

TOURISM, LIVELIHOODS AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION

An assessment of tourism related policy interventions at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (BINP), Uganda



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Tourism, livelihoods and biodiversity conservation

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Tourism, livelihoods and biodiversity conservation

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Wilber Manyisa Ahebwa

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

AUTO	Association of Uganda Tour Operators
AWF	Africa Wildlife Foundation
BCCDA	Buhoma Community Campground Association
BINP	Bwindi Impenetrable National Park
BMCDA	Buhoma-Mukono Community Development Association
CBTE	Community-Based Tourism Enterprise
CML	Clouds Mountain Lodge
CPI	Community Protected Area Institution
FFI	Fauna and Flora International
IGCP	International Gorilla Conservation Program
IGG	Inspector General of Government
ITFC	Institute of Tropical Forest Conservation
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
KTA	Kisoro Tourism Association
MBIFCT	Mgahinga-Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust
NFA	National Forestry Authority
NTDA	Nkuringo Tourism Development Association
PAA	Policy Arrangements Approach
PCP	Private-Community Partnership
PMAC	Park Management Advisory Committee
TRS	Tourism Revenue Sharing
TUSC	The Uganda Safari Company
UBOS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UCOTA	Uganda Community Tourism Association
UGD	Uganda Game Department
UNP	Uganda National Parks
UTB	Uganda Tourist Board
UWA	Uganda Wildlife Authority
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

1. General introduction and background

1.1 Introduction

For a long time, people have transformed nature in an attempt to satisfy their needs. The increased scale of nature transformation for development and for meeting livelihood needs has often disregarded the basic laws of nature and is widely acknowledged as the main cause for the loss of biodiversity (Duffy, 2006). The consequence of biodiversity loss has been manifested through destabilization of the earth's systems resulting in problems such as climate change, depletion of the ozone layer and, to some extent, the worsening poverty levels in many parts of the developing world. These problems are increasingly being recognized as human-induced. Although biodiversity degradation effects can be regarded as another form of 'global common' (posing a global risk), the developing countries have been hard hit due to their inability and very limited means to cope and adapt. Paradoxically, attempts to conserve the remaining biodiversity in the developing world have also frequently threatened the livelihoods of the rural poor who directly depend on nature for their survival (Adams, 2004).

Conservation concerns and efforts amidst increasing human needs are not new as human pressure and the associated threats to the environment have been increasing in intensity and in response to growth in population (Hearne *et al.*, 2010; Western *et al.*, 1994). This has necessitated the application of different approaches by several actors and coalitions from individuals, national and international governments as well as local and international conservation agencies at various scales (local, national, regional and international). The conservation approaches and debates have been shifting in response to changing human needs, concerns, new environmental threats as well as new knowledge based on a better understanding of the shortcomings of the old ones (Adams & McShane, 1992; Cumming, 1990; Sandbrook, 2006; Western & Wright, 1994). To date, mitigating human-induced environmental problems through biodiversity conservation is considered an urgent global priority. In the developing world over the last few years, the focus has been on reconciling conservation objectives with the general need to improve human well-being, collectively referred to as 'development'. This thesis particularly focuses on the developments at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (BINP), Uganda, in light of the conservation-development nexus.

1.2 Main shifts in global conservation policy paradigms

Population expansion along with Romanticism movements in Europe and the United States between the 1850s and mid-1900s marked the beginning of conservation discussions at local levels (Western & Wright, 1994). More momentum towards conservation debates was ushered in by scientists and researchers who warned of harsh consequences if nothing was done. The common example being the publication of the perceived 'tragedy of the commons'

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(Hardin, 1968) where individual rationality was seen to yield collective disaster and therefore necessitated intervention from an external authority to overcome it (Beck, 2000).

In the USA, the expanding conservation sensibilities gave way to the protectionism approaches based on the 'hardliners' view on conservation, advocating 'species protection for their own sake, independent of their utility for humans' (Thomas, 1983 in: Western *et al.*, 1994). Protectionism was spearheaded by spiritualists and romantics like John M. Stuart who saw it as the best approach to achieve nature conservation (Western & Wright, 1994). Depicting the strict rules and control by the state, protectionism has largely been referred to as top-down, 'coercive', 'fences and fines', or 'fortress' and has persisted as a conservation dimension even today. It sees protected areas created and put under strict protection and surveillance by the state (Peluso, 1993). It is these protectionism ideologies that ignited the creation of several protected areas globally as a means to achieve conservation.

The 'Western' protectionism policies quickly diffused into Africa and other regions in the 'South' through the works of colonial regimes. Authors like Roe (2008) and Adams (2004) have highlighted the key reason for the expansion and implementation of the 'protected area' policies in the colonized world as the need to promote the colonial interests of protecting wilderness for elite enjoyment and controlling the utilization of biodiversity by 'locals' which colonial administrators perceived as unsustainable. The new rules that were associated with protectionism campaigns in Africa regarded local livelihood strategies such as local hunting (for meat) as 'poaching', while food gathering and plant harvesting were seen as 'encroachment' (Mugisha, 2002). These 'local' livelihood strategies were declared illegal in the colonial-state biodiversity governance style. Excessive protectionism however denied local people a right to use their 'own' resources (Adams & Infield, 2003) and they were also excluded from decision making. Their traditions, rules and norms were completely seen as 'destructive' to the environment and their indigenous ways were seen as unscientific, superstitious and illogical necessitating replacement (Mahonge, 2010). Formal state institutions were introduced to steer protectionism mechanisms but they unfortunately caused a lot of 'protected area' resentment by the local population in many developing countries (Adams, 2004).

Parallel to the above developments, international conservation organizations were emerging at the global level: the New York Zoological Society (now – Wildlife Conservation Society) in 1897; the Society for Preservation of Wild Fauna of the Empire (currently – Fauna and Flora International) in 1903; the International Council for the Preservation of Birds (now – Birdlife International) in 1922; the International Conservation Coalition – IUCN in 1948 (Roe, 2008). These were later energized by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) which was launched in 1962 (Holdgate, 1999). Their emergence and participation fostered the globalization of conservation campaigns. The question of biodiversity loss and the related environmental problems were defined as 'global' and hence necessitated combined efforts to combat. Despite the emergence and involvement of global conservation organizations, the course of action still focused on wildlife preservation through the establishment of new forms of protected areas and monitoring of existing ones (Adams, 2004).

However, by the 1960s and '70s, a critical stance towards protectionism ideologies arose as states were becoming increasingly ineffective in managing protected areas (Roe, 2008). Also questions like 'conserving for who?' increased to challenge extreme protectionism policies in the developing world and critics started regarding pure protectionism as 'an isolation policy' that disregards local people who shoulder the burden of conservation (Büscher & Dietz, 2005; Western *et al.*, 1994). The approach was further criticized on the basis that it reduces local people to environmentally irrational beings and hence necessitated modification to acquire a human face (Barret *et al.*, 2001; Mahonge, 2010).

The 'human face' concept in conservation debates aimed at considering the development and livelihood needs of local people and involving them in conservation campaigns while at the same time taking very good care of the threatened biodiversity (the 'stick and carrot' paradox) which captured the support of many conservation organizations and governments in the 1980s (Roe, 2008). For example, in 1980s, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) published the World Conservation Strategy which was a milestone in conservation and development debates (Robinson, 1993). The strategy embraced the sustainable development approach (a dominant discourse of the time) where conservation and development would go hand in hand. As a follow up, the theme of the third World Parks Congress in 1982 was 'conservation for sustainable development' (McNeely & Miller, 1982; Roe, 2008). Though the emphasis was still on buffering parks, there was a move from preservation to sustainable multiple use of protected areas (Western *et al.*, 1994). It was increasingly becoming clear that apart from disregarding the rights of local communities, the 'preservation' policies in many developing countries had failed to achieve conservation objectives (Hulme & Murphree, 2001).

Livelihood-related threats as well as negative attitudes towards protected areas were advanced as major reasons for the failure of the 'fortress' conservation philosophy (Coad *et al.*, 2008; Hecker, 2005; Namara & Nsabagasani, 2003; Saito, 2007). Addressing these threats became inevitable in efforts to attain conservation objectives in the developing countries (Adams *et al.*, 2004; Kiss, 1990; Newmark & Hough, 2000). Reacting to this trend, conservation policies in Africa started shifting in dimension with principles that conservation should be community-based, conservation should be managed to achieve community development and that markets should play a role in shaping incentives for conservation (Hulme & Murphree, 2001). The third principle largely reflected the neoliberal rhetoric that sought to commodify nature and develop market-based mechanisms for its conservation (Büscher, 2008), scaled down to Africa by international conservation and development organizations through national governments.

Nature-based tourism is one of the most widely applied mechanisms to achieve conservation and development and a means to embrace the above three principles. Increasingly, tourism is being advanced by national governments, and development and conservation organizations as one of the major ways to address livelihood and conservation concerns in Africa and other parts of the developing world (Ashley & Roe, 1998; Ashley, 2000; Ross & Wall, 1999; Tao & Wall, 2009). Advocates of this approach suggest it can provide 'win-win' outcomes for

conservation and development by generating tangible benefits that compensate for costs and create incentives to conserve (Font *et al.*, 2004; Goodwin, 2002).

In addition, the development of nature-based tourism is highly regarded as one of the possible solutions to poverty in the developing countries and is recognized by United Nations (UN) as one of the major tools to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGS) (1) *ending poverty and hunger* and (7) *environmental sustainability* (UN WTO, 2008). Through government departments, local and international non-governmental organizations, donors, private sector organizations and communities, most developing countries are currently investing resources and hope in tourism as a means to improve rural livelihoods and achieving nature conservation objectives (Ashley, 2000; Ashley *et al.*, 2007).

Although there is no doubt that tourism can generate considerable benefits, concerns have been raised about the inequitable distribution of costs, benefits and power among different actors and on different scales, and the insignificant economic impacts at local destinations. These concerns undermine the effectiveness of tourism as a tool for conservation and development (Brockington *et al.* 2008; Goodwin 2002; Kiss 2004; Sachedina *et al.*, 2010; Laudati, 2010; Sandbrook 2008; Wells *et al.*, 1992). Over the past few years, various policy interventions involving actors such as the state, civil society and private sector have emerged with claims that they can circumvent or address such concerns. The interventions are: (1). Direct community involvement in tourism enterprises (Ashley & Ntshona, 2002; Mburu, 2003); (2). Protected Areas outreach arrangements (Archabald & Noughton-Treves, 2001; Saarinen *et al.*, 2009). (3); Public-Private Partnerships (Spenceley, 2003; Varghese, 2008); (4). Private-Community Partnerships (Southgate, 2006); (5). Public-Community initiatives (Mburu, 2003); and vi) Public-Private-Community Partnerships (Ashley & Roe, 1998; Spenceley, 2003). In principle, these policy interventions are aimed at addressing the limitations of tourism outlined earlier, increasing benefits accruing from conservation and enabling communities to generate gains from flourishing tourism business in their vicinity. In this way, conservationists hope to offset livelihood demands, diversify livelihood strategies and improve attitudes of communities towards conservation. There is, however, a need to understand the context within which these policy interventions are enacted and implemented and to evaluate the extent to which they address livelihood and conservation concerns. This thesis particularly addresses this research need and focuses on the first, second and fourth policy interventions that are being implemented at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (BINP), Uganda.

1.3 Scaling down global conservation policies to Uganda

In the scaling down of the protectionism policies to Uganda in the 1950s, National Parks like Queen Elizabeth, Murchison Falls and Kidepo were gazetted by the British colonial regime (Figure 1.1). More protected areas ranging from National Parks; Game Reserves to Forest Reserves were gazetted in the late 1950s by the colonial state and after 1962 by the 'independent' Ugandan state working closely with conservation and development organizations such as WWF, FFI, IUCN and USAID.



Figure 1.1. Major National Parks in Uganda.

In both pre-independent and post-independent Uganda, the manner in which protected areas were gazetted still depicted characteristics of classical protectionism (Mugisha, 2002). State authorities considered such areas ‘idle lands’ despite the fact that they were being utilized by local people who practiced pastoralism, hunting and shifting cultivation as main livelihood activities. Local people were not consulted. Some areas like Bwindi and Mgahinga were declared protected areas to guard against the extreme pressure from huge populations characterized by poverty and limited livelihood options (Nowak, 1995) as I will elaborate on later in this chapter.

National Parks were managed by a parastatal – Uganda National Parks (UNP) – under the classical protectionism rules of the game. Game Reserves were administered under the Uganda Game Department (UGD) with softer rules that allowed access by the community. However, the Wildlife Statute of 1996 (now the Wildlife Act, Cap 200 of the Laws of Uganda, 2000) caused institutional reforms that saw UNP and UGD combined to form the current Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) mandated to manage all wildlife in and outside all protected areas

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in Uganda (UWA, 2004a). Until 2004, all Forest Reserves were administered by the Forest Department under the Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment. However, from 2004, a semi-autonomous body called the National Forestry Authority (NFA) was created to manage Forest Reserves in the country. To date, the number of protected areas has grown to over 40 (including National Parks, Game Reserves and Forest Reserves) and Western governments, conservation as well as development organizations such as International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP), USAID, WWF, and AWF have been very instrumental in supporting the sub-state entities named above to conserve protected areas.

Although conservation was the main aim in gazettement of the protected areas, underneath it lay the market-oriented motive of promoting wildlife-based tourism. In fact the history of 'formal' tourism in Uganda can be traced back to shortly after the 'first' National Parks were gazetted in the 1950s. During this period, tourism was seen as a means of generating revenue to fund state conservation policies, and parks were exclusively visited by white colonial settlers and their visitors mainly on hunting expeditions. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the number of holidaymakers to Uganda was high as the country was an integral part of the then famous East African Tourist Circuit also covering Kenya and Tanzania, and tourism was seen as a key sector for economic development. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, for instance, tourism was the third largest foreign exchange earner in Uganda after traditional cash crops; cotton and coffee (Uganda Investment Authority, 2005). The hotel sector had been developed and managed by the state through a parastatal called Uganda Hotels (UH).

However, like other sectors of the economy, tourism suffered tremendously from the years of political turmoil in the period 1973 to 1986. This period was characterized by the emergence of a dictatorial and autocratic leader – Idi Amin Dada – whose policies frustrated the development of the industry. Because of his poor foreign policies, President Idi Amin Dada suspected all foreigners visiting the country. He declared tourists as 'spies' and therefore not welcome in Uganda. In his reign, there was a major deterioration in the services offered by hotels, neglect of protected areas which led to rampant wildlife hunting and illegal settlement in protected areas (Ringer, 2002). Most of the state-owned hotels were used as accommodation units for his unruly soldiers. The situation deteriorated further with the outbreak of more political turmoil and wars following his overthrow. Amin's government was overthrown through a war supported by the Tanzanian government in 1979, and the years that followed were characterized by power struggles that reached a climax in 1986 when the current National Resistance Movement (NRM) government under President Museveni took power. The described events completely deterred tourism growth and development and Uganda lagged behind her East African neighbors (MTTI, 2003). Tourism in Kenya and Tanzania continued to play a big role in their economies. In this 'dark' period, Uganda got disconnected from the global conservation network and most national conservation policies and institutions collapsed.

Since 1986, the Museveni government has restored the rule of law and tremendous progress has been achieved politically, economically, socially and even ecologically (Ringer, 2002). The formation of semi-autonomous conservation bodies like UWA and NFA re-connected Uganda to the global conservation network. Uganda is now a signatory to most international

conservation and environment-related treaties. This enables both down-scaling and up-scaling of conservation policies and views from global and local levels respectively. Today, animal populations are no longer what they used to be, but have shown a remarkable recovery rate since 1990s (MTTI, 2003). Though still not as highly competitive in the market segment catering for the long-haul tourists seeking the 'big five', Uganda has repositioned herself to focus on new markets and attractions (MTTI, 2003). This strategy is being coordinated by the Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry and implemented by the Uganda Tourist Board and the Uganda Wildlife Authority. The World Bank funded the process of designing a tourism policy that was launched in 2003.

In line with the neoliberal forms of development favored by many development agencies, the tourism policy emphasizes the role of the private sector in tourism development and less government intervention. The tourism industry today is to a large extent being driven by a vibrant private sector under umbrella associations like the Uganda Tourist Association (UTA) and the Association of Uganda Tour Operators (AUTO). As part of the regional cooperation efforts through the East African Cooperation, players in the sector have also launched joint efforts to market the region to enable tourists to benefit from the biodiversity offered by each of the five countries: Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi.

The above historical circumstances make Uganda a relative newcomer in today's international tourism scene. But despite Uganda's newcomer status, a recently improved image and relative political stability have led to a significant increase in international tourist arrivals from 53,594 in 1986 to 176,042 tourists in 1996 and to 843,864 tourists in 2008. By 2008, the tourism sector contributed USD 450 million (UGX 977 billion) to the Ugandan economy (UBOS, 2008). The industry's contribution is 26% of the country's total export earnings and also provides vital employment for people with a wide range of skills as well as the unskilled (UTB, 2009). In 2007, the tourism sector emerged as the number one foreign exchange earner overtaking coffee, cotton, mining and fishing industries which have been traditional sources of foreign exchange for Uganda (UBOS, 2007). Though the industry is largely reliant on international arrivals, there is hope in the domestic market, especially with the current economic recovery and steady increase in middle-class Ugandans.

Nature and wildlife are the basis of Uganda's contemporary tourism development. The tourism sector has until recently largely benefitted urban elites (tour operators, well-educated people) with a limited focus on local communities neighboring protected areas. Reflecting the global tourism-livelihood and conservation policy discourses, UWA's mission has been phrased as follows; 'to conserve and sustainably manage wildlife and protected areas of Uganda in partnership with the neighboring communities and stakeholders for the benefit of the people of Uganda and the global community' (UWA, 2004b: 1).

In line with the global conservation and development policy domain, UWA's Community Conservation (CC) policy elaborates the importance of sharing benefits from wildlife in promoting positive attitudes, knowledge and change of behavior of neighboring communities and the general public towards wildlife conservation in general (UWA, 2004a). The Community Conservation policy framework spells out specific policy interventions

such as sport hunting, collaborative resource management, revenue sharing, community-private partnerships, and conservation education among others that UWA implements in partnership with key stakeholders (NGOs, private sector and communities) to address conservation, livelihood and development concerns in and around individual protected areas. The policy interventions applied vary depending on the local context of the particular protected area in question (UWA, 2004b).

1.4 Bwindi Impenetrable National Park and the surrounding communities

This thesis focuses on Bwindi Impenetrable National Park which is known to have had severe conservation threats when it was gazetted. The threats were associated with confrontational occurrences, high population densities characterized by limited livelihood options and poverty as well as negative attitudes. It is also an interesting case because it was gazetted in early 1990s when the tourism-conservation and development discourses were increasingly attracting the attention of conservationists in Africa. Bwindi happens to be among the National Parks in Uganda where a wide range of different policy interventions are being implemented in one National Park. In addition, it is the top tourism-revenue generating National Park in Uganda and therefore it is important to establish the implication of this on the conservation-development nexus. Bwindi is also home to the rare mountain gorillas, an important biodiversity site and hence of great international and national significance as far as tourism and biodiversity conservation are concerned. The rich, rare and endemic biodiversity and the associated threats therefore make Bwindi an area that deserves scientific attention.

Bwindi is located in South-Western Uganda within the Kigezi highlands. In the North of the park is Kanungu District, Kisoro in the South and Kabale District in the East. The current study was conducted in the park and the three frontline parishes where policy interventions are being operationalized. The parishes are Nteko and Rubuguri in Kisoro district and Mukono in Kanungu district (Figure 1.2). Bwindi covers approximately 331 square kilometers (33,092 ha) of thick forests on a hilly landscape and contains both montane and lowland forest (Nowak, 1995). The park lies about 540 km from Kampala (Uganda's Capital City) and overlooks the western arm of the great East African rift valley bordering the Democratic Republic of Congo to the West.

Bwindi is richly endowed with biodiversity, varied landscapes and complex ecological systems (UWA, 2006). It is a conservation area of international importance and the richest in Uganda in terms of ecosystem resources including exceptional diversity of biodiversity (IGCP, 2008). It is rich in fauna, with extensive lowland-montane forest and possesses several Albertine Rift endemics and globally threatened species, particularly the mountain gorillas (UWA, 2006). It is a home for more than 380 (48%) of the total population (786) of the world's remaining mountain gorillas (AWF, 2010a). The rest (406) being spread in Mgahinga National park (Uganda), Parc National Virungas (DRC) (Figure 1.3) and Parc National des Volcans (Rwanda).




Figure 1.2. The study area.




Figure 1.3. The Great Virunga Conservation Area (IGCP, 2008).

1.4.1 Situating Bwindi in the global conservation policy shifts

Reflecting the protectionism policies of the time, conservation efforts at Bwindi are traced back to 1932. In this year, the present Northern and Southern sectors of Bwindi Impenetrable Forest were gazetted by the British colonial regime as Kasatora and Kayonza Crown Forest Reserves respectively covering an area of 20,700 hectares. The two reserves were combined in 1942 and extended into the Impenetrable Central Crown Forest Reserve covering 29,800 ha. (298 square kilometers) and was under the joint control of the Ugandan Government's Game and Forest Departments. The year 1964 saw the entire reserve gazetted as an animal sanctuary under the Game Preservation and Control Act of 1952 and amended in 1964 to grant additional protection to the mountain gorillas (IGCP, 2008). The area was later renamed the Impenetrable Central Forest Reserve (Namara & Nsabagasani, 2003).

In 1966 two other local Forest Reserves were incorporated into the Reserve increasing the area to 32,080 ha (321 square kilometers). The area continued to be managed as both a game sanctuary and Forest Reserve. The Impenetrable Central Forest Reserve was gazetted as a National Park in 1991 under the Statutory Instrument No. 3, 1992, National Parks Act, 1952 and later named Bwindi Impenetrable National Park – covering an area of 330.8 square kilometers. The newly gazetted Bwindi was placed under the management of Uganda National Parks.

The history above indicates that the colonial state in Uganda was the medium through which protectionism policies were scaled down to Bwindi. To date, the influence of international conservation regimes is evidenced by the conservation efforts in the Virunga area (Gorilla mountain ranges in Uganda, Rwanda and Congo) coordinated by the International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP) – a coalition of the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), Fauna and Flora International (FFI) and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). The coalition works at a regional level and collaborates with respective protected area authorities of the three countries in which it operates; the Office Rwandais de Tourisme et des Parcs Nationaux (ORTPN), the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) and the Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature (ICCN).

Bwindi Impenetrable National Park lies in one of Uganda's most densely populated regions, with more than 300 persons per square kilometer in some areas and an annual population growth rate of 3.5% (UBOS, 2008). The majority of local people are Bantu agriculturalists (Bakiga and Bafumbira) and the minority (0.5%) is Batwa, a Central African forest people. The total population in the three study parishes is approximately 21,000 people with an average household size of 4.6 (UBOS, 2010).

The area that is currently gazetted a park served the community as a source of income (from sales of timber, firewood, and alluvial gold and game meat), medicine (medicinal plants) and extra food (wild mushrooms, game meat and honey) (Korbee, 2007; Namara & Nsabagasani, 2003). Namara and Nsabagasani (2003) further note that the agricultural land around Bwindi has become less productive due to over-cultivation and soil erosion and the park is often seen as a potential fertile area for expansion of subsistence agriculture. Upgrading Bwindi

from a Forest Reserve to a National Park in 1991 was intended to protect the 'tiny 330-square-kilometre island of biodiversity' (Nowak, 1995) that was threatened by large-scale logging, poaching and other activities by people. As a National Park, access was forbidden for communities in search of park resources (Hecker, 2005; Namara & Nsabasagani, 2003).

The closure of resource access was not an effective conservation solution. Instead, it ignited resentment among communities as they were denied income from forest resources and wild foods (Nowak, 1995). This led to conflicts between communities and park staff, manifested in sixteen fires started in and around the park by communities in 1992 and other confrontations (AWF, 2009). Resource deprivation and crop raiding (by baboons, monkeys, gorillas, and forest elephants) led to negative community attitudes towards the park (Hamilton *et al.*, 2000; Nowak, 1995). As a result, conservation actors became concerned that local hostility to the park undermined its protection.

To mitigate conflict, the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) started implementing a handful of community conservation interventions aimed at harnessing community needs with conservation, controlling problem animals, conservation awareness campaigns but also the 'stick' mechanism to enforce park regulations. Some of the interventions consist(ed) of various combinations of the following: collaborative resource management arrangements, problem animal management, conservation education and awareness programs, and demarcation of park boundaries (Chhetri *et al.*, 2003; UWA, 2004a).

Under collaborative resource management, access by the local community to some park resources like medicinal plants, firewood (dead wood), mushrooms, and honey (whose harvesting does not have serious negative conservation impacts) is allowed with permission from the Chief Warden. This means that communities' access is still very much controlled. Several problem-animal control mechanisms have since been put in place, including stone walls (against buffalos), thorn hedge and red pepper growing (against primates and forest elephants) in some parts of the park with the intention of stopping wildlife from crossing community gardens. Conservation education and communication has also been implemented through drama organized in schools around the park and conservation messages sent over the radio and through meetings with local leaders in areas around the park. In addition, park boundary demarcation has been employed to tame conflicts arising from 'ignorance' of park boundaries. This has been implemented through the plantation of eucalyptus trees as land marks to separate the park and community private land.

In addition, various Integrated Conservation and Development (ICD) interventions were initiated by international conservation and development organizations working with UWA at Bwindi. These included the establishment of a major agricultural development program, and support for farmers to grow substitutes for forest products, such as timber in woodlots (Blomley *et al.*, 2010, unpublished report). A crucial component of the ICD program was the establishment of tourism. Tourism was launched at Bwindi in 1993 after the preparation of its development plan by IGCP. Since then, the park has experienced tourism development hinged on mountain gorilla trekking. As a further demonstration of global-local connections at Bwindi, new actors like IUCN joined WWF, IGCP, UWA and Makerere University in

processing and nominating Bwindi to UNESCO to be included on a World Heritage list. Given the tremendous biological importance of the park, UNESCO declared Bwindi a World Heritage Site in 1994. The enrolment of UNESCO as an actor in the conservation processes of Bwindi widened the scope of international actors at a local level and raised Bwindi's conservation status. This development further catalyzed tourism development through an increase in visitor flows and tourism-related businesses.

1.4.2 Tourism at Bwindi

Bwindi is an important area for gorilla trekking activity, a pillar of Uganda's tourism. However, other tourism activities have also been developed, including community trails, forest walks, butterfly and bird watching and these are contributing to the generation of tourism revenue (Sandbrook, 2006). The park headquarter is located at Buhoma and gorilla trekking permits are purchased from UWA general headquarters in Kampala. At the time of this study, six gorilla families had been habituated for tourism, but more than two were still undergoing the habituation process. Habituation is a taming process of familiarizing gorillas to the close presence of human beings (Woodford *et al.*, 2002). This process varies in duration depending on the behavior of particular gorilla groups and the process can, at times, last up to 7 years as the Nkuringo group proved (UWA official, research interview, 2009).

The six gorilla groups available for tourism are:

1. The Mubare group ('M' group), opened for tourism in 1993 and consists of 10 gorillas with one silverback.
2. The Habinyanja group ('H' group), opened for tourism in 1998 and is composed of 21 individuals with 2 silverbacks.
3. The Rushegura group ('R' group), opened for tourism in 2002, with 10 gorillas and 1 silverback.

The above three groups are accessed through Buhoma, Kanungu district. But due to political and community pressure and the need to maximize tourism revenue, three extra groups were habituated:

4. The Nkuringo group ('N' group), opened for tourism in 2004 and is composed of 19 gorillas and 1 silverback. This group is accessed through the Nkuringo sector, Kisoro district.
5. The Bitukura Group ('B' group) was opened for tourism on the 1st of September 2008. This is located at Ruhija, Kabale district.
6. The sixth group was opened in late 2009 at Nsongi, Kisoro district.

As of 2010, two more groups were still to be opened for tourism. Eight tourists were allowed to trek each gorilla group per day. A gorilla trekking permit cost USD 500 for foreign non-residents, USD 475 for East African residents and about USD 80 for Ugandan citizens. Plans were also underway to offer discounts on permits especially in the low tourism business seasons. The gorilla permits revenue makes Bwindi one of the most lucrative National Parks in Uganda. Visitor numbers have grown from 1,313 in 1993 to 4,048 in 2002 and 10,124 in 2008 (UWA, 2010a). The tourism revenues (from park entry fees and gorilla permits) at the park have shown a growing trend ranging from USD 898,400 in 2003, USD 2,052,928 in 2006 and to USD 3,316,900 in 2009 (UWA, 2010b; Ahebwa *et al.*, 2011).

It was a common belief among actors that tourism at Bwindi would generate revenue for both conservation and local development, generating jobs and other benefits for local people and, thus, justifying the existence of the park to communities (Nowak, 1995). According to the logic of Integrated Conservation and Development (ICD) approaches, for tourism to earn the support of communities for conservation there must be meaningful benefits which accrue to a large number of people. However, from the outset, tourism around Bwindi was largely dominated by private sector businesses (Sandbrook, 2006 and 2008). In an attempt to ensure greater community access to tourism benefits, UWA and support institutions have applied three main tourism-related policy interventions in villages around the park which are the subject of this thesis. They are:

1. *Direct community involvement in tourism businesses* (initiated in 1993), where a Community-Based Tourism Enterprise (CBTE) in Mukono parish, Kanungu District, has been supported to take advantage of tourism.
2. *Tourism Revenue Sharing arrangements* (started in 1994, but legalized in 1996), with 20% of total 'gate' collections channeled through district administration to communities in all frontline parishes surrounding the park. Since 2006, a USD 5 gorilla levy was added to the revenue sharing fund at BINP.
3. *Private-Community Partnership* (since 2006), where a joint venture in a high-end eco-lodge (Clouds Mountain Lodge) between communities of the Nteko and Rubuguri parishes, Kisoro district and a private operator has been initiated.

This thesis analyzes the three tourism-related policy intervention models (also referred to as arrangements in this thesis) outlined above and evaluates their implications in addressing livelihood and conservation concerns at Bwindi. The thesis looks critically at the functioning of each of the three policy intervention arrangements. It explicates the introduction and implementation processes. It also evaluates the extent to which the three policy interventions address livelihood and conservation concerns. Therefore, the central objective of this thesis is: 'To analyze the introduction, development and implementation of the three tourism-related policy interventions and evaluate their implications on livelihoods and conservation at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park'.

By expounding the processes and context in which the tourism-related intervention models are implemented, this thesis makes a contribution to on-going contemporary debates on policy strategies that can be employed to redeem the threatened biodiversity in the developing world. More so, on the extent to which the use of market-based mechanisms that seek to use tourism in biodiversity conservation efforts in Africa can work. It adds a voice to ongoing discussions regarding the relevance of Community-Based Tourism Enterprises (CBTEs), Tourism-Revenue-Sharing (TRS) and Private-Community Partnership (PCP) policy arrangements that have been advocated by international and national conservation organizations over the last few years as possible conservation and development links. The study was conducted in a developing country, where poverty and biodiversity conservation concerns are outstanding in the face of tourism development. Thus, it generates additional primary and scientific information that is needed in the scientific circles on conservation and development.

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If tourism is to be employed by policy makers as a tool for improving community livelihoods and promoting conservation, information generated empirically on its implications through different models of policy interventions is very vital. The results contained in this thesis will provide a basis for conservationists and tourism practitioners to understand the position of tourism in regard to conservation and poverty alleviation as they address their concerns to governments and other funding agencies. It will provide a critical view on tourism-related policy interventions being implemented at Bwindi and the lessons learned. The information will be of particular value to AWF, IGCP and UWA, the key conservation organizations in the region. But also to the development actors such as USAID and the Ugandan government in understanding the extent to which tourism can go in addressing development issues.

1.5 The structure of this thesis

This thesis is composed of seven chapters. Chapter 2 introduces and elaborates the theoretical basis of this thesis and gives an account of the methodological choices. Elaborated are the sensitizing concepts and how they were used at Bwindi. It also spells out the research questions. Chapter Three provides a historical overview of the introduction of the Buhoma-Mukono Community-Based Tourism Enterprise arrangement. It then analyses the implementation of this model from a policy arrangements perspective. The chapter concludes by explaining the governance capacity of the Buhoma arrangement.

Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 describe the introduction and development of Tourism-Revenue-Sharing and the Private-Community-Partnership arrangements respectively. The chapters also provide a four-dimensional analysis of the two arrangements using the policy arrangement approach and end by explaining the governance capacity of the two policy arrangement models and highlighting their shortfalls.

Chapter 6 discusses the implications of the three tourism-related policy interventions on the community livelihoods and associated outcomes in addressing conservation threats at Bwindi. It compares the three policy interventions in terms of livelihood implications and shows how the policy processes influenced livelihood outcomes. The conservation implications are discussed on the basis of the threat reduction indicators (attitudes, park-community relationships, trend of illegal activities). The chapter ends by indicating the conservation gains at Bwindi and commenting on the position of tourism in the whole process.

Finally, Chapter 7 presents the overall conclusions of the thesis. The chapter uses outcomes at Bwindi to illustrate that policy making is an on-going process of construction and reconstruction. It highlights continuous developments within the three policy arrangements which are most likely to continue even in the future. The chapter also indicates that policy processes have a bearing on shaping the livelihood and conservation outcomes. It therefore emphasizes the need for analysis of the policy processes so as to be able to understand how policy implications are shaped.

2. Policy arrangements, livelihoods and conservation: theoretical and methodological accounts

2.1 Introduction

In Chapter 1, I introduced the main research aim of this thesis: 'to analyze the introduction, development and implementation of the three tourism-related policy interventions and evaluate their implications on livelihoods and conservation at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park'.

To address such a research aim, an analytical and evaluation 'lens' is required. This 'lens' should give guidance on what to look for and how to interpret and explain what is found in line with the stated research aim. It was a challenge to find conceptual tools that would help to frame and achieve such a research aim in the complex setting found at Bwindi. In such a setting, the contexts within which people interact as well as the policy processes are neither predictable nor completely consistent. But to deal with this, I opted to follow the suggestions of Charmez (2003), Bowen (2006), Buizer (2008) and Van der Duim (2011) to deduce concepts or categories as 'sensitizing concepts' to empirically assist the analysis of policy intervention models and the evaluation of their outcomes.

According to Blumer (1954), sensitizing concepts give the user a general sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances, most especially in a qualitative study. Sensitizing concepts 'draw attention to important features of social interaction and provide guidelines for research in specific settings' (Bowen, 2006: 14). Gilgun (2002: 4 in: Bowen, 2006) argues that 'research usually begins with such concepts, whether researchers state this or not and whether they are aware of them or not'. And to this, Charmaz (2003) and Bowen (2006) add that sensitizing concepts provide background frames or ideas that inform the overall research problem. They are ways of seeing, organizing and understanding empirical situations and outcomes.

In summary, sensitizing concepts are important starting points for a qualitative study; they are interpretive devices and guidelines for analysis and evaluation rather than imperatives (see also Buizer, 2008). The following sections present the analytical and evaluation direction of this thesis as well as the methodological choices.

2.2 Creating analytical and evaluation clarity

Insights from the policy analysis literature in general indicate that the functioning of a policy and/or its interventions in any field involves the interaction of actors, whose daily policy

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practices are shaped within specific rules or institutional frameworks (Arts & Goverde, 2006; Arts *et al.*, 2003; Leroy & Van Tatenhove, 2006; Wiering & Immink, 2006). In the process of interaction and putting policy into practice, these actors make use of resources. There are also often dominant and dissenting discourses associated with a policy in question and, at times, discourse coalitions emerge (Arnouts, 2010; Arnouts *et al.*, 2011; Hajer, 2003; Van Gossum *et al.*, 2011). Four key analytical concepts were therefore delineated from the above sources to guide the realization of the first part of the research aim: (a) actors/coalitions, (b) rules, (c) resources/power as well as, (d) discourses.

Again, from the existing literature, several 'meso' theories and frameworks were found that can guide the analysis of these concepts. Most of these theories/frameworks largely address one or two of the outlined concepts. For example, discourse analysis (Dewulf, 2009; Hajer, 1995), the policy network approaches (Evans, 2001; Jordan & Schubert, 1992) and the advocacy coalition approaches (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). These can be used to study discourses, actors and coalitions respectively. Power analysis approaches also exist to elaborate issues of resources and resource allocation (Meyer, 2001). However, the Policy Arrangements Approach (PAA) (Liefferink, 2006; Van Tatenhove *et al.*, 2000) which builds upon the outlined meso theories appeared to be an encompassing and a more comprehensive analytical point of entry for the first part of this study's aim. It attaches equal importance to the four concepts delineated above and combines their analysis.

2.2.1 The Policy Arrangements Approach

The Policy Arrangements Approach was developed as an analytical framework to 'describe and characterize [policy] arrangements [and] to interpret and understand their relative stability or change, and the mechanisms behind these dynamics' (Arts *et al.*, 2006: 13). It does so through the analysis of four different dimensions of policy arrangements, namely actors (and coalitions), discourses, rules of the game, and resource/power. By considering each of these aspects, the framework captures both the technical and political dimensions of policy enactment as well as its functioning (Van der Zouwen, 2006; Wiering & Arts, 2006).

A policy arrangement is defined as 'a temporary stabilization of the organization and substance of a policy domain at a specific level of policy making' (Arts *et al.*, 2000: 54). To stay within the scope of this thesis, the domain at stake is the tourism-conservation and development nexus, manifested through numerous policy intervention models of which three are applied at Bwindi. Each of the three tourism-related policy intervention models can be seen in temporary substantive (in terms of discourses and rules) and organizational (in terms of actors and resources) terms. As such, PAA argues that the institutionalization of policy interventions is an ongoing process of construction and reconstruction (Van der Zouwen, 2006). From the PAA perspective, the analytical point of entry can follow any of its four dimensions as long as they are all finally tackled.

Actors/coalitions

The 'actors' dimension entails an analysis of people and organizations involved or excluded in the formation and implementation of a policy arrangement as well as those who benefit from it (Buizer, 2008). On the other hand coalitions refer to 'clusters of actors grouped around certain points of view, interests or policy perspectives' (Wiering & Immink, 2006: 2). A coalition is formed, for example, when individual actors join with others to achieve more or less similar goals (*ibid.*). Coalitions may share resources or the understanding and interpretation of discourses in the context of the applied rules of the game. But it is important to note that in this process, dominant discourses and rules may be supported by some actors while others challenge them. As a result, 'supporting' and 'challenging' coalitions can eventually emerge as well as the wielders and the yielders (Buizer, 2008). Yet, advocacy coalitions can emerge based on shared beliefs (Liefferink, 2006).

This thesis analyses actors (and coalitions) associated with the three tourism-related policy interventions at Bwindi. It considers actors at different scales and analyses the roles of each in designing the interventions and putting them into practice. It also considers emerging coalitions supporting or challenging certain ideals. This is especially done by looking at who is involved in coalitions, why they are formed and their implications in the process. An understanding of the coalitions and why they existed in particular situations helped to explain the nature of the rules in place, and how they are interpreted by actors.

Discourses

From the policy arrangements perspective, discourses refer to sets of ideas, perceptions, narratives and storylines possessed by actors about a particular policy or key paradigms prevailing in a given policy domain (Arts, 2006; Liefferink, 2006). They are interpretive schemes that actors or coalitions make use of and are closely linked to practices (Arts *et al.*, 2006; Wiering & Arts, 2006). It is through the ensemble of these perceptions, or ideas, which are produced and reproduced in certain practices that meaning is given to physical and social realities (Arts & Van Tatenhove, 2004). Generally, a policy arrangement can be characterized by one particular dominant policy discourse, the content of which is often challenged by competing or supportive discourses. This implies that discourses might support or challenge a policy arrangement and might refer to detailed theories or policy programs or simply popular buzzwords such as 'participation' (Arts *et al.*, 2000).

In this study, the 'discourse' dimension of the policy arrangements approach guided the analysis of particular narratives or storylines possessed by actors and the key paradigms enshrined and prevailing in policy documents in relation to the implementation of the three tourism-related policy interventions at Bwindi.

Rules (of the game)

According to Van Tatenhove *et al.* (2000), the 'rules' dimension of a policy arrangement relates to the formal procedures of decision making, informal rules and routines of

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interaction. Formal rules are fixed in legal forms such as constitutions, binding agreements or a memorandum of understanding, while informal rules simply raise the do's and the don'ts for actors (Arts & Van Tatenhove, 2004). Such rules shape the boundaries within which policy interventions are implemented. For example, they specify how financial resources are allocated, how issues are raised, how evaluation is done, and who does what in the process of policy implementation (Ahebwa *et al.*, 2011; Buizer, 2008).

Drawing from the above, in this thesis 'rules of the game' generally guided the analysis of regulatory instruments associated with the three policy intervention models at Bwindi. Conducting this analysis entailed, among others things, an examination of the guiding constitutions, binding agreements and other actor-interaction procedures such as minutes of meetings. Subsequently, this thesis highlights these rules, explains how they were designed and put into practice by actors; who does what, how issues are raised and how agendas are set, how interests are expressed, how profits and other benefits are shared or accessed, how rules are implemented, how decisions are made and implemented, and which procedures and allocation tasks are involved. The thesis further explains how the enactment and operationalization of these regulatory frames has at times caused problems leading to resistance, coalition formation and demand for adjustment. In addition, it elaborates how rules shaped the outcomes of the three policy models at Bwindi.

Resources/power

Actors' access, possession, and the ability to mobilize resources, lead to differences in power and influence (Liefverink, 2006). Division of resources also defines and configures relations of power. Therefore, power can be defined as the ability of actors to mobilize and deploy resources. Resources can be financial, knowledge, political, religious, land, contacts, etc. (Buizer, 2008), and may be mobilized and deployed by actors in policy arrangements. As they are the media through which power is exercised, they may lead to new inequalities within and between societal fractions. However, there is always a possibility for the 'powerless' actors to form coalitions and command negotiating power over the resource powerful actors (Ahebwa *et al.*, in press). When this happens, Scott (1985) describes it as invoking the 'weapons of the weak'.

The ability to manipulate the social situation of others or their perception of it, by the exercise of one's resources and rights, thereby increasing the pressures on others to act in accordance with one's own wishes, is power based on influence (Meyer, 2001). Influence is always hidden power and its inclusion in power analysis widens the focus and helps to generate a deeper understanding of all hidden forces that could be influencing policy processes, implementation and decision-making processes (Meyer, 2001).

Again, this thesis makes use of this dimension to explicate the processes leading to the enactment and implementation of the three policy interventions at Bwindi. It guides an understanding of who owns resources, how they are utilized and deployed, which rules guided resource utilization and the implications of resource deployment and differences in actor possession of resources to the processes and outcomes.

Interrelations between the four PAA dimensions

The dimensions of policy arrangements approach described above can be visualized as a tetrahedron (Lieverink, 2006; Figure 2.1). Not only does the tetrahedron illustrate the four dimensions, but it also shows that an analysis of a policy domain and/or its interventions can be approached from any angle of the tetrahedron as long as all dimensions are finally tackled (Ahebwa *et al.*, 2011; Liefferink, 2006).

In addition, the four dimensions do not just sum up to define a policy arrangement. They are inextricably interwoven, meaning that a change in one dimension can trigger a change in all other dimensions (Lieverink, 2006). For example, the entry of new actors can cause the injection of new financial resources which in turn may necessitate new guiding rules. And in the process, this might cause a shift in the prevailing discourses. This interrelationship is useful in analyzing a policy arrangement at a given period of time (Arts & Leroy, 2006). This is one of the strengths of PAA as it generates a deeper understanding of the whole policy process.

Due to the instrumental role of multi-level actors in the scaling-down, implementation and adoption of tourism-conservation and development policy interventions at a local scale, the actor perspective coincidentally surfaces as the main point of departure in this thesis. But its linkage with other dimensions in enactment and implementation of policy interventions at Bwindi is explained.

The policy arrangement approach has proved useful in analyzing developments and changes in policies for periods ranging from 2 years to over 20 years (Van der Zouwen, 2006). It has been applied to a broad range of policy arenas including nature (Arnouts, 2010; Van Gossum *et al.*, 2011), water (Wiering & Immink, 2006), agriculture (Lieverink, 2006) and environment/land (Arts *et al.*, 2006; Buizer, 2008).




Figure 2.1. Tetrahedron portraying the four dimensions of the Policy Arrangements Approach (Adopted from Liefferink, 2006).

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Moreover, the policy arrangement approach is also useful in the investigation of the governance capacity of the new modes of governance (Arts & Goverde, 2006) such as policy interventions at Bwindi. As explained earlier in the first chapter, tourism-related policy interventions were engaged as 'new' modes of biodiversity governance after the shortcomings of 'fortress' approaches. By establishing the governance capacity, the extent to which these modes of governance (policy interventions) are able to contribute to the solution of the prevailing conservation problem (Nelissen *et al.*, 2000 in: Arts & Goverde, 2006) can be reflected. Accordingly, a high governance capacity means that the institutional preconditions of the policy arrangement contribute to the effective realization of the desired policy impact (Van Gossum *et al.*, 2011). To examine this capacity, Arts and Goverde, (2006) borrowed the concept of 'congruence' from Boonstra (2004) This concept is divided into three: (1) the policy views of the different actors (*strategic congruence*); (2) the coherence between the four dimensions of policy arrangement (*internal-structural congruence*); and (3) the extent to which the policy interventions are entrenched in wider conservation and development policies (*external-structural congruence*).

According to Arts and Goverde (2006: 80):

The assumption is that a certain level of congruence – strategic and structurally, internally as well as externally – is needed for a policy arrangement to perform (and in contrast, that a lack of congruence implies governance failure). What 'a certain level of congruence' means, by the way, is hard to say in general terms and it remains an empirical question to be specified in any research.

This implies that we cannot expect congruence to mean a perfect situation (harmony) or total consensus or consistency (in the case of strategic and structural congruence respectively) (Grin *et al.*, 2004). Total 'harmony' cannot be attained because some contradictions are inevitable, and there is always room for contentions and counter movements in policy processes as well as real-life situations (Arts & Goverde, 2006). These contradictions and inconsistencies however should not be 'too much' to pose a big constraint and hamper the policy implementation process (*ibid.*). Hence, the key shortcoming of applying this concept is that it gives the policy analyst the role of 'a judge' to determine an 'acceptable' level of congruence below which it becomes difficult for policy interventions to shape intended outcomes.

It should be noted here that the policy arrangements approach is largely useful in understanding the institutional pre-conditions and how they influence the performance of particular policy arrangements (Arts & Goverde, 2006). However, evaluating the implications of these policy arrangements on livelihoods and conservation necessitated additional evaluation frames. This leads to the second part of the research aim addressed in this thesis. But before I do that, I would like to re-emphasize that the four dimensions of PAA (actors/coalitions, discourses, rules and resources/power) were taken and utilized as 'sensitizing concepts' to guide the realization of this thesis.

2.2.2 Evaluating the implications of policy interventions

In the second part of the research aim, I set out to evaluate the implications of the three tourism-related policy interventions on livelihoods and conservation. Again, I relied on insights from literature, but this time in relation to 'livelihood' and 'conservation' concepts as well as policy evaluation. Accordingly, evaluation is seen as the collection of evidence of the performance of a policy/intervention and make judgment of its worth or merit (Plummer & Armitage, 2007). Evidence-based policy making is seen as one of the essential ingredients of contemporary public management and policy impact assessment as it helps in determining how effective selected approaches are in achieving their specified targets (Radej, 2011). Evaluation identifies shortcomings in policies, or interventions and may justify or query decisions and actions as well as contribute to learning processes leading to improved policy making and implementation (Plummer & Armitage, 2007; Van der Meer & Edelenbos, 2006).

The evolution of evaluation has gone through different 'generations' with measurement being central to the 'first generation' (Guba & Lincoln, 1989) and still remains a popular policy evaluation approach (Plummer & Armitage, 2007). The measurement model emphasizes identification of the goal variable first, and an assessment of whether such a goal is attained as an intended result of the intervention/policy in question. This positivist linear thinking has however been criticized as one-sided, too limited and characterized by methodological individualism which underrates the influence of structures as well as institutions in policy processes (Arts & Goverde, 2006). In addition, it is seen to ignore issues of complexity (multi-level problems) related to policy processes (Radej, 2011).

To overcome the weaknesses of this measurement (rational) model, a 'second generation' evaluation is proposed and characterized by a re-evaluation of the classical rational model (Plummer & Armitage, 2007). Here, the idea of determining a goal variable and measurement is retained but more emphasis is also placed on the description of patterns pertaining and leading to the stated objectives.

The 'third generation' evaluation-judgment/multi-criteria model is also an extension of the classical rational approach (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). The evaluator's roles are extended from being a mere 'objective measurer' of policy effects to passing judgment based on a range of criteria such as legality, participation, equity, institutional capacity as well as effectiveness (Arts & Goverde, 2006). Multi-criteria judgment is claimed to produce multi-level logic which goes beyond rationalism (Fischer, 1995) although the evaluator still claims expert authority (Arts & Goverde, 2006).

The 'fourth generation' evaluation is responsive constructivist. It is proposed based on the shortcomings of the earlier approaches (Plummer & Armitage, 2007). Abma (2001) argues that:

Performance measurement and value judgments are no longer adequate in situations of ambiguity, uncertainty and complexity, which are characteristic for

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our late-modern society. The problem is that these types of evaluation seem to reduce and fix interests and values according to the demands of an objectivist-empirical method, undervaluing dynamics in policy processes and shifts in policy preferences... also the evaluator claims authoritative expertise, subordinating the one of stakeholders
(Arts & Goverde, 2006: 72).

Accordingly, the constructivist model takes the evaluator as a process facilitator who should actively engage stakeholders, capturing their views on the policy issue in question (Sanderson, 2000). Such a process is seen to inspire dialogue, participation, collaboration and mutual learning processes which take into consideration different views of stakeholders (Chess, 2000) while disregarding pre-set evaluation criteria and the evaluator's judge's role (Bryan, 2004).

In general, this thesis borrows a lot from previously described models. First, it takes note and does not disregard the basic aspects of social constructivism such as collaboration, participation and discussion with stakeholders (at policy making, implementation and beneficiary levels). This is because such a stance helps the evaluator not to fall completely into the trap of a closed, fixed, and one-sided linear position of positivism. At the same time, it is necessary for a policy evaluator to propose (pre-set) the evaluation 'frames' to guide the rather 'open' dialogue process and to situate the evaluation process within the existing body of knowledge on a particular policy issue in question. By doing this, the evaluator avoids a scenario that Arts & Goverde (2006: 73) describe as; 'de-valuing the policy scientist into a subjective story teller or an interactive process facilitator at best'. These processes can be augmented with reflexive and judgmental approaches such as situational analysis, technical verification, and interaction. The results from all these approaches can then be aggregated/triangulated into assessment domains that correspond to the guiding evaluation 'frames'. In this thesis, 'livelihood' and 'conservation' concepts were also taken as 'sensitizing concepts' to guide the evaluation of policy intervention outcomes.

The concept of livelihood

'Livelihood' is a concept that creates a deeper understanding of the dimensions of poverty (Haan & Zoomers, 2005). The use of the concept has gained global relevance out of the need to address poverty in response to the desire to fulfill the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG 1) which has become the central focus of development assistance (DFID, 1999). Addressing poverty necessitated an understanding of its dimensions since it is relative and difficult to define in absolute terms (Brocklesby *et al.*, 2003). The design and implementation of appropriate remedies necessitates taking an all-round view of the circumstances surrounding and determining poverty (DFID, 1999). It is the definitional problems of poverty that gave rise to the use of the term livelihood. Already, the livelihood concept is advanced by several development actors as a tool and an approach that assists in packaging the appropriate interventions to tackle poverty as well as a frame for evaluating such interventions (Brocklesby *et al.*, 2003).

To conservationists, understanding the aspects of livelihood is vital to comprehend the effectiveness of the conservation and development policy interventions aimed at linking and addressing livelihood and conservation concerns (Salafsky & Wollenberg, 2000). This is because community livelihood requirements in many developing countries have most of the time been in conflict with conservation objectives (Kiss, 2004). The dominant assumption by many conservation actors has always been that attempts to address community livelihood needs around biodiversity areas would automatically ease the process of achieving conservation aims (Ashley & Hussein, 2000) as it is perceived to counter threats to ecosystems at a given site (Salafsky & Wollenberg, 2000; Salafsky *et al.*, 2001). Such an assumption cannot be verified without considering and understanding the dimensions of livelihoods and what they mean and imply for conservation.

The livelihood concept is not new as it has been used since the 1940s through the 1960s and 70s to describe people's ways and means of making a living (Kaag *et al.*, 2008). According to the UK Department for International Development (DFID, 1999), livelihood thinking continued to be traced in the rural development works of Robert Chambers in the mid-1980s. But since the 1980s, there were shifts in perspectives of looking at poverty to include elements like participation, empowerment and social networking as evidenced in the works of Sen, Swift, Chambers and Conway and Moser between 1981 and 1998 (Brocklesby *et al.*, 2003).

The livelihood concept gained global recognition in almost the same period as the sustainable development concept. It was in 1987 that the Brundtland Commission was established and the Commission's report *Our Common Future* (1987) became the benchmark for thinking about the global environment. This was the time that the term 'sustainable development' also became popular. In the same year (1987), the World Commission on Environment and Development made use of the term 'sustainable livelihoods' to discuss resource ownership, basic needs and rural livelihood security (Brocklesby *et al.*, 2003). Brocklesby *et al.* (2003) further note the adoption of sustainable livelihoods in linking socio-economic and environmental concerns by the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992. Since then, the Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) has been advanced by DFID and adopted by many development organizations and practitioners as a lens through which livelihood issues can be understood. The framework has been widely used in fields of rural development, community development, tourism and conservation management as well as forest management (Ashley & Hussein, 2000; Brocklesby *et al.*, 2003; Mazur *et al.*, 2008; Simpson, 2007; Turton, 2000). It is also adopted as an operational tool for DFID and the UK's Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and to some extent by other international organizations like United Nations Development Programme, World Food Programme, Oxfam, CARE International and Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).

In DFID's (1999) simplified version, the sustainable livelihood framework constitutes five main aspects (Figure 2.2 and Box 2.1): (1) assets or capital endowments; (2) livelihood strategies/activities; (3) outcomes, (4) external influences (policies, institutions and processes) and (5) context.




Figure 2.2. The five main aspects of the Sustainable Livelihood Framework (adapted from DFID Sustainable Livelihood Presentation).

Box 2.1. Description of the main Sustainable Livelihood Framework aspects (based on Ashley & Hussein, 2000).

- *Capital assets:* (human capital, natural capital, social capital, physical capital and financial capital). These are the basic livelihood building blocks and determine people’s ability to escape poverty. From assets, livelihood outcomes are derived.
- *Outcomes:* Elements of improved livelihoods or wellbeing (e.g. more income, empowerment, good health, reduced vulnerability, food security, and more sustainable use of natural resources). These are what people try to achieve through their activities or strategies.
- *Livelihood strategies:* what people do to earn a living (e.g. farming, hunting, mining, trading etc).
- *External influences:* Policies, institutions and processes that affect assets and opportunities that are available and their productivity; e.g. policy interventions, formal organizations and informal organizations, and access to market. These also shape people’s access to capital assets.
- *Context:* The context is the external environment in which people operate. The natural, demographic and economic context shapes people’s access to assets and shocks and trends tend to increase their vulnerability.

Summarized within the framework of this thesis, policies, institutions and processes shape people's access to capital assets (see also Brocklesby *et al.*, 2003). The impact of policies, processes and institutions on capital assets in turn determines livelihood outcomes which again can re-shape *capital assets* that people possess. This chain of events (policies – capital assets – outcomes – capital assets) is likely to influence the livelihood strategies that people pursue to earn a living and can influence the context in which people operate (by either decreasing, increasing or not affecting at all people's vulnerability). In a situation of poverty, a 'poor' livelihood outcome is always based on an inadequate or limited set of livelihood assets which make it difficult to adapt to shocks, changes and trends, especially if there is a lack of enabling policies and institutions to enhance asset possession and usage. Escaping poverty is therefore largely perceived to be dependent on people's access to capital assets or the propagation of enabling policies.

As elaborated on in Chapter One, the three tourism-related policy interventions at Bwindi aimed to enhance people's livelihood as a means to address conservation threats. With the help of the four dimensions of the PAA, this thesis analyses the three policy interventions and evaluates whether the alignment of their substantial and organizational characteristics bear any implications on capital assets, livelihood outcomes, strategies and whether or not this in turn influences the vulnerability context and conservation outcomes. This approach is also supported by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report (MEA, 2005) which defines human wellbeing in terms of capital assets (social, human, physical, natural and financial capitals) and emphasizes their potential to trigger a chain of reactions that affect other aspects of livelihood and also biodiversity conservation. Based on Ashley and Hussien (2000), Table 2.1 highlights the main livelihood aspects and the key 'research issues' that can be explored.

The concept of conservation

In Chapter 1, I explained the various paradigm shifts and how the conservation concept has been understood to the present day. So as not to repeat that, I will only re-emphasize the current view on conservation. Though still contested, the present popular interpretation of the concept draws heavily on the principles of sustainability where people, planet and profit (Mowforth & Munt, 2009) are supposed to be given equal attention in policy frameworks. In this line of thinking, conservationists have opted for a more 'sustainable approach' where local people's needs and their participation are taken into consideration in conservation campaigns (Wells & McShane, 2004), popularly known as community conservation (Hulme & Murphree, 2001; Chhetri *et al.*, 2003). The general view among conservationists is that the survival of wildlife remaining in the world depends largely on the willingness of local people. It is therefore essential to establish good relations and get local people involved (Campbell *et al.*, 2003).

Over the last two decades, there has been a growing interest in conservation and development interventions commonly referred to as Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) to address the twin challenge of biodiversity conservation and development. The emerging debate however is whether these ICDPs achieve conservation objectives (Salafsky & Margoluis, 1999; Wells *et al.*, 1992; Western & Wright, 1994). One of the reasons behind

Table 2.1. Main livelihood aspects and research issues that can be explored (adopted with modifications from Ashley & Hussein (2000)).

Main livelihood aspects	Issues for exploration
<p>Capital assets and livelihood outcomes Human, financial, physical, natural and social capitals</p>	<p>Policy implications on capital assets and the associated outcomes What are the implications of policy interventions on capital assets and what are the associated livelihood outcomes? (e.g. skills development, labor, education/schools, capacity to work, knowledge, income, savings and credit, land and produce, water and aquatic resources, transport-roads, vehicles, water supply and sanitation, energy, communications, shelter, social networks, empowerment, relationships of trust, formal and informal groups, etc).</p>
<p>Livelihood strategies</p>	<p>Policy implications on livelihood activities to what extent do policy interventions influence livelihood strategies? to what extent are existing livelihood activities a threat to biodiversity?</p>
<p>Context</p>	<p>Policy implications on the context to what extent do policy interventions influence people's ability to cope with shocks and trends (e.g. droughts, seasonal changes, death, population growth, technology, etc)?</p>

these debates is the incongruity on what to consider and how to describe the outcomes of conservation interventions.

Literature indicates that assessment of conservation outcomes in particular localities such as Bwindi should be focused on the extent to which they address the prevailing conservation threats (Margoluis *et al.*, 2009). Accordingly, Salafsky *et al.* (1999) argue that the most proximate threats to biodiversity conservation in many developing countries are human-induced (direct threats). Direct threats can be divided into internal threats – caused by actors living close to biodiversity areas (local communities) – and external threats caused by outsiders (e.g. logging companies) (Salafsky *et al.*, 2001). Salafsky *et al.* (2001: 1425) further argue that 'behind these direct threats are causal factors that are often less visible, but significant drivers of the threats' Examples of causal factors for external threats are government trade policies, demand for timber and firewood, and transportation development. Driving factors for internal threats are associated with communities' livelihood issues (e.g. need for cash), negative attitudes held by communities and local politicians (Adams *et al.*, 2004; Blomley *et al.*, 2010, unpublished report; Kiss, 2004), conflicts and disharmony between the communities and conservation authorities (Gillingham & Lee, 1999; Holmes, 2003; Infield & Namara, 2001; Salafsky & Margoluis, 1999).

It should be noted that since Bwindi was gazetted a National Park and later a World Heritage site, the new rules of the game decimated external threats. There was a general shift from external commercial activities to subsistence agriculture. As a consequence the main threats for the National park were local livelihood strains and general negative attitudes (Blomley *et al.*, 2010, unpublished report). Tourism-related interventions ultimately aimed at making use of tourism to link community livelihoods and conservation so as to mitigate internal threats. Reflecting a framework advanced by Salafsky *et al.* (2001) (see Figure 2.3), the logic behind the introduction of tourism-related policy interventions was that they could provide a direct link between biodiversity conservation and livelihoods through initiation of development-related projects. This link is perceived to trigger a sequence of activities (increased livelihood benefits, enhanced biodiversity value, improved local actors' attitudes and will and capacity to mitigate threats, reduction of unsustainable livelihood strategies), all of which lead to biodiversity conservation. This thesis elaborates the implementation and the outcomes of this logic at Bwindi.




Figure 2.3. Tourism and biodiversity conservation direct linkage strategy (adopted from Salafsky *et al.*, 2001).

2.2.3 Research questions

In general, guided by the six sensitizing concepts (actor/coalitions, discourses, rules, resources/power, livelihoods and conservation), the study that led to this thesis set out to answer two main research questions:

1. In what way is the introduction and implementation of the three tourism-related policy interventions at Bwindi shaped in terms of actors/coalitions, discourses, rules of the game, resources/power and what is the governing capacity of each of the three policy intervention models?
2. What are the implications of the three tourism-related policy interventions on livelihoods and to what extent have these interventions addressed conservation threats at Bwindi?

The thesis is based on two main phases of research: (1) the three tourism-related policy interventions seen from a Policy Arrangements Approach (PAA) (*phase one*); (2) the implications of tourism-related policy interventions on livelihoods and conservation at Bwindi (*phase two*). The studies were centered on three different cases: (1) the Buhoma model – Direct Community Involvement in Tourism Business (Community-Based Tourism Enterprise CBTE) – implemented in Mukono parish, Kanungu District; (2) the Tourism-Revenue Sharing arrangement, applied in all parishes around Bwindi, though the study focused only on three study parishes (Mukono, Nteko and Rubuguri) to be able to compare it with the other two tourism-related models; and (3) the Private-Community Partnership arrangement (Clouds Lodge model) in Nteko and Rubuguri parishes, Kisoro District.

2.3 Methodological approach

The cases largely necessitated an interpretive policy analysis which covers a wide range of data collection approaches (Yanow, 2000). Interpretive research which emphasizes ‘meaning making’ is a widely acknowledged and used approach (Buizer, 2008; Jennings, 2001). It assumes multiple realities, a subjective epistemology and a set of methodological procedures (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). In interpretive research, ‘the researcher commences the study in the empirical world in order to develop explanations of the phenomena’ (Jennings, 2001: 39). A researcher informed by the interpretive research paradigm gathers data from the empirical world using qualitative methodologies. To this end, several methods of data collection can be applied, for example participant observation, in-depth interviews, case studies, focus groups and informal discussions (Jennings, 2001).

The choice of an interpretive inquiry approach was based on the fact that it enables the researcher to gain in-depth understanding of a phenomenon grounded in the empirical world (Jennings, 2001). It generates rich data and anecdotes (Margoluis *et al.*, 2009). In the current study, the interest was rooted in gaining an in-depth understanding of the context, processes and implementation dynamics as well as how this finally affects livelihoods and conservation. Qualitative methods of data collection were therefore more appropriate.

However, for a more rigorous analysis and evaluation and to enhance the internal validity of the study, the interpretive approach was augmented by reflexive approaches (Arts & Goverde, 2006) that tend to borrow some useful elements from the judgmental and rational positivist models (Plummer & Armitage, 2007). For example, pre-defined concepts (a characteristic of rational models) were adopted at the initial stage but more as ‘sensitizing concepts’ to guide the rather ‘open’ interactive process where I largely played a facilitating role. It is problematic to determine how open an interpretive process should be. Yet a study should always have boundaries within which interaction, data collection and interpretation take place. In my case, the pre-set indicators that were largely based on insights from literature and views from key actors provided this guidance frame. In addition, situational analysis, and technical verification (characteristics of reflexive and judgmental approaches) were very important and necessary to enrich the data generated through open interaction processes.

Data from these aggregated methods were triangulated into assessment domains that corresponded with the analytical and evaluation framework for interpretation and meaning creation which emerged more rigorous. The next sections give details of how each study was executed. It should be noted that methods of data collection are explained as applied under each study. However, there were instances where, for example, in one focus group discussion, data were generated simultaneously for all studies. In general the field study was conducted over a period of 15 months from June 2009 to August 2010.

2.3.1. Tourism-related policy interventions seen from a Policy Arrangements Approach

Within this phase, three sub-studies were conducted focusing on each of the three policy interventions at Bwindi:

1. The Buhoma model sub-phase

The study kicked off with an extensive review of documents. Documents like the constitution, the association's agreements, minutes of meetings, and financial reports of Buhoma-Mukono Community Development Association (BMCDA) since the business venture was started were reviewed. Based on this review, large amounts of data on actors, operational rules, resource mobilization and allocation and official discourses were obtained. The BMCDA membership is limited to people of the Mukono parish which is composed of eleven villages, administratively called Local Council Institutions (LCIs). The villages are Iraaro, Kashebeya, Rubona, Mukono Central, Kyumbugushu, Buhoma Central, Nyakaina, Kanyashande, Kanyamisinga, Nkwenda, Mukongoro. Each of the eleven villages is under the leadership of a village leader (*LC1 chairman*) who is answerable to the parish leader (*LC2 chairman*). Interviews were conducted with each of the eleven village leaders (*LC1 chairmen*) as well as the LC2 chairman. The chairman of BMCDA, BINP's Chief Warden, Community Conservation Warden and IGCP Programme Coordinator were also identified as key informants and were interviewed. Thereafter, eleven Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were held with residents in the eleven villages of the parish. The focus groups consisted of approximately 15-25 people each, while in three cases (Buhoma central, Mukono central and in Nkwenda) about 50 people turned up because they felt eager to contribute to the study. The focus groups included women and men as well as youth above 18 years and they were all encouraged to participate freely. These exercises primarily generated an understanding of people's views on the implementation of BMCDA venture and the emerging challenges as well as its implication for their livelihoods and conservation.

The focus group discussions were conducted in a rather open-structured fashion. In the first instance participants were encouraged to express their views – negative as well as positive – about Bwindi in general terms. In each of the focus groups, participants were requested to raise their grievances. Afterwards, I asked them to point out any positive aspects related to the National Park. Detailed discussions ensued about implementation of BMCDA benefits and governance issues. After these group discussions, I also held 20 separate in-depth open-ended interviews with individuals who had distinguished themselves during the group discussions in terms of their ability to express themselves on issues regarding biodiversity conservation as well BMCDA issues. A deliberate effort

was made to have informal discussions (N = 10) with elders who never attended the meetings and through these informal meetings, the history around Bwindi and changes ushered in by tourism and BMCDA were recorded. Lastly, observation was employed as transect walks were made within the parish to see developments linked to the BMCDA venture. As pointed out earlier, some data for phase two (attitude towards the park, etc.) were generated from some of these focus group discussions. This sub study was concentrated in Mukono parish. In total 36 interviews were conducted (16 with key informants, and 20 with 'outstanding' people who were identified from focused group discussions). In each of the 11 villages of Mukono parish a focus group discussion was held, as well as 10 informal discussion with elders who never attended meetings but were identified by participants.

2. *The Tourism-Revenue Sharing model sub-phase*

In this sub study, data collection also started with a comprehensive review of relevant documents, including journal articles, books, and documents related to revenue-sharing, Community Protected Area Institutions (CPIs) and community conservation policy in Uganda. The review involved a critical look at revenue-sharing implementation and review reports, financial disbursement records and minutes of meetings involving Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), CPIs, local governments, the International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP) and community associations. Documentary review provided baseline data for understanding the history of conservation campaigns and hence the origins of revenue-sharing arrangements. Then, key stakeholders at implementation and at beneficiary level were selected and interviewed. The study was conducted at Bwindi and all the three surrounding parishes. There are 38 villages in total in these three parishes. Interviews were conducted with all the village leaders (N = 38) and with the three parish Chair Persons. Also the community conservation Warden, chair persons of CPIs in the three districts surrounding the park, district leaders and the coordinator of IGCP in the region were interviewed. The total numbers of interviews was 48. The interviews were open-ended to allow respondents to reveal in-depth issues related to the implementation of the tourism-revenue sharing policy.

In addition, ten focus group discussions were held with residents in Nteko and Rubuguri parishes as data in Mukono had already been generated in focus group discussions in phase (a). Focus groups consisted of approximately 15-25 people each. A deliberate effort was made to involve people of different socio-economic backgrounds. It was in these discussions that community views about revenue-sharing arrangements were captured. Informal discussions were also held in the evenings with members of the community to fill information gaps.

3. *The Clouds Mountain Lodge model sub-phase*

To accomplish this study, a thorough review of relevant policy-related documents was carried out. The documents studied included agreements signed between the Uganda Wildlife Authority, Communities, IGCP and The Uganda Safari Company (TUSC). In addition reports, adverts inviting bids for a private partner, financial disbursement records and minutes of meetings involving all actors were reviewed. Other relevant documents like the Nkuringo tourism plan, petitions of complaining groups to courts of law, written complaints to the district authorities, petitions to the President of the Republic of Uganda and to the Minister of Tourism, all the associated replies, newspaper articles on the

subject and the Inspector General of Government's (IGG) report were carefully studied. The review of these documents provided baseline data for understanding actors and their roles, discourses, flow of resources, operational rules, and other implementation issues related to the Clouds Mountain Lodge arrangement. Then, key stakeholders at implementation and beneficiary levels as well as those affected by the arrangement were selected and interviewed (N=13). These included the Programme Coordinator of IGCP, the Chief Warden of BINP, the Warden in charge of conservation at BINP, the Nkuringo sector Warden, both current and former Chairmen of NCDF, and the manager of the Clouds Mountain Lodge. The chairman of the Kisoro Tourism Association (KTA), Kisoro District chairman, the chairman of the Association of Uganda Tour Operators (AUTO) and the Rubuguri NCDF faction chairman were interviewed to capture their side of the story. To allow further probing by the researcher and the respondents to reveal in-depth issues relating to the implementation of policy interventions, the interviews were open-ended. Four focus group discussions involving between 20 and 25 people were held in the villages of Nteko parish and four others involving between 15 and 30 people were held in the villages of Rubuguri parish. In both parishes, focus group discussions were attended by both males and females above 18 years and an effort was made to encourage all participants to contribute to the discussion. It was in these discussions that community views about the CML arrangement were captured. Informal discussions were held to capture more data and to fill in gaps. The study was conducted in two parts totaling four months. It was intended to make a follow-up of new developments after the government instituted an investigation into the arrangement.

2.3.2 Implications of tourism-related policy interventions for livelihoods and conservation at Bwindi

This entailed an analysis of both actual and perceived implications of policy interventions for livelihoods, largely at a community level and to some extent at an individual level, focusing on those actors who directly benefitted from these interventions. The evaluation commenced with a critical review of policy documents detailing livelihood projects funded through specific policy interventions. The documents included periodic reports, accountability reports, and for BMCDA, the annual achieved activity summary sheets. From these documents, I was able to capture data on financial flows, and livelihood projects funded through each of the three policy interventions from an official perspective. Then, key informants' interviews were conducted to further assess the flow of financial resources and determine how major decisions are made. The interviews involved leaders of the institutions propagating the interventions (UWA, IGCP, TUSC, NCDF, CPI, and BCCDA), as well as local council leaders, and District local government leaders. This process augmented information gathered through a critical review of documents.

Thereafter, focus group discussions (see details in sub studies) were held and participants (community members) were asked if there were any direct benefits they could associate with each of the three interventions. As a meeting facilitator, I would list an intervention and then ask them to show how it had been of use in their lives and its shortcomings. These meetings provided a platform for wider community members to point out their benefits,

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priorities, needs, and requirements while putting across their feelings, views and beliefs. Focus group discussions also stimulated interesting dialogue between participants which helped to reveal more information on issues of context and strategies. Informal in-depth talks were also held with community members who were employed in ventures associated with the interventions. After focus group discussions and interviews, transects tours aimed at a situational analysis were conducted in the villages to confirm the location and composition of livelihood assets resulting from the interventions. Participatory observation with a focus on the developments in the area generated more data. Data collected through all the above methods was triangulated and interpreted in respect to capital assets' elements (financial, social, natural, physical and human) and the associated outcomes, livelihood strategies as well as the context.

Attempts were made to seek the respondents' perspective on whether livelihood-related outcomes influenced their stance on the National Park. Through focus group discussions communities were asked to list both positive and negative things associated with the park and to give their views concerning their relationship with park officials. This question was used to gauge their attitudes towards the park and to discover whether the attitudes were shaped by interventions or not, as well as to gauge the trend of park-community conflicts. This was augmented by informal discussions with communities in the evenings, where data on local views about interventions (local discourses) were also generated. In addition, in-depth interviews with key informants (UWA, Community leaders and IGCP) were conducted. The interviews focused on perceptions of the respondents with regards to the trend of illegal activities, attitudes towards the park, incidence of community-park management conflicts, and community practices before and after the application of policy interventions. Data generated was beefed up with the study of UWA's community conservation, illegal activities and conflicts' reports at Bwindi.

In all the phases above, data from interviews, focus group discussions, and informal discussions were transcribed, coded and integrated with data from documents, and situational analyses (observation). The aggregated data were later arranged into domains that corresponded with the described analytical and evaluation framework.

2.3.3 Challenges

As indicated in Chapter One, apart from the tourism-related interventions, there are other interventions by donor organizations and Uganda Wildlife Authority aimed at addressing human-related conservation threats at Bwindi. In addition, there are other private tourism business establishments and strict law enforcement by the Uganda Wildlife Authority. This means that livelihoods and conservation outcomes at Bwindi are a consequence of many factors. It was therefore problematic to candidly apportion the contribution of each of the three tourism-related interventions in addressing conservation threats at Bwindi. I therefore largely relied on a general trend assessment as far as efforts in threat reduction are concerned and gathering of perceptions of actors (UWA, IGCP and communities) on what they thought the role of tourism interventions were in the process. The perspectives of communities were particularly useful in showing how they linked the interventions, livelihood implications and

conservation. Situational analysis also supplemented this process by for instance looking at how and why illegal activities showed a particular trend in different parishes. But also, GIS maps showing the spatial distribution of illegal activities in parts of the park neighboring the parishes where the interventions are being implemented helped to highlight the role of interventions in those areas compared to others.

It was also a challenge to collect data in such a remote area where I found a complex research setting characterized by high levels of illiteracy and where it was difficult to access some homesteads. To address this situation, translators were needed as well as particular data collection methods such as focus group discussions and informal discussions which eventually eased this rather complex situation.

3. The Buhoma-Mukono arrangement

3.1 Introduction

In Chapter 1, I explained how it gradually became more difficult to conserve biodiversity at Bwindi amidst community aggression after the termination of their access to forest resources on the declaration of Bwindi as a National Park in 1991 by Uganda Wildlife Authority. This was meant to avert prior community reliance on the Bwindi ecosystem for timber, charcoal, game meat, firewood and other resources which were perceived to have seriously threatened biodiversity existence. The National Park status instead ignited stiff community resistance and never proved a solution at the time. The deteriorating situation attracted international conservation organizations such as the International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP), enrolled to support Uganda Wildlife Authority in mitigating the standoff. Their active involvement translated the global conservation trend of the time as tourism was introduced in 1993 as a possible solution. Development organizations such as USAID joined the campaign as well. The direct community involvement in tourism business (commonly referred to as Community-Based Tourism Enterprise, or CBTE) was the first tourism-related policy intervention at Bwindi aimed at enabling communities to benefit from tourism with the hope that it would generate economic and livelihood benefits and hence motivate communities to view biodiversity conservation positively.

For over two decades, Community-Based Tourism Enterprises (CBTEs) have gained prominence in developing countries as a strategy to promote biodiversity conservation (Kiss, 2004; Salafsky *et al.*, 2001). This strategy relies heavily on the notion of nature-based tourism which is one of the market-oriented approaches promoted by conservation organizations to reduce local threats to biodiversity conservation. The approach is operationalized through supporting locally owned tourism enterprises such as eco-lodges, wildlife proprietorship and other tourism support services (Van der Duim, 2011). The assumption is that such enterprises enable flows of tourist cash and other benefits which cause forward and backward linkages and ensure that conservation crusades help instead of frustrate poverty reduction efforts (Elliot & Sumba, 2010).

Increasingly, a number of studies indicate that community-based tourism enterprises are not doing well. This has cast doubts on the potential of this approach in addressing conservation and development concerns in developing countries. For example, an appraisal of 200 community-based initiatives across the Americas showed that the accommodation enterprises are operating below the break-even levels and that many of them were on the verge of collapse upon the winding-up of external funding (Mitchell & Muckosy, 2008; Van der Duim, 2011). Similarly, an analysis of 217 community-based tourism enterprises in Southern Africa (Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe) by Spenceley (2008) indicated mixed results, with the majority having serious operational constraints such as accessibility, marketing and advertising difficulties (Nel & Binns, 2000; Van der Duim, 2011). In response to this,

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Kiss (2004: 234) argues that 'tourism is also far from an ideal entry-level business for rural communities with little previous experience. It is competitive and demanding and can take years to get off the ground, and even people with considerable experience can fail to make a profit...'

Yet, Salafsky *et al.* (2001) advance that some level of viability and relative success is possible with CBTEs that utilize simple skills and technologies that communities already possess. Otherwise, joint ventures between private sector and communities are increasingly being propagated with claims that they can outwit the shortcomings of complete community-run enterprises (Ashley & Jones, 2001; Ashley & Ntshona, 2002; Eagles, 2009; Wunder, 2000). The assumption here is that such arrangements benefit from the business experience and networks of private operators (Spenceley, 2003).

This chapter presents the results of the relatively successful Buhoma-Mukono CBTE arrangement. The findings are based on a policy arrangements' four dimensional analysis and indicate high governance capacity as one of the several factors making this arrangement a relatively exceptional case. The chapter mainly scrutinizes the processes of its introduction and implementation. Its outcomes on livelihoods and conservation are presented and discussed in Chapter 6.

3.2 Initiation and implementation

By late 1992, the US Peace Corps Volunteers were already active in conservation and development efforts at Bwindi. IGCP and UWA were also in the final stages of drawing up a tourism development plan for Bwindi National Park (IGCP official, research interview, 2009). Community leaders from Mukono parish, with technical guidance from the US Peace Corps Volunteers, came together to form the Buhoma Community Campground Development Association (BCCDA). By 1993, tourism was launched at Bwindi and in the same year the idea of a community based tourism enterprise materialized among communities in Mukono parish with guidance from Peace Corps Volunteers in close cooperation with the Uganda Wildlife Authority (Hoke, 2000).

Towards the end of 1993, the enterprise plan had zeroed in on setting up a mid-end accommodation enterprise at Buhoma. With the strong backing of Peace Corps Volunteers, the communities under the newly formed association (BCCDA) prepared and submitted a development proposal to USAID for funding. A total of UGX 9,000,000 (USD 9,000 then) was made available through the 'Peace Corps' Small Project Assistance Grant' to assist in kick-starting the business venture (Hoke, 2000). Peace Corps Volunteers not only provided funds, they also worked closely in setting up the business venture and in training community members on the need for the conservation of Bwindi if this business was to be successful and sustainable (community association official, research interview, 2009). The Peace Corps' activities were spearheaded by John Dubois who recruited other volunteers:

John Dubois arrived in 1991 as one of the Peace Corps in charge of gorillas and tourism in Mgahinga, but was later transferred to Bwindi due to the Rwanda war. He later recruited more Peace Corps Volunteers, became interested in communities and used the Peace Corps Small Projects Fund to help them start up the camp while educating them on the need for conservation

(UWA official, research interview, 2009).

It is important to note that the Peace Corps program headed by John Dubois and funded by USAID made it easy for communities to link up with IGCP which had started conservation operations in the area with USAID as one of its major funders:

USAID was one of our funders and partner... John Dubois was also part of the USAID network through their Peace Corps program... so... it was easy for IGCP to link with him... At that time IGCP had only one staff... so John and his colleagues helped a lot in working closely with the local communities to set up their tourism enterprise

(IGCP official, research interview, 2009).

Community elders in Mukono parish confirm Dubois's and Peace Corps' activities in the area. John and his colleagues worked through a teacher recruited locally to simplify communication with a community most of whom did not know any foreign languages. The Peace Corps' initiatives convinced many members of the community on the value of conserving Bwindi ecosystem, especially as it would lead to earnings through tourism (community elder, research interview, 2009).

UWA at this stage had tried buying land from communities to annex it to the park, but with a lot of difficulty. The informal talks with several community elders revealed that John and his colleagues' activities in the area made the process of acquiring more land for conservation from communities easier: 'The collaborators of Dubois agreed to sell their land to UWA for conservation and convinced others to do so...' (UWA official, research interview, 2009).

3.2.1 Acquisition of land for the business venture

The acquisition of financial resources was not enough to kick-start the community business venture. Land as a resource for the venture was not available. The entry of IGCP was resourceful at the time as it utilized its network together with UWA to bring the Institute of Tropical Forest Conservation (ITFC) on board. ITFC is an institute affiliated to Mbarara University of Science and Technology (MUST), Uganda, and conducts conservation related research around Bwindi. ITFC had two pieces of land at Bwindi; the first is where its research institute is located and the other is located at Buhoma near the park headquarters (UWA official, research interview, 2009). The piece of land located near the park headquarters was more suitable for the planned community tourism venture. IGCP and UWA entered into negotiations with ITFC on behalf of the communities and the land was eventually leased out by ITFC. It was revealed that negotiations for the land were simplified by the fact that the aim of all involved parties was biodiversity conservation at Bwindi: 'It was as well our

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prime mission to agitate for conservation of biodiversity at Bwindi, so we willingly leased of the land to the communities...’ (ITFC official, research interview, 2010).

But the fact that ITFC was also funded by the same donors as IGCP, the Peace Corps programs and UWA, could have played a role in the process of land release. This implies that donor influence might have prevailed on ITFC to give away the land for the community enterprise as a top official of the community association actually argues: ‘The current management of ITFC is demanding for the land where the community lodge is located, which would be unlikely if they gave it to the community project willingly’ (BMCDA official, research interview, 2009).

Having acquired the financial and land resources, it was imperative for communities to get mobilized into a more embracing institutional structure with a constitution, since the initial (1992) association (the Buhoma Community Campground Development Association – BCCDA) was initiated largely by community leaders (see Hoke, 2000). IGCP and UWA encouraged general community involvement through meetings which led to the formation of the Buhoma Community Development Association (BCDA) towards the end of 1993. The membership of this association included all adults (above 18 years) from the eleven villages of Mukono parish (UWA official, research interview, 2009) who currently total about 5,000 people (UBOS, 2010).

But Buhoma being one of the parish villages, the association’s name became an issue of contention among members from the other ten villages. They rejected the name, arguing that it portrayed an image that the association belonged only to the people of Buhoma village (BMCDA official, research interview, 2009). Debates over the name ensued involving local council leaders from all the parish villages, facilitated and guided by UWA and IGCP. It was finally agreed that since the venture was located at Buhoma, and meant for all the people of Mukono parish, the name should be amended to the current name: the Buhoma-Mukono Community Development Association (BMCDA).

The people of Mukono parish were the key target of this initial tourism-related intervention as they had mounted the fiercest attacks against the declaration of a National Park as compared to other people in neighboring parishes (UWA and IGCP officials, research interview, 2009). Local leaders in Mukono parish mobilized people to openly protest by torching sections of Bwindi forest and attacking UWA staff:

The gazettement of BINP ignited harsh response from communities in Mukono as they burnt down parts of the forest and to overcome this resistance, such an intervention of involving them in tourism business was timely and necessary... that way, the need to conserve biodiversity would be justified and community livelihood needs could partly be addressed...

(UWA official, research interview, 2009).

3.2.2 Operationalization of the business idea

By December 1993, construction work had already commenced with the active involvement of the Peace Corps. For their part, the communities contributed labor and materials towards setting up the business venture. Work started at a very basic level with two accommodation bandas (Plate 3.1), showers, a campsite and a pit latrine (BMCDA official, research interview, 2009; Hoke, 2000).

Business started in the same period offering accommodation only to visitors and no catering services. Visitors either cooked their own meals or ate at local restaurants (Hoke, 2000). But after a period of 3 years, business was picking up and full-board service was being offered to meet the needs of the expanding clientele. Revenue generated from the initial investment paid for the operational costs and the balance was always re-invested as stipulated in their constitution (BMCDA official, research interview, 2009).

As a result of enterprise expansion, BMCDA currently owns the following assets and products (BMCDA, 2010 report):

- five well-furnished safari tents which are self-contained;
- one cottage that is self-contained overlooking the forest;
- five Twin-Bandas which are non-self-contained, built with local materials and based on an African architectural design;
- one dormitory with six beds;
- a camp site;
- a curio shop and bar;



Plate 3.1. Initial BMCDA bandas.

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- a car;
- a maize mill;
- a village trail;
- a small village microfinance institution (locally called 'village bank');
- a piece of land strategically located for business expansion.

Charges for accommodation and the associated services as of mid-2009 are summarized in Table 3.1. But at the time of this study, new rates had been proposed due to inflation and the associated increase in operational costs, and plans were under way to improve visitor services (Plate 3.2).

Lunch or dinner costs USD 10, breakfast USD 5 and packed lunch USD 5. More money is generated by renting out their vehicles (to some local business men who use it to transport merchandise) and selling beer and other drinks in the bar (BMCD A Financial Report, 2009).

A village trail was designed by BMCD A officials with support from entities such as the Mgahinga-Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust (MBIFCT) to diversify the association's income and to expand the tourism business enterprise. As Goodwin (2002) indicates, most nature tourists are always looking for other activities to engage in after participating in the nature-based ones. His survey in Komodo (Indonesia), Keoladeo (India),

Table 3.1. Accommodation charges at BMCD A as of mid-2009 (BMCD A Financial Report, 2009).

Accommodation rooms	Full board one person	Full board two persons	Bed only one person
Self-contained	\$65	\$80	\$47
Non self-contained	\$50	\$65	\$35
Dormitory	\$28	\$56	\$13
Camping	\$22	\$44	\$5



Plate 3.2. Some of the improved BMCD A accommodation facilities.

Gonarezhou (Zimbabwe) and Puerto Princesa (Philippines) indicates that culture and local people's way of life are major activities that tourists are interested in. The village trail offers culturally rich community walks as another tourist activity for visitors at Bwindi after gorilla trekking and bird-watching activities.

The village trail project was launched on 14 December 2002 and costs USD 15 (foreign visitors), and USD 8 (local visitors). The walk takes about 3-4 hours covering more than 10 sites that demonstrate various local cultural aspects as well as traditional farming systems. It starts at a craft shop located in Buhoma town center at a short distance from the lodge. The shop belongs to Bwindi progressive women group which has about 60 members. The women make baskets, necklaces, toys using local materials (Plate 3.3). They also buy 'gorilla' moldings from the local youth brought to their shop for resale.

When an item is sold, 95% of the money is taken by the owner, and 5% is retained by the shop attendant as a salary. With funding from IGCP, the Uganda Community Tourism Association (UCOTA) has always coordinated and brought experts to train communities at Buhoma to ensure quality in craft-making. It has also been very instrumental in the marketing drive for these products abroad (Trail Guide, research interview, 2009). Often, UCOTA coordinates big buying orders for export (UCOTA official, research interview, 2010). Interestingly, BMCDA was one of the founder members of UCOTA, which is an umbrella association of Community-Based Tourism Enterprises (CBTEs) in Uganda. It started in 1998 with a focus on assisting its members via training, advocacy, and control of standards, coordination, marketing, networking and conservation (Williams *et al.*, 2001).




Plate 3.3. BMCDA craft shop.

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After the craft shop, the guided community trail takes one through tea and coffee plantations where local tea and coffee processing procedures are demonstrated before heading for sight-seeing at a waterfall on a river that originates from Bwindi forest. The traditional healer's and banana brewing sites follow on the trail that ends with a cultural dance and other traditional performances by the Batwa (pygmies) communities. The Batwa are the minority community members who were originally forest dwellers and were ejected from the park. They had since lived as landless beggars and offering labor in the neighboring communities. But the tourism enterprise seems to have given them a new life. They now earn money by dancing and performing for tourists and continue as casual laborers during the low season. Their exposure through tourism has also attracted sympathy from individuals and donor agencies. Funds have been channeled through entities such as the Mgahinga-Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust specially to facilitate further Batwa development. Part of these funds was used to construct their reception center along the village trail (Plate 3.4). They also sell several local items at their center, though they are largely bought in from other communities. More funds have been injected into their education, and land has also been purchased to fully resettle them (Trail Guide, research interview, 2009).

BMCDA visitor records indicate that in the low season (Jan-June) the village trail sub-venture receives 30 visitors per month, and 100 visitors per month on average in the high season (July-December). Fees for the village trail are paid at the BMCDA office and shared as follows (BMCDA financial report, 2009):

- 40%-site owners;
- 30%-local guides;
- 20%-BMCDA consolidated account;
- 5%-village trail coordinator;
- 5%-stationery and general management and marketing.



Plate 3.4. The Batwa performance centre along the village trail.

The same record indicates that out of the 40% meant for site owners, the Batwa are given a bigger share as they largely depend on the trail project for their livelihoods. Overall, respondents along this trail expressed happiness and are contented with the management of the trail from which, they admit, benefits are trickling down. At each of the sites visited, the owner takes a record and comes to claim the share from the BMCDA management at the end of every month. And those who want their money to accumulate can claim after several months (Trail Guide, research interview, 2009). Some of the trail beneficiaries revealed this as their saving strategy as they are not familiar with banking procedures. They added that some of their clients even give donations to facilitate various community livelihood projects.

It emerged from focus group discussions that community members do not just depend on tourism. They still engage in other economic activities where they have invested their earnings from tourism in sustainable ventures like vegetable growing, cattle-keeping, goat-rearing and bee-keeping. The proceeds of these activities are used to pay school fees for their children as well as meet their daily household requirements. The only exceptions were the Batwa who are allegedly not investing their incomes. According to local leaders, the majority of the Batwa spend their tourism earnings on local beer. But there is hope since the Batwa project, spearheaded by the Mgahinga-Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust, is attempting to address the problem through sensitization (BMCDA official, research interview, 2009).

In summary, the BMCDA tourism venture generates finances from several sources ranging from accommodation, foods and beverages, transport services, village walk remittances, profits from the shop and the maize mill. Table 3.2 gives the revenue details from these sources. It is important to note that with the exception of the year 2000, when BINP was

Table 3.2. BMCDA total revenues for years 1998-2009 (BMCDA financial reports 1998-2009).

Year	Revenue in Ug. Shillings	Revenue in USD
1998	56,321,470	26,819
1999	54,067,570	25,746
2000	31,606,820	15,050
2001	46,924,160	22,344
2002	49,580,360	23,609
2003	79,962,360	38,077
2004	94,050,700	44,786
2005	104,400,950	49,714
2006	118,761,670	56,553
2007	173,804,365	82,763
2008	196,429,935	93,538
2009	255,244,628	116,020
Total	1,261,154,988	595,019

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recovering from the late-1999 Interahamwe attack on foreign tourists, the earnings are steadily increasing annually.

The high increase in revenue in the year 2009 was associated with the revision of accommodation rates from 80 to 90 USD for self-contained rooms and from 50 to 70 USD for non-self-contained room (BMCDA report, 2010).

3.2.3 Allocation of financial resources, rules and division of authority

Efforts were made to establish how financial resources are distributed and who makes the decisions and by which rules. A total of Uganda Shillings 1.26 billion (about US \$ 595,019) (Table 3.2) has been generated from BMCDA tourism business ventures from 1998 to 2009. BMCDA financial reports and key informant interviews indicate that the money generated is largely spent locally. This finding is supported by Sandbrook (2008) who argues that more than 95% of the BMCDA lodge revenues are retained locally and only 4.8% is leaking outside the area. According to the BMCDA financial report (2009), expenditure is on operational costs like staff salaries, supplies (food, vegetables, beverages, firewood, charcoal, stationery and construction materials), maintenance of premises and expansion of the construction and facilitation of management meetings. Since labor and other material supplies are largely sourced locally, a bigger percentage of BMCDA money remains in the community and therefore leakages are minimal. Revenue leaks to acquiring items/services not available or accessed locally e.g. wines and the professionals to conduct training.

It emerged that the funds that remain after settling operational costs are regarded as profit and are utilized as follows: (1) Re-invested into the business to expand and diversify the product (for example, land for expansion has been bought, modern cottages are being built, and a village trail has been designed and is being maintained); (2) Hiring consultancy services, for example, facilitation of training sessions for workers at the lodge and local site guides as well as a site planning for better expansion; (3) Supporting community projects such as schools, hospital, health centers, bridges, setting up a maize mill to assist in processing community produce and lastly; (4) Setting up micro-finance establishments (village financial institution) especially to assist women and the youth (BMCDA Report, 2009).

BMCDA has a five-organ structure (Figure 3.1) provided for in the constitution which oversees the association's activities. These organs have varying powers and responsibilities. Despite the involvement of IGCP, UWA, USAID and other donor agencies in the development of the Buhoma-Mukono business idea, the business is now in the hands of the community whereas initiating actors are now playing an advisory role. BMCDA structures are propelling the association, guided by its objectives. The five-tier structure comprises the General Assembly, the Council, the Board, the sub-committees and an advisory committee. In the following sections, the powers held and the roles of these organs are explained. Officially, the General Assembly is said to reserve absolute powers above all other organs when it comes to all decision-making processes. All the other four organs are meant to be answerable to the General Assembly.




Figure 3.1. Organizational structure of BMCDA (adapted from BMCDA Constitution pp. 8).

A description of the organ composition, powers and description of roles of BMCDA follows:

a. *The General Assembly*

This brings together all members of the association (Mukono parish residents) and meets once annually. The constitution defines members and beneficiaries of BMCDA as all those Ugandans born and/or who have fixed/permanent residences in Mukono parish, Kanungu District for not less than 10 years. It is stipulated that the General Assembly is the supreme decision-making body of the association. It receives and discusses reports and recommendations from the council. It is also supposed to approve policies, budgets and recommendations of the council as well as elect the chairperson, treasurer, vice chairperson, secretary and vice-secretary from the general membership of the association. However, in one General Assembly meeting that I attended during this study (Plate 3.5), it was clear that the number of members present at the meeting was so substantial that a few local elites who understood very well what was taking place, dominated the majority who were largely uneducated and also have to take part in decision making. It emerged that financial reports, business plans and budgets are indeed presented at the



Plate 3.5. Voting sessions at the 2010 General Assembly.

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annual General Assembly meeting for approval and all members present are free to air their views through a show of hands. The exercise of general participation makes all community members feel part of the business venture (UWA official, research interview, 2010) although participation levels are not equal; the majority of community members exercise their voting rights.

b. *The council*

Members of the General Assembly are eligible to vote annually to elect the 32-member council; two representatives from each of the eleven villages. The membership includes two elders (man and woman), one representative of the youth, a women's group representative, and one representative of the Batwa (pygmies) are added as these are disadvantaged groups, two local council representatives, two park representatives (the Community Conservation Warden and the Community Conservation Ranger), and one representative for people with disabilities.

As per the BMCDA constitution, the council is the second highest decision-making body and is answerable to the General Assembly. It is the duty of the council to receive and discuss proposals related to policies and projects from the board and its sub-committees as well as approving periodic budgets, reports and work plans of the board. The council always sits four times a year. This was confirmed by looking at meeting proceedings that are kept for the records.

The council has ex-officios who play an advisory role. These are: representatives from the International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP), the Institute of Tropical Forestry and Conservation (ITFC), the BINP Peace Corps Volunteers, the Bwindi Chief Warden and the Community Conservation warden. They meet with the Council quarterly to discuss conservation, development and other related issues.

c. *The association's board*

The role of this organ is to implement the association's policies and decisions of the council. It is composed of the chairperson, secretary, treasurer and all chairpersons of sub-committees established by the Council. This Board is answerable to the Council. The Board is meant to sit once every two months and possesses the allocative and authoritative power to determine how things go. The chairman and the secretary are also members of the Council. However, it is periodically changed through competed elections. The one who presents 'better' business plans (manifesto) to members is elected to this powerful organ. At the end-of-year General Assembly meeting, the influence and power of the Board could easily be felt as their views guided the whole process and were rarely rejected by other members. The Board oversees the activities of the secretariat on a daily basis.

However, when it came to the voting time, other 'weak' members also demonstrated their powers through their voting rights. The voting process that concluded the General Assembly meeting replaced two powerful members of the Board (the chairman and the secretary). Despite their initial influence during the meeting, it did not stop the General Assembly from voting them out. In part, this was also attributed to the lobbying potentials of incoming officials who happened to possess financial resources to reach a wider community and had good education backgrounds. They were able to convince the masses with good proposals for the business venture.

d. *The secretariat*

This constitutes technical staff employed by the association. It is responsible for the day-to-day running of the activities of the association under the supervision of the Board. The Secretariat is the custodian of all the records of the association and takes full control and administration of all properties of the association. It is answerable to the Board and the Council. The members of the Secretariat are trained in various capacities to run the association. They are paid a monthly salary from the association's revenues and can be fired by the Board if they breach their contracts. Business plans, annual reports and budgets that are presented for the approval of the General Assembly are prepared by the Secretariat and handed over to the Board.

e. *Sub-committees*

BMCDA sub-committees include:

- The Disciplinary and Security Committee responsible for the promotion of unity and the maintenance of social relations within the association through enforcement of the code of conduct of the association.
- The Project and Investment Committee responsible for soliciting and development of community-based development ideas/needs and developing proposals for funding.
- Tourism, Culture and Marketing Committee responsible for designing tourism products, marketing and preservation of culture amidst growing tourism business in the area.
- The Advisory Committee composed of nine members from BINP, IGCP, ITFC, US Peace Corps and the association's board. The Advisory Committee is appointed by the council. This sub-committee meets twice a year and helps the association to keep track in pursuing its objectives by giving technical guidance. Sub-committees sit every quarter.

3.3 A policy arrangement analysis

3.3.1 Actors

The enactment and operationalization of the Buhoma-Mukono arrangement was enabled by the combined efforts of various actors ranging from the international, and national to the local level. The foundation leading to the scaling down of the 'popular' Community-Based Tourism Enterprise (CBTE) paradigm was laid when IGCP and UWA favored and initiated nature-based tourism as one of the possible solutions to the conservation teething problems at Bwindi. However, the US Peace Corps Volunteers are credited for taking the lead to spread and promote the concept among a community that originally got irritated with the declaration of a National Park. Not surprisingly, the local elites were the early adapters, as evidenced by their formation of the Buhoma Community Campground Development Association (BCCDA) whose name later changed to the Buhoma-Mukono Community Development Association (BMCDA) upon embracing other community members. The early realization of the need to embrace and secure wider community endorsement and legitimacy was a smart move that probably explains why the Buhoma-Mukono arrangement faces limited opposition.

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Although the issue of ITFC land on which the lodge is built remains unresolved, it seems unlikely to disrupt the relatively peaceful implementation of the arrangement. This is because ITFC, itself a donor driven conservation-research entity, has an interest in keeping in the good books of both international and national facilitators. In addition, ITFC is part of the larger conservation network at Bwindi and may not dismantle the already functional strategic apparatus of a network to which it subscribes.

Finally, the enrolment of yet another conservation giant in the region (the Mgahinga-Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust – MBIFCT) to facilitate the planning and opening of the village trail not only portrays its efforts to associate with a promising venture, but it also showed the expansion potential of the BMCDA enterprise and the likelihood of achieving broad conservation objectives through joint efforts. Generally, the findings in the chapter provide evidence of a relatively healthy and positive relationship among actors.

3.3.2 Rules

The formalization of the arrangement and rule acceptance by the majority of actors is one indication of a relatively congruent and successful intervention (Arts & Goverde, 2006). The Buhoma-Mukono arrangement is formalized with a guiding constitution that clearly spells out the boundaries of its operation. The findings of this case study indicated wide rule acceptance as efforts are in place to follow the constitution and the general roles of the five-organ structure (the General Assembly, Council, Board, Secretariat and Advisory committees). The organizational structure clearly spells out the operational boundaries and roles of all BMCDA actors and, generally, dissenting views regarding these institutional guidelines and how they are implemented were extremely minimal. Three factors explain this relative congruence among actors regarding the rules of the game. First, the wider community was involved at an early stage and might have been content to take part in rule making, though more work to this effect was done by their representatives. But at least they perceive ownership of the process. Second, unlike the Clouds Lodge arrangement (Chapter 5), the rules guiding the operationalization of the Buhoma-Mukono model never involved controversial clauses. If they had had such clauses, the 'external' actors would have probably been 'sucked' in and have had the process derailed as happened with the Clouds arrangement (see Chapter 5). Third, local actors seem to be well informed about the rules of the game and what their responsibilities and rights are regarding the BMCDA venture. This was interestingly portrayed at the 2010 General Assembly meeting where the executive committee labored to explain their actions and the programs they had in place. The unconvinced community responded by voting the two top officials out of office as they were not convinced by their business plans and had some issues with their prior performance.

3.3.3. Resources

The initial stages of the CBTE intervention at Bwindi were fully directed and controlled by actors like the US Peace Corps Volunteers, IGCP and UWA. However, upon facilitating communities to secure both the financial and land resources from USAID and ITFC

respectively, these actors largely played a supportive and advisory role leaving the communities to take control of the venture. The Peace Corps utilized their knowledge and network endowments to attract USD 9,000 USAID funding, while IGCP and UWA made use of their connections and positions in the region to negotiate the leasing of land from ITFC. Both finances and land were resources much needed to put the enterprise idea into practice. Subsequently, communities also contributed labor, a resource they possessed in abundance to set up the venture.

Although not evenly distributed, decision-making power is possessed and practiced by all BMCDA actors at different fronts. For example, even the non-educated individuals from distant villages had a say when it came to the election of office bearers. Their power is enshrined in the voting right as members of the General Assembly. By exercising their voting rights, they decide through elections who the new office bearers will be. Consequently, those who are elected are empowered to run BMCDA activities. They make decisions backed by legal-rational instruments contained in the constitution on behalf of their electorate and they are answerable to the General Assembly. The General Assembly can query and challenge their actions. In essence, this illustrates relative democratic processes that are lacking in many CBTEs that have failed in the past (see Kiss, 2004; Van der Duim, 2011).

3.3.4 Discourses

Formally, BMCDA's activities are guided by its mission 'to initiate a development process targeting individual households in Mukono parish and with a special focus on women and youth empowerment, quality education, health, communication, conservation and recreation through creation of a sustainable resource base in Mukono parish' (BMCDA Constitution: 2).

This 'official' discourse on which BMCDA operates reflects the interests of conservation institutions operating in the area such as IGCP and UWA ('to conserve'), but also communities' views and interests rotating around livelihood issues focusing on improving the social and economic status of individual households in the Mukono parish.

The leaders of BMCDA indicated a strong desire to improve the social and economic status of communities in the Mukono parish. They argued that since BMCDA started the business venture to date, profits are largely invested in improving community livelihoods. This view was supported in all focus group discussions held in Mukono parish and is further confirmed in the analysis of resource distribution and utilization (see Chapter 6). The association has seven objectives through which it works to attain their mission (BMCDA Constitution, 2010):

- to create a sustainable resource base and initiate a development process in Mukono parish;
- to run and manage a tourist service (food and accommodation) to visitors in BINP;
- to promote education and health for the empowerment of women and youth;
- to provide employment to the local people through rendering services to tourists;
- to provide training for local people in eco-tourism including camp management and visitor services;

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- to promote conservation of BINP through working in partnership with BINP management through community sensitization programs including drama and songs;
- to promote conservation of natural resources through communication and recreational activities.

UWA and IGCP highlighted how the majority of Mukono parish residents were hostile to conservation when Bwindi was declared a National Park. A situation they argued is getting better with the CBTE arrangement and other interventions in the area. Attitudes of communities are said to be improving and alternative livelihood options are slowly emerging (as further explained and elaborated in Chapter 6). It was, however, a general view among many respondents that whereas the support for conservation has increased, the benefits from the BMCDA venture are still insufficient to cause a significant impact on the livelihoods of the entire community with a heavy population. And according to UWA, 'that is why other interventions like Tourism Revenue Sharing were introduced'.

The community, UWA, IGCP, and BMCDA management views are generally positive. Similarity in perspectives seemed to prevail as all actors expressed support for the prevailing discourse stressing conservation and community development through the Buhoma-Mukono CBTE. In all the village meetings across the parish, communities expressed knowledge of BMCDA business ventures which they described as 'our business' and appreciated the existence of BINP as a base for the success of this business. They also appreciated the trickling down of benefits from BMCDA and were very optimistic that if tourism continued to grow and their business expanded, these benefits would also increase for a bigger percentage of the community.

Some divergent sentiments were noted in the recruitment process. Although labor is sourced locally as BMCDA officials claimed: 'It was in the commencement period (1993-1998) that we used to hire technical staff like chef, accountant, and manager... as there were no trained people in our community... But over time, we have trained our own from within the community with assistance from IGCP and UWA...!' (BMCDA official, research interview, 2009).

An analysis of staffing records reveals domination over the minority tribe of Batwa. Although they were the worst affected by the declaration of a National Park, they are largely missing in employment opportunities at the lodge. But their low level of education is advanced as the reason for this. And BMCDA officials indicated that efforts to bring the Batwa on board are illustrated by the training and facilitation that the association offers them to effectively benefit from their center that marks the climax of the village walk.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter explicated the processes in which the Buhoma-Mukono CBTE arrangement was introduced and analyzed its implementation from a policy arrangements perspective. Generally, the chapter demonstrates that the Buhoma-Mukono CBTE arrangement has

a high governance capacity. This implies that the policy processes and the alignment of the substantial and organizational aspects of the arrangement contribute effectively to the realization of the desired policy outcomes. Chapter 6 provides further evidence for this. The tourism enterprise is widely accepted as a solution to conservation and development concerns in the area as it commands a great deal of support from the majority of actors and dissenting voices are extremely rare. This explains the strategic congruence as far as the Buhoma-Mukono model is concerned.

To further portray the high governance capacity, my findings show that the Buhoma-Mukono arrangement is internally structurally congruent. This is illustrated by the fact that the regulative instruments are well known, understood and accepted by actors and the relationships between actors are built on mutual participation and trust. The arrangement is also externally congruent as it links and integrates well with the 1990s' international discourses and policies on CBTEs, but also with other community-based tourism enterprises through an umbrella entity called the Uganda Community Tourism Association (UCOTA). UCOTA operates on a national scale and has got a lot of international networks benefitting members through funding and training. On a national scale, UCOTA is a community voice to be reckoned with; it has succeeded in making UWA and the Uganda Tourism Board put community associations on their agendas. Currently, UCOTA members are marketed on the websites of those national bodies. UCOTA has also enhanced the marketing drive of its members through its annual active participation in international trade fairs and other tourism promotional arrangements. The Buhoma-Mukono model is also well integrated with tourism and development-related arrangements as evidenced by the enrolment of the Mgahinga-Bwindi Conservation Trust which facilitated the planning and development of the village trail. Some BMCDA programs are also integrated and funded through the tourism revenue sharing arrangement, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Therefore, a combination of its high governance capacity and other practical reasons like its location (near the park headquarter), local sourcing and capacity building, make the Buhoma CBTE model an exception compared to many other CBTE arrangements that have generally failed elsewhere.

4. The tourism revenue sharing arrangement

4.1 Introduction

Debates on how to deliver the benefits of conservation to local people living close to high-biodiversity areas have preoccupied conservationists for more than two decades, premised on the assumption that conservation goals will be more easily achieved with the support of local people. According to this logic it is argued that benefits from wildlife should contribute to meeting the livelihood needs of communities adjacent to protected areas and to compensate for the costs of living next to a protected area (Adams *et al.*, 2004). One of the most commonly pursued strategies used by international, regional and local conservation entities has been the sharing of revenues from wildlife-based tourism (Tourism Revenue Sharing – TRS). It is argued that TRS can justify conservation campaigns amidst conditions of poverty and limited livelihood opportunities in developing countries (Adams *et al.*, 2004; Fisher *et al.*, 2008). TRS has become a widespread policy intervention in Africa and other regions where large populations of wildlife remain, with revenues usually shared on a percentage basis (Hulme & Murphree, 2001; Schroeder, 2008). Conservationists argue that TRS helps to offset conservation costs and improve local attitudes towards conservation (Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001).

Revenue-sharing programs can take three different forms. First, there are protected area outreach arrangements, where a percentage of park entrance fees is channeled to communities (Ahebwa *et al.*, 2011; Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001). Second, there are initiatives which involve private companies conducting commercial activities, such as hunting on community land, and then sharing the proceeds with the community (Baker, 1997; Becker, 2009; Lindsey *et al.*, 2007; NASCO, 2009; Ochieng, 2011; Saarinen *et al.*, 2009). Third, there are partnership arrangements which can involve private and public entities as well as communities in operating tourism ‘joint ventures’. The accruing revenues are thereafter shared based on written agreements guiding such arrangements (Elliot & Sumba, 2010; Spenceley, 2003; Sumba *et al.*, 2007; Van der Duim, 2011).

A number of studies that have attempted to evaluate the outcomes of revenue sharing and other incentive-based conservation arrangements in developing countries have revealed mixed outcomes (Ahebwa *et al.*, 2008; Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001; Peters, 1998; Schroeder, 2008; Southgate, 2006). Evaluations of incentive-based conservation programs indicate that the approach in practice often falls short of the rhetoric (Spiteri & Nepal, 2006). One feature which has been found to contribute to such failures is the structure and implementation of TRS policies (Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001; Schroeder, 2008). This chapter examines the Tourism Revenue Sharing (TRS) arrangement at Bwindi, which falls into the ‘protected area outreach’ category as described above. The partnership arrangement (category three) is dealt with in Chapter 5. Guided by the Policy Arrangements Approach (PAA), the current chapter analyses the introduction and implementation of TRS at Bwindi

as a policy arrangement, examines its governance capacity and highlights key critical issues affecting its outcomes.

4.2 Benefit sharing arrangements in Uganda

Benefit sharing arrangements in Uganda's conservation history can be traced back to the 1950s when colonial officials implemented the approach informally after realizing that forceful approaches to conservation could not yield positive results (Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001). However, it is important to note that such arrangements were not enshrined in a policy, did not have an institutional home, and were not linked to local compliance with conservation (Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001). Rather, residents were given game meat on an informal basis when the Game Department shot wildlife found raiding farms (Naughton-Treves, 1999). These arrangements continued until 1971 when the country plunged into a political crisis that led to a break-down in the rule of law and loss of control of conservation areas (Hamilton, 1984). Upon regaining peace in 1986, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government endorsed and re-ignited biodiversity conservation efforts by rebuilding the National Park system that had collapsed in the period of turmoil (Sebukeera, 1996). The new government's emphasis on grassroots governance and a growing interest in community-based approaches among international donors led to the development of a national tourism revenue-sharing policy for all national parks in 1994 (Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001).

Bwindi and Mgahinga Gorilla National Park were the first to benefit from the tourism revenue sharing arrangement. These two were prioritized as the surrounding communities had shown stiff resistance to conservation (UWA official, research interview, 2009). The target beneficiaries were 'those people living adjacent to the parks that are affected by, and affect the park' (Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001). This definition of beneficiaries had serious consequences as communities far away from the park also claimed equal benefits to those in the park's vicinity: 'The 1994 mandate for sharing park revenue caused more problems than it solved... Whereas the intention of the arrangement was to benefit people in frontline parishes, the vague definition of target communities made the issue more complicated to resolve...!' (UWA official, research interview, 2009).

In 1996, the conservation body (Uganda National Parks) which was implementing TRS merged with the Game Department to form Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA). UWA was charged with making conservation reforms in Uganda, including reviewing and improving the 1994 revenue sharing policy. In the review process, UWA realized that apart from the vague definition of target communities, the 1994 revenue sharing arrangement also lacked an institutional home and a legal framework (UWA official, research interview, 2009). UWA, working with support organizations, started working out procedures to improve the performance of the policy. This culminated in the Uganda Wildlife Statute of 1996 (UWA, 2000).

The new revenue-sharing policy differed from that of 1994 in several ways (Adams & Infield, 2003; Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001). The 1996 policy provided a legal framework as it had been passed as an Act of Parliament. The target community was defined as those in the neighboring 'frontline' parishes; a definition that emphasizes proximity to the park (UWA, 2000a). The 1996 TRS arrangement stipulated a change in revenue sharing from the 1994 policy of 12% of all park income, including income from user fees, fines, concessions and direct operation of commercial activities, to 20% of gate entrance fees only (UWA, 1996).

Park entrance fees contributed about 80-85% of park revenues in Uganda by 1996 (UWA, 2000a) as visitor numbers to Ugandan National Parks had greatly increased and parks' laws were increasingly being respected, so there was less revenue generated through fines and all other sources of park revenue remained unchanged (UWA, 2000b). It was assumed at the time that channeling 20% of total gate collections would therefore mean transferring a bigger share of conservation funds to communities. Communities surrounding National Parks with no visitor limitations (like Queen Elizabeth and Murchison Falls) benefited considerably from this percentage change as they had more visitors and hence more funds to develop and expand their livelihood projects. On the other hand, communities surrounding National Parks where visitor numbers were restricted for ecological reasons (e.g. Bwindi and Mgahinga) got less funds (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 highlights a critical issue of distributive injustice in wildlife sector which was also found to frustrate revenue-sharing arrangements in Tanzania (Schroeder, 2008). Despite the fact that Bwindi tops tourism revenue generation for UWA, it trailed behind other parks in distribution of TRS funds. In 2009 for example, total revenues from entrance and gorilla fees were more than 7 billion UGX Shillings (about USD 2,822,581), comfortably more than the other two parks. However, as gorilla trekking permits, which contribute more than 85% to tourism revenue at Bwindi, are excluded in TRS calculations, TRS funds' allocation to Bwindi were lower than in other parks.

Table 4.1. Total and shared tourism revenues in the three most visited National Parks in Uganda (UWA Accounts Department, 2010).

National Park		Years and amount in UGX Shillings		
		2005	2007	2009
Bwindi	total	3,349,712,128	5,121,800,940	7,297,180,333
	shared	149,491,900	107,713,006	100,004,000
Murchison Falls	total	1,357,168,768	1,447,768,743	2,031,828,839
	shared	189,400,531	454,155,365	150,000,000
Queen Elizabeth	total	1,104,093,653	1,554,425,517	1,809,687,869
	shared	177,757,600	153,850,000	200,000,000

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Between 1996 and 2009, a total of Uganda Shillings 680,349,200 (USD 263,000; exchange rate of July 2011) was disbursed representing only 9.3% of the tourism revenues that Bwindi generated in the year 2009 alone (Table 4.2). Of this UGX 23,248,000 was spent on projects in Nteko, 61,920,000 in Mukono and 19,398,000 in Rubuguri. The balance was allocated to other parishes bordering the park.

The three study parishes received almost equal shares except in 2007 when a bigger portion was allocated to Mukono specifically to meet the high costs involved in upgrading a road which is an important access route to the park. The development projects that have been funded for the period 1996-2009 in Mukono, Nteko and Rubuguri parishes are elaborated on in Chapter 6. In 2000 Rubuguri parish and in 2005 all the three parishes were unsuccessful in getting project proposals submitted or approved.

4.2.1 The USD 5 gorilla levy fee

Gorilla tourism is the key tourist activity and the main revenue-generating activity at Bwindi. However, the exclusion of gorilla permit revenues from the TRS scheme results in less funding being available for TRS than at the savannah National Parks of Uganda. Realizing this limitation, communities around Bwindi and Mgahinga National Parks advocated through local government administration that a levy be deducted from the gorilla permit revenue to boost the share they received from tourism (UWA, 2009). The conservation non-governmental organizations Mgahinga Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust (MBIFCT) and IGCP operating in the region supported this cause and boosted the communities' bargaining power. They participated in negotiations that involved UWA and the representatives from the three districts (Kisoro, Kanungu and Kabale) surrounding the two parks. This formed the basis for the August 2005 approval of a USD 5 levy on every

Table 4.2. Portion of tourism revenue sharing funds distributed in Mukono, Nteko and Rubuguri parishes (1996-2009) (UWA TRS Report, 2009).

Year	Total TRS ¹ funds released in UGX Shillings	Portion for the three study parishes		
		Nteko	Mukono	Rubuguri
1996	76,000,000	4,000,000	4,000,000	4,000,000
2000	43,819,600	3,400,000	3,717,000	0
2002	89,815,000	3,500,000	3,755,000	3,500,000
2005	149,491,900	0	0	0
2006	114,218,700	5,000,000	5,100,000	4,550,000
2007	107,000,000	3,000,000	41,000,000	3,000,000
2009	100,004,000	4,348,000	4,348,000	4,348,000
	680,349,200	23,248,000	61,920,000	19,398,000

¹ Tourism Revenue Sharing.

gorilla permit sold, for utilization by communities around Bwindi-Mgahinga Conservation Area (BMCA).

UWA started collecting gorilla levy funds in July 2006. In order to have a significantly bigger fund for effective utilization, the funds are supposed to be disbursed after every two years. Between July 2006 and June 2008, a total of UGX 289,559,783 was collected and disbursed in August 2009 during the celebrations for the year of gorillas (Table 4.3).

4.3 Policy arrangements analysis

4.3.1 Actors

At the park level TRS arrangements over time have been executed by different actor coalitions. Administratively, the revenue-sharing funds were initially managed by Park Management Advisory Committees (PMAC) (Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001). The PMAC was composed of district technical staff members selected by park management. However, certain challenges emerged. It was established to cater for park interests with regard to community participation in park management, and community interests were not catered for. PMAC members were not elected by the community and did not have the mandate and obligations to represent their interests. PMAC was accountable to the park management and considered themselves park employees but did not have an institutional framework. In most cases PMAC was not fully functional and where it functioned there were no community-park interactions. The communities only held meetings when called by the park management. The committee mainly played an advisory role to park management, which meant that issues of community interest in protected area management were not adequately addressed (UWA, 2000b; UWA official, research interview, 2009).

Uganda National Parks (UNP) attempted to address these issues by trying to adequately provide community representation on PMAC through the formation of parish Park Committees with the chairperson representing communities on PMAC (UWA, 2000). Where these committees were formed, most of them were not functional due to conflict and duplication of activities (UWA official, research interview, 2009). Improving community-park relations necessitated a strong institutional link that could effectively and adequately

Table 4.3. Distribution of 2006-2008 gorilla levy funds (UWA Accounts Department).

District	Amount in UGX. Shillings	Amount in US dollars
Kanungu	174,506,204	70,365
Kabale	74,788,386	30,156
Kisoro	40,265,193	16,236
Total	289,559,783	116,758

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represent the interests and concerns of park management as well as those of communities (UWA, 2000b). The absence of effective institutional linkages between park management, communities and other government institutions was characterized by poor communication and information flow, conflicts which often resulted in direct confrontation, marginalization of community participation in protected area management, community deprivation of benefits, resource degradation and generally negative attitudes of local communities towards the protected areas (UWA, 2000b). This seriously frustrated conservation efforts (UWA official, research interview, 2009).

Towards the end of 1996, a process started to form a new and more appropriate institution that fitted within the framework of legislated community institutions with a collection of the views, ideas and concerns of key stakeholders (UWA, 2000b). The lessons learned from PMAC also guided the process: 'We had a lot to learn from the shortcomings of PMAC and this time, we were determined to form a sustainable, effective and strong institution from the existing government institutions..!' (UWA official, research interview, 2009).

A Community-Protected Areas Institution (CPI) was formed and the Local Governments system provided the framework for CPI-development and the majority of CPI members. 'Secretaries for Production' at parish, sub-county and district levels are automatically members of the CPI. Community groups such as resource user groups, youth groups, women's groups and other specialized interest groups that directly or indirectly affect the conservation of park resources are also represented in CPI's. The members of the CPI elect an executive committee to manage the institution's activities, including reviewing proposals and making decisions about TRS funding. They are supported by ex-officio committee members representing UWA and the district environmental office (Figure 4.1). The ex-officio members are meant to give technical advice and guidance on matters relating to policy, legislation and management objectives of the park (UWA, 2000a).

It is important to note that the majority of CPI members are individuals elected to political positions in the local government system. This emerged as a very contentious issue in almost all focus group discussions, as the majority of CPI members were branded 'politicians' who are driven by the need for votes instead of objective decision making. In Nteko for example,




Figure 4.1. Composition of Community Protected Area Institution.

it was pointed out that political leaders favor their home villages when it comes to allocation of funds for livelihood projects. To address this problem, the Chief Administrative Officers in each district benefiting from the arrangement, though not included on CPI, have been appointed as accounting officers. They receive the money on behalf of communities and disburse it with guidance from CPI and in turn ask for accountability of the funds released. This was done to minimize corruption and embezzlement of funds that had become rampant in the early stages of its implementation (UWA official, research interview, 2009).

In view of all the above, it is clear that the TRS policy at Bwindi is implemented by a cross-section of actors. Despite this cross-sectional representation on CPI, it was revealed through informal discussions with communities and from the focus group discussions that the institution of CPI is still unpopular among communities who are supposed to be the target beneficiaries of this arrangement. One resident in Nkwenda village, Mukono parish commented: 'Yes, the CPI is there, and I hear that we are represented, but there are challenges that UWA should resolve...!' (Local Resident, research interview, 2009).

4.3.2 Resources

Despite the role of several actors in rule setting and implementation, UWA emerges as the most powerful overall actor as it collects and disburses the resources generated by revenue sharing. This gives it the central role in TRS and a position of great influence over the rules of the game, as explained in the following section. UWA is also responsible for establishing a rapport with the people who live around protected areas since creating and increasing goodwill between the park and the community is a key objective of TRS. However, in this sense UWA lacks the resources needed to fulfill its role, as communication with communities and explanation of the rules of the game is the responsibility of just one UWA employee (the Community Conservation Warden) and he admitted that he is overwhelmed by what he has to do: 'Going around Bwindi is not easy... Moreover there is no adequate facilitation for this... I try my best, but there is still a lot to be desired in addressing community issues...!' (UWA official, research interview, 2009).

Because of human and financial limitations, UWA relies on working mainly through the Community Protected Areas Institutions (CPI). Much as community members admit that some projects are being funded by TRS funds, they expressed ignorance about the process of selecting these projects. This suggests that it remains a top-down approach with local elites who are able to gain access to the CPI process, therefore deciding for the majority of community members. CPI members admit that they are supposed to work with local community members and other stakeholders to initiate project proposals where necessary. They confess that at times they do not do so, but argue that as they are community members themselves they know community needs and that the costs of consulting all community members in terms of time and money must be taken into consideration.

The implementation of the gorilla levy has also shown the influence of resource distribution among actors in determining policy arrangements. Initially, MBIFCT being the chief campaigner for the levy had proposed that the funds be disbursed through its accounts to

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further the livelihood activities they had initiated. However, this decision was challenged by the local governments of Kisoro, Kabale and Kanungu which argued that the disbursement of the fund through MBIFCT was not provided for in the law, and opted for a direct disbursement of the fund to the district local governments. From informal discussions with district officials and councilors, it emerged that the opposition to MBIFCT playing this role in the arrangement was supported by IGCP which facilitated and coordinated district local governments in attempting to object the arrangement. It is clear that behind the scenes, there is rivalry and political wrestling between the two conservation and development organizations (IGCP and MBIFCT): 'This organization support similar projects and actually does almost similar work... it seems they are fighting for donors... If their interest is communities and conservation, they should merge and work together...!' (chairman of the Rubuguri Pressure group).

The distribution of TRS resources at Bwindi is based on the number of parishes touching the park. Kanungu happens to have more and Kisoro has the least. However, this criterion is not supported by the people of Kisoro: 'You know Kanungu is a new district created in 2000..., they intentionally subdivided their villages and came up with many parishes. This helps them get more funds as opposed to ourselves... it is unacceptable... other criteria... like the population in those parishes should be considered...!' (Community member of Nteko parish, research interview, 2009).

But UWA and IGCP insisted that the revenue-sharing policy has been well debated and very prudent rules have been put in place to ensure fairness, justice and more importantly to cause an impact on the communities directly affected by the existence of the park.

4.3.3 Rules of the game

Several rules guide the implementation of the tourism revenue-sharing policy. The rules can be categorized into two; disbursement rules which specify the process and the channel of releasing TRS funds and project selection rules which specify the process and criteria for selecting projects to be funded under TRS arrangements. As described above, UWA is the most powerful actor in TRS and is able to shape the rules in favor of conservation objectives. UWA also monitors these funds to ensure that the set rules and conditions are fulfilled. All focus group discussions and informal interactions with the communities revealed that only a few community elites are aware of these rules. The majority of community members do not know anything. This is also well illustrated by the fact that the majority of the community do not know about the new gorilla levy. However, some elite community members who were informed of the arrangement questioned the levy being set at USD 5, or just 1% of the cost of a gorilla permit. According to UWA and ICGP this was what had been agreed on in the meetings since the bigger percentage of this money goes to finance conservation efforts elsewhere in the country where resources are limited (see also Adams & Infield, 2003). They argue that Bwindi is a national resource and money cannot only be spent at Bwindi and that if the communities feel unhappy about it, they should request more discussions for its revision.

The lack of knowledge on rules can be attributed to low levels of education in this region as legal technicalities cannot easily be understood by the majority, who has other priorities: 'We want to see more of our projects funded and not much attention on technical issues... We cannot understand them' (an elder in Rubuguri parish, research interview, 2009).

UWA argues that the rules are made in consultation with community leaders who are supposed to communicate them to their respective communities, but this did not happen. At the same time, the majority of the local elites support the rules describing them as more focused on the plight of the local people and to conservation needs.

Overall, TRS funded projects must be identified within the district and sub-county development plans. The proposals from the communities requesting TRS funds are prioritized and vetted. Those that fulfill the conditions are selected; these conditions form TRS project selection rules. However, whereas setting and adhering to these rules is important for effective management of finances, focus group discussions revealed that the majority of beneficiary communities find it troublesome to fulfill the set conditions. These include writing proposals, drafting constitutions, opening bank accounts, forming community-based organizations or NGOs and tailoring the proposal to the outlined conditions, all of which prove difficult for local people with a generally low level of education. The repercussions of this have been an emergence of a few local elites who know what to do and are taking advantage of the majority: 'Accessing TRS funds is not easy, we are told to write proposals... We don't know that... But young people who know this are given the money...!' (elderly respondent in Mukono parish).

4.3.4 Discourses

Despite the TRS livelihood projects elaborated on in Chapter 6, most people in Mukono, Nteko and Rubuguri parishes have no kind words for revenue sharing management by CPI. In other words, the 'official' discourse is challenged by a 'local' discourse. The official discourse is associated with the underlying motive and ideals of conservation organizations like UWA and IGCP, reflected in the TRS policy. It reflects UWA's mission to conserve biodiversity and is enshrined in the overall goal for TRS; 'to ensure that local communities living adjacent to PAs obtain benefits from existence of these areas, improve their welfare and ultimately strengthen partnership between UWA, local communities, and local governments, for sustainable management of resources in and around the PAs' (UWA's TRS Policy, 2003). The purpose and objectives for implementing TRS are thus tailored to contribute to this goal. Specifically the TRS policy sets out to achieve three objectives that clearly reflect the international community based conservation discourse which especially dominated the conservation debates in the 1980s and 1990s that if conservation benefits are shared with communities, their attitudes towards conservation will improve and this will help in the campaign to conserve threatened biodiversity. These policy objectives are (UWA's TRS Policy, 2000):

1. providing an enabling environment for establishing good relations between protected areas and their neighboring communities;

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2. to demonstrate the economic value of protected areas and conservation in general to communities neighboring protected areas;
3. to solicit support and acceptance of protected areas and conservation from local communities living adjacent to these areas.

UWA is very optimistic that the TRS arrangement is to a large extent successful. On the other hand, the local governments and communities view TRS differently. Local governments feel the funds should be handed over to the districts and utilized equally by all parishes in the surrounding districts. They base their argument on the view that the park is their natural resource and should spread benefits to all. They would prefer a different strategy to the current focus on frontline communities. They believe TRS should be an additional source of revenue for district programs. In fact one district councilor presented a radical idea, suggesting that Uganda should also decentralize the management of National Parks so that the district administration could manage and oversee the national park directly. From the community perspective, they argue that it is their right to share these benefits because the park is 'their resource'. They even view UWA as an 'intruder' having stopped them from accessing park resources. More particularly, they highlighted their problems with CPI in terms of corruption, poor information flow and limited funds. Community members argued that CPI inflates the costs of the projects funded. Some of these projects include livelihood projects (goat- and sheep-rearing), construction of schools, bridges and roads and health units. For example, whereas they admit that goats were purchased for community members, they argued that they were of poor quality (poor breeds), at inflated prices and the distribution procedure by village chairmen favored some community members: 'Yes, a few goats were supplied to community members, but we are aware that a goat was bought at 120,000 UGX. Shillings, yet the normal price of a good goat in this area is between 60,000-80,000... this is dishonesty on their part...' (community member in Mukono parish, research interview, 2009).

Another member of the community in Nteko also expressed discontent with the goat and sheep arrangement: 'the rationale behind a TRS arrangement is to develop communities shouldering the burden of wildlife... some of community members have these goats, sheep and pigs etc, we would supply CPI at cheaper prices... but CPI awards contracts to its members, inflate prices, and spoils the whole arrangement' (community member in Mukono parish, research interview, 2009).

In protest, most people who received goats slaughtered and ate them. No goat from this arrangement could be seen on a cross-sectional tour of the community and TRS funded projects and CPI has not followed it up.

A further challenge to the official discourse is that community members argue that they are never consulted on which projects should be funded and never given feedback on what transpires in CPI meetings. An interview with all village committee chairmen, however, revealed that local people are reluctant to attend meetings when invited to get updates on what transpires in CPI. This leads to limited awareness of what is happening. On the other hand, some community members say invitations are given discriminately (only the

supporters are invited and others left out) while others argue that turning down meetings is a protest move to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the arrangement. This puts CPI in the same position as its predecessor structure (PMAC) because the two institutions almost face the same challenges. The communities further argue that because of visitor limitations at Bwindi, funds for TRS are very limited and therefore cannot make a big impact on the entire population. But UWA argues that it is this dilemma (the limitation of visitor numbers at Bwindi) that led to discussions that gave rise to a USD 5 'gorilla levy' to increase TRS funds.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the introduction, development and implementation of the Tourism Revenue Sharing (TRS) arrangement at Bwindi from a policy arrangement approach. The results contained in the chapter demonstrate a low governance capacity of the TRS arrangement. Generally, the dimensions of the policy arrangement are structurally incongruent, the regulative instruments that have been established are poorly known, understood and accepted and the relationships between actors are disturbed and not built on mutual trust.

Two existing discourse coalitions are dissimilar in perspective; an 'official' one voiced by UWA and IGCP, reflecting storylines of international and national conservation focusing on linking conservation and development (Newmark & Hough, 2000), and a competing discourse advocated by local communities which challenges the way TRS is implemented. The oppositional discourse calls for more community involvement, more direct individual benefits, distributive justice, more funds to TRS and fewer conditions on TRS funds set by UWA. Similar concerns have been voiced in other developing countries (Schroeder, 2007; Spiteri & Nepal, 2006).

The internal incongruence of the four dimensions of the TRS policy arrangement is also well illustrated by the fact that although the transfer of management from the PMAC in 1994 to the CPIs in 1996 included the entrance of new community-based actors in the TRS arrangement, at the same time Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) is still perceived to be the most powerful actor as it has control over resources and consequently determines the rules of the game. The distributional effects of TRS were and still are subject to discussions at Bwindi, as well as the new rules for disbursing funds and project selection, which are still debated and considered as too 'technical' for many. Although the criticism of the low funding from TRS has been addressed by the introduction of new resources in the form of the gorilla levy, this has been criticized for only being USD 5.

TRS is still a policy arrangement where state actors dominate (Lieverink, 2006). Crucial resources are controlled by UWA. Therefore, the results in this chapter also echo the findings of Nelson & Agrawal (2008), who argue that there is a reduced likelihood of state institutions (in this case UWA) relinquishing control over resources when they are highly valuable. Whereas CPI and local governments are involved at all levels of TRS implementation, their powers are limited to resource distribution within the framework of UWA's conditional

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guidelines. The communities on the other hand are the most disadvantaged with neither financial nor knowledge resources. Despite being the main victims of conservation costs, their powers are minimal.

Similar challenges facing revenue-sharing schemes of the 'protected area outreach' variety have been identified elsewhere (Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001; Ahebwa *et al.*, 2008; Schroeder, 2008). The results of this study suggest that this may be due to the inherent imbalance of power in such cases, where the protected area authority will always be able to decide the level of benefit sharing and set the basic rules of the game (Barrow & Murphree, 2001). TRS based on commercial activities on community land or formal joint ventures would help to address this imbalance and deliver better outcomes for local people, but even under these arrangements the imbalance of resources (such as financial and knowledge resources) often results in arrangements that are more rhetorically than practically participatory.

5. The private-community partnership arrangement

5.1 Introduction

In recent years, partnership models between various combinations of local, state and private sector actors have emerged. Partnership arrangements can be classified in different ways including; Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), Public-Private-Community Partnerships (PPCP) and of late Private-Community Partnerships (PCP) (Ashley & Garland 1994; Ashley & Jones, 2001; Ashley & Ntshona, 2003; Barrow & Murphree, 2001; Eagles, 2009; Spenceley, 2003). Important variables for classification include the type of actors involved, the degree of centralization or decentralization, the type of management body, the main sources of income and the land tenure arrangements (Van der Duim, 2011). Most of these partnerships claim to circumvent the shortcomings of the 'wholly' community-based tourism models, arguing that whilst private sector partners should ensure profitability, local benefits can be guaranteed through community equity (Spenceley, 2008).

This chapter focuses on a particular form of partnership – Private-Community Partnerships (PCP) – which is often mediated by public and third sector organizations. The African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) has largely promoted and facilitated the Private-Community Partnership (PCP) arrangement in Africa through the introduction of 'conservation enterprises'. The conservation enterprises were first piloted by AWF and Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) as part of the Conservation of the Bio-diverse Resource Areas (COBRA) project from 1992 to 1998 and through Conservation of Resources through Enterprise (CORE) project from 1999 to 2005 (Nthiga *et al.*, 2011). The current case study, the Clouds Mountain Lodge, is the first of these conservation enterprises in Uganda.

Conservation enterprises are commercial ventures designed to create benefit flows that support the attainment of a conservation objective and may include eco-lodges, campsites, and cultural villages, fishing villages, harvesting and processing natural resource products. According to AWF these conservation enterprises are likely to do well with sound private sector and community partners, clear contractual agreements and community ownership, transparent intra-community benefit sharing arrangements and a clear conservation logic (Elliot & Sumba 2010). Conservation enterprises and private-community partnerships are intuitively appealing and have gained rapid popularity with donors and policy makers in Africa. Spenceley (2003) reveals successful partnerships in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa which have had positive implications for both livelihoods and conservation. Likewise Varghese (2008) found that similar interventions in South African National Parks have played a role in increasing net economic benefits attributable to parks, stimulating local economic development, mitigating environmental impacts and financing several conservation activities. Despite these successes in Southern Africa, disseminating and implementing the partnership approach has raised new challenges and dilemmas in other

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African regions. For example, Southgate (2006) indicates that power imbalances between actors, institutional failure and corruption frustrated the success of a private-community partnership (PCP) involving the Maasai communities and a private company at Kimana wildlife sanctuary in Kenya.

This chapter expounds the processes and context in which the Clouds Mountain Lodge, a new private-community partnership arrangement at Bwindi was designed and implemented. This is done from a policy arrangements perspective. The chapter reveals that the technical conceptualization of the partnership arrangement failed to take proper account of political and contextual factors, resulting in escalating conflict up to the national level.

5.2 The development of a private-community partnership at Bwindi

As elaborated on in Chapter One, tourism based on gorilla trekking began at Bwindi in 1993 (McNeilage, 1996) when the only access point for trekking was at Buhoma in Mukono parish on the northern side of the park. At the time of this study, six groups of gorillas were available for tourism. The PCP venture on which this chapter is based is linked to one group located in the Nkuringo sector, south of Bwindi, which has been open for tourism since 2004. Based on the Buhoma experience (see Chapter 3), tourism was subsequently proposed by UWA and IGCP as a way to address a long-standing history of human-wildlife conflicts in the southern side of Bwindi (UWA official, research interview 2009). The tourism concept for Kisoro district was supported by members of the community in Nteko and Rubuguri parishes, who envied the benefits that tourism was generating for the people of Mukono parish (Founder chairman of NCDF, Research interview 2009). Through the Kisoro District administration and local opinion leaders, demand grew for habituation of gorillas for tourism in the Kisoro district, so that the area could share in tourism benefits (Kisoro District chairman, research interview 2009). Having had this plan, but also responding to the community and district administration pressure, UWA and IGCP started the habituation process at Nkuringo, Kisoro district in 1997 (IGCP official, research interview 2009).

Preparing gorillas for tourism is a long process that first involves habituating gorillas to the presence of humans. It took about seven years for the Nkuringo group to be opened for tourism in 2004 (UWA official, research interview, 2009). In 1999 however, the gorillas undergoing habituation proved more dangerous and troublesome to the surrounding communities than before. Gorillas which were becoming used to humans began to stray further into the community areas. This exacerbated raiding of crops like bananas, avocados, maize and other related problems: 'The gorillas were spending most of their time in people's gardens, escalating the standing human-wildlife conflicts. We had to find a short-term solution to the problem, but also come up with a way how the local people could benefit from the existence of gorillas' (IGCP official, research interview 2009).

UWA and IGCP sought communities' views on how the problem could be tackled. This opened up negotiations between UWA, IGCP and the community leaders. Negotiations were

based on two options: stop the habituation process and hence put the planned tourism development on hold or acquire the land that gorillas had frequented and turn it into a buffer zone.

In anticipation of tourism-related benefits and also having suffered conflicts with gorillas and other wild animals, the majority of community members opted for option two and accepted to sell the land to UWA. Some of the people who sold their land migrated to other regions in Uganda; others bought land within Kisoro District, while others stayed on the small pieces of land that remained (local leader, research interview, 2010). Selling the land was on condition that communities would maximally benefit from tourism and that UWA and IGCP would put in place interventions to stop crop raiding. Although a few members of the community were against the idea of selling, they were overtaken by events as they could not remain 'islands' in an area frequently invaded by wildlife (elder in Nteko, research interview, 2010). They too were forced by the prevailing situation to sell their land to UWA. IGCP obtained the required funds from international donors and helped UWA to buy the land, an area 150 meters wide and 12 km long on the edge of the park on the Kisoro District side (UWA-NCDF MOU, 2004). IGCP later signed an agreement with UWA that necessitated the land to be turned into a buffer zone, annexed to the park and allowed to regenerate into forest vegetation. This buffer zone is currently co-managed by UWA and the community and is intended to cushion communities from conservation-related losses (IGCP official, research interview, 2010).

Meanwhile, IGCP hired a consultant to establish a tourism development plan for the Nkuringo area encompassing Nteko and Rubuguri parishes and designed a business plan for gorilla trekking for the same area. In the plan, the consultant recommended a PCP as an appropriate intervention to ensure guaranteed quick tourism-related benefits to communities, and suggested that this could be achieved through a high-end lodge. Preference for PCP intervention over the direct community involvement model as at Buhoma was hinged on two main reasons. First, since the Nkuringo area is so remote and not easy to access, it would be very difficult to generate quick benefits from a community-managed tourism venture. Second, there was a need for high-end accommodation units for the upper category of visitors at Bwindi and UWA wanted to use this opportunity to meet visitors' demands while addressing community interests as well (UWA official, research interview 2009). The consultant's report was adopted by IGCP and the Kisoro District Council (IGCP official, research interview 2009). The PCP proposal for Bwindi fitted well with the broader work of AWF, which is the main partner in IGCP, with headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya and supporting around 30 of such arrangements in Eastern and Southern Africa (Van der Duim, 2011).

While habituation of gorillas in Nkuringo was on-going, a group of 23 'elite' community members from Nteko and Rubuguri parishes formed an association called Nkuringo Tourism Development Association (NTDA), with the intention of taking advantage of the tourism-related opportunities through running private tourism businesses. They had planned to start a community campground, but UWA and IGCP managed to convince them to '...transform this into an institution with broader objectives that represented general community interests' (IGCP official, research interview 2010).

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Through NTDA, IGCP and UWA hoped to implement the recommendations in the tourism plan that the consultant had prepared and to reach out to other community members from Nteko and Rubuguri. As a public relations gesture, but also as a step to bring the community on board, IGCP and AWF sponsored a trip to Kenya to enable NTDA leaders to learn about best practices as far as community enterprises in tourism involving PCP are concerned. The founder chairman of NCDF described the Kenya trip as follows: 'What we saw in Kenya was great... we all thought of starting a big thing and not just a community campground if we were to benefit from tourism. When we returned from Kenya, we delivered the idea to the people of Rubuguri and they accepted it' (founder chairman of NCDF, research interview 2009).

The post-Kenya-trip period was dominated by discussions involving the rest of the NTDA members and some other community members from the two parishes on which tourism investment option should be taken. The results of these discussions, as revealed by key informants and in focus group discussions, were positive as these community members endorsed the IGCP and UWA's idea of a high-end lodge;

The idea of the high-end lodge was endorsed after realising with the help of UWA and IGCP that clients to the area are high class and therefore high-end services would be on demand... But also, since tourists trekking gorillas are always limited, it would not make sense to set up fragmented and many low-end accommodation establishments in each of the parishes

(NCDF official, research interview 2009).

Community members also seem to have approved of working with a high-end partner, for the following reasons:

From what the community members who went to Kenya had learnt and considering advice from IGCP, and UWA, it was more prudent if a high end lodge was established in partnership with the private sector. This was partly due to our limitations in hospitality business management skills, but also to follow the condition that IGCP had given for soliciting funds on our behalf for constructing the eco-lodge

(NCDF official, research interview 2009).

At this stage, the 23 members of the NTDA renamed their organization the Nkuringo Conservation and Development Foundation (NCDF), with technical and financial facilitation from IGCP and UWA. It is important to note that this subsequently led to controversy. Some community members, district officials and opinion leaders felt the group of 23 members were not representative of all the people in the two parishes since they were not elected in the first place and argued that they capitalized on the 'ignorance' of the masses. They described the group as 'local elites' who aimed at advancing their interests and that the same group was behind the development of the NCDF constitution. The NCDF constitution indicates 23 names of this group with appended signatures. Through an advocate, they registered NCDF with the registrar of companies as a 'company limited by guarantee' in 2004. According to the NCDF strategic plan 2009-2014 (pp. 6-7), members of NTDA chose

to register NCDF in this way for three reasons: liability of members is only limited to the amount guaranteed in the articles and memorandum of association; the company is not liable to pay corporation tax on profits as long as the profits are ploughed back into the company in line with its objectives; and, instead of declaring dividends, as in the case of a company limited by shares, profits are ploughed back to support social activities.

The registration of NCDF as a company increased the controversy, as some community members and tourism companies saw it as more evidence suggesting that NCDF was not a community focused venture, but a kind of private initiative driven by a few individuals who were using the community name to attract support. This period saw the beginnings of a coalition opposing the PCP process, described in more detail below. Defending their work with NCDF, IGCP argues that: 'We had to start from somewhere, and this group was already united and engaged in activities that suited our interests... so it was rational and in good faith to work through them to bring other communities on board' (IGCP official, research interview 2009).

IGCP further argues that all provisions were in place to involve the entire community. On the issue of registering NCDF as a company, IGCP and the NCDF leaders claimed to prefer this as it would ease the legal process of partnering with a private developer, and meant that profits made on the part of the community (NCDF) would be re-invested in community enterprises to expand benefits to the entire community in the long run.

In the following months, the 23 NCDF members on behalf of the Nteko and Rubuguri communities started brainstorming on how to move forward with the new idea of a high-end lodge. They resorted to the Nkuringo tourism development plan that had earlier been developed by the consultant (NCDF founding chairman, research interview, 2009). A committee constituting NCDF with representatives from IGCP and UWA, in consultation with Kisoro District, agreed that Ntungamo village in Nteko parish be taken on as the site for the project. This was because the UWA – Nkuringo sector office where gorilla trekkers converge for a pre-trekking briefing is located in Ntungamo village. NCDF, however, did not have land in this area on which the project could be established. With NCDF formed, the new challenge at this stage was mobilization of resources to purchase land.

5.2.1 Mobilization of financial resources

NCDF purchased 13 acres of land for the PCP lodge for a total of UGX 31 million (about USD 12,500). Of these funds, UGX 15 million was from NCDF reserves and UGX 16 million (about USD 6,452) was borrowed from the Solidarity Fund of Rwanda (a conservation fund also administered by IGCP for Rwanda). In both cases, IGCP played a major role in facilitating access to finance. The sum taken from NCDF reserves for land purchase was the same as an amount paid by IGCP and UWA to NCDF in exchange for labor to remove exotic fruit species from the new Bwindi buffer zone, necessary as these were attracting gorillas away from the park (UWA official, research interview, 2009). The UGX 16 million was also brokered by IGCP as a loan deal between NCDF and the Solidarity Fund of Rwanda, whereby the borrowed money was to be paid back once NCDF got any other funding for the project or after the

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eco-lodge started operating. This money has since been paid back using remittances from Clouds Lodge to NCDF (for details, see NCDF expenses 2008-2010, AWF 2010).

With NCDF in possession of land for a lodge, IGCP and UWA started facilitating the process of identifying the private developer to partner with NCDF in the PCP arrangement. A tender committee was constituted, comprising three members from NCDF, three from UWA and three from IGCP and the search process began in late 2004. The tender advertisements were placed both locally and internationally in newspapers and on websites (IGCP official, research interview, 2009). Four companies (The Uganda Safari Company (TUSC), Inns of Uganda (current Geo Lodges), Serena Hotels, and a Kenyan Consortium) responded to the advert by submitting concept notes, and later Serena hotels and the Kenyan consortium withdrew leaving TUSC and Inns of Uganda which submitted full proposals (IGCP official, research interview, 2009). The proposals detailed their business plans and company profiles.

The two proposals were reviewed by a consultant hired by the tender committee. This Kenyan-owned and -based consulting company was brought on board by AWF on behalf of IGCP. The tender committee developed selection criteria based on the bidder organization, the proposed product concept and partnership dynamics. On the basis of these criteria, TUSC emerged as the best (IGCP official, research interview, 2009) and was therefore selected by the tender committee to build and run an eco-lodge with NCDF.

The tendering process proved controversial in two respects. First, the direct involvement of IGCP, AWF and UWA in the tender process attracted mixed reactions. The founder chairman of NCDF said that the involvement of IGCP and UWA in the tendering process was initiated by NCDF to benefit from their experience and expertise: 'It was not easy for us to identify a private sector partner... That is why we sought the assistance of IGCP and UWA and it is not that they were imposing on us, but they were actually advising us' (NCDF founder chairman, research interview 2009).

In contrast, the Kisoro Tourism Association (KTA), which was emerging as a key opposition actor in the process, argued that it was a ploy by IGCP and UWA to bring one of their own into the whole arrangement: 'IGCP and UWA had a hidden agenda from the start of all the arrangement, they had preferential treatment and supported the monopoly of the gorillas in Nkuringo, that is why they brought in TUSC... It was very unfair... and we shall continue to oppose it' (KTA official, research interview, 2009).

On the other hand, UWA stated that its interest in the whole process was purely to secure the safety of the park through helping communities to get a better deal: 'Our only interest in the ... arrangement was to assist communities to secure a credible private developer to partner ... In any case our sole aim is to conserve, and we were very much interested in communities in these two frontline parishes who are facing conservation problems' (UWA official, research interview, 2010).

Secondly, some actors felt there was a conflict of interest between UWA, IGCP, and TUSC. At the time of the tendering process and awarding, the proprietor of TUSC was a Board

member of UWA (the top-most decision-making organ) (UWA, KTA, AUTO officials, research interviews, 2009; Inspector General of Government's – IGG Report, 2010). Because of this, KTA and others have since argued that he might have used his influence to curry favor with the tender awarding committee.

Upon soliciting NCDF's equity fund into the partnership and identifying the private developer, discussions on the partnership agreement ensued. These discussions involved NCDF and TUSC, mediated and facilitated by IGCP and UWA. The agreement was drafted by AWF lawyers who were based in Nairobi, Kenya.

Further resistance emerged when it was realized that in the agreement there was a clause that required NCDF, upon signing the agreement with TUSC, to transfer its exclusive rights to gorilla permits to TUSC. It emerged that on 30 August 2004, UWA had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with NCDF giving it exclusive rights to purchase all 6 gorilla trekking permits available in the Nkuringo section of Bwindi at that time. However, this clause attracted the attention of the Association of Uganda Tour Operators (AUTO) which joined the opposition as a new actor. AUTO is an umbrella association of more than 120 major tour operators in Uganda, all of which compete for the limited gorilla permits available at Bwindi. Other AUTO and KTA members viewed TUSC as a competitor supposed to operate in the same business environment as themselves, and argued that the transfer of gorilla permits' exclusive rights to TUSC would give it an unfair advantage in this section of the park. As the KTA chairman argued: 'We own many tourism accommodation facilities in Kisoro, by giving TUSC exclusive rights... it would mean that all clients coming to the Kisoro side of the park would stay at Clouds Lodge... we shall then be disadvantaged' (KTA chairman, research interview, 2009).

As for AUTO, the argument was that, 'exclusive rights would make TUSC the 'boss' in the gorilla business which is disastrous in a free economy' (AUTO chairman, research interview, 2009).

On the contrary, IGCP and UWA argued that giving exclusive rights to NCDF was intended to create an assurance of the market for the joint venture. This was an inducement to attract the interest of a private developer: 'Investment in Nkuringo area was risky since it is so remote, located near Congo and trekking the gorilla group is tough... an assurance of the market by tagging the permits was necessary to attract a private sector partner' (IGCP and UWA official, research interview 2009).

NCDF also signed the MOU that stipulated in article 3.7 that NCDF would share all benefits accruing from the utilization of the said gorilla permits with the entire Nkuringo community (the residents of Nteko and Rubuguri parishes). And that these benefits would be shared in a transparent and fair manner, and in accordance with NCDF's memorandum and articles of Association. Accordingly, UWA justifies this to have been targeting the entire community, which shoulders the burden of conservation.

5.2.2 Intensifying conflict

At this time, deep-rooted conflicts within NCDF itself began to emerge. Power struggles took place regarding who should lead and who should benefit. This in part led to the emergence of a 'Rubuguri pressure group'. It emerged from various focus group discussions and key stakeholder interviews that the leader of this group was previously one of the founding members of NTDA and NCDF, but dropped out due to conflicts. At the same time, he had also started an accommodation establishment in Rubuguri town and saw the joint venture as a threat to his business. He was quick at mobilizing other disgruntled members of the community especially from Rubuguri and their local coalition linked up with Association of Uganda Tour Operators (AUTO), and Kisoro District Tourism Association (KTA) to take their stand forward.

On 7 July 2006, the Minister of Tourism traveled to grace the signing of the NCDF-TUSC agreement at Kisoro District council hall. The opposition coalition, which had grown to include KTA, AUTO, the Rubuguri pressure group, and some district officials, requested the Minister not to sign the agreement. Issues of contention largely emanated from the gorilla permits 'monopoly' clause. The large coalition proved a force that the Minister could not resist, and he did not sign the agreement. The Minister called a side meeting on the same day and listened to the views of stakeholders. He advised members that though it was difficult at that stage to stop the arrangement, it was necessary to postpone the signing of the agreement to allow more time for consultations among various stakeholders. He urged the District administration and UWA to hold a meeting with NCDF and the opposition coalition members (KTA, AUTO, and Rubuguri pressure group) to come up with a 'win-win' solution to the stand-off. Following the minister's directive, the Executive Director of UWA called a meeting of KTA, Kisoro district leaders in the same year (2006). One UWA official indicated that the meeting was successful: 'NCDF retained exclusive rights of 6 permits as per the draft agreement and in a situation that the 6 permits are not sold, other operators would be offered an opportunity to buy them' (UWA official, research interview 2009).

It emerged in the same period that IGCP had initiated talks with Greater Virunga conservation bodies to increase the number of tourists per trekking from six to eight per day, partly to address the high demand for gorilla permits in the region. This idea was accepted and became applicable in the whole Virunga region and for the Nkuringo area; the extra two permits became available to be competed for by other tour operators (UWA official, research interview, 2010). However, despite this agreement, the district council still raised a complaint expressing their unease about the NCDF-TUSC agreement being drafted in Nairobi. At this stage, another committee, composed of the District administration (Secretary for natural resources, the District Executive), KTA, and NCDF, was established to again scrutinize the draft agreement. The key issue here was mistrust between some members of the district administration and IGCP and UWA: 'From what I read from these district officials, they were suspicious of IGCP and UWA and thought they were taking advantage of the community... but at the same time, the district also wanted to find avenues of how it could directly benefit from the arrangement' (NCDF official, research interview 2010).

Resolving this conflict was critical as under Ugandan law, any development in a district must be endorsed by the District administration.

The committee resolved that there was need for legal advice and interpretation of certain sections of the agreement necessitating the involvement of the Solicitor General (Government's legal advisor). The Solicitor General studied the draft agreement and certified that it was sound according to Ugandan laws. His comments, which were communicated in writing, gave the committee a green light to allow the signing of the agreement between TUSC and NCDF on 22 March 2007, facilitated by IGCP and witnessed by Kisoro District local government and UWA (Box 5.1).

The agreement was a milestone in the enactment of the PCP arrangement, and the project also received approval from the Uganda Investment Authority. However, opposition to the agreement continued. The opposition coalition lodged a case in the Courts of Law which they lost, but extended their opposition campaigns to the Internet and also continued with their petitions to several government officials including the Minister of Tourism. According to the chairman of KTA, their discontent was worsened by the inclusion of clauses which they had rejected earlier. The clauses were; (1) that no investor should operate a similar business within the radius of 20 km. (2) that no investor shall construct structures within the Clouds Lodge sightlines, and (3) that discussions or conversation with guests was to be a preserve of NCDF, UWA and IGCP. To the KTA members and other members of the opposition coalition, this was totally unacceptable in a free market economy of Uganda.

Box 5.1. Summary of key articles of the Private Community Partnership agreement.

- NCDF was bound to transfer exclusive rights of 6 permits to TUSC, Clouds Lodge management.
- NCDF had to hand over USD 250,000 solicited by IGCP to TUSC to build the lodge structures.
- The eco-lodge was to be legally owned by NCDF. The Uganda Safari Company (owned by a private investor) was to manage it on behalf of NCDF for a period of 15 years.
- In the period of 15 years, for every guest to the lodge, NCDF would get USD 30 per night.
- The Uganda Safari company was also mandated to pay NCDF a sum of USD 5,000 annually as ground rent.
- All the amounts above were to increase by 5% every year.
- At the time of the agreement, the private developer was to charge USD 150 per person per night.
- The agreement also provided that if the Gross Published Room Rate increased by more than the inflation rate, NCDF's earnings would automatically increase.
- TUSC was mandated to train and employ members of NCDF as much as possible.
- No investor could operate a similar business within a radius of 20 km.
- No investor could construct structures within the sightlines of the Clouds Lodge.
- Discussions or conversation with guests would be controlled by NCDF, UWA and IGCP.
- Clouds Lodge was to buy supplies and services from members of NCDF where possible (local sourcing).
- The Uganda Safari Company was mandated to promote the conservation ideals of AWF-IGCP and encourage its clients to take AWF-IGCP membership.

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An official petition was also sent to the Inspector General of Government (IGG- The Government's anti-graft body) which prompted a fresh investigation into the matter. It is important to note that soon after NCDF- TUSC signed their agreement on 22 March 2007, USD 250,000 from USAID was passed on to TUSC by IGCP as was stipulated by the agreement (Clouds Lodge official, research interview, 2010). The construction of the Nkuringo lodge, to be called 'Clouds Mountain Lodge', started and it was officially opened for business on 31 July 2008. This was the first PCP tourism lodge to open in Uganda.

The findings of the IGG's investigations were released in mid-2010. The IGG report questioned the procedure through which the USAID contribution for NCDF was channeled to TUSC without being reflected in NCDF bank transactions for audit reasons: 'Funds of USD 250,000... were not properly accounted for as Nkuringo Conservation and Development Foundation for whom it was received did not know how it was used. There was no evidence of receipt of the said money by NCDF and the bank statement of Nkuringo did not reflect receipt of the said money' (IGG report, 2010: 4).

Interestingly, despite the earlier approval given by the Solicitor General regarding the NCDF-TUSC agreement, the Inspector General of Government (IGG) quotes and used other rules and articles of procedure from the Ugandan constitution to challenge the actions of UWA and in this case quashed the observations of the Solicitor General (see IGG report, 2010). The IGG drew on the constitutional powers conferred to his institution and gave directions that were communicated to UWA and the Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry in a letter dated 28 April 2010 as detailed in Box 5.2.

The strength of the findings of the IGG report has attracted a lot of debate locally and nationally, with the Uganda Investment Authority on the one hand calling it 'an anti-investment move' that should be stopped and on the other, the opposition coalition calling it a breakthrough for justice and fairness. At the time of this study, the Ministry of Tourism had constituted a committee to look further into the matter by giving stakeholders a second hearing. The recommendations of this committee will most likely determine the next wave in the events regarding the Clouds Lodge arrangement.

Meanwhile, at the local level, several focus group discussions, especially in Nteko where the lodge is located, revealed some support for the existing arrangement. UWA on 25 September 2009 opened up another gorilla group (Nshongi) to visitors. This is located in Rubuguri parish. Partly, this was intended to address the gorilla permits conflicts and pressure from the communities. Nonetheless, opposition continues, with some actors arguing that although this group has been opened for tourism, the other six permits should also be opened up to allow fair competition.

5.3 Policy arrangement analysis

The case study provides evidence of how an attempt by international and national conservation agencies to address conservation and development concerns can be hampered

Box 5.2. Extracts from the IGG's letter.

In view of the above and pursuant to Article 230 (2) of the constitution and S. 14 (6) of Inspectorate of Government Act, 2002 this is therefore to direct as follows:

1. The illegal and irregular contracts, namely the Agreement between Uganda Wildlife Authority and Nkuringo Conservation and Development Foundation of 30/8/2004 and its addendums of 23/11/2006 and 29/11/2006, and the agreement between Nkuringo Conservation and Development Foundation and Uganda Safari Company, should be revoked.
2. Uganda Wildlife Authority should comply with all the laws and policies that govern it in executing its mandate without taking advantage of the ignorance of the communities it works with. It should particularly comply with the Uganda Wildlife Act Cap. 200, Local Government Act, 1997 and the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act, 2003.
3. Uganda Wildlife Authority should draw up a well thought out framework for the development of tourism opportunities for the whole region where Bwindi Impenetrable National Park is located, but not for particular isolated areas.
4. The sub counties of Nyabwishenya and Kirundo, where Rubuguri and Nteko parishes respectively fall, should in consultation with the district take over the Nkuringo Gorilla tourism project and improve development for the benefit of their communities after other modalities have been addressed. The sub-counties have the mandate and capacity to plan for their local communities, and can be held responsible for transparency, accountability and reporting because they have a planning and budgeting mandate for their parishes to channel any project opportunities for their communities.
5. The Ministry of Tourism should strengthen its supervisory role over Uganda Wildlife Authority, without simply being informed of what Uganda Wildlife Authority has already done regardless of its irregularity.
6. NCDF should be wound up because it does not serve the interests of the Nkuringo community for which it was allegedly formed. Another organization that will genuinely serve the interests of the people of Bwindi Impenetrable National Park be formed and registered with the relevant authority. The IGG's office expects a feed back (from UWA/Ministry of Tourism) on action taken in implementing the directions herein within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of this letter that was dated 28 April 2010.

by escalating conflict. The next section analyses the process of design and implementation of this particular private-community partnership in terms of the four dimensions as distinguished in the Policy-Arrangement Approach.

5.3.1 Actors

The course of the Bwindi PCP arrangement involved a bewildering array of actors, including local people, local NGOs, international NGOs, local, district and national politicians and the tourism industry. What was intended to be, and was presented as, a 'simple' partnership between a 'community' and a private partner, facilitated by IGCP and UWA, turned out to be a messy arena of smaller conflicts leading to bigger ones.

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One important source of conflict involving actors in the process was the issue of 'community' representation. The Nkuringo Conservation Development Foundation (NCDF) claimed to represent the community in Nteko and Rubuguri parishes. NCDF was supported, facilitated and promoted by IGCP and UWA. But some community members (especially from the Rubuguri parish), a section of district officials, and opinion leaders rejected NCDF's claim and insisted that the members of NCDF were 'local elites' who aimed at advancing their interests since they were not elected in the first place and capitalized on the 'ignorance' of the masses. It was a common complaint among many actors that NCDF started as a private institution without community consent, and its transformation into NCDF and claim to act on behalf of the community was questioned. Despite IGCP's efforts to broaden the objectives of NTDA and later transform it into a loosely woven NCDF, the core issue remained that the partnership was built on inaccurate assumptions and incomplete considerations of the notion of 'community' (Spiteri *et al.*, 2006). This finding reflects similar misconceptions of the concept of 'community' described elsewhere (e.g. Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Brosius *et al.*, 1997).

Actors identified in this research used coalition building as a strategy to enhance their impact. IGCP is itself the product of an international coalition between the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), Fauna and Flora International (FFI) and World Wildlife Fund (WWF). This gives it access to a wide range of resources and networks, and strong links to international actors central to the promulgation of the neoliberal conservation discourse (see also Section 5.4). Much of the PCP process was driven by a larger core coalition of IGCP, UWA and NCDF, later working in conjunction with TUSC. The multi-sectoral nature of this coalition, including local and international NGOs, a government agency and a tourism company, helped to give it legitimacy and the ability to push forward its agenda on multiple fronts. On the other side, a strong opposition coalition emerged, gradually building in size over time. It includes a fraction of the community who opposed NCDF and formed the Rubuguri Pressure Group, the Kisoro Tourism Association, and AUTO. Working together, this coalition managed to delay the signing of the PCP agreement, launched repeated legal challenges, and successfully brought the IGG into the process, resulting in a major setback for the PCP arrangement. Whilst the opposition coalition formed around a particular issue – resistance to the PCP agreement – the motivations of each member are fundamentally different. AUTO wants to see open competition for gorilla permits, KTA wants to see greater opportunities for local actors in tourism at Bwindi, and the Rubuguri Pressure Group is concerned with the sharing of benefits and the legitimacy of NCDF. Whereas in the latter case the conflict refers to the unequal distribution of scarce resources for those living in poverty outside the natural park, paradoxically the former refers to the high market value of resource-rich landscapes (that is: containing gorillas) such as Bwindi NP itself (Nelson 2010). Therefore, should the opposition coalition succeed in dismantling the PCP agreement, it is quite probable that the coalition will break apart due to different interests.

5.3.2 Resources

The distribution of resources of actors taking part in the PCP process at Bwindi has had a major influence on outcomes. Particularly resourceful actors have been IGCP and UWA. For

example, by facilitating the trip to Kenya for NCDF members, IGCP was able to encourage the option of a high-end tourism partner in the style of those seen on the trip. Similarly, although NCDF was able to provide some finance itself for the purchase of the land for the Clouds Lodge, this money originally came from IGCP in payment for the clearing of exotics in the national park buffer zone. The acquisition of the last installment to clear land payment was also brokered by IGCP. In both cases NCDF members may have been left with a sense of indebtedness to IGCP and a compromised ability to go against IGCP's preferred options for the PCP agreement, a process that has been described elsewhere under similar imbalances of resources (e.g. Nadasdy 2003). UWA had the authority to set the rules for access to gorilla permits, giving it great power to determine the policy arrangement. However, it has subsequently been undermined by the IGG, a rival state institution in terms of rule setting.

The resources of the two major coalitions identified in the PCP process varied relative to one another and through time. The coalition of IGCP, UWA and NCDF had considerable financial resources, particularly considering the backing of a major USAID project which had initially invested USD 250,000 to facilitate the 'community' in starting up a tourism venture. This coalition also had gorilla permits, access to knowledge, technical skills and political contacts which put them in a strong position relative to early opponents of the PCP agreement. This enabled the coalition to shape the PCP agreement and guide the community towards its preferred outcome.

However, over time, the opposition coalition grew in resources and power as it recruited more members. The addition of influential district politicians in Kisoro to the opposition severely hampered the PCP process, as did AUTO with its national and international business connections. Individual contacts of members of the Rubuguri Pressure Group also played a key role, bringing the Minister, the Solicitor General and the IGG into the process through personal appeals and petitions. The success of this coalition in breaking the monopoly permit arrangement and bringing about the IGG's report demonstrates the ways in which coalitions can form and draw on their diverse resources to influence policy processes. It also demonstrates the success that can be achieved by relatively less powerful local actors when they are able to recruit more powerful actors to their cause. This is an example of the 'weapons of the weak' in action (Scott, 1985).

5.3.3 Rules of the game

The rules of the game were seriously disputed. Rule refusal is one of the main reasons for policy arrangements not being able to mitigate or solve the social problems they were developed for (Van Gossum *et al.*, 2011). In this case both the way the agreement, as well as some of the terms, were drafted was not accepted by all. Referring to the former, the question of who got to draft the legal agreement was a source of considerable conflict in the Bwindi PCP process. The fact that it was drafted by AWF lawyers based in Nairobi, Kenya, was seen as inappropriate by members of the opposition coalition. AWF argued that drafting the agreement from Nairobi was one way of cutting costs as their lawyer could do it as part of his daily work. This example demonstrates that even a solution which may seem pragmatic

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from the perspective of one actor can seriously undermine trust in the process from the perspective of others. Referring to the latter, some of the terms of the PCP agreement were also a major source of conflict, particularly the 20 km exclusion zone for other lodges around the Clouds Lodge site. This together with the 'monopoly' over gorilla permits was heavily criticized and legally challenged by the opposition coalition as anti-competitive. The fact that these clauses were present at all in the PCP agreement demonstrates the considerable power the UWA/IGCP/TUSC coalition was able to exercise in influencing the terms of the agreement.

As the conflict over the Clouds Lodge PCP has escalated in scale, the power of different actors to dictate the rules of the game has varied. Initially, all the power lay with IGCP, UWA and NCDF. Following initial complaints from the opposition and ministerial intervention, the Solicitor General became the key player, and he found that the agreement was legal. However, further lobbying from the opposition coalition brought the IGG into the picture. The IGG was able to over-rule the Solicitor General and found that the agreement was void. This demonstrates that even the laws of the land are open to interpretation, and that state actors can be influenced and may not be in agreement. The shifting sands of rule-setting in this process have made it difficult for actors to understand where they stand or to plan for the future.

5.3.4 Discourses

The existence of two oppositional coalitions is clearly reflected in two over-arching competing discourses narrating the Clouds Lodge arrangement in either largely positive or negative terms. However, within these two higher order discourses, fragmentation into lower order discourses can be identified. The positive discourse as expressed by IGCP and UWA is couched in 'win-win' language, and reflects a wider and increasingly pervasive global discourse which stresses the need for hybrid neoliberal partnerships to address the conservation-development nexus. In this sense the Clouds Lodge case study can be understood as an example of how international actors bring with them generic discourses, which when applied on the ground are unable to take account of specific local conditions. At the same time, there is a more modest positive discourse, voiced by a section of community members employed by the lodge and those operating the craft shops. In the focus group discussions held with them, they strongly supported the idea that Clouds Lodge arrangement should be upheld and sustained. According to their story, the Clouds Lodge intervention is new and, like any new policy, it is bound to face challenges. Some of the highlighted challenges are associated with high expectations that local communities always have in sight with a new venture. However, they have already seen some benefits of conservation trickling down through jobs and incomes earned since the lodge started operating (see Chapter 6). Their narrative also bears a long-term perspective, where they expect more benefits to be delivered to communities as the operation of the lodge stabilizes without any interruptions. It is interesting to note that the majority of district administration members, including the District Tourism Officer, supported this view. They had a lot of hope in the intervention and argued that it is already showing a positive trend in addressing local people's livelihood issues as well as conservation. Whereas they initially opposed the arrangement, currently

they are only suggesting a middle ground where the existing challenges can be addressed to make the arrangement progress well by achieving a 'win-win' outcome for all stakeholders.

On the other hand, there is the 'radical' discourse initiated by the opposition coalition and officiated by the IGG. Two groups can also be identified within this discourse. First, there is a 'community' rights discourse pushed by the Rubuguri Pressure Group, which holds that the PCP arrangement is an imposition on a vulnerable local community by a coalition of powerful non-local actors, to the detriment of local people. It argues that despite the terms of the PCP arrangement and its negotiation appearing to be participatory and in favor of the community, the process has been and remains dominated by non-local actors (UWA, IGCP and TUSC) holding power, and a local actor (NCDF) which is not representative of the community. In contrast, the discourse framing the views of KTA and AUTO is about the anti-competitive nature of the agreement in the 'free' market economy of Uganda. These discourses are aligned in their opposition to the PCP agreement, but justify this stance on very different grounds.

5.4 Conclusion

Using the four dimensions of the policy arrangement approach this chapter discussed the introduction, development and implementation of a PCP model at Bwindi, Uganda. The chapter illustrated that the governance capacity of the Clouds Lodge arrangement is low. There is no broad acceptance of rules that guide operationalization of this arrangement and there are competing discourses which differ in perspective. In addition, the relationships between actors are troubled and not built on mutual trust. The incongruence in the dimensions of the policy arrangements largely explains the underlying conflicts associated with this arrangement.

The results in this chapter also illustrate that there are circumstances under which relatively less powerful local actors are able to resist neoliberal interventions such as the PCP model. Demonstrating what Scott (1985) describes as invoking the 'weapons of the weak', the local villagers succeeded in severely hampering, if not entirely derailing, the PCP agreement. This was possible through the alignment of their local opposition with the perspective of the tourism industry and district politicians, all of whom joined a single coalition. The conditions under which such local opposition to neoliberal conservation/development interventions emerge is an area requiring further research.

The recent fashion for hybrid neoliberal approaches to conservation suggests that there will be more and more PCP arrangements bringing diverse actors together in the name of conservation and development. Given the results of this and other studies, it seems probable that such arrangements will often lead to conflicts. Further research is required to confirm or reject this hypothesis and in the meantime, a cautious approach to the adoption of PCPs as a combined conservation and development tool is suggested. Still, it is important to note that it is too early to pass final judgment on the Clouds Lodge arrangement, which has only been in operation since 2008. To establish the long-term impacts of this model it is

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essential that the development and implementation of PCPs is closely monitored through longitudinal studies and by comparing particular cases in and between countries.

6. The implications of the three arrangements on livelihoods and conservation

6.1 Introduction

In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I explained that a variety of actors ranging from local to international are associated with the three tourism-related policy interventions at Bwindi. I also emphasized that tourism-related policy interventions being implemented at Bwindi reflect broader conservation and development discourses that aim to make nature-based tourism contribute to meet the livelihood and development needs of local people living in frontline villages as an incentive to achieve conservation. The kick-start for the three policy intervention models at Bwindi was enabled by the injection of resources in the form of finances and ideas largely provided by non-local actors. The motivation was to trigger 'a chain of reactions' that would finally ease conservation efforts at Bwindi through livelihood and development related incentives. In the previous chapters, the policy enactment and implementation processes have been dealt with in detail. The current chapter describes and discusses the shaping and the outcomes of the three policy interventions on livelihoods and conservation at Bwindi. It is divided into two main parts; Section 6.2 discusses the implications of each of the outlined policy interventions on the livelihood of communities around Bwindi. Section 6.3 elaborates on the bearing of the livelihood-related outcomes on conservation.

6.2 Community livelihoods

At Bwindi, the outcomes of the three policy interventions were solely shaped by deployment of both financial and material resources by actors within the boundaries of the enacted rules of the game and the ideological frames of the wider conservation and development discourses. Below, I elaborate more, with particular reference to each policy intervention model.

6.2.1 The Buhoma-Mukono arrangement

This case study reveals that the introduction of nature-based tourism at Bwindi by the Uganda Wildlife Authority and International Gorilla Conservation Programme, the diffusion of the 'tourism enterprise' ideas through the US Peace Corps, and the injection of financial and land resources by USAID and ITFC respectively, in principle enabled the setting up of the community physical assets in the form of a tourist lodge at Buhoma. This has since triggered the generation of more financial and material assets which have been allocated over time with various implications on community livelihood aspects in Mukono parish. It was also evident that the utilization, deployment and outcomes of these resources are shaped by the rules enshrined in the Buhoma-Mukono Community Development Association (BMCD) constitution. This constitution spells out operational rules as (BMCD Constitution, 2009):

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1. Labour and all other material supplies to the BMCDA tourism venture should be sourced locally from the people of Mukono parish.
2. After meeting operational costs, profits from BMCDA should be invested in community projects that meet their livelihood needs.
3. The general assembly which constitutes all community members of Mukono parish should be the one to decide on the livelihood priorities which can be considered for funding using BMCDA funds.

In total, from 1998 to 2009, the Buhoma-Mukono tourism enterprise generated UGX 1,260,000,000 (about USD 572,727). An analysis of BMCDA financial reports (1998-2009) indicates that out of the total generated, more than 92%, (UGX 1,159,200,000 which is about USD 526,900) was spent locally on community livelihood projects, payment of salaries for workers, maintenance of the facilities, enterprise expansion and other operational costs. Key informant interviews revealed the same. The Buhoma enterprise officials indicated that local spending is a pre-condition in their constitution:

In our constitution, it is clearly indicated that efforts must be put on local sourcing as much as possible and the same constitution dictates that after meeting the operational costs, part of the profit should be re-invested and the balance channeled to community livelihood projects... if we do otherwise, then we shall be in trouble with the community members who are well informed about these operational regulations...

(BMCDA accountant, research interview, 2009).

Local sourcing has tremendously reduced the leakages associated with the Buhoma-Mukono tourism venture. Between 2003 and 2004, Sanbrook (2008) conducted a survey on seven accommodation enterprises at Bwindi (Buhoma) to determine the level of tourism revenue leakages. Interestingly, he also observed that the Buhoma-Mukono enterprise retained 95.2% of its generated revenue compared to other privately owned high end accommodation establishments whose revenue leakage level stood at an average of 75%. This was the case because most high-end lodges are not locally owned; they largely source staff and other operational items externally leading to leakage of a bigger percentage of their revenues as compared to the Buhoma-Mukono enterprise. The latter is owned locally and sources consumables, materials as well as staff, locally (see Sandbrook, 2008).

Through a documentary study, cross-sectional situational analysis within Mukono parish as well as detailed discussions with communities in all the eleven villages, the Buhoma enterprise implications on community livelihoods were ascertained. Data were aggregated according to the three main livelihood aspects elaborated on in Chapter 2. The results are summarized in a matrix (Table 6.1). Livelihood outcomes are explained under the respective capital asset dimension.

Table 6.1. Livelihood and development implications of the Buhoma-Mukono enterprise at Bwindi.

Livelihood aspect	Implication
Assets and livelihood outcomes	
Financial capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • direct and indirect employment for the people of Mukono parish leading to increased incomes • market for local produce, e.g. vegetables, bananas, firewood, charcoal, pineapples, building materials and local souvenirs (increased incomes) • establishment of a village micro-finance institution that has assisted women and the youth with credit facilities • rise in prices (inflation) for commodities and land around Buhoma
Social capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • mobilization of people into sub-associations/clubs (social networking) e.g. Buhoma-Bwindi Women Development Club, and Batwa Association for Development with the sole aim of working together for development • re-vitalization of cultural performances especially the Batwa and Bakiiga dances • communities have established links with the international community through tourism • supported construction and running of Buhoma community hospital that has saved the communities traveling long distances to access medical services (improved health services) • supported procurement of a local ambulance that has eased transportation of patients, especially pregnant women to access medical services
Human capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • training communities in business management skills, e.g. customer service management, dance and drama courses and handicraft lessons • facilitating the construction of schools like Kanyashande and Rubona primary schools where hundreds of children are receiving education • bursaries for best performing students for tertiary education • facilitation of mainly the Batwa (Pygmies) with educational materials • at individual level, locals who generate money have used it to send children to school and access better health services
Physical capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • maize mill set up to assist communities' process produce like maize, millet, ground nuts, and soya beans • equipment to maintain village feeder roads has been procured • better houses and expansion on agricultural land through utilization of income generation by individuals employed directly and indirectly
Natural capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the natural Bwindi forest now seen more as capital

Financial implications and outcomes

In total, the BMCDA tourist lodge at Buhoma employs twenty workers, of which sixteen are males and only four are females (Table 6.2). The male dominance is largely attributed to the society characteristics where females have long been less exposed to formal education and are not only unskilled, but also not allowed to work in public places. Culturally, they have always been engaged in domestic activities. However, over the last 7 years or so, the situation has changed as more females are receiving an education and getting involved in the tourism sector (BMCDA chairman, research interview, 2009).

All these employees are from Mukono parish and revealed that their employment status has enabled them to generate a steady monthly income which they did not have before. Most workers indicated that this income has improved their standard of living, as one male employee asserted: 'Since I was employed here as a waiter, my monthly income has always come and on time. I have a family with three children and with my earnings, I have been able to build a better home, access medical services, educate my children' (Buhoma lodge employee, research interview, 2009)

The female room attendant on the other hand said: 'Yes, I get a monthly income and give part of it to my husband who plans to provide what we need at our home. I use the balance to look after my relatives. I never had this opportunity before I got a job with our lodge' (Buhoma lodge employee, research interview, 2009).

This statement implies that her employment has not only improved the provision of necessities at home, but has also increased her contribution as a woman in a family. It

Table 6.2. BMCDA lodge employment details.

Job title	Quantity	Gender
Manager	1	male
Assistant manager	1	male
Accountant	1	male
Cashier	1	male
Room attendants	3	2 female, 1 male
Chef	1	male
Cook	1	male
Waiters	3	males
Bartender	1	male
Guards	2	males
Staff cook	1	male
Receptionist	1	female
Laundry attendants	2	1 female, 1 male
Compound cleaner	1	male

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shows that the income she earns also helps her relatives. Staff records indicated that salary levels range from USD 30 to USD 120 per month. But the earnings are supplemented by tips from tourists, with some workers arguing that in a good season it triples their salaries: 'In a good season, our visitors give us tips which are three times our salaries...!' (Buhoma lodge employee, research interview, 2009).

Apart from the financial earnings, the lodge has offered an opportunity for skill development. This has been made possible through on-the-job training as well the implementation of several short courses (BMCDA chairman, research interview, 2009). This point is elaborated on later.

Indirectly, the Buhoma enterprise has been an asset especially to members of the community engaged in agriculture. It emerged from the discussions with the community, that a number of them do supply food stuffs, fruits, vegetables, and milk to the lodge: 'Our lodge has come with great opportunities for us... much as we are not directly employed, there is no grudge... we supply bananas, milk, and other people in this community supply eggs and vegetables...!' (respondent in Nkwenda, research interview, 2009).

The assertion above was supported by the area Agricultural Officer who concurs that the community lodge and other lodges emerging in the area are boosting the market for agricultural produce. He argued that the lack of a market had been a big development challenge for the area due to poor road networks and remoteness: 'The establishment of the community lodge and other private lodges at Bwindi has provided the market and more people now engage in farming to meet this demand...!' (agricultural officer, research interview, 2010).

In fact, Sandbrook (2006) documented wider tourism-agriculture linkages involving the Buhoma venture and other private lodges which source for agricultural produce like vegetables, honey, chicken, eggs and milk. Though a relatively small percentage of the private lodges' budget is spent locally, their presence in large numbers at Bwindi has been valuable to a population which largely depends on agriculture (*ibid.*). More than 80% of the people in Mukono are employed in the agricultural sector (UBOS, 2009) and tourism has emerged as an important link to boost production (LC1 chairman, research interview, 2009). This implies that tourism in general and the lodge in particular is having relatively strong backward linkages, which is crucial for agricultural production.

The village trail – one of BMCDA's tourism business sub-ventures – directly offers jobs to about 51 people from the community as guides (11), shop attendants (2) and dancers (38). Unlike the lodge, 70% of those employed on the community trail are women. According to the chairman of BMCDA, the employment of women on the trail was a deliberate move to empower them and expand their potential in tourism business. A discussion with these women indicated that tourism-related work is part-time as they are also engaged in agriculture, the back-bone of their livelihoods. They further revealed that money generated from tourism-related jobs has gone a long way to supplementing their incomes from agriculture and increasing their capacity to meet domestic requirements. But also, that

tourism-related revenue has been of great use in periods of low agricultural productivity associated with the vagaries of weather and crop raiding by wild animals. This implies that tourism in a way has helped women at Bwindi to adapt to vulnerability shocks related to weather changes and crop raiding that tend to affect their livelihood.

Indirectly, the village trail has created more part-time jobs for a relatively large number of people, especially the youth and women who are engaged in craft-making, but also those who own the sites visited along the trail. The trail starts at the lodge and then goes to the crafts shops in the Buhoma trading centre where women and the youth have an opportunity to sell their crafts to tourists. The owner of each visited site along the village trail is entitled to 40% of the fees paid per visitor. And the individual is at liberty to decide how to be paid by BMCDA management. Payments could be made promptly as and when visitors have gone to their sites. But at the time of this study, BMCDA management was encouraging site owners to keep record of all visitors going to their places and claim money monthly. According to the BMCDA chairman, this was aimed at encouraging a culture of saving among the communities and some have benefitted from it as elaborated: 'I didn't claim my money for three months, BMCDA helped save it for me... I got it at once topped up and was able to buy myself a zero-grazing cow which has helped me access milk every day and get daily income through selling milk to my neighbors...' (site owner along the village trail, research interview, 2009).

In addition, a village microfinance institution (locally referred to as the 'village bank') has been initiated and facilitated by BMCDA. At the time of this study, UGX 3 million (about USD 1,400) had been injected as an initial fund and more was expected according to an employee at the 'village bank' This money is aimed largely but not entirely to assisting women and the youth (BMCDA chairman, research interview, 2009). The 'bank' is located in Buhoma trading center and offers soft loans to women, youth and men who are planning to start some income-generating activities like bee-keeping, poultry, pig-rearing and craft-trading. According to the Chairperson of the village bank, lending is conducted with an interest rate of 10% so as to expand the initial capital and to increase the multiplier effect. This interest rate is much lower than that of commercial banks which charge between 25%-33% and have other tough conditions that communities fail to fulfill. In addition, there are only four commercial banks located in the Kanungu district and the nearest for the people of Mukono parish is located more than 20 km away. Though still in its infancy, several community members already appreciate its role in rural development: 'I borrowed money from the village bank and invested it in poultry farming... now, I plan to supply eggs to tourist lodges and the trading center and the returns will be used to pay back' (respondent in Buhoma central, research interview, 2009).

However, what emerged as a major challenge to the BMCDA efforts was the huge Mukono parish population, totaling more than 5,000 people. Yet they all expect benefits from BMCDA business. For employment, the venture can only absorb a few. This poses a significant challenge as people have high expectations in the business, yet it cannot generate enough benefits to turn around the livelihoods of the rural majority poor in the whole parish. Hence, it was revealed in several meetings across the parish that though benefits are coming and

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are visible, they are still too small to be felt in the whole village. 'BMCDAs business is trying to help our villages develop, but the benefits accruing cannot be enough to trickle down to all community members... But we appreciate its role in our community...!' (one respondent in Iraaro, research interview, 2009).

His view was supported by others in that discussion and in several meetings in other villages of Mukono. Because of the large population, the chairman of BMCDAs argued that their focus is currently on community-level livelihood projects, but as business expands, more opportunities will be created for people at the individual level.

The BMCDAs rule of local sourcing is credited for creating and expanding markets for local produce. Increased local demand has, however, also led to a rise in commodity prices (inflation) especially around Buhoma. For example, during this study, a bunch of Bananas at Buhoma cost between UGX 15,000- 25,000 (USD 6-10.2), a liter of milk went for UGX 800-900 (USD 0.4) and a tray of eggs cost UGX 6,000 (USD 2.5). These prices were much higher at that time than in Kampala City where a bunch of bananas cost between UGX 6,000- 20,000 (USD 2.5-8), a tray of eggs was UGX 4,000 (USD 1.6) and a liter of milk was 600-700 UGX (USD 0.3). The challenge is that the majority of the local population at the Buhoma trading centre was already complaining about the high cost of living. Apparently, the tourism activity at Buhoma has also pushed up the prices of land and land expansion has become increasingly difficult for peasant farmers.

In part, the increase in prices of agricultural produce has been attributed to the increase in local demand which is not backed by increased production. In other words, the rise in demand has created a gap that has not yet been filled. This however can be viewed as an opportunity in a community that originally lacked a market for its produce. It is the people staying in the Buhoma trading centre who are most affected by increased prices, while the majority who live in rural areas can produce enough food for domestic consumption.

Social implications and outcomes

Despite the economic challenges highlighted above, the Buhoma (BMCDAs) enterprise has catalyzed unity among the people of Mukono parish with a common goal of working hard to achieve development. As the chairman of the association observed:

Before the association was formed, the people of Mukono were struggling to develop on an individual basis with no common goal and advice... this is now history... we have a platform to usher development in our area and through the General Assembly, community views are captured, plans laid and where we manage, funds are availed or we look for donors... but others also are encouraged to work hard through interacting with fellow community members...

Unity and common focus are envisaged in the BMCDAs vision and mission as spelt out in the constitution. The association's vision reads: 'Improved social and economic status of individual households in Mukono parish' (BMCDAs Constitution: 1).

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While its mission is: 'to initiate a development process focusing on women and youth empowerment, quality education, health, communication, and conservation through creation of a sustainable resource base in Mukono parish' (BMCDA Constitution: 1).

Whereas these are official positions on which the association is based, there is evidence that they have been implemented. For example, communities have been mobilized into several sub-associations/clubs. Some examples are, the Buhoma-Bwindi Women Development Club, the Mukono Women's Development Foundation, the Bwindi Gardeners group – Amagara Project and the Batwa Association for Development. Members of these associations meet often to discuss issues of common concern (Local Resident, research interview, 2010). This has enhanced social networking with a focus on working together to achieve development (Local Leader, research interview, 2009). Social networking is a strong outcome of any livelihood intervention as it contributes to society's wellness (DFID, 2008).

The village trail has contributed to the re-vitalization of cultural performances. Especially for the minority group of the Batwa who were largely shunned by other members of the community. Through BMCDA efforts and with the assistance of Mgahinga-Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust (MBIFCT), the Batwa have been organized and trained into performance groups. A 'show' centre where they perform and also sell their souvenirs has been established at the end of the village trail. It was, however, noted that most crafts sold at their centre are not locally made. This 'leaks' the little earnings generated from the sale of crafts. Though credited as a way of enhancing the Batwa's trading skills: 'They are now aware that for one to do business, you buy the craft item at a lower price, and sell it at a higher price to make a profit...!' (local leader, research interview, 2010).

A discussion with the Batwa revealed their happiness with BMCDA and other support organizations that worked with them to support and establish a village trail including their communities. Their chairman explained as follows:

Ever since we were ejected from the forest, we have lived a miserable life, offering labour to communities in Mukono... We were not appreciated, our culture was dying... but we are very happy now that we have come together in our association and we perform for tourists who pay us... the money we earn is used to improve our wellbeing... For example buying food and clothing...

Exposing the Batwa to foreign tourists has also secured them sympathy from visitors who have offered further assistance in form of financial resources and encouraging them to access education. Unfortunately, most Batwa youth dodge school and prefer dancing for the tourists (school teacher, research interview, 2009). During the field visit, this was confirmed as school-age children danced for tourists with their parents at the Batwa performance centre during the school hours even though the school was in their neighborhood.

Although it never put in funds, BMCDA through the Church of Uganda and other donors attracted and contributed to the planning and eventual running of Buhoma Community Hospital. Apart from the small health centers, Mukono parish had no major hospital that

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could handle serious medical cases (such as surgery, typhoid, cerebral malaria, pneumonia, tuberculosis, and complicated pregnancies). People had to travel long distances to access better medical services. The nearest main hospital is Kambuga Hospital which is located about 30 km from Buhoma. Given the poverty levels, poor transport network and limited public transport, the community members used to have to carry patients in locally made 'troughs' for long distances. One elderly woman described how difficult the situation was:

In early 1980s, it was extremely difficult to access medical services... Whereas the government health centres treated simple illnesses, main complications which needed surgery or lab tests were referred to Kambuga Hospital which is far from here... some patients would die before reaching there... Our community hospital has since its establishment saved us; we even have very good Bazungu doctors from America...

The Buhoma Hospital is managed by the Church of Uganda and attracts many American volunteer health workers (some of whom are former clients of BMCDA). The hospital offers medical services at very low prices to local populations and free of charge to the Batwa community. It is important to note that the government has come in to complement and support the hospital by providing drugs, recruiting and paying medical personnel and providing other necessities to the hospital keeping prices low. The hospital has therefore brought services closer to the population.

To ease transportation of patients who are in a critical condition, BMCDA also requested and partly supported the procurement of an ambulance vehicle (BMCDA chairman, research interview, 2009). This has ensured quick transportation of patients to access medical services. The government, donors and the Church of Uganda have procured more ambulances and at the time of this research, the hospital had about four ambulance cars to offer services to local population. Access to these hospital services is open to other communities neighboring Mukono parish. A centre that supports people suffering from AIDS has been established by the government at the hospital. This has gone a long way to helping communities around Bwindi who are reportedly hard hit by high HIV infection rates partly linked to tourism activities and the presence of tourism security agents in the area (see also Laundati, 2010).

Because ambulances are mostly engaged in helping to transport patients, it had become increasingly difficult to transport the dead. Prior to this arrangement, local people also used to carry the dead in 'troughs' (locally made long basket-like structures) handled by four people and walking for long distances as explained by one local elder: 'the trough would be used to carry patients to hospital, but also to carry the dead from hospital for burial... in all cases, men would be mobilized from the community to offer services and would follow with drinks... it was horrible'.

To address this problem, BMCDA has procured a pick-up truck to help in transporting dead bodies free of charge and to offer other transport services. The community of the deceased is only required to contribute fuel and the car is provided (chairman BMCDA, research

interview, 2009). When not engaged, the pick-up is used by the BMCDA manager for the activities of the association.

In addition to the above projects, BMCDA with assistance from MBIFCT, IGCP and ITFC negotiated and partially funded a gravity water scheme. The gravity water scheme is currently managed by the BMCDA which pays the monthly maintenance costs. With BMCDA revenue and IGCP funding, gravity fed water has been extended to two schools, a health centre, seven private tourist campsites and about 315 households (BMCDA Report, 2009). Members of the community pay monthly user fees of approximately UGX 0.500 (approx. USD 0.26) per household. Private tourist camps at Buhoma pay UGX 50,000 (approx. USD 26.3 per month) and small private camps pay UGX 30,000 (approx. USD 15.8) per month. All this money goes to the BMCDA account for maintenance of the water scheme, part of which has been added to the donor funds to start a mini hydro power plant that had entered an advanced stage at the time of this study. When completed, it is estimated that Mukono community members will access electricity at affordable prices.

Human capital-related implications and outcomes

As part of community empowerment programs to reap benefits from tourism, BMCDA management has funded several community training sessions. BMCDA reports (2008, 2009 and 2010) indicate the following accomplished skills-oriented courses and trainings for the community: (a) four customer service management courses for staff working at the lodge; (b) guiding and business-related courses for local guides and shop attendants in Buhoma trading centre; (c) several dance and drama courses and handicraft training courses for the entire community. A total of about 100 people have benefitted from customer service courses and more than 600 from drama and handicraft training (chairman BMCDA, research interview, 2010). After attaining skills, some participants even obtained jobs elsewhere like in Kihiihi, Kanungu, Rukungiri and Kabale (Local Leader, research interview, 2009). The Uganda Community Tourism Association (UCOTA), UWA and IGCP have been partners in these trainings. UCOTA is also the market source, specifically for the locally made handicrafts like baskets and carvings. Several souvenir shops have been largely established by the youth and women at the Buhoma trading centre.

As part of BMCDA developments, two schools have been constructed around Buhoma. The decision to construct the schools was arrived at in the General Assembly after realizing that few government schools were available in this area and children had to travel long distances to access education as pointed out by the local council leader of Buhoma: 'Before opening up tourism at Buhoma, this village was the remotest in the District of Kanungu... We were neglected by the District administration and few schools were set up here. But now, our association though tourism business has managed to solve this problem with setting up of two schools...!'

The first school is the Buhoma community primary school which at the time of this research had a total of 345 pupils. Of these, 156 are boys and 189 are girls (Pupil Records, 2010). The school started in 1995 with only 16 pupils (4 girls and 12 boys) and pupil numbers have

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now significantly increased (school headmaster, research interview, 2010). Currently, the school offers educational services from primary one to primary seven. The other school is the Buhoma high school which was started in 2007 with two classes of 10 students (one girl and nine boys) (BMEDA chairman, research interview, 2010). The school runs four classes (from senior one to senior four), it has 110 students of which 64 are boys and 46 are girls (Student Records, 2010).

In addition, BMEDA has provided partial funding for the construction of some classroom blocks for Kanyashande, Mukono and Rubona primary schools where close to 1000 children from within and outside Mukono are receiving an education. As highlighted in several focus group discussions, the main challenge facing this development is high school drop outs, as children seek employment in the booming tourism sector at Buhoma. Some act as porters and dancers for tourists. Some schools girls have been defiled by tourist security agents and tour drivers (see also Laudati, 2010). These cases were reported in Buhoma central where a lot of tourism activity is taking place.

BMEDA has also set aside some funds for offering bursaries to the best performing students for tertiary education (Table 6.3). As per the BMEDA report of 2010, 10 bursaries (all for tertiary institutions) were offered to members of the community. However, the selection of bursary scheme beneficiaries was still a contentious issue as the majority of community members expressed a lack of knowledge about the selection criteria. Part of the bursary money is also used to facilitate the poor families especially the Batwa (pygmies) with educational materials which are not provided for by the school management (BMEDA chairman, research interview, 2010).

Table 6.3. Details of BMEDA expenditures on human capital aspects (BMEDA 2008 Report).

Period	Institution/school	Nature of assistance	Amount in UGX
Jan-June 2007	Buhoma Community High School	salaries	1,790,000
	Kyumbo gushu Primary School	iron sheets and labour	600,000
July-Sept 2007	Mukongoro parish School	iron sheets and labour	600,000
	Kanyashande Primary School	cement	287,500
	Teachers Training College	bursaries for two students	200,000
	Buhoma Community High School	salaries	1,332,000
Oct-Nov 2007	Teachers Training College	bursary for one student	100,000
	Buhoma Community High School	salaries	1,571,000
Jan-Mar 2008	Mukono Primary School		930,000
	Teachers Training College	bursary for one student	100,000
	Buhoma Community High School	building materials	906,000
April-June 2008	Mukono Primary School	building materials	800,000
	Teachers Training College	bursary for two students	200,000
Total			9,416,500

Physical capital implications and outcomes

As pointed out earlier, the communities around Bwindi largely depend on agriculture. Common food and cash crops are maize, millet, soya beans, and sorghum. Processing maize, millet, and soya for consumption was a difficult process that would involve the use of grinding stones to extract flour for making maize and millet bread meals (Elderly Woman in Buhoma, research interview, 2010). Not only was the flour contaminated with stone ash, but it was hectic to get a meal ready for bigger families (*ibid.*). As a relief to the community, BMCDA management utilized part of the revenues to set up a grinding mill for maize, millet and sorghum. The communities pay a very small grinding fee of about UGX 200 (less than 0.09 USD) per kilo for maintenance of the mill. The mill also offers jobs for 4 members of the community as machine operators (3) and accountant (1). On the contribution of this machine to community livelihoods, one village woman explained; 'We no longer have grinding stone in our homes, they were so tiresome and we would get flour mixed with stones... Our grinding machine is a real relief for us the women...!'

At an individual level, those employed directly at the lodge explained that they have put up good houses roofed with iron sheets which is a step forward, as they used to have grass thatched houses. BMCDA has also secured more land for the expansion of their business venture. The chairman of BMCDA asserted that the allocation and utilization of resources (funds) is done in line with BMCDA's constitution which spells out formal procedures and 'rules' to be followed.

Natural capital

As a result of all these tourism-related benefits, the communities at Bwindi currently value Bwindi Impenetrable National Park as their natural capital that should be protected (see Section 6.3 for details).

6.2.2 The Tourism Revenue Sharing arrangement

Unlike the Buhoma-Mukono model, the TRS arrangement has had very limited livelihood implications in the three study parishes, partly because it has to benefit all the 22 parishes surrounding Bwindi. Therefore, the TRS financial resources are not only inadequate, but have to be proportionally distributed to all the 22 parishes. To a large extent, this has always been the reason for the low-scale impact on community livelihoods (UWA official research interview, 2010). Secondly, the top-down setting of the regulative framework, which is done solely by the Uganda Wildlife Authority, has left decision-making authority in the hands of local politicians (the CPI) and UWA. This has left the larger community disadvantaged as they are not given an opportunity to articulate their priorities (elder in Nteko, research interview, 2009).

In Chapters 1 and 4, I indicated that Bwindi is the top-revenue generating National Park in Uganda which, for example, generated total revenue of UGX 7,297,180,333 (USD 2,990,648). Of this, only 14% (UGX 100,004,000/USD 40,985) was channeled into the Tourism-Revenue

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Sharing arrangement for the benefit of communities residing in all the 22 parishes surrounding Bwindi (UWA, 2010). As elaborated on in Chapter 4, UWA has always maintained that money generated in all National Parks in Uganda is channeled into a central pool and redistributed to fund conservation activities in the whole country. In other words, lucrative parks such as Bwindi always subsidize conservation efforts in non-lucrative protected areas. While this sounds rational from the perspective of UWA – the national custodian of wildlife resources – it rings bells of distribution injustice to many community members at Bwindi: ‘We were denied an opportunity to utilize Bwindi forest resources and were promised benefits from tourism, now from statistics that we get, our park generates a lot of money, and we are given very little... this very unfair’ (local leader, Rubuguri parish, research interview, 2009).

This view was echoed in several focus group discussions (FDGs) held in the three parishes. Overall, the communities at Bwindi find the TRS financial resources ‘meager’, ‘irrational’, ‘unjust’, ‘unfair’ and ‘unacceptable’ (Common view in all FDGs).

Statistically, a total of UGX 680,349,200 (Approx. USD 323,975) has been disbursed for all parishes around Bwindi over a period of thirteen years (1996-2009). Of this, only 3.4% (UGX 23,248,000) was spent on livelihood projects in Nteko, 9% (UGX 61,920,000) in Mukono and 2.9% (UGX 19,398,000) in Rubuguri (see Table 6.4 for details). The balance was allocated to other parishes bordering the park.

As articulated in the rules of the game, TRS funds are disbursed as conditional grants through CPI (see Chapter 4 for details). This implies that funded projects must be identified within the district and sub-county development plans. According to UWA’s TRS policy (2005), other noted conditions that Uganda Wildlife Authority attaches to TRS funds are:

- TRS related projects must operate within Sub County and parishes neighboring the National Park.
- The project must be environmentally friendly or if generating income, give a justification that it contributes to the protection of the National Park.
- Preference should be given to common good projects that will serve many people.
- To be legally acceptable and accountable, the project must operate as a registered CBO, NGO or run by lower local Government structures like LC1 or Sub County.
- The project must have clear leadership and structures and the procedure to determine this leadership is outlined either as appointed or elected during executive/general assemblies/meetings. Proposal written should have the group constitution attached.
- The project should have a demonstrated way of managing finances and clearly show how they acquire all monies and where they keep it. If in a bank, the account should not have less than three signatories.
- Work plans and an itemized budget should be clearly drawn up showing what the group has contributed (community contribution) and what assistance is required including the type (technical/material/financial) and the suggested sources.
- The project should then be approved by the relevant authorities on a summary form that is obtained from the nearest UWA office.

Proposals originating from communities for TRS funds are received, prioritized and vetted by the CPI. Proposals that fulfill the pre-determined conditions are selected.

On the basis of the outlined rules, TRS funds for the period 1996-2006 have largely focused on collective or common good development projects in Mukono, Nteko and Rubuguri parishes (Table 6.4). This has been in disregard of the community pleas for a general focus on individual household benefits that would directly play a role in their livelihoods (Local Leaders of Nteko, Mukono, research interview, 2009). The communities agitate for individual benefits as they perceive the collective-social projects involving roads, health units and schools to be a government responsibility to its people. To them, TRS should provide added advantages since they suffer the costs of wildlife conservation and the losses are felt at a household level. On realization of the community demands, UWA's focus is slowly changing as can be noted from the year 2007 (Table 6.4). Overall, 18 development projects have been funded from 1996-2009 in the parishes of Nteko, Rubuguri and Mukono. Of these, 61% are collective in nature (health units, feeder road, main road rehabilitation, community camp ground, maternity ward) as opposed to only 39% that focus on individual households (distribution of goats and sheep) as illustrated in Table 6.4.

The three study parishes received almost equal shares except in 2007 when a bigger portion was allocated to Mukono specifically to meet the high costs involved in upgrading a road

Table 6.4. Tourism Revenue Sharing funds allocated (UGX) and community livelihood projects undertaken in the three parishes (1996-2009) (UWA Revenue Sharing Projects' Report, 2009).

Year	Mukono		Nteko		Rubuguri	
	allocated	projects	allocated	projects	allocated	projects
1996	4,000,000	feeder road	4,000,000	health unit	4,000,000	health unit
2000	3,717,000	health unit	3,400,000	community camping ground	0	
2002	3,755,000	health unit	3,500,000	maternity ward of a health unit	3,500,000	feeder road
2005	0	-	0	-	0	-
2006		distribution of goats	5,000,000	community centre	4,550,000	primary school
2007	37,000,000	main road rehabilitation	3,000,000	distribution of goats	3,000,000	sheep-rearing project
	4,000,000	distribution of goats				
2009	4,348,000	distribution of goats	4,348,000	distribution of goats	4,348,000	sheep-rearing project

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which is an important access route to the park. In 2000, Rubuguri parish and in 2005 all three parishes were unsuccessful in getting project proposals submitted or approved and hence no development projects were implemented. Table 6.5 summarizes the above outcomes in a matrix to show the community livelihood aspects addressed by TRS.

Seen from the livelihood aspects (Table 6.5), the TRS arrangement has to some extent had an implication on livelihoods. In focus group discussions, TRS funded projects were appreciated by communities. For example, the rehabilitation of the main road and the opening up of feeder roads in Mukono and Rugubuguri parishes ‘unlocked’ these remote villages and linked them to the nearby town councils of Kihihi and Kisoro respectively. The villages are now accessed by car and this was credited for providing a crucial market link, promoting the sale of agricultural produce from these villages. The health units and schools have also brought services nearer to the people.

The contentious issue, however, was the kind of top-down approach applied in project decisions that does not accommodate their views and priorities. Even with the household-focused projects (goat and sheep projects), issues like corruption related to inflating the cost of the animals for distribution and the process of selecting the beneficiaries emerged (see Chapter 4). During the field tours, a situational analysis revealed that most people who had received goats and sheep as part of a TRS scheme, had either sold or eaten them, claiming they were of poor quality (see also Chapter Four). What I need to re-emphasize here is that communities are not happy with the TRS arrangement. They perceive it as an undemocratic arrangement conditional on tough rules that many of them find difficult to fulfill. Further, writing proposals, drafting constitutions, opening bank accounts, forming community-based organizations or NGOs and tailoring the proposal to the outlined rules are difficult for local people who are less educated. The deficiencies of TRS led to the introduction of a 5 US dollar gorilla levy which contributed additional financial resources of UGX 289,559,783 (approx. USD 141,941) into the arrangement. These funds constituted the first gorilla levy release

Table 6.5. Livelihood implications of the Tourism Revenue Sharing arrangement.

Livelihood aspect	Implications
Assets and outcomes	
Financial capital	• initiation of goat and sheep rearing projects at household level
Social capital	• construction of a community centre where community functions are normally held • construction of health units
Human capital	• construction of a class room block at a primary school to enhance education service provision
Physical capital	• construction of feeder road to allow village access • main road rehabilitation • financed community camp ground
Natural capital	• despite some critical issues, the natural bwindi forest is taken more as a capital

made towards the end of 2009. It is still too early to say whether the contribution of these additional funds will stand the test of time.

6.2.3 The private-community partnership model (Clouds Lodge)

In this section, I will re-highlight and emphasize only eight clauses of the agreement between The Uganda Safari Company (TUSC) and the Nkuringo Conservation and Development Foundation (NCDF) that are related to the sharing of benefits (Box 6.1) and hence linked to the livelihoods question. The first five clauses deal with sharing of financial resources and the last three with other benefits the communities should get from the joint venture. At the time of this research, the Clouds Lodge was three years in operation and this section elaborates the extent to which the eight outlined clauses have been implemented and their implications of livelihoods in Nteko and Rubuguri parishes.

As of April 2010, the Clouds Lodge arrangement had generated a total of UGX 97,014,000 (Approx. USD 44,097) which was disbursed to NCDF by TUSC (Table 6.6) in fulfillment of clause one (Box 6.1). This was an amount resulting from the accumulation of 30 dollars per person per bed night from July 2008 to April 2010.

Before I can elaborate how NCDF has allocated this money, it is important to note that three critical issues have already emerged regarding the implementation of financial related clauses of the agreement. First, by the time of signing the agreement, TUSC was to charge USD150 per person per night of which NCDF would receive USD 30 per bed night per person. And it was stipulated in the same agreement that any increase in bed night charges will lead to an automatic increase in the NCDF share as well. In addition, NCDF's share was agreed to automatically increase every year by 5%. However, it was revealed by NCDF officials that the current charges of NCDF were increased to about USD 450 per bed night per person, yet NCDF still received the initial USD 30 per bed night (see also IGG Report,

Box 6.1. Benefits' sharing related clauses within TUSC-NCDF agreement.

1. In the period of 15 years, for every guest to the lodge, NCDF would get 30 dollars per night.
2. The Uganda Safari company was also mandated to pay NCDF a sum of 5,000 US dollars annually as ground rent.
3. All the amounts above were to increase by 5% every year.
4. At the time of the agreement, the private developer was to charge 150 US dollars per person per night.
5. The agreement also provided that if Gross Published Room Rate (GPRA) increased by more than the inflation rate, NCDFs would automatically increase.
6. TUSC was also mandated to train and employ members of NCDF as much as possible.
7. It is stipulated in the agreement that the lodge should buy supplies that are available amongst the members of NCDF (Local sourcing)
8. The community members are also expected to render services and supply foodstuffs and materials to the lodge.

Table 6.6. Financial disbursements from TUSC to NCDF in UGX (African Wildlife Foundation, 2010).

Months and year	Bed night fees to NCDF
July-December 2008	25,365,000
Jan-December 2009	56,715,000
Jan-April 2010	14,934,000
Total	97,014,000

2010). In addition, despite the three years of agreement implementation and the presence of the clause that stipulates an automatic 5% increase in NCDF's share, no financial increment has been made to this effect (NCDF official, research interview, 2010). And what bothers many NCDF members is that TUSC has not given any explanation to this effect. Several complaints have been directed to IGCP – the mediating actor, but no tangible results have come of it (NCDF official, research interview, 2010).

Second, NCDF members feel uncertain and are not content with the amounts so far transferred. It was evident that there is no clear mechanism of monitoring the visitor arrivals at the lodge. Up to now, they only rely on what TUSC declares. This is a major problem with many private-community arrangements as auditing mechanisms are never included in the plans (Southgate, 2006).

Third, the current financial transfer details do not reflect the stipulated annual ground rent of USD 5,000 which TUSC was supposed to pay to NCDF. This amount was supposed to automatically be increased annually by 5% as well. According to NCDF officials, no explanation has yet been offered for this, but they hoped to sort out all these issues through IGCP and AWF.

Utilization of financial resources by NCDF

Out of the total UGX 97,014,000 (USD 39,760) received by NCDF (as of April 2010), UGX 34,365,575 (35%) has been spent on operation/administrative costs such as meetings, salaries and wages of NCDF officials, travel allowance, office expenditure, incidentals, stationery, motorcycle, NCDF lawyer and bank charges (Table 6.7). And UGX 38,885,900 (40%) has been spent on what NCDF calls 'investments' such as land, the Rwanda Solidarity Fund, trail activation, website, scholarships, tank and water supply, and purchase of cows and piglets (Table 6.7). The remaining 25% of the total financial resources that accrued from the Clouds Lodge arrangement is said to be cash on the NCDF bank account (NCDF official, research interview, 2010).

Table 6.7 clearly illustrates that only 17% (UGX 16,660,900) of total financial resources transferred by TUSC to NCDF under the Clouds Lodge PCP arrangement has been spent

Table 6.7. Comparison of NCDF's operation and investment expenditure (African Wildlife Foundation, 2010).

Operation elements	Amount spent in UGX	Investment elements	Amount spent in UGX
meetings	8,684,000	land	12,545,000
salaries and wages	8,795,000	piglets	12,160,000
transport/travel allowances	7,732,050	Rwanda solidarity	8,100,000
office expenditure	2,181,100	trail activation	350,000
contribution/incidentals	886,000	purchase of cows	2,010,000
stationery	1,216,400	tank and water supply	1,165,000
motorcycle	1,462,000	scholarships	1,325,900
NCDF lawyer	3,000,000	website	1,230,000
bank charges	409,025		
Total	34,365,575		38,885,900

directly on community livelihood projects. These projects include: purchase of piglets (UGX 12,160,000), cows (UGX 2,010,000), tank and water supply (UGX 1,165,000) and scholarships (UGX 1,325,900). On the other hand, 35% of the funds were spent on operational costs such as office space, motorcycle, transport allowance for officials, stationery, etc. Accordingly, the Rubuguri Pressure Group Leader argued: 'There is no convincing reason why only 17% should be allocated to livelihood projects and 35% spend on office, motorcycle, transport allowance, and such stuff...!' (Rubuguri pressure group leader, research interview, 2010).

Taking into account that the overall main aim of the Clouds Lodge joint venture was to address communities' livelihood needs and justify the existence of wildlife, this scenario echoes not only distributive injustice that Schroeder (2008) also noticed in Tanzania's revenue-sharing arrangements, but also distributive indiscipline. The Rubuguri group termed this irrational financial allocation based on which they describe the Clouds Lodge as 'a private venture belonging to the NCDF officials'. A close look at this scenario puts NCDF management under the spotlight, since they are the ones directly in charge of implementation. It also implies that, unlike the Buhoma-Mukono arrangement, the Clouds Lodge arrangement is constrained by a lack of wider participation in prioritizing.

Implementation of other benefit-sharing clauses and their implications on livelihoods

Despite the above issues regarding allocation of financial resources, other benefit-sharing clauses of the agreement have been effected (Local Leader, Nteko parish, research interview, 2010). Table 6.8 summarizes some of the livelihood implications linked to the Clouds Lodge arrangement so far.

Table 6.8. Livelihood implications of the Clouds Lodge arrangement.

Livelihood aspect	Implications
Assets and outcomes	
Financial capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • both direct and indirect employment • to some extent market for local produce e.g. Irish potatoes, firewood, charcoal, beans, eggs and crafts has been created • pigs and cattle projects for some community members
Social capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • water supply to the communities, conflicts
Human capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • on job training for lodge employees • scholarships to best students from the community
Physical capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • community lodge • community land where the lodge is built
Natural capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • despite some critical issues, the natural Bwindi forest is taken more as a capital

Financially, the eco-lodge currently employs a total of 48 people directly as waiters, cleaners, cooks, drivers, bartenders, supervisors and managers. Of these, 94% (45) of the employees are from Nteko and Rubuguri parishes (members of NCDF) and only 3 are hired from outside the two parishes as the Lodge manager clarified:

There are 3 technical positions (Manager, Chefs) where outsiders were hired as NCDF never had skilled people to efficiently serve in those positions. We always give preference to members of NCDF when it comes to job allocation... in fact look at all these boys and girls... they are from the community... We train them and they are doing a good job. We expect them to in turn help their families...
(manager Clouds Lodge, research interview, 2009).

Those employed sounded very happy with their new positions and admitted receiving on-the-job training and a 'good' monthly pay, which they argue has assisted their families. On what they do with the money, they listed paying school fees for their children, brothers and sisters, meeting medical bills and building iron roofed houses:

We had never thought of this opportunity in a remote village like ours... The management is so good, we were thoroughly trained and we are paid on time thanks to IGCP, UWA and TUSC. The money we earn has gone a long way in addressing our school fees, medical, and housing needs and we hope for the best...
(Clouds Lodge employee, research interview, 2009).

In the three years of operation, the Lodge spent UGX. 22,039,500 (Approx. USD 10,017) on casual laborers who do part-time jobs (AWF, 2010). Other people have been employed indirectly as guides (10), craft-makers as well as administrators of NCDF affairs.

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However, focus group discussions revealed complaints from some NCDF members that some of their children are only employed for a short time and then are dismissed. Most of these members were happy in principle with the Lodge arrangement, but were only bitter with the Lodge administration. They argued that within the NCDF-TUSC agreement, a procedure to terminate someone's contract was clear, such an individual should be called before a disciplinary committee comprised of some NCDF members and Clouds Lodge management. Then they would be given a fair hearing before a decision to terminate their contracts was implemented. However the management is accused of bypassing this clause. One former employee argued as follows:

I was employed as a driver at Clouds Lodge... My job was to pick clients from the airfield in Kisoro and drop them back at the end of their visit. One day, the manager told me to pack and go... I was shocked... These days, he drives visitors himself. He has also employed his girlfriend. Yet this is our Lodge. We complained, but the chairman NCDF is also powerless...

Conversely, the Lodge Manager argues that people whose contracts are terminated are incompetent: 'It is true, some employees' contracts are terminated if they become incompetent... The problem is that the community here has high expectations. But true this hotel is theirs; we have to manage it effectively. For those employees who serve well, we have them...!' (manager Clouds Lodge, research interview, 2009).

This scenario pointed to a failure to stick to the rules of the game by actors, especially TUSC. But this may also be a result of the complexities of working with a tribal community. While a private sector actor may be interested in competence and prudent service provision, the local actors may be interested in protecting tribal identities which automatically creates clashes of perspectives.

On local sourcing of materials, TUSC has to some extent fulfilled its obligation as most building materials that were available in communities were sourced locally and food stuffs available locally like eggs, chicken, vegetables, and potatoes are bought. For example, over the last three years in operation, TUSC has spent UGX 37,045,600 (approx. USD 16,838) on local market purchases, UGX 3,261,900 (USD 1,337) on firewood, UGX 1,352,650 (USD 554) on water, and UGX 2,127,300 (USD 872) on crafts from the community (AWF, 2010). This local sourcing implies that finances are injected into a community that was so remote, relying on agriculture and without access to a market for the produce (former NCDF chairman, research interview, 2010).

In many focus group discussions, especially in Nteko, the community members admit that some benefits are trickling down and appreciate the role of the Lodge in diversifying their incomes. However, the atmosphere was different in many meetings in Rubuguri as they seemed not to know about all these opportunities created by the lodge. One reason could be that the Lodge is located in Nteko and therefore communities there can easily access these opportunities. The Lodge Manager indicated that the venture could have contributed even more but because of limited and inconsistent supply from the community, the management

is at times forced to purchase from Kabale town and other areas. Despite this, the Rubuguri pressure group argued that the Clouds Lodge management buys everything from Kabale even when it is locally available. But a talk with residents of Nteko threw weight behind the Clouds Lodge Manager's argument.

In addition, the lodge is apparently a community physical asset being operated on their behalf by TUSC as well as the land where the lodge is located. In a short period of operation, however, it was revealed that some pig and cattle projects have been facilitated and water supply arrangements started in the parishes of Nteko and Rubuguri. Socially however, the controversy surrounding this venture has triggered community conflicts (see also Chapter 5).

Livelihood strategies and context

As can be noted in Table 6.9, the three tourism-related interventions have had varying implications for community livelihood capital assets. Consequently, the outcomes on aspects of capital assets have had a bearing on livelihood strategies and the vulnerability context in the three study parishes. Although agriculture has remained the key livelihood strategy for people in and around Bwindi, tourism has made a visible contribution in boosting this sector as key informant interviews as well as focused group discussions indicated that demand for local agricultural produce has increased. As noted earlier in this chapter, the market was a hindering factor to agricultural development in this remote region, but through the Buhoma community venture, the Clouds lodge and other private lodges, farmers now have access to different selling outlets at reasonable prices.

Though limited in relation to the population size in the three parishes, the projects associated with the three tourism interventions have clearly provided alternative livelihood strategies for communities. Direct jobs have been created for those community members who formally work at the two community lodges (Buhoma and the Clouds Lodge). Indirectly, several other community members have diversified their livelihood strategies as suppliers of crafts and other retail services in addition to participation in agriculture. As Table 6.9 indicates, the distribution of livestock (sheep, goats, and cows) has offered an alternative survival strategy on top of crop agriculture for those individuals that have benefited. In addition, the soft loans associated with the Buhoma model have gone a long way to diversify the livelihood strategies of the beneficiaries. For example, some have invested the money in poultry, zero grazing, etc.

Apparently, the implications of the three tourism-related interventions on the financial, social, human, physical and natural capitals have had a bearing on the community's vulnerability context. As explained earlier, Bwindi and the areas around it were isolated, remote and difficult to reach. There was no market for agricultural produce, and no access to clean water and health services. It was difficult to transport the sick to hospital as well as those who died from the hospital. Some patients who were in a critical condition would die on the way as they were being carried to the main hospital that was located a long distance away. The Batwa in particular were landless, and jobless upon being ejected from the forest. All these scenarios shaped the vulnerability context of the communities around Bwindi. The

Table 6.9. Comparison of the livelihood and development implications.

Livelihood aspect	Buhoma-Mukono enterprise
Assets and outcomes	
Financial	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • direct and indirect employment for the people of mukono parish • market for local produce, e.g. vegetables, bananas, firewood, charcoal, pineapples, building materials and local souvenirs • establishment of a village micro-finance institution that has assisted women and the youth with credit facilities • rise in prices (inflation) for commodities and land around buhoma
Social	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • mobilization of people into sub-associations/clubs (social networking) e.g. buhoma-bwindi women development club, and batwa association for development with the sole aim of working together for development • re-vitalization of cultural performances especially the Batwa and Bakiiga dances • re-vitalization of cultural norms, and local traditions. • supported construction and running of Buhoma community hospital that has saved the need for communities to travel long distances to access medical services • supported procurement of a local ambulance that has eased transportation of patients especially pregnant women to access medical services
Human	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • training communities in business management skills, e.g. customer service management, dance and drama courses and handicraft lessons • facilitating the construction of schools like Kanyashande and Rubona primary schools where hundreds of children are receiving an education • bursaries for best performing students for tertiary education. • facilitation of mainly the Batwa (Pygmies) with educational materials • at individual level, locals who generate money have used it to send children to school and access better health services
Physical and natural	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • maize mill set up to assist communities process produce like maize, millet, ground nuts, and soya beans • equipment to maintain village feeder roads has been procured. • better houses and expansion on agricultural land through utilization of income generation • the natural Bwindi forest is taken more as capital

¹Private-Community Partnership.

outcomes of the three interventions have created a change in this context. Bringing health services close to people, the schools, water services, electricity, local ambulance (pick-up services), market access, and income through direct and indirect jobs have all minimized the vulnerability context of these communities. For example, despite some shortcomings,

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Tourism-revenue sharing	PCP ¹ (Clouds Lodge)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • initiation of goat-rearing projects at household level • sheep-rearing project at household level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • both direct and indirect employment for some community members • creation of market for local produce e.g. Irish potatoes, firewood, charcoal, beans, eggs and crafts • pig and cattle projects for some community members
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • construction of a community centre where community functions are normally held • construction of health units and a maternity ward which have contributed to offering health services to local population 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • water supply to the communities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • construction of a class room block at a primary school to enhance education service provision 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • on-job-training for community members employed at the lodge • scholarships to best students from the community
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • construction of feeder roads to allow village access • main road rehabilitation • financed community camping ground • the natural Bwindi forest is taken more as a capital 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community Lodge • community land where the lodge is built. • the natural Bwindi forest is taken more as capital

schools are easily accessible, medical services are now within the reach of communities especially in Mukono parish even for complicated diseases like AIDS. Through revenue-sharing funds, the health units that are now providing similar services to the people of Nteko and Rubuguri were also initiated. For those who are employed, the income earned

has gone a long way to solving and meeting family needs. The construction of various roads has made the areas more accessible and easy to transport village products as well as people.

In summary, this chapter indicates that even though the implications of the three interventions on livelihood strategies are relatively minimal, a lot was revealed in relation to capital assets and the context. Overall, the Buhoma-Mukono model performed better, largely because of its high governance capacity and long period of existence compared to the other two interventions. The next section elaborates on the extent to which the livelihood implications of the three policy interventions have had a bearing on addressing conservation threats at Bwindi.

6.3 The implication of livelihood-related outcomes on conservation at Bwindi

In Chapter 2, I elaborated on the conservationists' assumption and logic behind many conservation and development policy initiatives in the developing world. Market-oriented mechanisms such as nature-based tourism are advanced as a means to address conservation threats through development initiatives. In the previous section, I discussed the livelihood implications associated with the three tourism-related policy interventions at Bwindi. The current section explains if the results on livelihood aspects described above have had any influence or implication in addressing conservation threats at Bwindi. The actors' perspectives in relation to the main threats at Bwindi supported by secondary data were the basis of this assessment.

6.3.1 Community attitudes towards conservation and existence of the Park

As explained earlier, the manner in which Bwindi Impenetrable National Park was gazetted and the associated new rules of the game ushered in by the 'National Park' model of biodiversity management bred negative attitudes towards the park. The central issue of community contention hinged on the 'tough arm' of the state in implementing the new protectionism rules (IGCP official, research interview, 2009). The negative attitudes were manifested in the hostile behaviors that the surrounding communities demonstrated soon after Bwindi was declared a National Park. These included and are not limited to fires on Bwindi forest that were started and coordinated by communities, hostility towards park staff (refusal to sell them food), malicious killing of gorillas (even when they did not eat them), campaigns by local politicians and opinion leaders to have the park de-gazetted, and boycotting of most conservation-related meetings (UWA official, research interview, 2009; Blomley *et al.*, 2010, unpublished report). As a Uganda Wildlife Authority official argued: 'With such stiff resistance from communities, it was very difficult to achieve conservation objectives...' (UWA official, research interview, 2009).

Indeed, as evidenced in other parts of Africa, local populations' attitudes are a crucial yardstick to gauge the success of conservation efforts (Hulme & Murphree, 2001). The three tourism-related policy arrangements at Bwindi were part of a bigger effort to ameliorate and

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improve community attitudes towards the park. In this particular study, in-depth interviews were held with different actors to gauge the current attitudes of the communities since the implementation of the interventions. They were also asked to comment on the future of conservation at Bwindi in face of the current nature of perceptions and attitudes held about the park. Interestingly, upon comparing past and present attitudes towards Bwindi, the majority of respondents portrayed a substantial improvement. They indicated the 'fading' of the community-park hostility:

There is a very big improvement in the way communities view the park now. For example, we have recorded increased willingness by the community members to report illegal activities, to respond in controlling fire outbreaks in the park, and to actively participate in conservation meetings, improved communities' friendliness to park staff and tourists and this change in attitudes has been influenced by livelihood projects that have been initiated

(UWA official, research interviews, 2010).

The above narrative from an official from Uganda Wildlife Authority clearly indicates that outcomes on livelihoods have to some extent had a bearing on improving community attitudes towards Bwindi. An official from another conservation organization (IGCP) that has been very active at Bwindi since it was gazetted stated:

It is absolutely true that the tourism related projects that have been initiated have improved the value of Bwindi National Park in face of communities. For example, the communities of Mukono parish who often burnt the forest are now very good partners in conservation. They are now more concerned with running their lodge and any interruption in tourism flows is a major concern to them as well

(IGCP official, research interview, 2010).

Blomley *et al.* (2010, unpublished report), in their study around the greater Bwindi Conservation Area that also encompasses Mgahinga National Park, echoed the revelations of UWA and IGCP. Their study indicates that the attitudes of communities around Bwindi and Mgahinga National Parks have improved compared to when the parks were gazetted and attribute this largely to tourism-related developments in the area and other livelihood projects funded by donors around the two national parks.

From the narratives of UWA and IGCP officials as well as Blomley and colleagues' revelations, two issues can be emphasized. One is that there are unquestionably signs of improved community attitudes towards conservation at Bwindi associated with the tourism-related interventions. Two, there are other factors, such as donor funded livelihood developments around the parks, which could have complemented the interventions to improve attitudes to this extent. The quotation below even highlights other factors such as collaborative resource management, and problem animal control to have contributed towards the community attitude improvement at Bwindi:

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When BINP was gazetted in 1991, the people around it, especially those of Mukono parish proved so hostile to park staff, visitors and burnt parts of the park... Park staff had to be very careful as at times some would be beaten in evenings... when we started community outreach programmes, community members would shun them... It was horrible... Because Mukono was the main problem area, we worked with conservation partners... the Buhoma lodge through tourism has made communities value conservation... This was for people of Mukono parish; later tourism revenue sharing started and was targeting all communities around the park... The situation has improved... though still with some challenges; the communities now view the park as their own resource... Of course, we have also started collaborative resource management, problem animal control and other interventions to address community concerns

(UWA official, research interview, 2010).

Under collaborative resource management, communities are allowed access to the park to harvest some resources such as mushrooms, honey, medicinal plants and firewood. But this is done with permission from the Chief Park Warden and in a controlled manner (UWA official, research interview, 2010). Problem animal control mechanisms entail erection of pepper hedges around the park to stop vermin such as monkeys, and baboons from accessing community gardens.

On the southern side, when the park was gazetted, local politicians played an active spearheading community resistance. Their attitudes have also been evaluated positively;

Politicians in Kisoro were outstanding in mobilising local people to resist the existence of Bwindi National Park... They made several calls to the government to de-gazette the park to allow local communities access the resources that used to form the basis of their livelihoods... When tourism started bringing benefits... the politicians now view the park as a district resource which should be guarded... The TRS funds are channelled through the district leaders and helps in addressing some of community needs as per the district plans... with Clouds Lodge in place, more benefits are going to communities although it was opposed by some politicians from the beginning...

(IGCP official, research interview, 2009).

From this narrative, the role of TRS and the Clouds Lodge arrangements emerge as factors contributing to change in the attitudes of local politicians. Equally, it can also be noted that the actions of the wider communities were fuelled and planned by local politicians. In one of the district council meetings that I attended during this study, the district councilors were discussing how the gorilla levy funds should be utilized. Interestingly, they constantly referred to Bwindi National Park as their 'oil' resource (comparing themselves with Bunyoro Region in Uganda where large oil deposits have been discovered). They therefore argued that efforts should be put in place to work with Uganda Wildlife Authority to protect the park as it has the potential to generate more benefits for the development of the District. This seemed to be a change in the tone that previously in the early '90s called for de-gazettment

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of the park. In this meeting, which was also attended by UWA and other conservation actors, local leaders put aside some of their disagreements with UWA and IGCP regarding the management of Clouds Lodge and argued that the existence of Bwindi is extremely crucial to the development of the district.

The community narratives regarding their attitudes towards Bwindi were almost similar to those previously elaborated, except that they were accompanied by a number of other issues. In all the focus group discussions the communities narrated the costs as well as benefits of living near the National Park. The highlighted costs and issues included crop raiding and a lack of compensation from the Uganda Wildlife Authority in cases when wildlife kills or injures people or in the event of crop losses. They also pointed out the high school dropout rate blamed on tourism and existence of security personnel in the area.

Interestingly, at Bwindi, problems such as eviction from the forest and denial of park resources were not raised. Yet in many other cases, these largely contribute to the negative attitudes held by surrounding communities (Adams, 2004). Instead, the focus group meetings across the three parishes generated a very long list of benefits associated with the existence of Bwindi National Park such as jobs, revenue sharing, market for local produce and materials, construction of schools by the park, roads, health centers, scholarships, and initiation of livelihood projects involving distribution of goats, sheep, pigs and cows, and the community lodges (as community assets). Furthermore, the communities were able to link these benefits to each of the three interventions. On the basis of this, despite the prevalence of conservation-related costs and the shortfalls of some the three tourism-related interventions, they still viewed the park more positively. They largely attributed their attitude change to the current and anticipated benefits from the park:

When the Interahamwe Rwandan rebels attacked and killed tourists at Buhoma... it was bad news to the whole community here... Our park was no longer visited. UWA closed... our lodge did not work and benefits were missed... now that everything is back to normal, we are always willing to report bad elements in the community who engage in illegal activities...

(elder in Nkwenda village, research interview, 2010).

The issue of Interahamwe came out in many discussions as communities tried to describe the 1999 incident that left 9 foreign tourists dead. They used the incident to explain the value they attach to the park. The Interahamwe attack led to the temporary closure of Bwindi National Park which affected 'their' lodge (BMEDA lodge) and meant that they missed out on other benefits. Secondly, the narrative portrays the communities' willingness to report illegal activities which also manifests improved attitudes.

On top of the benefits and costs associated with Bwindi, the village discussions unveiled several contentious issues related to governance of the arrangements, inadequacy of financial resources and opportunities offered by tourism. Most of these issues are extensively covered in the previous chapters. But it is worth mentioning that despite the communities' contentions, no focus group discussion revealed anti-Bwindi narratives.

6.3.2 Relationship between park management and the community

The community conservation staff at Bwindi was asked to gauge their relationship with the communities by comparing past and present situations. Their narratives revealed a significant improvement in their relationship with the communities. For example, one long-serving UWA staff member argued that: 'There is no way you can compare our present relationship with communities with the past when the park was gazetted..., in 1991, 1992, it was total chaos and mistrust. They suspected UWA staff all the time. But now, we drink with them and chat freely in bars, and even they reveal to us some useful information on illegal activities'.

The enhanced relations between the two are attributed to the general improvement in community attitudes and the numerous community conservation approaches that UWA has employed such as tourism-related interventions, conservation education, and collaborative resource management (UWA official, research interview, 2009). Through these approaches, the majority of community members have been brought on board as far as conservation issues are concerned and conservation benefits are also being shared with them;

We and the communities currently enjoy very good relationship; we are working together very well in ensuring conservation of this important resource... We hold regular meetings with them and majority do attend unlike in the past when they would boycott most meetings initiated by UWA. Many of our rangers are from the community itself and through tourism related benefits, the relationship has further improved. They are now aware that we are here to conserve a resource that benefits them, the nation and the international community as well... They always invite us for social activities and we attend, and even on burials, they work with us...
(another UWA official, research interview, 2009).

Because of this, there have not been many major confrontations between park staff and the communities for the last five years, especially in Mukono, Nteko and Rubuguri (UWA official, research interview, 2009). Generally, forest fire incidents have fallen significantly over the last 10 years, more so in parts of the park that border with Mukono, Nteko and Rubuguri (IGCP official, research interview, 2009). Even the fire incidents that were documented in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 were largely accidental and not deliberate; 'Our rangers analyzed those fires, and evidence shows they were accidental. In any case, community members always report such incidents and respond voluntarily to put off the forest fire without even seeking payment from UWA' (UWA official, research interview, 2009).

The community narratives captured in focus group discussions tallied with UWA's view on improved relations with a few dissenting voices noticed in Nteko and Rubuguri. Those who expressed satisfaction with Uganda Wildlife Authority cited its efforts to handle and deal with conservation issues as the main reason. In Mukono parish, for example, apart from the support they got from UWA in the form of advice and marketing of their lodge, they also expressed happiness with UWA's change of approach by allowing them to access some of the forest resources. In Nteko, two relatively similar narratives were captured in focus group

discussions. There were those members of the community that appreciate their working relationship with UWA staff, for example one elder argued: 'UWA has been so nice to our people; they have given some people money to buy pigs and sheep... This will help them to earn extra incomes... We like working with them to make sure our park is safe and more visitors come to our lodge...' (local leader in Nteko parish, research interview, 2009).

The lodge referred to in this quotation is the Clouds Lodge. In this narrative, Bwindi is seen by this local leader as 'our park' whose protection serves to sustain community benefits. Same views were echoed by the majority in Rubuguri describing UWA as 'good' and 'genuine' in ensuring that communities benefit from tourism, but they blamed IGCP for favoring some elites in the community to use others in advancing their missions. The chairman of the a pressure group argued;

UWA seems well intentioned, but they were misled by IGCP to tag gorilla permits to the lodge... we shall continue complaining to UWA and we are sure, they will listen to us and change that arrangement... We have always negotiated with UWA and they take our pleas into consideration... what I can assure you is that BINP is our resource, we shall work with UWA staff to protect it... but we cannot allow IGCP to use the name 'community' in its fundraising drives, yet they only work with a few people

(chairman Rubuguri pressure group, research interview, 2010).

Such arguments were also advanced by some community members in Nteko. They admit the existence of challenges working with UWA, but seem to have more trust in it than in IGCP. It was evident that events that led to the Clouds Lodge influenced their perception of IGCP. This group seemed to be working closely with the opposition coalition described in detail in Chapter 5. In all meetings held in Rubuguri, the communities outlined several losses incurred due to being close to the park, but went ahead to appreciate its existence. They argued that UWA tries to respond when called upon to chase animals from their gardens and were speculating to reap more tourism-related benefits due to the existence of the park if gorilla permit 'monopoly' issues are addressed. In sum, the dissenting voices seemed not to dispute that there is an improvement in the way UWA is perceived locally.

6.3.3 Trend of illegal activities at Bwindi

Despite improvements in general attitudes, some members of the community in the three parishes and others from outside still engage in unsustainable activities such as hunting, grazing in the park, firewood collection and others (IGCP official, research interview, 2010). Since Bwindi was declared a National Park all these activities were declared illegal. The trend of illegal activities' occurrence has however been declining over time; 'Despite strict law enforcement, some community members still venture into the park, but we always get tip offs from other members of communities when they get to know such incidents and we respond accordingly' (UWA official, research interview, 2010).

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The above quotation reveals the role of law enforcement in conservation efforts at Bwindi. But it also highlights improved attitudes since community members are willing to report 'bad guys' in their vicinity.

Indeed, the available data on illegal activities at Bwindi shows a downward trend from 2001 to 2009 (Figure 6.1). According to Uganda Wildlife Authority and IGCP officials, this trend is explained by a cocktail of factors including improved community attitudes towards the park, improved relationships between the park staff and community members, and increased conservation awareness among communities as a result of different conservation and development actors approaching from various fronts (IGCP official, research interview, 2010). Other reasons advanced are tourism-related policy interventions that have enabled communities to associate the park with economic benefits, collaborative resource management approaches, problem animal control mechanisms and law enforcement (UWA official, research interview, 2010). Generally, the observed illegal activities still continuing at Bwindi range from placing bee hives in the park, cutting down trees for building poles, collection of firewood, collection of honey, pit sawing, placing of snares, grazing and trespassing (IGCP, 2010). In a further illustration of the role of tourism in conservation, the sharp fall in illegal activities between 2001 and 2003 is explained by a resumption of tourism that had totally collapsed with the temporary closure of the park for visitors after the Interahamwe attack in 1999 that left 9 foreign tourists and 2 local staff members dead. The loss of hope and income could have fuelled more illegal activities.

In analyzing illegal activities, particular interest was further placed on the three parishes which formed the focus of this study. Using the same illegal activities' data from UWA and IGCP, two Geographical Information System (GIS) maps were produced and used for further analysis. Only data for years 2007 and 2009 was geo-referenced and enabled production of GIS maps. The analytical focus was on the spatial distribution of the prevailing illegal activities




Figure 6.1. Trend of illegal activities at Bwindi (2001-2009) (UWA and IGCP, 2010).

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within the landscape of Bwindi National Park. The analysis gauged if there was a significant difference in terms of distribution and intensity of illegal activities in areas of the park that share borders with the parishes where the three tourism-related policy interventions are being implemented. Interestingly, the spatial distribution and intensity of illegal activities in those particular locations near the three study parishes shows a significant difference compared to parts of the park bordering other parishes (Figures 6.2 and 6.3). For example, of the data available, placing snares to trap animals emerged as the main illegal activity at Bwindi for years 2007 and 2009 (Figures 6.2 and 6.3), but the intensity of the activity reduces on park borders with the parishes of Mukono, Nteko and Rubuguri.

According to UWA and IGCP, the tourism-related policy interventions to a large extent explain the declining intensity of illegal activities in areas of the park near the three parishes. People in those areas have been very vigilant in reporting illegal activities compared to those in other parishes (UWA official, research interview, 2010). This view was confirmed in focus




Figure 6.2. Illegal activities observed at Bwindi in 2007 (UWA and IGCP, 2010).




Figure 6.3. Illegal activities observed at Bwindi in 2009 (UWA and IGCP, 2010).

group discussions in the three parishes. Community members argued that they constantly report illegal activities sighted in their neighborhood and added that at times the hunters originate from Congo. They linked their willingness to report illegal activities to tourism-related benefits as well as other park-related benefits that UWA has made available to them.

The increased intensity of illegal activities in parts of the park that border other parishes seems to confirm the limitations of the TRS arrangement which is implemented in all 22 parishes surrounding Bwindi. It shows that the TRS has not been very effective. An interview with UWA supported this:

TRS funds have been so small to cause a big impact in all parishes surrounding the park. And yet in Mukono, there is a business venture bringing in more resources and benefits which are topped up with TRS funds. In Nteko and

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Rubuguri, despite some challenges in their arrangements, the role and prospects of their lodge cannot be underestimated. They are speculating the benefits in addition to those of the TRS which could have influenced their behaviors

(UWA official, research interview, 2010).

This implies that UWA recognizes the role of tourism-related policy arrangements in helping to sensitize communities about the need for conservation in the three parishes. However, UWA added that:

The good performance in terms of the spatial distribution of illegal activities in parts of the park that border with the three parishes might be augmented by other factors. For instance, the park headquarter is located at Buhoma, Mukono parish and the Nkuringo sector offices for UWA are located in Nteko parish. The existence of park staff may play some role as well

(UWA official, research interview, 2010).

While this might appear a rational claim, it was overwhelmingly refuted in discussions with communities in Mukono parish who instead associate the trend with tourism-related benefits. For example, one resident argued:

People who engage in illegal activities at times do it at night and can easily dodge park officials... in our parish, the park has played a big role in development, so we report all people who engage in illegal activities... we don't tolerate them... actually the majority who used to participate are well known in the community and they gave up on the habit... some are now into making crafts sold to visitors who come to our lodge and other private lodges around here...

(resident of Nkwenda, research interview, 2010).

This narrative was repeated in several other focus group discussions in Nteko and Rubuguri apart from minor dissenting voices of individuals who admitted that without UWA officials, they would be happy to extract park resources. But overall, the actual and anticipated tourism-related benefits and other approaches by UWA influenced communities' willingness to report illegal activities. The willingness of the majority of community members is appreciated by UWA as an important factor in addressing the problem.

In a further manifestation of the falling conservation threats at Bwindi, the population of mountain gorillas has shown a continuous growth trend since 1997 (Table 6.10). This increase is also further proof that their ecological habitat (the forest) has been secured from unsustainable utilization.

As Table 6.10 illustrates, the population of gorillas at Bwindi grew from 300 individuals in 1997 to 340 in 2006. Currently, a gorilla census has been launched and results are expected in 2012. However, estimates from UWA staff place the 2010 figure at about 380 gorillas. With the exception of 2002 when one group is suspected to have joined another, the number of groups has been on the increase up to 33 in 2010. The habituated groups have also increased

Table 6.10. The population of Mountain Gorillas at Bwindi 1997-2010 (UWA, 2010c).

	1997	2002	2006	2010
Total population estimate	300	320	340	380
Number of groups	28	27	30	33
Number of solitary males	7	10	11	13
Number of habituated groups	3	5	5	8
Individuals in habituated groups	52	72	76	119

from 3 in 1997 to 8 in 2010, though at the time of the study, 6 were officially open for tourism and plans were underway to launch the other 2 (UWA, 2010c).

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter evaluated the implications of the three tourism-related policy interventions on community livelihoods and discussed their bearing on conservation outcomes at Bwindi. Despite some critical issues that are discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5, it was evident that the contribution of the tourism-related policy interventions on livelihood aspects is undisputed by all the actors including those at a community level. There is a clear indication that the alignment of both the substantial and organizational characteristics of the three policy interventions and their respective governance capacities has had an influence on livelihood outcomes. This is evidenced, for example, by the allocation of both financial and material resources, authority endowment in decision making, actors' roles as well as rules guiding their implementation. Subsequently, the Buhoma-Mukono model which revealed a high governance capacity performed relatively better than the TRS and Clouds Lodge models in terms of livelihood outcomes. This implies that the institutional preconditions and/or the policy processes determine the nature of the policy outcomes and should be given due attention in conservation and development policy impact evaluations.

Secondly, although the implications of the three policy interventions on capital assets and the vulnerability context was substantial, outcomes on livelihood strategies were relatively minimal. This can be explained by the big population in the three parishes (over 20,000 people) opposing the opportunities that tourism can potentially offer. Hence, there is need for integration of tourism-related projects with the wider development programs implemented by other actors such as government and development organizations to maximally expand the livelihood options in developing countries like Uganda.

Thirdly, looking closely at the turn of conservation events at Bwindi since tourism and the related interventions were introduced, it is unavoidable to conclude that it has made a significant contribution in addressing conservation threats. However, we cannot ignore the fact that tourism-related interventions have worked with other interventions such as

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law enforcement, collaborative resource management, problem animal control, and other funding schemes for livelihood projects around the park as well as conservation awareness campaigns to achieve these results. What remains a challenge is how to replicate or extend what is happening in the three study parishes to all the other 20 parishes surrounding Bwindi Impenetrable National Park.

Lastly, the outcomes of this chapter suggest that while communities have benefitted, UWA emerges the biggest winner in two aspects; first, it has managed to generate huge revenues from gorilla tourism with less problems locally and this has enabled the funding of its other conservation activities. Second, it has managed to sustain biodiversity conservation at Bwindi as evidenced by increased gorilla populations and reduced illegal activities.

7. Conclusions

7.1 Introduction

Conservation approaches have long been shifting in response to new pressures and in the direction of a better understanding of the shortcomings of the old ones. But over the last two decades, more focus in the developing countries has been zeroed in on attempting to reconcile conservation objectives with a more general need for improving human well-being, collectively referred to as 'development'. Increasingly, a neoliberalist rhetoric seeking to commodify nature and develop market-based mechanisms for its conservation has been adopted (Büscher, 2008). Nature-based tourism is one of the most widely applied market-based mechanisms for conservation and development. Tourism is being advanced by national governments, and development and conservation organizations as one of the major ways to address livelihood and conservation concerns in Africa.

Amidst protruding community aggression that followed the declaration of Bwindi forest as a National Park in 1991, conservation entities operating in the region introduced tourism as a possible instrument to address the twin challenge of conservation and livelihoods. With tourism as a conservation strategy at Bwindi, three important policy interventions have been applied to make it work: (1) the direct community involvement in tourism business (Community-Based Tourism Enterprise-CBTE) model; (2). the Tourism-Revenue Sharing (TRS) model, and; (3). the Private-Community Partnership (PCP) model. This provided a unique opportunity to evaluate their implementation and implications on conservation and development. The current thesis therefore aimed at: 'Analyzing the introduction, development and implementation of the three tourism-related policy interventions and evaluating their implications on livelihoods and conservation at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park'.

This chapter presents the main outcomes contained in the empirical chapters, discusses the theoretical reflections and finally outlines the relevance of this thesis in the broader tourism-conservation and development debates.

7.2 The three arrangements

This study illustrates effective scaling down of the contemporary market-based conservation mechanisms through tourism by international conservation and development organizations in close cooperation with the national conservation entities at a micro-level such as Bwindi. As it were, Uganda Wildlife Authority was confronted with teething problems of attaining conservation amidst aggressive community's livelihood demands. A coalition of popular international conservation entities 'code-named' the International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP) swung into action fronting tourism as a possible remedy. It is evident

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in this thesis that policy processes seeking to make tourism work for conservation and development at Bwindi are neither linear nor simple.

The analytical lens of the policy arrangements approach instead unveils complex processes characterized by a variety of non-local and local actors propagating, adopting or resisting policy solutions. A closer look at all three policy interventions portrays dynamic processes shaped both technically and politically and characterized by the interaction of both the organizational and substantial dimensions of a policy arrangement.

As elaborated in this thesis, the notion of tourism was introduced by the International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP) and Uganda Wildlife Authority at Bwindi in 1992. Immediately, the US Peace Corps Volunteers joined in and promoted the idea of Community-Based Tourism Enterprise (CBTE) to communities in Mukono parish, an ideal that both the Uganda Wildlife Authority and IGCP embraced and supported. The coalition of the three broad entities was shortly joined by USAID and ITFC contributing financial and land resources respectively and later by Mgahinga-Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust (MBIFCT) which initiated the village trail. Needless to say, the initial stages leading to the Buhoma-Mukono CBTE arrangement at Bwindi were fully directed and controlled by a coalition of the Uganda Wildlife Authority and support institutions which worked closely with a group of local leaders under the Buhoma Community Campground Development Association (BCCDA). But later at implementation, BCCDA was transformed by the participation of wider community members in the Buhoma-Mukono Community Development Association (BMCDA). Utilizing the BMCDA organs, it is evident in this thesis that the community is currently in charge and has fairly joined the coalition actors (UWA and support entities) to realize the policy agenda. The Buhoma-Mukono arrangement further reveals the rules of the game formally contained in a constitution stipulating a leadership structure and powers relatively endowed to local actors. Seemingly, the local actors were legitimately represented in rule formation processes and are well informed of the institutional instruments. This partly enabled wider acceptance and minimal controversy among the actors regarding the arrangement.

As for the Tourism-Revenue Sharing (TRS) arrangement, the origin is also traced from the Uganda Wildlife Authority supported by IGCP. Later, the Mgahinga Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust (MBIFCT) and local governments joined to lobby for the addition of a gorilla levy to enhance the arrangement's financial resources. Unlike the Buhoma-Mukono arrangement, it was evident that TRS has since remained a top-down arrangement with the Uganda Wildlife Authority in possession of both financial resources and decision-making power. The Uganda Wildlife Authority works through a community entity called the Community Protected Area Institution (CPI). UWA shaped the regulative instruments with minimal local participation; these instruments are implemented by the CPI. Partly this has been the cause of serious local opposition. Consequently, the local narratives strongly challenged the prevailing 'official' discourse that seeks to address conservation and development issues in a top-down approach. The reality is that top-down rule-making has failed to consider the interests of the policy targets (local actors).

The Private-Community Partnership (PCP) arrangement not only echoes the TRS's top-down characteristics in designing the regulatory tools, but it was also steered by a coalition of non-local actors (the International Gorilla Conservation Programme and Uganda Wildlife Authority) who equally worked through a loosely woven community entity called Nkuringo Conservation and Development Foundation (NCDF). They were later joined by The Uganda Safari Company (TUSC), a private entity that is operating the Clouds Lodge business arrangement on behalf of NCDF. The PCP regulative instruments were enshrined in an agreement drafted by AWF's lawyers in Nairobi. The rules were only introduced to local actors at a later date. Both the process that led to these rules of the game and some of the clauses have left the Clouds Lodge arrangement hotly contested compared to the other two arrangements. There is unbalanced resource endowment among actors (both financial and otherwise). Radical opposition coalitions have emerged and have succeeded in part in derailing the policy process.

A comparison of the three arrangements reveals both similarities and differences in terms of the concepts used: actors/coalitions, rules, discourses and resources. In terms of similarities, the three arrangements were largely driven by 'non-local' actor constellation constituting of International Gorilla Conservation Programme and Uganda Wildlife Authority working with their enrolled allies such as USAID. This actor constellation propelled the global conservation and development discourses that sought to utilize tourism for conservation at Bwindi. Their coalition formed around a common cause and perspectives aimed at steering policy processes to achieve conservation goals. It is this coalition that secured and injected the much needed financial and material resources that enabled the kick-starting of the three policy arrangements. However, it should be noted that coalition formation was not just a monopoly of these 'non-local' actors. The Clouds Lodge arrangement for example illustrates a coalition that originated locally with the aim of challenging the rules and arrangements advanced by the 'non-local' coalition. This finding implies that coalitions can take shape to assemble a platform for either advancing or challenging a policy process.

Second, it is evident in the three scenarios that the scaling down of these global conservation ideals was facilitated by the existence of local elite groups: a group of local council leaders, religious leaders and local business men (constituting the BCCDA) for the Buhoma-Mukono arrangement; a group of local council leaders (politicians) who constituted the Community Protected Area Institution (CPI) for the revenue-sharing arrangement; and a group of 17 who originally constituted the Nkuringo Tourism Development Association (NTDA) which was transformed into Nkuringo Conservation and Development Foundation (NCDF) for the Clouds Lodge arrangement. For the Buhoma and Clouds Lodge arrangement, these were the early adaptors with the ability to conceptualize the policy ideas and potential benefits. But, for the TRS arrangement, they were coordinated by Uganda Wildlife Authority as a strategic mechanism to enhance its impact.

Either way, this thesis on one hand rejects and on the other supports the critical stance on the position of local elites in the implementation of tourism-related arrangements. The critics view local elites as players who largely capture the opportunities triggered by tourism approaches while overshadowing the larger community members leading to

conflicts (Budhathoki, 2004; Duffy, 2000; Walpole *et al.*, 2000). Contrary to the critics' stance, this thesis provides evidence that the involvement of elites in conservation efforts is not always negative. For example, the Buhoma-Mukono arrangement demonstrates that early involvement of the elite group provided an apparatus for policy diffusion and enabled UWA, Peace Corps and IGCP to drive forward their objectives. This relative success, however, cannot be taken for granted; it came about because other community members were involved at an early stage which helped to avoid a situation of suspicion and illegitimacy. The wider community views were captured through their legitimate representatives. This later helped the arrangement to receive legitimacy and general acceptance. However, the Clouds Lodge and TRS arrangements provide evidence in support of the critics' arguments. In both cases the local elites, though different, are seen to have either consciously or unconsciously captured the two arrangements and claimed to operate on behalf of the community. As it happened with the Clouds lodge arrangement, when such a situation arises, resistance builds and creates fertile ground for the option of gradual resistance and opposition coalition building and the eventual derailment of a policy process. Interestingly, the Clouds Lodge case study shows that resistance coalitions are also steered by elite groups. For this particular arrangement (Clouds Lodge) elite groups constituting tourism business actors (Kisoro Tourist Association), tour operators (Association of Uganda Tour Operators) and some local opinion leaders, and teachers (Rubuguri pressure group) joined hands to steer opposition campaigns. It is the Rubuguri pressure group that recruited other members of the general community for this cause.

Thirdly, all the three arrangements indicate signs of continuous construction, stabilization and change over time. This was either due to the introduction of new elements or changes in one or more dimensions of the policy arrangement which induced changes in others. For example, with the Tourism-Revenue Sharing arrangement, the setting up of Park Management Advisory Committees (PMAC) in 1994 and the Community Protected area Institutions (CPI's) in 1996 clearly not only reflected the entry of new actors but also new rules of the game and changing discourses. The introduction of new resources through the gorilla levy as well led to the entry of new actors such as the Bwindi Mgahinga Conservation Trust. The same applied to the Clouds Lodge arrangement. The introduction of financial resources by USAID largely steered the formation of an entity called the Nkuringo Conservation and Development Foundation (NCDF). Working with the Uganda Wildlife Authority and IGCP, NCDF attracted new resources; the gorilla permits. Both the availability of permits and money attracted The Uganda Safari Company (TUSC) into the arrangement to partner with NCDF. This necessitated the setting of rules of the game to guide their operation as evidenced in the NCDF-TUSC agreement. However, some clauses in agreement such as the gorilla permits 'monopoly' attracted resistance and the entry of new actors such as the Uganda Association of Tour Operators (AUTO) and KTA who gradually teamed up to form the opposition coalition. The opposition actors in turn caused the entry of other actors such as the Attorney General, and the Inspector General of Government (IGG) as mediators. Based on the legal authority, the IGG called for the termination of the existing rules of the game (agreements) and the disbandment of core actors (NCDF) while suggesting the creation of another entity to run the existing resources. The IGG recommendations, if

implemented, might dismantle the coalition of actors advancing the official discourse. If this happens, the policy process is likely to change.

The Buhoma-Mukono arrangement was not different from the other two. The activities of the US Peace corps led to the formation of the elites' association. In turn, it led to the entry of USAID which introduced the initial financial resources. With financial resources to kick-start the community venture, other actors like UWA, and IGCP joined and facilitated the entry of ITFC which came with the land resources to house the community enterprise. This eventually necessitated the participation of the wider community leading to the formation of an association – BMCDA – to steer the process. It also necessitated guiding rules that were reflected in the enacted constitution. As can be seen, these are deeper insights into the rather complex processes of continuous construction, stabilization and change that largely enabled and in some cases constrained livelihoods and conservation outcomes.

In terms of differences, the variations between the three arrangements are reflected in the shifts in the content of discourses, actors, rules and resources. The 'official' discourses as enshrined in the overall aims and missions of the three arrangements reflected the broader conservation and development narratives seeking to make use of tourism. The three cases at Bwindi indicate differences in the discourse content as it was scaled down at a local level. For example, the Buhoma arrangement depicted the belief in Community-Based Tourism Enterprises (CBTEs) which emphasize direct community involvement in tourism business. Yet, the Tourism-Revenue Sharing arrangement had a bearing on the broader debates that agitated for the sharing of nature-based tourism revenues with the communities shouldering the burden of conservation. As for the Clouds Lodge, the Private-Community-Partnership approach reflects the wider emergence of 'hybrid' neo-liberalism, which links neoliberal strategies to civil society and at times local government institutions (Dressler & Büscher 2008; McCarthy 2005).

Consequently, the Buhoma-Mukono arrangement is largely driven by communities. The rules are largely shaped and resources allocated by communities. Tourism-Revenue Sharing on the other hand is largely propelled by the state (UWA) which designs the regulative tools as well as injects financial resources. Finally, the Clouds Lodge arrangement is 'owned' by the 'community' but mainly driven by the private operator and mediated by the state (UWA) and the third sector (IGCP). This illustrates how policy processes are always re-constituted and shaped on basis of the dynamics and injection of new policy ideas.

7.2.1 Livelihoods

Over all, the three arrangements had implications on community livelihoods and development in varying degrees. Boosted by a strong narrative stressing the use of tourism for development, financial and land resources from 'non-local' actors, the Mukono communities were able to start the construction of the initial physical structures for the CBTE project at Buhoma. The physical structures and land have since remained the community's physical and natural assets contributing to development and livelihoods in various ways. Upon the construction of the community lodge which has since been expanded, direct and indirect, full

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time and part-time employment opportunities have been availed to community members. This has been possible in the tourist lodge, the village trail, craft shops, and other service-related areas. Evidence is provided in this thesis on how these jobs have enhanced incomes of employees and their standards of living. In addition, the venture has created a market for agricultural produce and enabled communities to transform their agricultural assets into more fluid financial capital. This has helped communities to meet some of their livelihood needs like putting up better houses and sending their children to school. Reinvestment of financial resources generated from the venture was evident, generating more financial, physical and natural assets for communities. Some financial resources have been injected into offering the much needed micro-finance services to women and youth, thus widening their livelihood strategies.

As Chapter 3 illustrates, from 1998-2009, the revenues from the venture have significantly increased and part of the profits have been used to enhance the community's physical and natural capitals such as buying a community pick-up truck, a maize mill, setting up school structures, water projects and land for business expansion. Human capital development has also been facilitated from the proceeds of the lodge. This has been done through training and offering bursaries for tertiary institutions which has furthered the beneficiaries' employability. Finally, the arrangement has enabled social networking through the formation of various community associations and clubs funded with financial resources from the lodge. These livelihood achievements are enabled by a guiding discourse enshrined in the BMCDA mission statement to steer development in Buhoma and attain conservation at Bwindi. And of course, the Buhoma-Mukono arrangement provided evidence of regulative instruments that stipulated maximum local utilization of financial resources to steer local development and also wider participation of the community in priority setting.

Conditioned by the top-down regulatory apparatus of the Uganda Wildlife Authority, the Tourism-Revenue Sharing (TRS) arrangement has facilitated a number of community livelihood projects. But it is evident that there is little community input in terms of prioritizing the livelihood projects that are funded. CPI is driven by political interests and rarely considers input from the community. It is further evident that between 1996 and 2009, financial resources totaling approximately USD 323,975 have been injected into livelihood projects in the parishes of Nteko, Rubuguri and Mukono. This money translated into natural assets in the form of goats and sheep to some members of the community who also complained of their quality. The selection process of the beneficiaries and procurement of those assets has remained contested, stirring some community disorder and mistrust of local leaders in charge. The remaining finances were injected into physical assets such as the community center, which hosts local functions, a maternity ward and road networks. The livelihood importance of this arrangement is therefore constrained by the rules of procedure which have remained contested by the targeted actors.

The Clouds Lodge arrangement has achieved the least in terms of livelihood implications. Partly this is because it was only 3 years in operation at the time of this study and hence it would be irrational to judge its livelihood performance against the other two arrangements that have been in existence for over a decade. Secondly, its low governing capacity

characterized by insufficient coherence among actors and other dimensions of a policy arrangement has and might continue to constrain its impact on community livelihood needs. Overall, the injection of financial resources by USAID, topped up by the private operator, enabled the setting up of a high-end tourism facility. By the regulative framework this is a 'community' physical asset. The lodge has so far offered a number of jobs to community members who approved of earning a monthly income. The employees also get on-the-job training enhancing their human capital. However, it has triggered conflicts among community members. But also looking at the process leading to the formation of the opposition coalition, one can argue that the arrangement enhanced social capital through internal as well as external social networking for a common cause.

In summary, tourism is a promising mechanism in the conservation and development nexus. This thesis provides evidence of a significant number of tourism-related projects that have been initiated and have taken community livelihoods to a better level. However, as this thesis elaborates, the performative capacity of tourism is also sandwiched between a number of challenges ranging from the huge targeted populations in the face of limited financial resources for governance issues.

7.2.2 Conservation

The three tourism-related policy arrangements at Bwindi are being implemented alongside many other interventions by many different actors such as donor agencies, individual volunteers and the national government. In addition, other than tourism, the Uganda Wildlife Authority implements other interventions such as collaborative resource management, conservation awareness programs, problem animal controls and law enforcement. Together, the above interventions are driven by the general need to achieve biodiversity conservation to which resources have been committed. It was therefore problematic to accurately attribute a portion of gains made by particular interventions or arrangements in conservations efforts at Bwindi.

But what came out clearly is that, the injection of resources to support various livelihood projects as well as the associated outcomes has caused general conservation awareness as well as an appreciation of biodiversity existence among communities at Bwindi. To be more particular, in the three study parishes, communities and key informants were able to clearly associate gains in conservation efforts to the three tourism-related interventions. There was clear evidence of improved community attitudes towards the National Park as well as good relationships between park officials and local residents. The number of illegal activities has relatively decreased. There was also increased community tolerance and cooperation in law enforcement efforts evidenced in an increased role of the community in tracing people participating in illegal activities. And the population of gorillas (once threatened) is on the increase.

All in all, although conservation outcomes at Bwindi seem to be a consequence of a combination of factors, the evidence in this thesis indicates that tourism is a central

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intervention. However, tourism as a conservation instrument will only work if integrated with a variety of other policy interventions and vice versa.

Conclusively, the analysis of the three tourism-related arrangements at Bwindi portrays intricate processes with a bearing on livelihood and conservation. Explained by its high governance capacity, the Buhoma-Mukono arrangement emerges to be relatively more successful especially in addressing livelihood issues. The actors share perspectives and perceive the tourism venture as a possible solution to the conservation and development challenges in Mukono parish. In addition, the policy arrangements' dimensions of the Buhoma-Mukono model were structurally congruent, the establishment of its regulative instruments relatively participatory. The rules were well known, understood and accepted by actors.

Contrary, despite differences in the years and spatial scale of operation, the governing capacity of the Tourism-Revenue Sharing and the Private-Community-Partnership (Clouds Lodge) arrangements was rather low. This meant that the arrangements' potential to address conservation and development problems at Bwindi was relatively limited. There was evident incoherence in actors' perspectives and contradictory discourses, the rules were contested and the relationships between actors were disturbed and not built on mutual trust.

It can also be deduced that the outcomes of the three arrangements also had a bearing and impact on the policy processes and the arrangements themselves. For example, the livelihood and conservation outcomes of the Buhoma-Mukono arrangement is what caused discussions that partly led to the Tourism-Revenue Sharing arrangement. This arrangement especially targeted communities in other parishes surrounding Bwindi as well those surrounding other National Parks in the whole country. But the low governance capacity of TRS in a way constrained its results giving rise to challenging voices and a call for more resources which came in the form of the gorilla levy with new actors and rules of implementation. Meanwhile, the communities in the southern part of Bwindi Impenetrable National Park still perceived the Buhoma arrangement as a success compared to TRS. This led to the introduction of a new arrangement altogether: the Private-Community Partnership arrangement through the Clouds Lodge that was presumed to have performative superiority compared to the Buhoma-Mukono model in a typical reflection of changing global discourses. This illustrates that the policy making is an on-going process of construction and reconstruction (Lieverink, 2006; Van der Zouwen, 2006). Also revealed in this thesis is that: (a) CBTEs are not always problematic, (b) and also that partnership arrangements are not always the perfect solution to conservation and development issues.

7.3 Theoretical reflections

This research was both empirically and theoretically explorative. It aimed primarily to make a contribution to the tourism-conservation and development debate by analyzing the introduction, development and implementation of the three tourism-related policy interventions as well as evaluating their implications for livelihoods and conservation. The

theoretical journey to realize this research aim was guided by a combination of six sensitizing concepts: actors, rules of the game, resources/power, and discourses (constituting the Policy Arrangements Approach – PAA), livelihood and conservation. The use of sensitizing concepts was deemed necessary as I was approaching a complex, unpredictable and relatively inconsistent study setting. The area was very remote with a population characterized by low levels of education. With such a situation of uncertainty, taking such concepts as imperatives would be improper because they point at many discussions and theoretical thoughts which could only be partly addressed.

However, my conceptualization in Chapter 2 has proven to be suitable for accomplishing the aim of this thesis. The use of PAA's dimensions was especially fundamental in unfolding a general understanding of the policy processes at Bwindi. The PAA's four dimensions gave analytical directions distinguishing the organizational and substantial aspects of the three arrangements. This enabled the general picture and analysis of why, by whom and how the arrangements were introduced.

The policy arrangements' four dimensions were rather open and provided analytical directions. While this is advantageous for a researcher to attain interpretation freedom, the four dimensions tend to overlap and necessitate a clear demarcation of entry points into the analysis and interpretation (Arnouts, 2010). In this study, the actor dimension was taken as an entry point for the analysis of the three arrangements, given the central role of actors in operationalizing the interventions. This meant that I linked up and interpreted the other three dimensions in line with this focus to generate a general picture of what was happening with the tourism-related arrangements at Bwindi.

PAA enabled a nuanced and much detailed analysis which unraveled on-going complex processes of construction and reconstruction with the functioning of the interventions characterized by constant interaction between substantial and organizational aspects of the policy arrangement. This in the end shaped outcomes on livelihoods and conservation. As Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 of this chapter indicate, the constraining and enabling aspects of the three arrangements on livelihood and conservation largely depended on their governance capacities. The Buhoma-Mukono arrangement which had a high governance capacity performed better than the other two arrangements in terms of livelihood impacts.

An investigation of the governance capacity unfolded complex political as well technical issues that rotated around how the 'community' is defined as an actor, the institutionalization of actors, as well as the regulative frameworks that guided the implementation of the arrangements. It was, however, problematic to draw precise conclusions regarding the shaping of conservation impacts. The three arrangements are part of a far more complicated policy field in which many more actors and policy themes are present and many other arrangements contribute to livelihood and conservation impacts. This made the attribution of consequences especially on conservation a challenge. However, through triangulation, this study tried to capture the linkage of the three arrangements with the progress being made in the conservation arena at Bwindi. This enabled a general picture that the initiation of the tourism-related arrangements stirred conservation efforts and awareness at Bwindi.

All in all, the sensitizing concepts successfully steered the unfolding of complex realities at Bwindi with some attribution challenges. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 confirmed that the institutionalization of policy interventions is an on-going process which temporarily stabilizes and changes over time due to the addition or removal of resources, actors, rules or prevailing discourses. However, the processes of construction and reconstruction were not only limited within the arrangements but also between them as part of a more general policy field. This shows that the concepts were largely fruitful in unfolding the realities that led to this thesis. My findings can be complemented by future research which could conceptualize, theorize and study issues such as the role of trustful relations, elites and their roles in policy implementation and circumstances leading to formations of local opposition.

7.4 Prospects for tourism, conservation and development

This thesis aimed to make a contribution to the widespread debate about the livelihood and conservation impacts of conservation programs, the successes and failures of community-based approaches to conservation and the pros and cons of market-based mechanisms for conservation. Although tourism plays an important role in this debate, the role of tourism in the conservation-development nexus still needs to be fully assessed theoretically and empirically. This is a crucial task if we are to adopt constructive solutions. Based on the three case studies at Bwindi, the following messages are passed on.

First, as Bwindi illustrates, the market-oriented mechanisms seeking to use tourism as a conservation strategy can make a significant contribution, especially when tourism as an instrument is integrated with other conservation and development interventions. This would partly address the problems of financial resource deficiencies and huge numbers of targeted populations. Although still faced with a number of challenges, the Bwindi case demonstrated emphatically that this linkage strengthens and maximizes conservation and development outcomes.

Second, it is essential to consider political as well as technical issues when designing and evaluating conservation policy arrangements and their outcomes. When looked at from a purely technical perspective, the three cases presented here could be viewed as relatively successful, as they have established and tested a mechanism for transferring revenues from high-value tourism to the local community as part of experimentation with new conservation and development models in Africa. However, a wider view, which incorporates the analysis of power, resources and interactions of actors, reveals that the Clouds (PCP) and TRS arrangements have been beset by ever-growing levels of conflict and contests in the process. The PCP arrangement at Nkuringo may be generating revenues, but it has also created or exacerbated disputes within and between local communities, government institutions and the private sector up to the national level. This can be understood as a consequence of the coalition which supported the PCP agreement making use of a strategy which aimed to resolve conflict through a technical agreement for revenue sharing, and did not create adequate space for public deliberation of political disagreements. The same applies to the TRS arrangement which has been in existence for over a decade with revenues channeled

to communities. But in an attempt to ensure that funds are not diverted and also to create a direct link between these funds and conservation, the Uganda Wildlife Authority adopted top-down rule setting with strict and conditional project selection regulations. Again, no room was created here for opposition from the targeted beneficiary actors. Yet, a look at the Buhoma-Mukono arrangement illustrates a relatively successful model that appears to be an exception considering the shortcomings of other CBTEs elsewhere. But its relative success can only be well understood by taking a closer look at technical, administrative as well as political dimensions.

Third, there is a need to acknowledge the complexity of the governance and power-related issues at stake in the implementation of conservation policy arrangements. As illustrated in this thesis, challenges of conservation and development cannot be simplified, for instance, in mere regulative frameworks or too simplistic notions of community and community interests. Actors have different interests and are able to form coalitions to push their perspectives, they have varying resources which they are able to mobilize and deploy to challenge the rules of the game, and they are able to draw on or establish framing discourses to present their arguments. All of these heterogeneities create a recipe for conflict over the implementation of arrangements such as those at Bwindi. The balance of power between actors can also shift over time, causing a wave of reactions in the other dimensions of the arrangement. When this happens, conflicts are likely to occur. It is evident in this thesis that there are circumstances under which relatively less powerful local actors successfully formed coalitions and gradually gained power to resist an existing arrangement. This clearly implies that conservation policy arrangements are not as straightforward as is often made out and the elaborated challenges must always be recognized in contemplation of employing these arrangements to achieve conservation and development.

Fourth, despite the prevalent performative shortfalls of the TRS and PCP arrangements at Bwindi, they are far better than the strict protectionism approaches. They still give hope for communities and conservationists as viable options to address the conservation and development dilemma. Although the Buhoma-Mukono model is also not free from challenges, it can offer lessons drawn from its high governance capacity that has enabled relatively better outcomes from conservation by steering development. Therefore, to maximize the former arrangements' ability to contribute to this cause, the inequities in the design and dispersion of benefits need to be addressed. In terms of participation this could include changes in the policy arrangements to more meaningfully include "targeted" local people in decision-making processes. In terms of resources allocation, one possible route would be to make an explicit link between benefits from both arrangements and costs of conservation, such as a compensation fund for crop-raiding. Another would be to increase the proportion of gorilla permit revenue shared with local communities to a level sufficient to have a greater impact than what the USD 5 gorilla levy can achieve. As for gorilla permits, the best option would be to follow what the Uganda Wildlife regulatory framework says as it formed the basis for the IGG's critical stance. Still with these suggestions, it might not be so easy to eliminate the conflicts completely from the process. But once predicated, systems can be put in place to proceed with them without derailing the arrangement.

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Finally, the findings in this thesis also indicate that it will always take time for market-based policy interventions to develop governance capacity. This is because of the complexities involved. Therefore, the time dimension in implementing such conservation interventions is crucial. And of course, challenges and some level of incoherence are always expected, but should not be too much to disrupt the implementation of the arrangements. In view of the limited available options to address the twin challenge of conservation and development in the developing world, I argue that arrangements such as the three discussed in this thesis could be replicated and promoted elsewhere, but the associated shortfalls need to be given due attention.

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Summary

Over the last two decades, the developing world has focused on attempting to reconcile conservation and development with nature-based tourism as one of the main mechanisms. To address the twin challenge of achieving conservation and development at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Uganda, tourism was introduced in 1993.

According to the logic of Integrated Conservation and Development (ICD) approaches for tourism to earn the support of communities for conservation, there must be meaningful benefits which accrue to a large number of people. However, from the outset, tourism around Bwindi was largely dominated by private sector businesses. In an attempt to ensure greater community access to tourism benefits, the Uganda Wildlife Authority and support institutions have applied three main tourism-related policy interventions in villages around the park to enable communities to benefit directly from tourism. These policy interventions are the subject of this thesis and they include: the Buhoma-Mukono community tourism enterprise, the Tourism-Revenue Sharing Program and the Clouds Mountain Lodge – a Private-Community Partnership. This thesis critically looks at the functioning of each of the three policy interventions. It explicates the introduction and implementation processes and evaluates the extent to which the three policy interventions address livelihood and conservation concerns at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park.

By expounding the processes and context within which the policy interventions are implemented, this thesis makes a contribution to the on-going debates on policy strategies that can be employed to redeem threatened biodiversity in the developing world. More so, on the extent to which market-based mechanisms that seek to use tourism in biodiversity conservation efforts in Africa can work. It adds a voice to the ongoing discussions regarding the relevance of Community-Based Tourism Enterprises, Tourism-Revenue-Sharing and Private-Community Partnership arrangements that have been advocated by international and national conservation organizations over the last few years as possible conservation and development links.

To address the main research aim, I advanced a four-dimensional analysis using the elements of the policy arrangement approach to explain the introduction and the functioning of each of the three policy interventions at Bwindi as well as to elaborate their respective governance capacities. The elements of the policy arrangements approach on which the analysis was based include: (a) actors/coalitions; (b) rules; (c) resources/power; and (d) discourses. As Chapter 2 elaborates, the four elements of the policy arrangements approach were used as sensitizing concepts. This implies that they were used as interpretive devices and guidelines for analysis rather than imperatives. On the other hand, to evaluate the outcomes of the policy interventions, livelihoods and conservation were also taken as sensitizing concepts (evaluative devices). This entailed making use of the elements of the sustainable livelihood framework (capital assets, livelihood outcomes, livelihood strategies and the context) to understand the livelihood implications and the conservation threat reduction indicators to explain conservation outcomes. Within the context of Bwindi, an assessment of the status

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of the conservation threats entailed a look at the nature of community attitudes, park-community relationships, the trend of illegal activities and their distribution as well as the population of key animals – the mountain gorillas in the case of Bwindi.

Generally, the thesis demonstrates that the Buhoma-Mukono arrangement has a high governance capacity compared to the Tourism Revenue Sharing and Private- Community Partnership arrangements. This implies that the policy processes and the alignment of the substantial and organizational aspects of the Buhoma-Mukono arrangement effectively contribute to the realization of the desired policy outcomes. The arrangement (Buhoma-Mukono) is widely accepted as a solution to the conservation and development concerns in the area as it commands a great deal of support from the majority of actors and dissenting voices are extremely rare. This explains its strategic congruence.

In addition, in Chapter 3 I show that the Buhoma-Mukono arrangement is internally structurally congruent. This is illustrated by the fact that the regulative instruments are well known, understood and accepted by actors and the relationships between actors are built on mutual participation and trust. The arrangement is also externally congruent as it links and integrates well with the 1990s' international discourses and policies on CBTEs, but also with other community-based tourism enterprises through an umbrella entity called the Uganda Community Tourism Association. Therefore, a combination of its high governance capacity and other practical reasons like its location (near the park headquarter) and local sourcing and capacity building, make the Buhoma-Mukono CBTE model an exception compared to many other CBTE arrangements that have generally failed elsewhere.

As for the Tourism Revenue Sharing Program, in Chapter 4 I argue that the dimensions of this policy arrangement are structurally incongruent, the regulative instruments that have been established to guide its implementation are poorly known, understood and accepted and the relationships between actors are troubled and not built on mutual trust. Two discourse coalitions exist that are dissimilar in perspective; an 'official' one voiced by Uganda Wildlife Authority and International Gorilla Conservation Programme, reflecting storylines of international and national conservation focusing on linking conservation and development, and a competing discourse advocated by local communities which challenges the way TRS is implemented. The distributional effects of TRS were and still are subject to discussions at Bwindi, as well as the new rules for disbursing funds and project selection, which are still debated and considered as too 'technical' for many. Although the criticism regarding the low funding from TRS has been addressed by the introduction of the gorilla levy, this has been criticized for only being USD 5. In addition, TRS is still a state-oriented arrangement where UWA controls crucial resources. Whereas CPI and local governments are involved at all levels of TRS implementation, their powers are limited to resource distribution within the framework of UWA's conditional guidelines. The communities on the other hand are the most disadvantaged with neither financial nor knowledge resources. Despite being the central victims of conservation costs, their powers are minimal. The findings discussed in Chapter 5 illustrate a low governance capacity of the Private-Community Partnership (Clouds Lodge) arrangement. There is no broad acceptance of rules that guide its operationalisation and there are competing discourses which differ in perspectives narrating the Clouds Lodge

arrangement in either largely positive or negative terms. In addition, the relationships between actors are troubled and not built on mutual trust. The incongruence in the dimensions of the policy arrangements largely explains the underlying conflicts associated with this arrangement. The results also illustrate that there are circumstances under which relatively less powerful local actors are able to resist neoliberal interventions such as the Private Community Partnership arrangement by invoking the 'weapons of the weak'. The local villagers succeeded in severely hampering, if not entirely derailing, the Clouds Lodge agreement. This was possible through the alignment of their local opposition with the perspective of the tourism industry and district politicians, all of whom joined a single coalition. The conditions under which such local opposition to neoliberal conservation/development interventions emerge is an area requiring further research.

Despite some critical issues related to governance, regulatory frameworks and power imbalances, in Chapter 6 I show that the contribution of the tourism-related policy interventions on livelihood aspects is undisputed by all the actors including those at a community level. There is a clear indication that the alignment of both the substantial and organizational characteristics of the three policy interventions and their respective governance capacities has had an influence on livelihood outcomes. Subsequently, the Buhoma-Mukono arrangement which exhibited a high governance capacity, performed relatively better than the TRS and Clouds Lodge arrangements in terms of livelihood outcomes. This illustrates that the state of policy processes can determine the nature of the policy outcomes and should be given due attention in conservation and development policy impact evaluations. Although the implication of the three policy interventions on capital assets and the vulnerability context was substantial, outcomes on livelihood strategies were relatively minimal. This can be explained by the big population in the three parishes (over 20,000 people) opposed to the opportunities that tourism can potentially offer. Hence, there is a need for integration of tourism-related projects with the wider development programmes implemented by other actors such as government and development organizations to maximally expand the livelihood options in developing countries like Uganda.

Looking closely at the turn of conservation events at Bwindi since tourism and the related policy interventions were introduced, it is clear that tourism has made a significant contribution in addressing conservation threats. However, in Chapter 7 I argue that the tourism-related policy interventions have worked with other interventions such as law enforcement, collaborative resource management, problem animal control, and other funding schemes for livelihood projects around the park as well as conservation awareness campaigns. The livelihood and conservation outcomes discussed in this thesis suggest that while communities at Bwindi have benefitted, Uganda Wildlife Authority emerged as the biggest winner as it managed to generate huge revenues from gorilla tourism with less problems locally and enabling funding of other conservation activities. As Chapter 6 illustrates, the Uganda Wildlife Authority has also managed to sustain biodiversity conservation at Bwindi especially, since the population of mountain gorillas has been on the increase and illegal activities continually show a downward trend.

Summary

In summary, this thesis illustrates that tourism is a promising market-oriented mechanism in the conservation and development nexus. Evidence is provided of a significant number of tourism-related projects that have been initiated and have taken community livelihoods to a better level, more so when tourism as an instrument is integrated with other conservation and development interventions. Integrating tourism with other interventions partly addresses the problems of financial resource deficiencies and huge numbers of targeted populations. Although still faced with a number of challenges, the Bwindi case emphatically demonstrated that this linkage strengthens and maximizes conservation and development outcomes. The Bwindi case further illustrates that policy making is an on-going process of construction and reconstruction. It highlights ceaseless developments within the three policy arrangements which are most likely to continue even in the future.

Based on the three case studies at Bwindi, this thesis also passes on the following messages. First, it is essential to consider political as well as technical issues when designing and evaluating conservation policy arrangements and their outcomes. The success or failure of policies and their interventions cannot only be explained technically. As this thesis demonstrates, evaluation of policy arrangements could entail taking a closer look at technical as well as political dimensions of the policy process. Secondly, there is a need to acknowledge the complexity of governance and power related issues at stake in the implementation of conservation policies. Challenges of conservation and development cannot be simplified for instance in mere regulative frameworks or too simplistic notions of community and community interests. Actors have different interests and are able to form coalitions to push their perspectives, they have varying resources which they are able to mobilize and deploy to the challenge rules of the game, and they are able to draw on or establish framing discourses to present their arguments. All of these heterogeneities create a recipe for conflict over the implementation of arrangements such as those at Bwindi. The balance of power between actors can also shift over time, causing a wave of reactions in the other dimensions of the arrangement. This clearly implies that conservation policy processes are not as straightforward as is often made out and the elaborated challenges must always be recognized when thinking of employing these arrangements to achieve conservation and development. Thirdly, despite the prevalent performative shortfalls of the TRS and PCP arrangements at Bwindi, they are far better than the strict protectionist approaches. They still give hope for communities and conservationists as viable options to address the conservation and development dilemma. Finally, this thesis also indicates that it will always take time for market-based policy interventions to develop governance capacity. This is because of the complexities involved. Therefore, the time dimension in implementing such conservation interventions is crucial. And of course, challenges and some level of incoherence are always expected, but should not be too much to disrupt the implementation of the arrangements. In view of the limited available options to address the twin challenge of conservation and development in the developing world, it is argued in this thesis that the arrangements such as the three discussed, could be replicated and promoted elsewhere, but the associated shortfalls need to be given due attention. The findings can be complemented by future research which could conceptualize, theorize and study issues such as the role of trusting relationships, elites and their roles in policy implementation and circumstances leading to the formation of local opposition.

Samenvatting

Toerisme, natuurbehoud en ontwikkeling

Een analyse van toerisme gerelateerde beleidsinterventies in Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (BINP), Oeganda

In de afgelopen decennia is er steeds meer internationale aandacht voor de relatie tussen natuurbehoud en armoedebestrijding in ontwikkelingslanden. Zo ook in Oeganda, waar in 1993 rondom Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (BINP) toerisme werd geïntroduceerd om het hoofd te kunnen bieden aan toenemende problemen op het gebied van natuurbehoud en bij te kunnen dragen aan de sociaal-economische ontwikkeling van de lokale bevolking. Toerisme in Bwindi is vanaf het begin door de private sector gedomineerd. In een poging om volgens principes van 'Integrated Conservation and Development' (ICD) lokaal meer grip op deze ontwikkeling te krijgen zijn rondom Bwindi – in samenwerking met de Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) en andere ondersteunende partijen – drie verschillende toerisme interventies opgezet: de Buhoma-Mukono Community Tourism Enterprise, het Tourism-Revenue Sharing (TRS) programma, en de Clouds Mountain Lodge, een Community-Private Partnership (CPP). Dit proefschrift bevat een kritische analyse van deze drie beleidsinterventies. Mijn onderzoek richt zich op de introductie en uitvoering van deze interventies en de invloed daarvan op natuurbehoud en ontwikkeling rondom Bwindi Impenetrable National Park. Hiermee wil ik een bijdrage leveren aan de voortdurende discussies over de rol van toerisme als instrument om het verlies van biodiversiteit in ontwikkelingslanden tegen te gaan.

Om de introductie en werkzaamheid van de drie interventies in Bwindi te kunnen analyseren, heb ik gebruik gemaakt van de beleidsarrangementenbenadering. Aan een beleidsarrangement kunnen vier dimensies worden onderscheiden. Allereerst zijn er actoren, al dan niet verbonden in coalities, betrokken bij een beleidsterrein. Deze actoren hebben ideeën over beleidsproblemen en -oplossingen. Deze stelsels van ideeën worden ook wel discoursen genoemd. Actoren beschikken ook over allerlei hulpbronnen. De verdeling daarvan bepaalt de machtsverhoudingen binnen een beleidsarrangement. Tenslotte gelden binnen een beleidsarrangement bepaalde formele en informele spelregels, die bepalen hoe beleid gemaakt en uitgevoerd wordt en wie waarvoor verantwoordelijk is. Deze vier dimensies zijn behandeld als zogenaamde 'sensitizing concepts'; beginpunten van waaruit ik mijn onderzoek ben gestart. Het zijn begrippen die richting aan mijn onderzoek hebben gegeven. Naast de beleidsarrangementenbenadering is ook gebruik gemaakt van de concepten 'livelihood' (de manier waarop mensen in hun levensonderhoud voorzien) en 'conservation' (natuurbehoud) om de uitkomsten van verschillende interventies te kunnen beoordelen. Aan de hand van het 'sustainable livelihood framework' zijn de hulpbronnen onderzocht waar mensen van gebruik maken om in hun levensonderhoud te voorzien en heb ik de relaties tussen Bwindi National Park en omwonenden in kaart gebracht. Ook ben ik nagegaan in hoeverre er illegale activiteiten plaatsvinden en hoe de verspreiding en

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populatiegrootte van de voornaamste beschermde diersoort – de berggorilla's – zich heeft ontwikkeld.

In dit proefschrift toon ik aan dat de eerste interventie, de Buhoma-Mukono Community Tourism Enterprise, een hoog bestuurlijke vermogen heeft in vergelijking met TRS of CPP. De goede balans tussen inhoudelijke en organisatorische aspecten van het Buhoma-Mukono arrangement dragen in hoge mate bij aan de beoogde beleidsuitkomsten. Het arrangement wordt in de regio breed geaccepteerd als een oplossing voor natuurbehoud en ontwikkelingsvraagstukken. De 'regels van het spel' zijn bekend en worden begrepen en erkend door alle betrokken actoren. Daarnaast zijn relaties tussen actoren gebouwd op basis van vertrouwen en participatie. Het arrangement past ook goed binnen internationale discoursen en praktijken op het gebied van 'Community Based Tourism Enterprises' (CBTEs) uit de jaren negentig en er wordt nauw samengewerkt met soortgelijke projecten binnen de overkoepelende organisatie van de Uganda Community Tourism Association (UCOTA). Vergeleken met projecten in andere landen, is het Buhoma-Mukono model een positieve uitzondering op de regel door de combinatie van een hoog bestuurlijk vermogen met praktische voordelen zoals de locatie (nabij de ingang van het nationaal park), de beschikbaarheid van andere lokale producten en diensten en projecten gericht op het aanleren van kennis en vaardigheden.

In hoofdstuk vier bestudeer ik het Tourism-Revenue Sharing (TRS) programma. Ik laat daar zien dat de dimensies van dit beleidsarrangement structureel incongruent zijn, dat de regels niet goed gecommuniceerd, begrepen of geaccepteerd worden, en dat de relaties tussen actoren zijn verstoord en niet zijn gebaseerd op onderling vertrouwen. Ik onderscheid twee discursieve coalities. Ten eerste een 'officiële' coalitie bestaande uit Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) en het International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP). Zij representeren het 'succesverhaal', waarin (inter-)nationaal natuurbehoud goed samengaat met sociaal-economische ontwikkeling van de lokale bevolking. Ten tweede een conflicterende discursieve coalitie gevormd door lokale gemeenschappen die TRS bekritisieren op de wijze waarop TRS wordt uitgevoerd. Onderwerp van kritiek zijn de ongelijke verdeling van baten, de wijze van uitbetaling van fondsen en de selectie van projecten. TRS wordt door de lokale bevolking vooral gezien als een technische oplossing. Een deel van de kritiek richt zich ook op de beperkte financiële middelen. De voorgestelde oplossing – een extra \$5 gorilla heffing – wordt door veel mensen als onvoldoende gezien. Daarnaast wordt TRS hoofdzakelijk beschouwd als een door de overheid gestuurd arrangement waarin UWA de voornaamste hulpbronnen controleert. Ook al spelen lokale instituties (zogenaamde CPIs) en lokale overheden een rol binnen TRS, als het over de verdeling van middelen gaat is hun macht gelimiteerd.

In hoofdstuk vijf toon ik aan dat het Community-Private Partnership (CPP) een beperkt bestuurlijk vermogen heeft. Ook bij de Clouds Mountain Lodge is er geen sprake van brede aanvaarding van regels, zijn er verschillende conflicterende discoursen, zijn de relaties tussen actoren verstoord en is er sprake van onderling wantrouwen. Relatief minder machtige lokale actoren zijn in staat geweest om weerstand te bieden tegen neoliberale interventies zoals het CPP, door een beroep te doen op zogenaamde 'weapons of the weak'.

Ze zijn er in geslaagd het functioneren van de Clouds Mountain Lodge stevig te belemmeren en het arrangement bijna te laten ontsporen. Door lokale oppositie op één lijn te krijgen met de toeristenindustrie en de regionale politiek, heeft zich een tegen-coalitie kunnen ontwikkelen.

Ondanks deze kritiek, laat ik in hoofdstuk zes zien dat de bijdrage van toerisme op natuurbehoud door alle betrokken actoren niet wordt betwist, ook op lokaal niveau. Er zijn ook duidelijke aanwijzingen dat het samenspel van inhoudelijke en organisatorische dimensies van de drie verschillende beleidsarrangementen en het daaruit voortvloeiend bestuurlijke vermogen een positieve invloed hebben op de wijze waarop mensen zich in hun levensonderhoud voorzien. Het Buhoma-Mukono arrangement, met een hoog bestuurlijk vermogen, scoort daarbij relatief beter dan de TRS of CPP arrangementen. De bijdrage aan levensonderhoud is vooral indirect, doordat allerlei onderwijs- en gezondheidsvoorzieningen worden gecreëerd. Gezien de bevolkingsdichtheid in de drie omliggende dorpen (meer dan 20.000 mensen) is de directe bijdrage in termen van werkgelegenheid relatief gering. Het is daarom noodzakelijk toerisme te integreren in bredere ontwikkelingsprogramma's om daarmee de levensomstandigheden van bewoners structureler te kunnen verbeteren. Dat kan niet alleen via toerisme.

In hoofdstuk zes laat ik bovendien zien dat toerisme een belangrijke bijdrage heeft geleverd om bedreigingen voor natuurbehoud het hoofd te bieden. Echter, toerisme gerelateerde beleidsinterventies gaan vaak hand in hand met andere beleidsmaatregelen zoals rechtshandhaving, samenwerking op het gebied van natuurbeheer, specifieke bescherming van bedreigde diersoorten, andere vormen van financiering en bewustwordingscampagnes.

Dit proefschrift laat tevens zien dat UWA substantiële bedragen uit gorilla toerisme ontvangt waarmee zij activiteiten op het gebied van natuurbehoud kan bekostigen, ook in andere nationale parken. Een belangrijk gevolg hiervan in Bwindi is dat de populatie van gorilla's aanzienlijk is gegroeid en dat illegale activiteiten sterk zijn afgenomen.

Op basis van mijn onderzoek in Bwindi concludeer ik in hoofdstuk zeven dat het ten eerste van belang is dat bij het ontwerpen en evalueren van beleidsarrangementen zowel politieke als technische zaken meegenomen worden. Ten tweede is het noodzakelijk om de complexiteit van beleidsprocessen en de rol van macht niet uit het oog te verliezen. Actoren hebben verschillende hulpbronnen tot hun beschikking waarmee ze de bestaande spelregels kunnen tarten, en ze hanteren bepaalde discoursen over de wijze waarop problemen moeten worden aangepakt en door wie. Dit alles kan leiden tot conflicten en verschuiving van machtsverhoudingen tussen actoren, waardoor weer nieuwe regels nodig zijn of andere actoren betrokken moeten worden bij de uitvoering van een beleidsarrangement. Beleidsprocessen gericht op natuurbehoud en ontwikkeling zijn dynamisch en voortdurend aan verandering onderhevig. Ten derde concludeer ik dat, ondanks de gebreken van de TRS en de CPP, deze interventies beter werken dan een strikt protectionistische aanpak. Ze dragen duidelijk bij aan het creëren van draagvlak voor natuurbehoud, ook al staat de verdeling van sociaal-economische baten vaak ter discussie. Ten slotte toont dit onderzoek duidelijk aan dat het veel tijd en moeite kost om marktgeoriënteerde beleidsinterventies op

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het gebied van toerisme, natuurbehoud en ontwikkeling tot volle wasdom te laten komen. Er zullen altijd hobbels op de weg zijn en blijven.

Toch illustreert dit proefschrift dat toerisme een veelbelovend marktgeoriënteerd mechanisme is in de verbinding tussen natuurbehoud en ontwikkeling. Toerisme gerelateerde projecten kunnen bijdragen aan natuurbehoud en leefbaarheid, zeker wanneer toerisme wordt gecombineerd met andere natuurbehoud- en ontwikkelingsinterventies. Ook al zijn er nog steeds de nodige uitdagingen, Bwindi laat wel zien dat de relatie tussen toerisme samen met andere interventies voor natuurbehoud en ontwikkeling kan zorgen. Gezien de beperkte andere mogelijkheden om in onderlinge samenhang aan natuurbehoud en ontwikkeling te werken, pleit ik er voor ook in andere gebieden en ontwikkelingslanden met deze drie typen interventies te experimenteren en deze experimenten via onderzoek goed te monitoren. Bovendien is het van belang nader onderzoek te doen naar de rol van lokale elites in de ontwikkeling en uitvoering van beleid en naar de omstandigheden die leiden tot lokaal verzet.

About the Author

Wilber Manyisa Ahebwa was born on 21 March 1977 in Uganda. He had his high school education at Makobore High School in Rukungiri District, South-Western Uganda. He then joined Makerere University in 1996 where he completed a Bachelor of Tourism Degree Programme in 2000. After the undergraduate studies, the author worked with the Uganda Tourism Board (UTB) as an Information Officer, and later moved to Millennium Tours and Travel Services Limited where he served as a Sales and Reservations Officer. In 2002, he joined Makerere University as a Teaching Assistant. In 2004, he was admitted to Wageningen University where he gained a Master of Science in Leisure, Tourism and Environment in 2006 before returning to lecture at Makerere University. In 2008, he was granted a study leave to pursue a PhD with a focus on Tourism, Conservation and Development at Wageningen University, the Netherlands. He has currently returned to his lectureship position at Makerere University and also serves as the Coordinator of the Tourism Programme in the Department of Forestry, Biodiversity and Tourism. Besides university-related work, the author offers tourism- and conservation-related consultancy services in the East African Region.

Completed training and supervision plan

Wilber Manyisa Ahebwa



Wageningen School
of Social Sciences

Description	Department/Institute	Year	ECTS
I. General part			
• Research Methodology; From Topic to Proposal	Wageningen Graduate Schools (WGS)	2008	4
• Techniques for writing and Presenting a Scientific Paper	WGS	2009	1.2
• Scientific Publishing	WGS	2008	0.3
• Time and Project Management	WGS	2009	1.5
II. General research related competences			
• Mansholt Introduction course	Mansholt Graduate School	2008	1.5
• Presentation at Atlas Africa Conference	Kampala, Uganda	2011	1
• Presentation at International Workshop	Kampala-Uganda	2008	1
• Presentation at International Workshop	Kigali-Rwanda	2009	1
• Presentation at International Workshop	3 A STEP, South Africa	2009	1
• Presentation at International Workshop	DELPHE, Nairobi, Kenya	2010	1
• Nature INC International Conference	ISS, The Hague	2011	1
• Scaling and Governance Conference	Wageningen University	2010	1
• NVAS International Conference	Groningen University	2010	1
III. Discipline-specific part			
• Advanced Social Theory (RSO 30806)	Wageningen University	2008	6
• Quantitative Data Analysis course	Wageningen University	2009	6
• Participation in the training on Sustainable tourism Development	Masebe Nature Reserve, South Africa	Dec 2009	2
• Participation in the training on Tourism, Conservation and Development	Amboselli National Park, Kenya	July 2010	2
IV. Teaching and supervising activities			
• Guest Lecture	Sheffield Hallam University, UK	2009	1
• MSc Student A : Christine Ampumuza	Wageningen University	2008/2009	2
• MSc Student B: Amos Ochieng	Wageningen University	2010/2011	2
Total			37.5

