Sharing burdens……and decisions?

Democratic performance of Dutch policy networks around onshore and offshore wind farms

Joost Hulsbos

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SUMMARY

"Wind power may well be the least environmentally-friendly idea ever proposed by environmentalists. That certainly seems to be the verdict of those who live near proposed and actual wind farm developments in both the US and the UK (Murray, 2003)." Onshore, rapid instalment of wind turbines has suffered from this so-called Not In My BackYard-attitude (NIMBY) of the general public. It is certainly one of the reasons why recent years have seen a number of failed onshore initiatives, and a new focus on offshore wind farms, as national deadlines for renewable energy approach.

There is not much reason to assume that the circumstances in the Netherlands differ considerably from those in other countries. The national government has launched a 1500 MW-objective for onshore wind power and a 6000 MW-objective for offshore wind power for 2020, while respectively 1277 MW and 0 MW were installed at the end of 2005. This tremendous estimated growth in offshore wind energy evokes questions about both direct and indirect participation of citizens in policy networks around offshore wind farms, when compared to networks around wind farms on the mainland. This research examined two cases: one offshore wind farm in the North Sea, and one onshore wind farm in Wageningen.

Both networks were analysed by exploring their democratic anchorage, falling apart in three input-legitimacies (*who has decided?*) and two throughput-legitimacies (*how has been decided?*). Many different actors, inside and outside policy networks, can play a role in democratising these networks. Therefore, the discrepancy between the questions, *who has actually decided?* and *who should have decided?* was also investigated through the distribution of costs and benefits across stakeholders.

Four hypotheses on differences in actor arrangements were formulated, of which two were confirmed by the case studies. One of the confirmed hypothesis had serious consequences for the democratic performance, as the concerns of local citizens and fishermen were neglected by the national government. Both networks that were investigated in this paper can be characterised as policy networks with a key role for levels of government. In addition, it was argued that politicians should play a key role in these networks, with little room for negotiation between the organised beneficiaries and cost-payers.

I concluded with several theoretical improvements. First, *control by politicians* only made sense in a democratic way, when the issue at hand in the networks was also brought up during elections. Second, the input legitimacy, *representation via the membership basis of participating organisations*, assumes that directly affected people, or the organisations that represent them get mobilised. Several barriers to participation in the network were identified, and a conceptual clarification of 'directly affected people' was offered.

Murray, I. (2003), Green Civil War (26 November 2003), website Competitive Enterprise Institute: http://www.cei.org, viewed on 1 July 2006

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Front photo: Wind turbine in Zoeterwoude, South Holland (photographer: M. Bloemerts)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

> ... And now I must stop saying what I am not writing about, because there's nothing so special about that; every story one chooses to tell is a kind of censorship, it prevents the telling of other tales ... I must get back to my fairy-story, because things have been happening while I've been talking too much (Salman Rushdie, Shame, p. 68).

Censoring myself turned out to be a more difficult process than was assumed. One can tell myriad tales about wind energy and many more should be told. Luckily, a cordial kind of censorship was provided by my two supervisors. Jan van Tatenhove prevented me from telling several storylines, while Judith van Leeuwen remedied small gaps in my fairy-story. I am grateful to both of you. Other persons to whom I have to acknowledge my indebtness to are the interviewees. They were kind enough to help me explore the wonderland of wind farms. And to you, gentle reader, I hope you will share my sincere curiosity when reading the following pages.

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GLOSSARY

B&W	Board of mayor and aldermen (college van Burgemeester en Wethouders)
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment (milieueffectrapportage)
KPD	Key Planning Decision (planologische kernbeslissing)
MEP	Monitoring and Evaluation Programme
NGO	NonGovernmental Organisation
NIMBY	Not In My BackYard
NSW	Near Shore Windpark
OWEZ	Offshore Wind Farm Egmond aan Zee
WEW	Foundation WindEnergy Wageningen
WUR	Wageningen University and Research centre

LIST OF ORGANISATIONS (DUTCH-ENGLISH)

Mooi Wageningen	Society Beautiful Wageningen
Platform Duurzaam Wageningen	Platform Sustainable Wageningen
Productschap Vis	Dutch Fish Product Board
Stichting de Noordzee	North Sea Foundation
Stichting Duinbehoud	Society for Dune Conservation
Stichting Natuur en Milieu	Society for Nature and the Environment
Stichting WindEnergie Wageningen	Foundation WindEnergy Wageningen
Vogelbescherming Nederland	Society for the Protection of Birds
Vogelwacht Egmond	Birds Society Egmond
Wagenings Milieu Overleg	Environmental consultative body Wageningen

1. INTRODUCTION

Wind energy has been used in contemporary societies for the last 3000 years. The earliest windmills were used to provide mechanical energy for grinding grain or pumping water (Ackermann and Söder, 2002). However, in the 1970s, the oil crises caused a shift in attention towards using wind energy for electricity generation purposes. This turning-point in attention was not immediately followed by a rapid increase in installed capacity world-wide, although this decade and the one thereafter were characterised by fast developments in wind energy technology (see Ackermann and Söder, 2002). Only due to support schemes of certain national governments (e.g. Demark), the total installed capacity rose at the end of the 80s. The primary scheme that resulted in "the first wind energy boom in history" (ibid, p. 73) was the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in the United States. PURPA's section 210 required electric utilities to purchase power from independent power producers (Van Est, 1999). In this way, independent power producers were encouraged to install huge windmill farms, especially in California.

Subsequently, a second 'wind energy boom' has taken place from the 1990s onwards in Europe; nevertheless, other regions in the world have started to pick up as well (see table 1). Summarising table 1, the growth of installed wind energy is unevenly distributed around the world. By the beginning of 2005, around 73 per cent of the world-wide capacity was installed in Europe[1].

Table 1. Operational wind power capacity world-wide (source Ackermann and Söder, 2002; Windpower Monthly)

REGION	INSTALLED CAPACITY IN MEGAWATTS (MW)			
	End 1995	End 1999	End 2001	Start 2005
Europe	2,518	9,307	16,362	34,630
North America	1,676	2,619	4,440	7,196
South & Central America	11	87	103	227
Asia & Pacific	626	1,403	2,162	5,275
Middle East & Africa	13	39	203	246
World-wide	4,844	13,455	23,270	47,574

Several reasons exist for this tremendous growth in both the installation and use of wind energy in Europe. First of all, Member States of the European Union (EU) have repeatedly expressed their conviction that a change in energy production and consumption is needed with regard to the threat of climate change. The most widely-known examples of this conviction are found in the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the publication of the Greenpaper "Towards an European Strategy for the security of energy supply". Besides, the governments of some Member States have also set additional goals in national policy programmes. The government of the United Kingdom, for

[1] Putting into perspective all these figures about wind energy, in 2003, only 0.5 per cent of the world's energy demand was supplied by "other" resources including wind energy (International Energy Agency, 2005).

example, has stated to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide in 2010 by 20 per cent below 1990 levels. Second, the renewed attention for renewable energy sources in general is clearly linked to developments in the market of conventional energy sources. As a result of simultaneous increasing prices of conventional energy sources and falling unit costs of renewables, both energy sources are becoming more and more competitive. Another development is the growing reliance on suppliers in regions of political instability (e.g. the Middle East), which needs to be cut in the eyes of European governments. In addition to the ecological and economical explanations, according to the Eurobarometer 2002, public opinion strongly favours "more action with regard to renewable energy sources" (EORG, 2002: 14). To conclude, all three reasons seem to reinforce a continuous instalment of wind energy in Europe.

The above account of forces responsible for the fast growth of wind energy may indicate that the instalment is without constraints. Needless to say, such a statement cannot be upheld. The pivotal constraint is the effect on stakeholders (Gray et al, 2005). Onshore, rapid instalment of wind turbines has suffered from the Not In My BackYard-attitude (NIMBY) of the general public. Moreover, afraid of this NIMBY-attitude, the involved national authorities may have applied the Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anyone-principle (BANANA) to the procedure of granting a license to onshore wind turbines. The putting into practice of these two acronyms onshore has led to a boost in offshore wind energy (see table 2), even though other advantages over onshore wind energy are mentioned in literature[2].

Table 2. Operational offshore wind power capacity in Europe (source: Beurskens and De Noord, 2003)[3]

YEAR	AVERAGE CUMULATIVE INSTALLED CAPACITY
1991	5 MW
1994	7 MW
1995	12 MW
1996	29 MW
1998	32 MW
2000	86 MW
2001	96 MW
2002	256 MW
2003	0.3 GW
2004	1.4 GW
2005	3.1 GW

1.1 Problem definition

Onshore and offshore wind energy projects have disputes among stakeholders in common, but the nature of the disputes differs. Already indicated, siting *onshore* wind turbines is almost inextricably linked to local citizens accused of having the NIMBY-syndrome. They can delay or block projects. Yet, the seemingly rapid expansion of installed *offshore* wind turbines has also been accompanied by

[2] Other advantages are higher wind speeds, less turbulence (Pelc and Fujita, 2002) and less noise and visual disturbance (Zeelenberg, 2005a).

[3] Please note that the figures of the years 2004 and 2005 were based on projects that presented a construction schedule in 2003. A second remark is related to the definition of offshore wind power. Some of the mentioned windmill farms in this study are considered as semi-offshore by other authors (see Gaudiosi, 1999), because they are located in internal seas or in the nearby vicinity of coasts.

conflicts between various actors. Many conflicting interests arise in the use of (shallow) seas like tourism, shipping routes, submarine cables and pipelines, nature protection and military uses. The implementation of offshore wind energy has to compete with those other uses, and affected stakeholders are likely to oppose offshore projects.

Although both the offshore and the onshore case share conflicting interests, actor arrangements around offshore and onshore wind energy are unlike for at least four reasons. At first sight, the NIMBY-attitude weighs less on sea than on the mainland. The sea may be perceived as not belonging to their *backyard*[4], and as a consequence citizens appear to feel less involved with offshore wind energy farms. Few or none citizens or groups of citizens are to be expected in networks surrounding offshore wind energy. Second, large, environmental nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) are most probably not directly involved with onshore projects, while the opposite holds true for the offshore cases. The major reason for their absence on the mainland is that they fear losing public support for their organisations, because the issue at hand –wind turbines in the vicinity of neighbourhoods- is a delicate matter for citizens, their supporters. The third account is given by the fact that offshore wind farms demand higher investments than their onshore counterparts. As a general rule, more powerful market actors with more resources are involved. This may affect other participants in joining the network. Finally, the relevant government levels vary. In the case of the onshore farm, the decision is taken at the local municipality level, while the compromise concerning the offshore farm is taken at the national level. The latter difference leads to various susceptibilities to arguments of groups of stakeholders, as will be explained in chapter two. I argue that in this case national government levels are less susceptible to citizens' arguments against wind projects than local municipalities.

With these differences in mind, it is clear that citizens do not have a strong case in offshore wind energy. Even if they are represented in decision taking networks, they will meet other, more powerful actors. Moreover, national government officials are less inclined to respond to citizens' objections than local politicians. On the other hand, the reasoning so far implicitly assumes that governance arrangements around onshore wind energy *are* democratically anchored. But to which extent can this assumption be upheld? Democratic legitimacy in any policy domain is not only an essential pre-condition due to normative reasons, but it also enhances efficiency of policy outcomes (Kjær, 2004:12). If citizens feel that they have been involved, they will not object policy outcomes and even actively endorse them, thereby raising both efficiency and effectiveness. In this paper, these pivotal issues are under scrutiny, which are addressed in the underlying main research question:

- *what is the democratic performance of offshore and onshore wind energy networks?*

In order to answer the main research question, four, more operational research questions are needed:

1. *which kinds of governance arrangements have emerged around development policies for wind energy farms?*
2. *what role do Dutch levels of government, civil society actors and market actors play in these arrangements?*
3. *how are wind energy networks democratically anchored?*
4. *how is power exercised in wind energy networks?*

[4] Visibility of offshore windmills declines with the distance to the shore. When this distance exceeds 8 kilometers, the visual impact to viewers on the mainland can be assumed to be negligible (Henderson et al, 2003). This technocratic distance of 8 kilometers should not be interpreted as an absolute figure whether visible nuisance is caused or not, but the point remains that the spatial areas in which offshore turbines are constructed and 'backyards' may not coincide.

This research aims to assess the democratic performance of governance networks around offshore and onshore wind energy. The focus here is on making theoretical recommendations to improve the political participation of citizens with regard to both forms of wind energy. Which democratic lessons for the offshore case can be learnt from observing the onshore governance arrangements and vice versa –what do offshore arrangements have to offer for the onshore case?

This study is geographically limited to the Netherlands, for two reasons. First of all, the Dutch national government has recently launched ambitious objectives for offshore wind energy[5]. Valuable lessons for implementing these policy goals can be learnt from this comparison, because citizens or other stakeholders can also delay or block erecting wind turbines located off the coast. For example, it is likely that the Dutch governance arrangements have not yet been fully developed, i.e. not all stakeholders have joined the governance networks. Perhaps, because of that, the latest Dutch offshore projects have suffered from considerable delays (see Zeelenberg, 2005b). In addition to overcoming implementation gaps, the Dutch case study is essential for another rationale. Policy making in the Netherlands is characterised by a consensus tradition and a high degree of organisation of interests. This causes civil society and market actors having the exceptional capacity for self-organisation and for eluding government actors to control them (Peters, 2000:47). These possible capacities for self-organisation create both opportunities and difficulties for political participation of citizens (see chapter two).

1.2 Methodology and outline

Two case studies have been selected in the Netherlands: one offshore wind turbine farm named Offshore Wind Farm Egmond aan Zee in the North Sea, and one onshore wind turbine farm called Wind Farm Haarweg in Wageningen. In order to answer the research questions, the paper is organised as follows. Chapter two presents democracy, one of the core concepts of governance theory, and special attention is paid to the role of government actors. Subsequently, the specific traits of the policy domain of wind energy are discussed. In chapters three and four, the focus shifts to the offshore case study. The policy process and relevant stakeholders are firstly described, and then the democratic performance is analysed. A similar approach is used for the onshore case study in chapters five and six. In chapter seven, a comparison is made between the offshore case and the onshore case: *can the different distributions of costs and benefits explain which interests are mobilised and which ones are not?* Finally, I conclude with a reflection on the democratic performances of onshore and offshore wind energy networks. The analysis is based on policy documents, news articles and qualitative interviews. The latter were conducted with government officials, market actors, and civil society actors who have been involved in governance arrangements around the selected projects.

[5] The Dutch government also want to increase the share of electricity produced by wind turbines on the mainland. However, this goal of 1500 MW is somewhat less ambitious compared to the already installed potential of 1277 MW (Landelijke stuurgroep Ontwikkeling Windenergie, 2006).

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Marsh (1998) argues that any analysis of policy networks should be built around an integration of separate macro-level, meso-level and micro-level analyses. Macro-level analysis places networks in their broader context, and it pertains to two concepts: "structures and processes of government within which any network operates, and the relationship between state and civil society" (Marsh, 1998: 15). One level down in the hierarchy are meso-level concepts that solely concentrate on networks. These concepts deal with the structures of and patterns of interaction within those networks. Finally, micro-level analysis is concerned with actors in networks. Individual actions and decisions of network actors are here the prime areas of interest (*ibid*). A similar approach is taken in this paper. The first half of this chapter considers macro-level issues and examines governance theory and democratic characteristics of governance arrangements. In the second half of this chapter, the focus converges on the meso-level: the organisation of stakeholders within the policy domain of wind energy. The micro-level, investigated through analysing policy documents and conducting interviews, is covered in the analyses of the case studies. In this way, the structures of and patterns of interactions within networks (*meso-level*) can be constructed from the micro-level analyses. Lastly, in the concluding chapters is considered which narrative in governance theory (*macro-level*) provides an accurate description of the wind energy networks, since the precise role of governments has important consequences for shaping the democratic performance of networks.

In governance literature, the key concept governance refers to "something broader than the government, and it is about steering and the rules of the game" (Kjær, 2004:7). This rather vague statement of what governance is really about, is the only similarity between the different sub fields in governance literature. In a variety of bodies of science, governance has been used with completely different connotations. To limit the amount of meanings of governance, this report concentrates on political science and especially on its sub field *public administration*. This sub field is selected, because the regulation of wind energy belongs mainly to national affairs of states.

In public administration, the traditional model of *government* is often used as a starting-point from which the concept of *governance* is explored. Rhodes (1997), for example, describes the Westminster model of government as focussing on:

> parliamentary sovereignty; strong cabinet government; accountability through elections; majority party control of the executive (that is, Prime Minister, cabinet and the civil service); elaborate conventions for the conduct of parliamentary business; institutionalised opposition, and the rules of the debate (Rhodes, 1997:5).

Already since the 1970s, the underlying assumptions of the traditional (Weberian) model have been challenged for not providing an accurate picture of the "new spaces of politics" (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003:8). Three commonly described misconceptions are given. First, in sharp contrast with the traditional model of government, governance theory puts forward that the governments have lost functions due to forces from above (e.g. international organisations), below (e.g. local governments) and sideways (e.g. governmental agencies). Whether this decrease in functions is a deliberate action by governments or not, is an irrelevant point (Rhodes, 1997:17) In addition to the relative decline in the role of the public authorities, their structures have also changed according to literature on governance. Government structures have evolved from more vertical, hierarchical forms to more flexible, horizontal structures. Services are delivered by various levels of government over which no level of government has perfect control. Instead, levels of government have become interdependent, and as a result their structures changed. For instance, national departments negotiate with local authorities

about implementation of national policies, while municipalities bargain with national government levels about subsidies (*ibid*:8,9).

Third, a wider range of actors, including NGOs, has engaged in the process of the formulation and implementation of public policy. The interplay between governmental actors, civil society actors, and market actors has been captured in the notion of governance arrangements[6]. The latter can be described as "relatively stable sets of interdependent, but operationally autonomous and negotiating actors, focussed on joint problem solving" (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005:341). Two opposing views in governance literature[7] both stress the importance of how resources (money, information, knowledge, and authority) are distributed in networks. This distribution determines the mutual dependencies between actors and eventually the amount of interaction between them.

2.1 Government in governance arrangements

As noted above, the interactions between governments and civil societies have been changing. The rise of policy networks has posed a challenge to the implementation of government policies. Whenever governmental actors ignore other actors in policy networks shaped around policy problems and/or policy programmes, such actors can negatively affect the efficacy of policies in such policy areas. Despite the changing role of governments in these interplays, they remain an important 'game in town' when considering governance arrangements. The precise extent of this importance is still hotly debated. In a way, the debate can be characterised as a clash between proponents of 'old' and 'new' governance (Pierre and Peters, 2000)[8].

Old governance considers governance from a "state-centric" approach (*ibid*). From this perspective, it is stated that governments are still at the heart of governing societies, because they still possess the crucial resources (e.g. executive and legislative powers). Pierre and Peters argue that the role of the state might even be strengthened. The government "tends to gain substantial control at the implementation stage by having in essence co-opted social interests that might otherwise oppose its actions" (*ibid*: 49). This notion is captured in the concept 'meta-governance', which is strongly related to old governance. Meta-governance "involves the organisation of the conditions for governance in its broadest sense" (Jessop, 2002:5). In other words, meta-governance assumes that coordinators (often governmental agencies) are able to regulate governance networks. The far-going consequences of the concept meta-governance could even involve the "design of networks, formulation of the overall goals and framework, process management, and direct participation by politicians and administrators" (Torfing, 2005:6).

In sharp contrast with old governance, new governance considers governance from a 'network-centric' perspective. While old governance sees governments as still able to steer the solving of societal problems, new governance asserts that governments have lost this ability. Instead, governance networks are becoming more and more independent from governments. Networks are seen as increasingly being able to organise themselves. Following the characterization of Lundqvist (2001), at the other extreme of the continuum between old and new governance is Rhodes, who is clearly a

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[6] Similar terms have been used in literature, for instance policy networks (Kjær, 2004) or governance networks (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005).

[7] See following section.

[8] This distinction has been criticised by Treib *et al* of being of little analytical value, because the label "new" might be new in one field of study, but may be considered old in another field (Treib *et al*, 2005). However, this critique seems to mistake the means for the ends. The labels themselves are not important, but it is the descriptions of both narratives which matter.

proponent of new governance. The latter author states that the British government has become an actor amongst equals in the policy network (Rhodes, 1997). Each organisation in that network is dependent on other actors for resources. In sum, these networks are self-organising, and this characteristic provides them "a significant degree of autonomy from the state (*ibid*: 53).

Hitherto, the word government has been used. However, the utopia of one coherent national government does not correspond with reality, as both new and old governance seem to acknowledge. A typical 'national government' is composed of a multitude of governmental agencies, which all serve their own special interests (e.g. nature conservation, public transport) instead of the generic common interest (Glasbergen, 1989:5). The notion of a multitude of governmental agencies corresponds to Rhodes' 'core executive'. He explains core executive as follows:

> We define the core executive functionally to include all those organisations and structures which primarily serve to pull together and integrate central government policies, or act as final arbiters within the executive of conflicts between different elements of the government machine (Rhodes, 1997: 14)

Once again, the two perspectives differ on this issue. Whereas according to Rhodes (1997), institutional fragmentation is caused by power-dependencies in networks, Pierre and Peters state that states have deliberately lessened their cohesion to allow for "different segments of the state to develop their own forms of exchange with societal actors" (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 82). This broadly accepted denial of the existence of monolithic governments prompts to a final remark. If, according to old governance theory, national levels of government are indeed able to play a role as meta-governors in governance networks; will they play their role as a democratic meta-governor, or will they close the network for particular interests? On the other hand, if new governance proves to be right; will self-organising networks contribute to democracy or will they block public decisions? The next section touches upon these challenging questions.

2.2 Democratic characteristics of governance arrangements

In governance literature, governance networks have been both praised and condemned for their contributions towards democracy. The transformation of 'pure' representative democracies into systems with governance networks has obviously affected democratic processes. Networks evidently threaten the two basic principles of liberal democracy (Sørensen and Torfing, 2003; Wälti *et al*, 2004). On the one hand, networks tend to be exclusive of particular actors (e.g. actors with fewer resources). This exclusion impinges on the principle of democratic equality. The second principle, threatened by governance networks, is the principle of political accountability. Decisions about public policies are no longer privileged to politicians who can be held accountable. Instead, decisions are left to all the participants within networks, who are not accountable to the general public. Although true, these criticisms refer to the somewhat idealistic and theoretical advantages of liberal democracies (see Papadopoulos, 2003). A second remark is that the older practices of corporatism can be criticised for the very same reasons. In that sense, some aspects of governance are older than the concept itself.

Nonetheless, governance networks are also assumed to benefit democracy. Governance stresses horizontal instead of vertical relations, consensus instead of competition, and more participants instead of just politicians (Benz and Papadopoulos, 2003)[9]. In sum, more ways are open

[9] These authors consider these advantages as normative claims, which are not confirmed by governance in reality (Benz and Papadopoulos, 2003: 2)

for citizens to participate in decision making, and this enhances democratic processes. The two perspectives are linked by authors stating that the two forms of democracy, liberal democracy and network democracy, supplement each other (Rhodes, 1997; Kjær, 2004). However, the *de facto* relation between networks and more traditional institutions should be analysed, too. Like Van Tatenhove and Leroy (2003) rightfully ask, what is the status of consensus reached between market actors, civil society, and government actors in relation to formal, constitutional institutions? Will the reached consensus be treated like just an advice, or will it replace decisions made by democratically elected bodies? To conclude, governance networks should not be stigmatised as democratic or undemocratic before they are analysed. The democratic level depends on their actual form, functioning (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005) and relation with formal, democratic institutions.

The next logic question would then be: *how can the democratic performance of governance networks be analysed?* Any definition of democratic performance given here would be contested, because it is laden with values. Nevertheless, three perspectives on legitimacy can at least clarify the concept of democratic performance. First, there is input legitimacy. A political decision is considered as input-legitimate when it is linked to "the will of the people" (Scharpf, 1999: 6), i.e. citizens' preferences. Thus, a majority of the citizens must accept a system of democratic procedures, according to which collectively binding decisions are made. Second, a political decision is called throughput-legitimate when the process to come to such a decision lives up to 'standard' democratic values. How the decision was being made is here the prime question of interest. The final legitimacy is output legitimacy. Scharpf calls it "government for the people", when the government (or the governance network) succeeds to produce effective policies (*ibid*). This form of legitimacy links the needs of a society and the impacts of a policy. *Because the impacts of offshore wind energy are not yet well known, we focus here on input and throughput legitimacy.*

When we try to apply the two legitimacy concepts to governance networks, input legitimacy becomes problematic[10]. Whereas citizens often approve the traditional model of formal, democratic institutions, citizens are not familiar with the more fluid governance networks. In addition, citizens cannot give their blessing to a system of democratic procedures applicable to governance networks, because no fixed procedures exist in governance networks. Each network follows its own rationale of rules. Sørensen and Torfing (2005) have circumvented this flaw by taking input literally.

> There are many different actors, inside and outside governance networks, who can play an active role in the democratisation of governance networks: network actors, members of the participating organisations and groups, citizens within the relevant territory and politicians (*ibid*: 215).

As they argue, governance networks can be democratic if they reflect 'the will of several groups of people'.

But then the question of responsibility in relation with input legitimacy springs to mind. Responsibility means that a person, to whom an action can be attributed, justifies his own behaviour in front of other people (Pellizzoni, 2004:546). In the traditional model of government, decisions about public policies are privileged to politicians who can be held accountable. According to the governance concept, decisions are left to participants within networks, who are not accountable to the general public. To compensate for the traditional mechanisms of accountability, new mechanisms are needed for applying accountability to governance. We, therefore, revert to a conceptual clarification of the

[10] Each of the three legitimacies differs between the traditional model of government and the concept of governance. However, throughput and output legitimacy can easier be applied to the concept of governance.

term responsibility. When the democratic political system is under scrutiny, responsibility falls apart into two separate forms: accountability and responsiveness (*ibid*:549). Both forms have in common that they are related to pull factors. Pull factors are arguments brought forward, when someone justifies one's behaviour by referring to factors that lie in front of that particular person. For instance, a thief committed a theft *in order to* grab the money of his victim[11]. Accountability and responsiveness differ in their time of imputation. Accountability happens *ex post*, i.e. the relevant action has already taken place. The second form of responsibility is called responsiveness. It can be imputed *ex ante*, i.e. before the event in question has happened. In general, responsiveness means taking a receptive attitude in order to understand actors' needs and desires before deciding what to do (*ibid*). Pellizzoni (2004:558) subdivides responsiveness into two separate forms. First, *reaction* means that external inputs are transformed to something compatible with the existing system, for example, the politician who pleases his voters with the only objective of being re-elected. Second, *response* pertains to a willingness to understand stakeholders' wishes and readiness to rethink one's strategy (*ibid*).

This second differentiation is pivotal, since he accuses both old and new governance networks of being both accountable and reactive, instead of being truly responsive. According to this logic, in the case of old governance, politicians choose their own issues, for which they wish to take responsibility to the general public. New governance proves to be a more difficult case as three options are possible. The first does not differ from the old governance case: politicians take responsibility for issues they select themselves. It entails an ironic paradox, because new governance departs from the assumption that no stakeholder, including government actors, is in control of the network. How can politicians then take responsibility for something what is beyond their authority? Second, stakeholders of the network specify issues for which they take responsibility either to the general public or to their members. Thirdly, no stakeholder renders account. However, all options mentioned above implicitly assume that citizens outside governance networks at least know who can be hold responsible, but that does not have to be the case. If governance networks are not responsive, stakeholders outside such networks are left in the dark. Their questions and objections remain unanswered or even unexpressed (*ibid*).

This and subsequent subsections explore the model that was used to measure the democratic performance of the two investigated networks around wind energy. Sørensen and Torfing have developed a comprehensive model of democratic anchorage. Their model has been filled with another throughput legitimacy, so that the total number of legitimacies in the model comes to five: three input legitimacies and two throughput legitimacies. The first input legitimacy is *control by democratically elected politicians*. It provides a link between the network and the formal, democratic institutions. The main task of the involved politician is to ensure that the process leading to outcomes and the outcomes themselves of the network are in line with the opinion expressed by the majority in elected assemblies. According to the model, politicians should involve themselves with:

- the shape and structure of the network, by deciding which stakeholders are included (and which excluded), by giving some actors resources and capacities to make them more important, and by determining the scope and internal procedures of the network;
- the formulation of the goals and objectives for the governance network;
- actual participation in the network instead of leaving this task to public administrators, since the former can use their authority to modify networks (Sørensen and Torfing:2005:204).

[11] If the thief would have stated that he committed the theft because he is poor, then he would refer to an event that lies in the past. This argument is considered a push factor (Pellizzoni, 2004).

Two responsibility mechanisms are implicitly interwoven in this input legitimacy. One the one hand, the rationale behind elections supposes accountability, i.e. ex-post evaluation by citizens. On the other hand, the idea behind the link with the elected assemblies can vary from accountability to responsiveness. A politician, for example, can report the outcomes to the assembly and then the assembly can react, or the assembly can proactively instruct the politician on how the formulate the goals for the network. However, this form of input legitimacy is built around the notion of meta-governance (see 2.1), which implies that politicians have lost their ability to steer networks. In pure 'new' governance networks this first requirement of democratic anchorage is seriously flawed.

Second, a democratically anchored network means *representation via the membership basis of the participating groups and organisations*. The membership basis forms a "demos of directly affected people" that must be represented by their delegates in the governance network (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005: 205). Again, this second form of input legitimacy can be broken down into three aspects:

- the ability of the membership basis to select and instruct their representatives;
- the ability of the membership basis to form an informed opinion about their representatives' performance in the governance network;
- the ability of the membership basis to express different opinions and criticise the representatives' performance in the governance network.

Needless to say, this second input legitimacy further involves an old-fashioned view of social organisation. The reality of 'check-book activism'[12] of NGO-members and the agenda of NGOs defined by professional managers (Pellizzoni, 2004) does not strike with the idea of a membership basis instructing their representatives. Nevertheless, this second condition is considered essential, since NGOs have often been credited, but analysed less often, as improving the democratic deficit of various formal institutions. Sørensen and Torfing argue that an ex-post critique of delegates by their (fellow) members is the best way of enforcing representation, since anticipation and negotiation in the network rules out the possibility of a closely defined mandate (*ibid*:208). Still, the ability of the membership basis to instruct their representatives, one of the aspects, falls under responsiveness. It depends on the individual delegate whether he really listens to the members' concerns or he adapt them to something compatible with his own wishes. According to the Pellazzioni's classification, the former act would be termed *response*, while the second would be named *reaction*.

Anchorage in a territorially defined citizenry is a third requirement for a democratic network. It connects the governance network with the wider demos than just the directly affected people. Anchorage in a territorially defined citizenry can be analysed according to the following three requirements:

- transparency of governance networks and comprehensible accounts of their key policy decisions;
- access to public dialogue with the governance network;
- responsiveness on the part of the governance network (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005: 210).

Back to Pellazzioni's classification, this final form of input legitimacy requires members of the governance network to render account to the general public, and to be 'responsive'. Pellazzioni would call the former demand accountability as it invokes an ex-post evaluation. The latter shows that one

[12] This form of membership does not rely on regular and intensive meetings between members, or between members and their organisations. In stead of 'active' participation in their organisation, members contribute to their organisation by means of a check or a signature.

term can hide big differences. For Sørensen and Torfing responsiveness means willingness to readjust the course of action, while responsiveness in the eyes of Pellazzioni has everything to do with the timing of the evaluation. Since it entails an evaluation of the deeds of a network, the evaluation is ex-post and therefore should fall under accountability.

The first throughput legitimacy is *following the democratic rules specified by a particular grammar of conduct*. It entails these (normative) democratic rules to be followed in governance arrangements:

- inclusion of all relevant and affected actors and a broad definition of the political agenda in the beginning, in order to be accessible for a wide range of actors;
- demand of democratic deliberation, like respect for other people's opinions;
- demand for a democratic improvement of society and the future demand of governance.

The last demand is considered to contribute to a further democratisation of the decision-making process (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005).

The original model stopped here, but it leaves room for criticism. The model assumes horizontal interactions of actors and neglects with that assumption the notion of power balances[13]. The uneven resource distribution in networks often causes an equivalent power balance. The consequence might be that actors are involved in a network, but they are prevented by other actors to actually influence the political agenda (Kjær, 2004). This example shows that if the exercise of power is neglected in a network analysis, the process will be wrongfully considered as meeting democratic standards. In analogy with Kjær (2004:54), the model is accordingly extended with a second throughput legitimacy: the three dimensions of power. These three dimensions are captured in core sentences:

- A gets B to do something that B would not otherwise have done;
- A prevents B from putting issues on the political agenda that are detrimental to A;
- A shapes B's perceptions and preferences (Lukes, 1974).

The model of democratic anchorage extended with the three dimensions of power will form the basis of this research.

2.3 Costs and benefits around the issue of wind energy

The two previous sections covered the macro-level; i.e. theories that explore the relationship between state, civil society and market. In this section, we move on with the meso-level: the characteristics of the policy domain of wind energy. Central to the democratic performance of any policy domain is that interests that are considered as morally equal may not be politically equal (Stone, 2002:227), or in other words, interests that from a moral viewpoint should be represented are either absent in the network or are not taken into account. In political science, the question whether certain types of interests are stronger, and therefore more influential is an enduring one. Do certain traits inherent to a policy domain exist, which favour the organisation of certain interests and disadvantage the mobilisation of others? If so, disadvantaged interests are *a priori* disadvantaged by characteristics of a

[13] Rhodes has also been criticised for neglecting "the various forms of negotiation", including "power games" (Rhodes, 1997: 9).

policy domain. Needless to say, this can have major consequences for the three input legitimacies of the model.

In this regard, the trait *division of perceived costs and benefits* is most promising. It shapes mobilisation processes and behaviour of existing organisations. First, actors may organise themselves, if they view e.g. deterioration of the landscape as an important disadvantage. On the other hand, if this disadvantage is not highly valued, then actors are not likely to mobilise. Second, the division of perceived costs and benefits also acts upon existing organisations: governments and NGOs[14]. They represent two other ways for citizens to influence wind energy networks. Before these two mechanisms are explained, wind energy as a pubic good is introduced.

The contribution of wind turbine farms to an improved state of the environment can be looked at as a public good. Their contribution to the environment fulfils both the non-rivalry and non-excludability conditions of a pure public good: for example, no stakeholder can be denied access to clean air and, once it has been 'produced', one can benefit from clean air without diminishing other's enjoyment. Obviously, each public good has its own peculiarities resulting in advantages and disadvantages for stakeholders and society in general. Most social benefits of wind energy (in the form of cleaner energy conversion and less resource depletion) are higher than those of conventional energy sources. Therefore, social benefits are strongly related to evaded social costs of other energy sources (Wolsink, 1990). On the other hand, wind energy has also numerous disadvantages. The supply of wind fluctuates and so does supply of electricity, while demand is determined by people. As a result, supply and demand of electricity generated by wind do not coincide, and this creates a need for either innovative energy storage systems, or spare energy production capacity, using conventional energy sources. The environmental friendliness of wind energy is clearly reduced by these backup systems. A second category of disadvantages are the known and unknown effects on nature. Effects on migratory bird species are the most notorious example, but the consequences for sea mammals are highly uncertain. Most importantly however, is the perception of these and other disadvantages by affected stakeholders. This perception or even the perceived perception of stakeholders affects actual siting decisions. If citizens perceive that the costs exceed the benefits of a wind energy project, then they can raise objections or go to court. However, if the local City Council perceives that (a part of) their constituency is against the project, then the necessary permits may not be issued at all (*ibid*). In this case, citizens cannot give expression to their opinions in the decision process.

The social advantages mentioned in the previous subsection are geographically dispersed; that is, advantages like cleaner air are for the benefit of the whole society. On the contrary, most costs[15] are borne by local communities in the vicinity of wind turbine farms. Disadvantages like the visibility and noise of operating wind turbines and irritating shadows of rotating blades are often mentioned as reasons for local opposition against the siting of onshore wind turbines. However, other disadvantages (see Wolsink, 1990) could be as important as the three already mentioned for local stakeholders to object to nearby wind turbine siting. Stakeholders weigh the perceived local advantages against the perceived local disadvantages. Since most disadvantages are concentrated at the local community,

[14] Eventually, a third kind of organisation can be identified: market actors. This channel, however, is opaque for citizens in this case. Economic sanctions, like purchasing electricity from a supplier that is not involved in a particular wind energy project, are not likely to affect market actors' performance in networks for at least three reasons. First, a relatively small number of citizen will be up-set enough to consider a transfer of energy supply. Second, administrative burdens form a threshold for such a transfer. Third, owners of wind turbines and energy suppliers are not necessarily the same companies.

[15] The existence value (see Callan and Thomas, 1996: 228) of lost nature, subsidies and duty-free policies result in costs for the whole society. However, these costs are considered as having low per-capita value.

while the advantages are geographically dispersed, a special kind of social dilemma comes to the fore: Not In My BackYard (NIMBY) (*ibid*).

NIMBY is based upon the perception of someone's backyard and proves to be a first, strong motive for citizens to organise themselves. Underlying the NIMBY-dilemma however, is the assumption that individuals act rationally. Rational individuals choose the alternatives that maximize their utility and act accordingly. Wolsink's research proves that the number of people that act according to this rational model is very small in relation to (onshore) wind energy. Therefore, he proposes a reconsideration of the NIMBY-concept into four sub elements:

> A: a positive attitude towards general application, but still resistance to application in the own living environs (the cynical social dilemma version);
> B: resistance caused by a negative attitude toward application in general (the Not In Any BackYard version);
> C: an initially positive attitude towards application, followed by a shift in the negative direction caused by the announcement of a project;
> D: resistance created by the fact that particular projects are considered faulty, without the rejection of the technology as a whole. People may expect inference or they consider the landscape on the chosen location too sensitive, especially when other available locations nearby are considered more suitable (Wolsink, 1990: 208; 2000: 57).

Wolsink argues that these attitudes may change during the decision-making process and are highly dependent on institutional arrangements within the policy domain. The way a plan for a wind turbine farm is introduced often provokes more opposition than necessary, because real opportunities for influencing projects are considered as lacking (Wolsink, 1996). He concludes by stating that institutional constraints are more important than public acceptance in accounting for problems around wind energy facility siting (Wolsink, 2000). This is a valid but partial explanation, since both institutional constraints and public acceptance are equally important. Local residents consist of not only people with varying attitudes, but also more constant, negative attitudes can be identified. For example, one person with a strong NIMBY B-attitude can delay or stop an entire project, even when it was introduced in a collaborative style. In conclusion, negative attitudes towards wind energy (NIMBY-variants) can be worsened by hostile attitudes toward the decision making process, the developers, or government actors (Krohn and Damborg, 1999).

In this regard, type NIMBY C is essential. It is found to be dominant in measured attitudes when wind turbine farms are projected (Wolsink, 1990). Concerning type C, announcing construction plans of *single turbines* dwindles individuals' initial positive attitude towards wind energy, while the same attitude boosts even over initial levels after construction. Likewise, a sharp drop in positive attitude can be observed when plans for constructing *wind turbine farms* are revealed. However in this case, the positive attitude is also built up again, but remains under the initial levels (*ibid*). In relation with the two case studies, for which interviews were conducted, it is crucial that two wind turbine farms in the planning phase are selected. This criterion allows for more genuine answers by the interviewed stakeholders, since they tend to adjust their attitude after construction. A second criterion that allows for a smooth comparison is the selection of farms in areas with a similar prior experience level with wind turbines. In a study conducted for the British Wind Energy Association, Anne Simon finds that respondents living near wind farms have more positive attitudes towards wind farms than respondents lacking such experiences (Simon, 1996). Her findings made Krohn and Damborg conclude that "the NIMBY syndrome seems to have the strongest effect in areas where there is no or little knowledge about wind power" (Krohn and Dambrog, 1999: 958).

Wolsink's public characterization of wind energy has another three implications for the two different wind energy networks. The first one is related to the levels, where actual decisions about the construction of wind farms are taken. In the case of the onshore farm, the decision is taken at the local municipality level. The locus of decision taking coincides with the geographic locus where most social costs are borne (Wolsink, 1996). In opposition, the compromise concerning the offshore farm is taken at the national level and this partly coincides with the locus of social advantages. Of course, arguments can be made that advantages accrue to the entire world population, but the point here is that relevant decision makers are perhaps more susceptible to arguments concerning the social advantages than do local decision makers. In addition to the higher level of decision-making, another difference between the offshore and onshore cases can be identified. The distance from offshore wind turbines to houses is obviously larger than in the onshore case. Therefore, citizens might feel less involved with offshore wind energy. On the other hand, the aversion of people enjoying the 'unspoiled' scenery along the beach might prove to be even stronger motivated. Finally, NIMBY-attitudes are a delicate matter for large, environmental NGOs. Citizens raise concerns about the issue at hand -wind turbines near perceived backyards-, but the same citizens also happen to be the supporters of NGOs. If these NGOs take a firm stance on wind projects, they might lose public support. In which policy network –offshore or onshore- they are present, they might perceive NIMBY-attitudes as irrelevant. These differences between the offshore and onshore cases suggest that differences exist in structures and processes of these various networks surrounding wind energy decisions.

2.4 Arrangement of wind-networks

Policy processes initiating the construction of wind turbine farms do not often pass without dispute. Building wind turbines generates public debates and prompts public meetings, petitions, and letters to the press. Many (conflicting) visions and interests arise in such processes. Onshore, impacts on the landscape are the main concern of citizens and pressure groups (Wolsink, 1990), and the same presumably goes for offshore wind turbines. Moreover, wind energy has to compete with other spatial uses like submarine cables. More powerful groups of actors with other interests than citizens are encountered in networks surrounding wind energy projects. The arrangement of interests around wind energy projects is thus essential. Suppose now that Dutch government levels are in favour of wind energy. This statement is not unlikely since the Dutch national government has set ambitious wind energy targets for 2020. In an oversimplified scheme, government levels can then occupy four different political environments (Wilson, 1989). The exact arrangement of interests depends on the division of perceived costs and benefits among interests (see table 3).

Table 3. Four idealised types of political environments (source: Wilson, 1989)

		COSTS	
		dispersed	Concentrated
BENEFITS	dispersed	majoritarian politics	entrepreneurial politics
	concentrated	client politics	interest-group politics

When the benefits are highly concentrated with one interest, and the costs are borne by a large number of people, Wilson calls the environment *client politics*. Due to these benefits with high per-capita value, the recipients have a strong incentive to organise themselves. Contrary to the benefits, the costs have a low per-capita value, and people bearing such costs are not very likely to organise themselves. In the opposite side of the table is *entrepreneurial politics*, where the benefits are dispersed but the costs have heavily concentrated on one particular interest. As a result, the government policy will face heavy resistance from this group. The third environment can be

characterised as *interest-group politics*. This category entails both concentrated costs and benefits, which inclines both beneficiaries and payers to organise themselves. Kjær (2004:48) argues that in this configuration of opposing interests tightly knit networks are likely to be formed. In other environments, the interests are too highly skewed against or in favour of policies that besides networks other forms of social organisation are needed[16]. Finally, in an environment with both dispersed benefits and costs, neither one will organise to seek such benefits, nor one will organise to avoid such costs. Wilson labels this environment as *majoritarian politics*. Hitherto, I used the term *perceived* costs and benefits, whereas Wilson sticks to costs and benefits. The reasons for adding this extra term is twofold. First, it matters how stakeholders perceive the actual costs and benefits, whether stakeholders will organise themselves. For instance, if citizens feel that the landscape is only slightly influenced by wind turbines, no protest will follow. Second, the term perceived indicates that perception can be influenced by political actors (Stone, 2002). "Issues are portrayed in terms of who and how many people benefit precisely in order to mobilise support for and against proposals" (*ibid*: 226). Costs and benefits of policy proposals are not only directly perceived by stakeholders, but also shaped by political actors.

Wilson's typology adheres to the reasoning of Mancur Olsen in his famous book *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965). Both assume that individuals solely act out of self-interest. Olson even states that small interest groups are more effective to organise, since they have higher per-capita benefits than large interest groups. The general rule appears to be: incentives for group action decrease as group size increases, although two mechanisms exist to organise large groups effectively. The first mechanism is the "selective incentive" that selectively operates upon members of the group. So, only members who act in the interest of the group are rewarded for their contribution. Second, voluntary coercion is used by group members. If they realize that collective action cannot be accomplished without everybody's contribution, group members can decide that the goal of collective action can be reached by voluntary coercion. The often financial contribution to collective action then becomes mandatory (Olson, 1965).

Hazeu (1987) criticises Olson for two reasons. First, not all collective actions are based upon economical-rational considerations. Especially, collective actions based on non-economical or ideological incentives appear to be realised without voluntary coercion or selective incentives. Hazeu mentions environmentalist groups as an example, where group members bear individual costs without receiving many individual benefits (Hazeu, 1987). Second, entrepreneurs exist who take the lead in collective actions. Entrepreneurs perceive their efforts as an investment that will later bring them immaterial profits, especially in political parties. He concludes that Olson's theory is suited best, when economical interests are at stake (*ibid*). These criticisms also apply to Wilson's typology and are taken into account when the social costs are dealt with. In the next subsection, Wilson's theory is applied to direct-economic and social cost-benefit divisions separately for a clear overview. Advantages and disadvantages are namely framed in other dimensions by stakeholders in the two divisions. The vantage point here is the status quo: no wind turbines[17].

The direct-economic approach assumes that people initiating wind energy projects are driven by long-term financial profits. These benefits solely accrue to wind-entrepreneurs and are thus concentrated with a relatively small group. Dutch wind turbine farms have been subsidised and aided with duty-free arrangements by the Dutch national government. These costs are borne by al Dutch

[16] In this respect, hierarchical or market mechanisms can be considered.
[17] Wilson's labels change depending on whether one looks at the issue at hand from the status quo or the proposed change (Stone, 2002:224).

citizens and can be characterised as dispersed[18]. In addition, neighbouring citizens might fear that their property values will drop due to wind turbines nearby. These costs are concentrated with a relatively small group. If social costs and benefits are not taken into account, the political environment with two opposing interest groups is the product of *interest-group politics*.

The social-environmental approach encompasses local, directly affected citizens, other stakeholders with an interest in the spatial areas reserved for wind turbines, consumers of 'green' electricity, and environmental organisations. Local citizens who feel the costs are concentrated at their expense can be categorised as NIMBY A, B, C or D (see 2.3). Category NIMBY B is an odd one in Wilson's diagram, since people with this attitude are against wind energy in general. In their case, it is difficult to speak of a concentration or dispersion of costs. The costs are always perceived as exceeding benefits. However, even people with NIMBY B-attitudes are more likely to object to wind turbines in the vicinity of their surroundings. The second group within this approach, other stakeholders with an interest in the spatial areas reserved for wind turbines, is put here, because their indirect costs are not always easy to quantify. For example, fishermen oppose offshore wind energy, because it may increase the risk of a collision and it may reduce their fisheries. Such costs are difficult to quantify in economic terms but are perceived as concentrated. These two groups – local citizens and other stakeholders with an interest in the spatial areas reserved for wind turbines- share an important advantage over other groups of stakeholders. They are striving for a bad to be avoided. Indeed, every policy programme can be portrayed as a bad thing or a good thing (Stone, 2002:220). People tend to organise themselves more easily around a threatened loss than around a potential gain, because taking something away from them causes "strong emotions" such as anger (*ibid*). Hope like feelings that erecting wind turbines leads to an improved state of the environment are "weak emotions". Such a potential gain proves to be a less strong motivation to organise around. Still, the next two groups are potentially organised around so called weak emotions.

Thirdly, environment-minded consumers are potential gainers, who have a stake at electricity produced by clean technologies including wind power. Consumers' per-capita benefits accruing from one particular wind farm are rather small, however. Wind energy has divided the final group, environmental organisations, into environmentalists and green groups. Although windmill farms are seen as one of the solutions to combat climate change, their construction and operation are not necessarily free from environmental impacts. At dispute is the balance between destruction of the (local) landscape, which leads to concentrated costs at the expense of nature, and mitigation of climate change, which induces concentrated benefits to the environment[19]. A nice example of this arduous balance-finding is given by the leaflet *Frisse Zeewind 2*, in which ten nature and environmentalist organisations state a joint vision on offshore wind energy. According to this leaflet, important nature spots should be safeguarded from wind turbines (Stichting de Noordzee, 2005). In conclusion, these social cost and benefit-divisions result in the political environment *interest-group politics*. When the social-environmental and direct-economic approaches are integrated, the same political environment as previously mentioned remains, although now benefits are concentrated with two groups: environmental organisations and wind-entrepreneurs. So far, no conceptional differences in actor arrangements have been discovered between offshore and onshore wind energy networks.

[18] The future tax payments by the developer will be received by the national government. These payments could be considered as benefits due to the increased government spending. However, since it is not known to whom these benefits will accrue to, no other stakeholders than already described will come to the fore.

[19] The previous statement assumes that costs inflicted at the expense of nature must be regarded as costs concentrated with green groups, and a similar reasoning applies to environmental benefits and environmental groups.

2.5 Organisation of stakeholders

"Opposition can be defined in terms of negative attitudes, or alternatively described as behaviour: acts of resistance against new development" (Wolsink, 1996:1086). More broadly the question becomes: *although stakeholders do have reasons to organise themselves – either concentrated costs or benefits-, will they establish an organisation in any form in reality?* The answer for two groups of stakeholders is an easy one. Citizens living outside affected areas and consumers of 'green' energy do not organise themselves, because the respectively low per-capita costs and low per-capita benefits do not provide an incentive for this end. Other mechanisms for organising these two groups like Hazeu's entrepreneurs are disputable. Suppose people would take the lead in setting up an organisation representing one of these two interests, why should indirectly affected citizens or consumers become a member of it? Their interests are still too dispersed.

As regards other stakeholder groups and in this context especially directly affected citizens, five barriers to participation were identified. First, stakeholders must be aware that the issue is at stake, preferably in an early stage of the policy process. When stakeholders simply do not know that a project is initiated that might benefit or harm them, they will not set up an organisation. Putting together an organisation may take some time; therefore, knowledge that the issue is at hand should be present at an early stage. Otherwise, the decision about a wind project might already have been taken. A second barrier is either knowledge of policy processes, or the perceived ability to acquire this knowledge. For example, citizens might grasp a policy process as opaque and incomprehensible, and this opinion prevents them from participating. Third, two sets of costs arise in joining a decision-making process: decision-making costs and political-external costs (Toonen, 1979:283). *Decision-making costs* are the alternative returns from time, money and energy that are invested in negotiation processes between group members themselves and between groups of stakeholders. *Political-external costs* result from the differences between the individual's opinion and the group's standpoint on the one hand, and the final network's decision on the other side. The individual stakeholder will seek to minimise both decision making and political-external costs (*ibid*), but these costs may also prevent an individual from joining a decision-making process in the first place.

Critical to any cost-benefit analysis is to reconcile the timing of costs and benefits. In this case, the two kinds of costs previously mentioned accrue immediately to stakeholders, while the benefits of affecting policy accrue later. Moreover, such benefits are highly uncertain. Economists have solved this issue in cost-benefit analysis by introducing two types of time-oriented modifications: present value determination and inflation correction (Callan and Thomas, 1996). These tools might work for large companies, but methods like these certainly are not used by other stakeholders like citizen groups. Instead, *perception* of the time lag between costs and benefits and the uncertain nature of benefits is the key assessment method. This perception may be negative and forms then a fourth barrier to participating. The final restraint is the presence of other stakeholders in the decision network. Their presence or absence is a discouragement for joining the network, because they are considered either as too powerful, or essential in achieving certain goals (De Bruijn *et al*, 1993). For example, if a major pro-wind energy group is involved in a decision network, their presence might scare off citizen groups who are against the project. Involved stakeholders might also prevent other stakeholders from actual co-decision making. The existing network may be adored by the present actors, who wish to maintain the status quo. They will do anything within their powers to close the network for new entrants. To conclude, these five barriers are to overcome, if actors want to organise themselves. However, new organisations are also dependent on the characteristics of the existing network to become really effective.

2.6 Hypotheses

All these meso-characteristics have their impact on the three input-legitimacies of the democratic anchorage model. The second input legitimacy *representation via the membership basis of the participating groups and organisations* links the 'demos of directly affected people' with the governance network. This form of input legitimacy requires stakeholders to get mobilised. Two groups of stakeholders experience difficulties with their mobilisation: directly affected people and environmental organisations. Directly affected people are here defined as both citizens who live or frequently enjoy the scenery in the close vicinity of the planned wind turbines, and other stakeholders with an interest in the spatial areas reserved for the turbines. Although an organisation of directly affected people has to overcome the five barriers just mentioned, the costs at their expense are probably concentrated enough to do so for the onshore case. Moreover, they are organised around a strong emotion: the threat of wind turbines. Yet, only local citizens with a negative stance towards planned wind projects are thus probably represented in the governance network. Citizens who perceive the benefits as exceeding the costs are not likely to organise themselves due to low per-capita benefits and the five barriers. Another route for citizens with more positive stances towards wind projects is representation via environmental organisations. The question however is, whether these organisations will be present. As mentioned in chapter one, wind projects are a delicate matter for them. NGOs fear losing public support in the case of advocating wind energy in the vicinity of local residents, because the very same citizens who object against wind turbines might support their organisations.

By comparison, the mobilisation of directly affected people is even more ambitious in the offshore case due to two distances, one real and one virtual. The actual distance from the offshore turbines to the living areas on the mainland is larger, resulting in costs being less concentrated at the expense of local citizens and other stakeholders. In addition to the real distance, the virtual distance between directly affected people and the decision makers is also larger. The decision concerning the offshore wind farm is taken at the national level, while the objections are raised at the local level. Taken together, the two distances negatively affect the mobilisation of local citizens. These two distances do not count for other stakeholders with an interest in the offshore spatial area reserved for turbines. Not only is the actual distance between offshore turbines and 'interests' close to zero (e.g. fishermen, owners of submarine cables), also their interests are often well represented at the national levels of government. The same reasoning applies to owners of wind turbines and nature organisations. Their respectively benefits and costs in both cases are concentrated enough for mobilisation. All in all, not all directly affected citizens are represented via these various organisations in both governance networks.

A final, significant group are indirectly affected citizens, like tax payers, consumers of green energy and other citizens in the local territory. For these three groups, the offshore and onshore case do not differ. They will not mobilise[20]. The failure of both directly and indirectly affected citizens to mobilise leaves *control by democratically elected politicians* and *anchorage in a territorially defined citizenry*, the other two input-legitimacies, even more important. Via these routes -formal democracy and public contestation with actors in governance networks-, citizens are able to influence outputs of governance networks. However, initiating these routes is the privilege of politicians and existing network members. It is their function to ensure that governance networks surrounding wind energy

[20] If political actors portray costs or benefits as highly concentrated for groups of stakeholders, the latter might mobilise (Stone, 2002). I however argue that political manipulation of costs and benefits might work for opaque policy proposals, not for concrete proposals like building wind turbines. Stakeholders do not have to read the plans to know whether and how intensely the goods and bads are distributed.

projects are democratically anchored for “weak, legitimate interests” (Stone, 2002:227): those of immobilised citizens.

3. OFFSHORE CASE STUDY: POLICY PROCESS AND STAKEHOLDERS

Offshore Wind Farm Egmond aan Zee (OWEZ) is the first offshore wind farm to be constructed in the Dutch part of the North Sea. OWEZ will be built in a spatial area ranging 10-18 kilometres off the Dutch coast and will be located in territorial waters (up to 12 sea miles or 22 kilometres off a nation's coast) near the municipality Egmond aan Zee (see figure 1). In international law, the latter part of the sea is considered to be part of the territory of a state. Therefore, a state enjoys direct jurisdiction to exploit natural resources, including wind for generating electricity.



Figure 1. The location of the OWEZ is depicted by the blue spot within the territorial waters. The second blue spot, in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), represents a second offshore wind farm called Q7WP (source: SenterNovem, 2006).

OWEZ is the very first Dutch offshore wind farm, and for that reason, is designed as a pilot project. Two turbines will be prepared with diagnostic equipment to measure pressures exerted on the wind turbines, and a meteorological mast has already been erected (De Wit, 2005). In addition to a research into the effects of nature on used materials, an extensive monitoring and evaluation programme, which evaluates the environmental consequences, must be carried out. In total, OWEZ will consist of 36 turbines, each with a capacity of 3 Megawatts and a maximal height of 115 meters above mean sea level. Three cables, buried under the seabed, will connect the wind farm to an onshore substation in Velsen, which will transform the voltage from 34 kiloVolt (kV) to 150 kV. From the

substation, the power will be transmitted to the grid. The wind farm should be operational by the end of 2006 and is commissioned to be dismantled after 20 years. Initial preparation started as far back as in 1996, when within the scope of the TWIN-2 programme[21] a feasibility study was announced. Due to its long history of ten years, the policy process is divided in two parts: one focussing on the feasibility study and Key Planning Decision and a second one detailing the consents and the monitoring and evaluation programme. The reason for doing so appears rather obvious. The main driver behind the first two phases was the Dutch government[22], while in the later phases the initiative was handed over to the consortium NoordzeeWind. In other words, the meta-governor of the network may have very well changed.

3.1 Feasibility study and Key Planning Decision (1997-2003)

When the project started some ten years ago, it was labelled differently than the current name: Offshore Wind Farm Egmond aan Zee (OWEZ). The feasibility study into its predecessor Near Shore Windpark (NSW) was the first phase of the promise that a plan of action for offshore wind energy was to be presented. Aim of the feasibility study, ordered by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, was to explore the options for a 100 MW offshore wind farm near the Dutch coast. Several factors were taken into consideration like ecological and legal aspects, but also the support of the local citizens and authorities was measured. More interestingly was the extensive stakeholder participation that took place. A sounding board was installed to advise the project team. Members were representatives from ministries, market actors and the NGO *Natuur en Milieu*[23]. The latter was also asked to formulate environmental stipulations under which the NSW can be built. Ten key conditions were noted down in the 'Standpuntnotitie', which was signed by twelve nature and environmental organisations. Three stipulations are listed here:

- suitable onshore locations for wind energy must be fully explored;
- the NSW must be located at least four to five kilometres off the coast;
- the NSW must be the sole wind farm within territorial waters.

In exchange for compliance with the conditions, nature and environmental organisations committed themselves to the project.

After a quick scan into morphological aspects, shipping routes and the ten demands of environmental NGOs, three locations remained: IJmuiden-I, IJmuiden-II and Westerscheldemond. A fourth location was added by the sounding board to be investigated on ecological and spatial planning aspects, but was eventually dropped due to a combination of a good visibility from the coast and many recreating people in the vicinity. Support of authorities and local citizens was also gauged. Forty interviews were conducted with representatives of national authorities, municipalities, and other stakeholder groups. One of their demands was that the NSW must be located at least eight kilometres off the coast. In addition, attitudes of 1200 citizens living nearby the two intended locations were

[21] The Toepassing Windenergie In Nederland-2 (TWIN-2) was a policy plan of the Dutch ministry of Economic Affairs to promote wind energy production.
[22] The Dutch government has repeatedly urged the need for wind power. In the *Derde Energie Nota* (1996), the goal was 2750 MW. It later became a 1500 MW-objective for onshore wind power and a 6000 MW-objective for offshore wind power. More recently, a report of the Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis has tempered expectations that the offshore goal will be reached quickly. The findings suggest that the balance between social costs and benefits can become positive if investment costs will drop.
[23] Society for Nature and the Environment.

measured. Residents near the southern location (Westerscheldemond) were more supportive of the new project than their northern counterparts near IJmuiden. Along with these results came recommendations from the project team about the procedure that was to be followed. Economical calculations proved that a subsidy from the government was needed to realise the NSW. The project team recommended that a link between the subsidy and a research programme should be established. The subsidy was to be considered as a strategic fund to let offshore wind energy gather momentum. Though, this momentum was to be gained conscientiously. A Key Planning Decision (KPD) combined with an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was strongly suggested for ensuring maximal support from nature and environmental organisations. The EIA should actually consist of two separate EIAs: one into the location of the wind farm and one into the precise configuration of the wind farm. In this case, the Ministry of Economic Affairs (as competent authority) and the future commercial developer had to draw up a joint notification of intent. The project team anticipated that the earliest date that the wind turbines could be operational would be in 2001 (Novem, 1997). As it turned out, this estimate was rather optimistic.

Spatial planning on the mainland is dealt with under the current National Spatial Strategy[24] and the Spatial Planning Act, but these juridical instruments did not apply to the intended, offshore wind farm. Therefore, the location of the NSW had to be arranged under another spatial planning frame. This led to a partial modification of the Structure Scheme Electricity Supply II (SEV-II), in which locations for large-scale electricity production are taken down. The policy plan SEV-II was to be changed via a Key Planning Decision (KPD). However, Dutch law prescribes that if a location of an activity that requires an EIA, is determined by means of a KPD, the KPD shall have to be combined with an EIA-procedure. According to the EIA Decree[25], erecting wind turbines is an activity that is subject to an EIA. The final location of the wind farm in the KPD would be based on the most suitable location provided by the EIA, after which both documents would be submitted to a public participation procedure.

In June 1998, the predetermined procedure of the EIA , which had to lay down the precise location of the NSW, started with the publication of the notification of intent by the competent authorities[26]. In this document, the intended wind farm and its environmental consequences, which were to be investigated, were described. Three informative meetings were held in Haarlem, The Hague, and Middelburg[27]. Considerations about the notification could be raised by stakeholders through a formal participation procedure, where after the notification of intent and the written objections were sent to the Commission for the EIA. The Commission is funded by the government and has an important role in the EIA-procedure in the Netherlands. Experts from the Commission defined the scoping guidelines. However, these guidelines are merely an advice to the competent authorities, which lay down the final guidelines. It could not be traced back whether the competent authorities deviated from the advice, when they set the final guidelines on 25 March 1999.

[24] In Dutch: Nota Ruimte
[25] In Dutch: Besluit Milieueffectrapportage
[26] Competent authorities were four ministries: Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment. The two latter ministries were the initiators of the project.
[27] These cities are respectively the capitals of the Province of North-Holland, the Province of South-Holland and the Province of Zeeland. Since the NSW was to be located in the territorial waters of the North Sea, all three adjacent provinces were selected for accommodating a meeting.

Consequently, the EIA, counting 305 pages, was conducted. Six locations remained after assessing territorial waters on the following criteria (see figure 2):

- an average water depth of 15 meters;
- estimated investment costs;
- estimated maintenance costs;
- estimated energy production;
- conflicting interests (shipping routes, submarine cables, et cetera).



Figure 2. The six locations that were investigated in the location-EIA

Three locations fell off due to their high average water depths, resulting in high costs. From the remaining locations, 'Egmond' was the most environmental friendly alternative (Ministerie van Economische Zaken *et al*, 1999). On 11 February 2000, the EIA was approved by the cabinet and was made public along with the draft KPD ten days later[28].

Like mentioned before, the KPD-procedure is prescribed by the Spatial Planning Act. The procedure requires intergovernmental consultation and a participation procedure of at least one

[28] The draft KPD also included one to two test wind turbines each with a capacity of 3-5 MW. An separate tender was organised for this additional capacity, but no party was interested (Van den Heuvel, 2006).

month[29]. Both documents were released for public comment. In addition, an information evening and a public hearing, presided by an independent chairperson, were organised in Egmond aan Zee. Intergovernmental consultation took shape by consulting the board of major and aldermen of the municipality of Egmond[30] and aldermen and civil servants of the region IJmond[31]. Meanwhile, the process did not run without a hitch. First of all, when reviewing the EIA, the Commission for the EIA considered a serious omission in the report. The commission experts advised that the flaw was to be remedied by preparing a supplementary report to the EIA. Their advise was taken and the report was sent to those who had sent in comments before. Participants could respond, but their comments were not sent to the Commission. The Commission for the EIA carried out its advisory review within one and a half months, but the initial process was already significantly delayed. Second, a second initiative gave raise for concerns about the maximal water depth, in which turbines could be erected. The developer E-Connection applied for consents (under the Public Works Act) for seven wind farms in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 23 kilometres off the coast . Only one got fully licensed (see figure 1). Not only was the application under the Public Works Act a new, more efficient process, what raised questions about the 'pilot project' NSW (Zeelenburg, 2005a: 38), but the intended wind farm of E-Connection was to be located in waters with an average depth ranging from 20 to 25 metres. The minister of Economic Affairs ordered the Commission Review Near Shore Windpark, chaired by Verbruggen, to investigate whether the criterion of an maximal average water depth of 20 metres in which the NSW could be built was valid. In November 2000, the Commission 'Verbruggen' concluded, that a maximal average depth of 20 metres is reasonable, based on economical considerations and that the location of the NSW should be upheld (Commissie Review Near Shore Windpark, 2000:18).

After the two hitches, received comments and meetings described above were summarised in part two of the KPD. Part three of the KPD consisted of the final decision of the cabinet and the answers on the received comments. From the latter document, it appeared that several parties had been consulted about the onshore cable route, including municipalities, *stichting Duinbehoud*[32], and Corus[33]. Both documents were sent to the Dutch Parliament[34]. On 13 September 2001, part three was discussed in the standing committee of Economic Affairs. Although questions about Q7WP, the initiative of E-Connection (see previous section), were raised, all political parties approved the policy document about the Near Shore Windpark (NSW). The plenary session of the Lower House agreed on the proposal of the cabinet without further discussion four weeks later. The Spatial Planning Act requires the Senate dealing with the policy bill within four weeks. This did not happen, thereby automatically approving the bill. Then, the procedure entered the final phase with the publication of part four of the KPD in the *Staatscourant*[35]. Within six weeks, parties could challenge the decision before the Council of State, which is the highest administrative court of the Netherlands.

[29] This one lasted three months.
[30] Back then, the municipality of Egmond consisted of four places, including Egmond aan zee. In 2001, Egmond merged with Bergen and Schoorl to the new municipality of Bergen.
[31] Back then, it consisted of the municipalities of Velsen, Castricum, Beverwijk and Uitgeest. These are located to the south of Egmond.
[32] Society for Dune Conservation
[33] Corus is a steel-making plant. On the territory of the plant, a transformer substation was to be built. In here, the electricity would be converted to 150 kiloVolt.
[34] Dutch Parliament consists of the Senate, whose 75 members are elected by the twelve Provincial Councils, and the Lower House of Representatives, whose 150 members are directly elected by Dutch citizens.
[35] The official gazette of the Dutch government

In fact, two appeals were lodged against the KPD. *Stichting Duinbehoud* and two inhabitants of Egmond objected that the competent authorities had not done anything substantial to put the policy decisions in line with the comments expressed by stakeholders. Moreover, the decisions taken would not match with other spatial policy plans and would harm birds, benthic organisms, and landscape. Representatives of the government pleaded in defence that all considerations had been taken into account and that decisions had been in line with other policy plans. However, they admitted that the project could spoil natural values of the North Sea, but this was justified by the social advantages (less carbon dioxide emissions) of the project. Most surprisingly, *NoordzeeWind*, the developer that won the tender (see next section), declared that *Stichting Duinbehoud* was no stakeholder and that their claim was to be dismissed. Except for the latter claim, the defendants won the case outright and the KPD became definitive after the verdict on 9 April 2003 (Raad van State, 2003).

3.2 Consents and Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (2001-2012)

Although the lawsuit caused delays, the process did not stop completely. Already after the approval of the Key Planning Decision (KPD) in the Dutch Parliament, administrative policy rules were published in October 2001. These policy rules described the tender-procedure. On the basis of pre-determined criteria, parties would be selected to build and exploit the Near Shore Windpark (NSW). Four consortia handed in a proposal[36], that was to be evaluated by the Advisory Committee Near Shore Wind Farm on five criteria:

- the quality of the intended developer;
- the quality of the proposal;
- a financial assessment of the proposal;
- the innovativeness of the plan;
- the amount of subsidy that would be applied for[37].

NoordzeeWind, a joint venture between Shell (an oil company) and Nuon (an utility company), proposed to install 36 wind turbines, each with a capacity of 2.75 MW. They applied for the maximum subsidy amount, but in exchange they scored very well on the fourth criterion according to the Committee. Its members judged that:

> "the design by NoordzeeWind and the realisation of the farm are very innovative and the consortium is paying a lot of attention to research into the effects of the farm, for instance on birds and sub-aquatic life. The fact is also appreciated that NoordzeeWind is planning to develop a visitor centre in Egmond aan Zee and intends to examine the possibility to visit the farm by boat from IJmuiden (Projectbureau CO2-reductieplan, 2002)."

The advice was adopted by the minister of Economic Affairs, after which an official agreement was signed between the two parties on 5 July 2002. In the agreement, the minister and NoordzeeWind confirmed arrangements about the Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (MEP) and about the various phases of the process. For instance, NoordzeeWind had to make the final investment decision ten months after the development phase. In addition, it was

[36] One consortium was dropped, because they did not sent in all the required data in time (Projectbureau CO2-reductieplan, 2006).
[37] A maximum of 27.2 million euro was available (Projectbureau CO2-reductieplan, 2006).

agreed upon that the minister would be informed about the project's progress at least every six months.

One month later than the agreement was signed, the notification of intent (for the lay-out EIA) was published. In order to obtain an environmental consent, a second Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was to be performed, in which the spatial configuration of the wind farm was to be determined. A procedure, similar to the first one, was to be followed, including an informative meeting in Egmond aan Zee. This time however, the competent authority was the Ministry of Public Works and Water Management[38]. Civil servants of this ministry along with representatives of NoordzeeWind answered questions from the audience. Written objections and the notification of intent were sent to the Commission for the EIA. The commission advised the competent authority on the scoping guidelines for the layout-EIA. The definitive scoping guidelines were disclosed in December 2002.

The layout-EIA, the environmental consent[39], and the public works consent[40] were open for public inspection from 18 September to 16 October 2003. To inform the public and stakeholders, an informative meeting and a hearing were organised in Egmond aan Zee. Meanwhile, the judgment of the Dutch Commission for the EIA formed once again a hitch in the process. In the EIA-report, five different configurations of the wind farm were investigated. It remarkably concluded that two configurations were suited as the most environmental friendly alternative. The standard configuration is considered the best alternative, when positive environmental effects (renewable energy production) come first. Based on this configuration, a meteorological mast was erected in 2003[41].The *bolstapeling 7,5 D/geul*-alternative, however, outranks the standard alternative, when it comes to less (negative) environmental impacts (landscape, birds, etc.). The Dutch Commission for the EIA disagreed with the report on several points. Their main critique was that there was only one most environmental friendly alternative: the *bolstapeling 7,5 D/geul*-alternative. The experts from the commission advised that a supplementary report was not needed, because the information was present in the report. Still, two supplementary reports to the EIA were written. The first one was written, because the competent authorities gave comments on the initial study. Due to a research into the composition of the seabed, a large mud hole was discovered, thereby causing a small change in the configuration alternatives. This provided enough reason to write a second supplement.

NoordzeeWind applied for the two permits, based on the standard configuration. The competent authorities asked to supplement information why the joint venture chose the standard configuration instead of the *bolstapeling*-alternative, which was preferred by the Commission for the EIA. The answer of NoordzeeWind focused on technical and economical motives. Fist of all, the energy production of the standard configuration was projected 1.6 per cent higher than the other formation of wind turbines, yielding another 4.5 million euro. The other arguments went into already invested amounts: repositioning the meteorological mast (a few millions and one-year delay), reinvestigating the composition of the seabed (1.5 million), and re-examining radar interference (45,000 euro). The meteorological mast requires further explanation. One of its aims is to measure wind speed profiles at different heights. As part of

[38] In cooperation with The Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment
[39] In Dutch: vergunning op basis Wet milieubeheer
[40] In Dutch: vergunning op basis Wet beheer Rijkswaterstaatwerken
[41] A separate Public Works permit was issued for this offshore construction

the Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (MEP), so-called single and plural wake effects[42] have to be determined. The position of that time would not allow measurements done at single wake effects and therefore, the mast should be relocated. In addition, the MEP required that one year of wind profile measurements would have to be done prior to the construction of the wind farm. This demand caused NoordzeeWind to conclude that a relocation of the meteorological mast would delay the entire project one year, while the investments into the mast and into the two investigations had been made to accelerate the NSW (Olthoff, 2003).

The answer of NoordzeeWind appeared sufficient. In January 2004, the environmental consent and the public works consent were open for public inspection. Needless to say, another hearing was organised. Only one representative showed up at the hearing. It was a chairperson of *Vogelwacht Egmond*[43], who together with *Stichting Duinbehoud* would later challenge these consents before the Council of State. After the final participation procedure, opponents could only appeal against these decisions, before they became definitive. Two organisations lodged appeals. *Vogelwacht Egmond* argued that the methods that would be used to estimate deaths amongst birds were inadequate and that part of the money allocated for compensation should be given to their society. *Stichting Duinbehoud* contended that the wind turbines should be located more denser and that a clear compensation plan was lacking (SenterNovem, 2006). In exchange for a good bargaining position, the latter organisation dropped charges in December 2004 (see section 4.1). One month later, the Council of State rejected the appeal and the consent became definitive. However, several more consents had to be obtained (see appendix A), but only one is described here.

Initially, the three electricity cables were to reach the shore at the site of Corus. However, Corus feared that the cables and the transformer station would increase the risk of a power failure and disavowed these plans. An alternative site was a former broadcasting station in the dunes. The zoning scheme of the municipality of Velsen had to be adopted for this purpose, but its board of mayor and alderman was willing to cooperate. However, *Stichting Duinbehoud* objected to the adoption. NoordzeeWind feared that a possible lawsuit would impede progress and dropped its request for adopting the zoning scheme. As a consequence of *Stichting Duinbehoud*'s efforts, Corus was put under much pressure by Shell (one of the partners in the joint venture), the ministry of Economic Affairs and a member of the Provincial Executive of North Holland to capitulate (Dekkers, 2006). In the end, Corus did give in and the transformer station was located on their factory site.

This change and other advances required that the environmental consent and the public works consent were to be updated. First, the cable route was slightly changed. The new spot where the cables reached the shore was located 200 meters more to the south. Second, bricks were to be dumped around the foundations. Third, due to a merger between NEG Micon and Vestas the intended NM92-turbine was no longer available. The alternative type was the V90-turbine with a capacity of 3 MW, bringing the total capacity of the wind farm to 108 MW. However, a control system would prevent that the electricity supplied to the grid would exceed 100 MW[44]. According to the ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, the changes did not lead to other or higher environmental impacts, and the consents did not have to be reapplied for (Kersten, 2005a, 2005b). However, NoordzeeWind

[42] Wake effects is the disturbance of the wind flow by a single turbine rotor (single wake effects) and by several turbine rotors (plural wake effects).
[43] Birds Society Egmond
[44] This total capacity was laid down in the Key Planning Decision.

acquired a taste for updating consents. On 21 April 2005, they asked whether they could deliver 108 MW to the grid, and once again, this was allowed by the competent authorities (Versteeg, 2005).

The voice of nature and environmental organisations was also heard in preparation of another document, but this time the initiative for contact came from NoordzeeWind. In the Key Planning Decision as well as in the layout-Environmental Impact Assessment, it is underlined that a compensation plan must be submitted for approval to the competent authorities, before the construction will take place[45]. Four ministries[46], six NGOs, and one ornithologist were consulted[47]. The report by NoordzeeWind concludes that impacts on birds and on landscape have to be compensated. Six measures are announced (see table 4). These would be taken after the final investment decisions would have been made by the boards of directors of both Shell and Nuon.

Table 4. Compensation measures taken by NoordzeeWind (source: NoordzeeWind, 2004)

MEASURE	FOREMOST EFFECTS	PARTNER	COSTS (IN EURO)
Expansion of 'De Putten' bird reserve	Coastal and migratory birds	Vereniging Natuurmonumenten[48]	100,000
Fund for the benefit of (migratory) birds and marine organisms	Migratory birds	Vogelbescherming Nederland[49] and Stichting de Noordzee[50]	200,000
Fishing for litter	Coastal birds, landscape	KIMO[51]	50,000
Decontamination of a former transmitting station[52]	Landscape	PWN Waterleidingsbedrijf Noord-Holland[53]	100,000
Nature restoration of wet dune valley 'Diederik'	Migratory birds, landscape	PWN Waterleidingsbedrijf Noord-Holland	35,000
Documentary film on nature and marine reserves in the North Sea	Landscape	Stichting de Noordzee	50,000

[45] The environmental consent reads that a proposal must be submitted within 6 months after the consent becomes definitive.
[46] See footnote 26
[47] The environmental consent reads that consultation with (competent) authorities, expert and stakeholders is mandatory.
[48] Society for the preservation of nature in the Netherlands
[49] Dutch Society for the protection of birds
[50] North Sea Foundation
[51] Kommunenes Internasjonale Miljorganisasjon or Local Authorities International Environmental Organisation
[52] Due to the efforts of *Stichting Duinbehoud*, this intended location for the transformation station was decontaminated.
[53] Waterworks PWN North Holland

It was around that time that the name of the Near Shore Windpark was changed into Offshore Wind Farm Egmond aan Zee (OWEZ). Two reasons for this alteration have been mentioned. Only in the Netherlands, the distinction between near shore (within territorial waters) and offshore (beyond territorial waters) is made, while other countries only use the term offshore (Van den Heuvel, 2006). In order to gain international prestige and recognition to the 108 MW-wind farm, a change in the name was inevitable. A second reason that has been mentioned was to win the municipality of Bergen over[54]. Although perhaps true, many initiatives for new wind farms sharing this lack of creativity are called after the geographical coordinates in which the turbines are to be located or after the nearest municipalities. Exciting names are only found in a small sub set of the 65 initiatives, with names like Okeanos, Favorius and Thetys (Rijkswaterstaat, 2006).

What connects these new initiatives to their forerunner is the Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (MEP) of the OWEZ. Valuable lessons to improve future wind farms should be learnt from this programme. In the location-EIA, eleven learning objectives have been formulated, which are categorised around two themes: nine technical and economical objectives and two environmental objectives. An agency of the ministry of Economic Affairs, SenterNovem, elaborated the general objectives into more detailed sub goals and divided the responsibilities between the national government and the developer (Ministerie van Economische Zaken *et al*, 2001). On behalf of the ministry, SenterNovem takes care of the organisation of the project, because the government is compelled to reach the learning goals. Besides, the government is responsible for a part of the environmental goals (benchmark-studies), while NoordzeeWind's task is concentrated on measuring effects during and after construction[55]. In reality, SenterNovem and NoordzeeWind cooperate closely on the programme. Together they decided to establish a sounding board, in which the environmental part of the MEP was to be deliberated (Kouwenhoven, 2006). This board was chaired by an independent chairperson and was composed of representatives of the following organisations[56]:

- Greenpeace;
- *Stichting Natuur en Milieu*;
- *Vogelbescherming Nederland*;
- *Stichting de Noordzee*;
- *Productschap Vis*;
- municipality of Bergen;
- province of North Holland (*ibid*).

Currently, the wind farm is being built. Most measurements into the effects of the wind farm will be done in 2007 and 2008, but the programme will continue till 2012. The MEP could also have been named MP. The questions of how and when to evaluate still need to be answered.

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[54] The place Egmond aan Zee is located in the municipality of Bergen.

[55] NoordzeeWind estimated that the total MEP would cost them 6 million euro (NoordzeeWind, 2004). They were indirectly compensated by the subsidy of 27 million euro. Furthermore, the project has been supported by the government by the regular feed-in tariffs (*Milieukwaliteit Energieproductie*) and fiscal regulations (*Energie-investeringsaftrek*).

[56] NoordzeeWind and SenterNovem got the observer status (Kouwenhoven, 2006).

4. OFFSHORE CASE STUDY: ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE

In the previous chapter, the process starting from the initial plans to the actual building of the Offshore Wind Farm Egmond aan Zee (OWEZ) has been described. One province, several ministries, and a manifold of municipalities (see appendix A) were involved in the formalised structure of the Key Planning Decision (KPD) and the various consents. Through consultation rounds, formal participation procedures, and law suits, the voices of other actors than governmental ones were roped in. But to what extent? This and similar questions are answered in this chapter by using the democratic anchorage model, consisting of three input-legitimacies and two throughput-legitimacies.

4.1 Anchorage in democratically elected politicians

Control of the network by politicians would ensure that their decisions are in line with the opinion of the political majority of the elected assemblies (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005:202). When we try to determine who the relevant politicians are in this case study, the reality of Glasbergen's utopia of one coherent national government is encountered (1989:5). In total, five different ministries and thus five different interests have been involved, though consultation between four of them[57] took place at irregular intervals. One could argue that the ministry of Economic Affairs was the main driver due to their almost continuous involvement during the process (see previous chapter), but the ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, for instance, also played an important role by issuing the major consents. Therefore, the analysis of the first input legitimacy is more conveniently arranged, when a closer look is taken at the various stages instead of the overall process .

The amount and kind of interactions fluctuated during the different phases of the multi-year process. In the first phase, when the feasibility study was conducted, a sounding board compromising of representatives from ministries, market actors and the NGO *Natuur en Milieu*[58] was installed. On top of that, the initial point of departure was a joint vision of twelve environmental NGOs[59]. Their stipulations determined the offshore locations, which were investigated on suitability for building wind turbines. The joint vision was initiated by *Stichting Natuur en Milieu*, which was asked by an agency of the ministry of Economic Affairs to do so. The government installed a second sounding board for the location-EIA (Stichting de Noordzee, 2003), but it remains unclear who were exactly involved and which procedures were followed in this sounding board[60]. In this stage, the then municipality of Egmond were also informed about the project. The Ministry of Economic Affairs also wanted to know the opinion of the mayor and aldermen about the wind farm near their municipality. The succeeding KPD-procedure ushered in a more formalised participation procedure. Comments on both documents could be sent or spoken according to rules laid down by law.

The third phase, in which NoordzeeWind became the developer of the wind farm and applied for the two major consents, consisted of both consultation procedures specified by law and more informal meetings between different stakeholders. An example of the latter category are the meetings between the four consortia and *Stichting de Noordzee* during the tender procedure (*ibid*). In addition,

[57] Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment
[58] Society for Nature and the Environment
[59] This example was followed by other joint visions on wind energy (*Frisse Wind*, *Frisse Zeewind* and *Frisse Zeewind 2)*.
[60] The interviewed civil servant of the ministry of Economic Affairs could not remember such meetings.

also the Corus-incident (see previous chapter) brought about meetings between Corus, Shell, the province of North Holland and the ministry of Economic Affairs. A final example are the two meetings between NoordzeeWind and *Stichting Duinbehoud*, entering into negotiation about the compensation plan. *Stichting Duinbehoud*'s bargaining position was greatly strengthened due to their withdrawal of their objections against the permits, whereas other NGOs were only once consulted. Finally, around the Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (MEP) a third sounding board was convened by SenterNovem and NoordzeeWind.

From the foregoing two subsections, it is clear that as well the government in the form of the ministry of Economic Affairs as NoordzeeWind tried to meta-govern. To analyse the first input legitimacy, only the role of the former is considered. According to the democratic-anchorage model, politicians should involve themselves with:

- the shape and structure of the network, by deciding which stakeholders are included, by giving some actors resources and capacities to make them more important, and by determining the scope and internal procedures of the network;
- the formulation of the goals and objectives for the governance network;
- actual participation in the network (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005: 203,204).

Concerning the first aspect, the network has been partially shaped and structured by civil servants of the ministry of Economic Affairs. They have determined who was included in the consultation round about the cable route (KPD), the sounding board around the feasibility study, and the sounding board around the location-EIA. It is uncertain to which extent the civil servants have promoted cooperation between the environmental NGOs during the feasibility study, but from that moment on NGOs certainly tried to speak with one voice. Under the umbrella of *Stichting Natuur en Milieu* and *Stichting Duinbehoud*, several national and regional NGOs brought forward joint statements. Temporal cooperation liaisons were not the prerogative of just environmental NGOs. *Stichting de Noordzee*, *A.N.W.B.*[61] *and Productschap Vis*[62] wrote a letter to the cabinet to reconsider the pilot project NSW (Stichting de Noordzee, 2000). Civil servants have also mentioned organisations which were to be consulted for the compensation plan, and together with NoordzeeWind, they have determined whom should be included in the sounding board around the MEP.

Network design could also involve the empowerment of certain actors by giving them important capacities or resources. Several actors, amongst which *Stichting Duinbehoud* and *Stichting de Noordzee*, received governmental subsidies, but those were not related to their participation in the network. When it comes to NoordzeeWind however, this joint venture has been empowered by the government. Not only were they given a subsidy of 27 million euro, but in addition they were allowed to decide on participation of other actors and on the terms of reference belonging to that participation. Besides, two NGOs were favoured. *Stichting Natuur en Milieu* was asked by the government to formulate environmental stipulations during the feasibility study and therefore, they were asked to sit on the sounding board. *Stichting Duinbehoud* was benefited over other NGOs by NoordzeeWind during the compensation plan. In exchange for dropping charges against the permits, *Stichting Duinbehoud* negotiated with representatives of the two joint-venture partners and with civil servants of

[61] *Algemene Nederlandsche Wielrijders-Bond*: a conglomerate of a society and several companies. As a whole, it tries to serve and represent the interests of its members, especially on the areas of transport and recreation.
[62] Dutch Fish Product Board: a public-private organisation which represents the interests of the various branches of the fish industry and decides about actual policy-making and implementation. In that sense, the Dutch Fish Product Board is a self-regulating organ of the Dutch fish industry.

two ministries. The negotiation meetings were presided by former minister De Boer (Janssen, 2006). Other NGOs were later only consulted. A third form of network design is the determination of scope, decision-making competences and the internal procedures of governance networks (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005: 204). Scope, decision-making competences and the internal procedures of all meetings, described above, were decided on by civil servants, sometimes in cooperation with NoordzeeWind. The procedures of the sounding board around the MEP, for instance, were laid down in a terms of reference. NoordzeeWind and SenterNovem had written this document, which was discussed with organisations which wanted to join the sounding board (Kouwenhoven, 2006).

The second and third demands of the democratic anchorage in politicians have not been fulfilled. No political objectives to be pursued by the entire governance network have been formulated. For example, the government mandated that consultation with stakeholders should take place about the compensation plan. This was merely a goal for one of the actors: NoordzeeWind. The third demand prescribes that politicians should engage in governance networks. Although several politicians participated in hearings and meetings, politicians have not played an important role as meta-governor during the meetings between stakeholders. This was due to the fact that the politicians that participated were municipal ones, who represented solely the interests of their municipalities. National politicians could have played the role of meta-governor but depended entirely on their civil servants' participation in the network, perhaps except for occasional meetings between the developer and the competent ministers.

As stated in the theoretical framework, two responsibility mechanisms are implicitly interwoven in this input legitimacy: accountability through elections and responsibility in relation to the elected assemblies. The issue of offshore wind energy barely appears to be an issue in previous and coming elections. In the election programs of six major political parties, only two parties referred to offshore wind energy[63]. The latter impinged on the principle of political accountability. Politicians cannot held responsible through elections, if their viewpoint about an important issue that had a long history was unknown to the constituency. The elected assembly approved the KPD. To my knowledge, ministers did not meet with members of the parliament to discuss the OWEZ prior to this approval. Accountability was thus the only responsibility mechanism, which applied to the relation between the minister and members of the parliament.

In conclusion, civil servants functioned as liaison officers between stakeholders and the ministers. It is highly questionable whether these civil servants were instructed by ministers[64]. Most probable, decisions about this particular network were considered to fall under discretional decision-making of civil servants. The only roles for the ministers that remained are being accountable to the parliament and their role in ceremonies. The current minister of Economic Affairs fulfilled the latter role in an exemplary way on 15 June 2005, when he cut ribbons at the opening of a 1:25-scale-miniature wind turbine in Madurodam.

4.2 Representation via the membership basis of participated groups and organisations

The second input legitimacy is anchorage in the membership basis of participating groups and organisations. Its members consist of directly affected people, who must be represented correctly in order to obtain democratic legitimacy (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005: 205). Sørensen and Torfing have identified three aspects of representation:

[63] VVD, PvdA, CDA, GroenLinks, D'66 and SP. The latter two mentioned offshore wind energy.
[64] Civil servants received no ministerial instructions for the sounding board around the MEP (`t Hooft, 2006).

- the ability of the membership basis to select and instruct their representatives;
- the ability of the membership basis to form an informed opinion about their representatives' performance in the governance network;
- the ability of the membership basis to express different opinions and criticise the representatives' performance in the governance network (*ibid*: 207).

The first aspect contradicts the way large, modern NGOs operate. Representatives of such organisations are not chosen or directly instructed by the membership basis. Representatives of key players in the network like *Greenpeace*, *Stichting de Noordzee*, *Stichting Duinbehoud*, *Vogelbescherming Nederland*, and *Productschap Vis* were not selected or directly instructed by their constituencies[65]. Indirect instruction took place at two organisations. A board consisting of elected members of *Vogelbescherming Nederland* had formulated a general standpoint about wind energy, which served as a guideline for taking action (Tentij, 2006). A second, more complex example was provided by the representation of fishermen. The entire fishing industry ('from catching to selling') is highly fragmented. Branches in the fishing industry all have their own organisations, whose elected representatives are united in the board of *Productschap Vis*. In the case of the OWEZ, the *Productschap Vis* was the most dominant voice of fishermen. One organisation of fishermen was asked to give their opinion, but the issue was not discussed in the board of the umbrella organisation (Demkes, 2006). *Greenpeace* and *Stichting de Noordzee*, both foundations, deal in another, very pragmatic way with their supporters: 'if they do not agree with the strategy followed by their organisations, supporters can resign.'

This 'no-nonsense' approach[66] of the latter two organisations increases the importance of the second aspect, the ability of the membership basis to form an informed opinion about their representatives' performance in the governance network. Only then, supporters can make a reasonable judgement whether they should continue their membership or should resign. However, also for the membership basis of organisations which deal differently with their members, it is important to know how their interests are actually represented in the network. Direct access was provided by the various organisations themselves via their websites, newsletters and magazines. The quality and amount of information differed between the sources of the organisations. *Stichting de Noordzee*, for instance, gives a well-documented overview via a special file on their website and via their newsletters, but relevant issues like the compensation plan and the sounding board around the MEP are barely touched upon. One of their newsletters reads that they joined the sounding board, but the topics discussed and their reflections on them are never mentioned (Stichting de Noordzee, 2006).

The latter is a common characteristic of the investigated organisations[67]: concrete actions and letters are often communicated to their members, but the representatives' performance in relation to the compensation plan and to the MEP are rather left out in such reports. *Vogelbescherming Nederland,* for example, has not communicated the existence of the compensation plan to its members. Wind turbines are a delicate matter for his organisation, as it appears from the fact that they don not want their travelling costs for the MEP sounding board to be compensated by the government. A second prove that this organisation is very careful about maintaining its independence is showed by the fact that the organisation did not want to sit on the board of the 'fund for the benefit of birds and

[65] Another key player, the chairperson of Vogelwacht Egmond, had become fed up with the whole case. Therefore, he was not asked for an interview.
[66] Supporters of *Stichting de Noordzee* are called no-nonsense supporters.
[67] The interviewee of *Productschap Vis* said that articles about the NSW have been published on their website, in their magazine *Visserijnieuws*, and in magazines of affiliated organisations (Demkes, 2006). These articles could not be investigated.

marine organisms', one of the compensation measures. *Vogelbescherming Nederland* will now become a member of a sounding board around this fund (Tentij, 2006). In fact, *Stichting Duinbehoud* is the only organisation which mentioned the compensation plan to its members. The plan legitimised stopping with the legal procedure against the two consents (Stichting Duinbehoud, 2006). Indirect access suffered from the same shortcoming as direct access. Mass media reported the major events in the process, such as the tender. The objections of NGOs against the distance off the coast of the NSW (see 3.1) were also brought under attention of the various newspaper readers. Yet, insight into the representatives' performance was not given by newspapers or websites.

Finally, the third criterion, the ability of the membership basis to express different opinions and criticise the representatives' performance in the governance network, was partially fulfilled. *Vogelbescherming Nederland* and *Stichting Duinbehoud* were criticized by their members respectively via emails and during their annual meeting with members. This, and critique on a report on large wind turbines[68], caused the former NGO to be more cautious with mentioning wind energy in press releases and newsletters (Tentij, 2006). The other organisations said that they did not face criticisms, although they were open for it. Special forums were not organised by the organisations.

The evidence suggests that the relation between the representatives and the people they were supposed to represent was severed. Not only was the selection and instruction of representatives difficult in modern organisations, but also the information that the membership basis received was incomplete. The lack of information might result in the lack of critique of the representatives' performance in the network. In Pellazzioni's words, responsibility mechanisms did not function properly in all organisations.

4.3 Anchorage in a territorially defined citizenry

In this third section, the focus shifts to the last input legitimacy: anchorage in a territorially defined citizenry. It assumes that a governance network is accountable to citizens who live within the local or regional territory within which a governance network is making decisions. These citizens are indirectly affected by the policy outputs and outcomes (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005: 208). Three requirements must be fulfilled to enable public contestation of the policy outputs and outcomes created by governance networks:

- transparency of governance networks and comprehensible accounts of their key policy decisions;
- access to public dialogue with the governance network;
- responsiveness on the part of the governance network (*ibid*: 210).

The territorially defined citizenry is here delineated as the entire Dutch citizenry. They live within the territory within which the Dutch government made the decision that an offshore wind farm would be erected. This notion was also acknowledged by the government: "every citizen can recreate near the North Sea" (Van den Heuvel, 2006). This acknowledgement resulted in announcements of starting participation procedures that were also published in national newspapers.

The first requirement is transparency and comprehensibility. Both the long-lasting policy process and the technical complexity of the subject could have prevented the fulfillment of the first

[68] The main conclusion of the report was that large wind turbines caused less casualties amongst birds than was expected (Vogelbescherming Nederland, 2006).

demand, but several sources like newspaper articles, websites and hearings clarified the process. "During the hearings, civil servants explained in comprehensible terms what people could do if they did not agree with the project" (Janssen, 2006). In addition, three websites are worthwhile mentioning. The websites of NoordzeeWind[69] and *Stichting de Noordzee*[70] are probably very well accessible for lay people, while the website of SenterNovem[71] gives a well-documented overview of the key policy decisions. On the latter website, links to the policy documents and rulings of the Council of State are available. Interviewees felt that all important decisions were communicated well to people outside the network. Only one critical remark was made. The director of *Stichting Duinbehoud* thought that NoordzeeWind should pay more attention to the link between the compensation measures and the wind farm. According to him, this link received only marginal coverage (*ibid*). The fact that no press releases about the compensation measures were issued was confirmed by NoordzeeWind. They argued that renewable energy itself should be characterized as compensation. Consequently, NoordzeeWind wanted to stress the positive aspects of the wind farm (Dekkers, 2006).

Second, access to public dialogue with the network took place via two different kind of meetings organised by the competent authorities. The meetings were part of the official participation procedures, belonging to the various policy documents. The first variant was the informative meeting. As its name suggests, the purpose was to inform stakeholders. The meeting started with a presentation by a civil servant (and in later stages also by a representative of NoordzeeWind) and then questions could be raised[72]. These questions were immediately answered. The other variant was the hearing, presided by an independent chairperson. First, considerations could be raised, and when all these concerns had been uttered, answers were given by civil servants. Written objections could also be sent in, and these were also answered.

Whether the third criterion, responsiveness on the part of the governance network, is fulfilled, is rather difficult to answer. Competent authorities were willing to take concerns into account. Some criticisms did lead to relatively small changes in the policy documents. In addition, NoordzeeWind spoke with individual citizens who had complained during meetings (Dekkers, 2006). However, central decision makers like NoordzeeWind and the government did not negotiate with citizens. For instance, citizens' concerns were not taken into account when the compensation plan was discussed. Concerning the policy documents, they were informed and consulted. In that sense, the nature of the meetings prevented responsiveness on the part of NoordzeeWind and the government.

Concluding, we can see that many efforts were put in making the process comprehensible for lay people, although the subject and process itself were complex. At the time of formal participation, the policy documents, which could be criticised by citizens, were already elaborated. According to Pellazzioni's classification, this would be termed accountability. However, although public dialogue with the central decision-makers was accessible for citizens, it remains questionable whether the concerns of citizens have been taken into account by readjusting the course of action. Another critical remark is that not all policy documents, like the compensation plan, have undergone a procedure, in which network members had to render account to the general public.

[69] http://www.noordzeewind.nl/
[70] http://www.noordzee.nl/ruimtelijkeordening/
[71] http://www.senternovem.nl/Offshore_Wind_Energy/Wind_farms/index.asp
[72] The civil servants that were present at the meetings were the same civil servants who prepared the policy documents (KPD, consents). In this way, the key network actors were available for public contestation.

4.4 Democratic rules specified by a particular grammar of conduct

The first throughput legitimacy prescribes that a governance network should follow the democratic rules specified by a particular grammar of conduct. It entails these (normative) democratic rules to be followed in governance arrangements:

- inclusion of all relevant and affected actors and a broad definition of the political agenda in the beginning, in order to be accessible for a wide range of actors;
- demand of democratic deliberation, like respect for other people's opinions;
- demand for a democratic improvement of society and the future demand of governance (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005: 212-214).

The first kind of normative regulations can be broken down into two aspects. First, we deal with the demand for inclusion of all relevant and affected actors, which was not fulfilled. For the formal participation procedure, no actors were excluded. However, civil servants (and in later stages NoordzeeWind) determined several times which organisations were consulted. For example, an organisation that had a low profile in the network was the municipality of Bergen, the nearest municipality in the vicinity of the wind farm. The municipality wanted to be involved in the tender procedure and in the compensation plan. A civil servant of the municipality of Bergen was consulted for the latter plan, but he did not know he was not allowed to respond (Kwint, 2006). The final document does not read that the municipality of Bergen are consulted. Zeelenberg puts his amazement about the role of municipalities in another way. Whereas "the municipality of Velsen was directly involved in the consent procedures[73]"……, "the municipality that expected visual hindrance was not directly involved" (Zeelenberg, 2005c:12). Other stakeholders that played a marginal role were citizens and local NGOs, except *Vogelwacht Egmond*. Citizens and local NGOs were only involved in the formal participation procedure. Finally, actors that are relevant for the production of public policy should be included (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005:212). One can argue that the involved civil servants have represented the ministers, but how much decision-making competences were taken by or were delegated to the civil servants? The final decision about the KPD was up to the cabinet, and therefore it seems reasonable that ministers were present in the network around the KPD.

The political agenda fell short of a broad definition in the beginning, which is the second aspect of the normative rule that a wide range of actors should be included. The policy problem of climate change and a range of (partial) policy solutions were never an issue of debate. This policy network has always been structured around an offshore wind farm. This predetermined subject prevented negotiation between stakeholders. Also other predetermined features of the wind farm were barriers for bargaining. Room for negotiation could have been provided by loosening these demands. For instance, NoordzeeWind was not allowed to build a wind farm with a capacity exceeding 100 MW[74]. Therefore, the site is not maximally explored (Zeelenberg, 2005c:20). In exchange for allowing maximal exploration, the subsidy of 27.2 million euro could have been lowered or the distance to the coast could have been farther.

[73] The municipality of Velsen issued the permit for the transformer station.
[74] Later, it was slightly increased to 108 MW.

For demand of democratic deliberation, the second kind of normative regulations, meetings between network actors should take place according to 'standard' democratic rules. Although none of the interviewees reported serious breaches of such rules, two violations of the demand for transparency were reported. Transparency demands, amongst others, that "everybody knows the terms of the debate, the options and the final decisions"(Sørensen and Torfing, 2005:213). This was not the case for the representative of *Productschap Vis*, who was a member of the sounding board around the MEP. He was unaware of the compensation plan and the six compensation measures (Demkes, 2006). A second, more serious breach was reported by *Stichting de Noordzee*. They and other NGOs were unaware of the layout-EIA and the two consents, till they read the advertisement in newspapers that the official participation procedure had begun (Noordzee, 2003). These two violations contrast the way in which the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Water Management operated in case of the draft consents and the final consents. These were sent to several NGOs and lower authorities, although they had not objected to these draft documents[75]. This service was agreed on between the ministry and the other parties (Van den Heuvel, 2006).

Sørensen and Torfing extended their normative regulations by adding a third one: demand for a democratic improvement of society and the future demand of governance. It can be obtained by an augmentation of the political empowerment of the participating actors. Most of the stakeholders that have participated already were 'expert citizens', having experience in participating in decision-making processes. It can also be obtained by "self-reflexive political processes that stimulate an active search for new forms of democracy that contribute to a further democratisation of the public policy-making processes" (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005: 214). Initiatives for new offshore wind farms will fall under a different legislative regime[76]. Developers must present a notification of intent, which will be open for public inspection. After this first step, the definitive EIA together with a Public Works consent will undergo a procedure, in which other parties can object. Thus, the total procedure will have fewer formal participation opportunities. In addition, the formal democratic institutions will not be involved, since the permits will be issued according to an existing law. A second reason why decisions about new wind farms might be taken in a less democratically anchored way is that new initiatives have lost their innovativeness. Media will pay less attention to the new wind farms and will publish less about them. As a result, decision-making might turn out more obscure to not-involved citizens and organisations. On the other hand, the entire decision-making process will become more simplified, thereby increasing its comprehensibility to citizens. All in all, it is highly uncertain whether the experiences gained from the OWEZ will contribute to future wind energy development, while lessons could be learnt from the first offshore wind farm. For instance, more efforts should be put in really involving all actors and better communicating policy outputs to them.

4.5 Dimensions of power

The final throughput legitimacy is the exercise of power. Lukes identifies three dimensions of power:

- A gets B to do something that B would not otherwise have done;
- A prevents B from putting issues on the political agenda that are detrimental to A;
- A shapes B's perceptions and preferences (Lukes, 1974).

[75] Normally, documents are only sent to persons or organisations who object against consents.
[76] Beleidsregels inzake toepassing Wet beheer rijkswaterstaatswerken op installaties in de exclusieve economische zone.

According to the one-dimensional view, we must look for the exercise of visible power. At least four times, visible power was exercised. First, the director of *Stichting Duinbehoud* claimed that the meteorological mast was erected based on the standard configuration, while the precise configuration of the wind farm was to be determined by means of the layout-EIA (Janssen, 2006). Before the commission for the EIA gave its final verdict about the EIA, the meteorological mast had already been built. When the commission concluded that another location was the most friendly alternative, NoordzeeWind stated in defence that the standard configuration would yield more energy and that the investments already made would be lost. The competent authority considered the first argument of NoordzeeWind valid and gave in[77]. The second exercise of power was also claimed by the director of *Stichting Duinbehoud*. Due to their achievements, the offshore wind farm was located farther off the coast (Janssen, 2006). This line of reasoning was confirmed by NoordzeeWind: "the actions of *Stichting Duinbehoud* were one of the reasons to select an alternative that was located farther off the coast than originally intended" (Dekkers, 2006)[78]. Thirdly, NoordzeeWind entered into negotiations with *Stichting Duinbehoud* and *Vogelwacht Egmond*, trying to stop the lawsuit against the two major consents. This resulted in *Stichting Duinbehoud* dropping charges. Finally, Corus was put under much pressure by several actors, including the Ministry of Economic Affairs, to allow the construction of a transformer station on its factory site. Once again, *Stichting Duinbehoud* was involved. It was this organisation, which objected against the alternative location for the transformer station, thereby forcing NoordzeeWind to search for another spot. The latter succeeded, when Corus capitulated.

To discover two-dimensional exercises of power, we must ask about non-decisions. Most interviewed representatives felt that they could add discussion points to the agenda of the sounding board around the MEP[79]. However, the representative of *Productschap Vis* could not put compensation for fishermen on the political agenda. According to him, the fishing industry suffers from its unsustainable image (Demkes, 2006). Also other issues were not open for discussion. The debate with stakeholders has always been restricted to an offshore wind farm. The exclusion of other renewable energy sources resulted from the government's decision to promote the construction of a pilot wind farm. The three-dimensional exercise of power is more difficult to establish, but NoordzeeWind has certainly tried to influence the perceptions of the municipality of Bergen. The municipality were promised a visitor centre by NoordzeeWind[80]. However, the developer had to cut down on its expenses and decided that the plan of creating a visitor centre could not continue. NoordzeeWind said to the municipality that the Ministry of Economic Affairs had approved the termination of the visitor centre, while the latter told the municipality they were only informed about stopping the visitor centre (Kwint, 2006). In doing so, the developer might have hoped that it would prevent protests from the municipality. The NoordzeeWind's side of the story actually blamed two actors: "both NoordzeeWind and the Ministry of Economic Affairs promised more than could be delivered" (Dekkers, 2006).

[77] This issue was picked up by NGOs and citizens mainly because the location preferred by the Commission for the EIA was located 1.2 kilometre farther off the coast.
[78] In two of the original alternatives, the nearest wind turbine was located 8.7 kilometre off the coast (NoordzeeWind, 2003a). The definitive alternative is located at 10.7 kilometre off the coast (NoordzeeWind, 2003b).
[79] Other sounding boards happened too long ago.
[80] The idea for a visitor centre came from the municipality itself. The current state of affairs is that the visitor centre will most probable become reality (Schoof, 2006).

Although NoordzeeWind is obviously entitled to keep the costs and expected benefits of the wind farm secret, the whole debate would have framed differently of those were known. The developer has received a fair amount of public money (subsidy, feed-in tariffs and fiscal regulations), and a future, huge profit of NoordzeeWind would put both the current location[81] and the subsidy system into another perspective. Finally, this section has not sought to provide a compendium of power exercises in the offshore case; its aim has been to show that the process did not completely live up to the democratic standards. Due to the way the debate was framed, stakeholders could not put all their concerns on the agenda. Still, most exercises of power, described here, were related with attempts between actors in the network to speed up the process.

[81] The maximal water depth of 20 meters was based on economical considerations.

5. ONSHORE CASE STUDY: POLICY PROCESS AND STAKEHOLDERS

Wageningen is a small city in the central eastern part of the Netherlands, with a population of approximately 35,000. It is located in the province of Gelderland. The city of Wageningen is politically administered by a mayor and four aldermen. They are responsible for the day-to-day administration of the municipality. The Board of mayor and aldermen (B&W) has to give account regarding implementing policies to the City Council. The latter draws up policies by majority vote. In this particular city, the City Council consists of 25 Members, who are elected by local residents every four years. The left-wing political party *GroenLinks* has always played an important role in initiating plans for building wind turbines. Due to the long history, this chapter is divided in two sections: the first dealing with the period that several locations were under consideration and the second detailing the policy process around the location that remained.

5.1 Former policy process (1997-2000)

The principles of the Trias Energetica are used as guidance for the current energy policy of Wageningen (in order of importance):

1. limit demand for energy;
2. use renewables to fulfil remaining demand;
3. use fossil fuels, if necessary, as efficiently as possible.

For the first two steps, policy targets have been formulated. The first step, to limit the demand for energy, was demonstrated by a commitment to reduce 20 percent of energy consumption below 1989 levels by 2005. The reduction target was not met and is now considered as an inspiring guideline than a concrete policy goal. The policy goal going with the second step, however, is still feasible and lays foundations for erecting wind turbines in Wageningen. In November, 1997, a policy target was set by the Board of mayor and aldermen, and was enacted by the Council in December of the same year, of renewable energy accounting for ten per cent of Wageningen's total energy requirements by 2008. From accompanying acts, civil servants have concluded that this target was meant to be bound to buildings and therefore, traffic emissions were not included in the target. An implication which cannot be deducted from the target or accompanying acts is whether the renewable energy should be generated within the territory of Wageningen. However, so-called 'green electricity', used by local citizens but generated beyond municipal boundaries, is counted in (see Van Wichen, 1999). The municipality still want to take their local responsibility when it comes to renewable energy. This recognition resulted in efforts to look for options whether generation of renewable energy was possible within city boundaries.

These local targets were not formulated in absence of national goals. That same tone echoed those in many national reports. According to *Now for later*, the most recent energy report, energy efficiency is considered as the most efficient policy option in the short term, and for the longer term, renewable energy targets are reaffirmed. Not only are measures aimed at achieving a share of renewable *energy* sources of five per cent by 2010, but also measures are introduced to ensure a nine per cent share of Dutch *electricity* generation by 2010. In that aspect, Wageningen's approach does not differ from the national one, the former only takes a more ambitious stance. The national goal of achieving ten per cent renewable energy has to be reached in 2020.

Back to local policy, in that same year 1997, consultation rounds started between the local university (WUR), Agriculture Research Service (DLO), Nuon (utility company), Novem (agency of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs) and the municipality of Wageningen. Aim of these rounds was to promote and to initiate renewable energy projects. Another result that came out of these talks was a covenant between Nuon and *GroenLinks*-alderman J. Bogers, on behalf of the municipality[82]. Within a term of 2.5 years, the energy company and Wageningen pledged to promote different kinds of renewable energy. Part of the contract was the establishment of a project agency, within which the intentions were to be devised. For wind energy, the intention was to realise wind energy with a capacity of at least 1.5 MW, eventually in cooperation with a third party. In fact, on 31 December 2000, the covenant expired and no wind turbines were sited in Wageningen.

Two years earlier, in 1998, the municipality started to actively look for sites suitable for wind energy. By order of the responsible alderman, WEOM, a wind energy consultant, was commissioned to do a 'quick scan'. A quick scan is a research into the selection of sites, in which criteria like economical, ecological and technical considerations are taken into account. Four sites remained: two in the water-meadows along the river Rhine, one near the industrial harbour and one near the recreational harbour (Dekkers, 1998). At that time, the location 'Haarweg' was dropped due to noise restrictions of the nearby nature reserve 'Binnenveld'[83] and its buffer zone of 500 meters (*ibid*). The following year, however, the location 'Haarweg' was mentioned again as one of the three site options in the policy paper 'Wind energy in the Renewable Energy Policy'. Apparently, Nuon had calculated that noise generated by wind turbines would not exceed noise limits of the nearby nature reserve (Van Wichen, 1999). In the same report, it was proposed that four wind turbines could be located at the 'Haarweg' location (on grounds of the local university), three could be sited near the harbour, and one could be positioned at the industrial site 'Parenco'[84]. In total, the capacities of these eight proposed wind turbines would amount to 12 MW. These 12 MW were needed to reach 45 per cent of the renewable energy target (see above). Under pressure of his coalition partners, the responsible alderman had to give in. The three locations were not proposed, like he intended, but public support for the three locations was to be measured instead.

In February 2000, a first questionnaire amongst 1280 local inhabitants[85] was conducted to test public support in relation to wind energy. The contents of the report can be explained best by mentioning its three findings. Its main conclusion reads that 64 per cent of the interviewees agrees with the statement that the municipality should actively look for sites where one or more wind turbines can be built. Second, while respectively 81 per cent and 76 per cent finds the location 'Harbour' and 'Parenco' acceptable, only 50 per cent agrees with plans for wind turbines along the 'Haarweg' (33 per cent disagrees with plans for this location). Finally, since 61 per cent wants to receive more information about the plans, the authors advise a so-called 'open planning procedure', in which reliable information should be disseminated by the municipality in cooperation with another party, and in which citizens should be able to participate as much as possible (IVAM, 2000).

Later that year, the second essential research report into the feasibility of wind energy within city limits was published: "Wind in the Gelderse Vallei: Wageningen" (De Ridder, 2000). Similar to the first report of WEOM, the technique of quick scan was used, however this time a more extended version was applied to the Wageningen case study. With a reference to the first report, it is stated that

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[82] Contrary to what is often believed, Wageningen never signed the climate covenant with the ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM).
[83] In Dutch: stiltegebied
[84] The last two locations were in line with the conclusions from the WEOM-report.
[85] The response was 30 per cent (IVAM, 2000).

three locations remained: the harbour, the industrial site ‘Parenco’, and most surprisingly the Haarweg (*ibid*). In the first report of WEOM, the latter location was considered as not suitable for wind energy[86]. Further, the three locations are assessed on feasibility of both installation and grid connection, and availability of wind resources. Especially on the criteria wind resources and grid connection, the location ‘Haarweg’ scores relatively low, compared with the other two locations. Based on all these reports, if one would rank the given options from one to three, the location ‘Haarweg’ would not top the list as most preferable location. But, what would happen to the policy process if the other two options were rejected by a higher authority?

5.2 Current policy process (2001-2006)

Difficulties for the wind turbine locations ‘Parenco’ and the ‘Harbour’ occurred almost from the beginning they had been mentioned as option. The Wageningen territory near the ‘Parenco’ site was too small for several wind turbines, and therefore, cooperation was needed from Renkum, the adjacent municipality. The council of major and alderman of this municipality, however, postponed a decision about a joint wind farm pending an act of the province Gelderland (De Gelderlander, 2000). In ‘Vision on Wind Energy in Gelderland’, an adoption of the regional planning policy[87], the provincial authorities decided that spots along the river Rhine fell into the red category, i.e. no wind turbines are allowed on these locations (Van Ham, 2004). In other words, the options ‘Parenco’ and ‘Harbour’ had to be dropped, because they would hinder bird migration, bird forage, and flow of the river. After that, Wageningen was advised to concentrate its efforts on the location ‘Haarweg’, provided that no better locations were available in the region.



Figure 3. The location ‘Haarweg’ situated between Wageningen (right) and the territory of Rhenen (left). The border between both municipalities is depicted by the red dotted line (source: Gemeente Wageningen, 2005).

[86] The requirement of a 500-metre buffer zone surrounding the nature reserve was probably dropped (Dekkers, 2006).
[87] In Dutch: Provinciaal Streekplan

Plans focussing on the Haarweg were elaborated in the draft 'Structuurplan', a local planning document which acts as a vision for long-term spatial development. The then Board of mayor and aldermen assumed that five wind turbines were necessary to fulfil four out of ten per cent of the renewable energy goal. In accordance with the wishes of the provincial board, cooperation with the adjacent municipality of Rhenen would make it possible to build wind turbines also on Rhenen's territory. In this way, a larger wind farm could be erected, however the Rhenen Board of mayor and aldermen opposed this idea (De Gelderlander, 2003b). In later stages, several political parties in the City Council were also displeased with wind turbines on Wageningen soil (De Gelderlander, 2005a). Political difficulties over wind energy have also been present in Wageningen, but they were settled by the precise formulation in the 'Structuurplan'. Like already said, the political party *GroenLinks* has always played an important, supporting role. Its coalition partners at that time, CDA and VVD, had second thoughts and demanded that issues like public support, landscape, and environment should be investigated, before the zoning scheme[88] could be adopted (Eweg, 2006). Without this adoption, the construction of wind turbines was not allowed at the Haarweg. The Haarweg was merely a so-called 'search location'. The dispute between advocates and opponents was not only present in the political sphere, but extended to citizens and pressure groups. In response to the draft version of the 'Structuurplan', several citizens and organisations raised considerations about the amount of wind resources, the quality of the scenery, impacts to birds, and a possible conflict with the measurements done at a weather station. All considerations were turned down.

The intensive stakeholder participation that took place for the 'Structuurplan' was labelled as an 'open planning procedure'. The procedure to reach a decision about a wind farm along the Haarweg was to be made similarly. The initial concepts of the open planning procedure can be traced back to a notion written in 2002 by a civil servant of the municipality[89]:

- maximal generation of renewable energy;
- profits should be reinvested in compensation and support;
- fair distribution of costs and benefits; damage to private propriety, nature, and society should be compensated;
- maximal support for erection and exploration of wind turbines (Van Wichen, 2002).

In addition to these four principles, groups of stakeholders were ranked according to the risks they have to bear:

1. large investors and operators;
2. landowners and users;
3. local inhabitants near the search location (including the inhabitants of Rhenen);
4. other inhabitants of Wageningen;
5. organisations that represent nature, environment and society.

According to this participation model, the first four groups should bring in the required capital. Part of the profit should be invested in the fifth category (*ibid*).

[88] In Dutch: bestemmingsplan

[89] Back then, the idea still was that the energy company Nuon would develop a wind farm on the fields owned by WUR, the local university.

The year 2003 ushered in the establishment of both a major proponent and a strong adversary. The *Stichting WindEnergie Wageningen* [90] (WEW) was chartered in that year as backing for a wind farm within city limits. Its founders, all citizens of Wageningen, were discontent with the poor progress in the project, achieved by the municipal government. Therefore, they wanted to realise the project themselves. In fact, when WEW launched its initial action plan, the founders announced that their foundation should be appointed by the municipality as the sole initiator of the wind farm (WEW, 2003). In return, WEW offered that consultation would take place with stakeholders, that inhabitants of Wageningen would be able to invest in the project themselves, and that part of the revenues would be reinvested in other renewable energy projects within the city borders. Their first argument is shaped by their categorisation of stakeholders:

1. directly involved professionals, like the municipality and large investors;
2. indirectly involved professionals, like the municipality of Rhenen and other wind associations;
3. directly involved, private persons, like neighbouring inhabitants and ground owners;
4. indirectly involved, private persons and NGOs, like other inhabitants and *Mooi Wageningen*, a local NGO[91] (*ibid*).

Needless to say, the action plan of WEW and the notion of the municipality (see previous subsection) show resemblance. The reinvestment loop and notion of a fair distribution of costs and benefits are striking details. Though, the interpretation of reinvesting revenues differs. Whereas WEW concentrates on financing other renewable energy projects, the municipality also focuses on compensation of private property, nature and society.

We now turn to the most significant opponent: association *Mooi Wageningen*[92](MW). Founded in 2001, its mission can be summarised as to promote conservation and further development of nature and scenery in Wageningen. In 2003, the board of MW declared itself against wind turbines along the Haarweg and called for a referendum to let citizens speak out about this issue (De Gelderlander, 2003a). The board's arguments reaching this opinion were twofold. First, they feared wind turbines would spoil the scenery. Their second argument relates to the cost efficiency of the project at this particular location: wind turbines at locations with more wind resources deliver electricity with a lower cost price per unit (kWh) than the proposed one in Wageningen. MW underlines that they are not against wind energy in general, but according to them other locations are better suited. Against the will of MW, the city council approved the 'Structuurplan' including the 'search location' for wind energy. In the end of 2003, the 'Strucuurplan' became definitive.

With a compromise between the political partners in B&W and an unresolved dispute beyond the political sphere in mind, an action plan was written the next year. The action plan describes successive stages in the decision making process, resulting in a decision by the City Council about the wind farm. A new project team would successively write a requirements specification, organise an excursion, and set down a communication plan. In the requirements specification, all kinds of demands would have to be elaborated. A third party willing to build the wind farm would have to fulfil these demands. For instance, the contribution towards the municipal goal of ten per cent renewable energy must be described, but also compliance with several national standards must be targeted. The excursion, would serve aldermen, Council Members and citizens to form a picture of how wind

[90] Foundation Wind Energy Wageningen
[91] Not all parties mentioned in the action plan are reproduced in this report.
[92] Beautiful Wageningen. *Mooi Wageningen* has done anything within its powers to stop the intended wind farm. They have participated in all relevant, formal participation processes (local, regional, provincial) and have addressed the issue in newspapers and in meetings of the City Council of Wageningen.

turbines would fit in the landscape. Finally, the communication plan would inform citizens by means of a DVD film and would measure public support by means of a survey. The document belonging to each phase (requirements specification, communication plan) would be discussed by a sounding board. Their comments would be attached to the concept documents, which would be successively discussed in the Board of mayor and aldermen and the City Council. The following cast of the sounding board was proposed:

- department of Real-estate and Construction of Wageningen University and Research Centre (WUR)[93];
- other ground owners near the Haarweg;
- neighbouring inhabitants;
- Foundation *WindEnergie Wageningen* (WEW);
- Society *Mooi Wageningen*;
- Foundation *Wagenings Milieu Overleg*[94];
- Foundation *Platform Duurzaam Wageningen*[95] (Van Harn, 2004).

On 15 June 2004, B&W laid down the plan of action, which was later discussed successively in the sounding board[96] and in the commission of Sustainability and Public Planning. The latter consists of Council Members, belonging to various political parties. *GroenLinks* endorsed the goals of the plan of action by its own alderman and warned that without wind energy the renewable energy goal of ten per cent would not be achieved. Other political parties, including the coalition partners of *GroenLinks*, had a more critical stance towards the plan and pointed out several considerations. Two parties even rejected the whole idea of wind turbines in Wageningen.

Supposedly, 2005 was the year of major political developments for the policy process. First of all, in a concept 'Vision on spatial planning'[97] of the province Gelderland, the 'Haarweg' location was not mentioned as one of the search locations for wind energy. In addition to this withdrawal, it was stated that wind farms existing of fewer than four turbines would not be supported by provincial spatial planning policy, unless such farms were described in regional visions on spatial planning (Pol, 2005). Although the wind farm was part of the regional WERV-vision[98], this particular phrase in the provincial document was formulated quite vaguely. So, not only the precise location of the future wind farm was missing in the provincial document, also the amount of four turbines was a dangerous threshold for the project in Wageningen. Up to then, B&W assumed that five turbines could be erected if the adjacent municipality Rhenen would join the project. Without the cooperation of the latter, three turbines within the borders of Wageningen was the most probable number. This two-headed threat challenged both B&W and foundation WEW to address this issue in a letter to the Provincial Council. Their efforts were not in vain. In the final 'Vision on spatial planning' of the province, the Haarweg in Wageningen was described as one of the three promising initiatives for building wind farms in this region (Provincie Gelderland, 2005: 108). The threshold of four wind turbines was adopted in a threshold of four turbines with the exception of cases in which three turbines would yield more electricity than four wind turbines at the same spot (*ibid*: 76).

[93] The local university owns the lion's share of meadows near the Haarweg.
[94] Environmental consultative body Wageningen
[95] Platform Sustainable Wageningen
[96] This was reported to the commission by the responsible alderman. In reality, the plan of action was explained in the Sounding Board.
[97] In Dutch: Streekplan
[98] WERV stands for four cooperating municipalities: Wageningen, Ede, Rhenen and Veenendaal.

Backed with the support of provincial policy, the plan of action continued. An excursion was made[99] to get an idea of how wind turbines are embedded in the landscape at similar locations and two plans were written: the requirements specification and the communication plan. In the first document, all kind of legal requirements and extra demands are stated, which have to be fulfilled by future initiators[100]. For instance, the municipality demand that a compensation plan is designed to offer compensation for nature, environment and society affected by the wind turbines. Goal of the second policy document, the communication plan, was to inform and consult direct and indirect stakeholders. Communication channels were determined for each target group. Citizens, for example, were to be informed about the legal requirements for wind turbines via the website of the municipality and via a regular page in the local newspaper. According to the procedure laid down in the action plan, both policy documents were successively discussed in the sounding board, the commission of Sustainability and Public Planning and the City Council. On 30 March 2005, the requirements specification and the communication plan were debated on the regular meeting of the Council. Several parties underlined that although they approve both documents, they had not yet made a final decision about the wind farm. Their final opinion would be strongly based on the result of the survey determining public support for or against the wind farm. *GroenLinks* concurred without reserve. Three parties voted against- one of them even called the information film propaganda.

The making of the film 'A future wind farm in the municipality of Wageningen' heralded the start of intense communication by the municipality towards regular citizens. Before this period, information was just disseminated through the municipal website, press releases and a regular page in a local newspaper, but now communication took place via an unprecedented channel: a DVD film. It starts with a voiceover explaining the need for wind turbines in Wageningen. After that, the responsible alderman and a civil servant speak about the local policy process and mention possible disadvantages. To get a good picture of those disadvantages, animations are shown. They portrait the landscape with and without three wind turbines from different viewpoints and different distances ranging from 500 to 5000 meters. Then a representative of WEW underscores the need for wind energy again, and he unravels the intentions of WEW. Then the voiceover switches to the position of *Mooi Wageningen*. Finally, the DVD concludes by gainsaying several disadvantages and by stating that wind energy is possible in Wageningen (Stichting NatuurEnergie, 2005). The 15 minutes film was shown at six primary schools and was broadcasted on Dalux, the local television channel, from 22 August till 4 September. In addition to the television and schools, the film was planned to be shown on a special evening, organised by the municipality, but unfortunately the DVD jammed. Part of the film, the animations of the wind turbines, could also be watched at the municipal website.

After this period of more intense communication, an opinion poll was held. It was conducted amongst 1080 citizens[101] to test attitudes to wind energy, preferable locations for wind turbines, and more specifically the Haarweg location. The survey, along with a brochure, was sent to randomly selected citizens and neighbouring citizens with an open view on the spot from their houses. The brochure, providing a summary of what was already been said on the DVD film, was also available at municipal buildings. Primary conclusions of the opinion poll are:

- 56 per cent of inhabitants supports the statement that the municipality should actively look for sites where one or more wind turbines can be built, while 18 per cent says no;

[99] In fact, this excursion was the second one. Another excursion took place on 31 January 2001.
[100] Although WEW was not appointed by the municipality as the sole initiator for this project, in reality they were the only interested party.
[101] The response was 40 per cent amongst citizens and not surprisingly higher amongst neighbouring citizens: 59 per cent (IVAM, 2005).

- 55 per cent of inhabitants agrees with a wind farm along the Haarweg, while 30 per cent disagrees with this;
- 30 per cent of the neighbouring inhabitants agrees with this plan, while 62 disagrees with this;
- 51 per cent of inhabitants wants information about wind turbines in general;
- 43 per cent knows about plans of erecting wind turbines in Wageningen, and a mere 8 per cent has seen the DVD film (IVAM, 2005).

The way some results above were calculated was disputed by members of the sounding board, which is discussed in appendix B. The responsible alderman declared beforehand that the opinion poll had an important but not a decisive role in the further process, i.e. the poll was not equal to a referendum. If a plan to build a wind farm was presented to the municipality, the final decision to adopt the zoning scheme was up the City Council.

This latter promise appeared to be breached by the election results of 2006. On 7 March 2006, a press release about the results of the opinion poll was sent out. Meanwhile, on the very same day, the City Council was elected. However, wind turbines were a minor issue during the 2006 election campaign. During an election debate on sustainability, the subject was briefly mentioned, but it never came up for discussion. On the local VoteMatch[102], no question was related to wind energy. More importantly, four out of nine political parties did not refer to wind energy or more specific terms in their election program[103]. Three of the remaining parties openly declared one selves for or against the wind farm: *GroenLinks* for; *ChristenUnie* and *PvdA* against[104]. The latter party came out as the major winner of the elections and formed a coalition with *CDA*, *VVD* and *Stadspartij Wageningen*. In the coalition program of the four parties, they simply state: ”That implies no wind turbines in the Binnenveld” (PvdA *et al*, 2006). The fact that the four parties possess a majority in the Council yields the obvious conclusion that third parties are not very likely to present a proposal for a wind farm to the City Council.

Having lost control of the town hall, *GroenLinks* objected to this standpoint of their political counterparts via their website and via an article in a local newspaper. Currently, the political party is investigating the options for holding a referendum about the subject. WEW followed their example by sending a letter to B&W, which was published in a local newspaper. In this letter, WEW asked the Board of Major and Aldermen to reconsider their viewpoint. The proponents still think about presenting their proposal for a wind farm to the City Council. The most important opponent of the wind farm, *Mooi Wageningen*, have been celebrating their victory on their website and via an article in a local newspaper. However, after almost nine years after the policy goal has been enacted, the story continues as the initiatives of *GroenLinks* and WEW prove.

[102] By answering a series of questions about one’s political opinion on various topics, this website helps citizens establish which party they are closest to and shows their preference for the other parties in descending order. The website (www.stemwijzer.nl) is developed by the Dutch Centre for Political Participation.
[103] CDA, D’66, SGP and Stadspartij Wageningen
[104] According to the SP, wind turbines are “a possibility” in an attempt creating more sustainable energy, while the VVD agrees with the project under the condition that the project will receive enough public support.

6. ONSHORE CASE STUDY: ANALYSIS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE

We have seen that a broad range of actors and stakeholders has been involved in the whole process of the Wageningen case, but a simple, unanswered question remains: how democratically anchored was it? At first sight, one could argue that it was a democratic process, both formally and participatory. A majority decision about the 'Structuurplan', the requirements specification, and the communication plan was taken in the Council, which represents the citizens of Wageningen. On top of that, a sounding board was installed, public debates were organised, and new developments were reported by local newspapers. However, if we take a closer look, we might conclude differently. To zoom in, the exercise of power and the democratic anchorage model with its four input-legitimacies are again applied.

6.1 Anchorage in democratically elected politicians

This first input legitimacy requires politicians to involve themselves with:

- the shape and structure of the network, by deciding which stakeholders are included (and which excluded), by giving some actors resources and capacities to make them more important, and by determining the scope and internal procedures of the network;
- the formulation of the goals and objectives for the governance network;
- actual participation in the network instead of leaving this task to public administrators, since the former can use their authority to modify networks (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005:203, 204).

In this case, the politicians in question are the aldermen and the members of the City Council. Control of the network by these actors would ensure that their decisions are in line with the opinion of the political majority of the elected assemblies (*ibid*:202).

The arrangement of the network took shape at later stages in the policy process. During the former policy process (1997-2000), intentions were too vaguely formulated to create stable patterns of interactions between the municipality, market actors and civil society actors. For instance, the debate was initially framed in terms of wind energy instead of wind turbines and no precise locations were described. Civil society actors were lacking in the meetings between the municipality, an energy company and WUR, the local university. Later, when three locations were detailed, obscure provincial plans prevented further action. Interactions became more frequent when the plans for wind energy were concentrated at one location and when this location was published in the municipal 'Structuurplan'. In order to finalise such a plan, hearings were organised by the municipality. In addition, written comments could be sent. Though, the nature of the interaction was not only limited to passive consultation. *Mooi Wageningen* talked about their viewpoint with leaders of the Council fractions, other Council Members, and with members of other societies in Wageningen and nearby municipalities. Also a letter was sent about an (in their eyes) incorrect simulation picture of the wind turbines to B&W, the Council, and the Provincial Council. The same bodies were approached by WEW in their quest for funds and approval of their plans. At that time, it was difficult to speak of any stakeholder acting as a meta-governor, since the initiative for contact fluctuated between the municipality and the civil society actors.

In 2004, the sounding board was installed by the municipality. Members were representatives of neighbouring inhabitants of the Haarweg (six or seven houses), *Stichting Flat Overleg*[105], Department of Real-estate and Construction of WUR, other ground owners near the Haarweg, Foundation *WindEnergie Wageningen* (WEW), Society *Mooi Wageningen*, Foundation *Wagenings Milieu Overleg* and Foundation *Platform Duurzaam Wageningen*. The municipality had already gained experience from the environmental sounding board[106], a bimonthly meeting between nature and environmental organisations and alternately the alderman responsible for the Environment and the alderman responsible for Spatial Planning. Although the municipality determined at first instance whom was included, initial participants were asked which organisations should join the sounding board. The openness of the network was demonstrated by the inclusion of the SFO. Its representative heard of the initiative via an organisation represented in the environmental sounding board.

Network design could also involve the empowerment of certain actors (*ibid*:204). WEW certainly tried several times to become empowered by the municipality. They wanted to be appointed as the sole initiator of the project, but their claim was rejected. Their initial plan of action required a municipal, soft loan of 100,000 euro, but this claim appeared unrealistic. Still, WEW applied and got a subsidy for promoting their goals. The *Platform Duurzaam Wageningen* was also subsidised to organise a discussion evening, but the subject itself was not part of the application. Finally, the viewpoints of WEW and *Mooi Wageningen* were interwoven in the DVD film, while those of other members of the sounding board were left out. However, as WEW and *Mooi Wageningen* are most sharply divided on the issue, the latter just seems a common journalistic approach to report the extreme sides of the story.

A third form of network design is the determination of the scope, decision-making competences and internal procedures (*ibid*). The scope and decision-making competences varied per document. The plan of action was only explained in the sounding board, while the document was 'only' discussed[107] in the commission of Sustainability and Public Planning. Here, no political competences were delegated to the sounding board. However, its members amended the requirements specification and the communication plan, before they were presented to B&W and the Council. This conflicted with the original terms of reference as stated in the plan of action. Considerations of the members of the sounding board were to be presented as an attachment to the draft policy document. This procedure was followed at the final document; the report presenting the results of the survey. The research institute who conducted the survey explained twice the methodology to the sounding board. Interestingly enough, not only opponents of the intended wind farm criticised the report, also representatives of the *Platform Duurzaam Wageningen* disapproved the methodology. The latter were absent at the final meeting; therefore, the attachment to the report read that opponents of wind energy along the Haarweg did not agree with the conclusions of the report. In fact, some proponents shared this view.

The internal procedures were more consistent. The municipality provided for a meeting-room, a chairperson and a secretary. The two civil servants determined the agenda of the meetings, but the representatives all felt that they could add points of discussion to the agenda. At the first meeting, the chairman stressed that organisations should select a representative who would come to the meetings. Since several ground owners were present, one volunteered. Other stakeholder groups or organisations had already deputed a representative.

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[105] Foundation SFO represents the tenants of the Social Housing Foundation Wageningen. The latter owns two buildings near the intended site for wind turbines.
[106] The three last-mentioned organisations also sit on the Environmental Sounding Board.
[107] There was no vote on the plan of action.

According to the model, politicians should formulate the objectives for governance networks (i*bid*). The alderman was briefly present at the first meeting and he stated the goals of the sounding board. The sounding board was established to improve the decision-making process by giving their advice on concept policy documents, after which both documents were discussed by B&W, the Council or both. He underlined that the final decisions were up to the formal democratic actors: B&W and the Council. These goals were not operationalised into detailed sub goals, so a degree of freedom was present for the stakeholders. When it comes to participation of politicians, we can be brief. Both the alderman and Council Members have not actively participated in the sounding board. The civil servants, who were the chairperson and the secretary of the sounding board, functioned as a liaison officer between the network and the alderman. Both civil servants received no instructions from the alderman before the meetings of the sounding board. Their only guidance was the plan of action. Outside the first meeting of the sounding board, the alderman spoke informally about the project with the *Platform Duurzaam Wageningen*, WEW and *Mooi Wageningen*. Formal contacts took place with WEW and *Mooi Wageningen*. In addition, members of the sounding board have contacted Council Members and the civil servant responsible for the project several times. Those lobbying efforts caused an uneven representation of interests, since not all members have contacted the alderman or Council Members. For instance, *Mooi Wageningen* and WEW were very keen on lobbying politicians, while ground owners or inhabitants were more passive.

To be exhaustive, the formal participation process of the regional WERV-vision and the provincial 'Vision on Spatial Planning' were formalised through hearings and letters of citizens and organisations. The *Wagenings Milieu Overleg* and *Mooi Wageningen* objected to the searching location for wind energy along the Haarweg, together with other nature organisations from other municipalities in the vicinity of Wageningen, while WEW and the municipality were in favour. More importantly however, were the elections in 2006. The intended wind farm was just a minor issue. For instance, not all political parties revealed their view on wind energy in general, or more specifically the intended wind farm. The latter impinged on the principle of political accountability. Politicians cannot held responsible through elections, if their viewpoint about an important issue that had a long history was unknown to the constituency.

Anchorage in democratically elected politicians implicitly assumes two responsibility mechanisms: accountability through elections and responsibility in relation to the elected assemblies. As argued in 5.2, the intended wind farm was not a major issue during the elections. This lack of attention caused that accountability through elections did not work out for the policy plan of the intended wind farm. The other mechanism, responsibility in relation to the City Council, involves the relation between the politician and the elected assembly. The opinion of the City Council was not asked before the entire policy documents were completed. Therefore, the only relevant mechanism was here accountability. To conclude, civil servants bridged the gap between the alderman and the sounding board. The alderman did not participate in the meetings and left the determination of the shape and structure of the sounding board to his civil servants. Although accountability through elections was severely severed, the alderman still had to render account to the City Council.

6.2 Representation via the membership basis of participated groups and organisations

The second input legitimacy is anchorage in the membership basis of participating groups and organisations. Its members are of directly affected people, who must be represented correctly in order to obtain democratic legitimacy (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005: 205). Sørensen and Torfing identify three aspects of representation:

- the ability of the membership basis to select and instruct their representatives;
- the ability of the membership basis to form an informed opinion about their representatives' performance in the governance network;
- the ability of the membership basis to express different opinions and criticise the representatives' performance in the governance network (*ibid*: 207).

When we look at the first aspect of democratic representation, the selection and instruction of representatives, we clearly notice that not all representatives in the sounding board have been selected or instructed by their constituencies. The representatives of the ground owners, *Platform Duurzaam Wageningen*, *WindEnergie Wageningen* and the local university have not been selected by their constituencies. Here, two organisations need explanation. *Platform Duurzaam Wageningen* is a foundation that supports cooperation between local nature and environmental groups. The board of the foundation itself exists of independent committee members. WEW is also a foundation with independent board members, but this one has 140 members who have paid the symbolic amount of one euro. Membership of WEW has only symbolic value, too. By having members, WEW wants to show their initiative has public support, but the members are not involved in decision-making.

The other representatives in the sounding board were selected by their constituencies, but in two cases the selection took place in an odd manner. First, the *Wagenings Milieu Overleg* (WMO) has an independent board, which facilitates cooperation between various nature and environmental organisations. Within the sub group Nature and Landscape, board members of WMO confer with representatives of other organisations, like *Mooi Wageningen* and *KNNV*, the society for field biology, to come to joint consensus. At the first meetings, the initial representative of WMO delegated its duties to the representative of *Mooi Wageningen*. During the final three meetings[108] however, a member of an affiliated association, *KNNV*, also represented the interests of the WMO with a clearly different view about the intended wind farm than *Mooi Wageningen* did up till then. Second, a resident of the Haarweg and at the same time member of *Mooi Wageningen* was approached by a board member of its society if he wanted to join the protest against the project. Later, all neighbouring inhabitants living north of the Haarweg were invited by the municipality to join the sounding board. In response to that, he asked his fellow residents if they agreed that he would represent them in the sounding board.

When it came to the instruction of their representatives, the membership basis of the represented groups did not have equal opportunities. Still, opportunities were present. Each representative underlined that he or she was open for comments by their constituency but admitted that it barely happened that he or she was addressed about the issue. Meetings were also convened by *Mooi Wageningen*, *Stichting Flat Overleg* and *Platform Duurzaam Wageningen* on which the intended wind farm was on the agenda. Members and non-members could inform the representatives about their concerns pertaining to wind energy. However, the only organisation that actively allowed her members to instruct their representatives was *Mooi Wageningen*. On July 2003, members of this organisation[109] were sent an email addressing the issue and the advantages and disadvantages of the intended wind farm. They were asked whether their organisation should oppose the intended wind farm along the Haarweg. The somewhat biased phrasing of the question resulted in 41 members in favour of and nine members against the protest.

[108] So far, six meetings of the Sounding Board have been convened.
[109] Only members with an email address were approached. They made up 166 out of approximately 260 members.

Three other representatives had an extraordinary way of taking pulse of their constituencies. First, the ground owner had to ask the civil servant which ground owners he was actually representing. In addition, he was unaware of the fact that some of his fellow ground owners considered to participate financially in the project. So far, he has never contacted the other ground owners. Second, the employee of the Department of Real-estate and Construction of WUR said that the nearby weather station would be relocated. Turbulence by wind turbines would affect thermal air-layers above the weather station, which would interfere with measurements. According to an employee of the weather station, this announced removal is simply not true and plans exist to measure at least another four years at the current location (Jacobs, 2006). The third odd manner of representation was done by the representative of the residents along the Haarweg. Whenever he rode on his bicycle and he spotted his fellow residents in their gardens, he sometimes started a conversation about the issue.

The second criterion of democratic representation is the ability of the membership basis to form an informed opinion about their representatives' performance in the governance network. Direct access was provided by the newsletters of *Mooi Wageningen*[110], *KNNV* and Foundation WEW, but the quality and amount of information differed. For instance, WEW released only two newsletters, both in 2004, addressing their meeting with the mayor, while more could have been announced; their entry into a partnership with commercial developer Evelop in 2006, for instance. In contrast, *Mooi Wageningen* released several newsletters between June 2003 and June 2005, addressing their efforts at the City Council, in the sounding board and in the media. In addition to the newsletter, an impressive file about the wind energy was put on their website. Needless to say, their information is somewhat biased. For instance, in their file about media coverage, articles about WEW are lacking.

Direct access to information could also have been provided by making the minutes of the sounding board public. Neighbouring citizens who were approached by the municipality for joining the sounding board could also state that they would receive the minutes. Although half of the citizens had reported they wanted to receive those minutes, citizens did not receive them. Indirect information channels were the DVD film (see 5.2), local and regional newspapers, and the websites of the municipality, WEW, *Mooi Wageningen* and *Platform Duurzaam Wageningen*. The problem is that the local newspapers often literally copy press releases of the municipality and organisations and that the regional newspaper has to serve more readers than just the readers from Wageningen. As a result, an independent, dedicated watchdog that could give an insight into the representatives' performance in the governance was clearly missing in this case.

Finally, the third criterion of democratic representation is the ability of the membership basis to express different opinions and criticise the representatives' performance in the governance network. Again, opportunities were present to express different opinions, except for ground owners, who were cut off from their 'representative'. Each representative underlined that he or she was open for criticism but admitted that it barely happened that he or she was addressed about the issue. In addition to members actively approaching their representatives, the meetings of several organisations provided at least some room for interactions between some representatives and their membership basis. Expressing different opinions was facilitated by the way two meetings were organised by successively *Mooi Wageningen* and *Platform Duurzaam Wageningen*. The two meetings had in common they were preceded by at least two speakers: one opponent and one proponent.

It is clear that not all representatives of participating organisations were selected or instructed by their constituencies. Only *Mooi Wageningen* actively allowed its members to instruct their representatives. However, the board of this organisation already had declared itself against the project,

[110] The Board minutes are also available for members, but these could not be scrutinised by the author.

which founds its way into the questionnaire. Still, the answers were summarised in a transparent and obvious way. Despite the biased survey, this form of responsibility should be termed response, because the answers were not adapted to something compatible with the wishes of the board. Indirect and direct access to information were incomplete and not always available. This lack of information may caused that representatives did not face *ex-post* critique from their members, but it could also be related with the fact that the wind turbines have not been erected.

6.3 Anchorage in a territorially defined citizenry

In this section, the focus shifts to the third input legitimacy, anchorage in a territorially defined citizenry. This form of legitimacy assumes that a governance network is accountable to citizens who live within the local or regional territory within which a governance network is making decisions; in other words, it links the network with actors outside the network. These citizens are directly affected by the policy outputs and outcomes (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005: 208). Three requirements must be fulfilled to enable public contestation of the policy outputs and outcomes created by governance networks:

- transparency of governance networks and comprehensible accounts of their key policy decisions;
- access to public dialogue with the governance network;
- responsiveness on the part of the governance network (*ibid*: 210).

The territorially defined citizenry is here delineated as the population of the municipality of Wageningen. They live within the territory within which the local authorities made the decision that a onshore wind farm should be erected. In chapter seven, the problems of this narrow definition of the territorially defined citizenry are described.

The first requirement, transparency, is ensured by the visibility of policy decisions for the general public. Press releases about the key policy outputs were distributed by the municipality, and policy papers could be retrieved from the civil servant. The existence of the sounding board was emphatically mentioned in the press releases, but the precise role the representatives played was omitted. The criticized interpretation of the survey results and changes in the requirements specification were left out. Nonetheless, *Mooi Wageningen* distributed a press release with their concerns about the survey results. Both the DVD and the newspaper articles were rather comprehensible for lay persons. For instance, technical jargon, normally attributable to wind energy, was seldom used in the media coverage of the wind farm Haarweg. However, when it comes to the height of the wind turbines, several parties have misled the general public. Both the municipality and *Mooi Wageningen* 'forgot' to tell that the height of wind turbines can be expressed in two terms: hub height and total height to the top of the blade tip. In the municipal DVD, a height of 105 meters was mentioned, while newsletters and newspapers articles of *Mooi Wageningen* reported heights ranging from 100 to 150 meters. The precise type of wind turbines that will be used depends not only on the location's specifics but also on the initiator's wishes. These are the most probable reasons why WEW will state that it has never mentioned any heights in its press releases.

Public dialogue with the governance network, the second criterion of citizen deliberation, took place in two forms. There were the already mentioned meetings of Council Members that could be attended or even addressed[111]. Not to mention, several events where organised either to inform or to serve as a discussion platform for the general public. Information was provided by an evening of the municipality and by board members of WEW at the local Saturday market[112]. Room for discussion was provided by a 'political pub', organised by *GroenLinks*; a debate, organised by *Mooi Wageningen* and another debate, organised by *Platform Duurzaam Wageningen*. On all evenings, members of the governance networks were present as opening speakers, after which the public could join the debate. Still, the link between opinions about wind energy and the role the representatives played in the network was not really dealt with during these evenings. For instance, the opponents were not asked how their organisations had tried to prevent that wind turbines would be built along the Haarweg. In this way, the deeds of the governance network in general or more specifically the representatives was not made publicly available.

Finally, the third requirement is responsiveness on the part of the governance network. At least one organisation, *Platform Duurzaam Wageningen*, used one of the meetings to check whether their standpoint was in line with the views expressed on that evening. But whether members of the governance network really readjusted their view based on these public meetings is questionable. In the sounding board, different opinions were also expressed and several interviewees stated that no representative has adopted one's view after hearing other representatives' opinions. In brief, many efforts were put by the municipality and organisations in making the process comprehensible for lay people. The goal of the organised meetings was solely to inform and to serve as a discussion platform Representatives or politicians did not render account of their actions, thereby making it questionable whether these actors readjusted their course of action.

6.4 Democratic rules specified by a particular grammar of conduct

The first throughput legitimacy is that a governance network should follow the democratic rules specified by a particular grammar of conduct. It entails these (normative) democratic rules to be followed in governance arrangements:

- inclusion of all relevant and affected actors and a broad definition of the political agenda in the beginning, in order to be accessible for a wide range of actors;
- demand of democratic deliberation, like respect for other people's opinions;
- demand for a democratic improvement of society and the future demand of governance (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005: 212-214).

The first aspect can be broken down into two sub aspects. First, the demand of inclusion of all relevant and affected actors was not completely fulfilled. Members of the sounding board were asked if other organisations should be included, but no groups were added. According to the model of democratic anchorage, three kinds of groups should have been included. Nature organisations from other municipalities and the province were not directly represented in the sounding board, although they raised considerations against the wind farm when the regional and provincial visions about public planning were discussed. However, two arguments against their inclusion could be made. *Mooi Wageningen* cooperates with both the regional and provincial nature organisations and via *Mooi*

[111] The minutes of the City Council could be retrieved via the website of the municipality.
[112] This took place two or three times.

Wageningen, their voice is heard. Besides this argument, a second argument could be that only citizens and organisations from Wageningen are directly affected since the wind turbines are to be located in Wageningen. Chapter seven deals more elaborately with this issue. A second organisation is the *Stichting Sociale Huisvesting Wageningen*[113] (SSHW), which owns two buildings in the vicinity of the intended spot. The SSHW was invited but only wanted to receive the minutes. This organisation lacks an official standpoint until planning and environmental permissions are applied for. Another group of actors who should have been represented in the sounding board are political actors. They contribute directly to the production of public policy; therefore, these actors should have been present.

The second sub aspect is a broad definition of the agenda, which was not fulfilled either. The meetings of sounding board were focussed on a single interest. The only issue that was on the agenda was the wind farm along the Haarweg. Other spots for wind energy were excluded by policy plans of provincial authorities. Other policy solutions like other forms of sustainable energy were banned by the political agenda. This small definition prevented negotiation between opponents and proponents. About wind farms, there is little to negotiate on. One can only negotiate on the particular spot or on compensation measures but not on the wind turbines themselves. For instance, the height depends on the available wind resources and on the surface roughness of the surroundings.

The second criterion of anchorage in democratic rules is the demand for democratic deliberation. All interviewees agreed that there was respect for other people's opinions in the sounding board and that the decision-making processes in both the political sphere and in the sounding board itself were relatively transparent. Despite the respect and the transparency, a commitment to reach a 'rough consensus' was not always present by *Mooi Wageningen*, but for them, this was thwarted by the negative attitude of their constituency and by the small-defined agenda of the sounding board. Other actors were more committed to reach consensus. For instance, a representative of WEW stated that the survey amongst citizens should not be a matter of dispute after other representatives had criticised the report. He then agreed that further explanation was needed. What was missing in one case, was 'respect' for the decision-making process at the provincial level. The *GroenLinks* alderman stated on 26 May 2005 that the Province of Gelderland had approved definitively the searching location for wind energy in Wageningen (De Gelderlander, 2005b). But the truth was something more in the middle. By then, the Provincial Executive answered the comments of the municipality. This led to changes in the draft version, which was still to be approved by a commission of the Provincial Council and the Council itself on successively 15 June and 29 June.

Whether the third criterion, demand for a democratic improvement of society and the future system of governance, is fulfilled, is rather difficult to answer. The political empowerment of at least three interviewees have been augmented. Other interviewees were considered as 'expert citizens', who were already more experienced than average citizens when it came to political capital. The search for new forms of democracy is also stimulated through the policy output of the new Board of mayor and aldermen. *GroenLinks* is currently investigating the possibilities for holding a referendum about the subject. Whether their political motives are meant to contribute to a further democratisation of the public policy-making process is highly uncertain. In the years *GroenLinks* had control of the town hall, a referendum was not put on the political agenda. Moreover, *Mooi Wageningen* also suggested that a referendum should be hold when the searching location for wind energy became public (De Gelderlander, 2003a). It is more likely that the opponents of the prevailing policy plans use the referendum as an instrument to persuade proponents than that the opponents are sincere advocates of further democratisation of the public policy-making process. All in all, it remains difficult whether experiences gained from this intended wind farm will contribute to future systems of governance,

[113] Social Housing Foundation Wageningen.

while lessons could be learnt. For instance, *Mooi Wageningen* and several political parties were not against wind energy, but only objected to the intended spot. A broader definition of the agenda and could have led to another form of renewable energy at another location.

6.5 Dimensions of power

If the exercise of power is neglected in a network analysis, the process can be wrongfully considered as meeting democratic standards. Therefore, the exercise of power was added as a second throughput legitimacy. Lukes identifies three dimensions of power:

- A gets B to do something that B would not otherwise have done;
- A prevents B from putting issues on the political agenda that are detrimental to A;
- A shapes B's perceptions and preferences (Lukes, 1974).

According to the one-dimensional view, the coalition partners of the two *GroenLinks* aldermen exercised visible power. The first alderman had to give in when his coalition partners wanted that the public support was first measured. The second alderman was forced by his coalition partners to accept that issues like public support, landscape, and environment had to be investigated, before the zoning scheme could be adopted. According to the two-dimensional view, we must look at so-called non-decisions. All interviewees shared the view that they could influence the agenda, but those issues had to fit in the frame of wind energy. Other renewables were not to be touched upon. These non-decisions were taken as a consequence of the fact that the *GroenLinks* alderman had installed the sounding board with only one discussion topic on the agenda[114].

Finally, according to the three-dimensional view, individual's interests have been shaped by other actors. Stakeholders reported that this was the case with the DVD. Goal of the film was to inform, but the need for wind energy was also clearly underlined, amongst others by gainsaying several disadvantages and by concluding that wind energy is possible in Wageningen. After the film was broadcasted, the survey was done. Moreover, the survey was sent along with a brochure, summarising what had already been said in the film. The need for wind turbines in Wageningen was certainly to be created by these communication channels. The second critical remark was that the representative of *Mooi Wageningen* was not portrayed on the DVD. He did not agree with the sentences he was intended to speak, but it was his own decision not to appear on the day of recording. Still, their viewpoint was read by a voiceover. Lastly, the whole debate would have been framed quite differently, if the real costs made by the authorities were known[115]. During the whole policy process, two surveys have been conducted, a DVD film has been made, two excursions have been held and several civil servants have worked on the project. The commission of Sustainability and Public Planning received an estimate of the costs, belonging to the plan of action. That estimate was kept secret, so the real costs of the plan of action or the costs of the preceding policy plans will not be known to the NGOs and the general public. If all those costs were known the public, it would have become very clear that the realisation of the project was more important than the cost-efficiency of the process leading to the realisation.

[114] In 1999, the decision to focus on wind energy was taken by B&W and approved by the responsible commission of the City Council (Van Wichen, 1999).
[115] Subsidies have been given by the ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment and SenterNovem, an agency of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.

Aim of this section has been to show that the process did not completely live up to democratic standards due to the various exercises of power. The political party *GroenLinks* continued to boost the process, while its members must have known that the City Council was divided on the issue. The coalition partners of *GroenLinks* used visible power to delay the project. Due to the way the debate was framed, other renewables or wind farms outside Wageningen were not dealt with. Finally, the municipality tried to shape citizens' interests by disseminating somewhat biased information and by keeping the real costs secret.

7. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE OFFSHORE AND ONSHORE CASES

In section 2.3, the question was asked whether interests were *a priori* disadvantaged by the characteristics of the policy domain of wind energy. I then argued that the policy domain of wind energy can be characterised by *interest group politics*, i.e. a political environment in which both concentrated costs and benefits give rise to organised beneficiaries and cost-payers. On the one hand, developers and 'pure' environmental organisations[116] are clearly beneficiaries of policies promoting wind energy, while on the other hand, possible adversaries are cost-payers only when locations have been selected for building wind turbines. In the case of concrete wind farms however, both beneficiaries and cost-payers are likely to organise themselves. Governance through networks is only possible in such a political environment. Other environments are characterised by interests that are highly skewed in favour or against a certain policy, and other forms of coordination are needed to ensure that opposing voices are heard (Kjær, 2004:48). But, although opposing interests exist in networks around wind energy, can we simply say that all voices were heard or were some interests disproportionably represented?

The hypotheses are repeated here, to make it easier for the reader to match them up with the input legitimacies of the democratic anchorage model. Actor arrangements were expected to differ between the onshore and offshore cases, because:

1. national levels of government are more susceptible for social advantages of wind energy than local authorities;
2. mobilisation of citizens is less likely in the offshore case;
3. large, environmental NGOs fear NIMBY-attitudes amongst their members;
4. actors with more resources are present in networks around offshore wind farms.

The first hypothesis was partially valid. Both the municipality of Wageningen and the national government have formulated targets for renewable energy, referring to the threat of climate change. Although the municipal goal can be characterized as more ambitious, the national government has in return set a separate goal for wind energy –both onshore and offshore. The differences between the offshore and onshore cases were reflected in the manner in which the political discussion was shaped. In the City Council, the support of the local population was considered as crucial, whereas members of the (national) Lower House mainly debated about the time-frame of the NSW and about the initiative of E-Connection for a second offshore wind farm. These findings seem to confirm the fist hypothesis, but the goal of the pilot project was to investigate social disadvantages. Just this research could be a ground for members of the parliament not to mention effects on nature and society as reasons to halt the KPD. What differed in the cases, was that the local authorities recognised most of the affected stakeholders[117] and asked them to join the sounding board, while the national government and NoordzeeWind decided who was consulted for the compensation plan or the MEP based on their own judgements, rather than analysing who was affected by the offshore wind farm. Apparently, local organisations were not judged as necessary to be included.

[116] There is no such thing as pure environmental organisations. The dispute between nature and environmental organisations can better be described as a continuum with two poles. Greenpeace, for example, lays close to the environmental pole.

[117] Citizens from Rhenen and neighbouring citizens living on the *Huppelpad* were neglected by the municipality of Wageningen.

Concerning the second hypothesis of the mobilisation of citizens being less likely in the offshore case, no new organisations have been established in both cases. Citizens have participated either directly, representing no-one but themselves, or indirectly, via existing organisations. In the onshore case, the sounding board consisted of all but one citizens of Wageningen. The concerns of citizens from Rhenen were not involved by the municipality of Wageningen, while the intended wind farm was located nearby the border with Rhenen (see figure 3). In contrast, citizens from several municipalities near the offshore wind farm were present in the formal participation procedures. Still, local citizens were not asked for attending meetings outside the formal participation[118]. Based on these case studies, it cannot be concluded that the barriers, as identified in 2.5, prevented citizens from participating in the offshore case. Some citizens did seek cooperation with NGOs to improve their position. *Stichting Duinbehoud* was approached by two citizens from Egmond for a joint lawsuit, but also in the onshore case, the person representing the neighbouring inhabitants cooperated with *Mooi Wageningen*. Barriers to participation may prove to be too low for people with a strong motivation. Citizens might extend their 'backyards' to the sea, which compensates for the increased distance from their actual backyards[119]. The virtual distance between local citizens and the national government was partly overcome by the national government by organising hearings in Egmond and by clearly explaining citizens what they could do if they did not agree. Not to mention, citizens with a positive stance towards the intended wind farms, consumers of green energy and tax payers have not participated in both cases.

At first glance, the third hypothesis seemed not difficult to prove in the offshore case. The presence of large, environmental organisations, which constituencies are nationally dispersed[120], was not mirrored in the onshore case. It was hypothesized that the reason for their absence on the mainland was that they fear NIMBY-attitudes amongst their members. Their presence in the network around the offshore wind farm was made clear by hypothesizing that environmental NGOs perceive NIMBY-attitudes as irrelevant due to the larger distance between people and wind turbines. But was the presence of large, environmental NGOs motivated by a lack of NIMBY-attitudes?

NIMBY is commonly perceived as related to the own living environs of citizens. Wolsink shows that three out of four NIMBY variants also apply to projects announced outside the neighbourhood of citizens. Only the rather cynical NIMBY-A variant is related to the own 'back yard' (Wolsink, 2000:57). In a survey of the Waddenvereniging[121] amongst its members, no relation between support for wind power and living near the Wadden region was found. In addition, the social advantage of wind turbines contributing to slowing down climate change was not highly valued, indicating that weighing ecological values and sustainable energy was not really an issue for members (*ibid*:61). Thus, the third hypothesis appeared theoretically flawed, because three out of four NIMBY attitudes are not dependent on the distance between 'homes' and wind turbines.

In reality however, NGOs might still use the conventional view of NIMBY as a reason to back off from wind farms on the mainland. In the offshore case study, two out of four investigated NGOs faced critique from their members[122]. Comments from their members did not prevent these NGOs from participating in networks. For instance, *Vogelbescherming Nederland* only adjusted their communication strategy towards their members. In sum, the hypothesis that large, environmental

[118] The municipality of Bergen, officially representing their citizens, sit on the sounding board around the MEP.
[119] Most citizens who participated in the formal participation procedure were living in the vicinity of Egmond aan Zee. However, measuring NIMBY-attitudes was not part of this research.
[120] Instead of constituencies who are bound to provincial or local borders
[121] Wadden Union
[122] The lion's share of comments and questions *Vogelbescherming Nederland* receives is related to wind energy (Tentij, 2006).

NGOs fear NIMBY-attitudes amongst their members could not be proven. Part of the fear might be removed by the way modern NGOs operate. The insight members have is largely determined by what their organisations communicate towards their constituency. Leaving sensitive issues out of newsletters then becomes very attractive for NGOs. Then, the key question that remains to be answered is why large NGOs are not directly involved in networks around onshore wind turbines. If they are present, they only advise their local counterparts. Several reasons for their absence can be given. First, large NGOs consider the threatened ecological values and the environmental benefits as too low, since the average onshore wind farms are much smaller than the offshore ones. Second, specialization in operating on local, regional, national or international levels has taken place. Large NGOs consider their local counterparts as more specialized in dealing with local activities. Finally, national NGOs avoid issues that are considered as too sensitive amongst their constituencies.

The last hypothesis was that actors with more resources are present in the offshore case. The resources of both the developer and the national government could not be mirrored by those of the intended developer (WEW in cooperation with a commercial developer) and the local authorities. A civil servant of the ministry of Economic Affairs told that the project team of civil servants was under much pressure to quickly round off the draft KPD. That pressure was caused by the minister, but also by consortia of developers (Boomsma, 2006). The civil servant of Wageningen did not report any external pressures. Due to a lack of financial resources, WEW was not able to put much pressure on the municipality. This may have changed due to their joint venture with a commercial developer. The national actors had more knowledge and financial resources than their local counterparts. Still, the governmental actors in both cases were dependent on other governmental actors. Whereas the province of Gelderland had to approve the plans of the municipality of Wageningen, municipalities were involved in issuing consents of the national project.

The distribution of resources in a network determines the mutual dependencies between actors. Although more resourceful actors were present in the offshore network, the abundance of resources was seldom used to exercise power. Resources were important, though. Having small amounts of resources prevented actors, like citizens and the municipality of Bergen, to become key players. However, having the right kind of resources was a major advantage. For example, the knowledge of the local zoning scheme made *Stichting Duinbehoud* to trump NoordzeeWind with the threat of a lawsuit against the intended location of the transformer station. The presence of actors with many resources might have functioned as a discouragement for other actors to participate. After NoordzeeWind became involved, the number of participations in the formal participation procedures dropped significantly. A more logical explanation was that the KPD has become definitive and many stakeholders lost hope that they could stop the project.

Concluding, two out of four hypotheses could not be proven. The other two had the following consequences for the democratic performance. The national levels of government were more susceptible for the social advantages of wind farms than the local authorities. This partly confirmed hypothesis may have led to the concerns of citizens and fishermen being neglected by the national government. Nature and environmental NGOs, however, were involved from the start (feasibility study). Besides, their cooperation could be used to create legitimacy (see chapter nine). The second hypothesis was not difficult to prove, but the consequences for the democratic performance were rather small. Resources were barely used to exclude stakeholders from participating or from influencing the agenda.

8. DISCUSSION

Several limitations of this research should be kept in mind, since they prevent an uncritical extrapolation to other case studies. First of all, two wind farms is not much. Therefore, this study must not be considered as a randomly selected sample from Dutch wind farms. That was never its purpose, but drawing a random sample from a 'population' of just one offshore wind farm would have been difficult, too. OWEZ had the symbolic value of being the first offshore wind farm. It served as an example for the then future offshore wind policies of the Dutch government, especially when E-Connection applied for consents for wind farms outside territorial waters. As a result, much of NGO protests were fed by the offshore wind energy policies in general, instead of only the wind farm itself. Second, the role of the government has not always been so prominent. Many onshore wind turbines are initiated by private actors and the same goes for initiatives for new offshore wind farms. Perhaps that is why both investigated case studies are rather exceptional when it comes to their democratic performance. Other wind farms might prove to be less democratically anchored, because installing sounding boards, for example, is quite uncommon. Decision-making about most wind farms is a prerogative of formal democratic processes, in which the opinions of stakeholders are perhaps seldom heard and taken into account.

Third, this report might be criticized on methodological grounds. The fact that no citizens from Egmond have been interviewed can be considered as a flaw. It was as well a deliberate choice of the author as the result of communication channels. Citizens from Egmond have not played a major role in the offshore case study, but their addresses were also difficult to find. In addition, job-hopping and long-lasting policy processes are a combination that does not yield benefits for a research into such processes. Most interviewees in the offshore case referred to former colleagues, when details of the KPD or even the consents were asked. In the case of Greenpeace, I was fortunately referred to such a former colleague, but often old details remained untouched in interviews. Most importantly however, is the question why a governance approach was chosen instead of an 'old-fashioned' network approach. Here, 'no result is a result, too' would be an appropriate answer. While investigating the case studies, I found out that not all assumptions of governance were fulfilled. Still, elements of the network approach are present in this study. The chapters three and five give an extensive overview of the two policy processes and which decisions were affected by which actors. Besides, the governance approach also has its advantages when it comes to analysing the democratic performance. Governance offers a holistic view of which actors *could* have been involved and what that means for the democratic anchorage, while a network approach would have solely focused on the actors that were involved.

9. CONCLUSION

This paper examined what the democratic performance was of an offshore wind farm and an intended, onshore wind farm. In this chapter, an answer to that question is given. For sake of clarity, the research questions are repeated here:

1. *which kinds of governance arrangements have emerged around development policies for wind energy farms?*
2. *what role do Dutch levels of government, civil society actors and market actors play in these arrangements?*
3. *how are wind energy networks democratically anchored?*
4. *how is power exercised in wind energy networks?*

Both networks that were investigated in this paper can be characterised as policy networks with a key role for levels of government. The competent authorities were in possession of crucial resources. The municipality of Wageningen and the national government could change spatial planning documents, could issue consents, and could give subsidies. Both wind farms were initiated by levels of government, and without their cooperation, the projects would have stopped. Still, the competent authorities were also dependent on other levels of government to issue consents and change spatial planning documents, and on market actors to develop the wind farms. Especially in the Egmond case, the national government became more dependent of the developer NoordzeeWind, when the consents had been issued. Then the relation between the two actors was based on a contract, implying a more horizontal relationship. In contrast, the onshore network lacked the presence of market actors for the larger part. In the beginning, Nuon was present and later, Evelop became involved. WEW, however, can be best described as an entrepreneur. WEW tried to take the lead in building the wind turbines with public and private money. The efforts of WEW's founders have to be seen as motivated by ideological incentives.

Finally, civil society actors have surely influenced decisions, but most meetings with NGOs have been used to create legitimacy. In these meetings, NGOs were informed and consulted, and sometimes they even participated in decision-making[123], but the real decisions were not taken in network-like settings. Instead, decisions about where, how tall, and how many were taken in technocratic and governmental settings. For instance, the Commission 'Verbruggen' advised the government to limit the maximal water depth to 20 meters, based on economical considerations. NGOs were not involved in such decisions. As a result, both network settings cannot be termed as governance networks. Major policy decisions were neither jointly produced nor jointly implemented by all actors involved in the network. One misconception, often reported by governance literature, did hold true. In the offshore case, civil servants from several ministries have negotiated about the KPD. In addition, the municipality of Bergen bargained with the ministry of Economic Affairs about the visitor centre. These examples show that levels of government are interdependent.

Now that the first two research questions are covered, the focus shifts to the questions three and four. The democratic anchorage of the wind energy networks was measured by the model of Sørensen and Torfing. Democratically elected politicians could have played an important role, but their civil servants functioned as liaison officers between other network actors and the politicians themselves. Two responsibility mechanisms were involved: accountability though elections and accountability towards the assemblies. The latter was fulfilled for the larger part, as most details were

[123] The onshore sounding board decided about the requirement specification.

open for discussion. However, accountability though elections was not met in both case studies. Furthermore, two interesting differences between them are mentioned here. The first one was that interest mediation took place between nature and environmental organisations in the offshore network. This was originally initiated by the government[124], but the mediation continued without interference. Second, local authorities were more susceptible for the concerns of local citizens and stakeholders with an interest in the area intended for wind energy. This confirmed the hypothesis that local authorities are more susceptible for the disadvantages of wind farms, while the national levels of government are more susceptible for the advantages of wind farms.

Democratic anchorage was also to be obtained by the representation via the membership basis of participating organisations, but in most cases the relation between representatives and members was severed. In addition, information about the representative's performance in the network was often unavailable and incomplete. The democratic performance could be enhanced by accountability to the territorially defined citizenry. Indeed, many efforts were put in making the process both comprehensible and accessible for citizens, but it remains questionable whether their concerns were really taken into account. In the Wageningen case, it was difficult to tell whether NGO representatives were accountable to their members or to citizens in general, as the particular meetings were open for both. The result was that access to onshore NGOs was easier for both members and other lay people than their offshore counterparts. When it came to the process itself, both networks were characterised by a small-defined policy agenda, which prevented negotiation between actors. In addition, other forms of power were exercised to influence the process. In both cases, actors tried to shape directly or indirectly preferences of local citizens by either promising a visitor centre (NoordzeeWind) or stressing the need for wind energy (municipality of Wageningen). Thus, the consequences of more resourceful actors being present in the offshore network had no significant consequences for the democratic performance[125].

Overall, it would be difficult to conclude that network A is better democratically anchored than network B, because weighing the five legitimacies is virtually impossible. We can conclude, however, that 'real' decisions were taken by politicians and that *similar* 'real' decisions could not have been taken in network-like settings due to several problems. First of all, the debates were solely framed around wind farms. In both cases, even the locations were predetermined. In this way, one can only negotiate about compensation. Other forms of renewable energy or the features on the wind farm (location, number of wind turbines) are excluded from the agenda. Second, technocratic and economical characteristics of wind farms prevented negotiation. The height, number, and location did not depend on the developer's wishes but on the availability of wind resources and financial investments. For the larger part, these characteristics are a given for developers. Third although, wind energy involves a political environment with concentrated costs and benefits (and thus probably organised beneficiaries and cost-payers), what matters is the timing of the costs. Actors with an interest in the area intended for wind energy have only enough reason to organise themselves, when that area is determined for wind energy. Without a concrete application of wind energy, they will not organise. So, their opinions are normally not heard before it is decided that wind energy should be part of the solution to climate change. In addition, Wolsink puts that some of the attitudes may change during the project. People might have an initially positive attitude towards application of wind energy,

[124] A reason for initiating this interest mediation is that nature and environmental organisations acknowledge both advantages and disadvantages of wind energy. Other stakeholders are either more focused on the advantages or more devoted to the disadvantages. Thus, nature and environmental organisations were an interesting partner for the government to legitimise their policies .

[125] In 'pure' governance networks, in which actors are dependent on each other, having more resources might have been linked with more exercises of power.

which is followed by a shift in the negative direction caused by the announcement of a project. Most importantly, civil society actors have nothing to offer in return for meeting their demands. These actors can only threaten to delay the project by judicial mechanisms. As a result, in 'pure' governance, in which actors are dependent on each other, it would have been attractive to exclude civil society actors from participating. Therefore, we conclude that in political environments with organised beneficiaries and cost-payers network steering without more hierarchical structures is only suitable, when beneficiaries and cost-payers have room for negotiation. If room for negotiation is lacking in such conflicting conditions, the decision should be made by politicians, who take responsibility for that.

The model of Sørensen and Torfing can be improved. It was extended by adding dimensions of power. Actors might be present in the network but could be prevented by other actors to actually influence the political agenda. This example shows that if the exercise of power is neglected in a network analysis, the process will be wrongfully considered as meeting democratic standards. It was also extended with responsibility mechanisms. Politicians are not only accountable to the assemblies, but they are also responsible to citizens. The issue, which was dealt with in a network, must at least have the opportunity to be an issue during the elections. The standpoint about that issue must be present in election programmes of political parties. This improvement should be included in the model. Finally, two concepts that are used by Sørensen and Torfing need clarification: 'directly affected people' and 'territorially defined citizenry'. I elucidated 'directly affected people' by using distributions of costs and benefits. Still, the matter cannot be resolved: are directly affected people equal to people with either concentrated costs or concentrated benefits? If so, how concentrated must they be for actors to be involved? Second, what means 'territorially defined citizenry', to which network actors are accountable? It is a concept that can be interpreted in many ways, which is shown by the following example. Citizens of the municipality of Rhenen were completely left in the dark in the onshore case. Still, some of them lived closer to the intended location than their counterparts in Wageningen, to which B&W of Wageningen is accountable. This example shows that projects near administrative borders, with cross-bordering effects, result in responsibility problems.

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OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEWEES

Table 5. Interviewees onshore case study: Wageningen

DATE	ORGANISATION	INTERVIEWEE
5 April 2006	Outgoing Alderman (GroenLinks)-Municipality of GroenLinks	Rik Eweg *
7 April 2006	Member City Council (GroenLinks)-Municipality of Wageningen Former member-Foundation WindEnergy Wageningen	Lex Hoefsloot
10 April 2006	Secretary-KNNV Wageningen, society for field biology	Andrew Spink
11 April 2006	Member-Platform Sustainable Wageningen Supportive Member City Council (GroenLinks)-Municipality of Wageningen	Nienke Brouwer
18 April 2006	Chairperson-Foundation WindEnergy Wageningen	Paddy Noë *
19 April 2006	Representative-neighbouring inhabitants Member 'Beautiful Wageningen'	Rolf Hoekstra
20 April 2006	Board Member-Society Beautiful Wageningen	Hans Brons *
20 April 2006	Representative-ground owners	G.Z.V. Daniëls
8 May 2006	Policy advisor Climate and Sustainability-Municipality of Wageningen	Hans van Wichen *

Table 6. Interviewees offshore case study: Egmond aan Zee

DATE	ORGANISATION	INTERVIEWEE
19 May 2006	Policy advisor-Regional environmental agency Alkmaar (MRA)	Frits Kwint *
22 May 2006	Policy advisor Housing and Spatial Planning-Municipality of Velsen	Joost Dunselman
23 May 2006	Director-Society for Dune Conservation	Marc Janssen*,**
24 May 2006	Permit manager-NoordzeeWind Senior developer-WEOM	Johan Dekkers*
30 May 2006	Policy advisor Maritime Affairs-Dutch Fish Product Board	Henk Demkes*
31 May 2006	Policy advisor-North Sea Directorate, Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management, Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Water Management	Ronald van den Heuvel
31 May 2006	Policy advisor-Directorate for Energy Production, Directorate-General for Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs	Hajo Boomsma
8 June 2006	Former Campaign leader-Foundation Greenpeace Developer-Evelop	Ruud van Leeuwen
19 June 2006	Officer Department Conservation -Netherlands Society for the Protection of Birds	Manon Tentij*,**
3 July 2006	The North Sea Foundation-project leader marine ecology	Systke van den Akker**

* In addition to the interviews, there have been several contacts with these persons, most of them by email or phone.
** Telephone interview

APPENDIX A. CONSENTS FOR THE OFFSHORE WIND FARM

Table 7. Consents and contracts of the OWEZ (source: Zeelenberg, 2005c; Dekkers, 2006)

	ACT	CONSENT	SCOPE	AUTHORITY
onshore	Public Works Act	Public works consent	Crossing 1 km-zone	Directorate Public Works and Water Management North Holland
	Public Works Act	Dispensation	Dunes crossing of cables	Water Authority
	Public Works Act	Public works consent	Crossing infrastructure works	Directorate Public Works and Water Management North Holland
	Flora and Fauna Act	Dispensation	Crossing coastal zone environment	Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality
	Environmental Management Act	Environmental consent	Transformer station	Province of North Holland
	Housing Act	Building consent	Transformer station	Municipality of Velsen
	Public Works Act	Building consent	Driveway transformer station	Regional Department North Holland Directorate-General of Public Works and Water Management
	Spatial Planning Act	Amendment of several local development plans		Municipality of Velsen
	Spatial Planning Act	Laying consent[126]	Electricity cable	Municipality of Velsen
	Spatial Planning Act	Laying consent	Electricity cable	Municipality of Beverwijk
offshore	Public Works Act	Building consent	Meteorological mast	Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Water Management
	Public Works Act	Public works consent	Constructing, maintaining and abolishing wind farm and electricity cable	Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Water Management
	Environmental Management Act	Environmental consent	Exploiting wind farm	Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment
	Civil Code	Lease for the site	Lease for 20 years	Ministry of Finance
	-	Contracts	Crossing other submarine cables	-

[126] Continuon applied for these consents. Continuon is a subsidiary of Nuon (one of the partners in NoordzeeWind).

APPENDIX B. DISPUTE ABOUT THE ONSHORE OPINION POLL

The results of both surveys, conducted amongst citizens of Wageningen, was a matter of dispute. Especially, representatives from *Mooi Wageningen* disagreed with the way the answers of the questions were presented, but the representatives of *Platform Duurzaam Wageningen* and *KNNV* also challenged parts of the second report (2005). The main grievances of Mooi Wageningen boiled down to two questions.

1. Citizens were asked the following question: *What do you think of the idea to built wind turbines along the Haarweg?*

Table 8. Answers of citizens on question one (source: Derijcke, 2006)

CATEGORIES	PERCENTAGES	
	All citizens	Neighbouring citizens
Highly acceptable	31	13
Somewhat acceptable	24	17
Neutral	15	9
Somewhat unacceptable	11	6
Highly unacceptable	19	55

2. Citizens were also asked the following question: *Do you think that your municipality should actively look for sites where one or more wind turbines can be built?*

Table 9. Answers of citizens on question two (source: IVAM, 2005)

CATEGORIES	ALL CITIZENS
Yes, certainly	56
Maybe	19
Probably not	3
No, certainly not	18
Don't know	4

Categories were taken together as follows. At the first question, the percentages of 'Highly acceptable' and 'Somewhat acceptable' were added, while the same was done for 'Highly unacceptable' and 'Somewhat unacceptable'. In doing so, the conclusion read that 55 per cent of all citizens was positive about wind turbines along the Haarweg and that 62 per cent[127] of neighbouring citizens was against. At the second question, the conclusion read that 56 per cent said 'yes, 18 per cent said 'no', and 26 per cent said 'under condition'. For the latter, percentages of 'maybe', 'probably not', and 'don't know' were added up (IVAM, 2005).

Mooi Wageningen did not agree with the different additions. According to this society, the conclusion with regard to the first question should state that 31 per cent of all citizens is in favour, 19 per cent is against, and 50 per cent is neutral or wants more information (Van der Kolk, 2006).

[127] Rounding error: 55.3 (highly unacceptable) and 6.4 (somewhat unacceptable) makes 61.7.