued that such conclusions are reached as a result of clinging to archaic concepts of liberal democracy. Scholarly research into public administration and policy studies in Europe have begun to employ theories of "post-liberal

democracy" and to work with analytical tools such as network governance (for example Cornwall & Coelho (2007); Fung & Wright (2001); Gaventa (2007); Griffiths (2010); Rhodes (2007); Sørensen & Torfing (2005)). That said, the use of such conceptual innovations have largely been confined to the western contexts, in developed and largely stable societies, with firmly established institutional structures. Kosovo, by contrast, is an entity emerging from a devastating period of conflict, with young institutions under construction, and whose geo-political status and polity is contested.

Nonetheless for a country with an estimated population of 1.7 million[7], there is a remarkably high number of diplomatic embassies, diplomatic liaison offices, and organisations mandated by international agreements operating in Kosovo. Many of these organisations operate according to norms of 'new public management' developed in Western Europe and the US (Duffield 2002). Such arrangements offer the possibility to analyse public decision making through the lens of network governance in a non-standard setting. And with decisions currently being taken on which discursive visions and narrations of war to engrave in the city's landscape, a focus on governance of urban regeneration offers insights into decision-making processes that will have implications for generations to come.

1.3 Structure of Thesis

The structure of this thesis is as follows: In Chapter 2 I begin by presenting the background of events leading to intervention by the international community and eventual (although contested) independence from Serbia. This is accompanied by a review of literature on peace building efforts by the international community. I then proceed to construct a theoretical framework of network governance and deliberative democracy, before linking and directing such a framework to the field of post-conflict urban design. Chapter 3 is concerned with the selection of case studies analysed in this thesis, outlining the Methodology used in conducting this research, and clarifying methods of data analysis. In Chapter 4 the findings of the first case study, on the issue of Christ the Saviour Cathedral, are presented. This is followed by the second and third case studies, on the Newborn monument in Chapter 5, and Prishtina International Film Festival in Chapter 6, respectively. A comparative analysis of the three case studies is presented in Chapter 8, before conclusions are drawn and discussed and recommendations formulated in Chapter 9.

Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.1. Background

Kosovo is one of the world's newest countries (although its status as a republic is contested). Having declared independence from Serbia in 2008, it now borders with Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and Serbia. According to a census conducted this year, the first since 1981, the population of Kosovo stands at 1.7 million[8]. According to UNMIK's estimations, 88% of the population identify as ethnic Albanian, 7% as Serbian, with the remaining 5% comprising other minorities such as Bosniak Muslims, Roma, and Turks[9].

Under Tito's Yugoslav Federation, Kosovo's status was that of an autonomous province within the Serbian Republic. In 1989, this autonomy was withdrawn by Slobodan Milošević, bringing it under direct rule from Belgrade. In response, a number of independence movements were formed, having their origins in the student demonstrations at the University of Prishtina, but finding their most visible manifestations in Ibrahim Rugovë's diplomatic campaign with the Democratice League of Kosovo, and in the paramilitary organisation, the Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK) or the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as it is known in English (Malcolm 1998). During the 1990s a series of independence movements saw the violent breakup of the Yugoslav Federation and the establishment of the independent nation-states of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia in place of the former republics. In 1996 the UÇK began their military campaign against Serbian and Yugoslav forces, seeking independence for the province.

As violence increased, so too did the interest of the United Nations, leading to military intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), who launched an aerial bombing campaign seeking the withdrawal of Milošević's troops from Kosovo. The involvement of NATO led to a cease-fire, mandating a peace building mission authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSC Res 1244). This civil-military peace-building mission was composed of a security force called Kosovo Force (KFOR), organised in part by NATO; and a civil/administrative dimension (UNMIK) organised by the UN, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and also by the EU (Paris 2004).

Elections have taken place to the UNMIK supervised Legislative Assembly of the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) on three occasions, in 2001, 2004 and 2007. During this last period a Declaration of Independence was formulated and, following the victory of moderate candidate Boris Tadić over nationalist Tomislav Nikolić in the Serbian Presidential elections of 2008, independence from Serbia was formally declared in February of that year. In the years since Independence has been declared, many international organisations have continued to play significant roles in the governance of Kosovo.

2.2 Theoretical Framework: International Intervention and the 'Liberal Peace'

In this section I discuss three competing perspectives on conflict related intervention by the international community from Roland Paris (2004), Mark Duffield (2002) and John Dryzek (2006). I examine some of the strengths and weaknesses they have to offer and ask what contribution they can make to a study of network governance in Kosovo.

Roland Paris and the Liberal Peace

The International peace-building mission in Kosovo operates largely according to a modified version of the 'liberal peace' thesis, which holds that the best way to ensure lasting peace in a post-conflict region is through the establishment of liberal democratic institutions and through a liberalised market economy (Paris 2004). This thesis has formed the basis of much conflict-related intervention by the international community and NGOs (ibid; Duffield 2002).

The concept and practice of the "liberal peace" has been extensively researched and reviewed by Paris (2004). The central notion is that liberal democracies and economies rarely go to war with each other. This has the theoretical implication that the best way to ensure peace in a post-conflict region is to build the institutions of liberal democracy and market capitalism (ibid). Arising from a review of research on post-conflict interventions by the international community in recent years, he has identified a number of problems with this peace-through-democracy policy, two of which I take up here.

In the first place Paris asserts that the 'liberal peace' thesis is severely under-researched (ibid). While there is substantial empirical data showing a correlation between democratic forms of government and peace, this body of evidence largely looks at established democracies. He argues that "the policy of promoting democracy necessarily involves *transforming* a state into a market democracy" and that "[m]ost scholarship on the liberal peace focuses on states that have already made this transition" (Paris 2004: 44; emphasis in original). What he calls for is more research that considers "both the end result of a successful transition to market democracy and the effects of the transition itself" (ibid: 44, 45). Moreover, he claims that in the absence of such research, "the strategy of promoting liberalisation as a means of fostering peace will remain an uncertain one" (ibid: 46).

The second problem of interest is the potential for rapid democratisation to re-enforce ethno-national divisions and hence the need for the involvement of outside actors in ensuring a politics of moderation often through actions that are remarkably undemocratic. To take one example, Paris recounts the democratisation of Bosnia in the mid-90s where early elections in 1996 saw Croat, Serb and Muslim voters elect representatives from the respective nationalist parties, in effect reinforcing the divisive ethnic cleavages on which bases the war was fought. As a response, several of the international peace-building agencies "sought to diminish the influence of the most extreme nationalists and simultaneously to increase the power of more moderate politicians" (ibid: 103). This was done in a quite blatant way, through "providing overt financial and political assistance to the more moderate candidates" (ibid: 104, 105). Paris concludes that "[o]nly by "rigging" the democratic process in favour of moderate politicians did peacebuilders succeed in installing a government in Republika Srpska that supported the full implementation

of the Dayton Accord" (ibid: 105). Such practice poses the question, how democratic is democratisation?

Seeking to address these knowledge gaps, Paris undertakes a substantial examination of a vast range of case studies of post-conflict intervention. Based on his review of such practices, Paris then recommends a strategy he terms *Institutionalization Before Liberalization* (IBL). IBL involves the presence of international peace-builders for a lengthy transition period. During this time, democratic sovereignty is suspended and administrative control is given to a body of actors from the international community who are charged with establishing and solidifying institutions of governance, security and justice. The peace-building mission in Kosovo is seen as an example of IBL in which there are "lessons learned and not learned" from previous intervention experiences (ibid).

While there is substantial empirical evidence for Paris' conclusions, there remain some conceptual problems, three of which are particularly interesting for this thesis. I outline below:

1. Narrow conception of Democracy.
2. Domestic reaction to foreign presence.
3. Motivations of Peace-builders

Narrow conception of Democracy

Although this is admitted quite openly by him, Paris reduces *democracy* essentially to representation. While this is a standard benchmark in most established theories of liberal democracy (Sørensen & Torfing 2005), I consider it inappropriate to uncritically accept such understandings in Kosovo. To be normatively acceptable, theories of liberal democracy rely on accepted borderlines between territorially defined political peoples as well as between political actors and civil society actors (ibid: 217). In Kosovo, neither of these two conditions hold as clearly defined as liberal democratic theorists would expect. Therefore I move to consider other forms or concepts of democracy.

Gaventa, for instance, has outlined 3 strands of practiced responses to identifiable problems with the spread of democracy: 1. Neoliberalism; 2. Renewed liberal representativeness, an approach which Paris' IBL strategy could be categorised as; and 3. Deepening democracy (2007). In addition to the practical strands mentioned above, there is a substantial body of theories of 'post-liberal democracy', for example discursive democracy, and power balance democracy, to name but two (for a good discussion of post-liberal theories of democracy see Sørensen & Torfing (2005); Sørensen & Torfing (2009)). I will return to examine these branching perspectives more thoroughly later. I mention them here to illustrate the possibilities to move beyond a narrow conception of Democracy in post-conflict situations.

Domestic reaction to foreign presence

Another problem with Paris' IBL strategy is that he appears to treat international peace-builders as somehow above the conflict and that therefore domestic populations or (un-)civil society groups will not object to prolonged foreign-controlled administration. As Hippler has pointed out, while Paris is "obviously right about the danger of political instability, which could produce a return to war, Paris seems to exaggerate the technical side of handling post-war situations and

underrates political pressure from the local population, which might not be satisfied with a quasi-colonial set-up" (Hippler 2008: 562). Indeed, it has been argued that the presence of the US and its allies in Afghanistan substantially contributed to the escalation in violence as they provided a common and identifiable 'enemy' with which the Taliban could recruit and build against (This argument is based on a similar argument made by Dryzek at a more general level (2006)).

Motivations of peace-builders

A related problem reveals itself when we consider why domestic populations might not be so happy with a quasi-colonial set-up. Throughout Paris' work there is an underlying assumption that peace-builders act and intervene purely with the motivations of building peace. However such a position is rather naïve when we consider the long history of conflict-related intervention, and more importantly, conflict-related non-intervention: "generally speaking, foreign military intervention is more likely in cases where the intervening powers have a strong self-interest" whether imperial, economic, strategic or otherwise (Hippler 2008: 565).

Mark Duffield and Global Governance

While Hippler cautions against an uncritical perception of conflict related intervention by the international community, Duffield instead gives an outright radical critique of the entire interventionist aid 'industry'. Where Paris views the presence of international actors as part of a flawed but nonetheless beneficial and necessary mission to ensure peace, Duffield views the 'aid industry' as a tool for Western governments to govern the conduct of populations in areas of conflict, turning them into subjects of the liberal peace (2002). In his words "[a]id can be seen as part of an emerging and essentially liberal system of global governance. It is embodied in public-private networks of aid practice that bring together donor governments, UN agencies, NGOs, private companies and so on" (2002: 1050). Through the technology of New Public Management, it is possible for Western donor governments to monitor and regulate the performance of agencies involved in policy making and policy implementation with a view to encouraging certain behaviour amongst the population. The certain behaviour that is to be encouraged is that displaying 'liberal' values of civility, rationality, restraint, and market based calculation.

According to Duffield this is done primarily through two mechanisms. The first is through quantitative performance indicators that allow the activities of agencies to be observed and encouraged through selective funding. In this way, organisations that perform favourably in the eyes of donor governments are supported while those deemed to be acting poorly or contrary to the interest of donors are stifled (ibid).

The second mechanism is through the discourse of 'coherence'. This involves "comprehensive and strategic planning" and "joined up government" whereby the different actors, organisations, departments etc. are encouraged to frame their multiple activities under a single, overarching coordinated goal (ibid).

There are four principal problems with Duffield's thesis. These relate to a lack of empirical testing, state centricity, an undifferentiated concept of 'donor governments', and the negotiated

nature of intervention. The first problem is the lack of empirical testing of his hypothesis. I hope that this research contributes to qualifying this narrative, as well as other narratives.

The second problem refers to Duffield's identification of 'donor governments' as the principal dominant actors. This ignores the role non-state donors have to play. For instance, it is quite possible that NGOs could equally be upwardly accountable to large businesses or diffusely accountable to individuals who donate money but who are unorganised and therefore cannot consciously articulate steering power. I will return to this criticism later.

The third problem with Duffield's thesis is that he sees 'donor governments' as a uniform body with a common interest that consciously and collectively organises and works to further this interest. To a certain extent this is confirmed by research. Grundmann, Smith and Wright, in their comparative research on representations of Western military intervention in Kosovo as portrayed in the French, German and British media, find that "during the Kosovan war there was a degree of synchronisation in the focus of public attention mediated through the press in three of the member states of the EU" (2000: 315). However, they caution that there were nonetheless "marked differences among the French, German and British papers studies in their contents and perspectives, dictated both by national contexts and by national agendas" (2000: 315).

The recognition of differentiated national agendas during a joint military campaign poses large questions over a generalised coherence in a context of peace-building, especially if we are to believe, as Duffield would have us, that such coherence is embodied in the practice of nominally independent NGOs. This points towards the need for research that focusses on the actions of peace-builders, while recognising the individual agency of all actors.

The final problem with Duffield is his reliance on the concept of discourse as an explanation of effecting change, without any real theory of decision making and social choice. This thesis then takes as its centre point how change can come about as a result of public decision-making involving negotiation between a range of actors.

John Dryzek and Discursive Contestation

In contrast to Duffield, Dryzek constructs the terrain of 'global governance' and 'international security' as a multiplicity of discourses, none of which are dominant (2006). While Dryzek does recognise that there have been and are attempts by western states and development institutions to establish hegemonic discourses ('market liberalism', ' sustainable development' and 'war on terror' are given as examples) he argues that "[d]iscourses get reproduced in the choices of the individuals subject to them" emphasising that "the ratio of questioning to obedience is not necessarily constant, and would appear to have undergone secular increased in recent decades" (2006: 112).

Apart from the discourse-agency element, Dryzek is also sceptical about the ability of states to mobilise their hegemonic discourses. He sees *hard power*, that is "unilateral discourse manipulation" such as the US 'war on terror', as problematic, as it can feed into and strengthen counter-discourses, namely those of Islamic extremists and anti-war protesters (2006: 109). Additionally, he sees *soft power*, that is "the ability to induce others to share one's values and goals, to attract them to one's viewpoint and to persuade them to engage in supportive actions" as similarly problematic (2006: 110). For a state to exercise soft power at a discourse level, it

must rely on quite a number of actors that are not under direct control of the state and who might also have different interests and seek to mobilise other (competing and/or complimentary) discourses.

These theoretical arguments of Dryzek pose problems for the Duffield thesis as it underlines two of the above criticisms, i.e. that it does not make sense to talk of one coherent discourse emanating from 'donor governments' and that even if that were the case, that hegemonic discursive power is limited. However Dryzek does recognise that the power to create and disseminate discourses is not distributed evenly, that certain actors have more capacity to mobilise their visions that others. What is important though is that the exercise of discursive agency, whether by a hierarchical state, a resourceful NGO or a municipal level official, this takes place within discursive fields and are themselves subjected to competing discourses.

So what does this imply for my goal to study emerging forms of governance of Kosovo? And how does this re-frame the question of how governance structures affect construction of urban narratives? The answer to the first question points immediately towards examining exactly these discursive fields where discursive agency takes place. Governance and policy making in Kosovo is characterised by the involvement of networks comprising multiplicities of multi-level actors and organisations. It is these networks that Paris sees as being responsible for building institutions of democracy and guaranteeing lasting peace. For Duffield, these networks function to facilitate and impose dominant discourses of Western governments. Finally, such a network seen through the lens of Dryzek is a platform allowing for the mobilisation and rational deliberation of competing and/or complementary discourses. These different viewpoints, although not comprehensive or even incompatible, present a knowledge gap, one that I seek to address.

2.3 Analytical Framework

To begin to an analysis of network governance and narrative mobilisation in Kosovo, theoretical understandings of *Network Governance* and of *Democracy* are essential. In this section I outline the theoretical orientation used in this thesis. In 2.3.1 I discuss the relevance of network governance in relation to the weaknesses identified in intervention theorists in the previous section. I then familiarise myself with leading (European) literature of network governance and also explore how it might be adapted to Kosovo. This is followed by a discussion of various post-liberal theories of democracy in 2.3.2, whereupon a theoretical grounding in deliberative and discursive democracy is developed.

2.3.1 Governance Network Theory

Theories of Governance Networks represent a transcending of the dichotomy between (often Marxist) political theorists of centralised control on the one hand, and pluralist theories of diffuse power on the other. Rather what governance network theories represent is that "power is structured in a few competing elites" (Rhodes 2007: 1250).

Network governance approaches allow us through the mapping of policy networks to identify what actor/organisations are involved in policy making. Additionally network theory allows us to see the plurality of goals that different actor/organisations within a network pursue, along with the various resources they can mobilise (e.g. funding, personnel, expertise, political legitimacy, security, etc.). Most importantly, governance network theories focus on methods of social decision-making amongst those involved, whether they are based on authoritative execution, aggregation, strategic bargaining or deliberation. In this way it becomes possible to empirically observe processes of governance, whether centrally coordinated *a la* Duffield and Paris, or diffusely contested *a la* Dryzek.

Generating empirical data using policy network analysis then makes possible the identification of possibilities for deliberation in governance in post-conflict Kosovo. Moreover, this can be done in a way that addresses the two knowledge gaps identified by Paris, the two problems identified with Paris' IBL strategy, and the four weaknesses I have identified in the Duffield thesis.

To pursue with this approach it is necessary to become familiar with both the literature on Network Theory and the literature on theories of deliberative democracy.

A theoretical understanding of Network Governance

Below I present a definition proposed by Sørensen and Torfing (2005), followed by an elaboration on all the key components of that definition, after which I discuss some of the most relevant aspects of this concept for this research.

Sørensen and Torfing, building on a careful and wide-ranging review of literature on governance networks, propose the following definition of a Governance Network:

1. “A relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent but operationally autonomous actors;
2. who interact through negotiations;
3. which take place within a regulative normative, cognitive and imaginary framework;
4. that to a certain extent is self-regulating; and
5. which contributes to the production of public purpose within or across particular policy areas”

(Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 203)

Building on the work of Marin & Mayntz (1991), Sørensen & Torfing establish that the first criteria implies that networks comprise “a number of private, semi-private and public actors” that are “*dependent* on one another” but also are necessarily “*operationally autonomous”* (2005: 203; emphasis in original). What brings them together into an analytical category is that they all have a stake in the issues of relevance and that they have access to material or immaterial resources that are of value to other actors, although the distribution of resources is often asymmetrical. Essential here is that the relations between actors are horizontal as opposed to vertical (ibid).

Secondly, the form of interaction between network actors is through negotiation. Negotiation here implies a balance between bargaining and deliberation. This balance is essential in order to allow actors to pursue their own interests on the one hand, thus guaranteeing their involvement, and to facilitate trust and collective action on the other, thus ensuring the functioning of the network. Put another way, “[d]eliberation takes place in a context of intense power struggles and the presence of disagreements, conflicts and social antagonism that means that political decisions will often be made on the basis of a “rough consensus” where grievances are unavoidable but tolerable” (ibid: 203).

Third, these negotiations take place within a “relatively *institutional framework”* (ibid: 204; emphasis in original). This implies that there is a shared understanding amongst the network actors on the institutional framework within which they operate but that this framework is itself partly a product of these negotiations. The *regulative* aspect of this definition implies a shared understanding of procedural rules; *normative* implies shared values; *cognitive* implying specialised knowledge that is constructed as necessary; and *imaginary* implying the construction of identities and visions (ibid; emphasis mine).

Forth, governance networks are self-regulating in that they have relative freedom from both hierarchical rule and from the laws of the market. The term *relative* freedom crucially implies that the actors within a network, as well as the network as an entity in and of itself, has some freedom to pursue its own ends but at the same time is subject to outside forces, be they market based, state based or otherwise.

Fifth, and most essentially, to be analytically included as a governance network, such an arrangement of actors must contribute to the production of public purpose. What is meant by ‘public purpose’ is “an expression of visions, understanding, values and polices that are valid for and directed towards the public” (ibid: 204).

I now wish to make some points about the relevance of this concept to the topic under research Firstly, and most importantly, point five indicates that governance networks contribute to public purpose. This criterion locates Governance Networks within the landscape of policy making, therefore focussing this analytical approach on the social world of policy and governance. This is

the social world that Paris recommends should be institutionalised before being liberalised, and the world that Duffield portrays as the apparatuses allowing western governments to govern at a distance.

Secondly, point one indicates the existence of a "relatively stable" collection of actors (ibid: 203). This contrasts with other theories of social networks (see for example Law's Actor-Network Theory (1992)) in that it implies that governance networks are not as fluid and have relatively clear boundaries. This allows for research to focus on interactions between a limited and identifiable group of actors.

The first criteria also mentions that network actors are *operationally autonomous,* signalling that they have different interests and agendas to pursue, relating to actions outside of a given network. These interests could be to deliver on an electoral mandate, to carry out projects in return for donor funds, to represent and pursue the goals of a grassroots pressure group, or to fulfil a commitment to the UN Security Council, for example.

In the fourth place, this point also indicates that network actors are *interdependent,* implying that they have access to material or immaterial resources that are of value to other actors within the network. The examples given in the previous paragraph could also easily be turned around as resources: electoral legitimacy, donor funding, grassroots support, or the backing of the international community, all of which can prove to be extremely valuable to actors/organisations who do not have access to them.

Fifth, the point is made that interaction takes place through negotiations. When this point is taken alongside the notions of operational autonomy and interdependence, we get a picture of deliberation that "takes place in a context of intense power struggles and the presence of disagreements, conflicts and social antagonism that means that political decisions will often be made on the basis of a 'rough consensus' where grievances are unavoidable but tolerable" (ibid: 203). This point is extremely important in the context of post war Kosovo. Here there are numerous disagreements; however a functioning network in a governance area of significance represents in some way the dealing with conflicts in a non-violent way. When we consider that the authors see negotiation as combining "elements of bargaining with elements of deliberation" (ibid: 203), it raises the question (one with which this thesis is centrally concerned): are disagreements to be dealt with on a normative basis of fairness (deliberation) or according to power games and resource mobilisation (bargaining)? Or, indeed, is there some other method of dealing with disagreements? Or does this facilitate *coherence* as Duffield implies (2002)?

A final quality of Governance Networks that is worth mentioning here is that such networks are relatively self-regulating, i.e. that they have relative freedom from both hierarchical rule and from the laws of the market. The term *relative* freedom crucially implies that the actors within a network, as well as the network as an entity in and of itself, has some freedom to pursue its own ends but at the same time is subject to outside forces, be they market based, state based or otherwise.

Situating network theory within theoretical knowledge gaps

In 2.2 I identified two problems with the liberal peace thesis that are raised by Paris, two problems with Paris' solution to the liberal peace thesis, Institutionalization Before

Liberalization, and four problems with Duffield's thesis of aid as global governance. Here I relate what governance network theory can contribute to each of these points.

First, a policy Network analysis will make a worthwhile contribution to the body of research on emerging processes of democratisation and institutionalisation in post-conflict state-building. A lack of research into this is one of the primary shortcomings in peace-building intervention by the international community according to Paris (2004).

Second, such an approach allows us to observe the workings of the international community, along with indigenous actors in the newly constructed (or under construction) institutions of democracy. This allows some insight into the democratic problems or potentials of such involvement and the implications for the stated aim of building democracy. By building on the enabling factors for deliberation and minimising the constraining factors, new emerging institutions can be made more deliberative and arguably, more democratic.

Thirdly, governance through networks implicitly implies transcending the notion of representativeness as a benchmark for democracy and opens up possibilities for new understandings of democratic governance. Such an approach offers hope for a peace-building strategy that does not require ceding democratic sovereignty to external actors, as IBL does.

Fourthly, governance network theories locate local actors alongside international actors in arenas of discursive contestation. Such an arrangement allows for the possibility for domestic actors to articulate an aversion (if, indeed there exists such an aversion) to what Hippler calls a "quasi-colonial set-up". In the case of such an aversion, analysis of contestation will give an indication of to what extent domestic public opinion tolerates suspended sovereignty and whether there exist strategies to deal with this.

Fifth, this represents a piece of empirical evidence against which Duffield's critiques of international involvement in post-war reconstruction efforts can be measured.

Sixth, observing the actions of agencies and organisations involved in policy games necessarily involves identifying the interests and agendas of each organisation and hence their backward accountability, whether towards donor governments, corporate donors, individuals, or combinations of those three. Therefore the state centricity of Duffield can be confirmed or denied.

Seventh, observing the multiplicity of international actor/organisations involved in policy making in Kosovo highlights the competing goals that they pursue. Therefore a differentiated view of what Duffield sees as a homogenous western interest should be revealed.

Finally, negotiated policy making involving numerous actor/organisations gives insight into inter-organisational decision-making, showing how hierarchical accountabilities are subjected to horizontally arranged power relations. Thus the largest problem with Duffield's work, that of how agendas of the metropolitans get transplanted onto the actual political landscape of the borderlands, can be addressed.

Network Governance: Towards an analytical scheme

As an analytical tool, this rigorous concept can be extremely useful in understanding the new forms of governance and policy making in Kosovo and their implications for the envisioning and democratisation of the newly constructed state. However, such theories are not without their drawbacks. As Roque and Shankland have rightly pointed out, most of literature on new forms of democracies and democratic experiments focus on contexts where the conditions for participation and deliberation are favourable (2007). Democratic theory and research is largely centred on western Europe and the US, along with some exceptional cases from the developing world, mostly in Latin America, while there is a dearth of research on emerging forms of democracies in situations with unfavourable conditions, such as "countries and regions with fragmented societies, high levels of inequality, restrictive legal frameworks, an authoritarian political culture and a history of armed conflict" (2007: 204). Nonetheless, some examples do exist of governance or policy network theories being applied in non-Western settings (see for example Hendrix (2010); Zheng et al (2010)).

Research into policy making in Kosovo in recent years confirms the presence of governance networks in the public landscape (see Gartska (2010)). Therefore I use this approach in my analysis of governance and policy-making in Kosovo as it is both valuable and contextually appropriate. Based on the previous discussion, governance network theory points to the following questions with respect to governance in post war Kosovo:

1. What institutional arrangements of governance are emerging in Kosovo?
2. What actors are involved in emerging governance structures?
3. What roles do such actors play both inside and outside of a given network?
4. What obligations do actors have to actors outside of a given network with respect to their activity within the network?
5. What material or immaterial resources do actors have access to/have potential to mobilise, that are of value to other actors within the network?
6. What issues are sources of disagreements or conflicts between actors?
7. What methods of decision-making are used to resolve or to generate a 'rough consensus' over such issues?
8. What are the factors influencing the adoption of certain modes of decision-making?

2.3.2 Discursive Deliberation

Relating back to questions Paris raised over democratic legitimacy of international involvement in Bosnia, similar questions arise over the democratic credentials of these governance networks. This is not simply a question of representativeness, a traditional benchmark for assessing liberal representative democracies. Not only do the underlying assumptions with the concept of representativeness not correspond to this new institutional landscape, but in the context of Kosovo, the very idea of the polity is itself contested, raising questions over who is to be or should be represented. What is needed is an analytical theory of democracy that is not prescriptive of organisational form, but one against which the process of governing through networks can be measured.

Sørensen and Torfing assert that governance networks, seen through the lens of most theories of liberal democracy, are a serious threat to democracy almost by definition, as they undermine

the fundamental institutions of liberal democracy: “governance networks undermine the crucial borderlines between territorially defined political communities; between the legislative and the executive powers; and between the political system and civil society” (2005: 217). However they argue that as the traditionally well-defined and accountable democratic institutions are unlikely to regain their former prominence, “[w]e must start searching for new models of democracy capable of democratically regulating governance processes as they take place today”(ibid: 217). Additionally, as mentioned previously, liberal democratic theory rests on the assumption of a broad correspondence between a geographical territory and a roughly homogenised people that might constitute a nation or at least a citizenry. In Kosovo such an assumption cannot be taken for granted and is actively opposed by the Serbian government in Belgrade and by certain Serb ‘parallel’ municipalities within Kosovo.

In a similar vein, although approaching from different perspective, Gaventa argues that there is a crisis with democracy in contemporary times, with many people sharing a widespread dissatisfaction with democratic institutions and disillusionment with the promise of democracy (2007). Accordingly, there have been three competing approaches to respond to such disillusionment:

1. a neoliberal approach, encouraging the weakening of the state and the transformation of citizens to consumers, with preferences expressed through market choices;
2. a liberal representative model, re-emphasising the need to construct solid reliable institutions of liberal representative democracy, much like what has been the stated aim of ‘liberal peace’ inspired post-conflict peace-building interventions by the international community; and
3. ‘deepening democracy’ where “democracy is not only a set of rules, procedures and institutional design” but instead is “a process through which citizens exercise ever-deepening control over decisions which affect their lives through a number of forms and a variety of arenas” (ibid: xii). In this way “the meanings and forms of democracy are constantly under construction” (ibid: xiii).

Let us then take a closer look at each of the options and their implications for post-conflict peace-building. The first choice, the neoliberal model is simply not feasible in a post-conflict situation. The dangers associated with weak states and violent conflicts have been well documented (Hippler 2008; Paris 2004).

The second option, that of liberal representativeness is what Paris has researched. His conclusions have been discussed above.

The third option, that of deepening democracy sounds promising but at this stage is very vague. Therefore I will explore this strategy some more. Gaventa further outlines 3 distinct but not incompatible strands of ‘deepening democracy’:

1.Invest in Civil Society
2.Participatory Governance
3.Deliberative Democracy (2007)

While all are promising and initially attractive, it must be said that all three rest on a normative assumption: that citizens (and civil society) are motivated and willing to participate in governance and that state actors are welcoming and willing to listen and share decision-making power with them, an assumption that research in the emerging field has discredited (Cornwall &

Coelho 2007). Such a criticism poses the question, 'where do we start?' and also offers in some way an answer. While investing in 'civil society' or opening governance forums to further participation makes little sense if citizens or civil society organisations and elites simply do not wish to meet each other on an equal footing, the third strand, deliberative democracy "focuses more on the nature and quality of deliberation when citizens *do* come together for discussion and debates in public spaces" (Gaventa 2007: xiv; emphasis added). Put another way, the third condition can be seen as a pre-requisite for the first two to be of any value. Such an approach can be applied to the study of governance networks without making fatal normative assumptions about citizen participation or strength of civil society. In such an approach, these assumptions are transformed into variables or factors that might have an impact on quality of discussion.

Deliberative Democracy

Fung and Wright have made extensive conceptual work in the field of deliberative democracy (2001). From an examination of a number of experiments, they deduce a number of principles and from that construct a model they term "Empowered Deliberative Democracy" or EDD. This model is built upon the following three principles:

1. A focus on specific problems
2. Bottom-up Participation
3. Deliberative Solution Generation

While the first principle is of some relevance to my study of network governance in Kosovo, the second one is not (at least not initially; see the arguments above). The third principle however, is extremely valuable. The authors differentiate deliberation from 3 other methods of social choice: a) command and control; b) aggregative voting; and c) strategic negotiation.

Command and control corresponds to vertical authoritarianism, where elites, be they politicians, experts, scientists or bureaucrats exercise exclusive decision-making power, insulated from broad participation (ibid).

Decision-making through aggregation involves a selected group of individuals (a national electorate, a parliament, or a governance network, who express their own, self-interested preferences, with one of those preferences being selected by an algorithm, often majority rule. What distinguishes aggregative from deliberative social choice is that voters are "expected to vote according to their own self-interest, without needing to consider the reasonableness, fairness, or acceptability of that option to others" (Fung & Wright 2001: 20).

Strategic negotiation implies that parties "use decision-making procedures to advance their own unfettered self-interest backed by resources and power they bring to the table" (Fung & Wright 2001: 21). This mode of social choice is characteristic of union-business negotiations or bilateral trade deals. It is a method of social choice that aggregative voting seeks to mitigate against through the redistribution of (decision-making) power, in the form of votes.

In contrast to the above three modes of group decision-making, deliberation involves selected participants listening and considering all possible proposed solutions, and generating a group solution based on normative goals of reasonableness and fairness for all those involved, as opposed to narrow self-interest (ibid).

As should be obvious, the methods outlined above are ideal types. It is quite normal for any practical situation to involve combinations of all four methods. For instance, many institutions of

representative democracies such as national parliaments nominally operate on the basis of 'one member, one vote'. As such, this might be described on paper as aggregative voting. However, in most cases, such a parliament is usually *de facto* controlled by a majority alliance, who exercise command and control over the legislature through forming a voting bloc. Such a majority alliance is often comprised of multiple parties with differing priorities, who agree to share power. Such an agreement will involve a combination of differing agendas, with the preferences of the larger parties (who have more votes) most visibly represented. If such an alliance involves parties with substantial differences in interests and priorities we might expect decision-making to involve strategic bargaining. If on the other hand, such parties are closely aligned, with only a narrow range of issues separating them, we might instead expect decision-making to contain more elements of deliberation.

While Fung and Wright present deliberation as one of four ideal type methods of social choice, they nevertheless prescribe deliberation as normatively more desirable that the others (2001: 21).

Discursive Democracy

Discursive democracy is another such post-liberal theory of democracy. Discursive theories of post-liberal democracy see 'democracy' as a means to regulate political conflict, but at the same time they try to combine conflictual approaches with an "integrative understanding of subjectivity as an outcome of identity formation conditioned by contingent hegemonic discursive articulations" (Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 225). Accordingly, some of the key questions raised by such theorists are "how the best conditions for discursive contestation are created, and how discursive images of the polity and the political issues produce patterns of inclusion and exclusion" (ibid: 226).

Dryzek constructs a model of deliberative democracy (2006). In his words, "discursive democracy rests on a tension between two related phenomena: first, the importance of discourses in ordering the world (and its conflicts); and, second, the potential for the structure of discourses itself to become the target of decentralized reflection and conscious action" (ibid: 105). Moreover he argues that discursive democracy can be practised even in the absence of formal institutions. This works through influencing relevant decision makers with the capacity to effect change, be they states, parliaments, agencies, networks, or individuals. This implies that it is possible to make a democratic assessment of unaccountable (according to the standards of liberal representative democracy) institutions such as governance networks, based on their capacity to *practice* discursive deliberation.

What is crucially important for assessing this practice is that "[d]iscourses get reproduced in the choices of the individuals subject to them" (ibid: 112) but that "power (however "soft") is distributed unequally, and some actors are more capable than others when it comes to creating and disseminating meanings and discourses" (ibid: 115). This directs the attention of the researcher to deliberation through the *negotiation* in networks as the arena where decisions are made as to what discourses are to be disseminated and hence what identities and narratives are to be constructed.

Discursive Deliberative Democracy: Towards an analytical scheme

So how does this discussion relate to my goal of studying governance networks in Kosovo? In the first place, in order to overcome the reliance on liberal democracy as a concept of democracy, and thus to avoid the double trapping of viewing network governance as essentially undemocratic on the one hand and democratisation as contrary to the goals of peace-building on the other, we can instead see governance networks as neither state-weakening (as the neoliberal model advocates) nor as an authoritarian attempt to 'impose' liberal democratic institutions (as in IBL), but as having potential for 'deepening democracy' in the post-conflict city.

Secondly, we can see the potential of governance networks for deepening democracy primarily in their capacity to function as arenas of deliberation rather than investing in civil society or as forums for participatory governance

Third, discursive democracy is seen as a democratic practices of (re)constructing inter-subjective meanings and identities (Dryzek 2006; Sørensen & Torfing 2005). From this perspective, the question is raised, what inter-subjective discourses and narratives are constructed in network governance?

Fourth, as Sørensen and Torfing argue, interaction in governance networks should theoretically take a form that is partial bargaining and partial deliberation (2005). The above discussion of Fung and Wright's typologies of social choice then lead to the question, what forms of decision-making are practiced in governance networks in Kosovo?

Fifth, both Dryzek (2006) and Fung and Wright (2001) offer normative justifications to prioritise deliberation as preferred mode of social choice. Such a normative position leads to the question of how conditions of discursive deliberation and contestation are created. Put another way, what factors enable or constrain deliberation as a practiced method of social choice over others in governance networks in Kosovo?

In summary, post-liberal theories of discursive deliberative democracy offer an ideal-type benchmark against which to view the democratic practice of network governance. Significantly such theories are undecided on the democratic implications of governance networks seeing the potential to make a positive contribution on the one hand, for example through widening the scope for discursive contestation through the involvement of diverse actors, but also to negatively affect democracy on the other, for example through transforming pluralist debate into a hegemonic discourse (Sørensen & Torfing 2005). Rather than seek to give a definitive answer to this dilemma, the following questions will be asked:

1. To what extent do governance networks in Kosovo function as arenas of discursive deliberation?
2. What inter-subjective discourses and narratives are produced through network governance?
3. What forms of decision-making are practiced in governance networks?
4. What factors enable or constrain deliberation as a practiced method of social choice over others in governance networks in Kosovo?

2.4 Governance Area: Towards a theory of Urban Regeneration

Following from the above discussion and from the research questions, my selection of case studies of governance areas and policy games will aim to fulfil two principal functions. On the one hand, the selected issues must have outcomes which in some way embody the preferred discourse of the network. That is, they should embody the visions and stories over which there is "rough consensus" over. On the other hand, for this research to be of significance to the body of research on post-conflict democratisation, the subjects of research must have some element of relevance to the conflict. Put another way, the issues I choose to look at, when dealt with by networks of multi-level actors and organisations, the negotiation and decisions over these issues must in some way represent a democratising of an issue that might otherwise be dealt with by other (non-peaceful) means.

An emerging field of study is that of post-conflict urban planning and its efforts at physical image enhancement, construction of identity and cultural regeneration in cities characterised by conflict and contestation. It is argued in the literature that urban regeneration is a question "not only about how authority is mediated through urban design, but how urban space becomes an arena of conflict" (Kallus & Kolodney 2010: 405).

To take an historical example, independence from Britain of the former colonies of the United States of America was symbolically marked by the erection of the statue of liberty, a gift from the French. This statue depicts the value of "liberty enlightening the world", an aspiration that even today is easily recognisable in political rhetoric in the US.

Similarly, the 'tearing down' of the Berlin Wall in 1989 has come to be equated in popular discussion with year zero for an almost uniform establishment of people's democracies and liberal capitalism across all of Eastern Europe and Russia. Such a narrative is an extraordinary distortion of reality, yet carries a substantial explanatory power today.

A somewhat contrasting and more recent example is that of the staged demolition and possibly unintentional decapitation of the statue of Saddam Hussein in Bagdad in 2003 to mark the end of the authoritarian regime and to usher in a new dawn of liberty and democracy. Eight years later such a goal seems as far away as ever, suggesting that such public and physical embodiment of particular narratives has little influence on shaping reality (for an interesting paper on the use of the staged event in producing victory, see Aday et al (2005)) . However such a conclusion can only be reached if one ignores the temporary lifespan of the initial official goals of US military intervention: to find weapons of mass-destruction. Such a popular but transitory goal should be contrasted with those that were established and engraved in the demolition of Saddam Hussein's statue, goals that have proved to be increasingly unpopular with the American public, yet find remarkable longevity and persistence as an obstacle to American military withdrawal.

While such examples serve to declare victories of one form or another, there also exists scholarly work on public space of poly-ethnic cities, where the focus is on some form of co-existence rather than a clear victory of one side. Writing about the Palestinian neighbourhood of Wadi Nisas in the Jewish city of Haifa, Israel, Kallus and Kolodney take as their analytical subject the 'co-existence route' through the traditional Arab centre of the neighbourhood (2010). Consisting of "[s]pecifically designated trails marked with painted yellow footprints" this tourist route has the effect that "the entire public space is transformed into an arena of coexistence"

(Kallus & Kolodney 2010: 412). In such a way, they argue, “the public space is inevitably linked to the construction of power relations and thus becomes a highly contested arena” (Kallus & Kolodney 2010: 406).

To give another example of such scholarly work, this time on the divided city of Belfast, Northern Ireland, Neill and Ellis write that “[s]ince a great deal of the established cultural life of the city remains too sensitive and controversial to facilitate a common vision of place, the image makers have preferred instead to turn to the shock of the new” (2008: 99). Writing of the recent flagship developments of Belfast they assert that “[g]lass is now the representational form of choice for development in the post-conflict city, offering as it does an obvious contrast to the brutalist terror-proofed buildings of the ‘troubles’” (Neill and Ellis 2008: 99).

These two sets of examples reflect a changing approach to post-conflict urban planning. Building on the work of Charlesworth (2006), Garstka notes that a traditional approach to urban reconstruction “prioritizes the rebuilding of the physical landscape by ’heroic’ architects, planners, and designers with the understanding that rebuilding leads to a quick renewal of everyday life and sense of normalcy in areas affected by conflict” (2010: 87). By contrast, a ‘newer’ approach emphasises “rebuilding civil society through the reconstruction, building, and urban planning of the built environment” (ibid: 87). Such a shift reflects the awareness that urban physical enhancement cannot be removed or be seen as above the conflict. A traditional top-down approach often results in a “bias scripting of urban narratives” reflecting “the stories and histories of the victors” whilst simultaneously “un-scripting the historical narratives of others – often the defeated” (ibid: 87). Such an approach is clearly reflected in the examples of the Statue of Liberty, the Berlin Wall and the Saddam Hussein statue given above.

Whereas the first approach is characterised by centralised expertise, the second approach emphasises a participatory and democratic process of design, where the city is rebuilt by civil-society, ideally from mixed political and ethnic communities, as opposed to a single, heroic architect (Charlesworth 2007). In such a way, urban renewal becomes a tool to rebuild a conflicted urban community by “providing the venue and platform for post-conflict dialogue and interaction” (Garstka 2010: 87).

There are two criticisms that might be raised about the feasibility and scientific validity of researching aspects of urban regeneration as representations of discourses of policy makers. Firstly, it could be argued that, like representations in the news media, flagship developments and cultural festivals rely on external actors. While this is partially true, it is also the case that architectural designers and public relations agencies are being increasingly incorporated into governance network circles, and so have influence and are influenced by the negotiated process (Garstka 2010). This was found to be the case during research.

Secondly, it can be argued that although those in power have the capacity to narrate their visions and identities into the urban fabric of the city, the people who live in the city have relative freedom to re-interpret and re-define the meanings of particular physical aspects of the city through their everyday use. This is a valid argument. However it does not take away from the capacity of governance network actors to shape developments with the meanings they attach to them. It is possible to expand this research to include how urban planning policy is re-shaped by the people who live there, although this is not included as part of this research report.

In addition to the above defence, I would like to give three reasons in favour of my selection of governance areas. Post-conflict Urban Planning has the following advantages for my research:

1.Access. It is more likely that a researcher can gain access to actors involved in urban planning than policy makers in the area of returning refugees, for example.
2.Urban planning is considered by many to be 'non-political'. Therefore there is more possibility for interviewees to feel free to talk about their experience in policy discussions, without feeling attacked, getting defensive, or giving PR-type interviews.
3.Aspects of urban regeneration give a uniquely frank insight into how policy makers view their city, and how they would like to see it develop. Additionally, they form part of attempts to construct identity for a city and a people, something of crucial value in a contested state. Put another way, urban regeneration projects constitute those attempts at identity formation by hegemonic discursive articulations that Sørensen & Torfing refer to (2005).

The above discussion then points in the direction of the following questions in the context of network governance in Prishtina:

1.What urban narratives are embodied in urban projects in Prishtina?
2.What identities are constructed in such narratives (e.g. Albanian, Serb, cosmopolitan, youth, tradition, tolerance etc.)?
3.How are such outcomes produced in governance networks?
4.To what extent do governance networks provide a "venue and platform for post-conflict dialogue and interaction"?

2.5 Summary of Theoretical Framework

In this chapter I have discussed and interlinked theories and approaches to the fields of post-conflict democratisation, network governance, deliberative democracy, and post-conflict urban design. This discussion has pointed towards urban governance networks as a valuable arena to conduct research so as to further understanding of emerging forms of governance and democratisation. Within such an arena, I am lead to urban planning and cultural design as an area of governance of huge importance in constructing an identity of a country, a city, its peoples and its political future. Finally we have been offered a normative goal of deliberation as a preferred method of decision-making over such important matters.

In seeking to conduct my research, and to realise my research objective, I am pointed towards asking the following questions:

With respect to forms of governance:

1.What institutional arrangements of governance are emerging in Kosovo?
2.What actors are involved in emerging governance structures?
3.What roles do such actors play both inside and outside of a given network?
4.What obligations do actors have to actors outside of a given network with respect to their activity within the network?
5.What material or immaterial resources do actors have access to/have potential to mobilise, that are of value to other actors within the network?

6.What issues become sources of disagreements or conflicts between actors?
7.What methods of decision-making are used to resolve or to generate a 'rough consensus' over such issues?
8.What are the factors influencing the adoption of certain modes of decision-making?

With respect to urban renewal:

1.What urban narratives are embodied in urban projects in Prishtina?
2.What identities are constructed in such narratives (e.g. Albanian, Serb, cosmopolitan, youth, tradition, tolerance etc.)?
3.How are such outcomes produced in governance networks?
4.To what extent do governance networks provide a "venue and platform for post-conflict dialogue and interaction"?

With respect to deliberation:

1.What forms of decision making are practiced in governance networks in Kosovo?
2.What factors enable deliberation as a practiced mode of social choice in governance networks in Prishtina?
3.What factors lead to the practice of other modes of social choice in governance networks?

The analytical framework is represented by the scheme depicted in Figure 1:



Figure 1 Analytical Framework

Chapter 3 Methodology: Selection of Cases Studies, Data Collection and Data analysis

This chapter outlines the methodology used to conduct the research on which this report is based. It begins with a description of the selection of case studies, followed by a discussion of the methodologies used. Next it is outlined how the collected data is analysed. The analytical framework described here is used for the findings chapters (Chapters 4-6). This chapter concludes with a brief discussion of ethical considerations.

3.1 Selection of Case Studies

I have selected three case studies of specific issues of urban renewal in Prishtina, dealt with in the context of governance through networks. These issues are of Christ the Saviour Cathedral (see Chapter 4), the Newborn monument, as part of the Declaration of Independence Celebrations (see Chapter 5), and of Prishtina International Film Festival (see Chapter 6). These cases are described briefly below:

Christ the Saviour Cathedral

The Serbian Orthodox Church began constructing Christ the Saviour Cathedral (see Figure 2) during the 1990s, in close proximity to the University of Prishtina. The outer construction was completed but with escalating violence construction of the interior was put on hold. During and after the conflict, the cathedral has been the subject of vandalism and graffiti and one unsuccessful attempt to destroy it with explosives. As a response, it was put under the protection of UNMIK, along with many other Orthodox churches after the NATO intervention in 1999. During the years of UNMIK administration, dialogue was difficult between the relevant stakeholders, the Serbian Orthodox



Figure 2 Christ the Saviour Cathedral

Church, the Ministry of Culture, and the University of Prishtina. However, in recent years, mechanisms of communication have emerged involving the European Union Special Representative and the Greek Liaison Office as mediators, sponsored by the International Civilian Office.

Newborn Monument

The Newborn Monument, a typographic sculpture in the centre of Prishtina, was unveiled as part of the official celebrations marking the Declaration of Independence on February 17th 2008 (see Figure 3[10]). It consists of seven yellow, steel, three-meter high letters, spelling the word 'NEWBORN'. As part of the unveiling ceremony, the sculpture was covered in thousands of signatures and autographs, and messages, led by the Prime Minister and the President of Kosovo. After the celebrations opened to the sound of fireworks, "firecrackers and celebratory gunfire"[11], the monument was unveiled in front of thousands and the signings of the monument were led by the President and Prime Minister of Kosovo (Pristina in your pocket 2009).

Figure 3 The Newborn Monument is unveiled

The monument was designed by Prishtina-based advertising agency, Ogilvy|Karrota as part of the wider celebrations, organised by public relations company B2 PR and Media Solutions in close consultation with the Office of the Prime Minister. A strong desire to create a festive atmosphere, yet to avoid aggravating tensions is evident in the campaign slogan "Celebrate with Dignity: For Kosovo" and in the absence of the colour red, the national colour of Albania, on the Newborn Monument. Original plans to have the sculpture repainted annually have not materialised.

Prishtina International Film Festival

September 2011 saw the third edition of the Prishtina International Film Festival (PriFilmFest), establishing the festival firmly within Prishtina's cultural calendar (see Figure 4[12]). According to its website, the mission and objective of the film festival is "to open doors of the newest country in the world, Kosovo, to welcome different cultures of the world through cinema, using it as a medium to promote open dialogue between cultures and nations"[13]. The

Figure 4 PriFilmFest Opening night 2009

festival is organised by the Board of PriFilmFest and is supported by, amongst others, the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports; the Embassy of Italy; and by the European Commission Liaison Office[14]. Honorary president of the PriFilmFest Board is British Actress Vanessa Redgrave. Also sitting on the Board is festival director Vjosa Berisha, whose PR company, B2 PR & Media Solutions was involved in managing the official celebrations surrounding the Declaration of Independence.

Discussion of Selection

Selection of governance issues has been informed by my research question and objective and by the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2. It is intended that selection provides meaningful cases that can be explored and analysed using the analytical framework developed in Chapter 2, and that also offer possibilities to answer the research question. To fulfil these purposes, the following criteria was used in selecting cases-studies:

1. Case studies involve making a contribution to public purpose. As noted previously, Sørensen and Torfing define governance networks according to this criterion, which locates networks under investigation in the public realm (2005).
2. Selected cases involve a number of different actors and organisations. This gives researched cases of urban governance a network form, making them suitable subjects for the analytical framework developed in Chapter 2.
3. Issues of urban governance were chosen purposefully so as to be characterised by the involvement of various types of actors, for example internationally mandated organisations, state and non-state actors, civil society, representatives of different ethnic groups, political, religious, and private companies.
4. The selected governance networks comprise struggles over construction of urban identities for post-war Prishtina.
5. Case studies have been chosen with the intention of exploring struggles over a variety of discursive identities.

This selection was purposeful in that in selecting these case studies I did so with the intention of selecting cases of urban governance that to a certain extent fit the network governance model described in Chapter 2. In doing so, this selection bias will confirm the presence of network-type governance in the public landscape of Prishtina policy making by default. However, in selecting these case studies I have focused only on 2 elements of governance networks: the public orientation and the involvement of multiple actors in decision-making. Such a selection is not prescriptive of other elements such as interdependency, operational autonomy, horizontality, regulatory framework or norms of decision-making. Such elements remain as variables within research.

3.2 Data Collection

Overview of Methodology

Two research methods were used in data collection. These are documentary analysis and semi structured interviews. These methodologies were used in two stages of research: the first stage of exploratory research undertaken in the Netherlands, using only documentary based methods, and a second stage of field research in Prishtina lasting from March to June of 2011, in which both methodologies were used.

My research involved collecting the following data:

- 28 news media pieces, including newspaper articles, press releases, blog posts, online comments, notices
- 22 reports and publications, including activity/annual reports, reports to the UN Security Council, Policy briefings, investigative/consultancy reports from organisations such as the UN, ICG, ICO, ECLO, UNICEF
- 4 legal documents including property papers, UN Resolutions and Ahtisaari Plan
- 19 websites of key organisations
- 15 individuals interviewed representing organisations such as SOC, ICO, CoE, PR agencies, PriFilmFest, Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, Vetëvendosje, and some 'non-aligned' individuals speaking in personal capacities.
- 5 items of promotional material including newsletters and festival programmes
- 38 videos and images from relevant PR campaigns

Data collection involved two distinct types of goals: 1) to explore and reconstruct models of network decision making for each governance area, referred to; and 2) to interpret actors' individual experiences, perceptions and strategies in that network. While the first goal reflects a somewhat socio-historical approach, the second belongs to a more interpretivist, constructivist approach.

Discussion of Methodology

The methodologies employed for research have been documentary analysis and individual, semi-structured interviews. These methods are most appropriate for generating the types of knowledge and data sought in this thesis. Such a choice of methodology is reflected in other research on governance and policy networks (see for example Griffiths (2010); Hendrix (2010); Kapucu (2005); and Zheng et al (2010)). Documentary analysis offers the following advantages as an exploratory research method:

- It is useful for generating findings reflecting a socio-historical epistemology
- A large quantity of data can be taken from freely accessible documents via the internet. This provides a wealth of information for a low cost in terms of resources such as time, personal contacts, travel, and money.
- Documents can provide a good overview or background knowledge to a case study. This has provided a good basis with which to inform second stage follow-up research.
- With a documentary analysis I was able to identify the key actors, patterns of communication between actors, some contentious issues and some key events.

- Different documentary sources can give different takes on events, indicating different perceptions that various actors hold.

However, a documentary analysis was also subject to the following drawbacks and limitations:

- There is likely to be a biased selection when choosing documents. There is a particular danger of finding sources from actors who speak English, who wish to communicate to an international audience, and who are well organised. In turn this is likely to lead to an underrepresentation of voices of community based organisations or individuals. I tried to combat this through purposeful selection of interviewees who were underrepresented in documentary data (see below).
- Documents did not generate in-depth insights into decision-making processes.
- There are many documents available on the internet that contain large amounts of information that is not relevant to my research. Thus a significant amount of time was spent sifting through non-relevant data
- The reliability of information is sometimes questionable (e.g. from biased news media). When I suspected this, I tried to increase reliability through comparing questionable data with that from other sources.

Semi-structured individual interviews as a second stage of follow-up research were used to address some of these drawbacks:

- Selection bias was combated through purposeful selection of interviewees who were underrepresented in documentary based data.
- With semi-structured individual interviews I had the opportunity to focus in-depth on topics that I judged to be especially relevant to this thesis.
- Recollections of various actors could be compared with each other and to documents to get a fuller picture of what counts as reliable information and what doesn't.

In addition, semi-structured interviews had the following further advantages:

- Decision making in networks relies a lot on various actors' perceptions of problems, solutions and events. In this way, research leans towards an interpretivist or constructivist epistemology. Interviews were an appropriate research methodology for such an approach in that such different interpretations were brought to the surface.
- Narrative-based. Since part of this research focusses on particular events that have happened in the recent past, and since different interviewees place different emphases on events, it is important that questioning allows the respondent some freedom to steer the interview to events they consider subjectively important. Such freedom is not possible in survey methods for example. Semi-structured interviews have proven to be a good method to allow various narratives to be constructed. Nevertheless, it was also important that I as researcher could direct the interview to topics that I wish to have explored, in a way that answers my research questions.
- Establishing contacts with interviewees has also offered the possibility to do follow up interviews with the same people, to access relevant documents, and to make contact with other relevant stakeholders.

Although semi-structured individual interviews have the advantages outlined above, it is important to be aware of the limitations of such an approach.

- First, I depend on people agreeing to be interviewed. If many people do not agree to be interviewed, or if certain key actors do not agree, then this results in an incomplete picture of my case studies. When this happened I tried to complete the missing picture as much as possible with complimentary documentary evidence.
- I predicted that for many interviews I would have to work with an interpreter. This would raise questions over the accuracy of translated interviews and require additional financial resources. As it happened I secured the services of two people who agreed to translate, one Albanian, one Serb, at no cost. However, there was only one interview in which a translator was needed (from Serbian). All other interviews took place in English, although when contacting organisations I made it clear that I could interview in Albanian or Serbian. There is a possibility that this has produced a bias selection of respondents. However, the research area is more likely to have produced this bias. As Rhodes has argued, a "core claim" of policy network theory is that "is that power is structured in a few competing elites" (Rhodes 2007: 1250). As is discussed in Chapter 9, I found that the ability to speak English appears to be an element of cultural capital necessary for gaining access to governance networks, comprising domestic political actors, international organisations, and private companies, both from Kosovo and abroad.
- There was the possibility that some respondents would give PR-type interviews or that people might be unwilling to talk freely about politically sensitive topics, especially if publication of their opinions could compromise their official roles. I was particularly concerned that this would be the case for well-organised actors and on issues of particular political sensitivity. This was overcome in part by keeping respondents anonymous as much as possible, and through interviewing different people about the same events. I have tried in my analysis to remove 'PR bias' where the goal is to reconstruct governance processes, and to discursively analyse 'PR constructions' where the goal is to interpret experiences, strategies, and narratives .
- Individual interviews require a certain degree of privacy. This is brought up in much literature on qualitative social research. In general I found that this was not a problem. Interviews were largely conducted in offices or in cafés that were not busy.

In considering methodological approaches I also considered Participant observation and group based interviews. However I decided against using these research methods. I concluded that participant observation is not feasible as there is no single 'site' where decisions take place (Teisman 2000). Additionally, using participant observation methods necessitates studying an on-going governance process, most of which unfold over the course of years rather than weeks. Such a time-scale is inappropriate for a Master thesis.

I also decided against conducting group based-interviews. I undertake this research specifically to bring divergent perceptions of events to the surface, whereas in a group setting, actors are more likely to talk about aspects they agree upon. Probing for divergent interpretations is then likely to lead to conflict and a breakdown in the interview, something that is both impractical and unethical. Secondly, group-based interviews are also likely to hide personal experiences. Respondents are more likely to talk highly of the overall process when in the company of other who were also part of the process. Third, group interviews are susceptible to domination by the most extroverted actors, or by those holding the highest political or organisational positions. Finally, problems of access associated with individual interviews are compounded when trying to get a number of key actors to participate in a focus group interview.

In light of the above discussion, I decided to use only documentary analysis and semi-structured individual interviews as data collection methods

3.3 Data Analysis

Data was analysed according to the analytical framework developed in Chapter 2. Data was used first to reconstruct a narrative of the historical unfolding of the issues at hand using Teisman's *decision-making rounds* (2000). Data, particularly interviews, is analysed extracting social constructions of important *key events* which are used to demarcate different *rounds* of public decision-making. This allows a socio-historical narrative to be constructed of how issues were decided upon in a dispersed pubic space. The purpose of this stage of data analysis is to order data in a way that minimises bias from the researcher (demarcation of decision-making rounds is based primarily on respondents' own perceptions of what constitute the most important events). A second purpose is to provide a coherent picture of how the issues under consideration evolved, from which urban narratives and governance networks can then be identified.

Secondly, key urban narratives or discourses are identified and analysed according to how actors refer particular issues or events surrounding examples of urban regeneration. It is then analysed how different narratives are mobilised by certain actors as strategies, how narratives are themselves effect change, and how different narratives interact with each other. This is done according to the socio-historical framework developed.

Thirdly, relevant *governance networks* are identified and their effect on narrative mobilisation analysed. This is done through analysing how the actions of individual actors within the context of a governance network, relations between actors, and a shared framework of governance effect construction and mobilisation of different narratives in the urban landscape.

Finally, relevant instances of group decision-making are selected and analysed according to how they reflect different methods of social choice (command, voting, bargaining, or deliberation). It is examined what factors facilitate more deliberative decision-making and in what ways is deliberative social choice acted against.

The analytical framework is depicted in Figure 5.



Figure 5 Analytical Framework

Assumptions

In undertaking this analytical scheme, the following working assumptions are used:

1. The organisation is the unit of analysis. This is assumed apart from the PriFilmFest foundation discussed in Chapter 6, which has blurred boundaries between central organisers and volunteers. This assumption is particularly relevant for analysis of deliberation between actors. In this context, the individual people representing an organisation may deliberatively negotiate with each other based on their capacity as representatives of that organisation, not in a personal capacity. In this respect, while the working assumption implies a large degree of hierarchical command *within* organisations, it allows for the possibility for horizontal relations *between* organisations.
2. Governance actors have the power to disseminate discourses in their decisions. Although it is always possible for other actors to re-interpret or reshape discourses, the focus of this research is on how governance actors construct and mediate narratives.
3. Discourses and narratives are assumed to be both shaped by actors, and shapers of actions. It is acknowledged that there is considerable debate about the power of discourses in relation to individual agency. However, the working assumption of this thesis is that, following Dryzek, on the one hand discourses play a role in shaping the world, but on the other, discourses get reproduced in the actions of actors, and actors have the capacity to mobilise certain frames as part of a strategy of collective action (2006) (see also Benford & Snow (2000)).

3.4 Ethical Considerations

Throughout the entire process of completing this thesis, but especially during the data collection, there are ethical concerns that must be taken into account. Of particular importance are my ethical considerations towards the interests of stakeholders. Below I outline these considerations for each group of stakeholders:

Interviewees

The interests and desires of those who agree to be interviewed by me must be respected. When wishing to record an interview, I informed respondents about this, and only proceeded if the respondent was agreeable. Requests for “off the record” interviews and for anonymity have been respected.

In conducting this research diverging perspectives on networked processes across organisations with differing degrees of authority have been revealed to me. In cases where publishing certain insights would jeopardise the professional career of my respondents I have either consulted this person or hidden their identity.

During data collection I have remained aware of political or conflict related sensitivities for interviewees. In line with this I have been careful not to cause undue emotional distress to people during interviews. Additionally, as mentioned previously, I have refrained from conducting group-based interviews as in-depth discussion of contentious issues could incite conflict between adversaries.

Actors implicated in research:

There are certain actors mentioned in this report who I have not interviewed but whose actions are described in detail and have been referred to by other respondents and in documentary evidence. Although every effort was made to contact such people, there are some who did not agree to be interviewed or for whom it has not been possible to interview within the timeframe of this report. However I still have ethical responsibilities towards these people and effort has been made to uphold the good name of such persons as far as is possible.

Wageningen University

While I was in the field, I used the name of Wageningen University in contacting organisations and respondents. Throughout this time I remained constantly aware of how my conduct reflects upon the good name of Wageningen University.

Those affected by findings and recommendations of research

In conducting normative research recommendations are being made that, if acted upon, will have an impact on certain people. It is therefore of the upmost importance that the normative goals of this research are ethical ones. The principal norm of this research is that of encouraging more deliberative governance, a norm I consider to be ethical. However, in certain circumstances, pursuing more deliberative and inclusive governance can lead to renewed tensions, violence and instability. Where I perceive this to be the case I have made clear the possible negative effects of pursuing the principal norm of deliberative governance.

Chapter 4 Case Study 1: Christ the Saviour Cathedral

Figure 6 Christ the Saviour Cathedral

In this chapter I present findings and analysis of my first case study, the issue of Christ the Saviour Cathedral. Today this unfinished building stands in the centre of Prishtina on a plot of what appears to be wasteland, next to the University of Prishtina (see Figure 6). Construction was begun by the Serb Orthodox Church (SOC) in the mid-90s but has been halted since 1998 amid increased violence and instability, uncertainty over landownership, and a lack of clarity with respect to the future of Kosovo. After many years of stalemate, and with much contention and non-decisions, and after some unsuccessful arson attacks, it appears now that construction is likely to resume sometime in the near future.

During the war between Kosovar Albanian paramilitaries and Yugoslav forces, and in much of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, religion played a major role in mobilising expressions of self-identity and territoriality (Di Lellio 2009; Perica 2002). Thus the construction of a large Orthodox cathedral in the centre of the Albanian majority city of Prishtina had been interpreted by many as the claiming of Kosovo by Milošević's Serbia. Subsequently this building became one of many Orthodox churches to be targeted by violent Albanian groups, actions that could be described as a bottom-up approach to what Garstka refers to as the architectural un-scripting the narratives of the defeated (2010).

With such contentious narratives attached to Serbian Orthodox churches in Kosovo, the issue became securitised during the period of UNMIK administration, forming part of what Coward describes as 'critical infrastructure' in the urbanisation of modern security (2009). Thus KFOR were deployed to physically protect many 'at-risk' churches and 'protection of Serbian heritage' has become an explicit condition of an Independent, Albanian-majority, Kosovar state.

What makes this case study especially interesting for this research is involvement of a multiplicity of International actors based in Kosovo to assist this new independent state in its obligations to "ensure the autonomy and protection of all religious denominations and their sites within its territory"[15]. Many of these International actors operate according to norms of respect for culture and heritage, in some way working against both the religio-national paradigm and the security paradigm. Thus we are presented with a situation where the governance of a cultural issue of significance to post-conflict state- and nation-building becomes an arena of discursive contestation amongst a multiplicity of international and domestic actors.

In this chapter, I introduce the institutional context of the issue over the last 15 years using a "rounds model" of public decision making (Teisman 2000). This is followed by a discussion of the urban narratives attached to the building along with the solutions they advocate and/or embody. I then analyse how this issue has progressed in the context of narrative contestations. In section 4.3 I look at two of the governance networks that emerged to deal with this issue, looking at how governance networks concepts give us a better understanding of narrative mobilisation in the context of post war Kosovo. Finally I explore some elements of deliberation with a view to asking whether deliberative governance is possible in this context.

4.1 Introduction: A Rounds perspective on the issue of Christ the Saviour Cathedral

As discussed in Chapter 2, I analyse the evolution of this issue using Teisman's *rounds* model of public decision-making (2000).To summarise, the *decision making rounds* model of public decision making rests on the assumption that problems and solutions are not objective but are constructed by actors. Thus, what one actor might consider to be a solution, another might consider to be a problem. Decision making moves forward through *rounds*: time periods in which there is an identifiable configuration of actors with shared perceptions of problems and solutions. These rounds are punctuated by *key events*: events that actors reconstruct as having importance and which mark a new configuration of actors, problems and solutions.

Round 1: Construction begins 1990 – 1999

Main actors: Serbian Orthodox Church; Municipality; University of Priština (Serb); 'shadow' University of Prishtina (Albanian)

Round 1 begins in the mid-90s. During the time of Milošević, the status of Kosovo as an autonomous province in the Federal Republic of Serbia was withdrawn and was brought under direct rule from Belgrade. Subsequently, it was made illegal for Albanians to work in the public sector and up to 80,000 Albanian employees were summarily fired from their jobs, including at

the University of Priština, where the number of Albanian-speaking professors and educators was greatly reduced (Malcolm 1998: 347). It was at this time that a key event took place marking the beginning of Round 1: the Municipality of Prishtina (at this time answerable to Belgrade) transferred a small parcel of land from the University of Priština to the Serbian Orthodox Church. The SOC then began construction of what was planned to be a large Orthodox cathedral on this plot of land in the centre of Prishtina. This was part of a larger church-building programme at the time, which saw the complete or partial construction of a number of Orthodox churches across Kosovo.

During this time, the Albanian speaking former employees of the University organised as part of a system of parallel governance, whereby school teachers and university professors used private houses to deliver education in the Albanian language to Albanian speaking students. This system allowed a parallel university to function, which is termed the 'shadow' University of Prishtina (Malcolm 1998).

Construction continued apace, until in 1998 the structure and exterior of the building was completed. Amid growing violence and instability, construction was put on hold[16]. Round 1 ends with the intervention of NATO and the establishment of a UNMIK protectorate in 1999, both mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1244. This key event marks the beginning of Round 2

Round 2: UN protectorate part 1 1999 - 2004

Main Actors: UNMIK; KFOR; Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG); University of Prishtina; 'violent groups'

With the establishment of the UNMIK administration, along with KFOR protection, there came an increase in stability after the violence of the war. During this time, the SOC enjoyed a less favourable position in Kosovo due to the withdrawal of Serb security forces (both military and police). Consequently, construction was not resumed during this time[17]. While the position of the SOC diminished in this round, the central actor now became UNMIK. For UNMIK the central problem was the possibility for Orthodox churches to become the target of retaliation violence, posing a threat to short-term stability[18]. As a solution, UNMIK therefore took the decision to place Christ the Saviour Cathedral, along with many other Orthodox churches under constant KFOR protection.

As part of its mandate in accordance with UNSC 1244, UNMIK established the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, granting political authority to a Legislative Assembly. Executive authority over ministerial functions was incrementally transferred from UNMIK over time[19].

In 1999, the Serb staff and students of the University of Priština were among the 40,000 Serbs displaced from Prishtina. The faculty buildings of the University were then occupied by the Albanian speaking staff of the 'shadow' University of Prishtina that had operated during the period of Albanian parallel governance. By 2001 the Serb-speaking University of Priština had re-established itself and located in Mitroviça (still with the name University of Priština).

Although violence levels had dropped during this period, it remained intermittent. There was at least one unsuccessful attempt to destroy this building in 1999 although it failed to damage the

structure of the building[20]. I term these groups of actors 'violent groups' as they are unidentifiable yet their actions have significant impacts on the development of rounds.

In 2003 the Albanian majority Municipality of Prishtina proposed four possible solutions for the long term future of the church: 1 to demolish it, 2 to convert it into a museum, 3 to use the building for another purpose, and 4 to preserve it as it stands[21]. In response to this, the SOC in Graçanicë/Gračanica collected property papers showing ownership of lands on which the Assembly of Kosovo building; library & University staff accommodation complex were located. They suggested converting these buildings to museums as a means of dissuading the Municipality from following through on its decisions[22]. Eventually these plans were overruled by UNMIK[23].

This round concludes with a key event in 2004: an outbreak of violence and rioting in which 19 people were killed and 35 religious sites, most of them Orthodox churches, were vandalized causing serious damage or destruction[24]. This event had the effect of crystallising that UNMIK and KFOR had failed in their principal objective of guaranteeing the short-term protection of Serb Churches[25].

Round 3: UN protectorate part 2 2004 - 2008

Main actors: RIC; CoE; UNMIK; Municipality of Prishtina; SOC; Ahtisaari negotiating team; PISG

Round 3 is characterised by a shared perception that UNMIK and KFOR failed to guarantee the security of Serbian Orthodox Churches and the Serbian community in Kosovo, and that there was growing frustration with the lack of a long term solution for the Kosovo status question[26]. Thus a new problem emerged: 35 sites were completely or partially destroyed.

As a solution to this, UNMIK invited Council of Europe to assess the situation[27]. Out of their assessment the Implementation Committee for the Reconstruction of Religious Sites was established, comprising representatives from Council of Europe (CoE); Serbian Orthodox Church; Republic Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments, Belgrade; Ministry of Culture Youth and Sports (of PISG); and the Institute for the Protection of Monuments, Prishtina (governmental body of the PISG). UNMIK were included in an observational capacity. The committee, which I argue later is a governance network, operated according to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that all religious sites damaged in the violence of 2004 should be restored. The function of the commission was then to find agreement on how these 35 sites were to be restored and to overcome and technical difficulties that any of the parties met[28]. However, as Christ the Saviour Cathedral was not damaged in 2004, it fell outside of the scope of the working group[29].

After an initial period of disagreement, a revised MoU was agreed upon by the parties in 2005 and the committee was renamed "The Reconstruction Implementation Commission for Orthodox Religious Sites in Kosovo" (RIC)[30].

Following the attacks of 2004, the Serb religious presence resident in St. Nikolai church in Prishtina felt unsafe and moved to the Serb majority town of Gračanica on the outskirts of the city[31]. In this context, the church felt it was not the right time to pursue the completion of the Christ the Saviour Cathedral for the time being[32].

Over the period 2004 – 2008 no conclusive decision was made regarding the future of the property.

Parallel to these happenings negotiations for a status settlement were taking place. In 2005, Finnish mediator Martti Ahtisaari was appointed Special Envoy of the Secretary General on Kosovo's future status, charged with finding a "political settlement that determines the future status of Kosovo"[33]. After it became apparent to him that agreement between all sides was impossible, he proposed a solution of supervised independence, in which Kosovo would become an independent state, with a number of key organisations mandated to supervise the government on behalf of the international community[34]. Following these recommendations, the members of the Legislative Assembly of the Provisional Institutions of Self Government declared Independence on 17th of February 2008[35], marking the commencement of the 4th Round.

Round 4: Independence 2008 - 2009

Main actors: MOC (of the government of the Independent Republic of Kosovo); ICO; EUSR; SOC; GLO

On the 17th of February, 2008, the elected representatives of the Legislative Assembly of the Provisional institutions of Self Government declared Independence from Serbia, in accordance with recommendations in the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement[36]. Also in accordance with the Ahtisaari proposal, the International Civilian Office (ICO) was established, under International Civilian Representative (ICR) Pieter Feith, in order "to ensure full implementation" of the proposal[37] and to be "the final authority in Kosovo regarding interpretation of [the settlement]"[38]. Following the violence in 2004, an annex was included in the status settlement, guaranteeing the security of all properties of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and giving the SOC full discretion in the management of its properties[39]. Thus, with regard to Christ the Saviour Cathedral, the constructed problem became: the owner of the parcel of land on which the building stands in unknown. The logical extension of this perception leads to the solution: to verify the owner of the parcel of land and accord them their rights.

A second, more general problem existed. The Ahtisaari Plan obliged the Independent Government of Kosovo (mostly through the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (MOC) & law enforcement bodies) to ensure protection of all the property belonging to the SOC[40]. Furthermore, the Ahtisaari Proposal mandated the ICO to supervise and ensure that this happened[41]. A problem then arose over communication as the SOC refused to recognise the Government of the Independent Republic of Kosovo and were slow to establish direct relations with ICO as a status-recognising body[42].

From this state of affairs, there emerged a number of mechanisms through which the ICO and subsequently the government, could communicate with the SOC, principally through the Office of the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) (at the time, the EUSR shared the same office as ICO, was headed by the same person, but was a status-neutral body) and later with the appointment of the head of the Greek Liaison Office (GLO), Ambassador Moschopoulos (also status-neutral) as mediator between the two sides in February 2010[43]. Thus a second governance network was formed (in addition to Reconstruction Implementation Council) to govern the field of (principally Serb) religious and cultural heritage.

Once this communication mechanism was in place, this network could set about 'implementing' the solution of clarifying ownership of the land on which Christ the Saviour was built. In 2009 the Ministry of Culture contacted the International Civilian Office to clarify the ownership of the land on which the unfinished Christ the Saviour Cathedral was situated[44]. The ICO, through EUSR, contacted Bishop Artemije of the Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Raska-Prizren and Kosovo-Metohija[45]. He then showed title deeds showing the transfer of land to the SOC in the mid-90s[46]. As this satisfied those actors with executive power (ICO, MOC, IMC), the issue was deemed to be resolved and permission was granted to the SOC to proceed with any plans it has to resume construction. Thus round 4 was brought to a close.

Round 5 Resolution 2009 -

Main actor: SOC

With SOC recognised as the sole owner of the property, and having been granted permission to resume construction as they please, they are once again the principal actor. The future construction no longer faces institutional constraints but resource constraints, both financial and managerial. The SOC is now primarily concerned with raising funds for future works and in overseeing restoration works underway on many other buildings[47].

Future Round

From the interviews it appears that there are two anticipated events in the future that could open up a new round of decision-making. The first is the on-going new round of negotiations over status. One of the issues for discussion is the change to the Protective Zones defined in the Ahtisaari Plan. Protective Zones are zones surrounding a site or area of heritage value, in which the Serbian Orthodox Church needs to be consulted over certain development that can take place there[48]. In the Ahtisaari Plan, Christ the Saviour Cathedral was not designated as a Special Protective Zone. However, the status of Protective Zones can be changed by the Implementation Monitoring Council (IMC) (another governance network mandated by the Ahtisaari Plan) and the ICO[49]. Should it be changed it would give SOC substantial say over the developments of the University of Prishtina and over the University Library. In such a case, new constructions of problems and solutions (e.g. over activities in the University Library) would likely be created, with additional actors involved in decision-making (e.g. University of Prishtina; Ministry of Education).

The second is the splitting of ICO and EUSR offices and the eventual expiry of the ICO mandate. The splitting of ICO and EUSR took place at the end of April 2011. The ICO are scaling down many operations due to progress made with their mission, with regional offices having been closed as of August 2011[50]. Questions remain over how communication will go between the Government and the Serbian Orthodox Church in the absence of the ICO as a central actor in creating conditions for dialogue.

4.2 Urban Narratives

Using *rounds* to order data and construct an historical narrative of change, it can be seen how different actors use different strategies to bring about certain solutions that are subjectively constructed as important. Attention is now turned to analysing the meanings and messages actors have attached to the building, which in turn construct subjective positions on problems and solutions and can be mobilised as strategies to convince others to pursue certain outcomes. Based on a discursive analysis of data on this case study, I have identified seven distinct frames that people have used in describing the building in question and events surrounding it. I label these seven urban narratives:

1. Milošević Regime
2. Unfinished Serb Victory
3. Serbs as Victims
4. Security Threat
5. Multi-Cultural City
6. De-Politicised Practicality
7. De-Nationalised Tolerance

I will go through each of these in turn, describing the narratives they represent, showing what identities they construct and tracing their development throughout the history of this issue. Before this I want to note that there are/were 5 solutions for the church to which these narratives can be attached. These are displayed in Table 1 below.

Important to note is the interactive relationship narratives play with outcomes and change. On the one hand, narratives advocate specific outcomes or solutions. On the other hand, certain solutions can embody, or discredit, certain narratives. The various solutions advocated by or embodied in each narrative will be discussed below. They are also summarised in Table 1.

Solutions	Completion		Preservation		Museum		Other function		Destruction	
Narratives										
	Adv	Emb	Adv	Emb	Adv	Emb	Adv	Emb	Adv	Emb
Milošević Regime	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Unfinished Serb Victory	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	Y
Serbs as victims	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Security Threat	-	N	Y (short-term)	Y (short-term)	-	-	-	-	N	Y
Multi-Cultural City	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
De-politicised practicality	Y	-	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
De-Nationalised Tolerance	Y	Y	N	N	N	-	N	N	N	N

Table 1 Narratives attached to Christ the Saviour Cathedral. Adv = Advocates; Emb = Embodies; Y = Solution is advocated/embodied in narrative; N = Solution is not advocated/embodied in narrative; - = narrative is neutral with respect to solution

4.2.1 Description of Narratives

Milošević Regime

According to this narrative, the construction of a Serbian Orthodox cathedral in the centre of Prishtina was planned "as a symbol of victory of the regime of Milošević, at a time when that regime was at the peak of its power"[51]. The church was built along with a number of other Orthodox churches in the mid-90s. The autonomy of Kosovo had been withdrawn in 1989, and this was followed by the purging of tens of thousands of Albanians from the workforce. The building of Orthodox churches all over Kosovo was then a further visual way to re-enforce the victory of the Serbian regime over Albanians. In Prishtina, this narrative is strengthened when we take into account that the University of Prishtina was "always considered by Kosovo Albanians as one of their main achievements"[52]. In the 1990s, the entirety of Albanian speaking professors and lecturers were fired and replaced by Serbs. Land was then transferred from the university to the SOC and construction of a huge cathedral was begun adjacent to and overlooking the University Library. Thus, religious elements were incorporated into the conflict "as a way for humiliating the other side"[53].

A more extreme embodiment of this sentiment can be found in some online comments. One commentator asserts that "[t]his church was built against Albanians" and that it was built while Kosovo was occupied, on the property of the University of Prishtina[54].

Advocates: Completion

Embodied in: Completion

Unfinished Serb Victory

This narrative builds on the *Milošević Regime* narrative discussed above but sees the failure to complete construction as embodying the defeat of Milošević. Where autonomy was withdrawn in 1989, Kosovo is now independent (or under protection of UNMIK prior to 2008). Where Albanians were fired from the University of Prishtina, the university is once again controlled by Albanians. And where the cathedral, as a symbol of victory by the Serbian regime was to be built and to overshadow the University, it now stands unused, unfinished and unmaintained, "like a symbol of unfinished victory"[55].

This narrative is also mobilised to a large extent by people who sought to have the building destroyed or demolished. Attacks on the church can be interpreted as attacks on the defeated Milošević regime, and efforts to have it legally demolished can be seen as attempts to erase or 'unscript' the narratives of the defeated.

Advocates: Preservation, Museum, Destruction

Embodied in: Preservation Museum; Other function; Destruction

Serbs as Victims

Overlapping with, and going further than the *Unfinished Serb Victory* narrative, this narrative positions the Serbian population as the victims in a war started by Albanian terrorists. Subsequently, with the imposition of Albanian-dominated institutions, followed by an illegal Independent Government of Kosovo, the rights of Kosovo Serbs are being undermined and their cultural heritage under threat. Additionally, Prishtina, the former home to 20,000 Kosovo Serbs, is seen as unsafe for Serbs to go[56], with most of them exiled in Graçanicë/Gračanica.

This narrative is embodied in the vandalism and attacks against the Orthodox churches and cemeteries, especially in 2004. Often attacks on Orthodox sites are perceived by Serb returnees as warnings not to return to Kosovo[57]. "if you destroy [churches], you also destroy [Serbs'] possibility to remain in the city."[58]

A more extreme embodiment of this narrative can be found in some of the newsletter of the Serbian Orthodox Church. One editorial describes institutional dealings over the issue as part of a "war against the Church and the Christian holy Sites in Kosovo"[59].

Advocates: Completion

Embodied in: Preservation; Museum; Other Function; Destruction

Security Threat

The Security Threat narrative was briefly mobilised by the UNMIK & KFOR coalition[60]. Serb Orthodox churches are seen as potential flashpoints for violence which could re-ignite the conflict, threatening stability. This narrative is different from the others in that it does not advocate, nor is embodied in, any long-term solutions. Rather, the unfinished cathedral as it stands embodies the security threat and therefore short-term protection is to be advocated.

An extension of this rationale, in line with Buzan et al's development of the 'securitisation' concept (1998), is that the holders of this narrative perceive themselves as having a moral right to override the opinions and decisions of others if they conflict with the goals of short-term security. This can be observed in the deployment of KFOR to physically protect Orthodox sites and in UNMIK's quashing of the Municipality's proposals for the building in 2004[61].

Advocates: (short-term) Preservation

Embodied in: (short-term) Preservation; Destruction

Multi-Cultural City

In the words of one Orthodox priest interviewed, the church can "present some visual mark of Prishtina, an additional thing for which Prishtina should be represented and memorised when one visits"[62]. Accordingly, this narrative views the Cathedral as one part, albeit an essential part of the list of markers that define Prishtina to the world. This narrative simultaneously suspends and celebrates the historical context in which the church came to be an issue. On the one hand, the role the Church played in the war as told in the first two narratives, is to be ignored, and the church should be completed. On the other hand, the church is then to be elevated to the same status as all other iconic markers of the city, including the Yugoslav monument of Brotherhood and Unity, the Catholic Cathedral, the old Turkish centre, Rugovë's grave, and the Skanderbeg Statue. In this way, the many sides of Prishtina's cultural heritage is to be celebrated, including its (under-represented?) Serb history.

Another facet of this narrative, one that connects with the *Serbs as Victims* frame, is that the church will serve as a symbol for displaced Serbs to feel welcome in Prishtina. Before the war there were some 40,000 Serbs residents in Prishtina. Today that number is 62, as reported by respondents[63]. At the time of writing (November 2011) no official figures were available to confirm this. It should be noted that the redrawing of Municipal boundaries, creating a Municipality of Graçanicë/Gračanica, which was previously within the Municipality of Prishtina, distorts estimates and lends more weight to this discourse).

A trend that is happening is that many Serb returnees prefer to move to the Serb majority town of Graçanicë/Gračanica on the outskirts of Prishtina. The completion of the church would represent a chance for Serbs to feel more welcome to return in Prishtina, making the capital city more multi-cultural.

Advocates: Completion; Preservation

Embodied in: Completion; Preservation

De-Politicised Practicality

This line of thinking argues against the *Milošević Regime* narrative. During the 1990s there was a large population of Kosovo Serbs in Prishtina. However there were no churches in the centre of the city apart from the small Church of St. Nicholas. Therefore a plan was put in place to build a large church in the centre so that Serbs could attend liturgy without having to travel to the outskirts of the city[64]. The construction of the Church on the University grounds therefore has nothing to do with Milošević and Serb expansionism.

Today, this frame also finds currency with the issue of returnees. In this view, Serbs are not returning to Prishtina due to a lack of necessary amenities, including places to attend religious services. The construction is necessary in order for Serb returnees, and Serbs who have returned to have an adequate standard of living in Prishtina[65].

I call this narrative 'de-politicised' because in my experience with interviews this discourse has been mobilised mostly in response to questions about the political context of the cathedral. When I asked about claims that the church was built as a symbol of the victory of Milošević's Serbia over Kosovo (as *Milošević Regime* has it), one Serb interviewee responded, "we never thought it was a political thing; we thought it was a practical thing. […] It's good to have a church in the centre"[66]. This response mobilises the practical element of the church principally as a counter argument to accusations of political motives behind the construction.

Advocates: Completion

Embodied in: Completion (with greater Serb population in Prishtina)

De-Nationalised Tolerance

This narrative has been mobilised by one principal set of actors: CoE, ICO, and UNESCO. In addition, the narrative also enjoys some currency with Kosovar Albanians in general. Essentially, this frame implies a separation of religions from the nationalist ideologies that they were associated with during the war: "Everyone is aware that it is a Serbian Orthodox Church Site but also everyone is aware that it needs to be protected"[67]. In this way, an Orthodox church is an orthodox church, nothing to do with Serbian nationalism. Likewise, a mosque is a Muslim place of worship, not a symbol of Albanian nationalism.

Included is a normative goal for people of different religions and cultures to co-exist, maintain mutual respect for one another and for all religious heritage to be protected. It therefore advocates and is embodied in the completion of the Church.

Advocates: Completion

Embodied in: Completion

4.2.2 Narratives in Rounds

In this section we go back to the rounds model of decision-making. I use the same demarcation of rounds as established in 4.2.1. This time however, the focus will be on the interaction between actors and narratives rather than on problems and solutions. That is, how different actors sought to mobilise their preferred narratives on the one hand, and how narratives themselves were motors of change on the other. Also of interest is how narratives interact with each other.

Round 1: Construction begins 1990 – 1999

Round 1 is characterised by a relatively stable and agreeable configuration of actors: SOC, (Serb controlled) Municipality of Prishtina; and (Serb controlled) University of Priština. My data suggests that these actors aligned themselves to the *De-Politicised Practicality* narrative. One respondent, a priest with the Serbian Orthodox church, explained to me that in Prishtina "there were 40,000 Serbs before war. So we needed a bigger church"[68]. Likewise, a Serb interviewee who studied in Prishtina in the early 1990s told me "I remember when [the] Church started to be built. We never thought it was a political thing; we thought it was a practical thing. […] It's good to have a church in the centre"[69]. These responses convey a viewpoint that during the early 1990s, practical considerations were the at the forefront of the rationale behind the construction of the Cathedral in the centre of Prishtina

However, I argue here that it is plausible that these actors also sought to mobilise the *Milošević Regime* narrative, even though this is not supported by my data. This is alleged by many Albanians both in interviews and in informal talk. For example one Albanian respondent recounted that the church was built "as a symbol of victory of the regime of Milošević, at time when that regime was the peak of its power"[70]. Furthermore, "the very fact that it was built in the middle of the University centre" confirms these motivations as "the university was always considered by Kosovo Albanians as one of their main achievements"[71].

This allegation is supported by church building programme in mid 90s and by the common perception that most churches damaged in 2004 were the new 'Milošević churches[72]. Additionally, the construction of the *Serbs as Victims* narrative necessitates focussing on aggression from the Albanian side, and a corresponding retrospective downplaying of aggression on the part of the Serbian Orthodox Church. To a greater or lesser extent, most of the Serbs I interviewed and spoke to informally spoke in terms echoing *Serbs as Victims*. This could account for the absence of evidence suggesting that the cathedral was built as part of Milošević's political campaign of Serbianising Kosovo.

When faced with such an argument, it also raises questions about the authenticity or reliability of claims that the building of the church was for practical reasons. Like with the national myth (di Lellio 2009), the *De-Politicised Practicality* could have been produced in hindsight, as a natural extension of the *Serbs as Victims* discourse. This is a possibility I deal with later on.

Another possibility is that such narratives were there in the 90s but were voiced by actors as a cover for their motivations about *Milošević Regime.* Both of these possibilities are plausible. However I will proceed here giving benefit of the doubt, and supposing that both of the narratives, *De-Politicised Practicality* and *Milošević Regime,* co-existed during Round 1.

I therefore argue that these two narratives were mobilised by the configuration of actors in Round 1. Recall from Table 1 that both narratives advocate only one solution: the completion of the cathedral. Therefore, with a consensus formed, *Milošević Regime* and *De-Politicised Practicality* were mobilised unhindered, advocating the construction of the church. These narratives continued to have dominance up until the beginning of the war and the intervention of NATO which began Round 2.

Round 2: UN protectorate part 1 1999 - 2004

In contrast to the 'peaceful co-existence' of narratives in Round 1, discursive contestation under the first years of UNMIK administration are much tenser. During this period the narrative *Unfinished Serb Victory* was almost completely dominant. Seen in Table 1, *Unfinished Serb Victory* finds embodiment in the solutions of preservation and of destruction. As such, this narrative was mobilised by three actors: the University of Prishtina, the Municipality, and by the actor I term 'violent groups'.

In the first place, the 'shadow' University, in re-occupying the grounds of the 'official' University, symbolically re-captured the territory Milošević had taken from them. Where Albanians were fired from the University of Prishtina, the university is once again controlled by Albanians. And where the cathedral was to be built and to overshadow the University as a symbol of victory by the Serbian regime, it now stands unused, unfinished and unmaintained.

Secondly, in advocating possible destruction of the Church, the Municipality also mobilised the *Unfinished Serb Victory* narrative, using the legitimacy of state-based institutions that were once answerable to Belgrade to reverse the invasion of the Serbian church and state. However this move was countered by Serbian Orthodox Church, acting according to the narratives, *Serbs as Victims, Multi-Cultural City,* and *De-nationalised Tolerance*. Writing of these happenings, Serbian Orthodox Bishop Artemije of Graçanicë/Gračanica described the actions of the Municipality as "yet another in a series of examples of the open institutional repression being carried out by Albanian dominated institutions"[73]. Furthermore, he argued that "a free and democratic society cannot be built on selective meeting of needs of only one ethnic or religious community to the detriment of other citizens" and appealed to "representatives of the United Nations, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and all cultural institutions in Europe and the world to decisively support the protection of the Serbian Orthodox spiritual and cultural heritage in Kosovo and Metohija"[74]. The actions of the Municipality were also acted against by UNMIK, who in acting this way embodied the *Security Threat* frame.

In the third place, attacks on the church by 'violent groups' can be interpreted as attacks on the defeated Milošević regime, and efforts to have it legally demolished can be seen as attempts to permanently erase or unscript the *Milošević Regime* narrative. Interestingly, these three events or actions can be seen as manifestations of the *Unfinished Serb Victory* narrative as a counter-narrative to that of *Milošević Regime.* However, these actions also have the effect of

strengthening a counter-counter narrative: *Serbs as Victims*. Viewed in this light, we can see that narratives do have the power to shape the actions of actors to a certain extent.

The position of actors KFOR & UNMIK during this time is interesting. Operating according to the frame of *Security Threat*, their primary goal was of short term protection, principally against destruction. In this sense, visibly guarding the site can be seen as the prevention of the ultimate triumph of the *Unfinished Serb Victory* narrative. By doing so in a very visible place however, this also has the effect of highlighting the threat that the church was under, and therefore making even more visible the narratives of *Unfinished Serb Victory* and *Security Threat*.

Additionally the temporary nature mind-set of UNMIK meant that there was no particular long-term vision or narrative that they purposely forwarded. However, their presence, and ultimately their success in preventing damage to the building, allowed other actors, notably the SOC, space and time to begin mobilising alternative narratives. In the first place, the diminished influence of the actors, SOC, University of Priština, and the Albanianisation of the Municipality of Prishtina, brought with it a reduction is the power of the *Milošević Regime* frame, both because the actors were not in the same position to mobilise this narrative and also because their visibly diminished role in public life argued against it. However in its place and with time and space given by the lack of long-term narratives forwarded by UNMIK, this group of actors began to turn their attention towards the following narratives: M*ulti-Cultural City, De-Politicised Practicality, De-Nationalised Tolerance,* and *Serbs as Victims*. Almost all of these narratives see only the successful completion by the SOC as a legitimate solution.

Round 3: UN protectorate part 2 2004 - 2008

In the first place, the attacks by 'violent groups' must be seen as a key attempt to make dominant once and for all the narrative of *Unfinished Serb Victory* (or put another way, Milošević defeated). However, it also created the space for the launching of the counter narrative of *Serbs as Victims*. An event that marks this is the vacating of St. Nikolai Church just after the 2004 violence. This move can be said to be a response from actors to narratives of (extreme manifestations of) *Unfinished Serb Victory* and of *Serbs as Victims*. On the other hand it can also be said to strengthen those respective narratives, particularly the latter.

RIC (although not dealing with Christ the Saviour) helped to foster narrative of *De-Nationalised Tolerance* and to a lesser extent *Multi-Cultural City*. This can be seen clearly in the language they used: "This is solely about the [...] protection of cultural sites. It is a solely technical body, both sides agree on that. So there is no political nature [...] RIC work has not been instrumentalised by politics [...] and there is an understanding that these sites should be protected and hopefully religious life in this case comes back to normality"[75]. The RIC mechanism was also noteworthy for its success in involving 'both sides' in the technical task of reconstructing buildings of cultural value, indicating that people of different ethnic groups should tolerate the fact that they co-exist and when necessary, to sit down together to discuss how to solve concrete problems. It could be argued the that the working practice of RIC was itself an embodiment of *De-Nationalised Tolerance*.

Throughout this round there were no conclusive decisions made regarding the cathedral. This lack of events during this period essentially allowed the *Unfinished Serb Victory* narrative, which had been gaining momentum in Round 2 and at the beginning of this round, to stagnate. On the

other hand, with the immediate threat of destruction receding, this also allowed actors to strengthen other narratives, notably the *De-Nationalised Tolerance* and *Serbs as Victims*.

From the Ahtisaari negotiations of 2006 – 2007, emerged a strong and resourceful manifestation of the narrative *De-nationalised Tolerance*, embodied in Annex 5 of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. For example, Article 1.1 states that the "Serbian Orthodox Church [...] shall be afforded the protection and enjoyment of its rights, privileges and immunities" to the extent that the "exercise of such rights, privileges and immunities shall carry with it duties and responsibilities to act in accordance with Kosovo law, and shall not violate the rights of others"[76]. As the need for protection "of the moveable and immoveable property and other assets of the Serbian Orthodox Church"[77] emanated most significantly from acts of violence against Orthodox Churches and Monasteries, principally in 2004, I argue that these narratives of *De-nationalised Tolerance* were mobilised as counter narratives to *Unfinished Serb Victory* and also in sympathy with *Serbs as Victims*.

On the basis of this Proposal, with these narratives included in the annex, the key event of Declaration of Independence was announced, bringing us into Round 4.

Round 4: Independence 2008 - 2009

The actual Declaration of Independence itself, as an event marked the decisive end to the currency of the *Milošević Regime* narrative. However I don't wish to go into more detail here about the Declaration of Independence as this is dealt with in Chapter 5.

What *is* of important to us here are the narratives mobilised by the new configuration of actors that followed the Declaration. The declaration and recognition, on the basis of the Ahtisaari Plan, created a new set of actors and gave vast resources to the narratives expressed in the plan, namely *De-Nationalised Tolerance*. Additionally, by making this basis upon which Kosovo's independence would be recognised by other countries, this *de-facto* aligned quite a number of external actors behind the narratives expressed in Ahtisaari. These actors include ICO, Independent Government of Kosovo, MOC, and any countries who chose to recognise the Independence of Kosovo on the basis of the Ahtisaari proposal.

Although it is difficult to say exactly when, I estimate that it was during this period that what I call a contradiction in narratives happened. This I have learned from data and anecdotally. As narratives of *De-Nationalised Tolerance* and of *Multi-Cultural City* began to take hold, backed by actors such as CoE, UNESCO and ICO, they started to come into conflict with the narratives of *Unfinished Serb Victory*. As one respondent put it: "If it is a religious object we are not going to destroy it. But at the same time, you have to accept that it was started by Milošević as a sign of his victory. [...] So it is unresolvable. And people in this situation, [they say] 'ok let someone else do it'"[78]. These two conflicting narratives result here in a pragmatic ignoring of the issue. This is speculation on my part but it might explain the absence of any Albanian actors (University of Prishtina for instance) seriously trying to mobilise the narrative of *Unfinished Serb Victory* during this period.

What led, in terms of narratives, to the key event marking the close of Round 4 was the central question of who the property belonged to. The narratives underlying the *raison d'être* of the governance network the was formed during this time was that of *De-nationalised Tolerance* (this point is argued further in 4.3). Underlying this narrative is the viewpoint that religious and ethnic

differences do exist in Kosovo but that different cultures should be given the freedom to operate as they please. Thus the autonomy of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the management of their own affairs and the freedom to pursue its own interests were to be guaranteed. These normative aspirations then necessitated the formation of a network, involving SOC as interested party, MOC as (Albanian-controlled) guarantor of cultural rights, and of ICO as supervisor of the government, and EUSR and/or GLO as mediators.

Once the question of ownership was settled, according to the logic of this narrative, the construction of the cathedral became an internal issue of the SOC. Resulting from these narratives, as seen in Table 1, there is only one possible solution left, that of completion.

Round 5 Resolution 2009 -

With the SOC now recognised as the principal actor, it is now the best positioned actor to mobilise narratives. However, due to the long process that has led them to be the principal actor, and to other narratives expressed by them, they do not have complete freedom to mobilise the original narratives of *Milošević Regime* and *De-Politicised Practicality,* as they did in the 1990s.

Firstly, the position they now occupy was arrived at as a result of the narratives according to which ICO, CoE, etc. operated by, namely *Multi-Cultural City* and *De-Nationalised Tolerance*. Both of these narratives disallow the use of religion as an accomplice to nationalist conflict, thus preventing the Orthodox Church from openly vocalising the *Milošević Regime* narrative.

Secondly, due to the use of the narrative of *Serbs as Victims by* the *Serbian Orthodox Church*, they are now in contradiction with earlier narrative of *Milošević Regime*. Within the *Serbs as Victims* narrative, there comes a deniability of any conflict-related intentions in the initial construction of the cathedral. Thus, the Cathedral was never meant as a sign of the regime of Milošević, making it almost impossible to revive this narrative.

During my interviews I found the response to questions of *Milosevic Regime* to often be: " We never thought it was a political thing; we thought it was a practical thing. […] It's good to have a church in the centre the centre"[79]. As argued above, this suggests an attempt to construct this narrative of *De-Politicised Practicality* in hindsight, as an alternative to *Milošević Regime* but one that finds consistency with the *Serbs as Victims* narrative.

However, I think that this narrative will not enjoy currency for long. Due to the very small number of Serbs living in Prishtina, and an overall trend for returnees to go instead to Graçanicë/Gračanica, the credibility of building a large cathedral for the purposes of serving liturgy is weakened. For example, when asked about the plans of the Orthodox Church to complete the building, one interviewee responded "if they reconstruct it, for how many believers?"[80]

Rather it is more likely that the narratives of *Multi-Cultural City* and *De-Nationalised Tolerance* will be the most prominent in time to come. Both of these are embodied in and advocate the completion of the Cathedral. Barring other potential key events that open up new rounds, this is likely to be prevailing set of narratives for the foreseeable future.

4.3 Governance Networks

In the previous section we have used a *rounds* model of decision-making to analyse the evolution of the issue of Christ the Saviour Cathedral, first in terms of actors' constructions of problems and solutions, and secondly in terms of narratives as shaped by and shapers of change. In both cases, we saw a certain resolution reached when a certain degree of consensus was reached amongst a stable group of key actors. In the first case this was the shared perception of the problem as to the ownership of the parcel of land on which the unfinished church stood. This led to the solution of clarifying who was the owner of the land and then granting discretion as to the use of that land to that actor. In the second analysis, the consensus reached was in terms of narratives: those of the *Multi-Cultural City* and of D*e-Nationalised Tolerance*. Subsequently, this consensus leads to the completion of the church as these narratives advocate.

In this section I now turn attention to the context in which this consensus amongst this group of actors emerged. The two configurations I refer to are: 1) the RIC mechanism; and 2) the group of actors comprising the ICO,SOC, EUSR, MOC, GLO and IMC, which I term the Cultural Heritage Governance Network.

In the proceeding analysis, it is important to bear in mind the difference between extended networks of decision-making in the rounds analysis, and governance networks. Whereas the former involves all actors whose individual actions influence social decision making whether or not there is any direct interactions (Teisman 2000), the latter represent a much narrower and more stable group of identifiable actors who negotiate with each other according to a shared framework (Sørensen, & Torfing 2005). While the focus of the former is on the cumulative effect on change of individual decisions by diverse actors, the focus in governance networks is on the integration of relevant actors into collective decisions. This is best illustrated by the actor I termed 'violent groups'. The actions of such actors in attacking Orthodox churches in 2004 undoubtedly had an effect on decision-making. However, from a network governance perspective, these actions are better described as events that governance actors collectively respond to.

In this section, I look at how governance through networks effects narrative mobilisation with respect to Christ the Saviour Cathedral. The analysis therefore focusses on the Cultural Heritage Governance Network rather than on RIC as the cathedral fell outside of the scope of RIC. The analysis begins by looking at the individual actors within this network and their actions in seeking to mobilise certain narratives in this context. Next, some issues of actor accountability are looked at briefly before characteristics of network relations and governance frameworks are and their effects on narrative mobilisation are examined. The network is then looked at in an evolutionary perspective, before identifying some key themes of network governance in Kosovo that have been revealed in this case study.

4.3.1 Network actors and narrative mobilisation

Serbian Orthodox Church

It was seen from 4.1 that the Serbian Orthodox Church initially sought (most probably) to mobilise *Milošević regime* and *De-Politicised Practicality.* After the end of the conflict, they changed strategies and sought to have *Serbs as Victims* and *Multi-Cultural City* mobilised. Their success was limited in this respect. However they were successful in blocking the plans of the Municipality to alter the function of the building in 2002, and thus preventing the mobilisation of *Unfinished Serb Victory*.

It was not until the SOC began to take part in first the Reconstruction Implementation Commission and later in the Cultural Heritage Governance Network that the SOC enjoyed more success in implementing narrative preferences. In participating in these networks, the Church enjoyed some success in having many of the churches and monasteries that were damaged in 2004 restored and in securing access and decision-making rights to the cathedral in Prishtina. In implementing such solutions however, the SOC did not have complete freedom to attach narratives to these solutions. Participating in governance networks and engaging in dialogue with representatives from the Ministry of Culture and with some international organisations, necessitated endorsing the narrative *De-Nationalised Tolerance* and distancing themselves from *Milošević regime*. Aside from these two conditions, the SOC were given relative freedom to mobilise other narratives alongside *De-Nationalised Tolerance* such as *Serbs as Victims, Multi-Cultural City,* and *De-Politicised Practicality.*

Narratives Mobilised: *Serbs as Victims; Multi-Cultural City; De-Politicised Practicality; De-Nationalised Tolerance*

Resources: Property papers; recognition as legitimate stakeholder.

Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports

Representatives from the Ministry of Culture Youth and Sports have been involved in both RIC and in the Cultural Heritage Governance Network. The most noteworthy action of the Ministry in this respect was to contact the ICO in order to have the issue of land ownership resolved (see 4.1). In doing this the office ultimately subscribed to the conditions within the Ahtisaari Package Proposal, which as I have argued before (in 4.2.2) primarily embodies the narrative *De-Nationalised Tolerance.*

Secondly, in seeing the issue as resolved once ownership of the land on which the cathedral stands was clarified, the MOC also recognised that decision-making rights lay with the SOC, transforming the issue from a pubic one into a private, internal matter for the SOC. This also strengthened *De-Nationalised Tolerance* and also *Multi-Cultural City* and *De-Politicised Practicality*.

In recognising the Serbian Orthodox Church as an organisation with a legitimate stake in public affairs, it could also be said that this recognition alone embodies *Multi-Cultural City* and *De-Politicised Practicality*. However, in doing so, the Ministry also established itself as a legitimate governmental body, with ultimate responsibility over areas of cultural significance within Kosovo. To a certain extent it could be argued then that this action also has the effect of further mobilising *Unfinished Serb Victory*, as a non-Serb state institution asserting itself.

These arguments are very fluid and rely a lot on concepts of performing legitimacy. It is therefore most appropriate to characterise these actions as embodying chiefly *De-Nationalised Tolerance,* with a lesser emphasis on *Multi-Cultural City* and *De-Politicised Practicality*.

Narratives Mobilised: *De-Nationalised Tolerance; Multi-Cultural City*; *De-Politicised Practicality*

Resources: state legitimacy; electoral mandate; moral authority.

International Civilian Office

The role of the International Civilian Office within the Cultural Heritage Governance Network is best described as supervisory[81]. More specifically, the role is to supervise the government in fulfilling its obligations in implementing the Ahtisaari Package Proposal. In helping to assemble a communication mechanism involving mediating bodies (initially the EUSR, which was at the time headed by the same person, Pieter Feith, but acting in a status-neutral capacity) between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Ministry of Culture, the office played an active role in establishing the cultural governance network.

This had the effect of strengthening *De-Nationalised Tolerance* for two reasons. First, the existence of a network involving (Albanian-run) Kosovo governmental bodies, the Serbian Orthodox Church, and some internationally mandated organisations itself is an embodiment of *De-Nationalised Tolerance* and to a lesser extent *Multi-Cultural City*.

Secondly, the functioning of the institutional arrangement was guided by a strict adherence to the provisions in the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. The provisions led to the question of land-ownership becoming central, and as such brought about a resolution in granting decision-making rights to the SOC as owners of the land. As argued above, this settlement advocated the narrative *De-Nationalised Tolerance, Multi-Cultural City* and *De-Politicised Practicality*. Both of these points are agued in more detail in 4.3.4.

Narratives Mobilised: *De-Nationalised Tolerance; Multi-Cultural City; De-Politicised Practicality*

Resources: Internationally-derived mandate; relations with status-neutral bodies

European Union Special Representative

The EUSR acted as a mediator in this network, doing so in its capacity as a status-neutral body, making it acceptable to both the SOC and the MOC. The data suggests that the EUSR played a largely neutral role in the network. Therefore it does not seem like they actively endorsed any particular solutions or narratives.

However, in facilitating a network in which the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Ministry of Culture were included as stakeholders, the narratives of *De-Nationalised Tolerance* and *Multi-Cultural City* were practiced.

Narratives Mobilised: *De-Nationalised Tolerance; Multi-Cultural City*

Resources: Status-neutrality; Internationally-derived mandate

Greek Liaison Office

The Greek Liaison Office had a very similar role as EUSR, utilising similar resources and having the effect of mobilising the same narratives in the same way.

Narratives Mobilised: *De-Nationalised Tolerance; Multi-Cultural City*

Resources: Status-neutrality

4.3.2 Network actor accountability

This subsection looks briefly at some elements of accountability and responsibilities towards actors or forces outside of the network. These patterns of accountability are mentioned purely so as the reader can be aware that they exist. No attempt is made to link issues of accountability to narrative references or to mobilisation.

Serbian Orthodox Church

The Serbian Orthodox Church is a hierarchical religious organisation. The relevant administrative unit is the Diocese of Raska-Prizren and Kosovo-Metohija, which was headed by Bishop Artemije for the most part of the period considered here[82]. The diocese forms part of the hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church which is headed from Belgrade.

It is worth mentioning something about funding for reconstruction of damaged churches. The Ministry of Culture has committed to fund reconstruction works for all religious sites damaged in the violence in March 2004 (although some funding has come from other sources)[83]. Funding for other works, such as that of Christ the Saviour Cathedral, will come from the organisation's own fundraising activities. Respondents have mentioned appeals to other Orthodox Churches, (such as in Russia) and to Serbian diaspora as means to raise funds[84].

Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports

Theoretically, the Ministry is accountable to the elected government of Kosovo and to the electorate of Kosovo. Additionally, the Ministry has been committed to certain provisions laid out in the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (aka the Ahtisaari Plan). In this respect they are answerable to the International Civilian Representative, Pieter Feith, who supervises the government in its implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan. These two official channels of accountability are somewhat distorted by the following four factors.

Firstly, during the period of analysis (2009 – 2011) the ministry has been headed by elected representatives from either the PDK or Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)) parties. These party members are not solely accountable to the electorate but also to their internal party hierarchies. Secondly, a report by Transparency International into Kosovo's

Institutional Integrity has shown dissatisfaction with the performance of government and with levels of transparency[85]. This assessment casts doubts on the traditional notion of electoral accountability. Thirdly, a small and weak economy such as Kosovo is hugely dependent on foreign aid and investment. The public representatives in the Ministry and in government are therefore more likely to act in ways conducive to the interests of aid and investors than in stronger, more established economies, as reported by the Transparency International report[86]. Finally, there is a substantial number of permanent staff at the ministry, who maintain input into policy making irrespective of elections.

International Civilian Office

The International Civilian Office is a creation of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. It is headed by the International Civilian Representative, who was appointed by the International Steering Group, a group comprising representatives of a number of European governments[87].

European Union Special Representative

The EUSR is appointed by the Council of the European Union. Until May of 2011, the EUSR was the same person as the ICR[88], although acting in different capacities[89].

Greek Liaison Office

The Greek Liaison Office is a mission of the Greek Foreign Ministry. Greece has not recognised Kosovo's independence and so does not have formal diplomatic relations with the government.

4.3.3 Network relations and narrative mobilisation

It was observed in 4.1 that the Serbian Orthodox Church were slow to establish relations with the Ministry of Culture, and also with the International Civilian Office, as these bodies endorsed the Independence of Kosovo, and the Ahtisaari Plan. In practice, it was possible for communication to function between the MOC and ICO on the one hand and the SOC on the other thanks to the roles the EUSR and GLO played as neutral mediating bodies, due to their role as status-neutral organisations.

The Ministry of Culture was most in contact with the ICO. It appears that there the Ministry was less in contact with status-neutral bodies[90].

The International Civilian Office appears to have had very close *de facto* relations with the EUSR. In May 2011, a new appointment was made to the position of EU Special Representative. Up until that point, the two offices were headed by the same individual, and were located in the same office.

At a glance, without quantitative indicators of relations and paths, the EUSR and GLO appear to be the most central actors in terms of "flow betweenness", a common indicator in network analyses used to measure the ratio between inter-actor connections involving one certain actor

compared with all connections not involving that actor(Everett & Borgatti 1999: 192). Theoretically, this measurement of network relations should give these two bodies the most power to influence network outcomes. However, both organisations professed to be involved as neutral mediators.

The next most central actor in term of face-value *flow-betweenness* is the International Civilian Office. This actor, unlike the two more central actors, did have a stake in the network that went beyond facilitation of dialogue. As mentioned previously, the ICO operated according to the Ahtisaari Plan, which embodied *De-Nationalised Tolerance* both in its advocated practice (e.g. involving representatives from both ethno-national communities in public governance) and in its outcomes (to afford the Serbian Orthodox Church decision-making rights on its landed property), which also embodies *Multi-Cultural City* and *De-Nationalised Tolerance*.

Interestingly, both of these goals of the ICO, in terms of practice and outcome, appear to have been realised, and the accompanied narratives mobilised successfully. This coincidence of successful network negotiation and apparent, face-value centrality suggests that measurements of *flow-betweenness* might be a good way to explain and determine influential positions within governance networks.

4.3.4 Governance Framework and narrative mobilisation

This subsection constructs an argument on the relation between the underlying working framework of governance and narrative mobilisation. Fragments of this argument have been made a number of times already.

According to Sørensen and Torfing's proposed definition of governance networks, network interactions take place in a relatively institutionalised arrangement, which is itself the product of network interactions (2005). The operational framework in which governance network interaction take place is said to have regulatory, normative, cognitive and imaginary elements (ibid). In the following analysis, I will be concerned with the integrated performance of governance according to some underlying framework. Attempts are made to link aspects of such a framework to narratives mobilised by the network. Of relevance here are the regulatory, normative and imaginary elements.

The network was initially assembled or created out of a need for the Ministry of Culture and the International Civilian Office to communicate with the Serbian Orthodox Church. In order to create an arrangement in which communication could occur, the involvement of mediators was necessary, which saw the inclusion of EUSR and later the GLO. However, the basic principal underlying the formation of the network was that the SOC and MOC, two bodies, one representing a Serbian religious institution, the other a democratic institution of an multi-ethnic independent Kosovar republic both have a legitimate stake in issues of pubic governance and should have input into public decision-making.

Thus we can observe a normative element to the performance of governance. This normative aspiration necessarily involves at a discursive level, detaching the individuals, organisations and actors from the competing nationalist ideologies on which basis conflict arose. Both Albanian and Serb nationalism see only a nation-state as a legitimate sovereign authority. Therefore to involve a religious institution and a governmental institution of a multi-ethnic (and arguably

multi-national) state in public governance is to step outside of the paradigm of nation-states and nationalism.

An additional underlying working assumption of governance was that all decisions had to comply with Ahtisaari Plan. Thus the framing the problem at hand was put in terms of land ownership. Once the question of land-ownership was settled, the logical outcome, following the Ahtisaari Plan, is for the SOC to be grated their rights as owners of the land to continue construction if they so wished.

Like the normative element discussed above, this shared understanding of regulatory procedures is built upon certain discursive visions and assumptions. Article 15 of Annex V of the Ahtisaari Plan says that "[t]he Serbian Orthodox in Kosovo shall exercise full discretion in the management of its property, property reconstruction, and access to its premises"[91]. In this way, a discourse of property rights is elevated above a discourse of nationalism and/or conflict.

Thus, it can be seen how discourses at an imaginary level can be translated into normative aspirations and procedural norms, which have the effect of producing certain outcomes in material reality. With the network established according to these discursive visions, which most closely resemble *De-Nationalised Tolerance*, each actor ad to 'sign up' to this working practice of governance. Therefore network actors become integrated into procedural norms, the logic of which led to a certain outcome: that of allowing the SOC to rebuild Christ the Saviour Cathedral.

4.3.5 Evolution of Networks and narrative mobilisation

It has not been possible in this case study to identify many potential future events that would alter the course of the institutional evolution. In 4.1 two *key events* were identified that could lead to new rounds of decision-making. However, both of these possibilities could have very dramatic and unpredictable changes in many different governance areas. It is therefore not possible to say much about how they would impact on narrative mobilisation with respect to the issue in question.

4.3.6 Network governance in Kosovo: key insights

After arguing that empirically, examples of governance mechanisms in post-war Kosovo can be described as governance networks as they are conceptualised in the literature on new forms of governance in Western Europe, I now turn attention to some important features of the context of Kosovo which must be taken into account when theories of network governance are applied in Kosovo.

Partial resistance to dialogue across ethno/national/political cleavage.

This is the most obvious aspect that springs to mind when talking about governance in the Balkans. However, it must not be interpreted narrowly as 'Serbs and Albanians don't talk to each other'. Rather there are competing views on what the political status of Kosovo should be. On the one hand there are those who believe that Kosovo should be an integral part of the Republic

of Serbia and that any cooperation with governmental institutions of an independent Kosovo strengthens and gives de-facto legitimacy to the independence of Kosovo. Likewise there are groups who believe that any cooperation with governmental institutions answerable to Belgrade (such as the RIPM Belgrade) will re-enforce the idea that the Serbian state has a legitimate stake in the affairs of Kosovo. This makes networks comprising configurations such as these unlikely, although not impossible as we have seen.

Co-existence of legitimate mandates and Parallelism

In Western Europe, most governance networks operate according to goals that derive directly or indirectly from public policy, usually created by national or local government. In Kosovo however it was observed that governance networks operate according to goals formulated in one of two international agreements: UNSC Res 1244 and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (Ahtisaari Plan). Furthermore, the international organisations working in the governance networks observed here subscribed to and derived legitimacy from one or other mandate.

'Parallelism' is a term receiving much attention in Kosovo at the moment. It refers first to the parallel institutions set up by Albanians, primarily in education, after the status of Kosovo as an autonomous province in the Republic of Serbia was withdrawn in 1989. More recently however it refers to the system of parallel municipalities set up in Serb-majority areas of Kosovo. These parallel municipalities do not recognise the independent government in Prishtina and are instead answerable to Belgrade (see Heijke (2010)).

As can be seen from the data, parallelism is practiced to a limited degree in governance networks. We observed two governance networks: RIC and what I term the Cultural Heritage Governance Network. These networks have similar goals, governing broadly similar areas of competence, utilising the same types of expertise and with a cross-over of actors (SOC and MOC are represented in both networks). Yet the large international organisations subscribe to different mandates, CoE & UNMIK following UNSC 1244 and & ICO following Ahtisaari. The result is that both networks function but remain separate and do not interact or cooperate with each other.

Resources

During this analysis it has been seen that 'resources' that actors possess can often take immaterial form. Amongst the forms of resources used in the governance networks under investigation here are: status-neutrality; internationally-derived mandates; electoral mandates; and state legitimacy.

4.3.7 What does network governance approach tell us?

As was seen from the subsection 4.2.4 Narratives in Rounds, the Governance Networks had quite an influential role to play in mobilising and strengthening certain narratives and discourses, namely those I call *Multi-Cultural City* and *De-Nationalised Tolerance*.

From this analysis of governance networks it is clear that network governance plays a role in integrating the narratives of various stakeholders. Resourceful actors (such as CoE and ICO) have had considerable influence over narrative contestation. This is seen to derive both from the positions they occupy within a network, and to the construction of networks according to an implicit framework.

Additionally it was seen that the Ahtisaari Plan was very influential. Influence can be attributed to the Package Proposal for three reasons. First, it mandated a central actor in the process (the ICO). Secondly, the Ahtisaari Plan formed the basis upon which the Cultural Heritage Governance Network functioned. The mere functioning of the network was itself an example of a practicing and performance of certain narratives. Thirdly, in forming the base 'logic' upon which the network functioned, it can be said that the proposal was influential in bringing about the eventual outcome: that of allowing the SOC to continue construction.

Finally it can be said that the presence of status-neutral actors were significant in facilitating trust-building, which allows agreement to be reached amongst actors 'across the ethnic divide'. Additionally, it is probably also the case that a certain cross-over of network actors is important in trust-building and narrative contestation, although this is not supported explicitly by the data. It is not unreasonable to imagine that the work of the SOC and MOC with the RIC mechanism was probably important in facilitating trust-building between the two, which might have facilitated easier agreement in the later network.

However, as said, this cannot be derived conclusively from the data. However, it does suggest that discursive change happens across multiple networks and venues and that therefore there is not one identifiable location of decision-making.

4.4 Deliberative Governance

Throughout this chapter it has been seen that the history of this issue of Christ the Saviour Cathedral has been a history of discursive contestation between relatively powerful and relatively powerless actors. On the one hand we have seen actors using physical force to implement their own decisions (e.g. UNMIK; KFOR; 'violent groups') and on the other hand we have seen actors marginalised and excluded from decision-making (e.g. University of Priština; University of Prishtina; SOC). Within circles of decision-making a reluctance of actors to talk directly to each other has been observed, along with the presence of organisations whose expressed goals are to find agreement between such groups. Finally it was seen that a breakthrough was reached with the apparent agreement amongst the actors involved in the Cultural Heritage Governance Network according to their shared construction of problems and solutions and their shared imaginary framework.

When confronted with such a diversity of actors, roles and resources in the governance landscape, two questions arise: to what extent can governance in Kosovo be described as deliberative? And secondly, can governance in Kosovo be made more deliberative?

As discussed in Chapter 2, Fung and Wright conceptualise a model of "Empowered Deliberative Democracy" (EDD) (2001). EDD consists of three elements: 1) A focus on specific problems; 2) Bottom-up Participation; and 3) Deliberative Solution Generation (ibid: 17). As was seen in 4.1 there is much difference in opinion as to what constitutes 'specific problems'. It has also been seen that bottom-up participation is generally lacking. It is less easy, however, to make an immediate conclusion regarding the third factor, something I now turn attention to.

Fung and Wright define *deliberation* as a form of group decision-making that involves selected participants listening and considering all possible proposed solutions, and generating a group solution based on normative goals of reasonableness and fairness for all those involved, as opposed to narrow self-interest (ibid). They compare *deliberation* with three other methods of social choice (command and control; aggregative voting; and strategic bargaining) but assert that actual decision making processes will in reality contain elements of each of these modes (ibid). Similarly Sørensen and Torfing argue that governance networks interact through negotiations, meaning a combination of "elements of bargaining with elements of deliberation" (2005: 203). In practice therefore, it will be almost impossible to categorise decision-making as deliberative or not. What can be done though is to look for *elements* of deliberation within decision-making, or indeed, elements of other methods of social choice. In so doing we get insight into the various ways in which deliberation has worked and ways it has been worked against. This offers us the possibility to formulate recommendations for deliberative governance that is suitable in this context.

I will first describe some examples of deliberation and of its absence. I then speculate on some of the possible factors enabling or constraining deliberation. Finally I move on to consider some actors that have been excluded from the decision-making process. It must be stressed that the findings and insights presented in this section are exploratory and speculative and should not be treated as conclusive.

4.4.1 Examples of Deliberation or its absence

Reconstruction Implementation Commission

The RIC mechanism has been held up as a rare example of successful deliberation involving parties from "both sides". Satisfaction with the process has been reported in interviews[92] and the continuity of the network over 7 years attest to this. UNMIK has referred to RIC as "the only platform for interface at a technical level between the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Serbian Ministry of Culture and the Kosovo authorities[93]", suggesting it should be extended as an "umbrella for cooperation in other technical areas"[94].

The RIC mechanism as it is constituted at the time of research (June 2011) comprised representatives from the following five organisations: Council of Europe; Serbian Orthodox Church; Republic Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments, Belgrade; Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports; Institute for the Protection of Monuments, Prishtina[95]. As such, the Reconstruction Implementation Commission is noteworthy for the involvement of governmental bodies from the Republic of Serbia, from the Provisional Institutions of Self Government, after 2008 from the republic of Kosovo, and of the Serbian Orthodox Church. As stated in a report produced by RIC, "Politics have undoubtedly played a part in the process but it has not prevented the reconstruction programme from moving forward"[96].

The RIC (or Implementation Committee for Reconstruction of Religious Sites as it was then known) mechanism was established in 2004. The concerned parties came to an agreement termed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), in which it was decided that the 35 cultural sites that were damaged in the outbreak of violence in 2004 were to be protected and restored by the commission[97].

Disagreements among the parties led to a temporary disbandment in 2005. Following discussions a second, revised MoU was signed and work of the commission resumed[98]. The RIC mechanism has continued in an unaltered form after Declaration of Independence, and since its inception has designed and implemented restoration work on the identified sites.

As has been reported in interviews, the parties in the RIC mechanism meet to agree on producing, implementing and evaluating work, based on the agreements contained in the Memorandum of Understanding[99]. This indicates an interesting possibility for bodies with substantial disagreements to meet and to agree to work on certain concrete problems. Dissatisfaction with the first MoU and eventual agreement of a second MoU further indicates that there was flexibility for the parties to dispute the terms of the first embodiment. Put another way, it indicates that there was a possibility for widening the scope for discursive contestation (Dryzek 2006).

The ability of the RIC mechanism to continue to work during the period in which the Declaration of Independence was issued further demonstrates an unusual example of cooperation in difficult circumstances. During this time, one involved party, the Ministry of Culture Youth and Sports, transformed from being an entity of the Provisional Institutions of Self Government, recognised by all parties under UN Security Council Resolution 1244, to a governmental body of the independent Republic of Kosovo. The self-declared independent Republic was declared

illegal by both the Government of the Republic of Serbia and by the Serbian Orthodox Church, both of whom were represented on RIC.

Respondents from RIC have attributed the success of RIC to 3 factors: 1) RIC was established under UNSC Resolution 1244, an international agreement that all sides accept; 2) RIC is chaired by the Council of Europe, a status-neutral body that can be trusted both by Kosovar governmental bodies and by governmental bodies in Belgrade and the SOC; and 3) there is a recurring emphasis placed on the technical nature of the work that RIC does[100]. The political context of the disputed status of Kosovo is taken as a given, and parties discuss how best to complete the task of reconstructing 35 damaged sites within this political context. As mentioned above, these findings are exploratory. A detailed case study of the RIC mechanism is recommended as further research.

[Recommendation: Detailed study of RIC mechanism as a case study of successful mediation and dialogue across ethno-national and political divide.]

2003 Municipality, SOC, UNMIK deadlock

In 2003 the Municipality of Prishtina proposed 4 'solutions' for Christ the Saviour Cathedral. These were to preserve the unfinished building; to convert it to a museum; to use the building for another purpose; or to demolish it. The response of the SOC was to suggest taking similar actions with buildings that were on the property of the SOC, including the Assembly of Kosovo, the National Library and the University Staff Accommodation buildings[101]. Eventually the plans of the Municipality were overruled by UNMIK[102].

In this case the interactions between SOC and the Municipality can best be described as *strategic bargaining*. On the other hand, the actions of UNMIK are best interpreted as exercising *command and control*.

From this example it can be seen that the two actors SOC and the Municipality at that time had mutually exclusive objectives and poor relations. This makes deliberation almost impossible in this case.

The executive powers of UNMIK allowed it at the time to overrule decisions of the Municipality. Thus even in cases that UNMIK did not intervene directly, their potential to utilise executive overruling powers makes deliberation difficult between UNMIK and governmental bodies. The executive powers of UNMIK derive from UNSC Resolution 1244 and are used to prevent actions that would lead to renewed violence. From this perspective, the non-deliberative, executive command methods of decision-making are justified on the basis of the risk of insecurity.

In order to allow more deliberative decision-making, such executive powers held by organisations such as UNMIK, ICO and IMC should be kept to a minimum, in line with the improving security situation in Kosovo. This is happening to a certain extent. Considerable power has been transferred from UNMIK to the Provisional Institutions of Self Government, prior to Independence[103]. Additionally, the ICR is scheduled to scale down operations as progress is made.

[Recommendation: executive powers of governmental and supervisory bodies be made subject to approval of citizen councils with at least one comprised of minority groups.]

Cultural Heritage Governance Network

In agreement with the involved parties, the Cultural Heritage Governance Network resolved to allow the Serbian Orthodox Church as owners of the plot of land to continue construction of the cathedral if it so wished. The logic of discussions of the governance network refers constantly to the Ahtisaari Package Proposal. From this perspective, deliberation happens within a pre-determined context, with the questions and agenda being shaped by this framework. Dryzek (2006) and Sørensen and Torfing (2005) would argue this does not amount to genuine discursive deliberation as the context within which decisions take place should also be open for discussion.

To a certain extent this is the case. Changes to certain provisions of the Ahtisaari Plan covering religious and cultural heritage can be made with agreement of the ICO, the Implementation Monitoring Council, and the Serbian Orthodox Church[104].

4.4.2 Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion of actors

It is difficult or almost impossible to make a comprehensive analysis of excluded actors from the process. Such an analysis would be difficult for two reasons. In the first place, a comprehensive analysis of excluded actors would require normative assumptions about who *should* be included. As the discussion on theories of liberal and post liberal democracy in Chapter 2 show, such normative assumptions are far from agreed upon.

A second reason making such an analysis difficult it that there is an inexhaustible list of potential actors who *could* be included but are not included for a variety of possible reasons, for example that they choose not to participate, they are not considered relevant, or that the size of governance networks need to be constrained.

Thus it is not possible to verify identifiable factors that are the source of exclusion. Here instead I give an exploratory glimpse of *elements* of exclusion. It is important to note, that here I am not selective about whether exclusion is normatively bad. I also deal mainly with exclusion since 2004. Of course the firing of Albanians from the university, and the subsequent displacement of Serbs from Prishtina are clearly examples of relevant stakeholders being excluded from the process, yet these instances are not dealt with here.

Kosovo Serbs are represented solely through Serbian Orthodox Church

Much effort has been made and energy invested into finding a means through which the Serbian Orthodox Church can be included in public governance over issues of Serbian Cultural Heritage. Special provisions are made within the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement explicitly guaranteeing the rights of the SOC as an organisation. However, little attempt is made to represent Kosovo Serbs through means other than the Orthodox Church (although much attention is given to this issue in other areas of the Ahtisaari Plan, notably Annex II on the rights of communities and their members and Annex III on Decentralisation).

University of Prishtina.

The University of Prishtina could be said to be a stakeholder in that the land on which the church was built was originally the property of the University, and the cathedral now stands very close to a number of University buildings. However representatives of the University are not included in governance networks dealing with the issue, nor does there appear to be an effort on behalf of the University to be involved[105].

There are two possible reasons for this. First, within the normative and technical framework under which Cultural Heritage Governance Network operated, the University were not considered a stakeholder as the land on which the cathedral stands was the property of the Serbian Orthodox Church, having been transferred to the Church in the 1990s. This exclusion on technical grounds stems from the technical manner in which problems are constructed in the Ahtisaari Plan. Thus, the way in which things are framed in the Ahtisaari Plan results in the exclusion of frames that put a political or historical context as central.

The above explanation is weakened somewhat by the absence of representatives from the University of Prishtina actively seeking to have input into decision-making over this issue. The second possible reason for the non-inclusion of the University as a stakeholder in the governance network is what I have described in 4.2.2 as a contradiction in narratives. What I mean by this is that actors who have adopted the narrative *De-Nationalised Tolerance* and/or *Multi-Cultural City* find it difficult to continue to act according to *Unfinished Serb Victory*. While the latter narrative implies for Albanians that the cathedral was built as part of Slobodan Milošević's campaign of 'Serbianising' Kosovo, and that therefore it is unacceptable, the first set of narratives implies that as a religious building, the cathedral must be protected[106]. According to respondents, this contradiction leads to a pragmatic ignoring of the issue[107], which could explain why the University has not acted on the issue after 2004.

UNMIK

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo has declined in influence after Independence. Part of the reason for this is that the UNSC has not endorsed the Ahtisaari Plan, and continues to operate under UNSC Res 1244. As mentioned in 4.3.6, the existence of two international agreements is leading to a certain degree of parallelism with respect to governance.

'violent groups'

Clearly, those taking part in the violent attacks on Orthodox churches in the early 2000s were never invited to participate in discussions and share their opinions.

Chapter 5 Case Study 2: Newborn Monument

Figure 7 Crowds celebrate after Newborn is unveiled. Photo: AP

On the morning of the 17th of February 2008, an extraordinary sitting of the elected representative of the Legislative Assembly of the Provisional Institutions of Self Government of Kosovo was called by Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi. The purpose of the meeting was to read and formally approve the Declaration of Independence. The elected representatives who were present voted unanimously (ten Serb members of the legislative assembly boycotted the event) in favour[108], and in so doing, asserted their sovereignty of Kosovo, unsanctioned by either Belgrade or by the UN Security Council.

News quickly spread of the event and people began to celebrate on the streets of Prishtina and many other major towns. Among the most memorable events of the celebrations in terms of international media coverage was the unveiling of the Newborn monument, a three meter high, 24 meter long, seven letter typographic sculpture displaying the word Newborn (see Figure 7[109]). The monument was unveiled at 6.30 on the 17th of February. As part of the unveiling ceremony,

the President and the Prime Minister signed the monument before black permanent markers were distributed to the crowd who then had their turn to sign. The idea was that whereas the members of the legislative assembly signed the Declaration on behalf of the people, now the people could themselves sign their own declaration of independence.

In doing so, what people were declaring was that Kosovo was now an independent state, independent from the rule of Serbia and from the UNMIK administration, representing the successful realisation of the aims of one party or side in the conflict. Thus, the urban public space was transformed into an arena in which a sovereign victory in a war situation is mediated to the world. In this sense, Newborn can be seen as an example similar to that of the Statue of Liberty or of l'Arc du Triomphe.

Although both the Declaration of Independent and the celebrations are often portrayed as unilateral and spontaneous, as we will see in this chapter, both activities were the result of careful planning and negotiation by a network of actors ranging from domestic public relations companies, to national political actors, to high level international actors. Similarly to what was seen in previous chapter, narratives are not produced in an institutional vacuum. Therefore in this Chapter I examine the institutional context that resulted in this monument, defining as it does the character of the newly created state, its capital city, and retrospectively, the character of the conflict.

The structure of this chapter follows the same analytical framework as described in Chapters 2 and 3 and used in Chapter 4. I begin by ordering data according to a *rounds model of decision-making* (Tesiman 2000) in order to construct a socio-historic narrative of the unfolding of events in question. This is followed by a description ad analysis of urban narratives ad discourses used by respondents in talking about the Declaration of Independence. In section 5.3 a key governance network is analysed to see how governance networks affects narrative mobilisation in this case. Finally, selected examples of decision-making are looked at to see in what ways governance contains elements of deliberation, and how deliberative governance can be encouraged.

5.1 Introduction: A Rounds perspective on the origins of the Newborn Monument

Here I present the institutional history leading to the construction of the Newborn monument to as part of the celebrations marking the Declaration of Independence on 17th February 2008. Similar to Chapter 4, I use the *rounds* model of decision-making to reconstruct this history (Teisman 2000). In *decision-making rounds*, actors compete to articulate and promote their own subjective constructions of problems and solutions over those of others. *Rounds* are characterised by a particular configuration of actors with shared constructions of problems and solutions. They are demarcated by *key events*: decisions or events that have been retrospectively constructed as significant by a substantial number of actors and that bring about a new configuration of actors, problems and solutions.

Preliminary Round: Ahtisaari negotiations November 2005 – March 2007

Main actors: Kosovo Unity Team; UN Special Envoy; Ahtisaari negotiation team

In 1999, NATO's aerial campaign effectively brought an end to large scale fighting between ethnic Albanian paramilitaries and Yugoslav forces. Establishing a protectorate in Kosovo, the KFOR mission of NATO and the civil administrative mission of the UN, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, brought about an increase in stability in the province. With the more stabilised situation in Kosovo, a large number of ethnic Albanian and international actors began to re-align themselves and their relations with others.

In 1999, many former members of the Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK) (English: Kosovo Liberation Army or KLA), including the former political leader of the UÇK, Hashim Thaçi, formed the Partia Demokratike e Kosovës (PDK) (English: Democratic Party of Kosovo)[110]. The party was the second largest Kosovo after the 2001 and 2004 elections[111]. After the 2007 elections the PDK became the largest political party in Kosovo and Hashim Thaçi became Prime Minister in the Legislative Assembly of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government[112].

In 2003, the public relations company B2 PR and Media Solutions was founded by Kosovar Albanian couple Vjosa and Fatos Berisha, upon their return to Kosovo from the United Kingdom. The company quickly established itself as a prominent marketing company in Kosovo.

Also in 2003, Kosovar Albanian, Fisnik Ismaili returned from the UK where he had been working with numerous design companies. In Kosovo he co- founded the advertising agency, Karrota. In 2006, Karrota became part of the multi-national Ogilvy and Mather advertising network, renaming itself Ogilvy|Karrota[113].

As mandated by UNSC Res 1244, the UNMIK and PISG were established in Kosovo after the 1999 intervention, as a means for "democratic and autonomous self-government, pending a political settlement"[114]. With a view to finding such a political settlement, in November 2005 the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon, appointed Martti Ahtisaari as his Special Envoy on Kosovo's future status[115]. Mr. Ahtisaari began negotiations with representatives from Kosovo and from the Republic of Serbia to try to arrive at a political settlement to the status of Kosovo that would be acceptable to both sides[116]. Kosovo was represented by the Kosovo Unity Team, a negotiating team comprised of 5 members form the legislative assembly of the Provisional Institutions of Self Government[117]. After over a year of negotiations, the Special Envoy concluded that agreement between the two sides was impossible and so in consultation with the Kosovo Unity Team, devised a proposal for the settlement of Kosovo's status[118].

This group of actors possessed shared constructions of two problems: the lack of a long-term settlement for the status of Kosovo; and the impossibility of agreement between representatives of Serbia and Kosovo. The shared solution of this configuration of actors was for them to draft a proposal for this settlement. The realisation of this solution came about with the publication of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (aka the Ahtisaari Plan), which recommended supervised Independence as the only sustainable status solution[119]. After it became apparent that the UN Security Council would not endorse the proposal, principally due to Russian and Chinese opposition, domestic politicians and some international actors began to consider the possibility of a unilateral Declaration of Independence.

Round 1: Adoption of Ahtisaari 26 March 2007-Feb 2008

Main Actors: Government; Kosovo Unity Team; US Embassy; USAID; B2 PR & Media Solutions; Strategic Group on Transition

Following the presentation of Martti Ahtisaari's recommendations of supervised independence for Kosovo, a draft Security Council Resolution was written although it failed to win the support of Russia, who vetoed it. Kosovar Albanian elected representatives nonetheless began to make preparations for an eventual declaration of independence in line with the recommendations in the Ahtisaari Plan. USAID, in consultation with the Kosovo Unity Team, launched a tender for the communication of the Proposal to the Kosovar public, which included Kosovar Albanians who were generally supportive of the recommendations, but also Kosovo Serbs who were openly hostile to any separation of Kosovo from Serbia. This tender was won by the PR company B2 PR & Media Solutions. This event thus established the above mentioned configuration of actors, amongst whom there was a consensus on the problem: the risk of the recommendations in the Ahtisaari Plan causing instability. The solution shared by this network of actors was to manage communication of the Plan to Albanian and Serb audiences.

In the summer of 2007, the Kosovo Unity Team launched a competition to for the design of a new Kosovar national flag. There were strict conditions barring the use of dominant colours from either the Serbian or Albanian national flags, and also preventing the inclusion of symbols from any of the ethnic groups in Kosovo. The competition received 993 entries. From this, a shortlist of three finalists were chosen and passed on to the legislative assembly of the PISG to make a final decision[120].

During this round there was a high degree of coordination between actors. Communication messages were designed by B2 PR and Media Solutions and had to be then approved by members of the Kosovo Unity Team, USAID, and the Strategic Group on Transition before being disseminated externally or internally[121]. Messages were designed to inform Albanians and Serbs about the implications of the Ahtisaari Proposal in such a way as to properly inform citizens about how they will be affected by the recommendations contained in the Package Proposal. This had to be done in a way that would not aggravate tensions between the different ethnic groups, therefore necessitating a high degree of supervision and approval of the communication strategy. The resulting marketing campaign included messages such as "Kosovo welcomes the future" in both Serbian and Albanian, with some additional references to the benefits of decentralisation[122] (as recommended in Annex III of the Ahtisaari Plan), reflects solutions that were favoured by this close configuration of actors.

Such close interaction on the content of communications facilitated trust-building amongst the network of actors. And so, approximately 10 days before Independence was to be declared, B2 PR and Media Solutions were hired for the contract of planning and organising the Independence Day Celebrations, on the basis of the work they had performed up until then. The awarding of the contract has been constructed by the actors as a key event. From that point onwards, actions were shaped by a shift in perceptions of Independence, from a hypothetical event to one that had to be implemented. This key event marks the beginning of the next round.

Round 2: Independence Day Celebrations Planning: 10/02/2008 – 18/02/2008

Main Actors: Government; B2 PR and Media Solutions; Muhamer Ibrahimi; Ogilvy|Karrota; Municipality; Kosovo Unity Team; Office of the Prime Minister;

The planning of the Independence Celebrations is a very short but intensive decision-making round. A similar set of actors from Round 1 are present, with the additions of Mr. Muhamer Ibrahimi, the designer of the winning national flag and of Ogilvy|Karrota, designers of the Newborn monument. By contrast, USAID, US Embassy and the Strategic Group on Transition appear to enjoy less prominent positions, although that is not entirely clear from data. The central problem during this round became: how to positively mark the Declaration of Independence but at the same time to avoid any instability. Unlike the previous round, there was no clear consensus on how this was to be done, with each of the new actors making various contributions.

The first event or decision of this round was for the government to contract B2 PR and Media Solutions to plan and organise the official celebrations[123]. This was a substantial change as the initial contract from Round 1had been with USAID. This change reflects a more central position for the government in this round. In this capacity B2 PR and Media Solutions planned the media campaign "Celebrate with Dignity: For Kosovo"[124]. Among events organised under this campaign were media management of signing of the Declaration in parliament, the Independence Day Philharmonic concert, the official fireworks in the evening, and the organising of the official state photographic archive of the event[125].

It is not entirely clear when a decision was made on the selection of the new Kosovar national flag. This was to be formally decided upon by the legislative assembly on the day that Independence would be declared. However, production of the winning entry by Muhamer Ibrahimi had already been arranged prior to the occasion. The new flags had been distributed to all municipal offices in Kosovo and were raised upon Independence being declared[126]. Either way, the winning flag comprised a yellow map of Kosovo on a blue background, accompanied by six stars, representing the six ethnic groups in Kosovo (see Figure 8[127]).

Figure 8 Kosovo Flag

Finally, Ogilvy|Karrota, a Prishtina based division of a multi-national Public Relations network also entered this decision-making round. This company, understanding that Independence would be declared soon, began to design an Independence monument[128]. Without consulting any external actors, the creative team put together the concept of a three meter high, 24 meter long, typographic sculpture spelling the word "NEWBORN", on which celebrators could sign their names. Staff at Karrota were extremely motivated to have this included in the official celebrations and so construction of this sculpture was begun unilaterally, without knowledge of whether it would be included in the official celebrations, how it would be paid for, or whether it would receive planning permission from the Municipality of Prishtina. As Fisnik Ismaili, formerly involved in military activities during the war and creative lead with Ogilvy|Karrota at the time of Independence, reports, "I was gonna do it anyway. Even if Government didn't agree [...] I wanted to tell the world that we're not that undeveloped, I mean we have some great minds here"[129].

Project proposals were then distributed to members of the Legislative Assembly with a view to having Newborn included in the official celebrations and to secure funding. Planning permission was sought and granted by the Municipality. Approximately three days before Independence Day, contact was made between the Office of the Prime Minister and Ogilvy|Karrota. During this meeting it was decided that Newborn would be unveiled as part of the celebrations and construction would be paid for from the official celebrations budget. It was also decided that the colour of the monument would be changed from red to yellow (see Figure 9[130]).

Figure 9 Newborn under construction. Photo: Visar Kryeziu/Associated Press

These decisions mark the finalisation of plans for Independence Celebrations. Although in the other case studies in this thesis, Independence Day itself is a key event, in this case the decisions made immediately prior to the Declaration of Independence are given more importance by respondents. These final decisions form the key events from which the Celebrations then naturally follow.

Round 3: Post Independence 19/02/2008 –

Main actors: Ogilvy|Karrota; Government; Municipality

According to the constructed problem in Round 2, Independence Day can be broadly defined as successful. Celebrations were attended by large, jubilant crowds and violence levels were not high. The international Crisis Group described the celebrations as "dignified and well-organised"[131], and while here were protests in the Mitroviça and two hand grenades were thrown and UN and EU facilities in the north of Kosovo, the more militant demonstrations were seen primarily in Belgrade[132].

The network of decision-makers began to fragment soon after the event. There are two probably reasons for this. The first is the short term goal of the network. This configuration of actors shared a common purpose: to organise successful celebrations. Once that was achieved there was less reason to remain in contact.

The second reason is that the relations between certain network actors deteriorated. Notable in this context is the distrust that developed between personnel at Ogilvy|Karrota and staff at the Office of the Prime Minister. As trust and personal connections were so important under securitised situation, distrust amongst the actors would make the functioning of the network impossible.

With respect to the legacy of decisions taken at the time, the Newborn monument still stands at a very central location in Prishtina. However, the metal construction is accumulating rust and is covered in graffiti.

In the years since Independence was declared, celebrations have taken place annually on the 17th of February. These events have understandably become much more low-key than those of 2008[133]. B2 PR & Media Solution have not played a role in organising any of the annual celebrations that followed after the Declaration of Independence on 17th of February 2008[134].

In the absence of the continuation of the network, the actors have continued to pursue goals in different forms. At the time of research (June 2011), Hashim Thaçi's PDK-led government remains in power although it has undergone numerous reshuffles since 2008, most notably after the election of 2010.

Top level-staff at B2 PR and Media Solutions have got involved in organising the successful Prishtina International Film Festival in personal capacities[135]. PriFilmFest will be discussed further in Chapter 6.

Meanwhile, creative lead at Ogilvy|Karrota, Fisnik Ismaili has become active in the opposition movement, Lëvizja VETËVENDOSJE! Translating into English as "Movement for Self-determination", the group calls itself a "community of people that refuse to submit" and who work to achieve "radical social and political changes that will enable respect for human rights, civil rights and social justice for each and every citizen of Kosova without discrimination"[136]. The group has become prominent largely through their protest marches in Prishtina, opposition to the privatisation programme, and spray-painting campaigns.

Additionally, Mr. Ismaili runs a satire series on Facebook entitled "The Pimpsons". Modelled on the American cartoon series, *the Simpsons*, the satire series mobilises fierce critique of the political establishment in Kosovo, with Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi and US Ambassador Dell are cast by parodies of Rainier Wolfcastle and Comic Book guy, respectively[137].

Future Rounds

Focussing specifically on Newborn, two possible future key events could lead to a new round of decision-making. Shortly after the Declaration of Independence, the Serbian Government took a case to the International Court of Justice challenging the legality of this action. In 2010, the court ruled that the Declaration did not violate International Law[138]. However the Serbian Government (along with other countries, notably Spain, Greece and Russia) continue to refuse to recognise Kosovo as an Independent country. Should Serbia be successful with another such attempt this will no doubt have consequences for how understandings of Independence is currently governed in Kosovo.

Figure 10 "Jo Negociata Vetëvendosje" (No negotiation, Self-determination) spray-painted above statue of Bill Clinton in Prishtina

A second possible event in the future would be for Newborn to be re-painted and maintained. It is possible that this could happen with the cooperation of relevant authorities or unilaterally. According to Fisnik Ismaili at

Ogilvy|Karrota, the original idea with Newborn was to have the monument re-painted annually to allow different creative expressions and also to guard against rust[139]. It is conceivable that this could be negotiated with the cooperation of the Municipality, or even with the government, possibly after an election.

On the other hand the movement Vetëvendosje show and increasing capacity and willingness to carry out unsanctioned actions altering the urban imagery (see Figure 10). This past year has also seen the appearance of 'guerrilla gardening' groups in Kosovo, planting flowers in unmaintained and neglected buildings. In the event of the monument being re-painted, it would once again become an issue of urban governance a new decision-making round would commence.

5.2 Urban Narratives

The events surrounding the celebrations of Independence described above are a good example of attempts at using urban space to mediate certain messages and to ascribe certain managed meanings to a political event. In this section, I now turn towards analysing those meanings and how they were produced in the networks of public decision-making outlined above.

During research I was able to identify frames which respondents (mostly interviewees) used in referring to the Independence Day celebrations. From a discursive analysis of data a number of independent frames were identified, each of which builds upon or suggests a particular narrative or story of Independence, Prishtina, and Kosovo.

From this method I have identified the following six urban narratives:

1. Innocence and Promise
2. Modern and Serious
3. Free Expression
4. Kosovar/Albanian Victory
5. Dignified Pride
6. Betrayal.

The most noteworthy of these, *Kosovar/Albanian Victory*, is the one that most clearly situates the Declaration of Independence as part of the conflict. Interestingly, there is a near consensus among governance actors on down-playing this narrative in favour of others. This seems to be especially the case for higher level International and governmental actors, some of whom, as former members of UÇK, once actively sought such a victory. There is instead considerable weight and resources given by decision-makers to promoting *Dignified Pride* as a counter-narrative.

Even so, other narratives are successfully mobilised, principally by Ogilvy|Karrota, who attempted instead to define Independence according to norms and goals of free speech and creative expression, embodied in *Free Expression*. As the decision-making network began to fragment, this narrative enjoyed less support. In turn this has led actors to mobilise the counter-narrative of *Betrayal* in recent years as they see the promises of Independence fail to materialise.

A description of each of the six narratives is presented below. Afterwards, I trace the mobilisation of narratives by actors in the decision-making rounds as outlined in 5.1.

5.2.1 Description of Narratives

Innocence and Promise

This narrative emphasises the fact that Kosovo has never formed a state before. This fact is then imbued with all the possibilities that statehood and self-determination bring. The Kosovar state and its peoples are thus constructed as cute, innocent and full of potential, promise and energy for the future. This is particularly embodied in the word *newborn*: “Newborn babies are always soft, vulnerable, cute things so it gives a message of something really good, something really […]

innocent"[140]. The innocence and promise of the Independent state of Kosovo are equated with that of a new-born baby, with their entire life ahead of them.

Modern and Serious

In some ways this second narrative contrasts sharply with the first. As a landmark on Prishtina, Newborn exemplifies modern art and urban design: it does not have any pretences to history, religion or war. Rather than Kosovo people being cute and innocent , the typographic sculpture showcases the creative minds that are already established in Kosovo[141], communicating to the world, using the English language, that Kosovo is serious, competent and developed: "[t]he idea was to present Kosovo as a new, contemporary, trendy country, ready to be embraced by the world"[142]. Newborn is an urban landmark that identifies Prishtina and Kosovo in the same way that Big Ben and the Eiffel Tower do for London and Paris[143].

Additionally, with Newborn coloured yellow, and with the Kosovar flag coloured blue and yellow, a certain aspiration and affinity is created for the EU. Rather than positioning Kosovo as part of 'backward' Europe, Kosovo is instead seen as moving, through Independence, inevitably towards the modernisation and development evident in the EU.

Free Expression

The Newborn monument was unveiled at 18.30 on the 17th of February, 2008, by the Prime Minister and President of Kosovo. After some short speeches, they signed their names on the monument, prompting the thousands of people gathered at the ceremony to follow suit with black permanent markers that had been distributed during the ceremony. Whereas earlier that day, the members of Kosovo's Legislative Assembly signed the Declaration of Independence, now it was the turn of ordinary Kosovars to make their own declaration by signing Newborn. Thus an integral element to the monument concept was the possibility for ordinary people to engage in public expression: "the idea of Newborn is to be there for people to express themselves"[144].

This concept may have an implicit reference to Kosovo's recent history of communism, occupation and war, although this has not been mentioned explicitly by respondents in relation to Newborn. However connections have been made by other respondents between the repression during communism and the creative expression that is possible in Kosovo today. Details of this can be seen in the narrative *Open and Creative* in Chapter 6.

The original concept at Ogilvy|Karrota was for Newborn to be re-painted every year in different colour or design scheme every year (examples include covering the monument with mirrors for one year, and the design of each 7 letters to 7 different international artists another year)[145]. In addition to guarding against rust, this would also allow continuous opportunities for re-expression. This element did not materialise however, due to a breakdown of relations between the designers and the Municipality and Government.

Kosovar/ Albanian Victory

Independence for Kosovo was one of the principal goals of the Kosovo liberation movement, including of the paramilitary organisation, the Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK) (aka Kosovo Liberation Army or KLA). Therefore the Declaration of the Independent state of Kosovo could be interpreted as the sovereign victory of one party to the conflict, assisted of course by some international actors: Martti Ahtisaari, UNSC, USAID. To avoid this perception there was considerable effort made to detach the political solution tabled by neutral conflict management actors from its original context as the political ends of violent means in an armed conflict.

It is worth noting that another principal goal of the UÇK and other liberation groups was that of uniting Kosovo with Albania. There have been particular attempts to detach Kosovar Independence from Albanian nationalism, which sees independence as a step along the way to the ultimate goal of a unified Albanian Nation-State, comprising present day Albania, Kosovo, and parts of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece. Interestingly, some critics of Kosovar Independence argue that the six stars on the Kosovo flag, rather than representing the six ethnicities who share Kosovo as is officially the case, the six stars actually represent the six territories in which Albanians form enclave populations[146]. The absence of the colour Red (the national colour of Albania) from the Newborn monument and from the Kosovo national flag are evidence of distancing of the narrative, *Albanian Victory*.

Interestingly, some of the governmental actors eager to downplay this narrative were themselves once members of UÇK, and once actively sought to bring about such a victory. The largest political party in Kosovo since 2007, the PDK, was formed in 1999 by former members of the UÇK[147]. The Prime Minister who declared the Independence of the Republic of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, was himself once the leader of the political wing of the UÇK[148]. It is noteworthy then that these actors acted so decisively against this narrative.

Dignified Pride

Dignified Pride is a counter-narrative to *Kosovar/ Albanian Victory*. The narrative recognises the humiliating oppression of Albanians under communist rule during the former Yugoslavia, as well as under the rule of Slobodan Milošević. The celebrated response to such memories in this case is not a triumphant victory of the paramilitary campaign, however. Rather it is the dignified and diplomatic assertion of Independence.

This narrative has its roots in the communication campaign promoting of the Ahtisaari Plan to the Kosovar public. One of the main tasks in this campaign was to communicate messages that will be accepted by both Kosovar Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. As such, this narrative can be seen in the slogan “Per hir të sakrafices dhe vuajtievë […] Festo me digniitët: Për Kosovë” (“For the sake of sacrifices and suffering […] Celebrate with Dignity: For Kosovo”; originally in Albanian)[149]. It can also be seen in the six stars on the Kosovo flag (representing the six ethnicities living in Kosovo) and in the Independence Philharmonic concert held in the afternoon of Independence Day. *Dignified Pride* reflects in particular the wishes of the coalition of actors in Round 1.

Betrayal

A final counter narrative has emerged in the years since Independence was declared. After the initial orderly signings at the unveiling ceremony, people continued to write on the Newborn

monument, with larger pens and in some cases with spray-paint. The original plans to re-paint the monument annually have not been followed through on and so the sculpture now stands dirty, graffitied and is accumulating rust. This had led Fisnik Ismaili, the designer of the Newborn monument to assert that "the negligence of Newborn reflects the negligence of the whole country"[150]. According to this narrative, reflected in the unmaintained Newborn monument is the lack of economic growth, freedom of speech, independent media, and governmental transparency[151]. In other words, the promises of the Independent State have been betrayed by those in charge: "I became so angry that I nearly painted it all black"[152].

5.2.2 Narratives in Rounds

Preliminary Round

Events and decisions in the preliminary round are not relevant to this discussion of narratives. Under discussion during this time was the terms of a possible future status of Kosovo, not how to narrate the beginning of that status. Decisions over the branding and narrating of Independence begin in round 1.

Round 1: Adoption of Ahtisaari 2007-feb 2008

Discussion amongst actors occurred at high political and security levels. It is therefore quite difficult to obtain data on these discussions. The data that can be accessed comprises examples from the PR campaign to communicate the Ahtisaari package proposal and from interviews with the agency, B2 PR and Media Solutions. The analysis of Round 1therefore focusses on narratives embodied in this vehicle.

In the first place messages were produced in both Serbian and Albanian, indicating an attempt to include both ethnic groups in narratives of Independence. The narrative *Modern and Serious* is embodied in the slogan "Kosova mirëpret të ardhmen" or "Kosovo podzdravlia budunost" ("Kosovo welcomes the future"; originally in Albanian and Serbian)[153]. It also contains an element of *Innocence and Promise*, although stressing the promise aspect more so than the innocence side.

The phrase "Decentralizacija dakle sam odlucujem" (English: "Decentralisation therefore I decide" ; originally in Serbian)[154] from the Ahtisaari plan promotion campaign can be seen as an important attempt to work against the *Kosovo/Albanian Victory* narrative. By stressing recommendations for decentralisation contained in Annex III of the Ahtisaari Plan, the campaign attempted to appeal to Serbian audiences, emphasising the provisions for considerable self-rule in Serb-majority municipalities. In this sense, it also contains elements of *Free Expression*.

In the absence of other data it has to be assumed that the narratives embodied in these PR campaigns represent those sought to be mobilised by the closed group of actors. The fact that B2 PR and Media Solutions were subsequently hired for PR management of Independence Celebrations suggests that higher actors were quite satisfied with representations created in this campaign, indicating that this assumption is quite plausible.

Round 2: Independence Day Celebrations Planning: 10/02/2008 – 18/02/2008

With the contract awarded to B2 PR and Media Solutions based on their communication strategy in Round 1, an attempt was made by this coalition of actors to bring the dominant narratives from round 1 into round 2. The outcome of this new contract, "Celebrate with Dignity: For Kosovo" embodies the *Modern and Serious* narrative and also that of *Free Expression*. However, 'free expression' in this case is not so free as there are attempts to guide people towards dignified expression. Therefore it makes sense to call this particular amalgamation the *Dignified Pride* narrative. Important though is that this campaign still had the effect of countering the *Kosovo/Albanian Victory*.

The competition by the Kosovo Unity Team for the design of the national flag had strict rules against the use of dominant colours from Serbian or Albanian flags and against the use of emblems of any of the ethnic groups in Kosovo. The effect of these rules was to prevent the national flag from privileging one ethnic group over any of the others. This prevented the national flag from being a vector specifically for the *Kosovar/Albanian Victory*.

Other rules in the competition stipulated that "[e]ntrants should bear in mind that the people of Kosovo should be able to identify with their flag and emblem. Accordingly, the flag and emblem should reflect a commitment to a common future in a spirit of respect and tolerance in Kosovo"[155]. By creating these rules, the KUT sought to influence the decisions of entrants to favour narratives of *Dignified Pride*, *Modern and Serious*, and *Innocence and Promise*.

The final selection of the Kosovar National Flag resulted in a design by Muhamer Ibrahimi being declared the winning entry. The flag comprises a yellow map of Kosovo on a blue background, with six stars representing the six ethnicities in Kosovo. Thus it embodies narratives of *Dignified Pride*, in symbolising Kosovo with its six constituent identities equally represented. Additionally, with the dominant colours of yellow and blue, and using stars as representative symbols, the flag clearly proclaims aspirations to join the European Union, thus also embodying *Modern and Serious*.

With the actions of Ogilvy|Karrota and their motivation to create Newborn we see a strong actor mobilising the narratives *Innocence and Promise*, *Modern and Serious*, and *Free Expression*. Permission granted by the Municipality gave major strength to all three. However the decision reached between the Office of the Prime Minister, and Ogilvy|Karrota to have it unveiled as part of the official celebrations gives a particular boost to *Free Expression*. This is the case for two reasons. Firstly, the unveiling ceremony served as a platform for expressions to be seen and heard by a much larger audience, in large part due to the presence of international journalists. Secondly the unveiling ceremony had the effect of including the large assembled crowds in a collective expression through the signing of the monument.

This meeting between these two actors was significant for a further reason. The Prime Minister also secured a change in colour of the monument, from red to yellow. This again signals the intention of actors to counter the *Kosovo/Albanian Victory* narrative.

Throughout this round, these narratives, *Dignified Pride, Innocence and Promise, Modern and Serious*, and *Free Expression*, were all co-existing and competing in the decision-making network leading up to Independence Day celebrations. The success of *Dignified Pride* can be seen in the generally peaceful nature of the celebrations. Celebrations in Prishtina were generally reported

as peaceful, while any violence that occurred on that day was directed at the international community rather than inter-ethnic[156]. Although it cannot be argued that narratives of *Dignified Pride* had a direct causal influence on reducing violence, in combination with some insights from other case studies it does suggest that narratives have a degree of power in shaping reality.

The success of *Modern and Serious*, *Innocence and Promise,* and *Free Expression* can also be seen in international new media coverage of the event. For example, *Time Magazine* described how "nearly 2 million ethnic Albanians celebrated their long-awaited freedom, dancing in city streets, releasing fireworks and waving flags.[157]" Furthermore, Time describes how after decades "under Serbian rule and then U.N. administration, Kosovars were elated by the prospect of at last controlling their own affairs"[158].

Round 3: Post Independence 19/02/2008 –

In this round I look at the narratives established on Independence Day, how they now stand. There are two things that need to be taken into account here. The first is that in this round, the network began to fragment. It is therefore less likely that alliances of actors remain empowered to carry their preferred narratives. Secondly, the campaign slogan 'celebrate with dignity' as a vehicle for narratives, was not physical and without the continued active support of actors, it could not be seen daily. By contrast, the Newborn monument was itself a physical structure in a prominent location in Prishtina. Even in the absence of active support from actors, the narratives attached to it are being promoted daily.

As was discussed above, media reports of the Independence Day Celebrations portray a relatively jubilant picture. International news media generally emphasise peaceful celebrations in Prishtina, while protests are more often associated with Serbs in Belgrade. Even three years after Independence was declared, the contrast is still reported by international news media: "fireworks roaring into the sky over the Kosovan capital Pristina but mass rioting in Belgrade, in which the US embassy was set ablaze"[159]. So although B2 PR and Media Solutions were not involved in the annual celebrations of 2009, 2010, or 2011, it seems that the narrative of *Dignified Pride* has been firmly established over the long term.

With respect to Newborn the sculpture remains in a prominent position in Prishtina, yet it stands unmaintained and it is not considered a governance issue by any of the actors. The narrative of *Innocence and Promise* has currency albeit in an altered form. As time goes by, the sculpture itself is becoming part of the routine of the city and is not new anymore. However the themes and aspirations within the narrative have been adapted by the nation-branding campaign Kosovo the Young Europeans. This branding campaign provides in some ways a bridge for the growth and evolution of the narrative from a representation of Independence to a representation of the country and its people.

Modern and Serious is in decline to an extent with the unmaintained Newborn. However, like with the *Innocence and Promise* narrative, *Modern and Serious* is being reflected elsewhere in the urban environment, for instance in the new highway (under construction at the time of research, June 2011), some of the countless newly constructed ultra-modern buildings around Prishtina, and also with marketing campaigns such as the Kosovo the Young Europeans.

Free Expression is the narrative that has receded most as a consequence of the fragmentation of the network. Plans for annual re-painting with new designs have not materialised, in effect

lowering the potential for creativity. Secondly with the lack of maintenance the monument is beginning to look ugly, signalling a lack of interest in the thoughts or expressions put into Newborn.

In some ways, arising from the decline in *Free Expression* comes the counter-narrative of *Betrayal*. While Newborn as it stands does not in itself promote this narrative over others, public comment by Newborn designer Fisnik Ismaili have helped to strengthen this narrative: "Kosovo is in such as a situation that people should be on the streets as we speak. I find it quite amazing that they're not"[160]. The narrative is further strengthened when one takes into account the numerous messages of discontent spray-painted on walls throughout the city, by amongst others, the opposition movement, Vetëvendosje.

When we consider the activities of some of the key actors in the years after Independence, it is also possible to see a continuation in the mobilisation of some of these narratives. For instance, the involvement of Mr. Ismaili of Ogilvy|Karrota in the movement Vetëvendosje and his satire series, *The Pimpsons,* both constitute attempts at mobilising the narratives of *Betrayal* and of *Free Expression*. On the other hand, CEO of B2 PR and Media Solutions, Vjosa Berisha's involvement in Prishtina International Film Festival (PriFimFest) embodies the narratives, *Dignified Pride*, and *Modern and Serious*, and *Free Expression*. PriFilmFest will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

Future Rounds

Looking to the future, and the two possible key events referred to earlier, both events and the decisions of actors thereafter would no doubt have a substantial effect on narratives discussed here. With respect to the possibility to the Declaration Independence being successfully challenged, it is extremely difficult to say anything about narrative change. Such an event is very hypothetical and would involve numerous actors that are not discussed here, making comparison between this analysis and such a hypothetical event completely speculative. All that could be guessed would be that the *Kosovo/ Albanian Victory* would be further marginalised.

Comparisons are easier with the other possible key event. Were Newborn to be re-painted this would most likely revive the *Free Expression* narrative and to a lesser extent the *Modern and Serious* narrative. Cooperation of official authorities would most probably weaken the *Betrayal* narrative whereas a unilateral action would probably strengthen it.

5.3 Network Governance

So far in this Chapter, I have approached the planning and organising of the Independence Day celebrations from the evolutionary approach of *decision-making rounds* (Teisman 2000). In this section I now switch perspectives to the more static *network governance* approach (Sørensen, & Torfing 2005). Due to the securitised situation in which decisions were made and the consequent small number of actors, the distinction between the two approaches is less clear here than in other case studies, with similar configurations of actors being discussed in both approaches. It is therefore worth bearing in mind that in *decision-making rounds*, the focus is on how change is brought about through the decisions of individual actors influencing one another in a dispersed public arena. By contrast, in the latter approach the focus is on collective decisions made by a relatively bounded and regulated network of actors (van Beuren, Klijn, & Koppenjan 2003).

For example, it was seen in 5.1 that a meeting took place involving the Office of the Prime Minister and Ogilvy|Karrota, in which it was agreed to change the colour of the Newborn monument from red to yellow. In *rounds*, this was interpreted as the response of the Office of the Prime Minister to the decision by Ogilvy|Karrota to construct the monument in red. The Prime Minister then acted to persuade Ogilvy|Karrota to change the colour, after which Ogilvy|Karrota responded by deciding to colour the monument yellow. By contrast, the *network governance* approach would view such a meeting as an attempt by governance actors to integrate the actions of Ogilvy|Karrota into a shared framework of a network governing the Independence Day celebrations.

For the purposes of this analysis I distinguish between 2 governance networks: that which existed in Round 1 and that which existed in Round 2. I label these the Package Proposal Promotion Network and the Independence Celebrations Network, respectively. In reality it is probably more accurate to describe this as one network that evolves from its manifestation in Round 1 to that of Round 2 (and possible to another form in Round 3). However, I find it useful to distinguish between 2 different governance networks for the following reasons:

1. The entrance of new actors implies change in relations of network actors and in stability of configuration.
2. Some of the central actors in the former network to not appear to be active in the latter.
3. There is a change in purpose or *raison d'être* of the network(s). In the first case, the purpose is to communicate details of the Ahtisaari plan to the Kosovar public whereas in the latter stage the purpose was to plan the Independence Day celebrations.
4. Trust building amongst the actor configuration in Round 1 should be seen as an on-going process but can be taken as given in the Independence Celebration Network.
5. There is a shift in the centre of gravity of the network(s). [Kosovo Unity Team & USAID-> PM Office]

The analysis that follows will focus principally on the Independence Celebrations network. I do this because it is this network that is central to the construction of urban narratives associated with the event of Independence being declared and realised.

Of particular interest in the following pages is the tendency for resourceful actors, namely the Office of the Prime Minister and the Kosovo Unity Team, to enjoy more success due to their position within the network and to the ability to formulate conditions for the entrance of other

actors to enter the network. Such powers appear to be justified on the basis of the threat of instability that a poorly managed celebrations could bring. Despite the prominence of some actors, the following analysis shows that there is still room for actor to negotiate narrative constructions.

The following network governance analysis begins by looking at the efforts of individual actors to mobilise narratives in the network, followed by a brief outlining of actor accountabilities. After this, the effect of the particular arrangement of actor relations on narratives is analysed, after which the shared, underlying framework(s) of governance are looked at. The analysis ends by looking at the network in an evolutionary context, before listing some of the key insights into the operation of governance through networks in Kosovo.

5.3.1 Network actors and narrative mobilisation

Office of Prime Minister

It appears that the Office of the Prime Minister had as a priority the mobilisation of *Dignified Pride* as a counter-narrative to *Kosovar/Albanian Victory*. The office acted to bring about these priorities in the following ways. First, through its position in the centre of the network, coordinating the activities of all other actors involved, the Prime Minister ensured the most substantial input into narrative constructions in the planning process. From this position, the office chose to award the contract for the Independence Day celebrations to B2 PR and Media Solutions based on their work on communicating the Ahtisaari Plan to the public. This move ensured a continuation of the prominent themes from one public relations campaign to the next.

It is not entirely clear when a decision was made upon the selection of Kosovo's new national flag, or who was involved in decision-making. The presence of the flags throughout Kosovo on the 17th of February suggests that a decision was made sometime prior to this date. It appears likely that the Office of the Prime Minister played a part in the final selection of the winning entry[161]. The rules laid out previously by KUT ensured that no flags representing *Kosovar/Albanian Victory* would be considered. The final selection then conforms to these rules, but also gives strength to *Modern and Serious* and to *Dignified Pride*.

Finally, in bringing Ogilvy|Karrota and the Newborn monument into the network, the office stipulated clearly that the monument could not be coloured red. In securing a change in colour, the prime Minister successfully weakened the prominence of *Kosovar/Albanian Victory*.

Narratives Mobilised: *Dignified Pride; Modern and Serious*

Narratives Marginalised: *Kosovar/Albanian Victory*

Resources: Network Position; Funding and Contracts; Moral Authority and Legitimacy; Electoral Mandate

Kosovo Unity Team

The main action of the Kosovo Unity Team in mobilising narratives for the Independence Day Celebrations was in its competition for the new national flag. As discussed above, the rules and restrictions prevented flags embodying Kosovar/Albanian Victory from being considered, and favoured entrants displaying narratives of *Dignified Pride*, *Modern and Serious*, and *Innocence and Promise*.

The Kosovo Unity Team derived this position to created rules guiding flag selection principally from their positions as elected representatives. Additionally, the trust and political capital they acquired through working with internationals during the negotiations over the future status of Kosovo was also important in gaining control over such a sensitive issue as designing a national flag for a multi-ethnic region.

Narratives Mobilised: *Dignified Pride*; *Modern and Serious*; *Innocence and Promise*.

Narratives Marginalised: *Kosovar/Albanian Victory*

Resources: Electoral Mandate; Trust and Political Capital

B2 PR and Media Solutions

B2 PR and Media Solutions played a major role in organising the official celebrations, including the official slogan, "Festo me digniitët: Për Kosovë" ("Celebrate with Dignity: For Kosovo"; originally in Albanian)[162], the fireworks display and the Independence Philharmonic Concert. These arrangements sought principally to downplay *Kosovar/Albanian Victory* and to mobilise *Dignified Pride* as a counter-narrative.

This set of narrative preferences show a remarkable similarity to those of the Office of the Prime Minister. This is best explained by the fact that entry to the Independence Celebrations Network came from a contract which was awarded by the Prime Minister based on satisfaction with the work done and trust built in the previous communications campaign for the promotion of the Ahtisaari Plan. The contract for the earlier campaign was awarded by public tender, in which the preferences of the contractors (USAID etc.) were specified. Thus entry into the Package Proposal Network was structured in such a way that only actors displaying similar narrative preferences would be eligible for selection. Subsequently, B2 PR and Media Solutions, as a like-minded actor had the opportunity to build political and social capital with the 'inner circle' which brought about their entry into the Independence Celebrations Network.

Narratives Mobilised: *Dignified Pride*

Narratives Marginalised: *Kosovar/Albanian Victory*

Resources: Communications expertise; Political and Social capital; Role in Network

Ogilvy|Karrota

Ogilvy|Karrota's most significant action was the design and construction of the Newborn Monument concept. As discussed above, this concept had embodied within it the narratives,

Innocence and Promise, Modern and Serious, Free Expression, and to a certain extent *Kosovar/Albanian Victory*.

However, the company was eager to be included in the official celebrations and so, using personal connections contact was established with the Prime Minster. After meeting, the parties agreed that Newborn would be included in the official celebrations, would be funded from the celebrations budget, and would be coloured yellow instead of red, to minimise associations with Albanian nationalism. Thus the integration of Ogilvy|Karrota into the Independence Celebrations Network happened in such a way that the preferred narratives of the company were maintained, but with the priority of the central actor, the Prime Minister, to marginalise *Kosovar/Albanian Victory* was also upheld.

Narratives Mobilised: *Free Expression*; *Innocence and Promise; Modern and Serious*

Resources: Social and Political Capital; Creative Expertise

Muhamer Ibrahimi

Mr. Ibrahimi designed the winning entry in the Kosovo Unity Team's national flag competition. As discussed above, the flag displayed elements of *Modern and Serious* and *Dignified Pride*. The selection of this design as the national flag came about in part through the rules guiding competition entries. These rules favoured *Dignified Pride*, *Modern and Serious*, and *Innocence and Promise* and specifically against *Kosovar/Albanian Victory*.

After the competition, Mr. Ibrahimi played a very marginal part in this governance network.

Narratives Mobilised: *Modern and Serious*; *Dignified Pride*.

Resources: Winning Design

Prishtina Municipality

The role of the Municipality appears to be confined to technical issues. Their most significant action was in granting planning permission to Ogilvy|Karrota to be situated in its chosen location in central Prishtina.

Narratives Mobilised: -

Resources: Decision-making over urban planning

5.3.2 Network Actor Accountability

This subsection now moves to consider elements of network actor accountability. While the analysis in 5.3.1 focussed on each organisations autonomous preferences, and how these were integrated into the network as a whole, here, issues of backward accountability are discussed, and questions of obligations to actors outside of the network are looked at. The reader should

note that this is not the main focus of research and is therefore not very in-depth. However, it is nonetheless important that issues of backward-accountability be recognised.

Office of Prime Minister

The Office of the Prime Minister was headed at the time of Independence by Hashim Thaçi of the PDK party. A number of patterns of accountability can be distinguished. Firstly, theoretically, the Prime Minister is elected by the voters of Kosovo and should therefore be answerable to them. Secondly, as a member of the PDK, who, at the time in coalition with the LDK. Therefore the actions of the Prime Minister would need to conform with the internal policies of the PDK party and with the negotiated terms of coalition with LDK.

On a less formal basis, the process of declaring Independence was not as unilateral as is sometimes portrayed. As noted in 5.1, a group of international and domestic actors had been meeting from as early as 2006 in order to coordinate activities leading to an eventual Declaration of Independence. Furthermore, in order for such a declaration to have effect other than the formal speaking of it, a small country such as Kosovo would rely heavily on the recognitions of powerful, established countries. Thus the actions of Government and of the Prime Minister specifically were not taken in isolation but in consideration of future diplomatic recognitions and relations with other countries.

A further remark is appropriate here. In 2011 the Marty Report contained allegations that Mr. Thaçi had been at the centre of an organised crime network during the war that was involved in trafficking drugs and human organs[163]. Additionally, the EU Rule of Law Mission, EULEX has made several investigations into corruption in the awarding of public contracts by the government[164]. While this thesis does not presuppose guilt or innocence on part of any of the parties under investigation, such allegations do raise questions over whether there have been any undisclosed interests represented during the events under discussion here.

Kosovo Unity Team

The Kosovo Unity Team was a five member negotiating team comprised of elected representatives to the Legislative Assembly of the Provisional Institutions of Self Government, from government and from the opposition. The KUT was established to present a unified negotiating position to status negotiations in 2005. As such the group is accountable to the political parties to which they belong and to the electorate of Kosovo.

B2 PR and Media Solutions

B2 PR and Media Solutions is co-owned by the CEO and Creative Director[165]. As an advertising agency in a small market, large contracts are very important.

Ogilvy|Karrota

Ogilvy|Karrota is the local partner of multinational marketing and communications network Ogilvy & Mather[166]. Similarly to B2 PR and Media Solutions, Ogilvy|Karrota is an advertising agency in a small market.

Muhamer Ibrahimi

Not much is known about this actor. He appears to have had history with the UÇK[167] but entered competition in a personal capacity, along with over 900 others. Regardless, he played a minimal role in Independence Celebrations Network after his entry was selected.

Prishtina Municipality

The Municipality of Prishtina is accountable to the electorate, and to Kosovo's central government. The Municipality also played a minimal role.

5.3.3 Network Relations and Narrative Mobilisation

A defining characteristic of the Independence Celebrations Network is 'inner-circle' comprising the Office of the Prime Minister and the Kosovo Unity Team, and an 'outer-circle' comprising Ogilvy|Karrota, B2 PR and Media Solutions and Mr. Ibrahimi, designer of the national flag. As has been seen above, the Prime Minster, Mr. Thaçi, and the KUT exercised considerable control over the admission of the 'outer-circle' into the governance network, as a respondent from B2 PR and Media Solutions remarked in an interview: "We didn't have a clue that we were chosen until one week before the [Declaration of Independence] because this went on in higher levels"[168].

Even after the additional actors joined, the Office of the Prime Minster played a central, coordinating role, with little contact between the actors B2 PR and Media Solutions, Ogilvy|Karrota and Mr. Ibrahimi. A respondent from Ogilvy|Karrota recalls that "some other agency were in charge" of the celebrations and that "they knew that at 6.30 that evening, the Prime Minister and President would go to [the Newborn unveiling]"[169].

A further point worth noting is that the Independence Celebrations Network had an intersection with the Package Proposal Promotion Network and quite possibly with other governance networks concerned with Independence and related issues. In such circumstances, it is possible for the intersecting actors, in this case the Office of the Prime Minster and the KUT but probably including the international organisations present in the Package Proposal Promotion Network, US Embassy and USAID, to coordinate objectives and strategies across a number of different governance networks.

These relational factors combine to give central actors significant input into what narratives were to be embodied in the eventual celebrations of Independence. Thus the narrative preferences of these central actors, to promote *Dignified Pride* and to a lesser extent *Modern and Serious*, and to marginalise *Kosovar/Albanian Victory*, can be seen in the celebrations on the 17th of February.

However, it is important to note that in addition to these narratives, the narrative preferences of Ogilvy|Karrota were also present in the Newborn monument. Respondents in Ogilvy|Karrota have attributed this successful discursive contestation to three factors. In the first place the intrinsic quality of the sculpture as a symbol of Independence is emphasised; "I knew it was

going to make an impact. [...] I'm in advertising so I have this hunch, I know what can and cannot work"[170]. A second factor is the effort made to make contact with government members through informal channels: "I made about 20 copies of the project proposal and I gave it to all the possible people I knew who had some connections in the government. And somehow one or two copies reached the right people"[171]. Finally another factor that has been mentioned is the sheer motivation of the staff in starting construction unilaterally. This suggests that despite the significant power exercised by these central actors, there was still room for other actors to negotiate and contest narrative construction.

5.3.4 Governance Framework and Narrative Mobilisation

It was seen in 5.3.3 and 5.3.1 that the actors, Kosovo Unity Team and the Prime Minister were able to use their positions within the network to explicitly direct and shape construction of urban narratives according to their preferences. Attention is now turned to a more subtle form of narrative alignment. This subsection examines how narratives are embedded in the particular mode of governance. The Independence Celebrations Governance Network was formed, and integrated additional actors into the network, according to a shared framework of governance. Attention is now turned to analysing this operational framework.

Sørensen and Torfing define the operational framework in which governance network interaction take place as having regulatory, normative, cognitive and imaginary elements (2005). Important to remember is that such a framework only exists to the extent that it is practiced by actors.

As evidenced in the Package Proposal Network of Round 2, a regulative framework can be seen in terms of public tenders and competitions as a means to implement decisions of a central core of actors. Similar arrangements are in place across Kosovo's governance landscape. Although tenders and competitions did not take place to the same degree in the Independence Celebrations Network, this is the norm from which the securitised situation deviates. This regulatory framework positions the tendering party in a more central position, and the contracted party on a more peripheral setting. The contracted party must agree to certain parts of the framework before being admitted. Such regulatory arrangements also give a hierarchical slant to the network even after contracts have been signed, in that tenders are positioned slightly above contracted companies.

A set of shared norms and values can be observed, with almost all actors valuing positive celebrations of Independence, but at the same time, for violence to be avoided as much as possible. This normative framework was shared by all concerned actors to a greater or lesser extent.

Sørensen and Torfing define a cognitive aspect of an institutional framework as codes, concepts and specialised knowledge that is constructed as having importance to the network (2005). It can clearly be seen that in these examples, public relations knowledge, understanding of Ahtisaari Plan and its implications, and assessments of the security situation are all seen as important.

Finally, the imaginary aspect of the shared institutional framework of governance is that which is most relevant here. According to Sørensen and Torfing, of relevance is the production of shared "identities, ideologies, common hopes and visions" (2005: 204). As was discussed in 5.3.1, the

narratives produced by this governance network are quite varied. However, there was a clear consensus to work against the *Kosovar/Albanian Victory* narrative (evident from 5.2 and 5.3.1). It was seen that there were actions taken by network actors and by the network as a whole to limit the influence of this narrative. It can therefore be said that the network was successful in marginalising this narrative.

It can also be argued that the network was successful in mobilising *Dignified Pride* as a counter-narrative as part of its strategy of marginalising *Kosovar/Albanian Victory*.

Therefore, the question I now turn to is to what extent the narratives that are constructed as outcomes of governance are also practiced through the acts of governance. This will be done through discursively analysing how actors perceived themselves as performing governance.

Insight into processes of constructing an institutional framework can be seen best when looking at the continuation of actors, namely the Office of the Prime Minister and B2 PR and Media Solutions, from the Package Proposal Promotion Network to the Independence Celebrations Network. It appears that a mode of governance was inherited from the former (and most probably from other governance networks in which central actors intersect) and adapted to the latter. While public tenders were the standard means of network entry, for the planning of the Independence celebrations the network was formed initially with a direct awarding of a contract to B2 PR and Media Solutions.

Speaking of the decision of the Prime Minsiter to contract B2 PR and Media Solutions for the Independence Day celebrations, a respondent from the public relations company reported that the government "decided to continue working [with us] on the Declaration of Independence […] because we were already working on very serious issues to different audeinces, Serbian and Albanian", indicating that "if you are not careful, […] you could have a clash. So while you want to celebrate, you needed to be careful to keep the crowds under control"[172]. This statement elevates above all other issues the priority for governance as that of preventing a confrontation. Although celebration is important (echoing *Free Expression*), this is secondary to avoiding violence. Moreover, the potential for confrontation lies in the distinction between two crowds, who are constructed as distinct audiences according to ethno-national identity. Thus, the role for governance is to prevent the crowds from going out of control through managed communication: "[the central actors] knew our team was capable of drafting and producing such messages that will not fire the crowds"[173].

Thus it can be seen that in entering the governance network B2 PR and Media Solutions had an understanding of governance as having normative goals primarily of preventing confrontations and secondly of celebrating. These normative goals then give rise to a cognitive element of governance in that managed communication and public relations is constructed as a specialised type of knowledged that is essential for the task of governance. Furthermore, the constructed problem of violence between two crowds can be seen as deriving from a wider discurisve framework which constructs ethno-national differences within Kosovo as the primary cleavage which can be exacerbated through unmanaged reactions to changes in (nation-)statehood. When considering things from this perspective, it is not surprising then that such conscious efforts were bade by the governance network to marginalise *Kosovar/Albanian Victory* and to promote *Dignified Pride* as a counternarrative.

While it could be said that all post-conflict governance in Kosovo has been informed by such a narrative frame, the crucial point here is that the potential for instablility caused by this cleavage is so great that it requires that normal proceedures, such as tendering, are suspended

and decisive decisions are to be made by the central actors. Interestingly, whereas previously securitised situations involved strong management by members of the international community (see Chpater 4), in this case such roles are performed by top level state actors. Such a move in itself could be said to pre-figure the Independent (nation)-state that was about to be declared. Nonetheless, the relevent state actors took as their point of departure the instiutional framework of governnace that was practiced in the Package Proposal Promotion Network, and quite probably from other governance networks in which governmental actors had been frequently involved.

Ogilvy|Karrota took a contrasting approach in this context, seeing expression and construction of narratives as somthing that happens outside governace, with the role of governance actors restricted to coordination and technical planning. Staff recall thinking prior to creating the concept of Newborn, "maybe we could do a project which would fit in the celebrations and would be financed by [the celebrations] budget"[174]. The working assumptions was that the celebrations could be a space for multiple expressive projects, rather than a situation to be controlled through careful communications management, as the Office of the Prime Minster and B2 PR and Media Solutions saw it. On this basis, Ogilvy|Karrota began with the construction of the sculpture. After this they went to the Municipality to seek permission for the planned location. After recieving permission, they then attempted to make contact with government circles in order to incorporate Newborn into the official celebrations. After proposals were sent, "three days before Independence, I got a phonecall. We had one single meeting. They said 'go ahead, the only thing you need to change is the colour; make it yellow or blue' "[175].

This example ilustrates the differeces in opinion over proceedural aspects of governance and the role of different actors. While B2 PR and Media Solutions see the sensitivity of the event as warranting close coordintaion and tight management by the government, ("If this was a normal situation it would go out to tender and they would choose a company [...] but it was completely different circumstances"[176]), Ogilvy|Karrota began on the basis that discursive contestation was something to be engaged in outside of governance circles, with coordination between central actors and themselves to be kept at arms' length. This can be interpreted as more in line with a liberal or libertarian approach to governance, where principal cleavages rest between individual liberty and central control. From this perspective it is not surprising that Mr. Ismaili of Ogilvy|Karrota was one of the principal actors behind mobilising *Free Expression* as part of Independence, and in the years since Independence, of *Betrayal*.

Nevertheless, despite this difference in approach to governance, when representatives from Ogilvy|Karrota and from the Office of the Prime Minister did meet, a certain agreement was reached which inchorporated, initially at least, the most important elements from both approaches.

5.3.5 Evolution of network and narrative mobilisation

It has already been discussed how narrative preferences evolved from the Package Proposal Promotion Network of Round 1 to the Independence Celebrations of Round 2. In terms of post-Independence evolution it was seen that the network began to fragment and quickly ceased to exist. In the absence of a governance network, the following changes in narratives have taken place. *Dignified Pride* remains firmly associated with the Declaration of Independence. *Kosovar/Albanian Victory* remains marginalised to a large extent. *Innocence and Promise* and

Modern and Serious are less associated with the Declaration of Independence but are embodied in other aspects of the regeneration of Prishtina. Finally, *Free Expression* was largely eclipsed afterwards, but has re-emerged in an altered form, associated with the narrative *Betrayal*. Attention is now turned to examining what aspects of network evolution contributed to these changes.

Dignified Pride and Kosovar/Albanian Victory

The narrative *Kosovar/Albanian Victory* was mostly related to the actual event of Independence being declared, rather than the continuity of independence. Therefore, as it was successfully marginalised at the time of Independence, there was little need for a network in place to prevent it resurging. Additionally, looking at the objects and media to which these narratives were attached, it can be seen that many of them did not require institutional arrangements to maintain them. For example, the Kosovo Flag, embodying *Dignified Pride*, has become well established throughout the country (at least in Albanian-majority areas). Therefore there is no need for governing actors to promote the flag.

Since Independence, governmental actors have participated in networks related to aspects of the Ahtisaari Plan that are considered favourable to Kosovo Serb communities. Significant progress has been made in areas such as protection of Serb religious and cultural heritage (relating to Annex V; see Chapter 4) and Decentralisation (relating to Annex III)[177]. These actions help to disperse the idea that Kosovo is a mono-ethnic Albanian state. Questions do remain however, as to the extent to which this message is accepted by the public(s).

Innocence and Promise and Modern and Serious

The rapid fragmentation of network had the consequence that no institutional arrangements were put in place to maintain the Newborn monument. As the monument has developed rust and is covered in graffiti, it is becoming less of a symbol of Kosovo as a modern city (see Figure 11). Similarly, the aspirations for EU membership contained in the Kosovo Flag have not materialised, discrediting the associated narratives. However, aspects of *Modern and Serious* and *Innocence and Promise* are being incorporated in other areas of Prishtina's regeneration, notably in the nation-branding campaign, Kosovo the Young Europeans, festivals such as PriFilmFest, and numerous ultra-modern buildings constructed in the city.

Figure 11 Newborn monument June 2011

The nation-branding campaign Kosovo the Young Europeans, is run by the public relations company, PR Solutions. Proffessional relations exist between Vjosa Berisha and PR Solutions as Kosovo the Young Europeans have financially supported the Prishtina International Film Festival (PriFilmFest), which was co-founded by Vjosa and Fatos Berisha, who are also co-owners of B2 PR and Media Solutions[178].

This PriFilmFest is a festival run volutarily by a group of people, including Mrs. Berisha of B2 PR and Media Solutions. This festival forms the focus of the following chapter. Suffice it here to say that this festival provides large support ot the narrative, *Modern and Serious*. *Innocence and Promise* is also embodied to a lesser extent. Therefore it is clear that actors from the Independence Celebrations Network do play a role in persisting the mobilisation of these narratives through direct involvement in other networks. Additionally it is clear that even in the absence of direct involvement in networks, cross-network ties exist between Independence Celebrations Network actors and actors who are involed in mobilising these narratives.

Free Expression and Betrayal

The narrative of *Free Expression* can be said to be receding due to the lack of maintenance of Newborn and from lack of arrangements facilitating annual artistic repainting of the monument as had been originally envisioned. Similar to *Modern and Serious*, this comes about principally from the breakdown in relations between Mr. Ismaili of Ogilvy|Karrota and the Office of the Prime Minister.

A resurgence of *Free Expression* and the emergence of *Betrayal* as a narrative has been seen in the years since Independence. The mobilisation of these narratives comes in part from the involvement of Independence Celebrations Network actors in other networks. There are three notable platforms in which *Free Expression* and *Betrayal* are mobilised, in which such actors are involved: The Prishtina International Film Festival (although not *Betrayal);* Urban artwork by Vetëvendosje; and the satire series, *The Pimpsons.* Connections between PriFilmFest and the Independence Celebrations Network have been discussed above.

Mr. Ismaili of Ogivly-Karrota, at the time of research reported two activities in which he was invovled in outside of his work. The first was his involvement with the opposition movement, Vetëvendosje (self Determination), the second being a satire series published on Facebook, entitled "The Pimpsons". With their strong anti-government rhetoric[179], the Vetevendosje movement embody and mobilise the narrative of *Betrayal*. Additionlly, with their spraypaining campaign (see Figure 12) and public demonstrations[180] they also embody the narrative of *Free Expression*. The Pimpsons is a satirical series casiting some of the leading figures in the Kosovo political landscape as parodies of characters in the Simpsons, a popular American annimated series[181]. Like Vetevendosje, it voices considerable critique over those figures in Kosovo's political establishemnet. Thus the narrative of *Betrayal* is also embodied here. With its popularity gaining, and using the medium of the social networking website Facebook (on which at the time of writing, over 19,000 people 'like' the Pimpsons[182]), this seris aslo embodies narratives of *Free Expression* and *Modern and Serious*.

Figure 12 Urban graffiti in Prishtina. ("I vote, you vote, he votes, she votes, we vote, you vote, they decide")

Other actors

The office of the Prime Minister is involved in many government projects. It would be too simple to characterise all government work according to one or more of the six narratives described here. Similarly with the Kosovo Unity Team, its members, including Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi, have participated in numerous governance networks in the three years of Kosovo's Independence. It would not be feasible to charaterise the work of such networks according to the narratives discussed here.

Mr. Ibrahimi has remained largely out of public life after his flag design was chosen to represent the country. As mentioned above, the Kosovar flag does fly in all Albanian-majority municipalities, maintaining the narrative of *Dignified Pride*. As aspirations towards EU membership look less promissing though, the narratives of *Innocence and Promise* and *Modern and Serious* embodied in the blue and yellow of the emblem are less credible.

Possible Future Rounds

In 5.1, two potential *key events* were identified that would lead to a new round of decision-making. The first key event would be for a successful challenge to come to the Independence of Kosovo. This possibility will not be analysed here as it would be an event of such significance, impacting on many variables, that it is not realistic to try to hypothesise about its impacts on Independence branding.

The key event that will be discussed here is the possibility of Newborn being re-painted. It is conceivable annual re-painting could happen through official state channels, or as part of an unsanctioned action. It is unlikely that relations will be repaired between Ogilvy|Karrota and the Prime Minister. However, institutional arrangements could be fostered between Ogilvy|Karrota and representatives from the Ministry of Culture, or from the Municipality of Prishtina. Evidence from the Reconstruction Implementation Commission (see Chapter 4) suggests it is possible to build constructive working relations between organisations who have disagreements at a political level. Respondents from RIC emphasise the importance of focussing on the technical issue at hand and to involve technical persons representing the respective institutions rather than heads of organisations[183]. If such institutional arrangements were to be constructed, *Free Expression* and *Modern and Serious* would probably be strengthened, while *Betrayal* would be weakened.

On the other hand, it is also conceivable that non-state actors could create arrangements to have the Newborn monument repainted annually. As mentioned previously, there are working relations between creator of Newborn, Fisnik Ismaili, and Vetëvendosje, the opposition movement whose members are active in political graffiti campaigns in Prishtina. Additionally there are some 'guerrilla gardening' groups active in Prishtina. It is conceivable that (non-governance) networks can develop between such groups. Were such semi-formal institutional arrangements to emerge, their effect on narrative mobilisation would likely be to mobilise *Free Expression* and *Modern and Serious*, but also to further mobilise *Betrayal*.

5.3.6 Network Governance in the context of Kosovo: Key Insights

Securitisation

Buzan *et al* define securitisation as the act of constructing the survival of a *referent object* as *existentially threatened* and thus justifying *emergency measures* to deal with the security threat (1998). A *securitising act* is a means primarily to move certain issues from the political agenda onto the security agenda. To a large extent this is what is presented here. The Declaration of Independence was constructed as a security risk in that it could provoke violent reactions from Kosovar Serbs, which could lead to instability. This has lead central actors such as the Office of the Prime Minister, USAID, and US Embassy to bypass normal procedures such as that of awarding the PR contract on public tender. This has then lead to a hierarchical skew within the network(s), with an inner circle comprising the Prime Minister office, Kosovo Unity Team, USAID and US Embassy (the latter two actors in the Package Proposal Promotion Network), and an outer circle consisting of B2 PR and Media Solutions, Ogilvy|Karrota and the designer of the flag, Muhamer Ibrahimi.

Huge importance attached to trust and personal connections

The importance of trust in this network has been repeatedly emphasised in interviews. This can be seen in 3 concrete examples. First, the work undertaken by B2 PR and Media Solutions in Round 1 has facilitated trust-building between the public relations company and governmental and international actors. This trust and confidence was apparently essential for the contract for the Independence Celebrations to be awarded without going to public tender.

Secondly, in his efforts to have Newborn included in the official celebrations, Fisnik Ismaili of Ogilvy|Karrota reported sending the Newborn project proposal to all of his friends who had contacts in high places. After receiving a phone call from the office of the Prime Minister a few days later, he concludes that "somehow one or two copies reached the right people"[184]. Thus, the entrance of Newborn into the official celebrations is reported as reliant on the existing social relations of Ogilvy|Karrota staff with friends, who had political capital with high level government actors.

Thirdly, it was seen in 5.1 that growing distrust and a breakdown in personal relations resulted in the rapid fragmentation of the network after Independence Day. Distrust between network actors, particularly between Ogilvy|Karrota and the Office of the Prime Minister prevented an agreement being reached over the maintenance of the Newborn monument and made the continuity of the network impossible.

The role of trust in this network has positive and negative implications. On the one hand it allows a quick formation of a network to conduct a large task in a short space of time and in a 'sensitive' context. On the other hand, the breakdown in trust can lead to a rapid fragmentation of the network and a consequent lack of follow-through on the work that was done.

Involvement of former protagonists from the conflict

It is widely understood that the Prime Minister of Kosovo who declared Independence, Hashim Thaçi was once a political leader of the UÇK[185] and it has been alleged that he was involved in drug and organ trafficking during this time[186]. It is no doubt to be expected that the political landscape in Kosovo should contain actors who were involved in various (violent or non-violent) campaigns prior to 1999. What is interesting however is the significant and sustained effort within this governance network to marginalise the *Kosovar/Albanian Victory* narrative, seeing as

one of the leading figures of the network, Thaçi, once conducted a violent campaign to explicitly mobilise this narrative.
This also raises questions about whether there are any non-disclosed interests being pursued by such actors. However, this is something that is beyond the scope of this thesis and in any case would be a very dangerous question to pursue.

Non-inclusion of Kosovar Serbs as stakeholders

Kosovar Serbs have been identified as one of the key stakeholders in the debate over the future status of Kosovo. As the largest ethnic minority in the Kosovo region they risk being subjected to discrimination both at inter-personal level and at policy level. Additionally, as has proven to be the case, their relative majority in some areas, particularly in the north of Kosovo, gives them the capacity to mount serious obstacles to the functioning of an Independent Kosovar state.

The importance of Kosovar Serbs as stakeholders in the Declaration of Independence has been recognised by the network actors. This has been reflected in efforts to communicate to Serb audiences as evidenced in the PR message "Decentralizacija dakle sam odlucujem" (English: "Decentralisation therefore I decide" ; originally in Serbian)[187]. Recognition of the importance of Kosovar Serbs is also evidenced in attempts to reduce the association between Kosovar Independence and Albanian Nationalism, in order not to provoke violence amongst Serb groups. Interestingly though, despite this concern, there were no representatives of Serb communities included in the network. It is not clear form the data exactly why this was, but there are two reasons that seem plausible.

Firstly, given the securitised context and the importance of trust, it seems unlikely that Serb groups could have been approached prior to the declaration without risk of leakage. Secondly, as Serbs are generally opposed to the Independence of Kosovo it would be difficult to find groups interested in planning the celebrations of the event.

These reasons aside, it is uncommon in the West to find governance networks existing without representatives of the key affected stakeholders.

Network actors pursue goals even after network has ceased to function

This network is noteworthy for the presence of private public relations companies, B2 PR and Media Solutions, and Ogilvy|Karrota. The interest of these actors in the governance issues in question extend beyond the mere financial gain of the organisations. This can be seen in the personal motivations of the company directors. Vjosa Berisha of B2 PR and Media Solutions reports "I'm really glad we did it", saying that she feels "so proud that we did a great job and we were part of history"[188]. Similarly speaking of the initial decision to construct Newborn, Fisnik Ismaili looks back on "ten days to build a monument that will stay forever" and says that "it has no price"[189].

Significantly, in the years since Independence was declared, Mrs. Berisha had worked with the Prishtina International Film Festival (discussed in Chapter 6). Likewise, Mr. Ismaili has since become involved with the opposition movement Vetëvendosje (Self-determination) whose principal aim is to "achieve and realize the right to self-determination for the people of Kosova"[190]. Additionally he has created the popular cartoon series, *The Pimpsons*, in which

members of Kosovo's political establishment are satirised based on characters from the American cartoon series, *The Simpsons*[191].

These examples show how network actors join a network to pursue particular aspect of their goal and continue to do so even after the network disbands. It also shows the capacities of influential people in these organisations to formulate and act upon goal that do not strictly correspond to the goals of their organisations.

Cultural Capital

With actors such as B2 PR and Media Solutions and Ogilvy|Karrota we can see articulations of young, professional, travelled actors included in governance networks. Both companies were founded by young, creative people from Kosovo, who have lived for some time and studied in the United Kingdom during the 1990s, and speak English.

These elements appear to constitute a form of cultural capital that aids participation in governance networks. It is plausible to speculate that entrance into governance networks for non-political actors is often through public tenders; the experiences and qualifications gained abroad can help such companies to win public contracts. The familiarity with western business culture, and the ability to speak English, facilitates good working relations with international organisations. Finally, coming originally from Kosovo, speaking Albanian and having knowledge of local business culture and motivation about issues in Kosovo, young, professional actors are in a good position to develop relations with domestic political actors over issues that concern them.

These possible ways in which cultural capital facilitates involvement in governance are not supported by my data, are speculative, and can only be confirmed with further research.

5.3.7 What does network governance approach tell us?

From the preceding analysis it is possible to derive some conclusions and insights specific to this case study. Firstly, it was seen that the positions actors occupy in network has significance in their ability to mobilise preferred narratives. It was seen that the Prime Minister and the Kosovo Unity Team exercised a considerable degree of control in guiding narrative selection. This was done in two ways. First, network positions were used by these actors to formulating conditions for the entry of peripheral actors. These conditions had the effect of disqualifying actors wishing to mobilise the *Kosovar/Albanian Victory* and also to favour actors promoting *Dignified Pride*. Network position was also used by central actors trough positioning themselves between peripheral actors.

The positioning described here, although constructed qualitatively rather than through quantitative measurements of network relations, correspond roughly to the measurement of flow-betweenness (Everett & Borgatti 1999). Interestingly other analyses of network governance have reported importance attached to the position of actors in terms of flow-betweenness (see for example Kapucu (2005)). The positions and powers that the Prime Minister and Kosovo Unity team exercised were derived from the securitisation of the issue, following the use of the concept by Buzan *et al* (1998), and form the shared institutional framework for governance.

Secondly , it was also seen that although these central actors derived significant influence over narrative mobilisation from their positions within the network, there was still room for peripheral actors to negotiate. It was seen that Ogilvy|Karrota successfully brought different narratives to the celebrations. However, the ability of this organisation to attain a position in which they could negotiate narrative mobilisation depended very much on their social and political capital, in the form of connections to people in government.

Third, consensus over marginalising *Kosovar/Albanian Victory* and promoting *Dignified Pride* as a counter-narrative has its origins in the package proposal network and in other networks in which central actors intersect. Therefore, what happens in one governance network has implications for many others. It would be extremely difficult to identify and include all relevant governance networks in a single study.

Fourth, the specific mode of governance or shared framework of governance was seen to have a strong tendency to favour the marginalisation of *Kosovar/Albanian Victory* and to promote *Dignified Pride* as a counter-narrative. A dominant framework of governance was shared in particular by the Prime Minster, the KUT, and B2 PR and Media Solutions. This framework construct ethno-national difference as the primary cleavage of concern. Accordingly, the ethno-national division posed a security risk, which needed to be addressed through managed communications. This mode of governance has its origins in previous networks, notably the Package Proposal Promotion Network, but possibly many others.

A contrasting governance framework was evident in the approach of Ogilvy|Karrota. This mode of governance constructed the tension between individual liberty and central control as the main cleavage. Divergence in governance frameworks was overcome by adopting the most important elements, and respective narrative preferences, of each one

Fifth, network fragmentation, caused by a deterioration in network relations and by a lack of trust, brought a decline to a number of narratives. However, some of these narratives were sustained through, amongst other things, the involvement or connections of Independence Celebrations Network Actors in other governance networks.

5.4 Deliberative Governance

This case study has been illuminating so far in showing how governance through networks can affect the narratives inscribed to the (material or otherwise) urban landscape. Attention is now turned to looking at selected elements of social decision-making, with a view to gaining an understanding of practices of network-based decisions and what potentials there are for deliberative governance within Kosovo's emerging institutional landscape.

Like 4.4, in this section the focus is on *elements* of deliberation rather than on categorising events or decisions according to certain methods of social-choice. It must be emphasised that the findings discussed here are exploratory and should not be read as exhaustive nor as representative of governance in Kosovo as a whole.

5.4.1 Examples of Deliberation or its absence

Distrust among Network actors

Shortly after Independence Day, the network began to fragment for a number of reasons, namely the single-issue purpose of the network and a breakdown in trust amongst network actors. The most illustrative example of this is that between Fisnik Ismaili of Ogilvy|Karrota and the Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi. Relations between these two figures have deteriorated to the extent that the creator of Newborn now publishes a satirical series parodying *the Simpsons*, in which the Prime Minister is portrayed as a corrupt, idiotic Rainier Wolfcastle, along with other influential political actors, notably US Ambassador Dell, parodied on 'Comic Book Guy' from *the Simpsons*[192]. Clearly deliberative governance it is almost impossible under such circumstances.

While it is not the goal of this project to repair relations between these two individuals, some of the structural factors contributing to distrust can be examined. It has been difficult to pin down exactly what has been the cause of distrust amongst these actors. However, frequent references have been made to a lack of transparency in the awarding of public contracts by government actors[193]. Indeed, research by Transparency International in 2007 found Kosovo to have the fourth highest proportion of respondents who admitted to paying a bribe for services[194]. Additionally EULEX have made several investigations into corruption in awarding public contracts, including the high-profile case of Transport Minister, Fatmir Limaj[195]. One solution could be the establishment of a statutory body with responsibility for oversight of public tenders. Such a body would be required to carry out investigations and produce publically available reports the awarding of public contracts over which there is considerable suspicion.

[Recommendation: Establish a public body with responsibility for overseeing transparency of public contract awards.]

Limitations/regulations on competitions

When announcing the competition to design the future flag of Kosovo, the Kosovo Unity Team stipulated that the flag must not contain elements representing any of the political parties in

Kosovo or any of the ethnic groups in Kosovo[196]. In effect, all persons wishing the flag to embody narratives using these elements would be disqualified from consideration.

By contrast, with negotiations over Newborn, there was no a priori exclusion of actors through such rules and regulations. Instead, on the basis of the Newborn project proposal, Ogilvy|Karrota was accepted as an actor to be negotiated with and then asked to change colour from red to yellow or blue. While it is not entirely clear whether this represented some bargaining (e.g.. change in colour exchanged for funding) it does appear more deliberative than the example of the flags.

Interestingly, the public relations company B2 PR and Media Solutions were under no such restrictions, due to their position coming from "almost two years working closely with the Government, the negotiation team, US Embassy, and USAID, […] we were very cautious in giving the right messages and working closely with our politicians"[197]. Whether this amounts to deliberation is unclear. On the one hand there were no restrictions placed on the company but on the other hand they were included on basis of shared understandings and tacit agreement with goals of other actors, fostered through the work done in Round 1.

Interestingly, of the three examples, Newborn represents the most deliberative process and perhaps is the one that resonates most with people and media. However, it is difficult to recommend policy changes in order to facilitate more deliberation in such interactions. For example, it would be completely unrealistic to expect the government to engage with all 993 persons who wished to contribute to the design of the national flag as they did with Ogilvy|Karrota over Newborn.

Additionally, it should be remembered that such restrictions were in place for good reasons: to prevent violence and instability. It has been argued that it was 'the Kosovo issue' that led to the rise to power of Slobodan Milošević, precipitating the wars of Yugoslavia (Malcolm 1998). It could therefore be argued that tendering regulations and competition rules preventing the expression of the narrative *Kosovar/Albanian Victory* were necessary to prevent the secession of Kosovo from Serbia being interpreted as a defeat for Serbs. On the other hand, it must be remembered that escalating violence in Kosovo throughout the 1990s was largely triggered by the withdrawal of Kosovo's autonomy in the Yugoslav Federation, a decision that was justified on the basis of security in response to unrest in the province (Malcolm 1998). The question then is, to what extent is an overriding of deliberative procedures necessary or desirable to maintain security? This question will be returned to below.

Two-tiered Network

The decision to award the contract for the Independence Celebrations to B2 PR and Media Solutions was not made known to the company until approximately one week before Independence was to be declared. While it would be unusual for a private company to be given executive power over the continuation of their contract, from a governance perspective this does highlight the existence of an 'inner circle' making decisions to which an 'outer circle' are expected to respond.

This was also to be seen when one looks at the involvement of other such actors in the 'outer circle'. There was little communication between Ogilvy-Karrota, or with Mr. Ibrahimi, designer of the national flag of Kosovo. Additionally, speaking of coordination with B2 PR and Media

Solutions, one interviewee from Ogilvy|Karrota, reported that most communication between Ogilvy|Karrota and B2 PR and Media Solutions was done through the Prime Minister: "they knew that at 6.30 that evening, the Prime Minister and President would go to [the Newborn unveiling]"[198].

Furthermore, in terms of relations between B2 PR and Media Solutions and Mr. Ibrihimi, it was reported that the winning entry was selected by the Government, and that subsequently, B2 PR and Media Solutions were given the responsibility of having them printed and distributed to all the relevant locations throughout Kosovo[199].

The two tiered structure of the network, like the limitations on network entry, is generally explained or justified by the security risk associated with the situation. Again, the question must be asked, do security concerns necessitate overriding deliberative discussions? And to what extent does overly centralised decision-making risk renewed conflict and instability?

Despite the recent violent flashpoints in northern Kosovo in July 2011, the security situation in Kosovo has vastly improved. It therefore makes sense for such securitised *emergency measures* to be reduced to correspond with the improving security situation. This would be aided by the carrying out of security-deliberation audits, whereby periodical indices of security and stability are compared with indices of deliberation and participation in governance. An independent statutory body could be established to conduct such audits, or they could be conducted by some of the existing international organisations operating presently in Kosovo.

[Recommendation: Conduct periodical security-deliberation audits. Emergency executive powers should be reduced in line with improving security situation]

5.4.2 Excluded Narratives

Kosovo/Albanian Victory

It was seen in 5.3.4 and 5.3.5 that the consensus over marginalising *Kosovar/Albanian Victory* probably had its origins in the Package Proposal Network and in other intersecting networks. It is unclear from this data how this consensus was arrived at and through what modes of decision-making was consensus generated, nor is it feasible to try to investigate an emergence of consensus through such interconnected networks of domestic and international governance actors.

Newborn as creation of International Community

It has been argued by some that the concept of Newborn "excludes our history"[200]. A commentator on an online article about Newborn argued that the "concept communicates [...] the idea that Kosova is a simplistic creation of the (English-speaking) international community, with no historic identity and little real substance"[201]. One interviewee took this idea further, saying that Newborn creates a Kosovo that is "like a baby, infantile, you have to teach it, tabula rasa". Most importantly, "the baby does not have the right to self-determination. Baby had

needs rather than rights," with the implication that "there's always a mother to take care of it, be it EU or US …"[202].

Such narratives have been particularly absent from governance networks. This narrative raises the cleavage of domestic sovereignty being over-ridden by internationally mandated organisations. In this respect, the narrative of *Betrayal* probably resembles this most closely.

5.4.3 Patterns of inclusion and exclusion of actors

Inclusion decided by 'inner circle'

The participation of the 'outer circle' of actors, Ogilvy|Karrota, B2 PR and Media Solutions and Mr. Ibrahimi was decided upon by an 'inner circle' of core actors. It was the Kosovo Unity Team who drafted the rules for the competition to design Kosovo's new flag. After receiving 993 entries a decision on the winner was made in secret prior to the Declaration of Independence. With B2 PR and Media Solutions, although they had been involved in the Package Proposal Promotion Network, their inclusion in the Independence Celebrations Network depended on the executive decision of the Prime Minister whether or not to contract the company for the official celebrations. Similarly, even though the Newborn sculpture was already under construction before any contact was established between Ogilvy|Karrota and the government, inclusion in the official celebrations depended on the actions of the Office of the Prime Minister.

These examples show that the central actors, the Office of the Prime Minister and the Kosovo Unity Team, had substantial decision-making power over which actors were to be included in, and by extension, excluded from, the network.

Trust and Social Capital

Apart from decisions over inclusion being made by a central group of actors, another process of inclusion and exclusion can be observed when the entry of the outer groups of actors is considered. In the case of B2 PR and Media Solutions, securing the contract for the planning of the official celebrations came about in large part due to the work that they had done on the public relations campaign promoting the Ahtisaari Plan[203]. The inclusion of the Newborn monument in the official celebrations depended on similar reserves of trust and social capital. Project proposals were given to personal friends of Ogilvy|Karrota staff, and some days later, the Office of the Prime Minister contacted the company agreeing to include the sculpture in the celebrations[204].

Leaving aside the fact that ultimate decisions over inclusion rested with the central actors, to be considered for inclusion required forms of trust and social capital with the appropriate people. In contrast to B2 PR and Media Solutions and Ogilvy|Karrota, Mr. Ibrahimi, who did not have the same type of connections with government, although his flag design was selected as the new national flag, his involvement in the network was minimal.

Formulating recommendations to encourage more inclusive governance is not so easy in this case. On the one hand, actors without connections to governmental actors are less likely to be included in decision-making. On the other hand, as has been seen in this case study and in other cases in this report, and as has been argued in literature, trust-building can play an important role in facilitating dialogue and deliberation in institutional settings affected by conflict.

So rather than try to mitigate against the need for social and political capital in order to be included in governance networks, extension of opportunities to develop social capital is recommended. One way to achieve this is to encourage participation of voluntary groups with state actors in governance networks covering non-security related issues. For participation to be meaningful, volunteers must be included at both planning, implementation, and evaluation stages of governance; substantial decision-making power must be transferred to them; and issues must be of significant public importance to motivate people to participate.

[Recommendation: Invite voluntary groups and individuals to participate in governance networks over issues of public importance that do not constitute a security threat]

Representation of Minority Groups

As discussed in 5.3.6, the Independence Celebrations Network and the Package Proposal Promotion Network included mostly ethnic Albanian and international organisations, with no representation of minority groups. While a good deal of attention was given by actors to the potential reaction of Serbs to the Declarations of Independence, no bodies representing Kosovar Serb communities were included even though they were recognised as key stakeholders. As discussed in 5.3.6, there are probably two reasons for this: the risk of leakage in approaching Serb groups to participate; and the general opposition of Kosovar Serbs to Kosovar Independence makes it unlikely for representatives of Serb communities to be willing to participate in planning celebrations.

Decentralisation as outlined in Annex III of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement is a good means to encourage the participation of Serbs in public governance. Nevertheless, it is also important that minorities have the chance to be included in governance issues that occur at a central level. One way to achieve this would be to invite minority groups to participate in governance networks in a similar way to what has been recommended above for the inclusion of people in a voluntary capacity.

[Recommendation: Invite minority groups to participate in governance networks over issues of public importance that do not constitute a security threat]

Chapter 6 Case Study 3: Prishtina International Film Festival

Figure 13 Vanessa Redgrave being interviewed on the opening night of Prishtina International Film Festival 2009

This Chapter take as its case study a high profile international film festival, the first edition having been held in 2009 (see Figure 13[205]). Prishtina International Film Festival (PriFilmFest)aims to "open doors of the newest country in the world, Kosovo, to welcome different cultures of the world through cinema, using it as a medium to promote open dialogue between cultures and nations"[206]. With their achievement of attracting a number of high-level prominent personalities from the world of International film and cinema, the festival offers a different image of Kosovo than what was seen in the previous two case studies.

This Chapter follows the same structure as that used in Chapters 4 and 5. The history of case study is introduced using a *rounds* model to order data into a coherent socio-historical narrative. Afterwards, a number of discourses raised by respondents when talking about PriFilmFest are looked at. Section 6.3 examines the organising and evolution of the festival in the context of network governance of Prishtina's cultural performance sector. Finally, aspects of decision-making are looked at with a view to determine any possibilities for deliberative governance.

6.1 Introduction: A Rounds perspective on the organisation of the Prishtina International Film Festival

Preliminary Round: Emergence of Cultural Governance Institutions 1999 - 2008

Main actors: UNMIK; MOC; Vjosa & Fatos Berisha; Raiffeisen Bank Kosovo; European Union Liaison Office; Kosovo the Young Europeans;

This preliminary round serves as a contextual background, from which alignments and formations of actors are created. It begins in 1999, when British actress Vanessa Redgrave, acting as a UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador, became active in organising benefits for refugees from the conflict in Kosovo[207]. During her time of involvement she became acquainted with two Kosovar Albanians, Vjosa and Fatos Berisha, who were studying in the UK.

After the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the UNMIK administration was established under UNSCR 1244. Consistent with this resolution, the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government were established in 2002. Over the next few years political authority and executive powers were incrementally transferred from the UNMIK to elected representatives of Kosovo[208]. As part of the new executive, the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (MOC) was established[209].

In 2003, the Austrian based banking group, Raiffeisen Bank International AG acquired 100% shares in the American Bank of Kosovo making it a subsidiary of Raiffeisen Bank International AG. American Bank of Kosovo was then renamed "Raiffeisen Bank Kosovo"[210]. By 2010 they had become the second largest bank in the Kosovo market[211]. Included in the Corporate Social Responsibility Policy, the bank is "committed to contribute to the society where it operates", focussing on "supporting culture, sports, charity projects and other activities"[212]. This commitment eventually led to being placed first in UNDP's Best Business award in 2011, in recognition of the company's implementation of their Corporate Social Responsibility programme[213].

Also in 2003, the public relations company B2 PR & Media Solutions was founded by Vjosa and Fatos Berisha upon their return to Kosovo from the UK[214].

In the following year, 2004, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244, the European Commission established a Liaison Office (ECLO) to assist in the preparation of Kosovo for EU integration and to manage EU assistance given to Kosovo as a Pre-Accession country[215]. As part of their assistance programme, they began to support organisers of cultural events and initiatives[216].

In 2008, the elected representatives of the Legislative Assembly of the Provisional Institutions of Self Government declared Independence. The structure of the PISG, along with that of the Ministry of Culture Youth and Sports, was retained in the Governmental institutions of the new Independent Republic of Kosovo. Following the Declaration of Independence, recognitions of the country began, diplomatic relations were formalised, and embassies were established in Prishtina. A number of embassies, notably those of Switzerland, France and Italy, offered programmes supporting cultural initiatives[217].

In September 2008, the Government of Kosovo announced a tender for a nation branding and international media campaign to promote the new Republic of Kosovo. The contract (for €5.7

million) was won by the multi-national branding agency, BBR Saatchi & Saatchi, and their local partners, PR Solutions. Thus the concept of 'Kosovo the Young Europeans' (KYE) was created[218].

Thus in the early years of Independence, there existed a number of actors contributing to cultural events and initiatives in Kosovo. These included the Ministry of Culture, Raiffeisen Bank, Kosovo the Young Europeans, ECLO, and a number of embassies. Of these actors, only the Ministry of Culture had enshrined an explicit responsibility for the promotion of cultural industry in Kosovo. However, all of these actors took some responsibility to help the development of the performance and visual arts industries to a greater or lesser extent. For example, one of the aims of the Culture For All programme is to have "[a]t least 8 existing cultural events organised in main cities in Kosovo benefiting from EU funding"[219] while part of the strategy of the Kosovo the Young Europeans campaign is "not just TV advertising", but by supporting cultural festival, they create "something on the ground […] you should generate positive news all the time"[220].

Thus we can observe a generally shared problem of a struggling film industry. Different actors responded to this problem in different ways but two dominant strategies are apparent. Support was given by organisations such as MOC, ECLO, and KYE to events stimulating the film industry. Notable examples of such events are Dokufest, a documentary film festival located in Prizren, and SKENA UP, a small festival in Prishtina where film students showcase their work.

There were four actors, Vjosa and Fatos Berisha, Orhan Kerkezi, and Faton Hasimja, all of who were employed in cinematography or public relations, who adapted a different strategy. They decided to organise an international film festival in Prishtina, calling it Prishtina International Film Festival (PriFilmFest). The non-profit organisation, PriFilmFest was founded in 2008.

Two decisions can be seen as constituting key events, bringing PriFilmFest from an idea to a reality. The first was the decision of MOC to agree to support the festival, earmarking funds for the event. The second was the involvement of British actress Vanessa Redgrave, who agreed to act as President of the Honorary Board and to promote the festival abroad.

Round 1: Creation of PriFilmFest 2008 – July 2009

Main Actors: PriFilmFest; MOC; Vanessa Redgrave; Raiffeisen Bank Kosovo; Volunteers; Kosovo the Young Europeans

With an organising board convened, funding secured from the Ministry of Culture, and the involvement of high-profile Vanessa Redgrave, the film festival transformed from an idea to a future event. The central problem now became: how to organise the festival given the limited resources. The solution of the organising board was on the one hand, to find more organisations willing to lend their support, and on the other, to enlist the services of people in the personal and professional networks of the organisers[221].

Raiffeisen Bank agreed to sponsor the festival, as did Kosovo the Young Europeans, in both cases funding being exchanged for branding of the festival[222]. Volunteers were recruited from the performance and visual arts sector. Many of these volunteers worked as actors, artists, film makers, and film directors and so stood to benefit from the networking opportunities that come with an international film festival[223].

Finally, organisations such as the National Theatre, American School of Kosovo, and National Museum were involved as host venues for the events of the festival[224].

All this activity culminated in the successful staging of Prishtina International Film Festival in June 2009. With the official slogan, "beginning of a beautiful friendship"[225], the attendance of high-profile guests such as Vanessa Redgrave, Franco Nero, and Eva Orner, and involving excursions to many heritage sites throughout Kosovo, the festival's volunteers, organisers, film stars and guests enjoyed a successful first edition of the festival. This marks the key event bringing us into Round 2.

Round 2: PriFilmFest 2nd Edition July 2009 – September 2010

Main Actors: PriFilmFest; MOC; Vanessa Redgrave; Raiffeisen Bank Kosovo; Volunteers; Kosovo the Young Europeans ; Italian Embassy; ECLO

The central actors in Round 1 considered the first edition of PriFilmFest to be a success. As Vanessa Redgrave put it, "There are A- and B-list festivals. The PriFilmFest will be on the A list from now on"[226]. The organisers of the festival then decided to organise the second edition of the festival and to make it an annual event. The constructed problem then became: how to build on the success of the first edition. The solution was to use existing resources and to expand the network of contacts.

The organisers went about solidifying relations with sponsors. The Ministry of Culture, Raiffeisen Bank and Kosovo the Young Europeans pledged to continue their support for the festival.

Expansion of the networks of support was done in two directions. Representatives of PriFilmFest travelled to numerous festivals in Europe, to promote the festival and to establish connections with people in film industries across Europe. This was a means of expanding horizontally.

Vertical expansion was pursued through attracting more sponsoring organisations. The Italian Embassy had been running a cultural programme but had begun to wind down operations that year. However, an agreement was reached between the organising board and the Italian Embassy, which saw the inclusion of an additional programme, Retrospectiva added to the film festival. The idea of Retrospectiva was that cinema from a different European country would be promoted each year. Films from Italian Director Fabio Amelio were showcased in the 2010 edition of PriFilmFest, with this programme being funded by the Italian Embassy[227].

The European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo was another prominent sponsor of cultural events in Kosovo. In May 2010, they launched the Culture for All programme, formalising their practice of supporting cultural events, setting standardised goals and requirements, and making decision-making on proposals more efficient[228]. A tender for the project was launched by ECLO and won by Italian company ARS Progetti.

The organising board of PriFilmFest added the PriFilmForum to the festival, a forum for discussion over issues of co-production to which cinematographers from all over the region, and from the EU were invited[229]. A proposal of this was sent to ECLO's Culture for All programme, and it was agreed to fund the PriFilmForum as it helped to create links and connections with the EU and as it fostered dialogue amongst the different ethnic communities in Kosovo and in the region[230].

From the 21 – 29 of September 2010, Prishtina played host to the second edition of PriFilmFest. The major changes from the first edition of the festival was the inclusion of the two new programmes discussed above, and the changing of the slogan from "beginning of a beautiful friendship" to "friendship continued"[231]. This edition established PriFilmFest as a competent annual festival and not just a once-off event. Thus new constructions of problems and solutions were articulated, demanding new configurations of actors, which began a new round of decision-making.

Round 3: On-going Planning of PriFilmFest September 2010 –

Main Actors: PriFilmFest; MOC; Vanessa Redgrave; Raiffeisen Bank; Volunteers; ECLO; French Embassy

With the festival solidified n Prishtina's cultural calendar and its continuity no longer in doubt, the previous problems of how to build on the success of the first edition gave way to how to make the festival grow sustainably. As the festival was attracting more funding and high-profile guests, the organisers were less able to rely on social capital with friends who were providing services to the festival on a voluntary basis[232].

The strategy adopted by the organisers was to continue to expand connections horizontally and vertically. Actors within the organising board also began to express a desire for regulatory change at governance level. Some have suggested providing tax breaks for businesses who sponsor cultural events and initiatives[233].

The Ministry of Culture gave an early commitment to support the 3rd edition of the festival[234]. Raiffeisen Bank's continued support earned them the title of "traditional sponsor" in the third year[235]. The PriFilmForum was also included in the third edition of the festival, and ECLO continued their support of the PriFilmForum through their Culture For All programme[236].

In 2011, the contract for the government's nation branding campaign expired and was not renewed[237]. As a consequence, the branding arrangement between PriFilmFest and Kosovo the Young Europeans was not continued into the third year.

Building on the success of the Italian Retrospective, discussions were begun with the French Embassy[238]. It appears that some agreement was reached with the French Embassy as a French Retrospective was added to the festival programme in 2011[239].

These elements were successfully combined to stage PriFilmFest for a third year, this time with the official slogan of "Friendship forever".

Future Rounds

From this point onwards, each annual staging of the festival will cease to have the same level of significance to warrant a key event marking a new decision making round. Looking to the future there are two possible key events that could change the trajectory of PriFilmFest.
The first such key event would be the failure of the festival to grow and develop. Were the festival to fail to secure new sources of funding and to firmly establish itself on the international stage, this would probably lead to a period of stagnation and a growing lack of enthusiasm

among volunteers and organisers. There would probably also be an eventual exhaustion of social capital, which would lead to the end of the festival.

On the other hand, the second event would be for the kind of institutional change advocated by some of the actors to materialise. This is sought by members of the organising board and by ECLO amongst others[240]. Such a change would likely see the entrance of a plethora of businesses entering the network of cultural performance governance in general and the network surrounding the organisation of PriFilmFest in particular. It is possible that this would be followed by a decrease in funding given by international organisations and by a decrease in the involvement of volunteers.

6.2 Urban Narratives

It has been seen that performance arts in general and PriFilmFest in particular attracts the interests and involvement of a wide variety of actors. It was also seen that the reasons for actors and organisations to become involved are rather varied, yet have enough in common to allow constructive cooperative agreements to be made. This section looks at the meanings that people across organisations attach to PriFilmFest. Data is analysed discursively, and patterns of coherent urban narratives are observed and discussed.

From discursive analysis of data I have identified 8 distinct discourses that interviewees attach to PriFilmFest. I label these:

1. Friendly and Welcoming
2. Balkan multi-cultural
3. European
4. Closed and repressed
5. Open and creative
6. Developing and Hopeful
7. Professional and Ambitious
8. Dialogue

Of particular interest in the analysis that follows is the 'old' narrative of *Closed and Repressed* and the 'newer' discourses that are constructed as counter-narratives to this (5-7). Also of interest is the tension between *Developing and Hopeful* and *Professional and Ambitious*, with the proponents of the latter trying to distinguish their visions of Kosovo from associations with the former. This case study is also noteworthy in comparison to the other cases when we take into account the relative lack of international organisations promoting the kind of inter-ethnic tolerance embodied in the *Dialogue* narrative.

The eight urban narratives identified above are described below. Following this, their development, the use of them by actors, and their dynamic relationship with the event of Prishtina International Film Festival are traced through the framework of decision making rounds identified in 6.1.

6.2.1 Description of Narratives

Friendly and Welcoming

According to one volunteer with PriFilmFest, "Kosovo is known for its macchiato and for the nightlife"[241]. An extremely neutral narrative, the standard references to Kosovo as a former communist country and as ethnically divided are forgotten and instead the focus is on the many cafés and bars Prishtina has to offer. People come to the festival to enjoy themselves, to socialise, and to mix with other people. In the words of a volunteer, "we try to make [guests] feel really comfortable when they come here"[242]. In contrast to other, larger film festivals where volunteers "don't have time to deal with guests," in Prishtina, festival personnel "really take care of them and go around with them and talk to them and sit with them and have a drink"[243]. Interestingly, this narrative is quite complementary to all other narratives described here apart from the *Closed, repressed* narrative which follows further below.

Balkan Multi-cultural

This narrative situates Prishtina as a 'normal' Balkan city. The region is characterised by a plethora of cultures and corresponding linkages throughout the region. Accordingly, PriFilmFest showcases cultural heritage from many periods of Kosovo's history. For example, excursions are organised to the Serbian Orthodox Monastery in Deçani/Dečani, tours are held in the National Museum, and the main venue of the festival is the National Theatre, a major symbol of the cultural achievements of Communist Yugoslavia. Building on this diverse tradition, the film festival is seen as a platform to showcase cinema from the Balkan region, with the opportunities for regional co-production being heavily emphasised[244]. For instance, a in a press release the PriFilmForum is described as aiming "aims to become an important regional meeting venue for producers and directors of neighboring countries "[245].

Interestingly, this narrative eclipses or bypasses constructions of a Kosovar national identity distinct from a shared regional identity.

European

A recurring theme is the emphasis that interviewees and people in Kosovo in general place on being part of Europe. Europe is not meant merely as the European Union, but the historical conception of Europe, extending to include not just the Balkans but also parts of Turkey and Russia. Interviewees have described themselves as "the same as everyone in Europe"[246] denoting a shared continental identity in contrast (but not in conflict) with the *Balkan Multi-cultural* narrative. The film festival is seen as a means to establish connections with film-makers throughout Europe, and at a more general level, to promote familiarity amongst Europeans with Kosovars, which might someday lead to EU membership.

Closed and Repressed

In many ways this frame forms a background against which most other narratives form counter-narratives. Kosovar society is comprised of closed people having lived through communism and occupation. Thus people are reserved and slow to express themselves openly. A further dimension to this narrative borrows from constructions of Albanian nationalism. Albanians were seen as uncivilised non-Europeans by most European powers and religions. The contemporary embodiment of this thought portrays Kosovar Albanians as Muslim fundamentalists involved in terrorist organisations such as the UÇK. Issues such as non-recognition of Kosovo's status, denial of visas and travelling rights, and non-admittance to the EU feed into this narrative. Prishtina International Film Festival is an explicit attempt to move away from this narrative: "10 years after the war and in its first anniversary of the Independence, Kosovo still doesn't have real presentable event that could drag attention of the media other than political things […] With PriFilmFest, Prishtina and Kosovo will get a name and a brand in the world, and it will not be political"[247].

Open and Creative

A counter-narrative to the *Closed and Repressed*, PriFilmFest serves as a platform for artists to express themselves openly to the region, to Europe and to the world. The objectives of the

festival are “to open doors of the newest country in the world” and to “promote the best of Kosovar film to the international audience”[248]. Additionally the role of PriFilmFest and other events such as Dokufest and Freedomfest, in bringing international film-makers and artists to Kosovo will help people to open up after all the years of repression[249].

Developing and hopeful

Another counter narrative to *Closed and Repressed*, *Developing and Hopeful* focuses on the growth and development of Kosovo in general and of the film industry in particular since the emergence from communism and conflict. PriFilmFest itself embodies this narrative as a young but growing festival in a young but hopeful country[250]. The involvement of volunteers, many of them actors and film makers, symbolises proactive people taking matters into their own hands. They choose to work together to improve and develop their industry. In one way the festival is a celebration of the achievements of Kosovo’s artistic community, generating enthusiasm and hope for the future[251].

Professional and Ambitious

This counter narrative to Closed and Repressed takes a similar focus to *Developing and Hopeful*, yet is more assertive and self-confident. Rather than focussing on the voluntary aspect of the festival and the struggling cinematography industry in Kosovo, emphasis is instead placed on attracting large sponsors and connections with famous film stars such as Franco Nero and Eva Orner. The tension between *Developing and Hopeful* and *Professional and Ambitious* is captured by festival director Vjosa Berisha’s description of the first edition of the festival as a “very young but ambitious and professional festival”[252].

Dialogue

An additional narrative, *Dialogue*, borrows from the *Balkan Multi-cultural* and Op*en and Creative* narratives. It sees culture as the best vehicle for inter community dialogue and overcoming of prejudice. Emphasis is placed on the potential for culture to allow social inclusion of marginalised groups and to “foster intercultural respect and promote diversity”[253]. Events such as PriFilmFest are seen as arenas in which conflict resolution can happen on a micro-scale, which, when replicated, can help to build a strong, cohesive post-conflict society.

6.2.2 Narratives in Rounds

Round 1: Creation of PriFilmFest 2008 – July 2009

The original idea for the festival came from the founders, Vjosa and Fatos Berisha, Orhan Kerkezi, and Faton Hasimja. The original concept then embodied their preferred narratives. These appear to be *Developing and Hopeful*; *Friendly and Welcoming*, *Balkan multi-cultural*, and P*rofessional and Ambitious*. Repeated references have been made by these actors to the struggling cinematography sector and also to the friendly and relaxed atmosphere in the Balkans[254]. The organising of the festival can be seen as part of a strategy of countering the

narrative of *Closed and Repressed*. It is acknowledged that after the war, cinematographers and actors in Kosovo are "in a kind of ghetto" and that it is therefore difficult to find co-production and networking opportunities[255]. However the organisers look instead to the friendliness of the people in Prishtina and to connections with others in the Balkan region.

The involvement of Vanessa Redgrave strengthened the narratives of *Ambitious and Professional*, *European*, and *Developing and Hopeful*, bringing with her fame as an internationally renowned actress, connections to European cinema networks, and her history of campaigning during the conflict in Kosovo.

The Ministry of Culture appears to have lent its support under its responsibilities to oversee development of performance and visual arts. The pledging of support also lifted the horizons of the festival organisers, allowing them to plan on a bigger scale. Therefore it can be said that the narratives of *Developing and Hopeful* and of *Professional and Ambitious* were attached to PriFilmFest with Ministry of Culture support. Indeed in his closing speech at the festival that year, the then Minister Valton Beqiri described PriFilmFest as "a very successful festival" which he hoped in the future to be a "special artistic space for the creators of cinematography from Kosova and from different countries of the world"[256]. In saying this he also invoked the narrative of *Open and Creative*.

Raiffeisen Bank further cemented the *Professional and Ambitious* narrative and strengthened the *European* narrative. The brand of a large, well-known, multi-national company helped to send the message of a serious and competent festival.

By contrast, Kosovo the Young Europeans added a different set of narratives, principally those associated with its branding campaign. These include *Open and Creative*, *Friendly and Welcoming*, *European*, and *Developing and Hopeful*. Examples can be seen in an image of Dhurata Lopivica, one of the "young Europeans" whose story is featured on the campaign website. A smiling 21 year-old Dhurata is pictured holding a film production clapperboard, with the accompanying caption: "From winning the 2007 Ford Supermodel contest to working as a producer. Hollywood is just around the corner"[257]. Emphasising her role as a (young) film producer plays on the *creative* element, while connecting the possibilities between working in Kosovo and in Hollywood emphasises *Developing and Hopeful* and the *open* element. Narratives of *Friendly and Welcoming* and *European* can be seen in almost all of KYE images.

Those who came to volunteer with PriFilmFest can be divided into two groups based on the narratives they mobilised by participating in the festival. The first category is of those high-profile volunteers who agreed to lend their name to the festival and to promote it in their networks, examples of these include Eva Orner and Franco Nero .Their contribution generally brought with them narratives of *Professional and Ambitious* and *European*.

When it comes to volunteers form Prishtina and elsewhere in Kosovo on the other hand, a much more nuanced set of narratives is evident. Of course with the amount of volunteers combining, it is likely that all narratives discussed here would have been represented by at least some of the volunteers. However, it is plausible that four narratives were carried in particular. Through their geographical proximity, involvement in the struggling yet creative industry, and their familiarity with each other, narratives of *Balkan Multi-Cultural*, *Developing and Hopeful*, *Open and Creative*, and *Friendly and Welcoming* were articulated. In the words of one volunteer, "For us, especially for the people who are working as volunteers, […] we are very happy to be a part of this festival, because we feel like we are contributing to the development of our culture. So,

most of us who work there work for fun and we enjoy it a lot. […] The only word I can describe this festival for it the country is 'hope'"[258].

Figure 14 PriFilmFest Opening Night 2009

The *Balkan Multi-cultural* narrative was further strengthened with the selection of National Museum and National Theatre as venues, symbolising as they do the cultural perspective of the period of history characterised by communist rule. To a large extent, these venues, formerly being subject to censorship over content and language, also symbolise the *Open and Creative* narratives as counter narratives to the *Closed and Repressed* narrative. Of course, the situating of the festival in Prishtina adds considerable weight to the *Balkan multicultural* narrative, even though this is not subjected to decision-making.

The staging of the event (see Figure 14[259]) can be said to embody all narratives discussed here apart from *Dialogue* and *Closed and Repressed*. It is very difficult to determine which ones were most prominent. Rather than try to do that however, I present instead the first edition of PriFilmFest as a benchmark from which we can 'measure' narrative struggle over the proceeding rounds.

Round 2: PriFilmFest 2nd Edition July 2009 – September 2010

Round 2 is characterised by an increasing tension between *Developing and Hopeful* and *Professional and Ambitious*. This round also saw increasing prominence of *European* and the introduction of *Dialogue*.

Speaking shortly after the holding of the festival, Vanessa Redgrave declared Prishtina International Film Festival to be in the "A-list of festivals"[260], showing clear efforts to distinguish the festival from the connotations of a backward emerging market characteristic of *Developing and Hopeful* and more towards *Professional and Ambitious*. Similar tension can be observed in Festival Director, Vjosa Berisha's recollection that initially people were saying "you can't have a red-carpet extravaganza in Kosovo; that is something you see in the Oscars". However, despite scepticism, the team "were persistent and ambitious, and we did it"[261].

Renewal of support and sponsorship from Ministry of Culture, Kosovo the Young Europeans and from Raiffeisen Bank constitute re-enforcing of associated narratives from Round 1.

Horizontal expansion of networks through visiting European film festivals represents an influx and strengthening of the narratives, *European* and *Professional and Ambitious*. Vertical expansion on the other hand saw the inclusion of the Italian Embassy and ECLO as funders. The resulting additions to the festival, the Italian Retrospective and PriFilmForum both heavily embodied the *European* narrative, with the latter also mobilising *Balkan Multi-cultural* and *Dialogue* narratives.

Finally, the second edition of the festival saw a change in slogan from "beginning of a beautiful friendship" to "friendship continues"[262]. While both clearly embody the *Friendly and Welcoming* and *Open and Creative* narratives, there is a slight shift away from *Developing and Hopeful* with relations more established and secure than before.

Round 3: On-going Planning of PriFilmFest. September 2010 –

Round 3 began with a change in strategy, to place less dependence on the resources of volunteers and friends in Prishtina and instead to search for funding at higher levels. This, in some way, represented the professionalisation of PriFilmFest, promoting the *Professional and Ambitious* narrative while somewhat diluting the narratives embodied in the voluntary aspect of the festival, principally *Balkan Multi-Cultural*, D*eveloping and Hopeful*, *Open and Creative*, and *Friendly and Welcoming.*

The continued support of Ministry of Culture and ECLO re-enforced the narratives of *Developing and Hopeful* and of *Professional and Ambitious,* and of *European, Balkan Multi-cultural* and *Dialogue,* respectively. Raiffeisen Bank's elevation to "Traditional Sponsor" served to give greater prominence to their associated narratives of *Professional and Ambitious* and *European*.

Although the brand of Kosovo the Young Europeans was no longer displayed on literature and did not have a presence at the festival, the associated narratives were not entirely diminished. The residual effects of Kosovo the Young Europeans branding all over Kosovo and abroad continue to be apparent. However, as time goes by, these narratives will be less and less associated with Prishtina International Film Festival.

Following the Italian Retrospective in 2010, the French Retrospective was part of the festival programme in 2011. Screening films of French Director Claude Chabrol, and ending with a French themed party with French cuisine[263], further re-enforces the *European* narrative. This is done not only through establishing connection with French cinema and culture, but also by firmly establishing the "Retrospectiva" programme, designed to involve a different European country every year, as an integral part of the festival.

Finally the change in slogan to "Friendship Forever" strengthens the *Friendly and Welcoming* narrative. It also strengthens, I argue, the *Professional and Ambitious* narrative, with its connotations of a business partnership, while the 'beautiful' element from the first year has been discarded.

Future Rounds

Looking at the two possible future key events, it is possible to make some statements. In the event that the festival fails to grow and attract new sources of funding, it is likely that the festival would cease to run as an annual event. Clearly, the festival would then cease to function as a vehicle for all of the narratives discussed here. While all narratives would be negatively affected by this, the greatest loosing narrative would be that of *Professional and Ambitious*. I argue that this would be the case because it is the pursuit of the objectives contained in this narrative that motivates the search for funding from professional organisations. The failure to attract funding would therefore embody the failure of the objectives of *Professional and Ambitious* to be realised, in effect discrediting the narrative.

Change at governance level facilitating sponsorship of cultural events by business would have the opposite effect. Such a change would bring new businesses as actors into play. It is reasonable to assume that these actors would promote the *Professional and Ambitious* narrative.

6.3 Network Governance

So far in this chapter I have looked at the actions of actors in organising the Prishtina International Film Festival, efforts to mobilise certain narratives, and how actors responded to the actions and narratives of one another. This could be called the agency-focused, micro perspective. The events described thus far have been happening within a broader, meso-level context of the cultural and performance arts sector in Kosovo. This broader context is itself subjected to attempts at shaping the direction of its evolution by actors exerting agency at the meso-level in the emerging institutional and governance landscape in Kosovo. This emerging configuration of actors and structures is what I now turn attention to in this section.
Kosovo's cultural and performance arts sector is governed by a network of actors, notably the Ministry of Culture, European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo, various Embassies, including those of the Swiss, Italian and French, the branding campaign Kosovo the Young Europeans, and some businesses, notably Raiffeisen Bank. One distinguishing aspect of this governance network compared to the others discussed in previous chapters is that the network is relatively open. That is, the collection of actors mentioned above have autonomously commenced their governing activities, without requiring the permission of those actors already in place.

Another characteristic of this network is the absence of any Serb organisations within the governance network or of organisations concerned with the impact of things on Serb audiences as was seen in other case studies.

The question I turn to in this section is how governance through networks influences narrative mobilisation in Prishtina International Film Festival. To do this I first look at individual network actors and their effects on narratives. Secondly I examine some issues of accountability. Next network relations are analysed and their implications for construction of narratives, before I look at the framework for governance, following governance network theory. This section ends with some of the insights into governance through networks in Kosovo raised in this case study.

6.3.1 Network actors and narrative mobilisation

Ministry of Culture Youth and Sports

As we saw in 6.2 the Ministry of Culture brought with them the following narratives: *Developing and Hopeful; Professional and Ambitious;* and *Open and Creative.* Their most direct intervention in the construction of Prishtina International Film Festival as a vehicle for narratives was with the closing speech of the first edition, by the then Minister, Valton Beqiri. In this speech he described the festival as "a very successful festival" that will in the future become "a special artistic space for the creators of cinematography from Kosova and from different countries of the world"[264].

The Ministry of Culture derives this capacity to directly assign narratives from the traditional moral legitimacy ascribed to the Ministry of Culture. As the Minister remarked, "even though Ministers usually do the openings of the festivals, I am here to close the [festival]"[265]. There appears to be an implicit expectation that the Ministry of Culture of a country will give financial and moral support to voluntary festivals[266]. The moral support given by a Minister thus also

allows it room to shape and attach narratives. Additionally, having the Ministry of Culture of the Independent Republic of Kosovo as financial and moral supporters re-enforces a normative legitimacy to the Minister as a moral authority in cultural governance. While this might seem obvious at first glance, in Kosovo the state, the territory and the polity are contested. Granting the Ministry an authoritative moral position in the festival allows the office to practice and act as a legitimate state-based institution for the city of Prishtina. By referring to the development of cinema "from Kosova and from different countries of the world"[267] the minister tries to extend his territorial competence to all of Kosovo and then distinguishes Kosovo from other countries in the world.

Narratives Mobilised: *Developing and Hopeful; Professional and Ambitious; Open and Creative*

Resources: Financial Support; Moral Support; Moral legitimacy; Promotional space

Kosovo the Young Europeans

The nation branding campaign, Kosovo the Young Europeans brought with them the narratives of *Open and Creative, Friendly and Welcoming, European, and Developing and Hopeful*, narratives that are visible in all of their work. KYE came to support the festival by an agreement with the organisers, who were enthusiastic to get their support[268]. KYE would make financial contributions to the organisation of the festival and in return the logo of Kosovo the Young Europeans would be displayed prominently in PriFilmFest literature[269]. Additionally, KYE had a physical presence at the event in the form of a stall with personnel handing out promotional items.

The strategy behind supporting events like PriFilmFest is explained by Ekrem Tahiri, executive director of PR Solutions: "the whole idea that we have is that we create a better image for the country and then [the country will] also become like that, by acting like that. [...] that's how you create a brand. You cannot create a brand with just […] some TV ads or advertising in some magazines"[270]. The idea is to create a buzz by supporting activities like PriFilmFest or Dokufest: "we try with some activities on the ground to send [...] messages and communicate positive news towards the neighbours and others in Europe"[271].

Thus cultural events like PriFilmFest and others such as Freedom Fest and Dokufest are seen by the branding agency as vehicles with which to promote their preferred narratives of the country. Important to note, however, is that PR Solutions saw their role as one of many in a network: "everybody should do their own job. We want to create this feeling, this perception, this communication strategy. And then it is the Government who can use this communication strategy"[272].

Interestingly, the narratives embodied in the branding campaign of Kosovo the Young Europeans are quite similar to those expressed by festival organisers during interviews. Therefore it is possible to view the sponsorship of PriFilmFest a mutually beneficial agreement between like-minded actors. From such a perspective, the role of Kosovo the Young Europeans as a governing actor would be described as neutral, in line with pluralist theories of the state and governance (for example see Rawls (1993)).

On the other hand, a different perspective might look at Kosovo the Young Europeans as a relatively large and resourceful actor, with the capacity to raise the profile of events and initiatives reflecting similar narratives to its own, to a higher level of visibility. From such a

standpoint, the presence in popular media and in research of PriFilmFest and other events supported by Kosovo the Young Europeans, as examples of cultural activity in Kosovo, could be due to a selection bias due to prominence and visibility. A third perspective might see the activities of the nation branding campaign as a prominent organisation promoting certain narratives as a strong influence on the narrative preferences of potential producers of culture.

These three perspectives, which can also be applied to the relationship between PriFilmFest and most other governing actors discussed here, correspond roughly with the 1-, 2- and 3-dimensional views of power described by Dahl (1957; 1961), Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and Lukes (1974), respectively. Determining which perspective is most accurate in this case is beyond the scope of tis thesis. Such an analysis would require a comprehensive review of all events sponsored by KYE, all events applying for funding, and interviews with all event organisers before and after the launching of the nation branding campaign.

What can be concluded based on the data available is that Kosovo the Young Europeans is or was a substantial sponsor of activities in Kosovo and that there have been explicit mention of using events like PriFilmFest to promote managed images of Kosovo. At the very least, the sheer prominence of Kosovo the Young Europeans branding space throughout Kosovo's public sphere is evidence of substantial success in mobilising preferred narratives. This indicates significant capacity for KYE to engage successfully in discursive contestation, using its position as a prominent funding body of cultural activities throughout Kosovo.

The non-renewal of the contract severely limits the capacity of PR Solutions to continue with the branding campaign. At the time of research (June 2011) the agency was considering strategies of keeping the campaign alive in the absence of Government funding[273].

Narratives Mobilised: *Open and Creative; Friendly and Welcoming; European; Developing and Hopeful*

Resources: Financial support; Promotional space

European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo

We saw in 6.2 that ECLO brought with them narratives of *European, Balkan Multi-Cultural,* and *Dialogue.* These narratives were embodied in the PriFilmForum in the second and third editions of the festival. PriFilmForum is a co-production forum where cinematographers from the region come to meet and discuss issues of co-production[274]. Also present at the forum were EU-based training and networking organisation European Audiovisual Entrepreneurs and the German film-funding and media business development agency, Medienboard[275].

PriFilmForum was added to the festival programme in the second edition. The organising board wanted an event where shared problems of co-production could be discussed and tackled constructively by filmmakers in the Balkan region. Representatives from professional agencies from Western Europe were also invited so that upcoming regional film makers could learn from them[276]. Thus the creation of PriFilmForum can be seen as a solution to the constructed problem of a shortage of co-production opportunities in the Balkans. From this perspective it can also be seen as mobilising narratives of *Balkan Multi-cultural, Developing and Hopeful,* and *Professional and Ambitious.*

The format of PriFilmForum also found the approval of European Liaison Office to Kosovo's Cultural for All programme and so after receiving a proposal, they agreed to fund the PriFilmForum programme[277]. The Culture for All programme aims to "preserve and promote cultural diversity in Kosovo"[278]. It aims to do this through enhancing "cultural diversity and inter-cultural dialogue", strengthening "the cultural sector as a vector of creativity and social innovation", and developing "the cultural industry as an asset for Kosovo's economy and competitiveness". A further means is through the "creation of networks between cultural operators at regional and European level"[279]. From this perspective, PriFilmForum can be seen as a vehicle for mobilising the narratives implicit in the Culture for All programme (*European, Balkan Multi-Cultural,* and *Dialogue*) in addition to those mobilised by PriFilmFest organisers.

In this respect, while PriFilmForum can be viewed on the one hand as a strategy of the organisers to address issues co-production opportunities, on the other hand the programme, as it was designed, also fulfils the goals and objectives of the ECLO. While the ECLO Culture For All programme does not explicitly make demands on what elements they wish funded events to have, their objectives and criteria are being made widely known. Thus, they do seem to operate according to a certain *soft power*. As one ECLO representative described it, "we want indeed that the EU vision and the EU priorities are known to the public so that we can also get the proposals we are searching for"[280].

Thus, with aspects such as linkages with EU film industries and discussions amongst different ethnic groups of the Balkan region, the PriFilmForum embodies narratives reflecting the objectives of the ECLO's Culture for All programme. These aspects are embodied in the narratives *European, Balkan-Multi Cultural,* and *Dialogue*.

Narratives Mobilised: *European; Balkan-Multi Cultural; Dialogue*.

Resources: Financial Support; Promotional and Discursive Space

Italian Embassy

The Italian Embassy to Kosovo had been running a cultural support programme for some years although it was being wound down in the years prior to their involvement with PriFilmFest. In the second year of PriFilmFest, the organising board added the 'Retrospectiva' programme, showcasing movies from a specific European country[281]. In 2010 that country was Italy, and together with the Italian Embassy they organised the Italian Retrospective, in which five films form the Italian director Gianni Amelio were shown[282]. In this way, through the financial support given and through providing the films of Gianni Amelio and other aspects of the Italian Retrospective, the Embassy of Italy used PriFilmFest as a space to promote the culture of their home country, and in doing so contributed to the *European* narrative.

It is not clear from the data in which direction negotiations went, or whether there existed an element of *soft power* similar to that displayed in the case ECLO. However, it is clear that this cooperation was viewed as successful. In the subsequent years, discussions were begun with the French Embassy to Kosovo about organising the French Retrospective[283], something that came to fruition in the third edition of the festival[284]. Such arrangements show intent on the part of PriFilmFest organising board to cooperate and avail of funding from some of the many European embassy offices in Prishtina. Additionally it shows that both the Italian and French Embassies were willing and satisfied to support the Retrospectiva programme of the festival. Whether this is evidence of soft power on part of the embassies, of strategic resource mobilisation on part of

the organisers, or of mutually beneficial agreements is unclear. However, the result was that the Retrospectiva programme was added to the festival, and was used to mobilise the narrative *European*, a narrative which was favoured by all sets of actors concerned here.

Narratives Mobilised: *European*

Resources: Financial Support; Promotional and Discursive space; Co-organisation

Raiffeisen Bank

Raiffeisen Bank entered the Kosovo banking market in 2003 and have since become the second largest bank in the market[285]. Raiffeisen Bank are notable for their Corporate Social Responsibility policy, where they declare their commitment to "contribute to the society where [they operate]", through "supporting culture, sports, charity projects and other activities"[286]. Raiffeisen were approached in 2009 by representatives of PriFilmFest and asked would they support the festival. An agreement was reached and so Raiffeisen Bank pledged financial support, and their logo became the most prominently displayed on festival literature and on the PriFilmFest website[287].

As mentioned in 6.2, the financial support given by Raiffeisen to PriFilmFest allowed the organisers to raise the horizons of what was organisationally possible[288]. The sponsorship was of value in proclaiming the organisational quality of the festival in showcasing the standard of sponsorship they could attract. It also gave Raiffeisen Bank considerable promotional space. These arrangements added weight to the *Professional and Ambitious* and *European* narratives.

Unlike other actors discussed here, there doesn't seem to be any co-organising of programmes or of active participation in the festival. This is intriguing as their continued support has earned the bank the title of Traditional Sponsor in the third edition of the festival[289]. Therefore it is difficult to determine in what way negotiations and narrative contestation went. What is apparent is that there is mutual satisfaction with the arrangement, as reported in interviews[290] and evidenced in Raiffeisen Bank being named 'Traditional Sponsor' in recognition of their continued support. PriFilmFest is not alone in this respect. The awarding to Raiffeisen of the title of "Best Company in Kosovo for Corporate Social Responsibility"[291] is evidence of that the Bank is a significant player in the shaping of Kosovo's cultural field.

Narratives Mobilised: *Professional and Ambitious*; *European*

Resources: Financial Support; Moral Support; Promotional space

6.3.2 Network Actor Accountability

Although most actors in the governance network are nominally autonomous, it is worth remembering that the actions of each organisation are accountable to some factors outside of the narrowly defined network. Clearly, accountability within the network is created in interactions and agreements between network actors. Additionally, the actions of people within an organisation are theoretically accountable to that organisation's hierarchy (although for the

purposes of this analysis, the organisation has been the unit of analysis; the working assumption being that organisations are homogenous actors). That is not the focus here. Rather the focus is on accountability of actors to other actors external to the network. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to establish causations between accountability and narrative mobilisation. Nonetheless, it is important that relations of accountability are recognised.

Ministry of Culture Youth and Sport

The accountability of the MOC has been discussed in 4.3.2. The Ministry is theoretically accountable to the elected government of Kosovo and to the electorate of Kosovo and is further answerable to the International Civilian Representative, Pieter Feith over certain issues laid out in the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (aka the Ahtisaari Plan).

These two official channels of accountability are somewhat distorted by the following four factors.

Firstly, during the period of analysis (2009 – 2011) the ministry has been headed by elected representatives from either the PDK or LDK parties. These party members are not solely accountable to the electorate but also to their internal party hierarchies. Secondly, a report by Transparency International into Kosovo's Institutional Integrity has shown dissatisfaction with the performance of government and with levels of transparency[292]. This assessment casts doubts on the traditional notion of electoral accountability. Thirdly, a small and weak economy such as Kosovo is hugely dependent on foreign aid and investment. The public representatives in the Ministry and in government are therefore more likely to act in ways conducive to the interests of aid and investors than in stronger, more established economies, as reported by the Transparency International report[293]. Finally, there is a substantial number of permanent staff at the ministry, who maintain input into policy making irrespective of elections.

Kosovo the Young Europeans

The nation-branding campaign is run by the public relations company PR Solutions, the local partner of multinational branding agency Saatchi and Saatchi. The branding campaign Kosovo the Young Europeans was created after PR Solutions won a public tender from the government to run the nation-branding campaign. In this sense, the activities of the campaign are accountable to the management and shareholders of PR Solutions, to the management and shareholders of Saatchi and Saatchi, and to the government. In 2011 the government of Kosovo took the decision not to renew the contract for the branding campaign. This means that the campaign now has more independence from the government, but also less resources.

European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo

The Culture for All programme is a mechanism allowing the formal management and allocation of EU funding for culture in Kosovo. It has been contracted to the implementing partner, Italian company, ARS Progetti. As a private company, ARS Progetti are theoretically accountable to their shareholders in most of their activities. In managing the Culture for All programme, they are accountable primarily to the ECLO as contractors as long as this complies with obligations towards their shareholders. As an illustration of this, the implementation of the Culture for All

programme was temporarily suspended by ECLO in early 2011 due to concerns over the performance of the implementing partner, before implementation was resumed following agreement between the parties[294].

The European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo is accountable primarily to the European Commission of the European Union. In this respect, the ECLO derives its objectives to implement EU policy through preparing Kosovo for EU integration, guiding and advising policy reform, and managing the provision of EU financial assistance through the Instrument for Pre-Accession[295]. The nature of this relation is hierarchical, yet provides considerable room for autonomy.

Italian Embassy

The Italian Embassy is an Ambassadorial office headed by the Italian Ambassador to Kosovo. It is hierarchically answerable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the government of Italy. The Ambassador has residence in Kosovo as long as diplomatic relations are maintained between the Italian and Kosovo governments.

Raiffeisen Bank

Raiffeisen Bank Kosovo is a 100% subsidiary of the banking group Raiffeisen Bank International AG. The actions of the bank in Kosovo are primarily accountable to these shareholders.

6.3.3 Network Relations and Narrative Mobilisation

This governance network is much more dispersed than other networks discussed in this report so far. While the actors all share certain goals in common and contribute to governance in similar ways, multilateral meetings between all concerned actors do not happen. However, bilateral interactions do take place between the actors. For instance, ECLO maintains close relations with the Ministry of Culture[296]. When asked about this however, I was told that due to a recent change in government, their contact person was no longer working at the department and they were requesting the Ministry to appoint a new project contact point[297].

Similarly in interviews and in correspondences I observed people within organisations refer to staff in other organisations by their first names[298]. Additionally, it is worth remembering that these Governance networks involve a substantial number of international as well as domestic actors. This has the implication that relations between organisations fluctuate and depend on the relations of contact persons who speak a common language (often English)[299].

These phenomena suggest that inter-organisational relations take the form of fluctuating semi-formal social relations between organisational actors at different levels, as opposed to strictly formal interlinkages between heads of organisations. Thus we might expect inter-organisational relations in the cultural governance network to have large potential for developing close, trust-building ties. However, many of these ties do not involve members who are at high levels in the hierarchies of their respective organisations. Hence, while it is possible for close ties between organisations to emerge, without linkages amongst the most influential people, the potential for coordination of aims and strategies across the network is relatively low.

Therefore it is difficult to envisage a consensus or coherence emerging amongst governance actors concerning the types of narratives sought or in the strategies used to mobilise them. This partly explains the plethora of narratives attached by different actors to PriFilmFest in the context of this governance network. What consensus existed on the *European* narrative and against *Closed and Repressed* is more likely to be accredited to pre-existing objectives rather than on a consensus alignment. This will be discussed further below.

The implication of this is that PriFilmFest organisers are empowered to choose which governance actors they wish to work with. This gives substantial control to the 'governed' actors to mobilise their preferred narratives.

6.3.4 Governance Framework and Narrative Mobilisation

So far we have looked at the individual actions of network actors in shaping Prishtina International Film Festival, and we have looked at inter-organisational relations. Both help to explain the plethora of narratives evident in 6.2. However, neither approach explains the near consensus on mobilising the *European* narrative and on the marginalisation of *Closed and Repressed* narrative. Nor do they add much explanatory value to the tension between *Developing and Hopeful* and *Professional and Ambitious.*

In order to explore these things further, I now turn to look at what Sørensen and Torfing call the normative and imaginary framework of the governance network in question (2005). According to these authors, governance networks operate according to a shared framework which involves normative and imaginary element as well as cognitive and regulative elements (ibid). Contained within the normative and imaginary elements are shared norms and values and shared constructions of identity and visions, respectively (ibid).

In the first place, what stands out most about this network compared to others discussed previously is that governance actors contribute to the project at hand primarily in terms of funding, whether through various forms of assistance (e.g. Italian Embassy, ECLO, MOC) or through sponsorship (e.g. KYE, Raiffeisen Bank). Interestingly, even Raiffeisen Bank have framed sponsorship as a "[c]ontribution to the community"[300], using charitable connotations to describe their role.

Thus it is possible to observe a certain positioning, whereby governance actors see themselves as donors in relation to a culture industry in need. Following the arguments of Escobar (1992), one might argue that such positioning constructs a situation of permanent underdevelopment of the subject of assistance, in this case Kosovo's cultural performance sector. This line of thinking might explain one half of the tension between *Developing and Hopeful* and *Professional and Ambitious*. However, the argument relies on translating the empirical evidence through a very specific theoretical orientation, and is therefore unsuitable for drawing conclusions.

As mentioned before, a number of actors have advocated for the government to provide tax-relief for small and medium-sized enterprises who wish to sponsor cultural events as a means to generate additional support for the sector. This can be seen as a means to create a sustainable solution whereby the industry can become independent of the temporary aid providers who are seen as filling a gap in the absence of other sources of funding[301].

Such strategies contain two important underlying assumptions about the nature of governance.

Firstly, it re-enforces the positioning of governance actors as assisting the development of an underdeveloped culture industry. Secondly, aid or assistance is seen as temporary, with the real strategy for development lying in the decentralisation of resource generation, and of governance and decision-making, towards the market. These two assumptions mirror the tension between *Developing and Hopeful* and *Professional and Ambitious* although it does not explain how this is translated from normative and discursive assumptions into practice.

Another common feature of governance in this network is the association with the EU. The actor that most clearly is associated with this is the ECLO. The office describes itself as playing a "pivotal role in realising the European agenda in Kosovo with the aim to promote Kosovo's approximation to the European Union"[302]. However, to a greater or lesser extent, all actors involved, with the partial exception of Raiffeisen Bank, work to in some way further the goals of Kosovo's EU prospects, locating this goal within a shared normative framework.

This time, it is possible to make a link between governance framework and narrative mobilisation. The example of PriFilmForum is illustrative in this regard. As was seen in 6.3.1, PriFilmForum was constructed by the organisers in such a way that it would further the goals of the organising board, and attract the funding of the ECLO's Culture for All programme. From the point of view of the ECLO, by publicising the the goals of the Culture For All programme, it expected that they will receive proposals containing some of the elements they are looking to support. These include specifically the "creation of networks between cultural operators at regional and European level"[303]. In this way, the goals of EU integration contained in the normative framework of governance are transplanted onto the fabric of the discursive space.

As argued above, this network is distinctive compared to those discussed in other case studies in that it is relatively open and there is less of a pre-arranged agreement that forms a condition for entry of new actors. Because of this less aspects of a shared governance framework can be identified in this case study than in others. Of course is could be argued that this itself is a regulative aspect of the framework of governance: the relative lack of institutional rules is itself an institutional arrangement. While this is true, it does not tell us much in terms of narrative mobilisation, apart from allowing that there is a wide diversity of narratives pursued by governance actors.

6.3.5 Evolution of network and narrative mobilisation

It is difficult to create a picture of performance and visual arts in Kosovo prior to the emergence of the governance network discussed here. The introduction of all these actors has happened gradually in the years after the conflict was (formally) brought to an end. Data is lacking on how governance functioned before this, especially during the war. Going by the achievements of the Albanian organised 'parallel institutions' in education and health, it is reasonable to assume that some (formal or informal) institutions concerning cinematography were in place, however unstable they were. Research on cultural performance during the years 1995 to 2009 would be an interesting study in itself.

Rather than tracing the emergence of governance networks in the years since 1999, what has been depicted in this section so far is a cross-sectional picture of the evolution of governance over the years 2009 – 2011. For analytical purposes, I have presented a somewhat static view,

although in reality institutional evolution cannot be said to have stopped during this time. In the absence of data from the years at which conflict was at its height, a slightly more dynamic approach is possible by speculating on the possible future events mentioned in 6.1.

The first future key event discussed was for the failure of PriFilmFest to attract more funding and to professionalise. This would likely lead to the termination of the festival. The implications of such an eventuality would be felt mostly at festival organising level rather than at governance level. Therefore it is unclear whether and in what ways this would impact on governance. There are many variables between change at festival level and at governance level, for example, the responses of actors involved in PriFilmFest (agency factors), the success or failure of other initiatives (environmental factors), the responsiveness of governance actors to such events (structural factors), and the capacity of governance actors to respond (agency-structure factors). Due to this wide array of influences, it is not possible to provide a reasonable estimation of the impact of this potential event on governance network and narrative mobilisation.

With respect to the second key event, more can be said about it. A regulative change facilitating businesses wishing to sponsor cultural events in exchange for tax-relief is a governance level change that is demanded by actors in response to the progression of PriFilmFest. While this type of change is also advocated by some governance-level actors, it is not clear whether the absence of such change is due to a lack of implementing capacity or to disagreement and resistance to change.

In the event of such change being implemented, it would likely see the entrance of a number of business actors into the governance network. It is possible to speculate that these business will to a certain extent displace the position of the Embassies and of ECLO, as PriFilmFest organisers appear to favour the support of commercial companies over that of international organisations[304]. In this respect, the narratives associated with the input of ECLO and the embassies, *Balkan-multi Cultural* and *Dialogue*, would enjoy less support, apart from *European*, which receives widespread support.

Increased sponsorship would also lessen the influence of volunteers and their respective expressions of narratives. In the first year of PriFilmFest, there was a huge reliance on the efforts of volunteers, who used the festival as a space to express themselves. Over the years there has been a progression towards more managed use of the festival as a vehicle for narrative mobilisation. Like the first future event discussed above, a decrease in volunteers will have impacts primarily at festival level. There are too many variables to make a reasonable estimation of how this would impact on governance.

6.3.6 Network Governance in the context of Kosovo: Key insights

Resources

Throughout this case study we have observed the importance of different types of resources. It was seen that Prishtina International Film Festival represents a promotional space to many organisations seeking to promote their brand or their presence. In return, these organisations often contributed financial support. An additional type of support has been termed “moral support”. This refers to actors using their perceived moral authority for promotional purposes. This is especially the case for the Ministry of Culture and also for famous actors such as

Vannessa Redgrave and Franco Nero. In this sense moral authority can also be described as a resource. Finally, a resource that many volunteers and organisers possess but that is not prevalent among governance-level actors is that of personal or professional networks. The importance of professional and personal networks was especially important in the first year of the festival, before securing stronger links with governing actors in the second and third years. In this sense social capital can be used when political capital is in short supply.

Cultural Capital

Similar to the case of Newborn, the performance and visual arts sector is characterised by the involvement of a significant number of actors who have been born in Kosovo but have lived and worked abroad and speak English. These characteristics seem to contribute to a certain cultural capital that is seen as of value. English is often required to foster links between different organisations at governance level. Additionally, the experiences gained abroad appear to be of value for networking both within Kosovo and with people from outside Kosovo. When asked about PriFilmFest one respondent, uninvolved with the festival, remarked that it was "organised by key players from the media, TV, and from film,"[305] suggesting the existence of some sort of cultural capital possessed by "key players".

Governing Actors and Participating actors

In the creation of Prishtina International Film Festival, there are two categories of actors: governing actors, in the form of organisations; and participating actors, in form of people, volunteers and organisers. The first group of actors have a stake in following the missions of their organisations and so contribute resources in the form of financial support and moral support. The second group stand to gain from PriFilmFest through raising their own profiles, expanding their networks and through the development of the Kosovo film industry. These actors contribute resources in the form of human resources, personal networks and moral authority. Events like PriFilmFest can therefore be seen as the outcome of discursive contestation between, not just governance actors, but all actors involved. However it is important to remember that discursive influence is not distributed evenly, with governance actors generally having the capacity to influence a wider range of events than participating actors.

Informal connections between governing actors

It appears that contact between governing organisations in this case is maintained through contact persons who often have informal and/or fluctuating social relations with each other. Additionally, such contact persons do not always occupy controlling positions within an organisation. This has the implication that formal interlinkages between heads of organisations are rare, with the further implication that coordination of objectives and strategies is uncommon and difficult to achieve.

Governance of international cinematography

This analysis has focussed mainly on the governance network surrounding cultural performance in Kosovo. However, it was also seen that the organisers of PriFilmFest made connections to networks of people such as Vanessa Redgrave and Eva Orner, and organisations such as European Audiovisual Entrepreneurs, and Berlinale Film Festival, who were active in various international film festivals and other aspects of international cinematography[306]. Such a network could also be described a s a governance network, although one that aspires to govern an area that is not territorially defined, nor is the network aligned to any particular state structure. Because of these characteristics such networks are likely to be missed by governance, policy and political analyses.

Viewing this network as a governance network, PriFilmFest organisers could be conceived of as engaging in multiple forums of network governance. In this view, PriFilmFest represents the outcome of negotiations across both spheres of governance. However, unlike case of 'parallel governance' (discussed briefly in 4.3.6) the two forums of governance of relevance here, although they contain intersecting actors, they operate principally across different dimensions and do not need to compete for legitimacy.

This insight demonstrates the importance of acknowledging the existence and effects of wider forms of governance than are visible with a narrow conception of governance. For instance it is likely that all case studies here involve certain negotiations over institutionalised practices of intellectual property rights, advertising and marketing standards, gender relations, and labour relations. These institutionalised practices involve differing levels of formality with respect to their governance. For example, it is conceivable that intellectual property rights is 'governed' by bodies mandated by international agreements, by domestic legislation and courts, and by generalised practices of adherence to such legislation. By contrast, it is conceivable that gender relations are 'governed' by societal and familial groups, internationally recognised human rights charters, domestic legislation and courts, and by activist groups.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate process of governance with respect to international cinematography or to these other spheres. Nonetheless, it would make interesting material for further study.

6.3.7 What does network governance approach tell us?

One of the main conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis in this section is that resourceful actors have greater power to mobilise certain narratives. This is seen principally in the contrast in influence between governance actors and volunteers. However, resourceful actors still have to negotiate how narratives come about, as was seen with the involvement of the Italian Embassy and the European Commission Liaison Office. This gives non-governance actors room to influence narrative construction.
It is also important to remember that resource endowments are not static. Kosovo the Young Europeans was an influential actor for a time but following the non-renewal of their contract, will have less influence as time goes by.

Secondly, the open nature of the governance network in question here and the existence of semi-formal relational ties has the implication that actors are not in a position to effectively coordinate objectives and strategies. Thus, there is a wide range of narratives forwarded by different actors. In such a context, PriFilmFest organisers have been empowered to choose

which governing actors to work with, pursuing working arrangements that are mutually satisfying.

In the third place, although the dispersed nature of the network means that there is less of a coherent shared framework of governance compared to what was seen in other case studies, there are a number of elements that can be identified. In particular it was seen that governance actors operate on the basis that their role in governance is as part of temporary development assistance, with a sustainable solution to be found in the market. This assistance is also seen as a means to help build links with the EU, to further the eventual goal of EU integration.
While the discourses underlying such goals and practices mirror to a certain extent those embodied in PriFilmFest, it has not been possible to gain insight into how this comes about.

6.4 Deliberative Governance

With some insights gained into the functioning of the Cultural Performance Governance Network, this section moves to examine selected elements of network decision-making. Similar to previous chapters the aim here is to identify and understand decision-making that resembles deliberation, with a view to supporting possibilities for deliberative governance.

As with 4.4 and 5.4, the emphasis is on selecting examples that might prove insightful. The findings that follow here are exploratory and are not generalisable.

6.4.1 Examples of Deliberation or its absence

PriFilmForum and Retrospectiva

These two programmes were introduced in the second year of the festival and are the result of collaborations between the festival organisers and funding bodies, the European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo and the Italian and French Embassies to Kosovo. In the two programmes the desires and narratives of both organisers and funders are embodied. For example, the French Retrospective allows Kosovo cinematographers to network with French producers, thus furthering the interests of organisers and volunteers, most of whom work as film-makers or in similar areas. At the same time, with the showcasing of French cinema, a France-themed party, and French cuisine, the Retrospectiva programme of 2011 clearly reflects the interests of the French Embassy in promoting positive images of its country.

There are two important factors facilitating deliberation in this case. The first factor concerns the nature of the festival itself. PriFilmFest is a relatively open discursive space. Unlike Christ the Saviour Cathedral, in Chapter 4, which embodies certain narratives to the exclusion of most others, PriFilmFest has the capacity to expand in programmes, in venues, and in duration, with space for narratives to co-exist. This is the case apart from the narrative of *Closed and Repressed*, which in any case is not forwarded by any of the actors involved. While there is observable tension between the narratives *Development and Hopeful* and *Professional and Ambitious*, they are both embodied in many aspects of the festival. The openness of the festival as a discursive space allows actors to cooperate rather than compete for discursive representations.

The second factor facilitating deliberation here is the willingness on part of the concerned actors to cooperate. In one sense, this condition again derives from the properties of Prishtina International Film Festival as a vehicle for narrative mobilisation. Unlike Christ the Saviour Cathedral and the Independence celebrations, there is no wider circumstances necessitating either the creation of PriFilmFest or the involvement of specific governance actors. In this sense, actors are free to choose to work with actors with whom they expect to be able to cooperate and deliberate. However, the resources possessed by ECLO and the embassies, and by the Ministry of Culture, Raiffeisen Bank and Kosovo the Europeans ensure a greater possibility that they are selected and included in decision-making.

[Recommendation: create and support new, non-exclusivist, public spaces.]

[Recommendation: encourage and facilitate links between actors who are willing to cooperate with each other]

Volunteering

As we have seen, PriFilmFest relied heavily on the work of volunteers, especially in the earlier years of the festival. The involvement of local film-makers, actors and directors has allowed a large number of people to access and intervene directly in the discursive shaping of the festival. In the absence of formal discussion and collective decision this is probably better described as agonistic struggle (Mouffe 2007) than deliberation as conceived by Fung and Wright (2001). However, I still consider this as something to be normatively supported as such actions represent the opportunity for relatively powerless actors (although clearly not as powerless as many of Kosovo's ethnic minorities) to discursively shape the public space.

Amongst the factors leading to such circumstances are the close-knit nature of Kosovo's cinematography workers, and the lack of large scale funding, which makes PriFilmFest dependent on such volunteers. As has been remarked by numerous interviewees Prishtina is "a small place and if you're from the same profession then you know all the people"[307]. Therefore in the context of the cultural performance community in Prishtina, the boundaries between personal and professional, formal and informal relations become blurred. Because of this, it is relatively easy to assemble large numbers of trusted volunteers to work at all levels of festival organising: "when Vjosa and Fatos (co-founders of PriFilmFest) needed help, everybody from the community came forward to help them"[308].

There is the perception amongst the central organisers that the festival cannot grow sustainably while continuing to depend on the goodwill of volunteers and so they pursue the strategy of attracting financial support at higher levels to substitute for voluntary support[309]. Additionally some voices have also advocated regulatory change offering tax-relief to small and medium sized enterprises who sponsor cultural events[310]. These strategies are likely to reduce the potential for volunteers to engage in discursive contestation, as professionalisation will most likely see more influence from resourceful business and sponsors.

One possible way to encourage sponsorship and increased resources devoted to culture, one that does not displace the role and influence of volunteers, is for moneys generated by sponsoring companies to be managed and allocated by voluntary associations. This is discussed further below in 6.4.2.

[Recommendation: encourage events organised by large numbers of volunteers]

[Recommendation: Provide tax-relief for small and medium sized enterprises wishing to sponsor cultural events and associations. Appoint voluntary association to manage, allocate and distribute funds generated through sponsorship.]

Few formal meetings of Governance Actors

As mentioned previously, the cultural governance network takes the form of a dispersed ad hoc collection of actors. While many organisations do have bilateral relations with one another, often with the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, relations are often between individuals

within organisations rather than strictly formal organisational ties between controlling personnel. Thus, this governance network has not to date, sat down at a meeting to discuss issues and coordinate strategies. Therefore there is little opportunity for deliberation among governing actors.

However, a possible corollary of this is that in the absence of an agreed-upon policy consensus among elite governing actors, there is greater opportunity for deliberation between lower-level actors and individual governance organisations, such as those resulting in PriFilmForum and Retrospectiva. Another possible benefit of this dispersed nature of the network is that is easier for new actors to join the network without having to 'sign up' to agreements made previously.

6.4.2 Excluded Narratives

Cultural Minority Narratives

Prishtina International Film Festival is conspicuous in its absence of narratives reflecting Serbian or other ethnic minority viewpoints. Kosovo Serbs are represented in only two of the narratives discussed here: *Balkan Multi-cultural* and *Close and Repressed*. In the case of *Balkan Multi-cultural*, Serbian Orthodox religious heritage is celebrated as are the multi-ethnic peoples of the Balkan region. However, in both of these aspects, little attention is given to the contemporary experience of living as a marginalised minority in an Independent Kosovo.

Within the *Closed and Repressed* narrative, recognition is given to the conflictual reality of different nations and ethnicities occupying a politically contested geographical region. However, there is a consensus among volunteers, organisers and governance actors to marginalise this narrative. Thus focussing on giving Kosovo a "name and a brand in the world" that "will not be political"[311] and asserting that "people are trying to move forward and not make those differences anymore"[312] has the effect of excluding these narratives.

Finally the *Dialogue* narrative does attempt to bring forward the stories and narratives of Kosovo's minority communities. However, without the cooperation of Belgrade or Kosovo Serbs in PriFilmForum, the efforts of the European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo to foster inclusion are somewhat short of successful. It must be recognised however, that the ECLO's Culture For All programme is more successful in this respect with other cultural events (for example the "North City Jazz and Blues Festival in the Serb town of Zvečan).

Europeaness is equated with EU

Open and Creative, Developing and Hopeful, and *European* are all forward looking, future-oriented narratives. They contrast the repression and lack of development associated with the country's communist past with the creativity and potential for economic integration and cultural integration that is expected to come with EU membership. In this way, the EU is constructed as a European institution reflecting European norms and values as something Kosovo people should aspire to.

However, it has been argued that such a view ignores the history of Albanians as one of the oldest nations in Europe[313]. This conception of Europe as the EU or Western Europe creates a standard of Europeaness and a normative goal of cultural development of assimilation and integration into the European Union. Countering this viewpoint, one volunteer has asserted that Kosovo is part of the Balkans and that the "Balkans is a part of Europe so I feel like we are in Europe as well"[314]. Although the existence of 'wider Europe' is acknowledged in the *European* narrative, it aspirations of joining the Union are emphasised. Following this goal, Kosovars are attempting to become more European but the message back from the EU is that "no, you're not ready yet, you're different"[315] meaning they have to change their way of being in order to become European.

As pointed out by one film-maker, "Every political party and political statement has this European Union integration like it's an inevitable thing [...] There isn't any officially or publically any question over whether we should or not. Maybe we shouldn't. There isn't a debate"[316]. While these views are voiced by some volunteers, they have to compete with governing actors, such as Kosovo the Young Europeans, ECLO and the French and Italian Embassies who prefer to construct a Europeaness that is synonymous with or aspires towards the EU. As such, discussion and debate representing different conceptions and narratives of Europeaness and the goals of a European cultural development are not reflected in Prishtina International Film Festival, or in governance more generally.

Diversity of narratives

It was described in 6.2 and 6.4.1 how the involvement of volunteers in the organising and staging of the festival constitutes an example of healthy, inclusive discursive contestation. It was also seen that in the years since the first edition of the festival, the central organisers have pursued a strategy of professionalisation: seeking financial and moral support from governance and sponsoring actors in the place of work done by volunteers. In a sense this strategy represents a pattern of gradual exclusion of discursive diversity in favour of managed narratives, managed in line with the preferences of the central organisers and the governing and sponsoring actors with whom they engage.

Closed and Repressed

All actors have tried to work against this narrative as much as possible.

Dialogue

Although forwarded by ECLO, there is a conspicuous lack of actors promoting this. In other cases, similar narratives such as *De-Nationalised Tolerance*, and *Dignified Pride* find much support amongst some powerful actors. This was found not to be the case in the Cultural Performance Governance Network.

6.4.3 Inclusion and Exclusion of Actors

A recurring theme in the analysis of deliberation is the issue of the possibilities for actors to be included in deliberation processes. I now turn attention to process of inclusion and exclusion.

Ethnic Minorities

The issue of Prishtina International Film Festival and of governance of cultural performance more generally is conspicuous in its lack of representation of Kosovo's ethnic minorities, particularly representatives of the Kosovo Serb community. At the level of PriFilmFest, this can partly be explained by two variables. In the first place, the festival, and film-industry more generally, relies on personal as much as professional networks. In this respect, inclusion and exclusion patterns work on the basis of (face value) self-selection. While peace-building targets of political inclusion of minorities has enjoyed moderate success, the same cannot be said for social inclusion[317]. Therefore the predominance of ethnic Albanians amongst PriFilmFest volunteers is not unexpected.

A second explanatory factor is the consensus on marginalising the *Closed and Repressed* narrative. Amongst the organisers there was a conscious understanding of the potential for the festival to be used as a vehicle for narrative change: "We see PriFilmFest as a forum which will help for the wold to see Kosovo differently. Not just in political terms but with cultural terms"[318]. They used the festival then to move narratives away from those of war and conflict (as in *Closed and Repressed*) to the narratives of *Open and Creative, Developing and Hopeful,* and *Balkan Multi-cultural*: "Kosovo has been politicised and has been in the news for so many years, about political issues, about multi-ethnicity, about various problems, about being a new country, not being recognised. […] So we feel that the best ambassador for a country, and especially a young country like Kosovo, is through culture, through film, though cinematography. […] During the seven days of the festival […] we organise small excursions around Kosovo where we show them various heritage, tradition, food, touristic places. So we promote Kosovo from a different view"[319].

Similarly, after being asked about the lack of Serb representation in the festival, another organiser responded, "Before the war, lot of talk about Serbs, Albanians and all that, a lot of talk about that. After the war things have changed a little bit, because people are trying to move forward and not make these differences anymore. People are sick of fighting, sick of conflicts"[320].

Thus there appears to be an implicit association between mentions of ethnic difference and politicisation and conflict. Interestingly the narrative of *Balkan Multi-Cultural* does not carry with it the same clash of ideas. It appears that the celebration of regional diversity and mixed historical heritage is not automatically associated with conflict. Thus the showcasing of Orthodox monasteries is valued for its cultural relevance rather than ethnic or national associations. Put another way, *multi-culturalism* focusses on geographical and historical dimensions, of which the present day Kosovo *region* is only one part. By contrast, *multi-ethnicity* focusses on political dimensions, with the Kosovo *state* as the location of power struggle between different ethnic groups.

At governance level, there is a similar absence of organisations representing Kosovo's ethnic minorities. This is probably due in large part to the dispersed and ad hoc nature of the network. The situation is such that any organisation who can and wishes to get involved in influencing direction of development of Kosovo's cultural performance sector may do so. The absence of organisations representing minority groups is therefore probably an issue of resources rather

than wilful exclusion (notwithstanding the possibility of inequality of resources being an outcome of wilful exclusion).

Some of the governing actors, while not explicitly representing excluded groups, with their resources try to support initiatives which promote social inclusion of ethnic minorities. ECLO are noteworthy in this respect. For instance, among the expected results of the Culture For All programme are the promotion of new "inter-ethnic cultural events" and of "cultural activities implemented for vulnerable groups in remote areas in Kosovo"[321]. A result of this objective can be seen in the *Dialogue* narrative, evident in the PriFilmForum programme. The forum saw delegates from cinematographers from many countries in the region, including Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro[322]. Significantly, although an invitation was sent to a Serbian delegation from Belgrade in 2010, they declined to attend[323]. This suggests that inclusion is much more complicated than simply formally inviting minority groups to participate.

Volunteers

PriFilmFest is built upon the voluntary work and commitment of Kosovo's film-makers, actors, and directors. While the festival itself allowed such people much space to articulate narratives and visions, these people are not represented at governance level (apart from in the traditional liberal-democratic sense in which the Ministry of Culture is controlled by an elected representative of the people at large). Similar to the case of exclusion of ethnic minorities this has probably more to do with resources than wilful exclusion.

Events such as PriFilmFest, SKENA UP, and Dokufest show a willingness and capacity on the part of Kosovo's cinematographic community to organise effectively. However the direction of such organising has not (yet?) shifted from event and initiative organising to governance or policy making. Some volunteers have articulated desires to see regulatory change[324] reflecting a will on the part of some to effect change at governance level. The barriers to entry into governance networks are therefore more likely to be with resources.

Inclusive Governance Network

As argued previously, the absence of centralised consensus of the governance network allows new actors to be included. Thus in the years since independence a large number of actors have appeared, without needing conform to agreements made previously by the established network. Barriers to inclusion appear to be based on resources rather than of direct political exclusion (of course inequality of resources can be an outcome of political exclusion.

<u>Recommendation for inclusion of ethnic minority groups in Governance network</u>

One method to incentivise inclusion of Serb groups and other ethnic minorities, and of film-making community, would be for the funding of organisations such as the ECLO, various embassies, the Ministry of Culture, and of Raiffeisen Bank to be managed by organised bodies comprised of members of the respective communities. This would equip these excluded groups with resources, enabling them to enter deliberative processes such as those enjoyed by ECLO and the French and Italian Embassies, described in 6.4.1.

A substantial number of actors advocate institutional change, providing tax-relief to private companies who sponsor cultural events and initiatives. An adaptation of these proposals is recommended. Tax-relief should be granted to firms who donate to recognised, representative associations of ethnic minority groups and from the cinematographic community, money for use in supporting cultural events and initiatives. Funds generated in this way will be managed and allocated to the cultural activities of the choice of the associations.

The following conditions must be applied:

1. Representative bodies must be democratically controlled by, and accountable to, members of the respective ethnic or sectoral communities.
2. Membership of representative bodies is voluntary and must be open to all members of each community, with the exception of members of parliament.
3. Members of the representative bodies may not run for office, to avoid bodies being controlled by party politics.
4. Companies will be provided tax-relief when they donate monies to such representative bodies, for the purposes of supporting cultural activities.
5. Decision-making on the use of these moneys will rest solely with the democratic decision-making of the representative bodies, with the exception that moneys must be transferred to organisers of specific cultural events and activities, and must not be spent on the body's own internal functioning.
6. Tax relief may not be provided to companies sponsoring events directly.

Chapter 7: Case Studies in Comparison

This chapter deals with the important insights from the preceding three case study chapters. Insights and conclusions from the three cases are compared with each other to see if there is any extra insight to be gained and conclusions to be derived.

This chapter is structured according to the categories of points for comparison. It begins with a discussion of the urban narratives that were dealt with in each of the three cases. Secondly, some of the characteristics of governance networks are compared, before thirdly comparing various insights into specific characteristics of network governance in Kosovo. Fourth, this chapter will look at contrasting examples of how network governance affected narrative mobilisation in the three case studies, before finally dealing with different mechanisms and possibilities for deliberative governance that were seen.

7.1 Urban Narratives

Marginalised Narratives

It was seen that each case study had an example of one narrative that was marginalised to a greater or lesser extent by almost all of the actors involved (*Milošević Regime, Kosovar/Albanian Victory,* and *Closed and Repressed* in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, respectively). It was also the case that this marginalised narrative was that that most closely depicted extreme elements of the conflict. This was very obviously seen in the case studies of Newborn and of PriFilmFest, with the corresponding narratives of *Kosovar/Albanian Victory* and *Closed and Repressed*, respectively. In the former case, an explicit attempt was made by the 'central actors' to minimise this narrative as much as possible. By contrast, in the latter case, such efforts were much more implicit; *Closed and Repressed* was constructed as an 'old' narrative in the place of which other 'new' narratives now have the possibility to develop.

A contrasting scenario is evident in the case study of Christ the Saviour Cathedral. In this case, two narratives very closely resemble discourses of extreme conflict: *Milošević Regime* and *Unfinished Serb Victory.* In the years since 2004 there emerged groups of actors who tried to marginalise these two narratives, similarly to what was discussed above. However, whereas in the above cases these actors acknowledged the validity of the stories contained within the narratives (the independence of Kosovo *was* a demand of some UÇK fighters; Kosovo society *did* suffer repression during the years of conflict and Yugoslav communism), the actors, involved in Serbian Orthodox heritage, particularly governance actors, disputed the underlying premise of narratives that constructed the building of Orthodox Churches as part of Slobodan Milošević's 'Serbianisation' of Kosovo. The majority of the counter-narratives mobilised rejected the underlying premise of these two initial narratives (i.e. *De-Politicised Practicality* asserted that the Cathedral was built for practical reasons, not for political ones, while *De-Nationalised*

Tolerance saw the building as primarily a religious space, separate from any nationalist ideology).

Liberal Narratives

It was also seen in each case study that there existed one or more 'liberal' narratives which contained moderate perspectives of the conflict and that professed broadly liberal values. The narratives I refer to are *De-Nationalised Tolerance, Dignified Pride,* and *Dialogue* from case studies 1, 2 and 3 respectively. While the first and last emphasise a valuing of inter-ethnic tolerance, respect and communication, *Dignified Pride* places importance on adherence to due process.

These three examples are interesting in that they illustrate differing forms of support from large, resourceful (often international) actors. In the first case study, the evidence suggests that *De-Nationalised Tolerance* was introduced principally by international actors such as Council of Europe, International Civilian Office, EUSR, and possibly UNMIK. From there it was adopted by most other relevant actors. *Dignified Pride* was constructed amongst an 'inner circle' of a two-tiered network that involved the Office of the Prime Minister as the most central actors. This 'inner circle' also had intersections with many other governance networks. Despite this, these actors had to negotiate with an 'outer' actor (Ogilvy|Karrota) which was successful in bringing other narratives into the Independence Day Celebrations.

In contrast to these two examples, *Dialogue* was forwarded by the European Commission Liaison Office and enjoyed little support amongst other actors (at least in the case study which was researched here). Consequently, this narrative was not prominently embodied in aspects of the Prishtina International Film Festival that ECLO were not directly involved in.

Multiple Cleavages

These three case studies are interesting in that each of them display some narratives that emphasise other cleavages besides the dominant ethno-national cleavage. In Chapter 6, considerable tension was observed between the narratives *Developing and Hopeful* and *Professional and Ambitious.* Emerging from this tension a cleavage can be observed between the interests of 'grassroots' level film-makers, actors, and directors on the one hand, and those of a professionalising elite on the other. The prominence of the tension between these two narratives, compared to an almost unanimous silence on narratives representing an Albanian/Serb dichotomy suggests that this cleavage is far more important to the actors concerned here than the traditional ethno-national one. That is not to say however that we can expect this tension to escalate to violent conflict.

In the case of the Independence Day Celebrations, a conflicting set of values can be observed in the interaction between the two narratives, *Free Expression* and *Betrayal*. Contained within both are values of freedom of expression and of autonomy, which have historically been denied by various forms of state-authority but are now to be guaranteed by a newly Independent Republic. As time went by, some of the proponents of *Free Expression* (notably Ogilvy|Karrota) began to act according to the *Betrayal* narrative, which is built upon a frustration with those who act on behalf of the republic for failing to guarantee the freedoms inherent in *Free Expression*. Thus a cleavage can be observed between actors forwarding broadly liberal or

libertarian values on the one hand, and those abusing centralised state power or internationally sanctioned executive authority on the other.

This cleavage represents a greater potential as a mobilising discourse than that contained in the tension between *Professional and Ambitious* and *Developing and Hopeful*, discussed above. The narrative of *Betrayal* finds a visible and vocal advocate in the Vetëvendosje movement, which has been described as containing an unusual mixture of young, militant but non-violent activists and people more closely associated with the most vocal forms of Albanian nationalism[325]. Therefore it is possible that this cleavage could be used as a mobilising discourse for violent or non-violent action. However it is not possible to elaborate on such possibilities from the research conducted here. That said, this cleavage should be acknowledged and engaged with deliberatively so as potential conflict can be resolved through reasoned discussion rather than through more militant means.

A less obvious example can be taken from Chapter 4 in the narrative *De-Nationalised Tolerance*. Through its separation of religious objects and sites from the nationalist ideologies with which they were once associated, this narrative subtly constructs a group of (modern and civilised?) people who are separated from (conservative and barbaric?) proponents of Serb or Albanian nationalism, who attempt to incorporate religions in to their ideology. Thus a cleavage is created between a modernising, secularising majority and a narrow but influential minority who have the capacity to mobilise their discourses through attacks on, especially Serbian Orthodox, religious sites and heritage.

It is the assumed cleavage underlying this narrative that is used to legitimate the use of force and emergency powers in protecting heritage sites deemed vulnerable to attack. It could also be argued that this cleavage is what ultimately mobilised the intervention of the international community in 1999. However, this is something beyond the scope of this thesis to argue. Suffice it to say here that the cleavage contained in this narrative has been and continues to be a mobilising discourse for the use of force, even if this use of force is justified as primarily for reasons of stability.

It is important to note that the insights discussed here are based on research that was carried out in Prishtina, involving majority Albanian and international governance actors, and a largely ethnic Albanian population. It is reasonable to expect that ethno-national cleavages would receive greater emphases in studies conducted in areas in which ethnic differences are greater.

Urban Narratives: Conclusion

Comparing urban narratives from the three case studies in this way demonstrates that there are numerous ways in which different actors define the period of war and post-war recovery. Moreover, it can be seen that the narratives held by actors are not static but become mobilised to the public in a negotiated context. Governance actors show a preference and an ability to mobilise narratives I have characterised as 'liberal' and to marginalise narratives displaying 'extreme' sentiments. This is quite interesting, in that outside of Kosovo, particularly in the West, the conflict is generally defined as ethno-national and/or religious. This suggests that the success of governance actors in disseminating liberal narratives that minimise the ethno-national dimension does not necessarily mean that they are interpreted the same way, at least outside of Kosovo.

Furthermore, it was seen that all three cases illustrate the possibility for the actors to conceive of conflict along dimensions that do not mirror the ethno-national cleavage. All three of these extra cleavages represent differing propensities towards violent conflict. This has two important implications. First, current conflict resolution strategies that focus on creating structures that ensure the interests of Albanians and Serbs (and other minorities) are represented (for example through ensuring protection of Serb Cultural Heritage or through inter-ethnic cultural workshops) may have an incomplete scope if they ignore the other cleavages seen in these case studies.

Secondly, supporting certain 'liberal' narratives as a tactic of overcoming conflict can itself aggravate conflict. For example, in the planning of the Independence Day Celebrations, considerable effort was made to overcome the Serb/Albanian dimension to the conflict through marginalising *Kosovar/Albanian Victory* and mobilising the counter-narrative of *Dignified Pride.* However, the non-deliberative methods of pursuing this strategy have eventually lead to the emergence of the *Betrayal* narrative. The strategies used to mobilise some conflicting narratives over others, principally through non-deliberative means, demonstrates that a democratic resolution of such conflicts requires more than just getting formal structures right. In short, it underlines the need for deliberative network governance.

7.2 Governance Network Characteristics

What follows is a brief comparison of the differences in network structures that were seen in the three case studies

Verticality

The Independence Celebrations network in Chapter 5 was seen to have an unambiguous centre of gravity. The network could be analytically divided into an 'inner circle' with the Office of the Prime Minister at the central hub along with the Kosovo Unity Team. This inner circle was connected through spokes to an 'outer circle' comprising Ogilvy|Karrota, B2 PR and Media Solutions, and Mr. Ibrahimi.

The Cultural Heritage Governance Network could be said to operate "in the shadow of hierarchy" (Scharpf 1994: 41; cited in Sørensen & Torfing 2005). The ICO, EUSR, and GLO are the most central actors, yet they have described themselves as either neutral or as supervisory in searching for agreement between the sides. In this sense, the network could be described as having two foci: one surrounding the MOC, the other surrounding the SOC, with the facilitating actors functioning as a bridge between the two.

In contrast to the above examples, the Cultural Performance Governance Network seen in Chapter 6 is relatively horizontal, with no 'centre' so to speak. If there is a centre, it most likely surrounds the Ministry of Culture.

Openness

Linked to the horizontality of the Cultural Performance Governance Network is its relatively inclusive property. It appears from the data and analysis in Chapter 6, that actors who wish to begin to sponsor and influence the direction of cultural performance in Kosovo are relatively free to do so, without the need to be admitted into an established network or to 'sign up' to any pre-arranged agreements.

By contrast the Independence Celebrations network is very closed, with a limited number of actors being identified for inclusion, and strict conditions established for their entrance into governance.

Similarly, the Cultural Heritage Governance Network was seen to be closed, but with extra actors becoming involved as and when necessary.

Necessity

The networks examined in Chapters 4 and 5 were formed out of necessity. Both networks were formed in response to or in anticipation of events. Actors were then included because of resources they possessed that were essential for the network. For example, the Cultural heritage Governance Network was formed as a response to concern over the condition of various Serbian Orthodox sites and in response to the conditions in the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. The SOC were involved due to their position as owners of Serbian Orthodox religious buildings. The MOC were included as state officials, exercising state- and democratic legitimacy, while the EUSR and GLO as facilitators were needed to allow the principal parties to communicate with each other. Finally, the ICO, like the CoE and UNMIK in other networks, had a stake and a role as internationally mandated 'supervisors' of the process.

The Independence Celebrations Network was formed by the Office of the Prime Minister (again exercising state and democratic legitimacy) in anticipation of the Declaration of Independence and a possible de-stabilising fallout. Additional actors were included on the basis of communications expertise, and other contributions that could add to the celebrations.

By contrast, the Cultural Performance Governance Network was seen to be voluntary. Governance actors participate in network because they choose to do so, not because they are in possession of resources that are needed by the network (with the partial exception of the Ministry of Culture). Additionally, there is no single event that can be said to necessitate the formation of the network.

Longevity

The Independence Celebrations Network can be characterised as a single issue network. The network only functioned for between a week and two weeks. It then quickly fragmented.

As seen in Chapter 4 the RIC mechanism has had a defined task of reconstructing and/or restoring religious sites that were damaged in the violence in 2004. At the time of research, the network was coming to the end of its task and actors were in discussion as whether to continue in an amended format.

On the other hand, the other network discussed in Chapter 4 can be said to be on-going, without a clearly defined task that can come to an end. It is possible that at some point in time the need for supervisors and mediators will be overcome. The network might then transform to a smaller arrangement of actors.

The Cultural Performance Governance Network can also be described as on-going, with no central task that needs to be completed. However, unlike the Cultural Heritage Governance Network described above, it is difficult to identify a 'founding moment' of this network.

Governance Network Characteristics: Conclusion

This comparison has been included principally to demonstrate (some of) the different forms of networks that are currently being practised in Kosovo. This on its own is not very enlightening, as it corresponds to what has been identified in other works (see for example Sørensen & Torfing (2009)).

In relation to possibilities for deliberation, a few things can be mentioned. In the first place, it was seen in the deliberative governance sections of the case study chapters how open and non-necessitated networks can offer more potential for deliberation. For example, the Cultural Performance Governance Network was relatively open and was not formed out of necessity. By contrast, the Independence Celebrations Network was closed and formed in anticipation of an event. It was seen that the former governance network offered more possibilities for deliberation than the latter. This occurred due to lower levels of entry barriers and conditions, and due to the possibility for actors to select who they wish to work deliberatively and cooperatively with.

Another factor worth mentioning here is the possibility for networks leaning towards verticality to be influenced by non-deliberative methods of certain actors. This has occurred through central actors exerting authoritative control, and mediating communication between actors. This can again be seen by comparing the (horizontal) Cultural Performance Governance Network with the (more vertical) Independence Celebrations Network or the Cultural Heritage Governance Network.

7.3 Themes of Network Governance in Kosovo

Throughout this analysis certain key insights about how network governance functions in Kosovo in a distinct way from how it is practiced in Western Europe. Here some of the most prominent insights are analysed.

Securitisation

The concept of 'securitisation' developed by the 'Copenhagen School' is perhaps best illustrated in Chapter 5 (Buzan et al 1998). According to this concept, a *referent object* (in this case the viability of an Independent Republic of Kosovo and/or the stability of the Balkan region) is constructed by a *securitising actor* (in this case the office of the Prime Minister and possibly

others) as being *existentially threatened* (by the Declaration of Independence) which then moves the issue from the political arena into the security arena, legitimising the use of *emergency measures* (strict control over planning of celebrations) (ibid; Laustsen & Wæver 2000). Thus the issue was brought from 'normal politics' of governance through networks with open tenders and high degrees of autonomy, onto the security agenda, involving network governance in which strong control by one set of actors was legitimised.

What happened in Chapter 4 is in many ways the reverse of this. In the initial years after NATO intervention, considerable control and authority was exercised by UNMIK. This was especially the case for the protection of Serbian Orthodox heritage. In the years since intervention, a gradual transferal of power was made, first to the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and later to the Government of the Independent Republic of Kosovo, essentially moving issues from being decided by 'emergency powers' to normal politics. The role of international organisations that are perceived as neutral can be seen as helping to create structural arrangements of 'normal governance' in which such issues can be dealt with.

In contrast to the above examples, Chapter 6 contained barely any elements of securitisation as described here. In the cultural performance sector, there is nothing which is constructed as *existentially threatened*, and as a result, most issues under consideration in my case study were dealt with in what is understood by actors to be the standard procedure of network governance.

Cultural Capital

One interesting element to this research was the presence of many young, creative, English-speaking actors originally from Kosovo but who have travelled, often to the United Kingdom or to the United States. These characteristics appeared to be of value to the governance networks discussed in the Independence Celebrations Network and in the Cultural Performance Governance Network, with evidence suggesting importance in facilitating links between domestic and international organisations, and a valuation of public relations knowledge and artistic creativity. The presence of such people and valuation of these attributes and characteristics amongst governance networks that has been evidenced is likely to have strong implications for the future direction of Kosovo's development.

By contrast, the case of Serbian Orthodox heritage showed very little presence of actors with such cultural capital. One possible reason for this could be that religious heritage is seen as more of a traditional conflict related issue, which necessitates the involvement of religious actors and international experts on cultural heritage. If that is the case, then there is an important lesson for conflict studies to be drawn from this: too strong a focus on issues that are strongly related to traditional understandings of conflict can lead to such actors, and the implications that such cultural capital will have on the future direction of Kosovo, being ignored.

Trust and social relations

The importance of trust amongst network actors has been a recurring theme throughout the investigation of the three case studies. In the case of the Independence Celebrations Network, established social and professional relations were essential in the entry of two key actors into governance circles. On the other hand, it was seen that a breakdown in trust between network actors was what primarily lead to a rapid fragmentation of the network after Independence.

Again, the reverse happens with the case of Christ the Saviour Cathedral. For many years there is no trust or relations between the key actors, the Serbian Orthodox Church and governmental bodies. From this context, an enormous amount of energy and resources is devoted to trying to establish conditions in which certain, largely technical, relations can be developed between representatives of the SOC and of the Ministry of Culture. Thus, after limited trusting relations are established, networks can be formed and sustained.

Similar but milder phenomena can be observed in the case study of PriFilmFest. With a much less 'securitised' situation, and with a largely voluntarily-entered-into network, trust and agreement are not as contentious. Nonetheless, it can be seen that where agreements have been reached it is between organisations that have good relations with one another. Additionally, with such a dispersed governance network, the establishment and maintenance of formal relations between organisations who wish to work together depend to an extent on agreeable contact persons.

Therefore in all three cases, it was seen how important trust and social relations are to facilitate collective decisions and how in the absence of such circumstances, collective decision-making becomes almost impossible.

Representation of ethnic minorities; little dialogue across ethnic cleavages

A common reason given for the expansion of governance from state institutions to networks is that this was a means to include relevant stakeholders (see for example Sørensen & Torfing's discussion of three broad traditions in network governance in Europe (2009); also see also Sørensen & Torfing's discussion of associative democracy theorists (2005)). It is particularly interesting then to look at the involvement of ethnic minorities in these case studies. In two cases (Chapter 4 and 5) Serb groups have been identified as major stakeholders. Considerable effort is made to include the Serbian Orthodox Church in governance of Serb religious and cultural heritage. This runs into multiple difficulties, relating to any dialogue with organisations representing or endorsing a sovereign Republic of Kosovo. These difficulties can only be overcome with the presence of neutral organisations acting according to UNSC Res 1244.

Kosovo Serbs are also identified as key stakeholders in the planning of the Independence Day Celebrations and in the communication of the Ahtisaari Plan. They are recognised as stakeholder to the extent that it could be argued that the entire governance network is formed around the need to deal with the concerns of Serbs. Despite this recognition however, no attempt is made to include representatives of such groups in networks of decision-making. The reasons for this have been dealt with in Chapter 5. It is a particularly interesting phenomenon that a network would be formed due to the possible concerns of a stakeholder, and yet no effort is made to include that stakeholder in that network.

In contrast to the two examples there is no representation of minority groups in the Cultural Performance Governance Network. Furthermore, apart from some mentions, (notably in the ECLO), Kosovo's ethnic minorities are not even recognised as stakeholders.

Resources

Throughout this analysis it has become clear that essential to the functioning of governance networks is the use of material or immaterial resources possessed by different actors (verifying the theoretical work of Sørensen & Torfing (2005)). What this thesis contributes is a picture of some of the possible forms immaterial resources can take. In Chapter 4, some of the most important resources were status-neutrality, internationally-derived mandates, electoral mandates, and state legitimacy. These were seen as important due to particular constructions of problems and solutions that saw the lack of dialogue between the Serbian Orthodox Church on the one hand and the government of Kosovo on the other (see 4.1).

Some of these resources were also seen to be of importance in Chapter 5, namely, an electoral mandate, possessed by the Office of the Prime Minister and the Kosovo Unity Team. Added to this is the use of trust, social, and political capital, and of communications and creative expertise. In some ways this mirrors the framework for governance described in 5.3.4. This working framework saw public relations expertise as of value and due to the security situation there was a strong need for trusted partners. Additionally the entrance of Ogilvy|Karrota demonstrated the need for social connections in order to reach political actors. Finally, the breakdown of the network is further evidence of the importance of trusting social relations between actors.

Trust and social relations appear to have played a role in the Cultural Performance Governance Network although the importance is not emphasised as much as in Chapter 5. Rather, the most recognisable form of resources in Chapter 6 was the provision of promotional space. Promotional space was often traded for financial support or moral support, in some ways resembling a 'marketplace of discourses'.

This latter point illustrates the importance of two other forms of resources: moral authority, and financial capital. The first element, used in particular by the Ministry of Culture, demonstrates a certain cultural capital (although quite different from that possessed by young, travelled actors discussed elsewhere) that can help promote certain promotional spaces. With respect to the second element, the use of financial capital should not be too surprising to an outside reader. However when considering the complexity of network dynamics in Chapters 4 and 5, it is worth remembering that some things in Kosovo governance do come down to money.

7.4 Network Governance and Narrative Mobilisation

Each case study has shown different ways in which emerging forms of governance through networks influences production and dissemination of narratives in the urban landscape of Prishtina. Some of the most interesting elements of the analyses of network governance are compared here.

Resourceful Actors

It was seen how larger resourceful actors were able to influence governance processes to bring about certain solutions. For example, the Ministry of Culture, Kosovo the Young Europeans, the European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo, and the Italian and French Embassies were relatively successful in including their preferred narratives in PriFilmFest. This occurred largely

through different negotiating practices. However, to be in a negotiation position, these actors used their positions as prominent sponsors and funders of cultural event in Prishtina.

In the case of the Independence Day Celebrations, the most resourceful actor, the Office of the Prime Minister (and possibly also the Kosovo Unity Team, which included the Prime Minister as a member) used resources in a different way. It was mostly through network positioning that this actor exercised most control over narrative mobilisation by this governance network. This was done in two ways, through creating conditions for the entry of actors into the network and for maintaining a central coordinating role throughout the course of the network. Thus the Office was successful in ensuring a prominent representation of the narrative *Dignified Pride* and the marginalisation of the narrative *Kosovar/Albanian Victory.*

Similarly, it was seen that resourceful actors such as Council of Europe and the international Civilian Office have had considerable influence over narrative contestation, giving prominence to the narratives *Multi-Cultural City* and *De-Nationalised Tolerance.* In this case, the resources used combined elements of financial resources, network position, and official positions in relation to international agreements, namely UNSC Res 1244 and the Ahtisaari Plan.

This latter element has been utilised in two ways. In the first place, the Council of Europe has reported that their position under UNSC Res 1244, but not under Ahtisaari, has allowed them to be acceptable to both the Serbian Orthodox Church and governmental bodies of the Republic of Kosovo (similar to the European Union Special Representative and the Greek Liaison Office), and hence to act as a neutral chair in meetings of the Reconstruction Implementation Commission. On the other hand, the ICO have derived a supervisory position, mandated by the Ahtisaari Plan, in overseeing the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan by the Kosovo Government.

Thus a general tendency was observed that resourceful actors do have more potential to shape governance processes in ways that result in the mobilisation of their preferred narratives. However, despite this, such actors at all times needed to negotiate such outcomes with other actors in the network. I now turn to this point.

Room for Actors to Negotiate Narrative Constructions

Two very clear examples of negotiated processes involving actors of different resource levels were seen in the case study of PriFilmFest. In the first place, it was seen that PriFilmFest organisers successfully constructed two programmes in the second edition of the festival that embodied the narrative preferences themselves and of governance actors with whom they were negotiating. These examples are of the PriFilmForum and Retrospectiva, supported by ECLO and the Italian Embassy, respectively.

Another example from the same case study is that of the involvement of volunteers in the running and staging of the festival. In Chapter 6 it was argued that such volunteers bring quite a wide variety of narratives into the festival. This is an example of successful negotiation of volunteers with central organisers, with the latter clearly the more resourceful party.

The construction of Newborn also provides a similar illustration of the room for actors to negotiate narrative constructions. Although the process of planning the Independence Day celebrations was very tightly controlled by the Office of the Prime Minister, the public relations

company Ogilvy|Karrota managed to create the room for other narratives, notably *Free Expression* and *Innocence and Promise,* to be included in the event.

From the *decision-making rounds* analysis of Chapter 4 it can be seen that the cathedral in question was frequently the object upon which actors tried to unilaterally impose their preferred narratives (see 4.1, 4.2.2). This is the case with violent groups who tried to vandalise and demolish the building, with UNMIK who forcefully prevented any such action for a number of years, and, if the *Milošević Regime* narrative is to believed, with the original constructers of the building.

The years since 2004 can be interpreted as attempts to integrate such actors into a common forum of decision-making. Whether this ultimately increases the power of resourceful actors or distributes power towards less prominent actors is unclear. For now it is safest to say that it does both: in transferring the 'site' and means of decision-making into networked negotiations, the format of discursive contestation exercised by both resourceful and less resourceful actors is changing, bringing with it different forms of valued resources (e.g. neutrality in place of executive powers) and new methods of negotiation (discussion in place of direct, unilateral action).

However, despite this room for negotiation, it is important to observe that the capacity to sustain influence on governance is limited. To go back to the examples discussed above, although Ogilvy|Karrota enjoyed success in having the Newborn monument included in celebrations, the network ceased to exist within a short space of time and plans to have the monument repainted were not realised, with the implication that the narratives embodied in this monument went into decline.

Similarly, although volunteers with PriFilmFest had significant influence on the discursive content of the festival in the first year, it was noted that there are explicit attempts by organisers to professionalise and become independent of such volunteers. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the existence of social, professional, or semi-formal relations was of importance for these two groups of actors in initially gaining access to arenas of discursive contestation. In the first place, Ogilvy|Karrota has reported that project proposals of the Newborn monument reached the Office of the Prime Minister through friends with connections. The volunteers for Prishtina International Film Festival were recruited by and large from the film-making scene in Prishtina which has been described as a closely-knit network.

Institutional Framework of Governance

The institutional frameworks of governance as conceived by Sørensen & Torfing (2005) have had an influence on narrative mobilisation in different ways. In Chapter 4 such a framework was seen to provide discursive assumptions which, through regulative procedures translated into discursive practice and outcomes.

Analysing governance frameworks was also quite illuminating in Chapter 5. In a similar way to Chapter 4, the framework provided shared discourse at the imaginary level and also a means to operationalise these discourses through shared regulative and normative aspects. Most interestingly though, the case of Ogilvy|Karrota demonstrated how a differing understanding of governance lead to different narratives being mobilised. Agreement reached between

Ogilvy|Karrota and the Office of the Prime Minister involved not only negotiations at a narrative level, but also negotiations over how governance was to proceed.

In Chapter 6, an analysis of working frameworks of governance was less illuminating. Although the analysis showed how discursive tensions in PriFilmFest mirrored tensions in the governance framework, it was not clear how this came about.

Nevertheless, these examples do show the added-value that in-depth analysis into governance networks can bring. The cases demonstrate certain influences on narrative mobilisation that cannot be seen by focussing on the actions of actors alone.

Evolution and overlaps of networks

Many important actors in the Cultural Heritage Governance Network are involved in other networks. For instance the Ministry of Culture and the Serbian Orthodox Church are both represented at RIC. Similarly, the ICO liaises with governmental bodies such as the Ministry of Culture on many other issues, and has regular contact with the office of the EUSR (which at the time of research, June 2011 comprised the same offices, headed by the dame individual).

Such involvement has two implications. In the first place it facilitates trust building between actors. A second implication is that there is no one site of decision-making in which official narratives are decided upon. As is clear from rounds analysis of Chapter 4, changes in the narrative preferences of actors has come about gradually through interaction with other actors in a variety of arenas.

Similarly to Chapter 4, in Chapter 5 the Kosovo Unity Team, Prime Minister, and B2 PR & Media Solutions were involved in both the Package Proposal Promotion Network and the Independence Celebrations Network (and possibly others). It was found in the analysis in that chapter that the cooperation between the Office of the Prime Minister and B2 PR and Media Solutions in the former network was influential in standardising an agreed set of narratives to be used in the latter network. It is also possible that some of the narratives advocated by the Prime Minister and the Kosovo Unity Team could have had their origins in previous overlapping and intersecting networks.

It was further seen that after the Independence Celebrations Network fragmented, Ogilvy|Karrota and B2 PR and Media Solutions continued to try to mobilise their preferred narratives (even though some of these preferences might have changed in the meantime) in subsequent networks in which they became involved. The case of Ogilvy|Karrota's Fisnik Ismaili is especially interesting here. After a partially unsuccessful time with planning the Independence celebrations, Mr. Ismaili began to favour the narrative of *Betrayal* over *Free Expression* and became involved in networks seeking to mobilise the *Betrayal* narrative.

What this comparison illustrates is that rather than being decided upon in one identifiable meeting, narrative preferences are continuously negotiated across a spectrum of networks. As such, research into public choice and influence such as this can only offer an small, although nonetheless insightful, picture of public governance.

7.5 Deliberative Governance

Security and executive powers

As mentioned above in 7.3, the cases studies suggest that 'securitisation' as defined by Buzan *et al* is a prominent feature of network governance in Kosovo (1998). The securitisation of issues is particularly evident in the case studies of Christ the Saviour Cathedral and of the planning of the celebrations for the declaration of Independence. The securitisation of issues granted UNMIK executive powers, which could be used to overrule any actions by other parties it deemed to be a threat to stability. The possession of such powers makes deliberative governance particularly difficult. The ICO currently has the capacity to exercise some such executive powers although the office is in the process of winding down operations.

Due to the securitisation of the Declaration of Independence, the Office of the Prime Minister and the Kosovo Unity Team exercised a commanding position within the networks discussed in Chapter 5. In contrast to the above example, this position did not carry with it any executive powers. Rather the network position was used to create conditions for the entry of new actors into the governance network and in acting as a liaison between different 'outer-actors'.

In contrast to the above two examples, PriFilmFest and the Cultural Performance Governance network does not show evidence of deliberative decision-making being suspended due to a security threat.

As argued in Chapter 5, security levels in Kosovo have improved and so the same levels of 'emergency measures' are no longer justified. It is recommended that periodical security-deliberation audits be carried out, and emergency executive powers be reduced in line with the improving security situation. This recommendation is returned to in Chapter 8.

Deliberation between trusting actors

Trust is essential in all cases where deliberation has successfully taken place. The best example of this is probably the Reconstruction Implementation Commission. Success in getting 'both sides' to agree to engage in constructive dialogue has been attributed to the technical nature of RIC work, its legitimacy under UNSC Res 1244, and the presence of a status-neutral body as chair of the process (Council of Europe), that governmental bodies in Prishtina and Belgrade and the Serbian Orthodox church can trust[326].

Similarly, it was seen that the EUSR and Greek Liaison Office were able to act as mediators between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Ministry of Culture precisely because their mission in Kosovo was defined under UNSC Res 1244, and did not officially recognise the Independence of Kosovo. The presence of these actors was essential in arriving at a solution that all parties were agreeable to.

However, from Chapter 5 we can see that deliberation becomes impossible when trust between parties breaks down. This happened between the Office of the Prime Minister and Ogilvy|Karrota, leading to a situation where neither party could cooperate with the other over what was to be done with the Newborn monument over the years since the Declaration of Independence.

In contrast to the examples above, the case study of PriFilmFest provides illustrations of how two parties who do trust each other can come together and cooperate. The organising board of PriFilmFest successfully negotiated programmes with external funders (ECLO & Italian Embassy) that suited both organisers and funders. While this on its own is not very illuminating, it should be compared to the fragmentation of the network in Chapter 5 and the extraordinary amounts of resources needed in Chapter 4 to facilitate dialogue between parties who did not wish to enter into discussions. Put in this context, the cooperation between PriFilmFest and ECLO and the Italian, and later French, Embassy illustrates that one of the best ways to 'get things done' is to support and encourage interactions between actors who can and do trust each other.

UNSC Res 1244 and Ahtisaari parallelism

A certain degree of parallelism was seen in Chapter 4, whereby governance networks happened to overlap in membership and competence but did not work together due to adherence to different international agreements (UNSC Res 1244 and the Ahtisaari Plan). A more subtle version of this institutional parallelism gives a possible explanation of the absence of actors who did not endorse the Ahtisaari Plan in the Independence Celebrations Network in Chapter 5.

By contrast, this parallelism did not seem to be an issue in the case study on PriFilmFest.

While the existence of this practice of parallelism makes dialogue across this institutional gap difficult, there have been positive results associated with the adherence to the two agreements. In Chapter 4 it was seen that 'status neutral' actors (such as CoE, EUSR, and GLO) were essential in facilitating trust-building and dialogue between actors who disagreed over the status of Kosovo.

Inclusion of minority groups

As mentioned above, there have been large amounts of resources devoted to including Serbian Orthodox Church in decision-making networks over issues of Serbian Orthodox heritage. By contrast, although Serbs are recognised as key stakeholders in the Independence Day celebrations, no attempt is made to include them. Likewise there is minimal representation of Serbs or other ethnic minority groups in the Cultural Performance Governance Network investigated, nor is representation seen as a pressing issue.

From this perspective, the situation described in Chapter 4 is the most inclusive. However, the question must still be asked: is the Serbian Orthodox Church a democratic platform for Serb views? This is not a question I will attempt to answer here; I include it only to illustrate how limited inclusion of minorities in governance networks is from a deliberative perspective of democracy.

It must be stressed that insights into inter-ethnic deliberation have their limitations, as research had been conducted in a largely ethnically homogeneous municipality. Greater insight could be gained into the potentialities or problems with inter-ethnic deliberative governance by conducting similar research in ethnically mixed areas of Kosovo.

One final remark in relation to the above question is warranted here. Chapter 6 was illustrative in a further way in that it showed a significant gap between narrative preferences and ability to

mobilise them of 'grassroots' level film-makers and cinematographers who acted as volunteers in the early editions of PriFilmFest on the one hand, compared with those of governance actors on the other. This is the case even with the Ministry of Culture, which should theoretically be accountable to such grassroots level persons, and also with Kosovo the Young Europeans, a public relations campaign commissioned by the Government.

It is significant that with a likely gradual exclusion of volunteers in favour of professionalisation, such film-makers and cinematographers will be included only through representation through the governance actors mentioned. In a similar way, although subject to more serious forms of exclusion, the findings suggest that Serb groups are included only through representation of the Serbian Orthodox Church. As indicated in the analysis in Chapter 6, there could be significant gaps between the narrative preferences of 'ordinary' Kosovo Serbs and those of the Serbian Orthodox Church. This indicates conceptual problems with using liberal democratic theories of representation and puts forward the argument for direct participation and deliberative governance.

Open and voluntary networks compared to closed and necessitated networks

Prishtina International Film Festival is a non-exclusivist public space that allows a range of actors, from central organisers, to funders to volunteers, to contribute diverse narratives. Unlike with the Serbian Orthodox Cathedral discussed in Chapter 4, actors can contribute narratives to the construction of the space without diminishing the presence of other narratives.

Similarly, the Cultural Performance Governance Network can be characterised as relatively open. There is no pre-defined consensus new actors must agree to in order to be admitted, and actors are free to work with whoever they can work with. Thus there have been some encouraging examples of deliberative governance between amicable governance actors.

By contrast, the Independence Celebrations Network was seen to be closed. The network was assembled through necessity, in anticipation of the declaration and of possible violent reactions by celebrators. However, what seems like the best example of deliberation from the analysis done in Chapter 5 was with the entry of Ogilvy|Karrota and the Newborn monument into the network. Interestingly, this example of deliberation involves a new actor entering a closed network through non-standard means.

In a similar way, both the Cultural Heritage Governance Network and the Reconstruction Implementation Commission were constructed out of necessity. In stark contrast to PriFilmFest, the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour is clearly an exclusivist public space. Attempts at using the space to mobilise narratives occurs quite often to the detriment of other narratives. To illustrate: seeking to destroy the cathedral, as *Unfinished Serb Victory* might advocate would be entirely to the detriment of *Milošević Regime, Multi-Cultural City,* and *De-nationalised Tolerance*.

Also in contrast with the Cultural Performance Governance Network, deliberation over issues of Serbian cultural heritage was only made possible with huge amounts of resources and the efforts of mediators in trying to find agreement between actors that aren't enthusiastic to communicate. It is unlikely that such resources and energies would be mobilised for open, voluntary networks like that discussed in Chapter 6.

Deliberative Governance: Conclusion

Looking at the different ways in which deliberation was facilitated or hindered in the three case studies, we are now in a position to say something about how to encourage more deliberative governance in Kosovo's emerging institutional landscape. It was seen that deliberation was helped by the involvement in governance of voluntary associations and of representatives of minority groups when involvement is facilitated by neutral mediators (although this finding would be strengthened by further research conducted in ethnically mixed areas of Kosovo). Additionally, deliberation was made possible largely between trusting actors, whether trust existed between them initially or was fostered with the help of actors who were perceived to be neutral. Finally it was seen that deliberative governance is more feasible in open, voluntarily constructed networks compared to closed networks constructed out of necessity.

On the other hand, comparison of the findings suggest that the securitisation of issues and the exercise of executive powers by certain actors substantially discourages deliberation. Additionally, the parallelism and the institutional gap between adherents to UNSC Res 1244 on the one hand and the Ahtisaari Plan on the other is creating certain obstacles for deliberation. That said, the institutional gap also provides opportunities for mediators to enter governance networks and encourage dialogue across the political and/or ethno-national divide.

These conclusions will be returned to in the next chapter.

Chapter 8 Conclusion and Discussion

The success of the peace-building mission in Kosovo has been cast in doubt following clashes at border check-points in July of this year. Renewed tensions between Serbs in Northern Kosovo and government authorities were sparked by attempts on behalf of the Prishtina government to enforce an import ban on Serbian goods. This was the first attempt by Prishtina authorities to assert control over an area that conceptually is part of the jurisdiction of Kosovo, but has remained *de facto* governed by local municipalities supported by Belgrade since 1999.

These actions follow frustration on part of Prishtina authorities with on-going, EU-sponsored talks with Belgrade over technical issues such as licence plates and recognition of educational qualifications. The limited success of such efforts illustrates the paramount importance of the status of Kosovo in any discussions involving competing claimants for sovereignty of the territory.

These events contain a microcosm of a more general dynamic tension between governance and discourse. On the one hand, the centrality of unresolved status, that is, how one is to refer to and conceive of the place, country, or province, is of such importance to both Serbian and Kosovo authorities that it prevents almost any possibility for joint governance over any other issues, no matter how technical. On the other hand, the mixed results of attempts to assert authority over the north of Kosovo are an important reminder that the viability of an envisioned reality of an Independent Kosovo depends completely on the governing capacity of those actors who wish to implement such a reality.

Both of these elements have been apparent in the case studies in this thesis. This chapter now turn towards drawing conclusions from the findings and comparisons seen thus far. This is followed by a discussion of the results. The chapter ends with a list of recommendations for policy change and for further research.

8.1 Conclusions

Many possible ways to see the future of Kosovo but the construction of different narratives occurs in a wider negotiated space

The multiplicity of urban narratives evident throughout the research indicates that there are many possible ways to envision the future and past of Kosovo. It was seen in particular that narratives emphasising the ethno-national dimension of the war (*Milosevic Regime, Kosovo/Albanian Victory,* and *Closed and Repressed* from Chapters 4, 5 and 6, respectively) are generally not favoured by governance actors discussed here. Rather, narratives embodying broadly 'liberal' values and emphasising progress (*De-nationalised Tolerance, Dignified Pride,* and *Dialogue*) are more prominent and receive more support among governance actors.

Such differences in narratives expressed by respondents suggest that the Serbian/Albanian cleavage is not the only possible one. Indeed, other ways of imagining the city, including 'liberal'

narratives aimed at overcoming nationalist conflict, have brought forth other cleavages such as between individual freedom and state control, or between film-workers in a developing industry and a professionalising elite.

What such examples ultimately illustrate is that the construction and dissemination of different urban narratives occurs in a wider negotiated space. That is, both resourceful and marginal actors, in seeking to mobilise their preferred narratives, have to engage in negotiations in a wider network of governance actors. This has the implication that narratives and discourses embodied in the outcomes of such interactions will reflect the multiplicity of narratives that actors personally attach to the city, and the negotiated process in which narratives come to be constructed.

There are two implications that can be drawn from this. Firstly, conflict resolution strategies that focus purely on the ethno-national dimension may be incomplete if they ignore other possible cleavages.

Secondly, marginalising narratives that emphasise conflict or militancy in favour of more liberal and tolerant narratives can itself serve to aggravate conflict along different lines, especially if this is done through non-deliberative means. Therefore it is essential that democratic and deliberative methods of discursive contestation are used for the planning of Prishtina's future urban landscape.

Resourceful actors tend to be more successful in mobilising narratives

As was discussed in Chapter 7, all three case studies showed different ways in which resourceful actors, be they domestic state actors or internationally mandated organisations, could enjoy success in mobilising preferred narratives, either through direct financial power or through network positioning. It was also seen that other actors could nonetheless create some room to negotiate with larger organisations, either through voluntary participation in networks or through joining networks in which shared views are represented.

However, access to discursive space is not open to everybody. Those who successfully engaged in negotiations often had semi-formal or informal relations with more central governance actors. Indeed, it was also seen that inclusion in decision-making circles was subsequently reduced for such actors. Additionally, the findings from these case studies suggest that minorities are severely under-represented and do not have access to governance circles.

Although there are many factors against it, deliberation is possible in some cases

It has been seen from the case studies and from the comparative chapter some of the ways in which deliberative governance is hindered. Firstly, it was seen that the exercise of executive powers and/or emergency measures due to security threats has negative prospects for deliberative governance. Such powers can be used to overrule decisions made collectively. Additionally, strategic positions in networks have been gained due to threats of security and stability. Although such measures might have been justified in the past, the security situation in Kosovo is much improved and such powers should be reduced accordingly.

Another factor contributing to non-deliberative decision-making is the phenomenon of 'parallelism' between networks operating under to UNSC Res 1244 and those operating

according to the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. The result is that there are sometimes networks with very similar competence areas and sometimes a cross-over of certain actors, yet that operate largely independently of each other.

However, such 'parallelism' has also been seen to be useful for organisations to act as mediators and to facilitate dialogue between actors. Therefore it is important not to characterise tendencies towards 'parallelism' as exclusively non-deliberative.

Finally it can be observed from the findings that non-inclusion of ethnic minorities and other excluded stakeholders is a barrier to deliberative governance. It was seen in Chapter 5 how the exclusion of Kosovo Serbs as stakeholders from the Independence Celebrations Network prompted governance actors to adopt non-deliberative methods to centrally control the process. By contrast, the inclusion of representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church in governance networks in Chapter 4 prompted the recruitment of facilitators and exercises in trust-building.

On the other hand, examples were seen in the data demonstrating that deliberation is possible in Kosovo despite difficulties. In the first place, the Reconstruction Implementation Commission has been held up as a success story of dialogue between governmental institutions of the Independent Republic of Kosovo and with institutes from Belgrade and the Serbian Orthodox Church. Respondents have attributed the success to the technical nature of the work, the presence of Council of Europe as a neutral party, and to the adherence to UNSC Res 1244. RIC has not been the main focus of research for this report, so there is little more that can be said here. However a detailed study of the Reconstruction Implementation Commission is recommended as further research.

Examples of deliberation were also to be seen in good working relations between trusting actors. Although this might sound obvious, it must nonetheless be emphasised. A significant amount of resources are spent on facilitating dialogue between actors who are very reluctant to engage with each other. By contrast, a surprising amount of constructive work has been accomplished at little transaction costs, between actors who were initially willing to engage. More deliberative governance could be achieved through supporting opportunities for such actors to work together.

Finally, one of the largest contrasts between the case studies also shows some potential for more inclusive deliberation. Open governance networks in which participation is on a voluntary basis, that engage with non-exclusivist public spaces, tended to facilitate deliberation in ways that closed networks brought together out of necessity could not.

It follows from these conclusions that promoting deliberative governance should therefore try to involve voluntary and minority groups in governance networks. Moreover, open governance networks, dealing with non-exclusivist public spaces should be encouraged. Trust building between disagreeable actors can be encourage with mediators who are perceived to both parties as neutral, often those in Kosovo under UNSC Res 1244. On the other hand, cooperation between actors who do wish to work together but who lack necessary resources or access to governance circles should be encouraged. Finally security-related executive powers of international and domestic state actors should be reduced according to the improving security conditions in Kosovo.

8.2 Discussion

Post-Conflict Urban Regeneration

One thing that this research shows is that the Serb/Albanian cleavage is not the only possible dimension of conflict in Kosovo. While this might be obvious to some scholars, a large amount of conflict-related literature still focuses on this (for example see the International Crisis Group report "Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ opinion"[327]). Importantly, it is seen that issues of urban design and contested meanings of the urban landscape is useful a useful analytical tool for the researcher to bring other dimensions of conflict to the forefront of analysis and to de-centre the ethno-national cleavage. This thesis then should make a worthwhile contribution to existing literature on post-conflict urban space (for example Charlesworth (2006); Garstka (2010); Kallus & Kolodney (2010); Neill & Ellis (2008)).

Network Governance

Network governance as a new theoretical approach to governance has been predominantly applied in Western Europe. However, this report demonstrates that network governance is a useful approach to the study of post-conflict governance and post-conflict urban regeneration in Kosovo. This approach has provided us with a number of significant insights. In the first place, this approach has demonstrated that governing actors play an important role in deciding what narrative are mobilised, and hence what cleavages are considered most important, and how Kosovo is to be imagined in the future.

Furthermore, the approach generates scientific evidence suggesting that resourceful actors, usually domestic state actors and internationally mandated organisations, are usually but not always successful in mobilising their preferred narratives, at least in the case studies observed here. Such findings could make valuable scientifically grounded contributions to debates over power and the role of the international community in post-conflict recovery.

Additionally, a network governance analysis has shown that a certain degree of consensus has been brought into governance networks from a spectrum of other networks in which governing actors intersect. This was particularly evident in the cross over of governmental and international actors in multiple networks and a possibly consequent long-term alignment of narratives and strategies, as discussed in Chapter 5. Therefore there is a drawback in focussing on one governance network as a site of decision-making. Nevertheless the insights gained into network-based governance from these case studies are rather significant, and should be used alongside studies of overlapping networks.

These aspects discussed above suggest that theories of governance networks can indeed be used more frequently and are of value in non-Western settings, echoing similar conclusions of other researchers who have attempted to extend these theories elsewhere (see for example Hendrix (2010); Zheng et al (2010)). The relevance of network governance theories to non-Western settings more generally should be assessed with caution however. Although theories of network governance have been successfully applied yielding useful findings in this thesis, it must be remembered that Kosovo is a specific case in which the international community play an active role in shaping emerging processes of governance. The role of the international

community could be critical in bringing about governance processes that are recognisable in Western theories of political science.

Aside from the applicability of network theory to emerging governance institutions in Kosovo, a number of insights were gained that suggest some extra factors need to be taken into account when studying governance processes in post-conflict contexts like Kosovo. In the first place, it was seen that 'normal' procedures of governance can frequently be suspended due to concerns over security and stability. It has been argued in this thesis that this resembles what has become known as the 'Copenhagen school' effect of 'securitisation' (Albert & Buzan (2011); Buzan et al (1998); Laustsen & Wæver (2000)).

Secondly, an interesting finding is the presence of actors amongst governance networks who possess a collection of attributes and characteristics that I have describe here as 'cultural capital'. It appears that traits and abilities such as artistic creativity, youth, having grown up in Kosovo but spent some time abroad, and the ability to speak English and Albanian form elements of a certain 'cultural capital' that appears to be of value in governance networks. To my knowledge, little scholarly information is available on this phenomenon. An investigation of the importance of these elements of cultural capital in governance and political circles is recommended as further research.

A further important element of governance in Kosovo according to the findings from these case studies is the importance of trust, social relations and informal contacts between actors and across networks. On the one hand, trust-building has been hugely important in facilitating dialogue between actors across the ethno-national and political divide. Similarly, governance networks were seen to temporarily discontinue (RIC) and in one case completely fragment (Independence Celebrations Network) once trust between actors was put in doubt. On the other hand relations between network actors depend in many cases on semi-formal or informal relations between individuals within organisations. These findings echo similar insights in Kapucu's network based analysis of the inter-organisational emergency response to attacks on the twin towers in the USA in 2001(2005).

A further element to be taken into account when bringing political science theories from the West to Kosovo is that there are 5 ethnic minorities living in Kosovo alongside the Albanian majority. In the three case studies under investigation in this research report inclusion of ethnic minorities in governance processes has been limited. Indeed the only representation of Kosovo Serbs, the largest minority, is through the Serbian Orthodox Church. Notwithstanding questions over how representative the Church is of Kosovo Serbs in general, the inclusion of the Serbian Orthodox Church requires large investments in terms of mediators and trust-building in order to bring about any constructive dialogue. While the established body of literature has begun to look at *effectiveness* of governance and policy networks (Sørensen & Torfing 2009), such measures could be inappropriate in Kosovo and other ethnically heterogeneous contexts, where inclusion of stakeholders is sometimes an end in itself.

As noted in Chapter 7, governance in Kosovo is displaying a degree of 'parallelism'. This research has uncovered some examples of governance networks with overlapping spheres of competences and actors but who remain separate due to adherence to different international agreements (UN Security Council Resolution 1244 or the Ahtisaari Plan). There exists some research into parallelism in Serb majority areas of Kosovo (see for example Heijke (2010)), although it differs from that described here in that these governance networks do not show an explicit attempt to compete for legitimacy.

A final characteristic of governance networks in Kosovo that is worth bearing in mind is the variety of material or non-material possessions that can be considered as resources. Resources in the case studies have taken a range of forms, from status-neutrality and internationally-derived and electoral mandates, to trust, social, and political capital, to communications and creative expertise, to promotional space and financial and moral capital.

A venue for post-conflict dialogue?

Gartska has argued that contemporary post-conflict urban renewal projects are increasingly being used as a "venue and platform for post-conflict dialogue and interaction" (2010: 87). The findings of this research suggest that governance networks dealing with issues of urban regeneration in Kosovo can indeed play the role of forums for deliberative governance. Although significant factors hindering deliberation have been identified (security-related emergency powers, non-inclusion of minority groups), many potentialities for deliberative governance have also been seen (between trusting actors, involvement of voluntary organisers, open networks dealing with non-exclusivist public space). This illustrates that post-conflict urban renewal can have the positive implications mentioned by Garstka (2010). However, there remain substantial steps to take, particularly in terms of inclusion of ethnic minorities and other excluded groups in governance networks (see also Kallus & Kolodney (2010)).

Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation?

Paris advocates the strategy of "Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation" as a means of democracy- and peace-building (2004). Although I am not attempting to show causal relations between deliberative governance through networks and reduced violence levels, the evidence of this research does suggest that governance networks as they are practiced in these case studies do have some potential to democratise certain issues over which there is conflict. This was particularly the case with respect to issues of Serbian Orthodox Heritage, discussed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, it was seen that networks do give a platform to stakeholder voices that disagree with elected representatives (as seen in the inclusion of Ogilvy|Karrota alongside the Office of the Prime Minister in the Independence Celebrations Network in Chapter 5), something that would be ignored, and probably unresolved, by simple measures of liberal democracy.

However, it was also seen that the emerging institutions of governance discussed here can lead to a lack of deliberation and create potential for renewed conflict, possibly along other dimensions besides the ethno-national cleavage. This is particularly the case with respect to the lack of participation of minority groups and with the non-representation of viewpoints of the increasingly militant Vetëvendosje activists. For the current institutional arrangements under construction in Kosovo to act as a reliable means to democratise latent conflicts, governance actors must seriously and honestly engage such actors in deliberative discussions.

This thesis highlights three important aspects that should be taken into account in further studies of IBL or *peace through democracy*. Firstly, this research showed the ways in which governance practices can be deliberative and non-deliberative in a variety of network venues. This shows the importance of using a more nuanced understanding of democracy than liberal or representative democracy in further studies.

Secondly, this research has highlighted the multiple dimensions to conflict. Moreover it was seen that focussing exclusively on resolving one particular cleavage can accentuate conflict along another dimension. Therefore, research that focusses on reducing conflict along one dimension (for example inter-ethnic conflict) through institution-building runs the risk of ignoring how such practices might accentuate conflict along other dimensions (such as resistance to centralised control). Therefore a multi-dimensional approach to conflict analysis should be adopted in further studies of peace and democratisation.

Finally, this thesis has highlighted some of the ways in which conflict can be manifested, for instance through violent attacks on Serbian Orthodox churches, through militant, though non-violent activism such as unsanctioned alterations of urban imagery (See Chapter 5), or through reasoned engagement of disagreement in network-based forms of governance. Paris' work appears to focus exclusively on reducing levels of violent conflict through the strengthening of one particular set of state-based institutions. Further studies of *peace through democracy* should therefore incorporate more nuanced conceptualisations of peace and conflict in seeking to determine effects of democratisation on peace-building.

Governing at a distance?

Duffield has repeatedly argued that International post-conflict peace-building missions are in reality a means for Western governments to "govern at a distance" (2001: 315) (see also (2002); (2005)). Through techniques of "New public Management" and a discourse of "coherence" conflict related intervention networks act "as part of an emerging and essentially liberal system of global governance" (Duffield 2002: 1050). In certain cases (Chapter 4 in particular, but probably also in networks related to those discussed in Chapter 5), a certain degree of coherence was observed with many of the internationally mandated actors promoting narratives endorsing values that can be described as broadly liberal. Such actors are usually quite resourceful, often, though not always, succeeding in mobilising such 'liberal' narratives. Such findings would appear to support Duffield's arguments.

From this perspective, especially when looking at Chapter 4 and the successful mobilisation of *De-nationalised Tolerance*, it appears to resemble what Gartska describes as the 'old', top-down method of urban reconstruction, which tended to bring about "bias scripting of urban narratives" that reflected "the stories and histories of the victors" (2010: 87). That is, that the victors in the conflict (NATO) successfully engage in projects of urban reconstruction to embed their preferred (liberal) narratives into the urban landscape. However, this perspective makes sense only when one takes a homogenous view of 'the west' as Duffield does, with liberal narratives such as *De-Nationalised Tolerance* being promoted by the *de facto* military victors: NATO and liberal interventionism.

However, the Cultural Performance Governance Network examined in Chapter 6 provides a telling counter example. The findings presented in Chapter 6 suggest that due to the dispersed nature of the network and fluctuating organisational ties through individuals who do not occupy controlling positions within their organisations, there is little potential for close coordination of aims and strategies across that network. This is especially important when one considers that a number of embassy offices of EU countries were involved, along with the European Commission Liaison Office. Despite the presence of actors representing donor governments from 'the West', there was little effort made to coordinate efforts to mobilise the *Dialogue* narrative. In such a context it is difficult to imagine how the kind of coherence Duffield refers to could be brought

about. To a certain extent this hypothesis is mirrored in the diversity of narratives promoted by different governance actors in Chapter 6.

Nevertheless, findings from Chapter 5 indicate that there are limitations to observing one governance network as the 'site' where decisions are made, and suggest that alignments of narratives and strategies might be built over a longer term amongst actors who are involved in multiple intersecting governance networks (see 5.3.3 in particular). This would suggest that investigations into *governance at a distance* would need to focus on a comprehensively wide selection of intersecting governance networks across multiple governance areas over a relatively long period of time.

Discursive Fields for rational deliberation?

Dryzek argues that the emerging terrain of global governance and international security, whilst subject to attempts at discursive hegemony, increasingly represents opportunities for rational deliberation and discursive democracy (2006). As was seen from the findings, although certain parties do have more capacity to mobilise narratives than others, there is frequently room for negotiation (as seen with Ogilvy|Karrota and PriFilmFest in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively). Moreover, a number of promising examples of how governance can incorporate deliberative decision-making have been discussed. However, space for discursive contestation was seen to be largely limited to actors with social/political capital necessary to be included in discursive arenas (evident in how Ogilvy|Karrota and B2 PR and Media Solutions entered governance networks in Chapter 5) . Additionally, the case studies indicated a tendency for the integration of actors into governance networks to imply conforming to working frameworks that often limit scope of discussion (evident in the Cultural Heritage Governance Network in Chapter 4 and the Independence Celebrations Network and the Package Proposal Promotion Network in Chapter 5).

Nonetheless, some examples have shown that there are some possibilities to re-negotiate frameworks and scope of governance. The RIC mechanism came into existence with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding, which after some disagreements was amended with a second MoU. Similarly in Chapter 5 it was seen how the entry of Ogilvy|Karrota into governance network brought with them a expansion in the scope and assumptions of governance (and after disagreements arose, actors formed or joined new network in which they could forward their goals). Finally, one of the interesting things about the Cultural Performance Governance Network discussed in Chapter 6 is that due to its dispersed and open nature, there does not seem to be an established consensus that new actors must 'sign up' to.

From this perspective, these findings seem to support Dryzek (2006). As he puts it, although power to disseminate discourses is not spread evenly among actors, "the ratio of questioning to obedience" seems to be undergoing "secular increase" (2006: 112). To qualify Dryzek's arguments, the research here suggests that the potential for the realm of global governance and international security to function as terrains of discursive democracy depends on two factors. Firstly, it depends on the implementation of policy recommendations that increase the democratic and deliberative potentials of network governance. Secondly, a future of discursive democracy is also reliant on the willingness of actors, both powerful and marginal, to actively engage in and demand deliberative practices of governance.

However, as noted above, findings in Chapter 5 seem to suggest that short-term, identifiable governance networks might not be the most appropriate 'site' to observe deliberative practices, as they are not sensitive to the relevance of long-term alignment of goals and strategies between actors. Similar to what was discussed above in relation to Duffield, further research should focus on on-going discursive negotiations across multiple overlapping governance networks.

8.3 Recommendations

8.3.1 Policy Recommendations

1. **Periodical security-deliberation audits should be conducted in which possibilities for deliberative governance are compared with the security situation in Kosovo**.
   The emergency and executive powers of governmental and supervisory bodies should be reduced in line with the improving security situation, with such powers preferably being made subject to approval of citizen councils with at least one comprised of minority groups. (see Chapter 4, Chapter 5)

2. **Establish a public body with responsibility for overseeing transparency of public contract awards**. (Chapter 5)

3. **Invite and encourage voluntary groups and individuals to participate in governance networks over issues of public importance that do not constitute a security threat**.
   This could be a means for such groups to gain trust of higher-level governance actors, which would provide less justification for exclusionary measures to be adopted over sensitive issues. However, for participation to be meaningful, such governance networks must deal with issues of significant public importance, and have substantial decision-making power. (see Chapter 5)

4. **Continue implementation plans on Decentralisation as directed in the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.** (see Chapter 5)

5. **Create and support new, non-exclusivist, public spaces.**
   Non-exclusivist public space such as Prishtina International Film Festival and to a lesser extent the Independence Day Celebrations, which can be expanded to include a diverse range of visions, show a greater potential for inclusion and deliberative decision-making than exclusivist spaces, where certain discourses are embodied to the exclusion of others. Creating a more inclusive urban environment where citizens can feel common ownership of their public spaces would be helped by the development of non-exclusivist public spaces. (see Chapter 6)

6. **Encourage and facilitate links between actors who are willing to cooperate with each other.** While this may seem like an obvious thing to do, it does need to be emphasised. Consider the vast resources and energy devoted to facilitating dialogue between Serbian Orthodox Church and Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, actors who are not enthusiastic to engage with each other. On the other hand, some encouraging examples have been seen

of constructive cooperation between agreeable actors. The situation in Kosovo could be vastly improved if a fraction of these resources were directed towards facilitating inclusion of actors who do wish to work together, but who lack the necessary resources and/or access to do so. (see Chapter 6)

7. **Encourage and support events organised by large numbers of volunteers.**
   The involvement of volunteers or of actors who participate voluntarily shows good potential for inclusive deliberation and representation of diverse narratives and visions. (see Chapter 6)

8. **Provide tax-relief for small and medium sized enterprises wishing to sponsor cultural events and associations. Appoint voluntary association to manage, allocate and distribute funds generated through sponsorship**.
   Providing tax-relief in this way could possibly make more funding available for cultural events. However there is a possibility that such a change could lessen the influence of volunteers in favour of small and medium sized enterprises. Appointing a voluntary association to manage funding generated in this way would be a good way to increase the influence of volunteers, and to facilitate trust-building with higher level governance actors. (see Chapter 6)

8.3.2 Recommendations for Further Research

Expansion of current research

1. **Similar studies of governance processes in ethnically mixed municipalities in Kosovo**
   Case studies in this thesis have been based on research conducted in Prishtina, a municipality with a large ethnic Albanian majority population. As such findings into inter-ethnic deliberation, and multi-ethnic narratives have been limited. This research would be strengthened by similar research conducted in areas of Kosovo in which ethnic minorities are in greater numbers. A case study of Štrpce would produce valuable insight into deliberation between a Serb majority and Albanian minority. A similar study involving significant Roma population is also recommended.

2. **Study of how narratives have been received or reinterpreted by Prishtina public**
   The focus of this research has been on the construction and dissemination of narratives at governance level. One way to expand this research is to interpret to what extent such narratives are excepted by the public at large, and whether there are elements of reinterpretation and reconfiguration of narratives at grassroots level.

3. **Study on discursive contestation within organisations**
   Throughout this analysis, a working assumption (clearly incorrect) has been that the organisation is a valid unit of analysis. For research purposes it was assumed that an organisation is a homogenous actor. Analysis has focussed purely on disagreements between organisations, not within them. Further study could look beyond this working assumption at dynamics within some of the organisations looked at here, in response or in anticipation to some of the key events and decisions referred to.

4. **Quantitative analysis of governance networks across multiple areas**

What is presented in this thesis is the findings of exploratory, qualitative research. While some important insights were gained, the generalisability of findings is limited. A follow up quantitative study of some of the findings would strengthen this study. For example, correlations between network structure and deliberation, actor resources and successful mobilisations, positions in networks and input into discursive outcomes, number of network memberships of an actor and willingness to compromise, etc., could be investigated, provided it was possible to create measurements for these variables. It could also be investigated how widespread the currency of the narratives identified in this report are.

5. **Exploratory investigation of 'cultural capital' among Kosovo governance and policy circles**
   One new and interesting insight gained from this thesis is the valuation of particular forms of 'cultural capital' (artistic creativity, youth, having grown up in Kosovo but spent some time abroad, the ability to speak English and Albanian). Further study of this topic is recommended. Such a study could have an initial qualitative element to qualify the element identified here and to determine whether there are more characteristics that are similarly valued. Quantitative phases could follow, investigating how widespread a phenomenon this is, and what effects having cultural capital has on factors such as access to elite circles, the ability to effect change, willingness of others to engage deliberatively, and the ability to form social relations with a wide variety of governance actors.

Research arising out of findings

1. **Periodical security-deliberation audits**
   This thesis shows a number of examples of how deliberative decision-making was suspended due to concerns over security and stability. While such practices might have been justifiable at some point, they are less so as the security situation in Kosovo improves. It is recommended that periodical studies of the security situation and of deliberation in governance be carried out, with emergency measures associated with security threats being reduced in line with the improving security situation. (see Chapters 4 and 5)

2. **Detailed study of RIC mechanism as a case study of successful mediation and dialogue across ethno-national and political divide**
   The Reconstruction Implementation Commission has been hailed as a success story in facilitating meaningful and constructive cooperation between governmental institutions in Prishtina, in Belgrade, and with the Serbian Orthodox Church. Much could be learned from a detailed investigation into the RIC mechanism as a case study of successful mediation and dialogue involving actors from both sides of the ethno-national and political divide. (see Chapter 4)

3. **Study of cinematography in Kosovo during the years 1995-2009 as a case study of informal institutions during periods of conflict**
   The study of the Cultural Performance Governance Network in Chapter 6 has been insightful in a number of ways, particularly due to a largely voluntary nature of organisation, strong informal relations between people, and relatively non-political yet insightful governance arrangements. A sociological study of an informal cinematography industry in the period 1995-2009 would be an interesting case study of how informal institutions function during the period of conflict in Kosovo.

4. **Case-studies of securitisation and how it has been overcome.**

The findings in this report echo worries of Buzan et al that securitisation is a means of de-politicisation of issues in a non-democratic way (1998). However it was also seen that securitising moves have been overcome in some ways. Case studies of successful overcoming of securitisation moves in Kosovo would be a helpful ad useful contribution to the growing literature on securitisation and on deliberative democracy.

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