





Opportunities and obstacles concerning local partnership in Cordaid's post-earthquake aid mission in Haiti

Loukie Molenaar
Wageningen University
January 2012



Wageningen University - Department of Social Sciences

Rural Development Sociology

**Opportunities and obstacles concerning local partnership in
Cordaid's post-earthquake aid mission in Haiti**

January 2012

Msc International Development Studies

Loukie Molenaar

Disaster Studies

Supervisor: Dr. Jeroen Warner

RDS 70824

Summary

One of the things often mentioned in scientific literature and policy documents of international agencies is the need to engage local people in the reconstruction process of crisis-related situations in order to create resilient recovery. When in January 2010 Haiti was hit by a major earthquake there was an enormous influx of international organizations that all wanted to give their support. To understand to what extent international organizations have collaborated with local organizations since the earthquake in Haiti I conducted research for three months in the area of Léogâne. The aim of this research is to gain more insight into participatory approaches of international agencies and partnership relations between international and local organizations in crisis-related situations. During my fieldwork I stayed with the Dutch relief and development organization Cordaid, therefore this research is especially focused on the case of the Cordaid. However, information based on interviews with other international organizations in Haiti is also included in this thesis.

Cordaid has already been working in Haiti for more than thirty years, as many international organizations. Since, Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere it has been dependent on aid for many decades. After independence Haiti has been plagued by political instability, economic failure, violence, corruption, and high insecurity. In this situation international organizations like Cordaid try to reconstruct Haiti. Cordaid has always worked with local partner organizations on longer-term development programs, but after the earthquake they decided to open two offices in Haiti and start with a shelter program. To involve the local people in this program Cordaid established committees that assisted the Cordaid staff in selecting which beneficiaries would be the first ones to receive a shelter.

In this research three issues have been addressed. In the first place I studied what kind of local organizations were already present in the areas of Grand Goave and Lompré and if Cordaid has made use of those structures in their shelter program. It became clear that although Cordaid has recognized that an understanding of social structures and social capital is essential in responding to a complex emergency, Cordaid was not aware of already existing and emerging local organizations in the area of Grand Goave City and Lompré. However, Cordaid did involve local people in their shelter program by establishing local committees. In this way Cordaid has utilized local knowledge and networks of people in the communities. Besides studying local organizations in Grand Goave and Lompré I wanted to understand in what way the relationship between Cordaid and their partners was affected by the earthquake. It became clear that although Cordaid already worked for more than thirty years with local partner organizations in Haiti tensions arose between Cordaid and their partners after the earthquake. While, Cordaid involved some of their partners in emergency projects, it was soon stated by Cordaid that those partners were not capable enough to execute emergency projects. Therefore, Cordaid decided to coordinate their shelter program by themselves.

Second, I gained more insight into the challenges and regulations aid workers have to deal with in a post-disaster context like Haiti. It was concluded that the high level of corruption especially at government level, but also in other layers of society has limited constructive collaboration between different actors after the earthquake in Haiti. Also international organizations often have to deal with short time-frames, because donors require quick results. This means that there is often less time to invest in longer-term relationships with local people. Furthermore, the importance of visibility is also an issue that influences

actions taken by international organizations. Although, international agencies want to collaborate with local organizations they also want to show their own results, because when a next disaster happens they want to be part of the game.

Third, during my first weeks in Haiti I became aware that both international aid workers and Haitians had quite negative perceptions about each other. Therefore, I studied the mutual perceptions and expectations of international aid workers and Haitians. It became clear that those perceptions have hindered the process of creating valuable relationships between Haitians and international aid workers. While, aid workers I interviewed found themselves more suitable to reconstruct Haiti, Haitians I interviewed agreed on the one hand and argued that the presence of international organizations is necessary to reconstruct Haiti, because the government is doing nothing and those international organizations have access to funds. However, on the other hand there was also a strong voice of Haitians who wanted to be involved in the reconstruction of their country, but stated that they have no chance, because the international organizations are doing the work. They argue that local organizations and the Haitian government haven been substituted by all those international organizations. Furthermore, I observed a huge separation between the lives of international aid workers and 'ordinary' Haitians. While most aid workers live in quite luxurious circumstances, most Haitians live in very poor conditions. In general, there was very little interaction between Haitians and international aid workers in the public sphere. This has reinforced negative perceptions, as some Haitians I interviewed stated that they did not understand what those white people were doing, except driving around in their cars and going to the beach.

Overall, it can be concluded that there was very little collaboration between Cordaid and local organizations in Haiti after the earthquake. Also other international organizations I interviewed seemed to have difficulties to create constructive collaboration with local organizations in Haiti. The three issues mentioned above give more insight into why it is so hard to make collaboration work between Haitians and international organizations after the earthquake.

Preface

In November 2010 I received an email from the chair group Disaster Studies of Wageningen University, with an announcement about a field school in Haiti. The idea was that students from Tilburg, Delft and Wageningen University would do their research for their Master's degree in Haiti during the same period. It sounded very interesting to work in a multidisciplinary group of students. Also as I have studied international development with a specialization in Disaster Studies I was interested in understanding more about what actually happens in practice in a post-disaster context. For those reasons I decided to join the field school for Haiti.

In January 2011 there was a first meeting together with students from the different Universities. During the first meetings we discussed our own research topics and how we could supplement each other's research. The idea was that each student would conduct their own research, but information would be exchanged between students from different disciplines in order to create a more multidisciplinary research. Unfortunately, the preparations for this field research took quite long and therefore not all students could go to Haiti together. As it was unclear for a long time whether we could go or not, I was delighted to hear that I could go to Haiti in April 2011. It was decided that I could go to Haiti together with another student from the University of Amsterdam.

During the preparation phase in The Netherlands we also had some meetings with the Dutch relief and development organization Cordaid, as they would arrange accommodation for us. The idea was that we would conduct a research for Cordaid about their shelter program in Haiti and we would be able to gain information for our own Master research. Often in crisis-related situations there is less attention for already existing local structures, although there is a lot of attention for this issue both in scientific literature and policy documents of international organizations. To understand to what extent international organizations have utilized already existing local structures in the reconstruction process of Haiti this thesis especially focuses on the issue of partnership and participatory approaches in the reconstruction program of Cordaid.

Acknowledgements

In the first place I would like to thank Cordaid, because they made it possible for me to do my research for my Master's Degree in Haiti. I greatly appreciate the fact that Cordaid creates the opportunity for students to critically reflect on their work and also gives students the possibility to understand more about the everyday realities of international organizations that work in a post-disaster context. I have gained much more insight into the complexities of working in such a difficult post-disaster context. My special thanks to all the Cordaid staff in Haiti and especially to the staff in Léogâne, where I lived during my fieldwork. Thanks to the field teams of Grand Goave City, Lompré and 7ieme Gérard, that I could join everyday into the field. Of course I would also like to thank all my respondents, as without their help I could not have written this thesis. And special thanks to my interpreter, Shamica.

Many thanks to my supervisor, Jeroen Warner, for his helpful comments and his commitment during my fieldwork in Haiti and when I was writing my thesis in The Netherlands. I enjoyed our conversations, which always gave me new inspiration for my thesis. I would also like to thank Professor Thea Hilhorst, because she was one of the originators of the Haiti field school and made it possible for me to go to Haiti in April 2011.

Of course, I want to thank Angela Jansen, my fellow student and dear friend, with whom I have spent three months in Haiti. Angela, thank you for all the interesting discussions we had, and the nice trips we made together in Haiti. For me it was very valuable that we were together in Haiti and could share our experiences and frustrations, as it was not always easy to live in such a context with strict security rules. Also thanks to my co-referent, Samuel, for your feedback on my thesis and presentation.

Lastly, I would like to thank my family and friends for their support during my research in Haiti and when I was writing my thesis. Special thanks to my parents for their involvement and their helpful comments on my thesis. And also my special thanks to my boyfriend, Thomas, who was always willing to advice me on my research whenever I had no inspiration any more.

Table of Contents

SUMMARY	II
PREFACE	IV
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	V
ABBREVIATIONS	VIII
MAPS OF HAITI	IX
1) INTRODUCTION	1
1.1) POST-DISASTER HAITI	1
1.2) CORDAID	2
1.3) PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS	2
1.4) THESIS OUTLINE.....	3
2) CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	5
2.1) THE NATURE OF NGOs	5
2.2) CHANGING DISCOURSES.....	7
2.2.1) <i>'Natural' Disasters</i>	7
2.2.2) <i>Linking relief, rehabilitation and development</i>	8
2.3) CONCEPTS.....	10
2.3.1) <i>Frames and Framing</i>	10
2.3.2) <i>Participation</i>	12
2.3.3) <i>Partnership</i>	19
3) METHODOLOGY	22
3.1) RESEARCH AREA.....	23
3.2) RESEARCH TOPIC	24
3.3) RESEARCH METHODS.....	25
3.3.1) <i>Literature research</i>	26
3.3.2) <i>Interviewing</i>	26
3.3.3) <i>Focus groups</i>	27
3.3.4) <i>Participant observation</i>	28
3.4) RESEARCH POPULATION	28
3.5) ANALYSIS.....	29
3.6) RESEARCH LIMITATIONS	30
4) HISTORY AND CONTEXT OF HAITI	31
4.1) HISTORY	31
4.1.1) <i>Slavery and independence</i>	31
4.1.2) <i>Haiti in the 20th century</i>	32
4.2) HAITI'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION	33
4.2.1) <i>Economic situation</i>	33
4.2.2) <i>Haiti's politics</i>	34
4.3) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN HAITI AND HAITI'S CIVIL SOCIETY.....	35
4.3.1) <i>Haiti's civil society</i>	35
4.3.2) <i>The republic of NGOs</i>	36

5) CORDAID-----	40
5.1) BACKGROUND OF CORDAID -----	40
5.2) CORDAID IN HAITI-----	41
6) LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GRAND GOAVE AND LOMPRÉ -----	45
6.1) LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMITTEES IN GRAND GOAVE AND LOMPRÉ -----	45
6.2) CORDAID AND LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS -----	47
6.3) CONCLUDING REMARKS -----	47
7) UNDERSTANDING EVERYDAY REALITIES IN A POST-DISASTER FRAGILE STATE-----	49
7.1) CHALLENGES OF WORKING IN HAITI -----	49
7.2) THE DONOR SYSTEM -----	54
7.3) CONCLUDING REMARKS -----	55
8) THE INFLUENCE OF PEOPLE’S PERCEPTIONS ON THE PROCESS OF PARTICIPATION AND PARTNERSHIP -----	57
8.1) PERCEPTIONS OF AID WORKERS ON HAITIANS -----	57
8.2) PERCEPTIONS OF HAITIANS ON INGOS -----	59
8.3) INTERACTION BETWEEN HAITIANS AND INTERNATIONAL AID WORKERS-----	60
8.4) FRAMING OTHERS -----	61
8.5) CASE STUDY: CORDAID AND THEIR LOCAL PARTNERS -----	62
8.6) CONCLUDING REMARKS -----	65
9) REFLECTIONS ON MY FIELDWORK IN HAITI -----	67
9.1) THE DAILY REALITY OF DOING RESEARCH IN A SO CALLED FRAGILE STATE-----	67
9.2) REFLECTION: MODIFYING MY RESEARCH TOPIC -----	69
10) CONCLUSION -----	71
10.1) CONCLUSIONS -----	71
10.2) DISCUSSION -----	74
REFERENCES -----	77
APPENDICES -----	84
APPENDIX A: DISASTER TERMINOLOGY -----	84
APPENDIX B: TOPIC LISTS-----	86
APPENDIX C: OVERVIEW OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GRAND GOAVE AND LOMPRÉ-----	88

Abbreviations


ASEC	Communal Section Assembly Member
CAP	Community Action Plan
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
Caritas	International Confederation of Catholic organizations for Charitable and Social Action
CASEC	Communal Section Administrator
CBO	Community Based organization
CIDSE	Catholic International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity
CORDAID	Catholic organization for Relief and Development Aid
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
INGO	International Non-Governmental organization
JEN	Japanese Emergency NGO
LRRD	Linking relief, rehabilitation and development
NGO	Non-Governmental organization
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
SHO	Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties – Dutch cooperation of relief organizations
UN	United Nations
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

Maps of Haiti

Map 1: Haiti including the research location in the area of Léogâne¹



Map 2: Earthquake history of Haiti and Dominican Republic²



¹ <http://geology.com/world/haiti-satellite-image.shtml>

² <http://www.nature.com.ezproxy.library.wur.nl/nature/journal/v463/n7283/full/463878a.html>

1) Introduction

“At the dawn of the 21st century, the country is caught between the aspiration of the Haitian people to obtain genuine support to rebuild their lives and the legacy of foreign interventions, either armed or humanitarian, that have contributed to creating a country that is totally dependent on foreign assistance to function (Pierre-Louis, 2011: 187)”.

On January 12, 2010 Haiti, the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere was hit by an earthquake of 7.0 on the Richter scale, causing many deaths and injured. Around 1.3 million people became homeless and half a million people fled from the cities to the rural areas of which many returned later as there was not enough food in the country side (Fatton, 2011). The Presidential Palace lay in ruins and many federal government employees were killed. The consequences of this earthquake were devastating for Haiti. Although, it was not the first natural disaster that hit Haiti, it was certainly the worst to hit Haiti in modern times (Bolton, 2011). As a result of the enormous destruction eight million US dollars had been pledged by the international community for the reconstruction of Haiti (SHO, 2011). Also many international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), international armed forces, civil-society groups and faith-based organizations came to Haiti to provide assistance (CIA World Factbook, 2011; Julmy, 2011). In this context both Haitians themselves and international aid workers try to reconstruct Haiti. To understand more about the social dynamics between Haitians and international agencies in this post-disaster situation, I conducted qualitative research in Haiti from April until the end of June in 2011.

In this chapter I will shortly elaborate on the situation in Haiti after the earthquake and on the Dutch relief and development organization Cordaid with whom I stayed during my fieldwork. Then I will discuss the problem statement and my research questions, and lastly I will provide an outline of my thesis.

1.1) Post-disaster Haiti

Haiti, the first independent black republic, known for its Vodou culture³ is nowadays considered to be a ‘fragile state’, and the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. This ‘poor’ country was flooded by international relief organizations right after the earthquake, which saw the disaster as a chance ‘to build back better’⁴. This goal to build back better relates to the idea that a crisis creates opportunities to change political and social systems in societies, which are often the underlying problems that turn a natural hazard into a disaster (Tukker and van Poelje, 2010). In the past decade it has been stated by different scholars that so called natural disasters are strongly influenced by socio-economic and political factors in society, especially in those places where natural hazards happen in the midst of conflicts such as with Hurricane Mitch or the droughts in Sudan (Christoplos, et al, 2001). In Haiti the economic and political problems, such as poor legislation of housing and high numbers of people who already live in very poor conditions have turned the earthquake into a massive disaster. Thus, according to many international agencies the earthquake in Haiti could be seen as a chance to tackle those economic and political problems and change Haiti in a “better way”. *Better* starts with creating a new Haiti that stands on its own and is not forever dependent on foreign aid. It means fostering a political and social structure

³ Read for more about Vodou in these two books: *Rara!: vodou, power, and performance in Haiti and its diaspora* by E.A. McAlister (2002) and *Vodou in Haitian life and culture*. Michel, Claudine; Bellegarde-Smith, Patrick (eds.) (2006)

⁴ President Bill Clinton (2010) “Our commitment to Haiti”. In: *Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization*

that is honest, open, and responsive to the basic needs of the Haitians. While, the international community is an important actor in the reconstruction of Haiti, it is also necessary that Haitians are involved in this process, because Haiti is their future (Roy, 2010).

1.2) Cordaid

Since, Haiti is classified as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere many international organizations wanted to provide assistance after the earthquake. Also the Dutch relief and development organization Cordaid opened an office in Haiti, to start with emergency programs. Before the earthquake Cordaid was already working for more than thirty years in Haiti on development issues. This work was especially done by local partner organizations, which were financed and supported by Cordaid. After the earthquake Cordaid decided to open two offices in Haiti where both international and local staff could work on shelter and health programs. One office is based in Port au Prince and the other office is in Léogâne. During my fieldwork I stayed at the compound of Cordaid in Léogâne. In this area Cordaid has a shelter program in three different zones: 7ieme-Gérard, Lompré and Grand Goave City. Although, I have visited all three areas during my fieldwork, I have especially focused on Lompré and Grand Goave City. Since, I stayed with Cordaid the information in this research is especially related to the case of Cordaid in Haiti.

1.3) Problem statement and research questions

Immediately after a disaster has taken place emergency teams and humanitarian aid organizations arrive into an area to provide assistance and to support the victims. Within the very short time scale of a few days, in a chaotic context, decisions have to be taken quickly. Exactly this time pressure conflicts with the broadly encouraged approach to utilize local capacities and structures. To get more insight into the local capacities and social structures requires time and awareness at the moment of arrival.

Often humanitarian agencies enter an unknown area, with a lack of local information, and having almost no local contacts available. While media show the sorrow of the disaster, the donors require adequate and immediate action. In this context it is obvious that a participative and local approach establishing valuable partnership relations is not so common at that stage. In this light it is interesting to study the case of Cordaid in Haiti after the earthquake of January 2010, because Cordaid was already present in Haiti before the earthquake, so at least they have the advantage that they know the area and have contacts.

The opportunity offered by Cordaid to interview and evaluate their "local committees" (see Jansen and Molenaar, 2011) on their demand, has resulted in three months fieldwork in Haiti as part of an embedded Cordaid mission. Besides, in the difficult context of Haiti's current security situation, they facilitated the possibility to interview many aid workers and members of local Haitian organizations which has given an excellent opportunity to answer my central research question:

To what extent has the international relief and development organization Cordaid collaborated with local organizations since the earthquake?

To create the right context to answer this central research question, two preliminary sub questions have to be answered:

- *Which kind of local organizations can be identified in the area of Grand Goave City and Lompré?*
- *Which challenges have humanitarian aid workers faced since the earthquake in Haiti?*

In the first couple of weeks in Haiti I became aware of two important facts. In the first place, I noted that there are tensions between Cordaid and their local partners since the earthquake. Second, during my interviews and informal conversations with international aid workers, I became aware that most of the aid workers I interviewed were quite negative about Haitians and Haiti in general. Vice versa, Haitians I interviewed had very negative ideas about international organizations as well. I realized that the relationships between Cordaid and their partners, and the perceptions of international aid workers and Haitians about each other might be of decisive importance to construct the right context to answer my central research question. That is why the following additional sub questions arose during the fieldwork research in Haiti:

- *What kind of perceptions do international aid workers and Haitians have of each other?*
- *Given this perspective, what kind of expectations do both parties have about each other?*
- *How do international aid workers and Haitian citizens interact in daily life?*
- *How have mutual perceptions of international agencies and Haitians influenced constructive collaboration since the earthquake in Haiti?*

The aim of this research is to gain more insight into participatory approaches of international agencies and partnership relations between international and local organizations in crisis-related situations. This research is especially focused on the case of Cordaid, but also includes information based on interviews with other international organizations in Haiti. I studied social structures and what kind of local organizations were already present in the districts Grand Goave and Lompré, areas Cordaid has been working, and if Cordaid has made use of those structures in their shelter program. By studying the everyday realities in which international humanitarian agencies work, I gained more insight into the challenges aid workers face during their work in Haiti.

1.4) Thesis Outline

This thesis consists of ten chapters that are divided into different sections. In the next chapter the conceptual framework will be discussed. First I will give more insight into what NGOs are. Then I will elaborate on different discourses that have influenced the work of humanitarian organizations. Both the discourse on disasters and linking relief, rehabilitation and development has influenced policies and practices of international organizations. Lastly I will discuss three concepts that are valuable for the analysis of my research. These concepts are participation, partnership and framing. In chapter three I will elaborate on my research area and the research methods I have used to conduct this research. Furthermore, I will discuss the analysis of my research and some limitations of my fieldwork.

Chapter four will give an historical overview of Haiti and I will give more insight into the economic and political situation of the country. I will also discuss the influence of international humanitarian organizations on Haiti in the past thirty years. And I will elaborate on Haiti's civil society. In chapter five more background information about the relief and development organization Cordaid will be provided. I will give more insight into the organizational structure of Cordaid and their history. Furthermore, this chapter gives more information about the shelter program of Cordaid in Haiti.

In chapter six until eight I will discuss the observations of my fieldwork, connecting practice to theory. In chapter six I will elaborate on my findings of local organizations in Lompré and Grand Goave. In chapter seven I will discuss different challenges aid workers face when working in a post-disaster fragile state like Haiti. The context in which people work has an influence on actions taken on the ground, but also the humanitarian aid system has an influence on the way relief and development programs are executed by international organizations. Chapter eight will give more insight into the mutual perceptions and expectations of international aid workers and Haitians. Furthermore this chapter will discuss what the influence of those perceptions is on participatory approaches and partnership relations. In this chapter a case study is included of the relationship between Cordaid and their local partners after the earthquake.

My personal reflections on the research are described in chapter nine. I will reflect on the following issues: What were my impressions and what are my own experiences of conducting research in a post-disaster fragile state like Haiti. Chapter ten will conclude this thesis. I will answer the central question of this thesis by discussing my findings. Furthermore, I will include some recommendations.

2) Conceptual framework

This chapter begins with a short discussion about NGOs. I will elaborate on the term NGO, what their role is and why the number of NGOs has increased recently. The next section illustrates how certain development theories have an influence on the way humanitarian relief and development operations are executed. In order to understand why humanitarian agencies work the way they work, one has to be aware of the underlying principles and ideas of those agencies. To get more insight into those principles and ideas I refer to the relevance of discourse. "The notion of discourse can explain how reality is socially constructed and deconstructed (Frerks, 2007: 45)". To understand more about the way humanitarian agencies, faith-based organizations and other benefactors have responded after the earthquake in Haiti, I will discuss the influence of several discourses. First, I will elaborate on the influence of the currently dominant disaster discourse in the western society and the presence of a counter discourse after the earthquake in Haiti. Second, I will discuss the discourse on linking relief, rehabilitation, and development (LRRD). This discourse reflects the need to involve a more developmental approach in relief programs. Despite its criticism made, it is still an objective for many international organizations. In the last section of this chapter I will highlight specific concepts that are important for my research. The first concept is framing. The concept of framing has become popular in many different disciplines, which resulted in some confusion. In my research I will use this concept to understand how people frame relationships and issues that may affect the way humanitarian aid programs are executed. The second concept is participation. This concept has become very popular in the 1970s and is now widely used by humanitarian agencies. Another concept that is often mentioned in policy document of international agencies is partnership. Partnership ideally suggests that an equal relationship is constructed between different parties. However, this term is often used by international organizations to define a very diverse range of relationships.

2.1) The nature of NGOs

"Every development organization is a complex agent, not just an actor whose views and positions can be personified and treated as singular" - Cornwall and Brock, 2005

NGOs already exist since the nineteenth century. These were private networks of people who have contributed to campaigns to end slavery and fight for the rights for women to vote (Eizenstat, 2004). From the 1980s onwards the number of NGOs has more than doubled worldwide. Many of these organizations play an important role regarding issues such as human rights, climate change and poverty reduction (Turner, 2010). In a survey done in 2000 it was found that the non-profit sector spent around 1.1 trillion dollars annually and has close to nineteen million full-time employees (Eizenstat, 2004). There are different explanations why the number of NGOs has risen since the 1980s. Escobar describes how developmentalism became the predominant discourse after 1945, creating an imaginary geography between developed and underdeveloped states. According to him as a counter-reaction to this discourse the number of NGOs has increased. In contrast other scholars argued that the growth of NGOs has actually been the result of this discourse (Hilhorst, 2003). Grillo (1997 in: Sutton, 1999: 13) makes a distinction between three development discourses that have developed over time and have had an influence on the kind of actors involved in development:

- The elaborated authoritative, interventionist ideology after the Second World War, which involved the intervention of experts from multilateral and bilateral aid agencies

- The market-engendered spontaneous order discourse, that developed in the 1970s and was located in the involvement of the IMF and World Bank in development
- The discourse of the public sphere during which NGOs, research institutes and charities became important actors in development

Whatever the reason is for this rise of NGOs, the fact is that NGOs have become major players in the development scene. But what exactly is an NGO? This is a very complicated question and according to Hilhorst (2003: 3) there is no single answer to “what an NGO is what it wants and what it does”. Schuller (2007b) argues that it is quite difficult to agree upon a definition of NGOs, because it is “an inherently politicized process”. The term was introduced by the United Nations. The United Nations defines a NGO as: “A non-governmental organization (NGO) is any non-profit, voluntary citizens’ group which is organized on a local, national or international level. Task-oriented and driven by people with a common interest, NGOs perform a variety of services and humanitarian functions, bring citizens’ concerns to Governments, monitor policies and encourage political participation at the community level (Schuller, 2007b)”. This definition included a wide variety of different organizations and implies that NGOs are closer to the people and more democratic than governments. According to Hilhorst (2003: 3) “NGOs are many things at the same time”. There are always many understandings of what an organization exactly is, what it wants and what it does (Hilhorst, 2003). Hilhorst understands the term NGO as a label claiming that the organization does ‘good’ for the development of others.

Although, NGOs have long been celebrated, criticism of their possible lack of accountability, effectiveness and their connection with the grassroots has increased since the 1990s (Hilhorst, 2003). Smillie (2001: 15) writes in his book “whether it is true or not, some believe that the rise of NGOs has been at the expense of the state”. Also Schuller (2009: 91) states that “despite many NGOs’ good intentions, their prominence and receipt of foreign funding is undermining Southern states, eroding their capacity to provide services and to govern”. For example supporting local NGOs can weaken the responsibility of states towards the health care or education sector. While some scholars call NGOs “gap fillers”, because they provide services in which governments are lacking, this also has consequences for the functioning of the government. Smillie (2001) does not agree with this statement and argues that although there is much criticism on the role of NGOs, it is not universally true that NGOs are the largest providers of social services. Another issue that weakens state structures is the fact that people earn higher incomes when working for NGOs than for their own government, something also observed by Antonio Donini in Mozambique (Smillie, 2001). According to Donini INGOs have attracted local professionals with their high salaries and have become the most important provider of public welfare and sources of employment. Another negative impact of INGOs is that it creates a huge division between the expatriates driving in their white cars and the 'poor' local population (Schuller, 2009; Woodward, 2002).

Although international organizations argue that they work on behalf of the people in need, they also want to survive. Therefore, it should be clear that survival of the organizations is often a very important motivation and has an influence on how the organization chooses its strategies. This is the NGO paradox. From an idealistic perspective the aim of INGOs to put itself out of business, but from an organizational point of view they want to survive. In order to survive NGOs have to legitimize their presence as an organization that does ‘good’ for the development of others (Hilhorst, 2003: 218).

In the next part I will reflect on two discourses that influenced the work of INGOs in Haiti after the earthquake. First I will reflect on two disaster discourses and then I will discuss the discourse on linking relief, rehabilitation, and development.

2.2) Changing discourses

The concept of discourses concerning relief and development theories will be further discussed in this part. I understand discourse as the “ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena (Hajer, 1993: 45)”. It is through the notion of discourse that one can explain how we perceive and talk about the world. Discourses are shaped by perceptions, experiences and social practices in the daily lives of actors (Frerks, 2007). Foucault was one of the first to show how discourse, power and knowledge are interwoven. On the one hand powerful people may prevail in determining dominant discourses. On the other hand certain discourses can become popular and thus generate power (Frerks and Klem, 2004). According to different scholars there are always multiple discourses that interact. However, at a certain point in time some discourses can become more powerful than others (Hilhorst, 2003). When a certain discourse is more dominant, this can influence policy-making and actions on the ground, but one should always be aware that parallel, residual or counter-discourses exist.

There are certain discourses that have changed over time and have influenced the way programs have been implemented by humanitarian agencies. I will first elaborate on how the discourse of disaster has changed over time. As mentioned there are some dominant discourses, but one should always be aware of the parallel and counter-discourses that exist. Also after the earthquake in Haiti different disaster discourses can be identified which will be discussed in the next section. Second, I will discuss the discourse of linking relief, rehabilitation and development. Although, linking relief and development has become a popular slogan in policies of NGOs, there are a lot of challenges in practice.

2.2.1) ‘Natural’ Disasters

There are different types of disaster such as natural disasters, technological disasters and man-made disasters. Since my research is related to the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti, I will use the term disaster, which refers to natural disaster.

For a long time natural disasters were seen as “acts of God”. Since the 1970s the discussion was raised whether natural disasters should be explained as natural phenomena or as the result of human actions. Nowadays disasters are much more understood as natural hazards that become disasters, because of political and socio-economic factors in society, such as weak state structures, poverty, high levels of corruption and insecurity (Wisner et al, 2004). According to Hilhorst and Bankoff (2004: 2) some people are more prone to disasters than others, due to inequalities that “are largely a function of the power relations operative in every society”. This shift in disaster discourse has influenced the way humanitarian agencies respond to disasters. Many agencies have shifted their focus from response programs towards prevention and mitigation activities in the last couple of years. The term Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) has become a popular concept in the disaster terminology, because it states that people can have an influence in reducing the risks of disasters (Wisner et al, 2004).

There is also a deeper understanding of what disasters mean for those who experience them. Since, people who are classified as “vulnerable” can be vulnerable in very different ways; one should identify

different coping strategies through analyzing what capacities, needs and perceptions of risk people have. Just, calling people vulnerable is not only ineffective, but according to Bankoff (2001) is also part of a discourse of disempowerment. Through this discourse a separation between “them” “as vulnerable” and “us” as “savers” is enhanced. Although people are aware of the risk of generalization it still happens a lot by actors in relief and development practice. Categories such as “poor” or “marginalized” still occur in disaster discourse due to implicit assumptions that “we” as development workers have the right to divide people into categories as aid recipients (Christoplos et al, 2001: 191).

The earthquake in Haiti has been explained in the light of political and socio-economic factors that made this natural hazard a disaster. Therefore, those underlying problems should be addressed according to the international community. However, the fact that this earthquake became a massive disaster is also explained from another point of view. From this point of view it has been stated that Haitians made a deal with the Devil to free themselves from the French in 1804. Besides this they also practice Vodou, which is seen as a sin by some people, and therefore the earthquake was a punishment of God. Although, the first discourse has been dominantly present in the policies of humanitarian agencies, the second discourse can explain why especially faith-based organizations have a total different response to the disaster. According to Frerks et al. (1999: 17 in: Souverijn, 2001: 51) in disaster and post-disaster situations many different actors are involved, who have different interpretations and responses to the situation. “At the interface of interaction between these actors, multiple and contested realities are at stake. All actors are implicitly engaged in negotiations on how to understand the situation, and on who will do what, for and with whom, and when”.

2.2.2) Linking relief, rehabilitation and development

Efforts to link relief, rehabilitation and development have already been taken since the 1980s. It was much more understood that emergency situations could not strictly be divided from 'normal' development situations. To strictly separate crisis and normality is not correct for two reasons. First, many social and cultural assets stay somehow 'normal' during a crisis and second, as people often have to deal with crises their experiences becomes part of their culture. Therefore, when trying to understand the interrelations between crisis and normalcy it is important to study “what is going on 'on the ground' by exploring everyday activities of local people that reconstruct their society (Samuels, 2010). However, by the late 1990s this framework came into disrepute as it was questioned whether the categories of relief, rehabilitation and development referred more to structures of aid administration than to realities on the ground. Furthermore, it was stated that the LRRD framework “did not accommodate the chronic and recurrent nature of conflict and vulnerability to natural hazards (White and Cliff, 2000 in: Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009: 15)”. Despite the criticism made this framework is still used by many international agencies, like Cordaid. Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994: 2) summarize the need of linking relief and development activities as followed:

“The basic idea is simple and sensible. Emergencies are costly in terms of human life and resources. They are disruptive of development. They demand a long period of rehabilitation. And they have spawned bureaucratic structures, lines of communication and organizational cultures, which duplicate development institutions and sometimes cut across them. By the same token, development policy and administration are often insensitive to the risk of drought and other shocks, and to the importance of protecting vulnerable households against risk. If relief and development can be 'linked', so the theory

goes, these deficiencies can be overcome. Better 'development' can reduce the need for emergency relief; better 'relief' can contribute to development; and better 'rehabilitation' can ease the transition between the two".

Although, it is recognized as an important issue by NGOs, there are still a lot of challenges in practice. Smillie (1998) has highlighted three challenges encountered by organizations that tried to link relief and development programs. Those challenges are: timing, funding and understanding.

Timing

One of the most important things in a disaster context is timing. The issue of timing is often discussed when talking about relief and development organizations. While, relief agencies act in quick manner in order to save lives, development agencies have a much longer-term time-frame. In longer-term development programs agencies can focus on involvement of the local people in their programs and get a better understanding of the local context. In short-term relief operations there is often no time for this, creating frictions between relief and development workers.

Funding

There is a sharp division between funding for emergency situations and funds available for longer-term development issues. Emergency funds have to be spent in a very short-time frame often within one year. This causes difficulties for relief agencies to incorporate development-oriented approaches in their programs. One of the problems is that donor governments have separate funding systems for relief and development activities, which are often managed by different departments. These structures hinder effective cooperation between relief and development organizations. Another issue is that emergency programs are often much more expensive than development assistance. Furthermore, there is an increased competition for scarce resources between relief and development organizations, since Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds have changed their focus more to relief. A large part of the budget of relief organizations comes from fund raising through media campaigns. As a result relief agencies are very much focused on their results and the issue of visibility.

Understanding

Smillie describes understanding as the most difficult challenge, as both the issue of proper timing and wise funding. Especially in emergency situations there is often a lack of time and or willingness to understand local conditions, capacities and customs, resulting in blueprint-type reconstruction programs. However, it is important to understand the local context and the underlying causes of an emergency. In the case of a disaster already existing political, social and economic structures in a country can have an influence on the way disasters occur.

According to Mangones (2001) a way to create more synergy between humanitarian relief and development is by seeing people not as victims, but as social actors. The issue of social actor or human agency will be discussed in section 2.3.2. In the next part I will elaborate on the following three concepts that are related to my empirical data: framing, participation and partnership.

2.3) Concepts

The first concept of framing will be explained in the next part. While I understand discourses more as a wider overall system of communication and language through which meaning is given to phenomena, frames are part of discourses. According to Frerks (2007: 46) “it is often through discourse that a particular issue or relationship is framed, and a course of action outlined and put into practice”. Frames are according to Gamson and Meyer (1996: 276) “on the one hand part of the world, passive and structured: and on the other hand people are active in constructing them. Events are framed, but we frame events”.

The second concept of participation has become popular in development theories since the 1970s. A shift was made from top-down approaches of development to an approach of including local people in development processes. It was realized that people should not be seen as helpless victims, but as agents who have capacities and coping strategies. Though, in practice already existing structures are often overlooked by humanitarian agencies. Especially in fragile states, it is often assumed that there are no existing or working social, political and economic structures. However, as stated by different scholars (Heijmans, 2004; Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010; Long, 1992) people do have capacities and strategies to deal with everyday realities, even in times of crisis or disaster.

The third term of partnership is somehow related to the concept of participation. It is based on the same assumptions that people have capacities and are organized in one way or another even in times of crisis. Although, the term is used to indicate different kind of relationships, in this research it will especially focus on the relationship between INGOs and local organizations. The concept will be discussed in section 2.3.3.

2.3.1) Frames and Framing

“Man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun” - Clifford Geertz, 1973

Framing has become a widely used word within different disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, communication and (conflict) management. Although, the widely used concepts of framing and frames have certainly produced interesting research insides in the different disciplines, it has also lead to confusion. Therefore, it is important to understand how those concepts have developed. Historically framing derives from work by Bateson (1954) about meta-communication and Bartlett's (1932) schema theory of memory. In Bateson's work framing is about exchanging cues that indicate how ongoing interaction should be interpreted. In Bartlett's schema theory frames are understood as mental structures that facilitate organizing and interpreting incoming perceptual information by fitting it into pre-existing categories about reality (Dewulf et al, 2009: 158-159). Those multiple ways of framing have been divided by Dewulf et al (2009) in the cognitive and interactional approach. The difference between those approaches is that the first one considers framing as a process of applying memory structures (frames) to new situations, while within the interactional approach framing is described as a dynamic process in which transient communicative structures (frames) are negotiated and shaped through ongoing interaction. In this thesis I will make use of the cognitive approach to framing.

For the purpose of this research I have applied the concept of frames to understand how perceptions and expectations of humanitarian aid workers and local people are shaped by pre-existing memory

structures. Already before, but also during my research period, I learned how humanitarian agencies have pre-existing ideas about the reality they work in. For example the way they frame themselves in relation to the people they work with is very much divided into categories of lifesaver and victim. DeWulf et al. (2009) refer to this kind of frames as identity and relationship frames, making a distinction between characterization frames, identity frames, power frames and trust frames. The first two frames capture how people frame themselves or another person, while the other two frames focus on how people frame themselves in relation to others. Characterization frames are positive, negative or neutral depictions about other people. This way of stereotyping creates certain expectations about how the other should behave. Identity frames are more focused on what persons think of themselves. In relation to others people can frame themselves as superior or inferior; Lewicki et al. (2003) describe this as power frames. People can have power because of expertise, resources, a high position, certain relationships, and sympathy from others or threatening others. The last frame is about whether people categorize their relationship with others as trustworthy or not. Whether trust can be considered as a frame, is still debated, but it is clear that feeling of trust has a lot of effect on how people frame others.

According to Lewicki et al. (2003) frames can be used to:

1. Define whether a problem exists and, if so, how this problem can be defined
2. Shape what actions should be taken and by whom
3. Enable us to justify our actions
4. Mobilize others to take action
5. Protect themselves and their interests

Thus, frames can have a lot of impact on how people define what they want to do and why, because frames can be used to persuade people and justify policies and actions (Heijmans, 2009). According to van Leeuwen (2008): 144 “framing implies an -often unconscious- choice for representing the world in a particular way, and is therefore a political practice”. This is also how framing can influence the process and outcome of relief and development processes.

Frames can be detected in discussions, but also when people's actions are observed. It is important to study both, because the two do not always match. Since, there is a difference between what people say they want to do and what they actually do. Argyris and Schön (1978) made a distinction between the espoused theory and the theory-in-use. Espoused theory consists of “the words used to express what we think we do and why, or what we like others to think we do” and the theory-in-use “defines the actions that are actually taken (Guijt, 2008: 109)”. There may or may not be congruency between the two. Heijmans (2009: 4) indicates that “in the espoused theory, people use frames strategically to deal with actors who do not necessarily share the same values or views, but with whom it is crucial to maintain relationships”. Since, NGOs have to deal with many different stakeholders with whom they have to maintain good relations; they strategically manoeuvre between multiple domains (Hilhorst, 2003). Barnett (1999) also argues that events can be framed strategically. First, people compete to frame an event, because the way this is done will have consequences for mobilizing action and furthering their interests. He understands this competition as a strategic framing process, which is defined by McAdam et al. (1996: 6) as “the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action”. However, Barnett also states that although frames are important for collective mobilization, “their importance is amplified at historical moments defined by cultural contradictions and competing visions of the future (Barnett,

1999: 15)". According to Gaspers and Apthorpe (1996) framing is a crucial element in policy practice, because frames present who and what is included and who and what is excluded.

Framing Haiti

The way Haiti is framed by outsiders has consequences for the kind of actions taken by humanitarian agencies. On the one hand Haiti is the first independent state that liberated itself from foreign domination, but on the other hand since their independence they had a lot of political and economic problems. Bill Clinton (2010) has written in an essay for Time Magazine: "Unfortunately, ever since the first slave revolt by Haitians in 1791, the country has been beset by abuses caused from within and without. It has never been able to fulfill its potential as a nation⁵". This implies that Haitians themselves have never been able to manage Haiti in a successful way according to the former president of the United States. Other frames often used to identify Haiti are "fragile state" and "the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere". Again those frames entail that Haiti is considered to be unable to "help" itself. Furthermore, the concept of "fragile state" draws a division between fragile and stable states, creating a legitimization for the latter one to intervene in these so called "fragile states". After the earthquake, many people saw the disaster as an opportunity to "build back better". As stated by the Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon on March 31, 2010 "Our goal is not just to rebuild. It is to "build back better"⁶". Or the international organization Oxfam who has published a report with the title "Haiti: A once in a century chance for change". However, to build back better one should also take into account what the structural causes are that have made the earthquake such an enormous disaster. Many natural hazards are turned into disasters due to political economic and social factors in society (Lyons, 2009). Thus, as Haiti was already framed as a fragile state before the earthquake, the situation has even become worse according to Western countries. This way of framing Haiti as a "weak" and "fragile" state has legitimized actions taken by the international community.

2.3.2) Participation

"Participation is a container-concept to which almost everybody connotes positive value and in which many different ideas can nestle" - Warner et al, 2002: 30

In the 1970s the concept of participation became popular, especially in relation to social movements and the struggle for citizenship rights (Gaventa, 2002). With the introduction of this concept a paradigm shift was made from a top-down or blueprint approach of development to more bottom-up or process oriented approaches. It was more and more recognized that local people understand best how and why certain things work and other things do not work (Ellis and Biggs, 2001). Thus, from a participatory perspective it was stated that one has to pay attention to local knowledge in the field of development work. One of the main points of this approach was to question the relationship between experts and laypersons. In previous approaches the first one was considered as the person who transferred his or her knowledge to local people, while in participatory approaches there is especially attention for local knowledge (Mohan and Stokke, 2000). Therefore, actively involving local people in development programs and relying on their knowledge and capabilities was seen as an important element within participatory approaches.

⁵ http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1953379_1953494_1953521,00.html

⁶ http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=768

Some important developments regarding participation were the advent of a participatory method involving participatory rural appraisal, participatory learning and action introduced by Robert Chambers and the rise of an actor-oriented perspective on rural policies described by Norman Long in his book *Battlefields of Knowledge: The interlocking of theory and practice in social research and development*. This actor-oriented perspective includes the idea that the “poor themselves are active actors with differing understandings of the processes of change in which they are involved (Ellis and Biggs, 2001: 443)”. I will elaborate on this idea of active actors in the next part.

There are two approaches to participation, namely the instrumental and the empowerment approach. While the first one implies that participation is used as a means, in order to make development programs more effective for local people, the latter one considers the process of increasing participation of local people as an end in itself (Guijt and Shah, 1998). Both approaches are used in development programs, having their own implications.

2.3.2.1) The legitimacy of participation

As already described before, the concept of participation is very popular in development theories and widely used by NGOs nowadays. As it seems that this concept is so popular, what than exactly is the value of participation in development theories and practice?

One of the most important elements for legitimizing participation is the fact that it is considered a human right to participate. Sen (1999) has stated that the essence of development is the freedom to make meaningful choices. When the lives of people are affected, they are the only ones who can develop themselves and not someone else (Anderson and Woodrow, 1989 in: Warner et al, 2002). The concept of human agency is an important starting point in participatory approaches, because it starts with the premise that people are not passive recipients, but active actors who have the knowledge and ability to influence their own situations. An important contribution to this mind-shift is the book of Anderson and Woodrow '*Rising from the Ashes*' (1989). By introducing their capacities and vulnerabilities analysis development organizations became aware of the fact that people have their own strategies to deal with challenges they face such as conflicts, earthquakes, landslides and other hazards (Cannon, 2008). By using the knowledge and capacities of local people development programs can become much more efficient and effective, as it is based upon the needs of people themselves. Thus, with the introduction of participation in development programs the image of affected people has changed from dependent and helpless victims to people who have capacities and coping strategies.

While in participatory approaches the role of local people is very important, there is often a distrust of the state, because the state has been too centralized and therefore does not include local people (Williams, 2004, Mohan and Stokke, 2000). For that reason, NGOs are seen as more successful, because they are seen as the ones who focus on the most vulnerable and marginalized people in the society. However, there is also a lot of criticism of NGOs as mentioned earlier. Thus, originally participation is deeply connected to a citizen's right of challenging exclusion and marginalization. Therefore it is argued that by promoting participation, those people who are often excluded have the opportunity to share their interests, needs and knowledge and have a chance to influence decision-making. In this way unequal power structures and inequality can be addresses (Hickey and Mohan, 2005). Thus, it is argued that participation in development programs can empower those people who are marginalized using

participation as an end goal. Also in self-evaluations of international development organizations in the 1980s it was stated that a greater participation by the target population would increase the likelihood of successful outcomes (Schuller, 2007b).

Another point that advocates the use of participatory approaches is the possibility to map both the social relations within societies and the diversity of people's opinions, problems and ideas. This can create a more holistic picture of the situation (Warner et al, 2002) both for participants and international organizations. Besides this participation can also lead to social learning (Röling and Maarleveld, 1999 in: Warner et al, 2002), as there is a lot of interaction and discussion between people that can improve communication frictions and create a shared understanding of problems. However, one should be careful by stating that participation leads to social learning, because this is hard to prove according to Warner (2007). Although, people learn by actively being involved in situations, Warner (2007: 5) states that the "social, mutual, collaborative aspect, is not necessarily happening". Common pitfalls in participation processes are free-riding, opportunism and double agendas of people.

Finally, participatory approaches in development work are also very important for international agencies to legitimize their work. When in a development program people's opinions are included and the problems are defined together with the affected people, the legitimacy of the program will increase (Warner et al, 2002). It is also argued in Warner et al. (2002) that by including people in decision-making and implementation of development programs, people will gain ownership over the whole process, which increases the sustainability of programs. Therefore, including participatory approaches in development interventions increases the relevance and sustainability (Chambers, 2004), as people feel more responsible for the maintenance of established programs. Besides ownership participatory approaches can also increase efficiency and cut costs, as local people put their own contribution in the program (Berner, 2010: 15).

Different forms of participation

Participation is considered to be important by humanitarian agencies, however one should be aware of the fact that there are different forms and levels of participation, ranging from non-participation to ownership driven programs. Furthermore, one can make a useful distinction between direct and indirect participation. Direct participation refers to beneficiaries, who are directly involved in a certain program, while indirect participation concerns participation of community based organizations or other target groups (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2005). Different scholars have classified forms of participation. One of the known typologies and ladders is Arnstein's ladder of citizen's participation. This is a widely used model that gives an overview of different levels of participation. Another typology comes from Pretty. The difference between those two is that Arnstein's ladder is based on the perspective of those on the receiving end, while Pretty's typology of participation is more focused on the user of participatory approaches (Cornwall, 2008). I have made an overview of Pretty's typology, because it helps to make clear that the motivations of those who participate are an important factor in shaping interventions.

Table 1: A typology of participation (Pretty, 1995: 1252)

Typology	Characteristics of each type
1. Manipulative participation	Participation is simply a pretence
2. Passive Participation	People participate by being told what has been decided or has already happened. The information being shared belongs only to external professionals
3. Participation by consultation	People participate by being consulted or by answering questions
4. Participation for material incentives	People participate by contributing resources, for example, labor, in return for food, cash or other material incentives
5. Functional participation	Participation seen by external agencies as a means to achieve project goals, especially reduced costs. Such involvement may be interactive and involve shared decision-making, but tends to arise only after major decisions have already been made by external agents
6. Interactive participation	People participate in joint analysis, development of action plans and formation or strengthening of local institutions. Participation is seen as a right, not just the means to achieve project goals
7. Self-mobilization	People participate by taking initiatives independently of external institutions to change systems

2.3.2.2) Criticism of participation

Although, participatory approaches are very popular, there is also a lot of criticism of participatory processes. One of the most famous books in which this concept is criticized is "Participation: The New Tyranny". The writers Cooke and Kothari (2001) argue that participatory approaches could be seen as a form of power. One of the key elements of participatory approaches is working with existing structures and power relations in society, including those based on inequalities. In the case of Aceh a few international organizations were able to understand the background political tensions that affected the aid and reconstruction activities (Kenny, 2010). This issue of international organizations being unable to address unequal power structures is related to the tendency that they view communities as homogeneous entities and unproblematic. Those poor communities are often set against the powerful elite, while the opposite is true, because also within communities different power relations, inequalities and exploitation exist (Mohan, 2006). However, in participatory processes large numbers of people ("considered to be the community") are often represented by a small number of participants. But what do people exactly mean when they talk about "the community", is everyone included, or just the majority, the men or the richer ones (Berner, 2010: 17)? And who are those participants? They are often community leaders or prominent figures, which are already in powerful positions and benefit from being a participant. This means that it is argued that participatory approaches undermine diversity and can reinforce existing power structures (Mohan, 2006; Berner, 2010). Berner argues that those who work with bottom-up approaches should start to recognize that communities are heterogeneous, where exploitation and inequalities take part also within communities. Therefore, when working with participatory approaches it is important to be aware of the existing power relations rooted in a historical

context of the society in general and specifically the communities you are working in, because by empowering certain groups of people new tensions could arise between those groups.

Another point of criticism of participatory approaches is that experts and development agencies often do not really include local people in the decision-making process. They only organize meetings for the local people to legitimize their own preconceived plans. Berner (2010) calls this ritualistic participation, because the concept of participation is used as an instrument by development agencies to legitimize pre-established development programs. Furthermore, Long (1992) argues that the theories of local participation show shortcomings, as they often fail to address the existing or emergent forms of organizing, they also pay little attention to understand the different meanings that local forms of organization have for the people themselves and how those people use organizational resources. Thus, participation is an important process in rural development, however according to Long participation should not just be seen as a process implemented by outsiders, but there should also be attention for the many forms of local organization which already exist within communities.

As already described before, in participatory approaches the state is often depicted as an institution that imposes top-down development and does not involve the voices of local people. Therefore, the role of NGOs is seen as crucial, because they give local people the opportunity to share their problems and interests. However, Maguire (2006) argues that although in weak states such as Haiti NGOs have a role to play; state institutions have to be strengthened as well in order to provide services for the citizens. It is important to build state capacity, rather than creating parallel systems outside the state. When neglecting the state in the reconstruction phase, this could lead to further isolation and weaker state structures, creating more insecurity and more dependency on external actors. However, one should also be aware that states could manipulate civil society groups and use “the local” as a political discourse that disempowers (Mohan, 2006). As Mohan and Stokke (2000) argue the role of the local civil society should not be romanticized, but instead we should try to understand how “the local” is politicized by for example state institutions or international donor agencies. Thus, a more critical reflection is needed of the state and especially of the relationship between the central and local levels in societies (Mohan, 2006). Wood (1999) argues that local knowledge may be “over-localized” as it could be that local people do not take larger issues into account, whether this is unconscious or conscious. Thus, local knowledge should not be taken for granted, because local people also have their own interests and could therefore manipulate their so-called “local knowledge”. As Heijmans et al. (2009) state “To maximize effectiveness, it is important that aid agencies recognize the inter-regional and even international dimensions of the issues which they intend to address locally.” Therefore Williams (2004) argues that it is important to carefully consider how participatory development works within particular spaces and times.

Lastly, it is often assumed by international organizations that everybody wants to participate. In contrast, some people do not want to participate in development programs, as the process can be quite time consuming or the program is not focused on the real problems and needs of “the whole community” (Warner, 2006). Also for organizations participatory approaches, can be quite time-consuming. When people have decided to use participatory approaches in development programs, this can cause delays for the implementation of the program and make the outcome of the process very unpredictable (Warner et al, 2002). For organizations, this can be an obstacle, because they have to meet deadlines of their donors. For participants themselves, time costs money, as they have to do their daily tasks next to participating in development initiatives.

2.3.2.3) Participation in relief and development programs

Participation does it still have a meaning or has it become one of those buzzwords, used by humanitarian agencies to legitimize their actions. While many humanitarian agencies claim to focus on participation in their programs, there are some critical points to take into consideration (Berner, 2010). An issue that is often overlooked in fragile states by INGOs is the fact that people often have to cope without the protection of the state, because there is a lack of human security. Therefore, people have their own security mechanisms to deal with insecure situations and high levels of violence. Already in the 1960s it was indicated that panic is not a problem in disasters. Instead of helplessly awaiting outside aid, people behave pro-actively assisting others who need help. Both social cohesion and informal mechanisms of social control increase during disasters, resulting in a lower incidence of deviant behavior during a disaster. Earlier research about this public response to disasters has identified strong situational induced influences, such as emergent social norms that lead to greater community cohesion during disasters and in the emergency period following a disaster (Tierney et al, 2006). Jaspars and O'Callaghan (2010) state that it is important to understand local protection mechanisms people have developed to deal with circumstances of high insecurity and violence. Furthermore, certain formal and informal institutions still function or somehow provide services even in times of crisis. For example people pay rebel groups in order to protect them and often those rebel groups or violent movements such as Hamas provide services for their followers. Also people split their families and send some to a safer area, while the ones who stay behind watch their assets. People hold on to normality as much as possible in times of crisis, planting their fields and trading their products (Barrs, 2010; Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009). Thus, it is important to understand already existing structures. However, Hilhorst and Jansen (2010) stated in their article that after the Tsunami, humanitarian agencies were very much focused on forming local organizations that could help to implement programs, instead of recognizing already existing CBOs. By neglecting existing local organizations, INGOs could make people look more vulnerable and claim the need for their expertise. Simultaneously, INGOs claimed legitimacy by stating that they really involved 'the most vulnerable people' in their programs by making use of participatory approaches. With the enormous number of INGOs present after the Tsunami "people were overwhelmed by the request for their participation (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010: 1132)", as many agencies worked in the same communities and wanted to involve beneficiaries in their programs.

Another point is that one should understand why organizations advocate participation in their programs. Thus, one should question what the goal is of participation. Do they use participation purely as an instrument in order to legitimize their own actions or do they want to strengthen the capacities of people. Despite the use of participatory approaches in relief and development programs, there is often the tendency to overlook already existing capacities and coping strategies of the affected people. As stated by the IFRC (in: Christoplos et al, 2001) their disaster mitigation and preparedness programs are often more about teaching than learning. Thus, one should question in what way the pre-established plans are useful and could complement already existing structures. However, donors, who have their own priorities, can impose those plans. Mohan (2006) describes in his chapter "*Beyond participation: strategies for deeper empowerment*" the work of the organization Village AiD. According to Mohan, they seem to be quite successful in their work. They try to look for methods that connect with the perceptions and already existing capacities of the people they work with. They state that participatory rural appraisal (PRA) has some serious shortcomings, because PRA is based upon the values, methods and agendas of outsiders. Therefore, Village AiD uses the "REFLECT" approach, which was originally piloted by Action Aid. In this approach there is room for different facilitation methods, such as dance, song and

storytelling. Furthermore, they understand the role of international development organizations purely as response-driven and not as agencies that focus on capacity building in order to legitimize their own programs.

Thus, the question rises whether participatory approaches really mean something or are just a way for development organizations to legitimize their actions. Why, then, even if it is quite clear that in some cases it is more a participatory game than real involvement, do local people still take part in those processes? According to Berner (2010) people participate, because of the so-called “hidden transfers”. For example there are free trainings often with some consumption available, the possibility to travel to events, and transaction costs, which are almost never compensated. Hilhorst (2003) mentions that people are willing to participate, because of material rewards. Warner (2007) states that participation whether it really works, or it is still something implemented from a top-down level, does create the possibility for participants to expand their social network, by attending meetings. Furthermore, people participate, because they gain a certain prestige or power (Hilhorst, 2003: 96). Whether people participate, because of network possibilities, hidden transfers or power it is clear that people try to get something out of the fact that they are framed as participants.

Of course it should not be seen as black and white. In some cases humanitarian agencies will use participation in a more instrumental way and in other cases participation will be the end goal. It cannot be stated that one form is better than the other. However, what is important is the fact that NGOs should clearly communicate their intentions why they make use of participatory approaches to avoid unnecessary frustration, because expectations cannot be met.

2.3.2.4) Moving beyond the criticism of participation

The concept of participation seems to be quite useful, but does create some difficulties regarding the fact how this concept is used and misused by different actors. To overcome those problems, different scholars have addressed issues that should be taken into account when it comes to participatory approaches.

In the first place it is important to notice that people who are seen as powerless are not. People, who are viewed as marginalized or vulnerable, are also active actors who have their capacities and strategies to deal with everyday realities. Although, from “our Western viewpoint” this “power” of the powerless is perhaps not perceived as such, it is according to Rahnema (1992 in: Mohan, 2006: 164) “very real in many ways, (it) is constituted by the thousands of centers and informal networks of resistance which ordinary people put up”. Mohan states that the attitude of humanitarian agencies can change when they are prepared to move beyond the idea that marginalized people are victims whom have to be empowered by those agencies

Also in participatory approaches the focus is on giving the local people a voice, while experts are set-aside as listeners. However, one should move beyond the division of insider/outsider, and not viewing one form of knowledge as more important or complete. As Katz (1992 in: Mohan, 2006) argues it is not about treating the insider as the “all knowing subject”, but instead we should recognize that nobody has “the perfect knowledge”. Related to this, another distinction between so called “indigenous knowledge” and “western ideas” is not really reflecting reality, as one should question whether there is something such as “pure” traditional or western knowledge. Instead of making a division between western and

indigenous knowledge, it would be much more interested to study the outcome of the interaction between those two forms of knowledge (Goebel, 1998). As already stated in 2.3.2.2 purely focusing on “the local” can undermine reality. Although the role of the state is often downgraded in participatory approaches, one should not undermine the influence the state has on the local level, both positively and negatively. Nyamugasira (1998) observed that although NGOs have been successful with initiatives at micro-level, the power structures and systems at local, national and global level remain largely intact. Thus, there should not only be a focus on the local level in participatory approaches, but also on the interaction between different levels and on wider, complex structures and systems. Whaites (1998, in: Mohan, 2006) argues that NGOs should also strengthen the capacity of the state, instead of creating parallel service systems.

Furthermore, one should take into account the politicized character of participation, because some people are included, while others are excluded. Also as already mentioned before, people do not always want to participate. Too often development workers assume that by talking about participatory programs, people want to be involved. The opposite is true, as people can be frustrated, because according to them it does not matter whether they participate or not, in the end nothing every changes (Warner, 2006). So, it is very important that there is a mandate; otherwise people will have no interest in actively participating. To know if there is a mandate, one should listen to the people. Although it sounds quite logic to listen, too often participation is imposed on people. Therefore, one should critically reflect on the (expected) outcomes of participatory approaches. Participation will be more successful, when people see the benefits of participation (Warner et al, 2002).

2.3.3) Partnership

Like participation partnership is also a concept that is over-used and under-scrutinized in development lexicon. It is used to describe a wide range of different kind of relationships such as between NGOs and their donors, between northern and southern NGOs, and between international donors and recipient governments (Harrison, 2002). The notion of partnership has evolved when it became clear that during development and emergency interventions international organizations failed to transfer skills and responsibilities to local agencies. Thus, the increased attention for better partnership is caused by frustrations with top-down and technocratic approaches, and the realization that one should understand and promote the interest and capacities of those who are often marginalized. Like participation partnership became an important aspect as an ethical necessity of development strategies of international organizations (Harrison, 2002).

The term partnership is often used to indicate those relations where INGOs fund local NGOs to perform humanitarian work. The ideal image of partnership in development is based on the idea that long-lasting attachments between agencies are developed. However, this ideal image of partnership is rarely represented, as relations between donor NGOs and recipient NGOs are very diverse. Van der Haar and Hilhorst (2009: 27) give an overview of the different shapes and intensity of partnership:

- A contractual agreement based on a tendering procedure where local organizations simply implement a job for which the donor fixes the parameters. There is no capacity building involved; the local organizations just have to prove that they have the capacities to do the job.
- A short-term incidental project applied by a local NGO engaged in relief or rehabilitation. There

- may be some functional capacity building.
- A longer-term partnership whereby the INGO supports the local NGO for a long time, and includes capacity building.
- A long-term partnership where the parties engage in a horizontal relationship in which, ideally, the different parties have an equal say in the policies and decision making of each other.
- A situation where an INGO forms a local NGO that is encouraged to become independent.
- A network partnership, where the donor-partner is part of the same network as the implementing partner.

The first two examples are especially based on financial contributions. In the other examples there is much more space for capacity building of the local organization involved in the process. According to Harrison (2002) relationships that are especially based on financial contributions often lead to a high dependency of NGOs on donors, which undermine their relationship with their beneficiaries. Since, accountability towards their donors is a higher priority than towards their beneficiaries, because of funding. Also in crisis-related interventions capacity building is a central issue in partnership. However, the question often rises: “who sets the agenda and for what purpose?” Sometimes capacity building refers more to controlling partner organizations instead of helping them to realize their own goals (Smillie, 2001). Stirrat and Henkel (1997: 75) state that: “for the donors, the great advantage of the model of partnership is legitimacy in that it allows them to claim a certain authenticity: “we are of and for the people””.

Nowadays, many humanitarian agencies believe that both in emergency response and development work there is a need and potential for partnership with local organizations. According to those organizations partnership can have a positive influence on the effectiveness of aid and will strengthen local capacities. This is in line with Article 6 of the Code of Conduct of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster relief. This Code states: “We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities (van der Haar and Hilhorst, 2009: 11)”. According to Diamond (1994) supporting local organizations is seen as crucial element to provide more sustainable development assistance. He believes that a strong civil society is necessary for development.

Although, the concept of partnership seems to be essential to create sustainable development, there are a lot of challenges concerning partnership, especially in crisis situations. Since, there is an influx of international organizations in emergency situations this influences the local organizational field. Often many international organizations will be seeking local partners, therefore local organizations can rapidly grow in size or new NGOs will emerge (van der Haar and Hilhorst, 2009). In Haiti many new local organizations were established after the earthquake, as many people hoped to benefit somehow from the enormous amount of money promised to Haiti. As a consequence it is sometimes difficult for INGOs to discover for what purpose local organizations have been established. Another problem mentioned by van der Haar and Hilhorst (2009) is that disaster response differs from development work, and local organizations may lack the specific expertise needed in such situations. Also funding cycles are usually much shorter in emergency situations than in development, limiting the possibilities to invest in capacity building and partnership. Lastly, one of the problems both in development and crisis situations is that according to international agencies there is a “lack of local capacities” in the context they work. According to Smillie (2001) this is often a euphemism to avoid the word corruption. He argues that the issue of corruption should be discussed more openly, because avoiding a discussion implies that there

are no solutions to deal with corruption, except for international organizations by doing everything themselves.

Often the problems related to capacity building and creating partnerships is not so much the intention to reinforce relationships or strengthen civil society groups, but much more if it really happens in practice (Smillie, 2001). In some countries there is a long tradition of civil society; while in others civil society organizations have been less developed. "A general lesson about capacity building, one now decades old, is that builders must have good knowledge of "bildees", their society, and the context in which the effort is expected to take place (Smillie, 2001: 177)".

3) Methodology

In this chapter I will first describe my research area and the various research methods used for collecting my data. Then I will reflect on my research population and how I analyzed my data. Lastly, I will discuss some limitations of my research.

From mid-April till the end of June 2011 I conducted qualitative research in the area of Léogâne in Haiti. The idea of qualitative research is to study the meaning of people's lives in their own social habitat and to give more insight into the views and perspectives of those people. The researcher should take into account contextual conditions, such as the social, environmental and institutional conditions that influence people's lives. In order to get a more holistic view of the research context data should be collected from different sources and with different techniques to increase the validity of the research (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002; Yin, 2011). During my fieldwork in Haiti I was embedded with the Dutch relief and development organization Cordaid together with another Dutch student, Angela Jansen. We had to conduct a research for our Master's degree in International Development Studies, and write a report for Cordaid⁷. During our research period we both collected data for our own thesis and for the Cordaid report. By interviewing, organizing focus groups and observing the daily activities of humanitarian agencies, specifically from Cordaid, I collected information for my research and the report of Cordaid. Besides fieldwork activities in Haiti, I also did literature research both on the historical context of Haiti and on more general theories within development studies and sociology. In this section I will first give a description of the research area. Then I will discuss my research topic, the different research methods and my research population. Finally I will explain how I analyzed my data and I will discuss my research limitations. This research is done from a constructivist perspective, on which I will elaborate in the next paragraph.

Constructivist perspective

From my point of view to understand how social realities are constructed, one should study practical activities on the ground, as well as broader historical events, cultural elements, discourses and theories that influence the way social actors shape those realities. The idea that realities are socially shaped through interactions, ideas, perceptions and interests of actors refers to the notion of constructivism. Since I believe that there is not 'one' reality, but people have their own realities, due to their cultural background, specific circumstances in which they live, their interaction with others and their own perceptions, this research is done from a constructivist perspective. This means that my role as a researcher is to provide insight into how and why people have different interpretations and understandings about reality and not to determine one scientific truth (Frerks and Klem, 2004).

Linked to constructivism is interpretivism, which believes that natural reality and social reality are different, because natural scientists focus more on abstract phenomena, and social scientists deal with human actions (Gray, 2004). This also means that different research methods are required. When doing research from an interpretive perspective, one is interested in understanding how cultural elements and historical events influence how people interpret and construct social realities. In my research I have taken an interpretive theoretical perspective within constructivist epistemology. From this perspective

⁷ The complexity of local participation: A study on the participatory component of Cordaid's shelter programme in post disaster Haiti". Internal Cordaid report

one looks for “culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of the social life-world (Crotty, 1998 In: Gray, 2004: 20). Although, I believe that social actors construct meaning and truth, I also think that power relations or social positions can influence the way people construct meaning. Those who have a critical inquiry perspective argue that interpretivists are not critical towards the culture they study. Therefore, I place myself also in the critical paradigm, which states that “ideas are mediated by power relations in society” and some groups in society are privileged over others (Gray, 2004: 24). Thus, I do believe that the world is socially constructed, but one should also take into account that power relations and inequalities in societies can influence those processes.

3.1) Research area

During my research period I lived for almost three months in a Cordaid shelter on the compound in Léogâne. Cordaid already works for more than thirty years on developmental issues in Haiti with partner organization. While they had no office before, Cordaid decided to establish two offices in Haiti to focus on humanitarian assistance, and specific on shelter reconstruction after the earthquake. One office is based in the capital, Port au Prince, and the other office is in Léogâne. When I was doing my research I lived in a shelter at the Cordaid compound in Léogâne.

Picture 1: Cordaid compound with shelters in Léogâne



Cordaid works in three different areas around Léogâne, namely Lompré (commune Léogâne), 7ieme Gérard (commune of Grand Goave) and Grand Goave City. Grand Goave City is the only urban area where the Léogâne team is working. This is a small city with approximately 50,000 inhabitants⁸. Lompré and 7ieme Gérard are both rural areas, but they differ a lot from each other. Lompré is a flat area, where most people work on agriculture. This area has a population of about 20,000 people. Recurrent floods are one of the main problems in this area. The other area, 7ieme Gérard, is a more mountainous area, but there are also some villages on Route National (one of the two important highways in Haiti). The people who live in the mountains already live there for several generations. Families fled to this area just

⁸ <http://maps.live-translator.net/HT/Grand-Goave/>

after the independence of Haiti in 1804 and most of them have never left this place. While the people who live in the villages nearby Route National, migrated to this area in recent decades. Grand Goave City and 7ieme Gérard are part of Greater Grand Goave where about 110,000 people live. The map below provides an overview of the size of the areas where Cordaid is working. This map shows how large the area of 7ieme Gérard (Section Communale 7) is compared to Grand Goave City and the two Cordaid zones in Port au Prince.

Map 3: Overview of the Cordaid areas⁹



During my stay I visited all three areas in Léogâne to collect information for the Cordaid report, but for my own research I especially focused on Grand Goave City and the area of Lompré. Due to time limitations I decided to focus on those two areas for my own research. I also did interviews with humanitarian organizations that are based in Léogâne city and in smaller villages around Léogâne. Furthermore, I interviewed seven partner organizations of Cordaid in Port au Prince to get more insight into the relationship between Cordaid and their partners after the earthquake. In the next part I will elaborate on my research topic.

3.2) Research topic

Before I went to Haiti I wrote a proposal about my research topic. On the one hand this is very useful, because it gives you the opportunity to get a focus. On the other hand, it often turns out that your topic is not always suitable or relevant when you arrive in the field. Although my first idea was to study how the Cordaid shelter program could be linked to a more sustainable livelihood program and how local

⁹ <http://www.slideshare.net/UrbanEmergenciesHT/110324-ue-ia-7522266>

people could participate in this process, it turned out to be more complicated than I thought. Due to several reasons on which I will elaborate in chapter nine I decided to modify my research topic. Since, I noticed that many international organizations were struggling to link short and longer-term programs I wondered what exactly makes it so difficult to have a more long-term focus in relief operations. While it is often argued by international organizations that partnership relations with local organizations and participatory approaches can contribute to a longer-term vision, this seems to be a complicated issue in Haiti. In this research I have especially focused on the case of Cordaid. To understand in what way Cordaid has utilized already existing social structures and collaborated with local organizations after the earthquake I have formulated the following central research question:

To what extent has the international relief and development organization, Cordaid, collaborated with local organizations since the earthquake?

In order to give a clear answer to my central question I have formulated the following sub questions:

- *Which kind of local organizations can be identified in the area of Grand Goave City and Lompré?*
- *Which challenges have humanitarian aid workers faced since the earthquake in Haiti?*

As already described in the introduction during my first weeks in Haiti I also became aware that mutual perceptions and expectations of international aid workers and Haitians have a lot of influence on how reconstruction activities are implemented on the ground. To understand more about those perceptions and expectations of different actors in the field, I formulated four additional sub questions.

- *What kind of perceptions do international aid workers and Haitians have of each other?*
- *Given this perspective, what kind of expectations do both parties have about each other?*
- *How do international aid workers and Haitian citizens interact in daily life?*
- *How have mutual perceptions of international agencies and Haitians influenced constructive collaboration since the earthquake in Haiti?*

The sub questions will be discussed in chapter six until eight. To understand how I have collected my data to answer my central question and my sub questions I will elaborate on my research methods in the next section.

3.3) Research methods

In order to gain data from the field, I have carried out 34 interviews alone and 34 interviews together with Angela Jansen. These were semi-structured interviews. Besides this we organized four focus groups. I have also carried out participant observation by going into the field almost every day with the field teams of Cordaid. Furthermore, I have written field notes and I held many informal conversations with humanitarian aid workers and staff from Cordaid. Before, during and after my fieldwork I did literature research about topics related to Haiti and broader development and humanitarian aid issues. By using different research methods, also known as triangulation, I have tried to increase the validity of the research. I will elaborate on the different research methods in the next part.

3.3.1) Literature research

Before I went to Haiti I have performed literature research to understand more about general scientific theories related to my research topic and the social, political and historical context of Haiti. Apart from scientific literature I also studied documents about Cordaid in general and their shelter program in Haiti. As mentioned before I changed my research topic when I was in Haiti. Due to this change I had to collect more literature on issues related to the practices and policies of humanitarian organizations in post-disaster situations. Furthermore, I have been reading literature on participation and other related concepts to support my fieldwork data.

3.3.2) Interviewing

Interviewing is something you can do in many different ways. My research is mostly based on semi-structured interviewing as a method. With semi-structured interviewing I used a list of topics and questions to be sure that all issues were included. Another important way of collecting information is by informal talks. Informal interviewing is more like a casual conversation where the researcher follows the lead of the participant, but can ask questions to focus the topic or to clarify certain points he or she does not understand (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002). During my research period I conducted interviews with people who have been participating in Cordaid's shelter program, employees of local and international NGOs, staff of Cordaid, and partners organizations of Cordaid. I was also interested in interviewing local officials, but unfortunately it was quite difficult to arrange a meeting with officials in Grand Goave and Léogâne. I spoke to some Casecs (Communal Section Administrators) and Asecs (Communal Section Assembly Members). In theory, the Casecs have an administrative role in each communal section¹⁰ and have to report to the mayor, while the Asecs have the responsibility of counselling the Casecs and acting as their budget watchdog¹¹. I will elaborate on the role of Asecs and Casecs in chapter four.

Picture 2: Interviewer with respondents in Grand Goave



¹⁰ Haiti has 565 communal sections (Coupeau, 2008)

¹¹ http://www.haitiaction.net/News/IJDH/12_8_6/12_8_6.html

3.3.3) Focus groups

Another way to collect data is by organizing focus groups. The value of a focus group lies in the interaction between people. When discussing certain subjects with people in a group, it is very interesting to observe group dynamics and how people react on each other. A disadvantage of a focus group can be that some people speak less freely in a group than when they are alone. This is especially the case when one wants to discuss sensitive topics. In total I held four focus group meetings. The first two focus groups arose spontaneously when more people joined the conversation, while we started with one person. The first focus group in Nieme Gérard consisted of three boys and one woman. When I was interviewing a potential beneficiary of Cordaid's shelter program they passed-by. They were interested in what I was doing so they stopped and became involved in the conversation. The respondents of the first focus group all live in the same village. The second focus group was in a small village near Léogâne where four women and two men joined the conversation when I was asking some questions to a young woman. When they heard my questions they became interested and wanted to share their opinion as well. They were all family members of the young woman. The two other focus groups were in Grand Goave City and organized by Angela and me. The first organized focus group consisted of committee members of the Cordaid committee. In this focus group we discussed several subjects such as their opinion about the Cordaid shelter program, their own role in this program as committee representative, and what could be improved about this program. The people, who participated in the other organized focus group, were some elderly from Grand Goave, who gave us some more historical background information about Grand Goave. In all the four focus groups I had no feeling that the answers people gave were influenced by the presence of others. On the contrary the people who participated in the focus groups wanted to share their opinions.

Picture 3: Focus group with committee members in Grand Goave



3.3.4) Participant observation

When a researcher is using participant observation he or she observes and/or takes part in daily activities of the people being studied in order to understand their culture and life routines (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002: 1-2). During my research period I went into the field almost every day with the Cordaid teams. This gave me the opportunity to observe both technical and social aspects of the Cordaid shelter program. My daily observations in the field have given me more insight into the shelter process from delivery and distribution of materials, to actually building a shelter. Second, I attended several meetings with Cordaid committee representatives and special organized forums (meetings for Cordaid beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries). This gave me more insight into the social aspects of the Cordaid shelter program; because during those meetings people could mention the problems they faced in shelter program and what could be changed. Furthermore, I have attended a shelter cluster meeting, where different INGOs were involved. During this meeting there was one organization that showed some beautiful and very modern architectural designs of houses they wanted to construct in Haiti. However, in this shelter meeting they were advised by other organizations to adapt their plans more to the Haitian context instead of designing something fancy without involving the local people. It was useful to attend this meeting, as I got a better understanding of the issues that are discussed by different INGOs.

3.4) Research population

In order to collect my data I interviewed different groups of people. In the following table I made an overview of those different groups who were involved in my research. These are people with whom I held semi-structural interviews.

Table 2: Research population

Group	Number of people interviewed
Beneficiaries of Cordaid shelter program	8
Non-beneficiaries of Cordaid shelter program	4
Representatives Cordaid committee	10
Staff from partner organizations of Cordaid	12
Local staff from Cordaid	7
International staff Cordaid	7
International staff other INGO	8
Local staff other INGO	1
Staff local Haitian organizations	15
Other ¹²	2
Total	74 ¹³

¹² One of those persons was a woman from Canada working for an Haitian organization and the other person was a Dutch woman working for a company in Haiti

¹³ This number is higher than the number of interviews I have done, because during some interviews more than one person was present

Since my main focus of my research was to understand more about the perceptions and expectations of people from Haitian organizations on international humanitarian organizations and the other way around, I spoke to 14 international staff members from international humanitarian organizations and to 27 local people from Haitian organizations. Those local people were either working for partner organizations of Cordaid or for local organizations in Grand Goave City and Lompré. The partner organizations of Cordaid are all legal organizations, while the latter are mostly informal organizations that are waiting for an official status.

Both for my own research and the Cordaid report I interviewed beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the Cordaid shelter program and representatives of the Cordaid committees to get more insight into their perceptions on the shelter program and INGOs in general. Furthermore, I spoke to local staff members from Cordaid and other international organizations to understand which challenges they face during their work in Haiti and what their ideas are about international and local organizations in Haiti.

The people I interviewed were partly chosen by me and partly by Cordaid staff members. Especially in the beginning, I went into the field with Cordaid staff whom I told that I would like to speak with a beneficiary or a committee representative and then they would be the ones to pick a person. After a while I came to know more people and when I collected some information on local organizations in Grand Goave, I chose myself which organization I wanted to interview. Furthermore, I also decided with which international organizations and local partners of Cordaid I wanted to talk.

3.5) Analysis

In this part I will describe how I analyzed my fieldwork data. Analyzing can be defined as processing research data by systematically organizing them, breaking them into manageable units, synthesizing them, discovering what can be used and what can be presented to others (Boeije, 2006: 62). Both during and after my fieldwork I analyzed my data. During my time in the field I wrote three reports about my findings to my supervisor in The Netherlands. Those reports were very useful to organize and analyze my data and to become aware of what kind of information I was still missing. I also worked out my new interviews every day, and I wrote daily observations and my personal experiences in my diary.

After my research in Haiti, I encoded the information I gained from my interviews and my observations. Encoding is a process during which the researcher examines and compares the research data and categorizes the data by using different topics and themes (Boeije, 2006). First I read all my interviews again, after that I subdivided my interview data into different topics that are mentioned in the following table.

Table 3: Topics for research analysis

Topics
Characteristics of local organizations in Grand Goave and Lompré
Challenges of aid workers in Haiti
Opinion of local organizations about the local government
Perceptions of aid workers on Haitians
Perceptions of Haitians on INGOs
Influence of INGOs in Haiti according to Haitians

Opinion of Cordaid staff about their local partners
Opinion of Cordaid partners about their relationship with Cordaid

By categorizing my information into different themes, I was able to compare my data and search for patterns. The analysis of my data will be discussed in chapter six until eight. In chapter six I will discuss what kind of local organizations already exist in the areas of Grand Goave and Lompré. In chapter seven I will elaborate on the challenges aid workers face during their work in Haiti. In chapter eight the mutual perceptions and expectations of aid workers and Haitians will be described. Furthermore, this chapter also includes a case study about the relationship of Cordaid and their local partners after the earthquake. This case study will give more insight into the challenges of partnership after the earthquake in Haiti.

3.6) Research limitations

A couple of limitations have to be taken into account when I conducted my research in Haiti. One of the biggest limitations was the fact that I did not speak any Creole and my French was not good enough to do semi-structured interviews. As a result I had to use an interpreter to help me with my interviews. By using an interpreter there are a couple of issues that one has to be aware of. In the first place, the answers given by respondents can be influenced by the presence of an interpreter, depending on the relationship between the respondent and the interpreter. Second, the interpreter can translate the answers given by the respondent in his own way, especially when the respondent does not understand English. Having an interpreter is not only problematic, because he or she can also function as a kind of informant who can give you some background information about certain answers and situations.

Another limitation I have to take into account is the fact that there are many security restrictions in Haiti. Therefore, I was dependent on Cordaid vehicles, as I was not allowed to take any public transport¹⁴. This meant that I always arrived with a Cordaid car in the field, making it more complicated to state that I was an independent researcher. Although I told people that I was a Dutch student, some of them still hoped that they could get a shelter or something else when talking to me. This also has implications for the answers of my research, as some people were very much inclined to give socially desirable answers, not to lose any credits with Cordaid or because they also wanted a shelter. However, as I have also been into the field every day I gained a lot of information by observing. I also had some interviews with local staff of Cordaid who could give me more background information about the situation of some people. In this way I could cross-check my data with observations and with experiences of others, like my fellow student Angela Jansen, but also international and local Cordaid staff. Thus, by using different research methods I have been able to increase the validity of my research data.

Before I discuss my research data I will give an historical overview and background information about the economic and political context of Haiti in the next chapter. Furthermore, information about Haiti's civil society and the presence of international organizations will be included in this chapter. By understanding both the historical and current context of Haiti one can also get more insight into how people interpret and construct social realities.

¹⁴ From June 2011 onwards it was possible to take the bus from Port au Prince to Léogâne

4) History and context of Haiti

Haiti is part of an island between the Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean. One third of the island is called Haiti, and the other two-third belongs to the Dominican Republic. Haiti has the size of the US state of Maryland with a total area of 27750 square kilometers and a population of around 9.7 million people. In 2010 it was estimated that around five million people live in urban areas, of which more than two million live in Port au Prince (CIA World Factbook. 2011). Although, Haiti has received billions in foreign assistance it is considered to be one of the poorest countries in the world. To understand why Haiti has become such a poor country it is essential to provide an historical overview. This will be described in the next part.

4.1) History

Haiti's history is fascinating, but is also very contradictory. Haiti has been the first nation that defeated a colonial power and therefore, became the first independent black Republic. However, nowadays Haiti is occupied by UN forces and ruled by international agencies that flooded the country after the earthquake. Another contradictory is that Haiti declined from the richest colony in the world to the poorest in the Western Hemisphere plagued by political and economic instability. To understand how Haiti's situation changed so drastically I will elaborate on different historical events that have influenced Haiti's past. In the first part I will elaborate on Haiti's independence and the period after. In the second part I will discuss Haiti in the 20th century and the period before and after the earthquake.

4.1.1) Slavery and independence

The first inhabitants of Haiti were the Arawak Indians. When Columbus discovered the island in 1492 it was called Hispaniola. Soon the Spanish established a plantation system based on the cultivation of sugar cane. The Arawak Indians became the first slaves on those plantations, but they were not resistant against the hard work on the plantations and many began to succumb to diseases and maltreatment. Therefore, the Spanish started to import slaves from Africa around 1513 to replace the rapidly declining Arawak population (Blackburn, 1997 in: Miller, 2000). When the French conquered a large part of Hispaniola in 1664 they renamed it Saint-Domingue. They also increased the sugar and coffee production and therefore had to import more African slaves. Saint-Domingue became one of the richest colonies of France in the 18th century and was called "The Pearl of the Antilles". Although, Haiti was rich the slaves lived in appalling conditions and they came into resistance. After a long revolt of the slaves under Toussaint L'Ouverture Saint-Domingue became the first independent black republic (Pierre-Louis, 2011). After independence the island was renamed after the Arawak word for mountainous land, 'Ayiti' (Courlander, 1996 in: Miller, 2000).

Quickly after the independence Haiti was divided into a northern black kingdom and a southern mulatto republic. The international community isolated both states after its independence from 1804 till 1825, as France and other Western countries did not recognize its independence. They were afraid that Haiti would be seen as an example for other colonies. This isolation had a devastating impact on the economy as both states had no access to foreign markets. The existence of the two states did not last long, as Haiti was reunited, when Christophe, the leader of the northern kingdom, surrendered. In the following years Boyer, the leader of the southern republic negotiated with France for recognition of Haitian independence. The French finally accepted independence of Haiti, in exchange for an indemnity. They

demanded compensation for their losses caused by Haiti (Pierre-Louis, 2011; Schuller, 2007a). The indemnity Haiti had to pay France was 60 million francs that took them 61 years to repay¹⁵.

After independence, the newly emancipated population was forced by the Haitian rulers to continue working on the plantations under harsh conditions and low wages in order to promote economic growth. As the plantation system was somehow restored a class society was created existing of a group of small elite and the poor masses. When the plantation system gradually collapsed a peasant economy relying mostly on subsistence came into existence. A combination of a peasant subsistence economy, a growing subdivision of land, the deficiencies of state assistance and the lack of significant incentives for peasant production all limited the chance for a productive development of the economy (Fatton, 2011; Shamsie and Thompson, 2006). Furthermore, due to the debt Haiti had, there was no funding for public education, creating a division between the French-speaking elites who paid for private education and the Creole-speaking majority that did not have this privilege. This division is still present in Haiti, where French is spoken by a minority of educated people and used by the government and business, although Creole has also been an official language in Haiti since 1987 (Schuller, 2007a).

4.1.2) Haiti in the 20th century

In 1915 the United States occupied Haiti for 19 years, legitimizing their action under the guise of democratic reforms. Although, the U.S. encouraged democracy, there were no official elections during this period and the U.S. appointed presidents (Buss and Gardner, 2008). Furthermore, French became the official language of Haiti, a modern army was installed and it became possible for foreigners to own land in Haiti (Schuller, 2007a), which had been prohibited since independence. During those years of occupation there were different resistant groups, and there was a widespread peasant's revolt from 1919 to 1920. The U.S. Marines struck down the rebellions with an iron fist and killed an estimated 3,000 peasants and rebels in various confrontations. In 1929 Haitians started to riot on a regular basis in order to force the Americans to leave the country. In 1934, the occupation was abruptly finished, resulting in a poor transfer of power. Although, the U.S. left Haiti, they still controlled Haiti's finances till 1947. After the U.S. occupation there was a lot of political turbulence as nine different rulers, including both presidents and military leaders, ruled Haiti during the period of 1930 till 1957 (Buss and Gardner, 2008).

From 1957 until the mid-1980s Haiti was ruled by two dictators, François Duvalier "Papa Doc" and his son Jean Claude Duvalier "Baby Doc". The U.S. financed the presidential campaign of Papa Doc as he was considered to be a reformer who had followed a medical education at Michigan Medical School. To control civil unrest and political opposition François Duvalier created a paramilitary force, the Tontons Macoutes (Creole for "bogeymen"). Many people, who were seen as betrayers were murdered, tortured and unjustly imprisoned. Papa Doc was not in favor of the mulatto aristocracy and he tried to keep them out of power. He also closed the country to reduce outside influences. Still, he was tolerated by the United States, because he was an anti-communist. The situation in Haiti deteriorated during Papa Doc and many people fled the country. When he died, his son Baby Doc became the new president. In the beginning people were very positive, since Baby Doc wanted to institute some reforms, such as opening up the country to more foreign investment. Despite the reforms, he was still a repressive dictator. After

¹⁵ Although some sources state that it took Haiti 12 years to repay the indemnity. The original debt was 150 million francs, but was reduced to 60 million. However, 30 million was added, as this was the money Haiti borrowed from a French bank to start repaying the original debt.

many threats and civil unrest, he was forced into exile in 1986. Due to this widespread unrest, the Haitian economy crashed and government capacity to govern was also deeply affected (Buss and Gardner, 2008).

After decades of repression by dictators and the military, Jean-Bertrand Aristide became Haiti's first freely elected leader in 1990. He was also the first president who addressed the Haitian majority in their own language, Creole (McAlister, 2002). However, his fame did not last long as he was overthrown by a military coup in 1991. And history repeated itself again. There was a lot of violence during this military dictatorship and many people fled to the countryside, the Dominican Republic, or the United States. The international community embargoed trade with Haiti, but this did not influence the military, because they simply ratcheted up drug trafficking. The only ones who suffered from the embargo were the poor people. Finally, on September 18, 1994 the United States occupied Haiti to restore Aristide (Buss and Gardner, 2008). Aristide became president from 1994 till 1996 and again from 2001 till 2004. In 2004 he went into exile after a *coup d'état* by former soldiers. Due to an armed conflict the UN decided to start a peacekeeping operation (MINUSTAH) to restore order. The UN is still present in Haiti at the moment.

After the earthquake Aristide returned to Haiti after seven years in exile. Also a new president, Michel Martelly, was chosen and inaugurated on the 14th of May 2011. He is a former musician and businessman with some political experience. Although, he has many plans to reform Haiti, the history has shown that political instability is nothing special in Haiti so people are waiting to see what will happen with Martelly as the new president.

4.2) Haiti's socio-economic and political situation

Haiti, a fragile state considered by the international community. To understand when a state is defined as fragile different scholars have identified a series of key indicators that could be characteristics of a fragile state. According to Gros (1996: 462) “economic malperformance, lack of social synergy, authoritarianism, militarism and environmental degradation caused by rampant population growth” are features of a fragile state. Furthermore, high income inequality, state power in the hands of the elite, tensions between ethnic and religious groups, and the absence of a strong judicial institution and security sector are mentioned by other scholars. Many of those characteristics also apply for Haiti and therefore it has been classified as a fragile state. Haiti's state infrastructure is very weak; there is an overall climate of insecurity due to the fact that the prevalence of a high number of small arms in the country has sabotaged attempts to establish the rule of law; HIV/AIDS rates are one of the highest in the Western Hemisphere and there is an overall ecological, social, economic and political crisis (Shamsie and Thompson, 2006). In this context of high insecurity, poverty and corruption humanitarian organizations and the Haitians try to rebuild their country after the earthquake.

4.2.1) Economic situation

When you hear the stories about Haiti it really sounds depressing: “The poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and one of the poorest in the world”. The Human Development Index ranks Haiti as the 145th least developed country in the world of the 169 countries included in the report (HDR, 2010). A recent study has shown that three-fourths of the population lives on less than two US dollars a day (Buss and Gardner, 2008). More than half, around 56 per cent, of the Haitian population lives on less than one US dollar a day. In all other countries in the region except Nicaragua and El Salvador this number is

around 25 per cent (Shamsie, 2006). The annual gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2010 was 650 dollar¹⁶. Remittances form nearly twenty per cent of GDP and more than twice the earnings from exports. There is a lack of investment, because of security problems and limited infrastructure (CIA World Factbook, 2011).

Haiti has an unemployment rate of 40.6 per cent and more than two-thirds of the labor force does not have a formal job (CIA World Factbook, 2011). This means that most people in Haiti work in the informal sector and pay no taxes. Haiti is a country of extremes, where inequality and exclusion are highly visible. It is a country where a very small minority controls almost half of the wealth and where the most millionaires per capita live in the region (Schuller, 2009). This creates a lot of inequality between the majority of the Haitians and a very small upper-class. The economic elite have squeezed the Haitian majority through inequitable trade practices and tax burdens for a long time (McAlister, 2002).

4.2.2) Haiti's politics

From independence onwards fifty-five presidents¹⁷ have ruled Haiti of which only nine have served out their terms. Seven died in office, three were assassinated or executed, and twenty-three were overthrown by military or paramilitary groups. Thirty-one were president for two years or less (Buss and Gardner, 2008). Almost all Haitian rulers have tended to run the country like imperial and monarchic presidents, showing little sympathy for a democratic system. Already directly after independence Toussaint L'Ouverture has set the tone for future generations by declaring himself governor general of the island 'for life' (Fatton, 2005). As a consequence of the material scarcity and unproductive economy Haitian political class have traditionally fought for power with each other reflecting '*la Politique du Ventre*' (Politics of the Belly) (Fatton, 2011; Shamsie and Thompson, 2006). Jean-François Bayart¹⁸ has introduced this term "to describe both the wealth-seeking struggle for state power and the methods used to maintain and benefit from that power (Harsch, 1997: 673)". The long violent history of Haiti, where dictators and military regimes have constantly alternated, has had an enormous impact on the situation in Haiti. As the old Creole proverb goes *konstitisyon se papye, bayonet se fe* – a constitution is made of paper, but bayonets are made of steel. This proverb defines the history of Haiti's politics and governance dominated by men with guns (Fatton, 2005; Bolton, 2011).

Since, Haiti has a long history of monarchs the government system is very much centralized. This means that everything is focused on the capital, Port au Prince, and there is very little distribution of power to regional or local levels of society. When Aristide became the new president in 1990, he took off with a progressive and ambitious plan. The three pillars of his plan were: the decentralization of political structures, a literacy campaign, and agrarian reform. To decentralize power, Aristide installed mayors and local officials. In every medium-to-large-size town a communal mayor and two deputy mayors have been elected to form the city council for four years. Furthermore three persons were elected to become the Communal Section Administrators (CASECS) (Americas Watch Committee, 1993) and Communal Section Assembly Members (ASECS). When Aristide was forced into exile, many of those elected officials

¹⁶ <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf>

¹⁷ Depending on how one classifies them. See Buss and Gardner 2008: 187-188

¹⁸ Bayart, Jean- François (1989) *L'Etat en Afrique. La politique du ventre*. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard (translated: Bayart, Jean François (1993) *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*. London: Longman)

have been subjected to brutal treatment by the military. Theoretically this system introduced by Aristide is still present, but in practice the power of local officials is very minimal.

Although, Haiti's politics are characterized by violence, corruption, instability and suppression from the late 1970s onwards an assertive civil society emerged in Haiti (Fatton, 2005). Besides Haiti's civil society one also has to understand the role of international organizations in Haiti. From the 1990s onwards the number of international organizations in Haiti has increased enormously. While these organizations have provided many social services for Haitians, they have also indirectly undermined the Haitian government (Schuller, 2007b). In the next part I will elaborate on the role of Haiti's civil society and the presence of international organizations in Haiti.

4.3) International organizations in Haiti and Haiti's civil society

4.3.1) Haiti's civil society

During colonialism Haitians offered resistance against their oppressors. Haiti has a long tradition of resistance against dominant regimes. In the early days during the period of slavery there were many forms of resistance, especially through Vodou rituals. McAlister also argues that Vodou functions as an important survival mechanism, already during the slave period and also nowadays within an environment of insecurity and poverty. Another form of resistance in Haiti are the so called "chan pwen" songs that criticize those in power (Schuller, 2007a).

During the authoritarian Duvalier regimes two trends in development work played an important role. In the first place there were some international and national organizations that focused on poverty reduction and worked through community structures controlled by the regime. The second trend was characterized by Haitian NGOs and the church that wanted to bring about social change and an end to the regime (Mangones, 2001). "Prominent among these organizations was the radical wing of the Catholic Church, known as *Ti Legliz* (little church) (Fatton, 2005: 18)". With the growing criticism and mass protests of Haitians Jean-Claude Duvalier was forced to flee the country. After the Duvalier regime from 1986 onwards, civil society began its rapid growth. In the rural areas so called 'popular organizations' started to address local needs, focusing on agriculture, education and other development issues often with outside help. Some of those organizations paid attention to issues such as human rights, corruption and land distribution. In the urban areas women groups, student associations, political active trade unions and many community groups were established.

Unlike Haiti's economy, its civil society was remarkable advanced, except for the political parties. Therefore, especially on local level Haitians seem to have a strong voice, while on national level the army still had much influence. In this environment Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected as president, during Haiti's first free elections on December 16, 1990. However, his triumph was short-lived, as he was overthrown by a military coup in 1991. During this period there was a lot of violence against popular organizations, the independent media and the popular church (Americas Watch, 1993). A lot of equipment was stolen, records were destroyed and funds were taken. Despite the systematic repression against Haitian civil society organizations, they offered resistance and adapted their strategies to the political context. For example organizations working in human rights were strengthened, emergency

funds were created for internally displaced and victims of the military violence and networking at national level to strengthen resistance.

Despite structural violence between 2003 and 2006 in Port au Prince, and despite the city's size and anonymity, neighborhood groups have completed minor infrastructure projects. They fixed roads, asking a contribution of passers-by until they had enough funds for material and a common meal. There is also a tradition of 'sòl' - organically organized, zero-interest solidarity lending. Six to twelve people combine their resources so that every sixth to twelfth month they can pay their annual rent or school fees (Schuller, 2007a). Those examples give more insight into how Haitians have organized themselves on local level either to resist against political oppression or to provide social services.

In 2000 the "Civil Society Initiative" (ISC) was founded by Haiti's business elites. Although they defined themselves as representatives of "civil society", they were especially focused on the bourgeois interests. As a reaction the Group 184 was founded in 2002 including women's organizations, labor unions, human right groups and peasants associations. Unlike ISC many of those organizations received funding from the U.S. and in 2003 USAID allocated \$2.9 million for "Democracy and Governance". USAID stated that they supported civil society by empowering local groups to engage with the government and to counteract against authoritarian rule (Schuller, 2007a). Haiti has become dependent on foreign assistance by the presence of international organizations. This will be discussed in the next section.

4.3.2) The republic of NGOs

"When you're put in the position of begging, you are obliged to accept whatever they give you, whether it's what you need or not" - Schuller, 2009: 90

Since the 1990s the presence of NGOs has increased enormously. In 1984 it was estimated that there were around 200 NGOs working in Haiti, ten years later there were already 800 NGOs and now it has been estimated that there are over 10,000 organizations¹⁹ of which 500 are officially registered (Pierre-Louis, 2011). Therefore, Haiti is also called "*La République des ONG*". This presence of INGOs has created a competitive environment (Zanotti, 2010), in which organizations are fighting for funding and beneficiaries, and try to be as visible as possible. Cooley and Ron (2002) have described this as the "NGO scramble". After the earthquake there was an enormous influx of INGOs and faith-based organizations, which all wanted to 'help' the Haitians.

During the military repression after the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier a lot of international organizations started to provide services. However, many Haitians saw their role as ambiguous and contradictory. On the one hand economic sanctions were imposed on Haiti and its people in an effort to force the military to relinquish power, while on the other hand humanitarian agencies provided help to victims of the military repression. According to many Haitians, this ambiguity of the international community has led to a prolonged crisis and, in some cases, has even strengthened the position of the regime (Mangones, 2001). After a violent and restless period Aristide returned to power in 1994 and served out the rest of his term. René Préval followed him. During this period 1.8 billion dollar of international aid was poured into Haiti from 1995 until 1999, directly funding (Northern) NGOs instead of the Haitian government

¹⁹ Including faith-based, community based, national and international organizations

(Schuller, 2007a). This indirectly undermines the state's legitimacy since nearly all "development" is done by NGOs (Schuller, 2007b). During this period Haiti's civil society flourished via peasants associations and neighborhood committees (Morton, 1997). From 1995 on, USAID and other donors have been prevented from supporting the Haitian government. The official reason was that the Préval government presided over a collapse of the Parliament. This was the first time after Aristide's return that less aid was given to Haiti (Schuller, 2007b). Thus, already for a long time Haiti has been dependent especially on US relief groups. In 2007, USAID and the Canadian development agency distributed about 70 percent of the funding available to Haitian organizations (Zanotti, 2010).

INGOs have been criticized for weakening social movements rather than working in partnership with them (Eade, 2010). Many INGOs often use internal personnel to implement projects and have single projects that fail to link with country practices and procedures (Brinkerhoff, 2010). Pouligny (2005) argues that there is a clear distinction between INGO workers, who often live in gated communities and the Haitian people. While INGOs pretend "to work with local civil society, outsiders actually collaborate with other outsiders - in other words with themselves (2005: 501)". However, it must be recognized that NGOs have to deal with certain restrictions imposed by their donors. To increase NGO accountability, donors demand visible and measurable results to know how the money is spent.

INGOs after the earthquake

After the earthquake in Haiti the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) has been established by the government of Haiti to develop an Action Plan for the National Reconstruction and Development (APNRD). The Action Plan was developed in March 2010. However, most of the plan was already designed by external advisers making it a top-down plan, not owned by the Haitian government and people (Oxfam, 2011). The most important idea of the IHRC was to decide in what way the aid budget for Haiti could be spent. International agencies would have to ask the commission for approval to implement their programs that have to fit into the reconstruction plan of Haiti. However, this accountability was not required for international agencies. Thus, many organizations have their own programs, own funds and their own methods. They do not want to put all their money in one basket, but they want to be visible. Humanitarian agencies do not only want to help others, but also themselves according to Linda Polman²⁰ and others.

As a result of this major emergency a Cluster System was formed to be able to coordinate the reconstruction process in a more efficient way. This so-called cluster system has been introduced as a result of a UN review of humanitarian responses to major emergencies after the Tsunami. There are different clusters (WASH, Health, Shelter, Logistics, Early Recovery, Education and Agriculture, Nutrition, Protection, Camp Coordination and Management, Emergency Telecommunications) which consist of UN agencies, INGOs and other international organizations that provide certain services during a humanitarian crisis. Every cluster has a 'cluster lead', usually a UN agency, which coordinates the group and chairs meetings. The clusters are responsible for needs assessment, coordination, planning, monitoring, evaluation, advocacy and resource mobilization in post-earthquake Haiti (Bolton, 2011). The cluster system has not been without controversy. In December 2010, the head of Medicines Sans

²⁰ <http://www.ismagazine.nl/2011/03/31/eer-voor-het-geld/>

Frontiers²¹ argued that the cluster system had failed to coordinate relief response effectively and instead of providing technical support for INGOs, this system only seems capable of passing basic information and delivering few concrete results. Furthermore, “the cluster system claims that it ensures humanitarian actors build on local capacities and maintain appropriate links with Government and local authorities (IASC, 2006 in: Bolton, 2011: 13). However, cluster meetings are often held in UN buildings, which are difficult to enter for ordinary Haitians. Another criticism of the cluster system is the fact that almost all meetings are held in French or English. This means that the few Haitians that take part in these meetings will be largely from the educated elite (Bolton, 2011). This is a general criticism of INGOs in Haiti, as most of their project documents are written in English or French, while a majority of the Haitians only speak Creole (Oxfam, 2011; Bolton, 2011).

Since there were so many international organizations after the earthquake there was a lot of uncertainty about the role of all those INGOs. Also fragmentation of Haiti's territory into 'program areas', marked with banners, flags and signboards and the division of Haiti into highly secured compounds – such as UN Logistics Base - and the rest of Haiti created a sharp division between Haitians and aid workers. Especially in times when steadiness and constancy were needed, the international governance system was confusing, fragmented and shifting (Bolton, 2011). Unfortunately this is nothing new as Buss and Gardner (2008: 103) found in an evaluation about the history of foreign aid to Haiti that there was a constant ebb and flow of aid funding, “unraveling many positive benefits they may have produced”.

On the next page a map is included that was created by InterAction, an alliance of U.S.-based international non-governmental organizations and their partners in Haiti. This map gives an impression of the number of international non-governmental organizations that were present in Haiti in July, 2011. This map only includes InterAction members.

²¹ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/dec/28/haiti-cholera-earthquake-aid-agencies-failure>

Map 4: Overview of InterAction members²²



Also many other international organizations are present in Haiti. One of these organizations is the Dutch relief and development organization Cordaid. I stayed with this organization in Haiti during my fieldwork. In the next chapter I will give more background information about the organizational structure of Cordaid and about their role in Haiti.

²² <http://humanosphere.kplu.org/2011/07/map-of-ngos-in-haiti/>

5) Cordaid

During my research period in Haiti, I was embedded with the Dutch organization Cordaid. This is one of the largest development organizations in the Netherlands. They are based in The Hague, and work mostly with local organizations in Asia, Latin-America, the Middle East and Africa. As stated on their website, their mission is to create a sustainable better future for the world's poorest people and most excluded by working in collaboration with partner organizations all over the world (Cordaid mission, 2011). They have almost 100 years of experience in relief, development and poverty reduction. Therefore, Cordaid tries to link relief and development perspectives in their programs (Cordaid, 2011). While Cordaid mostly works with local partners, they have established a few offices in areas of high insecurity such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Darfur, but also in areas where enormous disasters have hit, such as in Aceh after the Tsunami in 2004 and in Haiti after the earthquake in 2010.

5.1) Background of Cordaid

Cordaid was formed in 1999 through the merger of three Catholic NGOs, Mensen in Nood, Memisa, and CEBEMO and is the largest co-financing organizations in the Netherlands. Cordaid's vision is to create a world without injustice and poverty, where every individual counts. Cordaid understands development as a process in which unequal power relations can change. According to Cordaid poverty is not only caused by a lack of money and knowledge, but is often linked to social exclusion. Unequal power relations have an influence on the ability of people to benefit from economic and political development (Cordaid, 2011). Thus, by challenging those power relations, Cordaid believes that marginalized people can become more powerful and fight against their marginalized position.

At the moment Cordaid has 306 staff members working in The Hague and a budget of 149.3 million Euros per year. Although, Cordaid is a Catholic organization and part of two Catholic networks, the Caritas Internationalis network and CIDSE, they believe in freedom of religion. Therefore, they are not bound to the religious background of people, but help those people who are in need regardless of religion. Respect for human diversity is one of their principles (Cordaid, 2011).

They have a network of almost 900 partner organizations in 28 countries over the world, such as churches, governments, companies, trade unions, and other national and international development organizations. Cordaid believes in people's own capacities to improve their lives, and therefore they work together with local partners, as they are the ones who have the knowledge and understanding about their own culture and problems. Cordaid changed its strategy of donor organization into a strategic financing organization. This means that financial support of local partners is linked to efficient and sustainable development criteria. Cordaid also stimulates cooperation between different local partners and other organizations and has a focus on influencing policy (Cordaid, 2011). Thus, besides strengthening the capacities of their partner organizations, knowledge exchange, mutual learning, cooperation with civil society groups and influencing policies are a high priority of Cordaid.

Cordaid is sponsored by *Cordaid Memisa* (structural health care), *Cordaid Mensen in Nood* (relief and reconstruction), *Cordaid Kinderstem* (Children in slums), *Cordaid Microkrediet* (microcredit) and *Cordaid Bond Zonder Naam* (poverty reduction in The Netherlands). Furthermore, the Dutch government, the European Union, the National Lottery and several companies also finance Cordaid (Cordaid, 2011).

The organizational structure

Cordaid has a long history in working in emergency situations. Besides emergency situations Cordaid also has a lot of experience in longer-term development programs. According to Cordaid one of their strengths is to link relief and development. They start from the idea that people are not victims, but citizens. Cordaid makes use of the capacities of those citizens to make them more resilient against disasters and conflicts (Cordaid, 2011).

Every four years Cordaid re-organizes its organizational structure due to different reasons. Last year in 2010 it was argued that the re-organization was a consequence of the budget cuts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Netherlands. At the moment Cordaid has four sectors, which are divided into different programs:

Conflict Transformation
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Community Security• Fair and sustainable extractives• Identity Matters• Female leadership in peace and security
Health and Well-being
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Women's health• Community care and support• Social Protection• Health systems strengthening
Entrepreneurship
<ol style="list-style-type: none">6. Enterprise in Conflict areas7. Access to financial services8. Sustainable agriculture
Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Aid
<ol style="list-style-type: none">8. Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction

Besides those sectors there are also several departments within Cordaid. There is a department for internal management, a department for external funding, a department for internal knowledge and evaluation, and a department especially focused on programs in The Netherlands.

5.2) Cordaid in Haiti

For over 30 years Cordaid has been supporting partners in Haiti with financial aid and capacity building. After the earthquake Cordaid established a field office in Haiti in coordination with local authorities, UN clusters and Caritas Internationalis to implement earthquake related activities. The initial focus of Cordaid was to give emergency aid together with local partners, such as distribution of food and tents and provide medical care for the victims (Cordaid Haiti 'Programs', 2011). The first longer-term program of Cordaid after the earthquake was a shelter program. Another large program of Cordaid in Haiti is a mental health program, which started in November 2010, to address psychological problems of Haitians due to the earthquake.

One of the main reasons for opening this field office was the fact that Cordaid received direct funding for emergency activities in Haiti from the Dutch citizens. This funding brought some strong obligations, such as accountability to its donors. The idea of a field office in Haiti was that it would enable Cordaid to be more accountable to its donors and to increase collaboration with their local partners (Cordaid Haiti, 'About', 2011). The duration of the Cordaid office in Haiti is limited, which means that most activities should be handed over to local partners by the end of 2012. The idea is that Cordaid's local partners will have a central role in future implementation and continuation of programs in Haiti (Cordaid Haiti, 2011). Thus, also after the field office is closed Cordaid will continue to provide technical and financial support to its local partners.

The shelter program

After a couple of months Cordaid started with more long-term reconstruction programs. One of their largest programs in Haiti is a shelter program, which started in March 2010. The aim of this program is to build 5900 semi-permanent shelters and repair 2200 houses for more than 8000 Haitian families both in rural and urban areas. In the rural area around Léogâne, Cordaid works in three areas: Lompré, Grand Goave City and 7ieme Gérard. In the urban area Cordaid works in Villa Rosa, St. Marie, Tisous and Nan-Cocteau. "The underlying principle of this program is to build back better. To ensure this we work with a people centered approach in which local communities have a central role in the implementation of the program (Cordaid Haiti 'Programs', 2011)". Cordaid has involved local people in their shelter program by establishing committees. Also local youth is involved in the reconstruction process and is educated to build save constructions. The shelters of Cordaid are earthquake and hurricane proof to prevent another disaster from happening.

The shelter program started as a transitional shelter program, but this changed after a few months as it was decided by Cordaid that a longer-term development perspective would increase the sustainability of the program. Therefore, Cordaid designed permanent shelters based on traditional Haitian architecture both for the rural and urban areas. However, after a few months it was noted that building in rural areas differs a lot from building in urban areas. Due to many difficulties in the urban areas in Port au Prince, such as poor accessibility, high complex land tenure situations and the challenge to build safely on steep slopes Cordaid switched its focus of merely constructing houses to a more integrated approach around May 2011 (Cordaid Haiti, 2011). The aim of this integrated approach is to improve an entire neighborhood on a wider level together with different stakeholders, such as local government, the private and public sector, CBOs, NGOs and INGOs. At the moment a pilot program is running in Villa Rosa, a neighborhood in Port au Prince. "By focusing on building local capacities and placing ownership firmly in local hands Cordaid ensures the sustainability and long-term success of these programs" (Cordaid Haiti, 2011).

Picture 4: Cordaid shelter in Grand Goave



Community driven approach

An important element of the shelter program is community participation. Cordaid made use of a Community Action Plan (CAP). This is a tool to stimulate planning processes with active involvement of the people who live in a particular neighborhood. The result of this process is a plan that contains the summary of priority actions for reconstruction per community²³. As a result of the CAP in Léogâne and Port au Prince it was decided to establish local committees in order to involve the local people actively in the shelter program. The representatives of the committees are working voluntarily for Cordaid. In the area of Léogâne five committees were established. Their own community members have selected the committee representatives. Their main role is to function as a bridge between the community and Cordaid. They know the people in their community and prioritize who is the most vulnerable and has to get a shelter first. The overall objective of the CAP strategy is described by Cordaid as follows:

*“To stimulate and empower the populations of the communities in which we work, to identify and prioritize development interventions relating to reconstruction in order to find sustainable solutions based on community ownership”.*²⁴

When those committees were established the idea was that they would first support the shelter program, but would also play a role in different kind of programs like WASH and Livelihood. However,

²³ Cordaid Haiti: Manual of Operations. May 2011.

²⁴ Ibid.

due to a lack of funding there are no further programs at the moment in Léogâne. The committees are still actively involved in the shelter program.

Cordaid Haiti and Cordaid The Hague

Cordaid works especially with local partner organizations. However, after enormous disasters like the Tsunami in Indonesia and the floods in Pakistan Cordaid also started with their own programs. In Haiti it was decided by Cordaid to start with a shelter and mental health program, therefore two offices were established. The time horizon of the field office in Haiti is limited, and will be finished by the end of 2012. During my stay in Haiti, Cordaid Haiti had almost no contact with their partners. There was one international staff member of Cordaid Haiti responsible for all the contact with Cordaid's partners. However, in May 2011 Cordaid The Hague became fully responsible again to maintain contact with their partners in Haiti (Cordaid Haiti 'About', 2011). Thus, Cordaid is an organization that is both involved in longer-term structural work together with local partners, and emergency activities. In the next chapter I will discuss my research data which is related to the case of Cordaid in Haiti.

6) Local organizations in Grand Goave and Lompré

In the following three chapters I will elaborate on my empirical data. I have collected this data through interviews, informal conversations, focus groups and my own observations. In this chapter I will give an overview of the different kind of organizations I have interviewed in order to give an answer to my first sub question: “Which kind of local organizations can be identified in Grand Goave City and Lompré?” During my research I have interviewed both international aid workers, especially from Cordaid and several local organizations in the urban area of Grand Goave and the rural area of Lompré. I have interviewed fifteen persons from local organizations in Grand Goave and Lompré.

6.1) Local organizations and committees in Grand Goave and Lompré

Already in the first weeks after the earthquake Haiti was flooded by INGOs who came into the country to give their support to the Haitian people. As described before, the concept of NGOs in Haiti is nothing new, however after the earthquake “the number of NGOs implementing relief projects in Haiti increased uncontrollably (Stumpfenhorst et al, 2011)”. Not only the number of international organizations increased, also many new local committees and organizations have been established right after the earthquake. It was argued by respondents that those initiatives were the result of the enormous amount of money promised for the reconstruction of Haiti. One of the local staff members of Cordaid said that he is sure that a lot of those local organizations will stop working after the INGOs leave Haiti again. Also in the areas of Grand Goave and Lompré local organizations have been established right after the earthquake. However, especially in Grand Goave there were also many local organizations present before the earthquake. To get more insight into the kind of local organizations in Grand Goave and Lompré I have interviewed both organizations and associations established before and after the earthquake. Almost all organizations I have interviewed in those two areas are informal and voluntary organizations.

In Grand Goave I have interviewed eight different organizations, but respondents also mentioned the names of nine other organizations. In Lompré I have spoken to four organizations and I have collected the names of three others. An overview of those organizations can be found in a table in the appendix. This table is taken from the internal Cordaid report “The complexity of local participation: A study on the participatory component of Cordaid’s shelter programme in post disaster Haiti” by Jansen and Molenaar (2011). In this table more information is provided about the aim and the activities of the different organizations I have interviewed in Grand Goave and Lompré. To give some examples I will shortly elaborate on several organizations in the next paragraph.

Organizations in Grand Goave City

In Grand Goave, a small city west of Léogâne, there are quite a few community-based organizations, neighborhood committees and associations present. One of the largest organizations is Codagg (Committee for the development and advancement of Grand Goave). They have a variety of different kind of activities, such as garbage clean-up, a small credit system and activities for women. They have meetings twice a week, on Thursday and Sunday. It was stated by the president of the committee that around three hundred people attend the meeting on Sunday. Another organization ‘Bousol’ (Bourad pou Sove lavi- Save people, save life) was established one day after the earthquake. This organization was

founded by the SAKA team²⁵, the Grand-Goave Online team²⁶ and some Haitian doctors and teachers to give medical care to those people who survived the earthquake. This is still a very active organization giving free medical health care in Grand Goave City and the rural areas around. Furthermore, there are a few associations in Grand Goave. One of those associations is called the 'Association des Pecheurs de Grand Goave', established by fishermen. There is also an association for farmers "Association des Planteurs de Grand Goave" that stimulates agricultural activities in the areas of Grand Goave. Besides associations and organizations, there are some small-scale social initiatives organized by people in a specific neighborhood. For example, there is Sector Tete Kole, a neighborhood committee that is committed to clean their streets and the beach of Grand Goave. Another example is the foundation FSTL (Foundation to give children a safe house) that helps around four children a year to go to school.

Organizations in Lompré

The rural area of Lompré close to the city of Léogâne is much more extensive than the city of Grand Goave. There are some neighborhood committees and a few organizations that have been established after the earthquake. Most of those organizations and committees are linked to a certain zone in Lompré²⁷. For example MPKT (Mouvement paysant Kafou Tikalbas - movement for the peasants of Kafou Tikalbas) is connected to the area of Kafou Tikalbas. In Lompré I have interviewed two organizations that have been established after the earthquake and two that already existed before the earthquake. However, those organizations better described, as neighborhood committees did not seem to be very active at the moment. The two organizations I have interviewed are MPKT and AFVL (organizations for women). Those two organizations have been established after the earthquake and have mainly done some assessments and projects for international organizations such as CARE, JEN (Japanese Emergency NGO) and Cordaid. The organizations that have been working in Lompré before the earthquake did some small projects like road repair and organizing some cultural events.

Overall, I could conclude that especially in Grand Goave there are several interesting organizations and associations. However, compared to the INGOs present in this area, those organizations in Grand Goave are very small, as they are mostly voluntarily run and often have no official status. In Lompré there are less active organizations, but Lompré is also a less densely populated area compared to Grand Goave. In both areas there are several organizations that have been established after the earthquake to execute projects for INGOs. However, Bousol, the medical organization in Grand Goave, is an exception, because they were directly active after the earthquake before any emergency organization arrived in Grand Goave. Bousol is an interesting example, because it gives more insight into how Haitians have responded directly after the earthquake. Despite the increasing recognition by international organizations that people in crisis situations should not be seen as helpless victims, but as agents who have capacities and coping strategies, there is still less attention for already existing initiatives and local response mechanisms after a disaster.

²⁵ A community radio of frequency 93.3 FM stereo

²⁶ Grand Goave Online is a project that aims to inform the outside world on what is happening in the community and encourage tourists to visit us (<http://grand-goave.webs.com>)

²⁷ Lompré consists of two larger zones that are divided into several sub-areas

6.2) Cordaid and local organizations

During my research it became clear that Cordaid was not aware of the existing local structures in Grand Goave City and Lompré. Although, a participatory approach is included in their shelter program, Cordaid did not identify already existing forms of organizations, but established new committees. This is exactly one of the shortcomings of the concept of participation according to Long (1992). He argues that the theories of local participation show shortcomings, as they often fail to address the existing or emergent forms of organizing, they also pay little attention to understanding the different meanings that local forms of organization have for the people themselves and how those people use organizational resources. While on the one hand this could be explained because Cordaid already had a partner network in Haiti and had no intentions to work with other local organizations anyway. On the other hand this statement is contrary to earlier mentioned lessons learned by Cordaid after the Tsunami. In a previous study done in Aceh after the tsunami it was mentioned “that Cordaid has recognized that an understanding of social structures and social capital is essential in responding to a complex emergency such as that of the earthquake and tsunami in Aceh in December 2004 (Eye on Aceh and Cordaid, 2008: 10)”. Thus, although Cordaid has stated that they are aware of the importance to understand the social structures of the context in which they work; this was not exactly the case in Haiti.

Although international Cordaid staff was not really aware of the wide variety of local organizations that exists in the areas they are working, they have involved local communities in their shelter programs. In the area of Grand Goave and Lompré Cordaid established two committees that function as a bridge between the communities and Cordaid staff. Many representatives of those committees have prominent positions in their communities. They are either a local official (Asec or Casec), or an active member of a local organization. By involving those people in the Cordaid shelter program, Cordaid makes use of their local network and knowledge. Thus, although Cordaid was not informed about the existing local organizations in the areas they were working, they have involved local people in their shelter program by establishing local committees.

6.3) Concluding remarks

This study of local organizations in Grand Goave and Lompré, has given more insight into the already existing and emerging organizations in those areas where Cordaid is working. From this study I can conclude three things. First, there seem to be many local organizations especially in Grand Goave, but they are relatively small and unstructured. Second, when Cordaid started with their shelter program in Grand Goave and Lompré they were not aware of the already existing social structures. Third, Cordaid has involved local people in their shelter program by establishing new committees in which local leaders and staff members from local organizations are participating.

Thus, the organizations identified in Grand Goave and Lompré are especially small-scale informal social initiatives. Therefore, I argue that this could be an explanation for the reason why Cordaid and also other international organizations in those areas seem to have some difficulties to collaborate with local organizations. The absence of strong local organizations in Grand Goave and Lompré is according to INGOs an obstacle to create partnership relations. However, this conclusion does not mean that international organizations should neglect local organizations and do everything themselves. On the contrary, there are two things that can be done by international organizations regarding local organizations. First, international organizations could strengthen the capacities of those local

organizations in order to create a more sustainable social network. Second, international organizations can always make use of the knowledge and networks of those local organizations. This is something Cordaid has done as they have involved already prominent persons in their shelter program.

7) Understanding everyday realities in a post-disaster fragile state

In this chapter I will give an answer to the sub question: “Which challenges have humanitarian aid workers faced since the earthquake in Haiti?” To understand the actions taken by humanitarian agencies after the earthquake in Haiti, one has to understand the everyday realities in which they work. Hilhorst and Jansen (2010: 1120) state, “that the realities and outcomes of aid depend on how actors along and around the aid chain interpret the context, the needs, their own role and each other”. I will also give more insight into how “the humanitarian aid system” in general works. It is important to understand what kind of rules and regulations international organizations must respect, because this can explain why certain decisions or actions are taken by international agencies. I will first elaborate on specific issues related to the context of Haiti aid workers have to deal with and then I will discuss more general issues related to the humanitarian aid system aid workers face when working in a crisis related situation. Since, I was embedded with Cordaid the information I gathered reflects especially the opinion of Cordaid staff. The information in this chapter is both based on empirical and theoretical literature. The starting point of this chapter is to give an understanding of everyday realities of humanitarian agencies in Haiti based on interviews and observations. However, I have complemented this information by already existing literature on this issue to give a broader picture of the challenges aid workers face in a post-disaster situation.

7.1) Challenges of working in Haiti

One of the things often stated by international agencies is that there is a “lack of local capacities” in the area they work. This is according to Smillie (2001) a euphemism to avoid the word corruption. When I asked humanitarian aid workers about the problems they had to deal with in Haiti, many of them mentioned this problem of corruption or a lack of local capacities. In 2010 Haiti was ranked by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as number 146 out of 178 countries²⁸. It seems that Haiti has made some progress in the last years, since Haiti was ranked as the fourth most corrupt country in the world in 2008²⁹. Even though, Haiti has become less corrupt in the last couple of years according to the CPI, criticism of the government is omnipresent. Most international aid workers and Haitians I interviewed argued that the problem of corruption is especially a problem at national and local government level. However, as stated by Bayart (1993) one should be aware that corruption is present in every layer of society and not only found amongst the powerful.

Corruption at government level

In most of the interviews and informal conversations with international aid workers they mentioned that their relationship with the Haitian government was not very strong. When asking them about the importance of strengthening government structures for sustainable development, they agreed, but often mentioned the problem of corruption as an obstacle. Overall, the picture I got from my respondents about local and national government was not very positive. Many of my respondents do not perceive them as effective players in the reconstruction phase of Haiti. Unfortunately, I have not been able to speak with officials myself. I have tried to make appointments with some officials in Grand Goave City, but this was unsuccessful. The only officials I have spoken were some Asecs and Casecs, but they have

²⁸ http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results

²⁹ http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table

very little influence in practice. This means that the following information is only based on interviews with Haitians and international aid workers. Therefore, I can only provide one part of the story. However, it does give an overview of how Haitians themselves and international aid workers perceive the local and national government.

According to international staff members from humanitarian agencies they face a lot of difficulties due to the high level of corruption in the Haitian society, especially at government level. Since, many organizations are involved in building shelters; the biggest challenge is solving the issue of land rights. There is no proper land administration system in Haiti, which makes it difficult to determine who officially owns the land. Another problem for international organizations is the customs. For example the cars of some international organizations were already in customs for more than a year, so they had to hire cars in Haiti. This is very expensive, since hiring a car costs around 150 US dollars a day in Haiti.

Since most of my respondents live in and around Léogâne, they especially had to deal with the local government in this city. Especially, one of the mayors in Léogâne did not really function according to the staff members of the international organizations I spoke to. One of them stated that: "In Léogâne there are three mayors, one of them you cannot really take seriously; he talks with you for ten minutes and then he falls asleep. I am not extremely amazed by the work the government is doing. Your social relation with the mayor is very important to let him approve your projects. But the thing is that the mayor here is always keeping his own position in mind. Some organizations are bribing the mayor, they are giving them gifts, such as generators, but the mayor never distributes them. But, the power of the mayor is limited, so if we really want things to move, we have to make agreements with Port au Prince". Unfortunately I have not been able to interview the mayor about the fact if he has some influence or not. However, many Haitians in Grand Goave stated that the local government has very little influence in this area and that important decisions are always taken in Port au Prince³⁰.

These negative experiences of international aid workers hinder cooperation with the local government. As stated by Grünewald and Renaudin (2010) although, efforts have been made to create close cooperation between national and local authorities and international agencies in Haiti; this cooperation was not sustained over time. It was found in evaluations that many government agencies were excluded from humanitarian coordination and decision-making. As a result the relationship between international organizations and the governance was strained. Instead of strengthening government structures they have only been weakened further.

Not only international aid workers were negative about the government, Haitians themselves were also very skeptical about the role of the government. When I asked Haitians about the government in Haiti, some started to laugh and others turned around telling me that they are not interested in politics. The most frequent comments about the government were: "I never see anyone from the government", "I have no idea what they do" and "They do nothing for us". Overall there is a very low level of trust in local and national government. When I asked people if anything would change with the new president Martelly, most people answered that for the people who do not live in Port au Prince nothing will change. Although, there have been efforts to change the government structure in Haiti, it is still very

³⁰ The trust of aid workers and Haitians in the local governments is very low. Unfortunately, this research does not include the opinion of government officials

centralized. Respondents from the rural areas and in the urban area of Grand Goave, who felt neglected by the national government, also stated this.

When I asked local organizations in Grand Goave city about their relationship with the government, most of them stated that there is no relationship. Some of them asked the government for financial help or other support, but only one local organization I interviewed receives money from the local government. Most of the local organizations in Grand Goave are still waiting for official papers, because they want to become a legal organization. The national organizations (partners of Cordaid) I spoke to all seem to have somehow a relationship with the national government or are at least officially registered by the government. Although, most of the staff members from the local organizations state that more collaboration between the government and INGOs is needed, they also admit that government structures in Haiti malfunction and are corrupt. According to one of my respondents the problem is that the national government has no idea how many benefactors (including humanitarian agencies, faith-based organizations and civil society groups) are working in Haiti at the moment and what they are doing. Therefore, all those organizations in Haiti can do whatever they want, since the government has no control.

Not only Haitians from local organizations, but also those who have been appointed as representative of the local government, were quite negative about the local government. The next box shows a conversation with an Asec (who is also a representative of the Cordaid committee) about his relationship with the local government:

What are your tasks as an Asec?

Asec: "I am overlooking everything, so if there are problems I will tell it to the local government so they are able to intervene".

What do you mean with everything?

Asec: "I mean that I keep an eye on how things go around here.

Maybe there is a problem with the road or with the river".

Will the local government intervene, when you tell them about those problems?

Asec: "No, the local government does not do anything in this area".

As stated above, both Haitians and international aid workers do not have much trust in the local and national government. They accuse many officials of putting municipal funds and development funds into their own pockets. This image has hampered collaboration between international organizations and local governments in Haiti. Creating a situation where international organizations either tried to avoid contact with officials as much as possible, or involved officials in their programs, but did not give them an official say. There was one international organization I have interviewed, that had a program that was especially focused on strengthening government structures. This organization gave some administrative training to the secretaries in Léogâne. However, this example seems to be an exception rather than the rule, as overall there has been very little collaboration between INGOs and the Haitian government after the earthquake.

The issue of corruption in local and international organizations

Although, corruption was often linked to the local and national government, some respondents also mentioned the issue of corruption within local organizations. According to one of the local staff members from Cordaid “local organizations exist mostly out of intelligent guys who have the knowledge to write a strong proposal so they receive money. But when their proposals are approved, they put most of the money into their own pockets”. Furthermore, it was stated by respondents, that after the earthquake many people started a local organization hoping that they could make some profit out of the NGO business. Also during my interviews with local organizations in Grand Goave city and Lompré it was sometimes difficult to find out what the main purpose was of the organization: to make money or contribute to the welfare of the community.

However, there is not only corruption within local organizations, there are also cases where corruption occurs in programs of international organizations. As stated by van der Haar and Hilhorst (2009: 32) international organizations “are wittingly or unwittingly part of the politics of the situation”. In the book of Timothy Schwartz (2008) cases of abuse and lack of transparency within international organizations in Haiti are discussed. He has done research for CARE about their school feeding programs. It turns out that there are a lot of problems going on as a high percentage of the food never reaches the children and many schools that are supposed to get food, do not exist.

During my time in Haiti I heard many stories and rumors about issues of corruption in programs of INGOs, but these were not based on actual research. However, rumors and stories also contain some truth. For example in the Cordaid shelter program there were rumors about some committee representatives who only gave shelters to their family and friends. Also some community representatives were accused of selling materials to other parties. Those stories and rumors give some insight into the context in which international aid workers have to implement programs. It shows that those programs are also part of the politics of the situation. As stated by Ewins et al (2006: 58) shelter programs are an attractive area for corruption, since it is “a capital-intensive activity often requiring compliance with a multitude of regulations”. When working in such a context it is important to be aware of the possibilities for corruption, as it can have a huge impact on the image of international organization, but also on the programs implemented. On the other hand international organizations also have to understand the underlying mechanisms that are part of the cultural context in which they work. While aid workers accuse local organizations of being corrupt and unreliable for Haitians this might be just a way to make a living. An important underlying mechanism to understand this misunderstanding might be found in the following cultural difference, due to a difference in social economic reality: Aid workers, part of “Western Society”, expect fair judgment and reliability of their local partners in their responsibility of distributing aid. However, in countries where people have to survive day-by-day, fairness and reliability might be slightly differently experienced. In such societies family and friends share the success of the day together, because the next day you might be dependent on one of the other members of your family or friends. This sharing of the complete harvest of the day can be considered as their social premium or tax, ensuring them in situations like unemployment, illness, and retirement. Ethically it is their duty to serve firstly the social group members as family and friends.

Professional beneficiaries

Not only people within international and local organizations have their strategies to deal with a new situation also beneficiaries are not passive victims. In the case of Haiti, where after the earthquake so many new organizations arrived, some people knew exactly how to make a profit out of this situation. As already described in the theoretical chapter, people are not passive recipients, but active participants who have the ability to process information and invent their own strategies to deal with different actors in their environment (Long, 1992). One of my respondents stated that you have to be aware of 'professional' beneficiaries as he called them. According to him these are beneficiaries that know how to make some profit out of aid given by INGOs.

During my fieldwork I heard many stories, about local people who circumvented international aid workers. Some people knew exactly how to benefit from the work INGOs are doing. Also Hilhorst and Jansen (2010) state that aid recipients are not just waiting until aid arrives, but they have their strategies to become eligible for aid. For example there was a story of a family in Léogâne who already had a house, but one of the family members moved for a while to another area to live in a tent. The person in the tent got a shelter from an organization, which was later sold by the family. There were also stories about people who received three shelters from different organizations, or people who rented their shelters or sold the building materials.

Not only many shelter have been built after the earthquake, also a lot of people still live in tent camps. During my stay in Haiti I heard a story about a tent camp in Port au Prince. It was argued that many people were not living in this camp permanently, but only during the day to be eligible for free food. At night only a few people were sleeping in the camp. In other camps, some people had moved to those camps because it would save them some money they otherwise had to pay for renting a house.

Practical challenges for aid workers in Haiti

There also seem to be many practical challenges that have an influence on the work of aid workers. One of those challenges is the issue of security. Due to security regulations international aid workers of Cordaid, but also aid workers of other INGOs could not move freely around. Sometimes, aid workers could not go into the field, because there were violent demonstrations or road blocks. Another issue mentioned by respondents was the fact that Haiti is really expensive. Prices have increased after the earthquake when all those international organizations entered the country. Also poor infrastructure has obstructed the work of INGOs, as it takes much more time to move from one place to another. For example to drive from Port au Prince to Léogâne would take you around three hours, while it is only 45 kilometers. Furthermore, the constant shift of aid workers especially at management level has influenced programs of Cordaid as strategy plans constantly changed. This was not only a problem within Cordaid, but according to Bolton (2011: 28) especially in the first few months UN and NGO staff changed frequently and unpredictably. This also had an influence on the cluster system, because plans and decisions taken by one person could be lost or radically reversed by his or her replacement. Bolton (2011) stated that in one cluster the UN official in charge changed three times in six months. Beside those practical challenges international organizations also have to deal with regulations imposed by their donors. I will elaborate on this in the next part.

7.2) The donor system

“For Christ’s sake, that is what the CARE charter says, 'help the poorest of the poor' and now you're telling me that we are all working for USAID, not the poor.” - “That's right. It is USAID. Get with it. You want a job or you want to be an idealist?” This is a conversation between Timothy Schwartz³¹ and a CARE director. Often this is how it works, donors have certain ideas about a program and the INGO has to execute the pre-designed plan. If they want to give money for food aid, the INGO will start with a food aid program and if there is money available for building shelters, INGOs start building shelters.

Pre-designed plans

Again Schwartz (2008) has shown that international organizations often implement their pre-designed plans neglecting already existing structures and the actual needs of local people. Since a portion of the budget of organizations such as CARE relies on the transformation of donated food into cash, they have to sell food in order to sustain their own budget even though food aid may have a devastating effect on local agriculture. Furthermore, food aid is often only distributed to those areas where there is an infrastructure, which means that people living in remote areas receive nothing. Thus, food aid is delivered where it is most easily transformed into cash for the INGO that distributes it and not necessarily where it is most needed. Schwartz also noted that although local farmers indicated that they were interested in learning more about storage technologies for their own crops, INGOs kept on delivering food.

In Haiti many INGOs already had their own ideas and strategies about how to support the Haitians after the earthquake. Also an emergency team of Cordaid came to Haiti with a plan to build shelters. As a result of the Community Action Plan (CAP) it was decided to establish local committees in order to involve the local people actively in the shelter program. As Cordaid already had a plan to build shelters the function of the CAP was not to identify together with the local community what their needs are, but to get enough response from the local communities to legitimize their shelter program. Also Cordaid was very much focused on the outcome of their program and less on the impact, as their main goal is to construct shelters. According to one of my respondents INGOs should measure the impact of their programs and not only their results. However, the results count; because that is something concrete INGOs can show their donors. Building shelters is also a highly visible and results can easily be shown to donor organizations. However, the impact of free housing on communities is often not taken into account, although it can create a lot of jealousy and social tensions within communities.

Short-time frames and funding

Reconstruction, development, participation, and capacity building all take time. According to Peter Morgan (1994: in Smillie, 2001) capacity issues are long-term problems that can take fifteen to twenty years to address in a serious way. In times of emergency longer-term planning and capacity building are non-issues, because international relief agencies only get funds for very short time-frames. This means that there is often no time to identify and strengthen local capacities, work with local organizations and think about how direct emergency interventions can connect to longer-term development strategies

³¹ Timothy Schwartz the author of “Travesty in Haiti: Haiti: A true account of Christian missions, orphanages, fraud, food aid and drug trafficking” and of the controversial report of USAID draft report, “Building Assessments and Rubble Removal” (BARR). According to this report, “The number of fatalities that resulted from the earthquake is estimated at 46,190 to 84,961” (http://defend.ht/documents/BARR_Report_PauP_Final.docx)

(Smillie, 2001). The international organizations I interviewed were all struggling with how they could link their relief programs to more sustainable development. One of the issues that hampered this process was the short-term funding by donors. This made it hard for INGOs to focus on longer-term commitments. A clear example was the Japanese organization JEN. One of the staff members of JEN stated it is very hard to focus on longer-term programs, because “the Japanese only finance for five months”. Also Cordaid had to deal with a short-time frame as they had to finish a part of their shelter program already in July 2011, because this was required by one of their donors.

Not all shelters of Cordaid have to be finished in such a short-time frame, because the Dutch citizens have donated the majority of Cordaid’s funding for emergency. This money has to be spent within a time-frame of three to five years³². However, the Dutch citizens also want to know on what their money has been spent, therefore Cordaid has to show some results as quick as possible.

According to many local partners of Cordaid the emergency phase has taken far too long in Haiti. They state “that after three months you should start with “normal life” again and focus on development”. When I heard a story about an INGO that was responsible for building latrines, each consisting of a cesspit, I asked what would happen after three years when those holes are full. The answer was: “That is something development organizations will deal with”. This vision partly created by donors, who have set hard deadlines to get results and sharp time-frames in which money has to be spent by INGOs, has stimulated that after emergencies many INGOs are particularly focused on the outcome of programs and have less attention for the longer-term impact of their programs. Ramalingam and Barnett (2010) also stated that donors are typically focused on the quantity of programs rather than the quality.

Those examples show that the regulations of donors can hamper the possibilities of INGOs to include more long-term commitments in their relief programs. However, also the organizations own survival is an important reason for organizations to focus especially on the visibility of programs. As a shelter program is much more visible than a capacity building program, international organizations are more likely to build shelters than to strengthen capacities of local organizations.

7.3) Concluding remarks

The aim of this chapter is to give more insight into the challenges aid workers face in Haiti. This insight can be useful to get a better understanding of why aid programs are implemented in a certain way.

Haiti classified as a fragile state and affected by many disasters has been described as a very complex and difficult context to work in by international aid workers. One of the main problems according to aid workers was the issue of corruption, especially at government levels. Since, there is a low level of trust in the government by different the international organizations this hindered the process of collaboration with the Haitian government. This does not mean that there was no collaboration at all between international organizations and officials; it was just not based on a very strong relationship. Besides corruption at government level, it was also stated by international organizations that local organizations are corrupt as well. According to international aid workers and some Haitians I interviewed many local organizations have been established after the earthquake, because people wanted to benefit from all

³² <http://haitinu.nl/pages/over-haiti/>

the money promised to Haiti. Therefore, aid workers I spoke to had a very low trust in local organizations and preferred to do the work themselves.

Another issue that has an influence on the way aid programs are implemented is the fact that decisions have to be made quickly and funds have to be spent in a certain time-frame. Donors require quick results and therefore international organizations are often more focused on the output of programs than on the impact. Also Cordaid has to show the Dutch citizens, who donated a large amount of money for the reconstruction of Haiti, what has happened with their money. Furthermore, there are also some practical issues that hamper the work of international organizations in Haiti, such as security issues, poor infrastructure, and constant changes of INGO staff.

While this chapter provided more information about the everyday realities aid workers have to deal with in Haiti, the next chapter will give more insight into the mutual perceptions and expectations international aid workers and Haitians, and what the influence of those perceptions is on actions taken on the ground.

8) The influence of people's perceptions on the process of participation and partnership

During my first weeks in Haiti I became aware that international aid workers were quite negative about Haitians and the situation in Haiti in general. Haitians on the other hand seem to be both positive and negative towards international organizations. While the scientific literature and policy document of humanitarian agencies are full with statements about creating partnerships with local organizations and including participatory approaches in relief and development work, I wondered whether it is possible to create partnerships with local organizations if international aid workers have such negative perceptions of Haitians. According to Donini (2007) and Snyder et al. (1977) perceptions are important: whether right or wrong, because they have an impact on social interaction and are symptomatic of a particular time or situation. Hence, to understand what the influence of people's perceptions is on how reconstruction programs are implemented after the earthquake in Haiti, I have studied mutual perceptions of international aid workers and Haitians. The focus on people's perceptions places emphasis on the actions of individual and collective actors, arguing that all actors have their own perception of reality, but can also influence the reality of other actors they interact with. This relates to the concept of human agency stating that people have knowledge and capacities to influence their own situations, but also have their own interpretation of reality. This means that people who live in the same environment can have very different perceptions due to their interaction with others, their own perception of reality and their particular circumstances. This chapter will provide more insight into those different perceptions of Haitians and aid workers and in what way those perceptions have influenced humanitarian practices after the earthquake in Haiti. Also the concept of framing will be discussed to understand why people have certain perception and in what way those perceptions legitimize specific behavior. This chapter is divided into different sections in which the following sub questions will be addressed:

- *What kind of perceptions do international aid workers and Haitians have of each other?*
- *Given this perspective, what kind of expectations do both parties have about each other?*
- *How do international aid workers and Haitian citizens interact in daily life?*
- *How have mutual perceptions of international agencies and Haitians influenced constructive collaboration since the earthquake in Haiti?*

8.1) Perceptions of aid workers on Haitians

After the earthquake in Haiti the idea of the international community was to 'build back better'. This meant that Haiti should be developed in such a way that it can stand on its own and is not forever dependent on foreign aid. One of the most important things stated by Bill Clinton and other prominent persons was that in this process of 'building back better' international agencies and Haitians should reconstruct Haiti together to create sustainable development. However, even though this idea of collaboration is present in many policy documents of international agencies one should seriously question: "Who is reconstructing Haiti in practice?"

When I asked international aid workers what their opinion was about this idea of constructive collaboration between local and international organizations one of my respondents answered: "Yes, we really want to work together with local organizations, but unfortunately until now we have not found

any organization that is suitable enough to become our partner". This was stated by more respondents and according to a staff member from an international organization in Léogâne, local Haitian organizations do not seem efficient and effective enough. Therefore, international agencies rather prefer to do the work themselves than to spend time and money on those local organizations. Someone else stated, "to hand over our mandate will probably create more equal relationships, but will also ensure more corruption". As already mentioned before, corruption is a problematic issue in Haiti and although international aid workers are aware of the unequal relationships between international and local organizations it seems to be difficult to change this relationship.

Especially in informal conversations with international aid workers Haitians were described as 'lazy', 'dependent', and sometimes even 'fatalistic'. According to one of my respondents people have become very dependent, because aid has been poured into Haiti already for a long time. She also has the feeling that many Haitians try to take advantage of every situation where aid is involved. She gave an example of an NGO who donated shelters to people. When the people received the shelter they had to paint the shelters themselves, but they did not want to paint the shelter except if they got paid. Other interviewees stated that many Haitians were just waiting for aid organizations to arrive and give them a shelter or a water pump.

During some interviews and informal conversations I noticed a feeling of superiority, of "us" as humanitarian aid workers who would help those poor Haitians. One of my respondents argued, "The relationship between local people and INGOs is a weird one. It still seems that the white people intimidate the Haitians. During the slave period, they had the role of the master, in which they could easily punish the Haitians, but also provide services for them. She noticed this weird relationship herself during her daily work, since a lot of her colleagues are very uncomfortable talking to her during a meeting and prefer talking to her Haitian deputy after the meeting".

Another issue I observed during my fieldwork was that some respondents did not really know what kind of local structures already existed in the areas they were working. This was especially the case when the international organization they were working for already had a fixed plan. From the eight international agencies I interviewed two really worked with already existing organizations and committees. Four others did include participatory approaches in their programs, but instead of strengthening already existing organizations, they established new committees to implement their own programs. Overall the perceptions of international aid workers are very negative about local organizations. They have a very low trust in the capacities of local organizations. Thus, on the one hand INGOs say that they do want to work together with local organizations, but on the other hand they do not really believe that those organizations are suitable enough to collaborate with. However, it should be noted that international aid workers not only believe that many local organizations are disorganized, there also seem to be a lot of inexperienced international organizations in Haiti who say they avoid cluster meetings so they will not end up in uncomfortable situations.

Expectations of aid workers about Haiti

Taking those perceptions into account people have certain expectations about the people and the situation in which they work. Due to those negative perceptions of aid workers about local organizations, those aid workers do not expect that local organizations are capable enough to work independently at the moment. They are even wondering whether international organizations will ever be able to work by

themselves. The case of Cordaid and their partners is an example of local organizations that have been supported for more than thirty years, but are, according to Cordaid staff, still not strong enough to work independently in times of crisis. I will elaborate on the relationship between Cordaid and their partners in the next chapter.

Also the aid workers I interviewed all believed very much that they are doing 'the right thing'. I observed very few aid workers who critically reflected upon their work. They have come to Haiti to reconstruct this country and therefore they expect some gratitude from the Haitians. As it is not always the case, because some Haitians criticize the work of INGOs, aid workers are sometimes frustrated, as their expectations are not met.

8.2) Perceptions of Haitians on INGOs

When I asked Haitians what their opinion is about humanitarian organizations, the most common answer was: "Some of them do a good job, and others do a bad job". When I asked them to explain this to me, they often mentioned more negative than positive points. Some of the negative points mentioned by people were: international organizations do not understand the context they are working in; they do not really know what people need; they do not cooperate with local governments and organizations. Although this criticism can be very helpful to understand more about the way aid is given, respondents did not always manage to be critical and constructive at the same time. It has to be kept in mind that it is much easier to be critical in a non-constructive way, than being critical and constructive at the same time.

Although, people were critical about the work of INGOs, many respondents stated that with all the INGOs coming to Haiti employment has increased, which was perceived as very positive by the Haitians I interviewed. INGOs need drivers, cooks, cleaners, guards and local staff in their offices. This is very important in a country with an unemployment rate of 40.6 per cent and where more than two-thirds of the labor force does not have formal jobs (CIA World Factbook, 2011). Also, many people got a shelter something that could not have been achieved without the help of INGOs according to some of my respondents. Furthermore, new information flows have come into the country, as INGOs brought a lot of knowledge. One of the interviewees told me that he got a lot of experience by working with an INGO. However, this possibility for work has also a downside according to the president of a local organization. Since, people are able to work for an INGO people in his own organization are complaining about the low salaries his organization is paying in comparison with international organizations. This is also a well-known criticism of INGOs in general, because with their high salaries they often attract many people from important positions, such as teachers and officials. This creates a brain-drain from crucial positions and has a negative impact on the development process of a country, where only a small number of people are highly educated. Already right after the Duvalier regime the government in Haiti has been weakened by this brain drain, as NGOs provide better salaries and working conditions (Morton, 1997). Local partners of Cordaid also have to deal with this problem, because INGOs pay much better salaries than local organizations. This sometimes creates tensions within their own organization as people start to complain about their salaries and some people even said to me in interviews they would quit their job.

Another negative point according to many respondents is the fact that local organizations are substituted by all those INGOs in Haiti. INGOs have money tools and expertise, and therefore the power to implement projects, whereas local organizations often have a very small budget and are in many cases

dependent on money from INGOs. Also many INGOs who came into Haiti already had a fixed plan, so there was not a lot of room for manoeuvre to include local organizations in their program, except when it was already an objective of the program. It often happens that organizations come with their fixed plans and tell local people what their problems are, but according to a citizen from Grand Goave City “Haitians are perfectly capable of telling what they need”. He also states that many INGOs do not work together with local organizations, but they only work in such a way to make their own work become visible.

It was also stated by Haitians that international agencies make a lot of promises, but often cannot live up to these promises, because there is a lack of money or some management changes that influences the strategies of the organization. This was also a criticism of Cordaid, because besides a shelter program they also promised to start with a livelihood and Wash program in Léogâne. However, due to a lack of money those programs will probably not be implemented. Those promises create certain expectations with people, and when those expectations are not met, people can become quite frustrated, which can affect the level of trust between people.

Expectations of Haitians about INGOs in Haiti

One day when I finished my interview and asked my respondent if he had any questions for me, he asked me if it was true that, when you get a Cordaid shelter, Cordaid would take care of you for the rest of your life.

This question reflects the expectations of many Haitians about INGOs. “Go and ask the NGOs, they will fix it for you” those are the words of the mayor of Léogâne according to a local staff member of an international agency. Many Haitians, especially the younger generation, has grown up in an environment where INGOs are constantly present, making them somehow used to the concept of ‘giving’. During my interviews I also recognized this kind of behavior, as a lot of people were telling me that they expect INGOs to give them a school, a hospital or fix the road. When I asked some of them, what they, as Haitians, were doing to improve their neighborhood, they became a bit angry, stating that the INGOs are here to help them, as they are the ones who have the money and expertise. This aid dependency syndrome somehow created by INGOs themselves, has an enormous impact on what people expect and how they act in their daily lives. On the contrary there was also a strong voice of Haitians, especially staff of Cordaid’s partner organizations and members from local organizations in Grand Goave and Lompré, which stated that those INGOs should work in collaboration with local organizations. Instead of expecting INGOs to do the work, they had expected that they would work in close collaboration with international organizations and reconstruct Haiti together.

The difference between expectations of staff members from local organizations and Haitians in general (including government officials) are quite obvious. While Haitians in general benefit from the presence of INGOs that provide free food, health care, seeds and shelters, staff members from local organizations feel redundant by the presence of those INGOs.

8.3) Interaction between Haitians and international aid workers

As already described before, during my fieldwork time I noticed quite a large gap between Haitians and international aid workers. Most of the international aid workers I met were living pretty much in their own INGO bubble. There was not much direct interaction between international agencies and Haitians,

except for the Haitians who are working for INGOs or those Haitians who are involved in a program as a beneficiary. In the latter case this is always an unequal relationship, because the beneficiary is dependent on the aid worker.

There is a difference between the situation in Port au Prince and in Léogâne; I came to the conclusion that there is very little interaction between Haitians and international staff members in the private sphere. One of the reasons for this limited interaction are the strict security rules, as most expatriates live in fenced compounds and are only allowed to move in a car (this is especially the case in Port au Prince). In Léogâne the situation was a bit different, since security rules are less strict and aid workers are allowed to walk around at night and drink something in a local bar. There is also an U.S. volunteers organization based in Léogâne, where both internationals and locals work. The international Cordaid staff in Léogâne often got a chance to hang out with those volunteers, and be in contact with Haitians outside Cordaid. Still, this was an exception rather than the rule, and although there were some social activities organized by Cordaid for their local and international staff members, the majority who came to those activities were the expatriates. Other public places where people could meet are for example the market or in a bus station. Expatriates, because of security reasons, almost never visited those places. Food is either bought by a Haitian housemaid on the market or by the international staff in the big supermarket in Port Au Prince ("The Giant"). This supermarket is only affordable for upper-class Haitians and expatriates.

Until July 2011 the international Cordaid staff was not allowed to take public transport (according to Cordaid's regulations). As a result expatriates were driven around in their white four-wheel drives as many other international aid workers. Therefore, it is not surprising that Haitians who are not actively involved in programs have no clear idea of what "the whites" are exactly doing in Haiti, but driving around in their cars. An old man in Grand Goave City said to me: "I do not really know what they are all doing. I only know they help the people. I see that they give people, who were living in a tent, a house. But it would be better if everybody helped each other; than we would not need all these international organizations". Another person said: "I always see many white cars passing by, but they never stop". However, most people I spoke to were indirectly or directly involved in a program of an INGO (mostly Cordaid). Thus, they had some interaction with INGOs, although it was either as beneficiary or as a committee representative of the Cordaid shelter program. People who were not actively involved often told me that they did not really know what INGOs were doing and some of them even stated that they had no idea, which organizations were working, in their area. Whether they said this, because they were hoping that I would encourage INGOs to come and work in their area or they really had no idea what INGOs were doing, is difficult to know. However, one thing is sure: except during the executing of programs there is not much interaction between Haitians and INGOs in the public sphere.

8.4) Framing others

In this section the mutual perceptions of Haitians and international aid workers are discussed through the process of framing. To understand someone's perceptions and actions, you have to understand how someone interprets the world around him. This interpretation of the world is shaped through the process of framing. This idea of framing, as I already described before is explained by DeWulf et al. (2009) as the process of applying memory structures (frames) to new situations. Often people do not think consciously about how they view things, thus framing can go in an unnoticed way. However, it is also possible that people use certain frames to decide what actions should be taken, to persuade others

to take action, to legitimize their own actions or to protect their interests. Politicians, social movements and the media often use this kind of tactic or strategic framing. In this section I argue that international and local organizations use certain frames to justify their action and to maintain good relationships with different stakeholders.

In the first place Haiti is classified as a fragile state, where insecurity, corruption, political unrest and natural hazards have ravaged the Haitians for a long time. Framing Haiti in such a negative way has legitimized the enormous influx of international organizations after the earthquake. Also Haitians have been framed as dependent, lazy and even fatalistic, instead of paying more attention to the local structures and coping mechanism that were already present before the earthquake.

The way people categorize other people can be related to the characterization frame, whereby other people are framed in a positive, negative or neutral way. This way of stereotyping creates certain expectations about how the other should behave or how you should behave in relation to the other. From my interviews it became clear that international aid workers framed local organizations and the government as “incapable”, “inefficient” and “corrupt”. Those frames create a certain expectation about other people and influence the way international organizations operate. However, framing local organizations in such a way also legitimizes the presence of so many international organizations in Haiti. When one of the international aid workers told me that while she really wants to work with local organizations, she has not yet identified any organization that would be capable enough to collaborate with, this automatically legitimized the fact that her international organization has not yet collaborated with other local organizations.

International aid workers also frame themselves in a certain way, referred to as the identity frame. When you become an aid worker, you already have a certain idea about this job. You have gone to a certain place to help other people who suffer and need help. In this way they frame themselves as a lifesaver. Also in the case of Haiti aid workers framed themselves in such a way. This automatically places aid workers in a powerful position; since they have come to Haiti to save the lives of those “poor” Haitians. The way people frame themselves in relation to others is, as already mentioned in chapter two, described as power frames. Lewicki et al. (2003) state that people can have power because of a certain expertise, the availability of resources, a high position, certain relationships, sympathy from others or because they threaten others. This kind of power frames can be clearly identified in the case of Haiti, where different actors frame themselves in a certain way to legitimize their presence. For example Cordaid has framed itself as more efficient, effective and suitable to work in a crisis-related context than their local partners. This legitimizes the fact that Cordaid established two offices in Haiti and started to run the shelter program itself. In the next part I will discuss the relationship between Cordaid and their local partners in more detail.

8.5) Case Study: Cordaid and their local partners

In this case study I will elaborate on the perceptions and expectations of international Cordaid staff and staff of several local partners to give more insight into how the relationship between Cordaid and their partners changed after the earthquake. The information is based on seven interviews local partners of Cordaid who are based in Port au Prince. I also interviewed international staff from Cordaid in Haiti.

For more than 30 years Cordaid has been supporting church and non-church related organizations in Haiti in the fields of food security, disaster risk reduction, health and protection (especially issues related to gender based violence and HIV/AIDS), upgrading of slum areas and civil society capacity building³³. In 2009 Cordaid had twenty-seven partners, while in 2011 there were seventeen left. Due to budget cuts of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cordaid will be unable to sponsor all those seventeen partners in the near future. This means that after 2011 some partners will no longer receive funds from Cordaid. The partners of Cordaid are all legal organizations and have connection with the Ministry of Planning (MPCE³⁴), because they have the right to deny or recognize an NGO's legal status (Schuller, 2007b). Cordaid's partners have relations with different Ministries such as Public Health and Education, depending on the aim of the organization. According to the respondents that was the contact person for the Cordaid partners after the earthquake it is important to distinguish between two different types of Cordaid partners:

1. Organizations who are working for Cordaid. They get money from Cordaid to execute Cordaid projects.
2. Organizations that get funding from Cordaid for their own projects.

While Cordaid classifies all those organizations as partner organizations, there is a difference between the kinds of relationships. As described in chapter two van der Haar and Hilhorst (2009) argue that relationships differ in intensity and shape. The relationship of the category one partners is more based on a contractual agreement where local organizations just implement a job for their donor. The partners of category two are involved in a longer-term partnership whereby Cordaid has supported the local NGO for a long time and focuses on capacity building. During my research I have interviewed one organization in the first category, and six organizations that can be placed in the second category. To make a clear distinction between the different types of partners I will refer to the first type of partners as contract partners and the second type I will call long-term partners.

When Cordaid decided to start with a shelter program in Haiti, they choose to work in those areas where they already had some long-term partner organizations. Also in Grand Goave and Lompré there were two long-term partners of Cordaid. While, in the beginning they did some emergency projects together with some of their long-term and contract partners, Cordaid Haiti soon stated that those partners were not capable enough to do this kind of emergency work. Therefore, the Cordaid staff in Haiti decided to execute the shelter program by themselves and in Grand Goave and Lompré no longer-term partners were involved. However, Cordaid did involve one of their contract partners in this area to construct the shelter frame. Since, Cordaid longer-term partners did not really understand what the role of Cordaid was in Haiti the relationship between Cordaid and some of those partners became quite tense after the earthquake.

³³ Oprichtingsmemo Haiti Cordaid, 2010

³⁴ Ministère de la Planification et Coopération Externe

Expectations of Cordaid's local partners

“The added value that partnership has in development situations, in terms of reach, effectiveness, and capacity building, also holds in crisis situations. Especially when working partnerships are already in place, these offer an effective starting point for responding to disasters and conflict” – van der Haar and Hilhorst, 2009: 75

When Cordaid came to Haiti the partners I interviewed had expected that they would work more closely with Cordaid. With the presence of Cordaid in Haiti they had expected more involvement and interest of Cordaid in the work they are doing. However, according to many local partners I spoke to the opposite was true, as Cordaid Haiti was not involved in the work they were doing and did not really listen to them after the earthquake. It seemed to be, that it was not very clear for the partners of Cordaid what role Cordaid played right after the earthquake. Cordaid Haiti entered the country with their own agenda, something partners of Cordaid had not expected to happen. After the earthquake Cordaid had appointed a person within Cordaid Haiti, who was held responsible for the contact with the partners and Cordaid. However, as strategies and budgets recently changed within Cordaid due to the budget cuts of the Foreign Ministry in the Netherlands it was decided that Cordaid The Hague would be responsible again for all the contact between partners and the contract of this person was not extended. Furthermore, partners mentioned to me that, due to a lot of changes in the management of Cordaid The Hague and Haiti, it was sometimes unclear for them who they had to contact after the earthquake. Due to those changes at the management level, strategies and visions within Cordaid also changed a lot during the last one and a half year. It was stated by several respondents that the strategies and decisions taken by Cordaid depend a lot on those persons who hold a management position.

The visions and strategies of Cordaid Haiti did not correspond with the visions of the local partners of Cordaid. Some partners stated that it was not so much a communication issue they had with Cordaid Haiti, but more a vision problem. There is a huge difference between the activities of local partners and the way they are working, and how Cordaid Haiti is implementing their programs. While Cordaid Haiti focuses on building shelters, the local partners of Cordaid are more involved in longer-term development programs.

So what did local partners expect from Cordaid after the earthquake? They expected to be more included in the reconstruction phase by Cordaid. Fernando and Hilhorst (2006: 298) state in their article that after the Tsunami “local NGOs felt that they had unequal access to the post-tsunami rehabilitation effort”, even though there was the intention to include them in the international aid programs. It seems that the same question arises for the situation in Haiti where international NGOs say they want to involve local organizations in their work, but what does it mean in practice? Although many INGOs have the intention to form partnerships with local organizations, often the question rises whether this really happens. What does this ‘partnership’ really mean? As Smillie (2001) correctly notice the term ‘partner’ is often misleading, since this term implies an equal relationship. Some ‘partners’ of Cordaid stated they had the feeling that they have no equal relationship with Cordaid, as they finance the projects and you have to follow their procedures. One of the partners stated that they did feel somehow equal, as they had the feeling that they could criticize Cordaid’s decisions. Still for many partners the relationship with Cordaid does not feel as an equal one, of course this is understandable as Cordaid finances and the local partners are dependent on Cordaid.

Tensions between relief and development

It seems that tensions between the local partners and Cordaid are the classic problems between those people who work in relief and those who work in development. It was stated by international and local Cordaid staff that the way some of their partners work is not suitable for the Cordaid Haiti team. While Cordaid Haiti staff told me they tried to work with some of their local partners it turned out that those partners were not able to achieve the results Cordaid Haiti was waiting for. From interviews done with Cordaid staff in Haiti I found them very negative about the local partners of Cordaid. As Cordaid had worked for more than thirty years with some of their partners, it is interesting to notice that according to the emergency team most of Cordaid partners are not very efficient and they even question how reliable some of the partners are. It surprised me that after working for more than thirty years with those partners, Cordaid did not try to put more effort in their relationship with their partners, but instead was so much focused on their own agenda. People from Cordaid who were already working for many years in Haiti felt they were pushed aside by emergency specialists with their quick fix solutions.

It is interesting to notice that after such a long time it becomes clear that maybe some of the partners Cordaid worked with were not so successful. Perhaps it is too difficult to know exactly how your partners function when you only visit them twice a year. However, one should also be aware of the fact that working during an emergency phase is totally different from working on longer-term development. In an emergency phase a certain amount of money has to be spent quickly, results have to be much more visible and targets have to be reached within a very short time-frame. This explains also why Cordaid's partners who are focused on longer-term development were not really suitable for the emergency team. However, the question is whether you want to create a totally new program or try to strengthen already existing programs you, as an organization, have been supporting for more than thirty years? This is up to the management of an organization, which decisions are made, but it is important that those decisions are communicated in a clear way to prevent that people become frustrated, because expectations are not met. In the case of Cordaid expectations of both Cordaid and their local partners were not met, creating tensions and damaging confidential relationships between people.

8.6) Concluding remarks

In this chapter I gave an overview of the way international agencies and Haitians perceive each other. The way people perceive each other and the context, in which they live, has an influence on their expectations, and the actions they take. International agencies often mentioned the weakness of local organizations and Cordaid partners, and corruption at local and national government level, as a lack of local capacities. Those negative perceptions of aid workers on Haitian organizations and the government justify the large presence of international organizations, because according to international organizations outside assistance is needed to rebuild Haiti.

Haitians I interviewed are on the one hand quite critical about the way INGOs work as they often exclude local organizations and the Haitian government in the reconstruction process. Some of them state that those international organizations substitute local organizations, while they had expected that collaboration between local and international organizations would increase with all those international organizations present in Haiti. On the other hand many Haitians accept whatever aid is given to them and also expect international organizations to support them, because they have funds and expertise. This aid dependency is something that already exists for a long time in Haiti, as large amounts of aid have been poured into Haiti already since the 1990s.

Although, this is not the case for every international in Haiti, overall there is a huge separation between Haitians and the expatriates. Movement restrictions due to security issues have contributed to very little interaction between Haitians and international aid workers, especially in daily life. As already described before, there is a difference between Léogâne and Port au Prince regarding interactions between Haitians and international aid workers. However, still I have observed a huge gap between the world of the international aid workers and the Haitians. Often aid workers live in quite luxurious circumstances compared to most Haitians. This has reinforced frustration of Haitians about the presence of international organizations.

Overall, the mutual perceptions of aid workers and Haitians, and very little interaction between those aid workers and Haitians have hindered the process of creating valuable relationships between Haitians and international aid workers. While, aid workers I interviewed found themselves more suitable to reconstruct Haiti, Haitians I interviewed agreed on the one hand and argued that international organizations are needed to reconstruct Haiti, because the government is doing nothing and those organizations have access to funds. However, on the other hand there was also a strong voice of Haitians who want to be involved in the reconstruction of their country, but stated that they do not get a chance, because the international organizations are doing the work.

The aim of the three empirical chapters was to provide more insight into the complexities of the process of reconstruction after the earthquake in Haiti. While more engagement of Haitians is needed in the reconstruction of Haiti to promote resilient recovery (Rencoret et al, 2010: DRLA and UEH, 2011) there still seems to be a lot of obstacles that hinder the process of constructive collaboration between Haitians and international organizations. Before I will discuss my final conclusions of this research, I will elaborate on my personal experiences and my impressions of my fieldwork in Haiti in the next chapter.

9) Reflections on my fieldwork in Haiti

In this chapter I will elaborate on my own experiences of doing research in a post-disaster fragile context. First, I will discuss my impressions and personal experiences of the situation in Haiti. Second, I will reflect on my research topic, because my topic has changed during my fieldwork.

9.1) The daily reality of doing research in a so called fragile state

It was not the first time for me to go abroad for a longer time, and it was also not the first time I went to a development country, but it was the first time to visit a country just recovering from a disaster. The images I have seen on television about Haiti were partly consistent with the reality, but on the other hand I have also seen completely the opposite. The contrasts of tent camps, huge piles of waste and debris, but also beautiful beaches, enormous villa's and busy markets show how life just continuous also after a disaster, but also give an impression of the high inequality in Haiti. In this context many international agencies implemented their programs to reconstruct Haiti. It was interesting to see so many well-known international agencies like, CARE, Novib, USAID, Samaritans Pursue, and UNICEF. Most of the white Jeeps I saw in Haiti belong either to a humanitarian organization or to the UN. Besides white Jeeps, I have seen many shelters and other projects executed by humanitarian organizations. I have not only seen all those shelters, but I have really got an insight into the whole process of building shelters and the complications related to this process in a post-disaster context. The experiences of this field work have helped me to better understand the difficulties humanitarian agencies face in the field, but on the other hand it have made me also more cynical towards the work those agencies are doing.

One of the things that influenced my research was the fact that I had to obey strict security rules, something that I had never experienced before. For example I was not allowed to take any public transport or walk around in Port au Prince. In Léogâne the situation was less strict and walking around was allowed. However, when I wanted to go into the field I was always dependent on Cordaid transport and therefore I could never enter my research area as an independent researcher. Although, I told people I was a student, they always saw me with Cordaid staff. This had some influence on my research, because some of my respondents hoped they would benefit somehow from my contact with Cordaid. Other practical issues I faced during my research where the problems of floods and demonstrations making it sometimes impossible to go into the field. Although, those issues did not have a serious influence on my research, it is something that you have to be aware of when going to such a context.

The strict security rules also had an influence on my social life in Haiti. Since, I was not allowed to take public transport; there were only a few moments where I met Haitians in daily life. In Léogâne I could hang out in local bars with some Haitian volunteers from the organizations All Hands or with the local Cordaid staff. Sometimes, I had some conversations with street vendors, but most of the time I spent with international and local staff of Cordaid. During my fieldwork most of the time my social life consisted out of Cordaid. When I choose to do this research I was already aware of the restrictions I would face, however I had not really thought of the effect it would have. When I became aware of the impact of those security restrictions on my daily life, I also experienced the huge division between international aid workers and Haitians.

Although, it was certainly not always easy to live in such a kind of protected life, I also met many interesting people and I had a chance to really understand what happens on the ground in such a post-

disaster context. This research has given me a lot of insight into the challenges humanitarian aid workers face, but also into the perceptions and mentality of people in the field. I certainly do not want to generalize, but maybe one of the things that surprised me was the mentality of several international aid workers. While I had expected to meet international aid workers who would care less about luxury, I experienced the opposite (Léogâne and PAP). It seemed that international staff got quite used to the hot showers, electricity and good meals. I do not suggest that aid workers should live in the same conditions as most Haitians do, but I think that the gap between them should be less clear. The huge division between international aid workers and Haitians does not seem to create much understanding for each other. The following pictures give an impression of the huge separation between the life worlds of 'ordinary' Haitians and international aid workers.

Picture 5: Neighborhood in Port au Prince



Picture 6: Hotel in the west of Haiti



Picture 7: Armored vehicle from the UN



Picture 8: Port au Prince



Picture 9: Tent camp near Léogâne



Picture 10: Supermarket in Port au Prince³⁵, only affordable for international aid workers and upper-class Haitians



9.2) Reflection: Modifying my research topic

During my first weeks in Haiti I became aware that I had to adjust my research. My previous research topic was to study how the Cordaid transitional shelter program can be linked to a reconstruction program concerning the development of sustainable livelihoods, and secondary, to invest how local people can participate in this reconstruction process in a post-disaster fragile state such as Haiti. Before I went to Haiti, the new head of mission since January 2011, Peter de Vries³⁶, mentioned that he was interested in the possibilities of starting with livelihood programs. Since, Cordaid was already working on a shelter program I thought that it would be interesting to study the possibilities of linking this program to a more long-term livelihood program. One of Cordaid's core principles is linking relief and development; therefore I had expected to get more input from Cordaid staff about the possibilities to link the shelter program to a livelihood program. However, after a few weeks it became clear that there were very different ideas of Cordaid staff about the priorities in Haiti. Since, deadlines had to be met regarding the shelter program; the main focus of Cordaid staff in Haiti was building shelters. While, some people within Cordaid such as Peter de Vries were interesting in exploring the possibilities for other programs, most of the international staff in Haiti consisted out of architects hired for the shelter program. Also the strategy of the shelter program of Cordaid was changed from building transitional shelters to semi-permanent shelters. This means that the shelters are not a short-term solution, but give people the opportunity to live there for a long time. As Cordaid changed their strategy it became clear that the process of building semi-permanent houses would take much longer than building transitional shelters. When we arrived the shelter program was the main program in Léogâne at that moment and there was no budget available at that moment for other programs such as WASH and Livelihood.

Thus, when it became clear that the Cordaid staff was especially focused on finishing the shelter program I wondered what kind of ideas other international organizations would have about livelihood programs. I asked other humanitarian organizations about their experiences to link short-term and longer-term

³⁵ <http://reinventingtheeventhorizon.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/grovery-store-in-petion-ville.jpg>

³⁶ Synonym

programs, but I often got the answer that they had not yet focused on that or that they were struggling with that issue. It seemed that most of them were struggling with this issue, because of time limitations and a lack of funds. Then, I started to wonder was it only an issue of time and money that was seen as an obstacle for international organizations to link relief to development programs or was there some other challenge? The well-known discourse about linking relief and development often seems to be present in policy documents, but as stated in evaluation papers is never really implemented on the ground. Thus, what exactly makes it so difficult to have a more long-term focus in relief operations? It is often argued by international organizations that they have to establish partnership relations with local organizations and increase the level of participation in their programs, because this can increase the sustainability of programs. Thus, partnership and participation can contribute to a longer-term vision according to many INGOs, but in Haiti this seemed to be a complicated issue.

Although, Cordaid has involved local people in the shelter program it became clear that this was done in an instrumental way rather than really being an end goal. Also Cordaid already worked with local organizations before the earthquake in Haiti and wanted to involve some of those partners in their emergency programs. However, it turned out that there were some difficulties between Cordaid Haiti and the local partners. To understand more about the challenges of partnership relations and participatory approaches in post-disaster situations I was interested to study the relationship between Cordaid and their local partners after the earthquake. Soon I became aware that international aid workers and Haitians I spoke to had very negative ideas about each other. Therefore, I decided to study those mutual perceptions of local organizations and international aid workers. During my interviews I realized that perceptions of people about another person or situation could have an enormous influence on what exactly happens in practice.

Besides studying people's perceptions and expectations, I also tried to understand what kind of challenges aid workers face in a post-disaster fragile state such as Haiti. Of course not only people's perceptions have an influence on what happens in practice, also the context in which people work and certain regulations on a higher level influence the actions taken by humanitarian aid workers on the ground. Thus, on the one hand there is a kind of humanitarian system that sets certain rules and regulations that influences how people work in practice. On the other hand, people themselves are directly influenced by the situation in which they work, but also have an influence on this situation. Therefore I decided to shift my focus about understanding how a shelter program can be linked to livelihood programs to understanding what people on the ground actually think and believe is possible to do in a post-disaster situation like Haiti.

10) Conclusion

When international organizations arrive in a crisis situation they face many difficulties. They have to respond quickly in order to save lives and do as much as possible in a short-time frame. Although collaborating with local organizations and involving local people in emergency programs is very important according to international organizations, this seems to be quite complicated in such a situation. This study of the Dutch relief and development organization Cordaid has given a better understanding of the practical complications of participatory approaches and partnership relations in times of crisis.

10.1) Conclusions

From this study the following conclusions can be noted. First, although Cordaid already worked for more than thirty years with local partner organizations in Haiti tensions arose between Cordaid and their partners after the earthquake. In the beginning Cordaid involved their partners in several emergency projects, but soon started with their own shelter program in Port au Prince and Léogâne. According to Cordaid staff in Haiti their partners did not seem capable enough to execute emergency projects. Therefore, Cordaid decided to run the shelter program with local and international staff. Cordaid's partners did not understand what the role of Cordaid was in Haiti and they became frustrated, because they had very different expectations of their relationship with Cordaid.

Second, even though Cordaid has recognized that an understanding of social structures and social capital is essential in responding to a complex emergency, in the area of Grand Goave City and Lompré Cordaid was not aware of already existing and emerging local organizations. When Cordaid started to work in Lompré and Grand Goave they decided to establish local committees to involve the communities in their shelter program. Thus, although Cordaid did not collaborate with already existing organizations, but instead created new committees, it should be noted that they have made use of the local knowledge and networks of the Haitians by involving them in the shelter program.

Third, while Cordaid involved their local partners in emergency programs and established local committees to involve the local communities in their shelter program, this was more done in an instrumental way than really strengthening capacities of people. Since, Cordaid's partners had to execute emergency projects commissioned by Cordaid partnership in this case could be better understood as a contractual agreement whereby partners implement programs on demand of Cordaid. Also the local committees functioned more as a legitimization of Cordaid's shelter program instead of really empowering people. Although, making use of participatory approaches in an instrumental way is not necessarily incorrect, it should be clear for the participants what the reason is why they should participate. Since, the local partners had a very different relationship before the earthquake with Cordaid; they also had very different expectations of their collaboration with Cordaid. When those expectations were not met, tensions arose between Cordaid and their partners. Before the earthquake, Cordaid funded programs of their local partners, but after the earthquake Cordaid had some emergency programs for which they contracted some of their partners. In this case it was Cordaid who decided what kind of program would be implemented and how this program would be executed. Also the Cordaid committees were established with the idea that those committees could play an important role in future programs in Haiti. However, due to a lack of funding there will be probably no follow-up program in Léogâne. This means that Cordaid cannot fulfill their commitment with regard to the local committees.

Overall, it can be concluded that there was very little collaboration between Cordaid and local organizations in Haiti after the earthquake. Also other international organizations I interviewed seemed to have difficulties to make collaboration work with local organizations in Haiti. When I got more insight into those conclusions, I wondered what the obstacles are for an organization like Cordaid to collaborate with already existing local organizations and their partner organizations in a crisis-related situation. From my research I have concluded three issues that can serve as an explanation for current situation in Haiti that have hindered constructive collaboration between Cordaid and Haitians. Those three issues are the context in which international organizations work, the influence of funding regulations and short-time frames, and the perceptions international aid workers and Haitians have about each other.

The context

The high level of corruption especially at government level, but also in other layers of society has limited constructive collaboration between different actors after the earthquake in Haiti. According to international organizations government officials and staff members of local organizations just want to make money. This statement legitimizes the fact that INGOs tend to do the work by themselves rather than involving the government or local organizations in their reconstruction programs. However, excluding the Haitian government during the reconstruction of Haiti only further weakens the government institutions. Furthermore, without strengthening local organizations in Haiti it will be very likely that Haiti will stay dependent on outside forces for a long time.

It was not only stated that local organizations seem to be corrupt, but it was also argued by international organizations that there did not seem to be any efficient or strong local organizations in the area of Léogâne. After my research in Grand Goave and Lompré I could conclude that there did not seem to be a lot of strong local organizations especially when you compare it with international organizations. However, there are people who are committed to their community and want to contribute to positive change. Thus, the small but active local organizations in those two areas might be inappropriate for large budgeted operations, since the risk of evoking corruption as well as destabilizing such small organizations is obvious. However, approaching such organizations to mobilize social active members to participate in local committees is valuable to obtain insight in local needs and circumstances, like Cordaid did in Haiti. When Cordaid started with a shelter program in Léogâne after the earthquake, they also established committees to increase local participation in the program. Many representatives of those Cordaid committees are also a member of local organizations and associations. In this way Cordaid does not directly work with local organizations, but they do involve already active members of the communities. Thus, while those organizations in Grand Goave and Lompré are not organized in such a way to handle large amounts of money, INGOs could make use of their networks and knowledge about the local situation.

The humanitarian aid system

When international organizations arrive after a disaster, quick decisions have to be made, because lives have to be saved. This means that there is often less time to invest in longer-term relationships with local people. Also in Haiti after the devastating earthquake relief operations were quickly set up by international organizations, while the Haitian government and local organizations have hardly been involved.

Another important point is that international organizations have to be accountable to their donors. After the earthquake, an enormous amount of money was collected by SHO (Dutch cooperation of relief organizations) for the reconstruction of Haiti. Cordaid also received a large amount of this budget; however this funding brought some strong obligations, such as accountability to the Dutch citizens. To be better accountable to its donors Cordaid decided to establish a field office in Haiti and start with a shelter program. Although, Cordaid already worked for a long time with local partners, they argued that those partners were not suitable enough to execute such a large shelter program. Quick results were needed for the Dutch citizens and Cordaid considered itself more suitable to execute this program.

The importance of visibility is also an issue that influences actions taken by international organizations. Although, international agencies want to collaborate with local organizations they also want to show their own results. In the end international organizations want to survive and when a next disaster happens they want to be part of the game again. Building shelters is a perfect program, because Cordaid can clearly show their results to their donors.

Mutual perceptions of international aid workers and Haitians

Besides the context in which people work and the limitations of funding and time people themselves also have a lot of influence on practices taken on the ground. During my research one of the things that I noticed was the fact that both international aid workers and Haitians I interviewed had very negative perceptions about each other. Especially, international aid workers were quite negative about Haitians and Haiti in general. According to those aid workers Haitians are dependent as they are waiting for aid to arrive. Also local organizations do not seem to be efficient and effective to work with. The already existing negative image about Haiti as a fragile state and the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere has also influenced the perceptions and expectations of aid workers. When aid workers arrived after the earthquake they framed themselves very much as lifesavers in contrast to the Haitians who were framed as victims.

Also the perceptions of Haitians have influenced the reconstruction in Haiti. On the one hand, many Haitians I interviewed are very positive about all those international organizations, because employment has increased and many people have received shelters. Some of the Haitians I spoke to even stated that they expect that international organizations rebuild Haiti, because they have funding and expertise. However, there is also a strong voice of Haitians, especially from local organizations, that are quite negative about those international organizations. According to them they substitute local organizations and especially work on their own not involving Haitian organization and government institutions in the reconstruction process. Furthermore, international aid workers often have no knowledge about the context in which they work and the needs of people. Therefore, collaboration is needed between local and international organizations according to those Haitians.

Also there seem to be little interaction between international aid workers and Haitians in the public sphere. The only context in which Haitians and aid workers meet regularly is during the implementation of projects. There is an interaction between aid workers and beneficiaries, and between local and international staff. In both situations there is often a power imbalance. In this case beneficiaries are always subordinate to aid workers, because they are dependent on the aid workers. Also the relationship between local and international staff is sometimes unequal, because it is often international staff that has senior positions within the organization.

The case of Cordaid and their partners

When Cordaid came to Haiti their partners thought that their relationship would strengthen. However, the opposite happened as Cordaid started with their own shelter and mental health program in Haiti. Since, Cordaid's partners had a different expectation of the role of Cordaid in Haiti, they were disappointed in Cordaid. On the other hand Cordaid did involve some of their partners in emergency programs, but became aware that those partners were not suitable for those projects, as they had no expertise in this field. This caused some frictions between Cordaid and their local partners, since both had different expectations of each other. Although, it is understandable that after a disaster emergency programs are necessary and decisions have to be taken quickly, organizations like Cordaid should be aware of the value that partner organizations can have.

In the last part I will shortly discuss my conclusions and I will formulate some recommendations. Some of the recommendations are specifically based on the case of Cordaid in Haiti, but can also be useful for other international organizations.

10.2) Discussion

Taking those conclusions into account it becomes clear that while the context and regulations imposed by donors have an influence on the practical work of international aid workers in Haiti, it is also necessary to get more insight into the perceptions and expectations of aid workers about Haitians and the situation in which they work. Furthermore, the perceptions and expectations of Haitians about aid organizations are also useful as they can provide a better understanding of people's behavior. In this specific case of Haiti where the international organizations I interviewed seem to have very little confidence in the capacities of local organizations it is not surprising that there is also very little collaboration between the two. On the one hand international organizations are too much focused on their own programs and the results they have to achieve within a certain time-frame. On the other hand the categorization of international aid workers as lifesavers and Haitians as victims legitimizes the fact that international organizations reconstruct Haiti. Even though the vision of Cordaid starts from the idea that people are not victims, but citizens, it seems that some employees of Cordaid in Haiti do not always have the same understanding. Not only employees of Cordaid, but also many other aid workers of international organizations I interviewed seem to believe that they are better capable of reconstructing Haiti than Haitians themselves.

While it is understandable that aid workers do not always seem to be very positive about Haitians and Haiti in general, it has to be recognized that in the end it are the Haitians who will stay and the aid workers who will leave. Even though there is a high level of corruption in Haiti, especially at government level, and the administrative and financial capacities of local organizations are not very strong, the solution is not to neglect the Haitian government and local organizations during the reconstruction of Haiti, because this weakens the government and local organizations only further. Thus, despite the obstacles international organizations face regarding partnership and participatory approaches, engagement of Haitians is needed to create resilient recovery and sustainable development in the longer run.

To make collaboration work time is needed and above all confidence in the abilities of others. If people have no confidence in others, a failure to create strong relationships is very likely to happen.

Furthermore, if people have no confidence in their own capacities it is more likely that they will depend on the help of others. In the case of Haiti, a country that is already dependent on aid for decades many Haitians I interviewed argued that international organizations should reconstruct Haiti, because they have the funds and expertise. Those Haitians stated that they need international organizations, because they are very poor and the government is doing nothing for them. However, one should not underestimate the strong voice of those Haitians who are often already active members in their communities and who do believe that they have the capacities and ability to reconstruct Haiti together with international organizations. While, international organizations always have to be aware of already existing formal and informal power structures and inequalities in the communities they work, it can be very useful to utilize the knowledge and networks of those active members in the communities. Furthermore, international organizations should focus on people's capacities and in what way they could strengthen those capacities in order to increase sustainable development.

A last point I want to elaborate on in this discussion is the highly visible separation between the lives of aid workers and Haitians. The fact that aid workers often live in quite luxurious circumstances compared to 'ordinary' Haitians has created frustration among Haitians³⁷. I clearly do not state that aid workers should live in tent camps and sleep on the ground, but I do argue that if the difference between the lives of Haitians and aid workers would be smaller, this would mean that aid workers would become more involved in the lives of those people they want to support. This involvement can increase their understanding about the local situation and already existing structures and can give them more insight into what people actually need.

Recommendations

The following recommendations have been formulated as a result of this research in Haiti. The first five recommendations are more general, while the latter three have emerged out of a case study about Cordaid.

- International aid workers should constantly invest in creating a better understanding of the political, social, environmental and cultural context in which they work, as this could provide better insight into what is actually needed and what is already present in the context they work
- It is important to understand what the mutual perceptions are of aid workers and local people, as this can give a better insight into the behavior of people and a better understanding of the actions taken on the ground by international organizations
- The separation between the lives of international aid workers and 'ordinary' people should become smaller, because this can increase the understanding of aid workers about the context in which they work, as they become more involved in the lives of the people they want to support
- Aid workers should actively listen to what people want or think that should be done to improve their lives, only when you really listen to people you are able to identify what their problems are and what kind of solutions are needed to improve their lives

³⁷ With Haitians I only means those Haitians I interviewed

- As already stated in many evaluation reports after the earthquake in Haiti, a need for more engagement of Haitians during the reconstruction is necessary to create resilient recovery

Specific recommendations related to the case of Cordaid

- As the key-message about future follow up programs in Léogâne is not clear for the beneficiaries and also not for the Cordaid committees, new expectations are raised in the communities, which Cordaid is maybe not able to realize. Therefore, it is important to give a clear message about what you are able to do as an organization for the communities you work in. If the program changes after a certain time, communicate this as soon as possible in order to prevent problems at a later stage
- Cordaid should benefit more from the fact that they have such an enormous partner network over the world. In times of emergencies Cordaid should be able to work together with local partners, as they know the context. Therefore, Cordaid should better prepare their partners for possible emergencies
- One of Cordaid's core principles is to link relief and development work; therefore they should try to be more impact oriented than focusing solely on the results in terms of numbers of the shelter program

References

- Adger, N.W. (2000) "Social and ecological resilience: are they related?" *Progress in Human Geography* September 24: 347-364
- Americas Watch Committee (1993) "Silencing a People: The destruction of civil society in Haiti". National Coalition for Haitian Refugees and Human Rights Watch, USA
- Argyris, C. and Schon, D. (1978) *Organizational learning: A theory of action perspective*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley
- Barnett, Michael N. (1999) "Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo", *European Journal of International Relations*, 5: 5–36
- Barrs, C. A. (2010) "Preparedness Support: How to Brace Beneficiaries, Local Staff and Partners for Violence", *The Cuny Center*
- Bayart, Jean-Francois, (1992) *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*, Longman: New York
- Benson, C. and Twigg, J. (2007). "Tools for Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction: Guidance Notes for Development Organizations". (IFRC, Provention Consortium: Geneva)
- Berner, E. (2010) "Participation between tyranny and emancipation." In: Gomez G. M. et al (eds.) (2010) *Participation for what: Social change or social control?* The Hague: ISS/Erasmus University of Rotterdam, Hivos, Oxfam Novib
- Boeije, H. (2006) *Analyseren in Kwalitatief Onderzoek*. Purmerend: Boom Onderwijs
- Bolton, M. (2011) "Human security after state collapse: Global governance in post-earthquake Haiti". LSE Global Governance Research Papers, London School of Economics and Political Science, London
- Brinkerhoff, D., (2010) "Developing Capacity in Fragile States". *Public Administration and Development*, 30: 66–78
- Buchanan-Smith, M., & Maxwell, S. (1994). "Linking relief and development: an introduction and overview". *IDS bulletin*, 25 (4), 2-16
- Buss, T. F. and Gardner, A. (2008) *Haiti in the balance: Why foreign aid has failed and what we can do about it*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Cannon, T. (2008) "Reducing People's Vulnerability to Natural Hazards: Communities and Resilience", WIDER Research Paper, United Nations University, Helsinki
- Cardona, O.D. (2004) "The Need for Rethinking the Concepts of Vulnerability and Risk from a Holistic Perspective: a Necessary Review and Criticism for Effective Risk Management". In: *Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters, Development & People*, Greg Bankoff, Georg Frerks, and Dorothea , eds. London: Earthscan, pp. 37-51
- Central Intelligence Agency "CIA" (2011) World Factbook. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook>, (Accessed September 15, 2011)

- Chambers, R. (2004) "Ideas for Development: Reflecting forwards". IDS Working paper 238, Brighton: *Institute of Development Studies*
- Christoplos, I., Hilhorst, D. (2009) "Human security and capacity in fragile states", Wageningen
- Christoplos, I., et al (2001) "Re-framing risk: the changing context of disaster mitigation and preparedness". *Disasters*, 25(3), 185-198.
- Cooke, W. and U. Kothari (2001) *Participation: the New Tyranny?* London: Zed
- Cooley, A., Ron, J., (2002) "NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action", *International Security*, 27
- Cordaid (2011) www.cordaid.nl (Accessed September 29 and October 26, 2011)
- Cordaid Haiti (2011) <http://cordaidhaiti.org> (Accessed September 29, 2011)
- Cornwall, A. (2008) "Unpacking 'participation': Models, meanings, and practices". *Community Development Journal*, 43: 269–283
- Cornwall, A. and Brock, K. (2005): "What do buzzwords do for development policy? A critical look at "participation", "empowerment" and "poverty reduction"". *Third World Quarterly*, 26: 1043-1060
- Coupeau, S. (2008) *The history of Haiti*. Westport: Greenwood Press
- DeWalt, K.M. and DeWalt, B.R. (2002) *Participant Observation*. Walnut Creek: Alta Mira Press
- Dewulf, A., et al (2009) "Disentangling Approaches to Framing in Conflict and Negotiation Research: A Meta-Paradigmatic Perspective". *Human Relations*, 62: 155–193
- Diamond, L. (1994) "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy*, 5: 4-17
- Donini, A. (2007) "Local Perceptions of Assistance to Afghanistan." *International Peacekeeping*, 14: 158-172
- DRLA and UEH - Tulane University's Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy (DRLA) and the University of Haiti (UEH) (2011) "Haiti humanitarian aid evaluation: Structured analysis summary report"
- Eade, D. (2007) "Capacity Building: who builds whose capacity". *Development In Practice*, 17, Numbers 4–5
- Eizenstat, S. (2004) "Nongovernmental Organizations as the Fifth Estate." *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, 5: 15–28
- Ellis, F. and Biggs, S. (2001) "Evolving Themes in Rural Development 1950s-2000s". *Development Policy Review*, 19: 437–448
- Eye on Aceh and Cordaid, (2008) "Missed Opportunities: post tsunami aid and social capital in the reconstruction programme of Cordaid in Aceh". *Reliefweb*
- Ewins, P. et al (2006) "Mapping the risks of corruption in humanitarian action". London: ODI

Fatton, R. Jr (2005) "The Fall of Aristide and Haiti's Current Predicament". In: Shamsie, Yasmine, and Andrew Stuart Thompson. 2006. *Haiti: Hope for a Fragile State*. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Fatton, R. Jr (2011) "Haiti in the Aftermath of the Earthquake: The Politics of Catastrophe". *Journal of Black Studies*, 42: 158-185

Fernando, U. and Hilhorst, D. (2006) "Everyday practices of Humanitarian Aid: Tsunami Response in Sri Lanka". Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of Oxfam GB, 16: pp. 292-302

Frerks, G.E.; Klem, B. (Eds.) (2004) "Dealing with diversity, Sri Lankan discourses on peace and conflict". The Hague, *Clingendael Institute of International Relations*

Frerks, G. E. (2007) "Conflict, Development and Discourse". In: Frerks, G.E. and Klein Goldewijk, B., eds (2007) *Human security and international insecurity*. Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers

Gamson, W. A., and D. S. Meyer. (1996) "The Framing of Political Opportunity." In Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. New York, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Gasper, D. and R. Apthorpe (1996) "Introduction: Discourse Analysis and Policy Discourse", in R. Apthorpe and D. Gasper (eds) *Arguing Development Policy: Frames and Discourses*. London: Frank Cass.

Gaventa, J. (2002) "Introduction: exploring citizenship, participation and accountability". *IDS Bulletin*, 33, 1-11

Geertz, C. (1973) *The interpretation of cultures*. New York: Basic Books

Goebel, A. (1998) "Process, Perception and Power: Notes from "Participatory" Research in a Zimbabwean Resettlement Area". *Development and Change*, 29: 277-305.

Gray, D.E. (2004) *Doing Research in the Real World*. Chapter 2: Theoretical perspectives and research methodologies. London: Sage Publications

Gros, J. (1996) "Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti". *Third World Quarterly*, 17: 455-471

Grünwald, F. and Renaudin, B. (2010) "Real-time evaluation of the response to the Haiti earthquake of 12 January 2010". Mission Report. Urgence réhabilitation développement

Guijt, I. (2008) Seeking surprise. Rethinking monitoring for collective learning in rural resource management. PhD thesis, Wageningen University

Guijt, I., & Shah, M. K. (1998) *The myth of community: Gender issues in participatory development*. London: IT Publications.

Haar, G. van der and Hilhorst, D. (2009) "Partners in crises, Peer Review on Partnership in crises-related interventions". The Hague, *PSO*

- Hajer, M. (1993) "Discourse coalitions and the institutionalisation of practice". In: Fischer, F. and Forester, J. (eds) (1993), *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press
- Harrison, E. (2002) "The Problem with the Locals: Partnership and Participation in Ethiopia," *Development and Change* 33: 587-610
- Harsch, E. (1997) 'Reviewed work(s): *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* by Mahmood Mamdani. *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly* by Jean-François Bayart. *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone* by William Reno. *Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa* by Robert Fatton, Jr. *Sociological Forum* 12: 671-679
- Heijmans, A. (2004) "From Vulnerability to Empowerment". In: Bankhoff, G.; Frerks, G.; Hilhorst, D. (2004): *Mapping vulnerability: Disasters, development and people*. London: Earthscan, 115-127
- Heijmans, A. (2009) "The social life of community-based disaster risk reduction: origins, politics and framing". Disaster studies working paper 20. London. *Aon Benfield UCL Hazard Research Centre*
- Heijmans, A., Okechukwu, I., Schuller tot Peursum, A. and Skarubowiz, R. (2009) "A grassroots perspective on risks stemming from disasters and conflict". *Humanitarian exchange magazine*, 44
- Hickey and Mohan (2005) "Relocating participation within a radical politics of participation". *Development and change*, 36: 237-262
- Hilhorst, D. (2003) *The real world of NGOs*. London and New York: Zed Books
- Hilhorst, D. and Bankoff, G. (2004) "Introduction: Mapping Vulnerability", In: Bankhoff, G.; Frerks, G.; Hilhorst, D. (2004): *Mapping vulnerability: Disasters, development and people*. London: Earthscan, 1-9
- Hilhorst, D. and Jansen, B.J. (2005) "You never walk alone: participation, partnership and coordination in humanitarian aid". The Hague: *PSO*
- Hilhorst, D. and Jansen, B.J. (2010) "Humanitarian space as arena: A perspective on the everyday politics of aid". *Development and Change* 41: 1117-1139
- Human development Report "HDR" (2010) "The real wealth of Nations: Pathways to human development". New York: United Nations Development Programme Available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/> (Accessed October 19, 2011)
- Jansen, A. and Molenaar, L. (2011) "The complexity of local participation: A study on the participatory component of Cordaid's shelter programme in post disaster Haiti". Internal Cordaid report (on request)
- Jaspars, S. and O'Callaghan, S. (2010) "Livelihoods and protection in situations of protracted conflict". *Disasters*, 34: S165-S182.
- Julmy, S. (2011) "Coordinating the earthquake response: lessons from Léogâne, western Haiti". *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine*, 49
- Kenny, S. (2010) "Reconstruction through Participatory Practice?" In: Clarke M.; Fanany I.; Kenny S. (eds) (2010): *Post-disaster reconstructions: lessons from Aceh*. Earthscan, London. pp. 79-104

- Lewicki, R., B. Gray and M. Elliott (eds.) (2003) *Making Sense of Intractable Environmental Conflicts*. Washington, D.C.: Island Press
- Long, N. (1992) *Battlefields of Knowledge: The interlocking of theory and practice in social research and development*. London: Routledge
- Lyons, M. (2009) "Building Back Better: The Large-Scale Impact of Small-Scale Approaches to Reconstruction". *World Development*, 37: 385-398
- Maguire, R. (2006) "Assisting a Neighbour. Haiti's challenge to North American Policy-Makers". In: Shamsie, Y. and Thompson, S. (eds.) *Haiti hope for a fragile state*. Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. pp 25-35
- Mangones, K. (2001) "Alternative food aid strategies and local capacity building in Haiti". In: Smillie, I. (ed.) (2001) *Patronage or Partnership: Local Capacity Building in Humanitarian Crises*, Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press
- McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D., & Meyer, N. Z. (1996) *Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- McAlister E. A. (2002) *Rara!: Vodou, Power, and Performance in Haiti and Its Diaspora*. Berkeley: University California Press
- Miller, N.L. (2000) "Haitian ethnomedical systems and biomedical practitioners: directions for clinicians". *Journal of Transcultural nursing* 11: 204-211
- Mohan, G. (2006) "Beyond participation: strategies for deeper empowerment". In: Cooke, Bill and Kothari, Uma eds. *Participation: The New Tyranny?* London: Zed Books, pp. 153-167
- Mohan, G. and Stokke, K. (2000) "Participatory Development and Empowerment: The Dangers of Localism". *Third World Quarterly* 21: 247-268
- Morton, A. (1997) "Haiti: NGO Sector Study". Washington, DC: World Bank
- Nyamugasira, W. (1998) "NGOs and advocacy: how well are the poor represented?" *Development in Practice*, 8:297-308
- Oxfam, (2011) "From Relief to Recovery: Supporting good governance in post-earthquake Haiti", 142 Oxfam Briefing Paper. Available at: www.oxfam.org (Accessed November 8, 2011)
- Pierre-Louis, F. (2011) "Earthquakes, Nongovernmental Organizations, and Governance in Haiti". *Journal of Black Studies* 42: 186-202
- Pouligny, B., (2005) "Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building 'New' Societies". *Security Dialogue*, 36, Sage Publications
- Ramalingam, B. and Barnett, M. (2010) "The Humanitarian's Dilemma: collective action or inaction in international relief?" *Overseas Development Institute*
- Rencoret, N. et al. (2010) "Haiti earthquake response: context analysis". London: ALNAP

- Roy, R. (2010) "The Transformative Power of 'Why not?'". In: Build back better: Strategies for societal renewal in Haiti. Special edition for the 2010 annual meeting of the Clinton Global Initiative. Innovations: technology, governance, globalization
- Samuels, A. (2010) "Remaking Neighborhoods in Banda Aceh: Post-tsunami Reconstruction of Everyday Life". In: Clarke M.; Fanany I.; Kenny S. (eds): *Post-disaster reconstructions: lessons from Aceh*. Earthscan, London. pp. 210-223
- Schuller, M. (2007a) "Seeing Like a "Failed" NGO: Globalization—s Impacts on State and Civil Society in Haiti". *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, 30: 67–89
- Schuller, M. (2007b) "Invasion or Infusion? Understanding the Role of NGOs in Contemporary Haiti". *Journal of Haitian Studies*, 13: pp. 96-119
- Schuller, M. (2009) "Gluing Globalization: NGOs as Intermediaries in Haiti". *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, 32: 84–104
- Schwartz, T.T., (2008) *Travesty in Haiti: A true account of Christian missions, orphanages, fraud, food aid and drug trafficking*. Charleston, SC: BookSurge Publishing, 2008
- Sen, Amartya, K. (1999) *Development as Freedom*. New York: Knopf
- Shamsie, Y. and Thompson, S. (2006) *Haiti hope for a fragile state*. Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press
- Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties (SHO) 2011 "SHO-actie; help slachtoffers aardbeving Haiti". SHO rapportage. Available at: http://haitinu.nl/static/uploads/jaarrapportage_haiti.pdf (Accessed December 3, 2011)
- Smillie, I. (1998) "Relief and development: The struggle for synergy". Occasional Paper 33, *Providence, RI*: Brown University, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies.
- Smillie, I. (ed.) (2001) *Patronage or Partnership: Local Capacity Building in Humanitarian Crises*, Bloomfield, CT: KumarianPress
- Souverijn, P. (2001) *We did it ourselves. Linking relief and development: A case study of post conflict rebuilding in Somaliland*. CIDIN: University of Nijmegen
- Stirrat, R.L. and Henkel, H. (1997) "The Development Gift: The problem of Reciprocity in the NGO World". *Annals AAPPS*, 554
- Stumpfenhorst, M. et al (2011) "The UN OCHA cluster approach: gaps between theory and practice". *Journal of public Health*
- Sutton, R. (1999) "The Policy Process: An Overview", ODI Working Paper 118. London: Overseas Development Institute
- Thywissen, K. (2006). 'Components of Risk: A Comparative Glossary', Bonn: United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security

- Tierney, K., Bevc, C., & Kuligowski, E. (2006) "Metaphors matter: Disaster myths, media frames, and their consequences in Hurricane Katrina". *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 604: 57–81
- Tukker, R. and H. van Poelje (2010) "Capacity Development in Humanitarian Crises: Practice and lessons learnt about strengthening civil society organizations". *International NGO Training and Research Centre*
- Turner, A.L. (2010), "Why has the Number of International Non-Governmental Organizations Exploded since 1960?". *Cliodynamics: the Journal of Theoretical and Mathematical History* 1: pp. 81-91
- UNISDR (2009). 'Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction', United Nations. Switzerland
- Van Leeuwen, M. (2009) *Partners in Peace: Discourses and Practices of Civil-society Peacebuilding*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Von Kotze, A. and Holloway A.. (1996). 'Reducing Risk: Participatory Learning Activities for Disaster Mitigation in Southern Africa', Natal: IFRCRS
- Warner, J.F., Waalewijn, P. and Hilhorst, D. (2002) *Public Participation in Disaster-Prone Watersheds: Time for Multi-Stakeholder Platforms?* Paper for the Water and Climate Dialogue. Wageningen University
- Warner, J.F. (2006) "More Sustainable Participation? Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Catchment Management". *International Journal of Water Resources Development*, 22: pp. 15-35
- Warner, J.F. (2007) "The Beauty of the Beast: Multi-Stakeholder Participation for Integrated Catchment Management". In: J. Warner (Ed.), *Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for integrated water management*. Ashgate
- White P., Pelling M., Sen K., Seddon D., Russell S. and Few R. (2004). 'Disaster Risk Reduction: A development concern. A scoping study on links between disaster risk reduction, poverty and development', Overseas Development Group
- Williams, G. (2004) "Evaluating Participatory Development: Tyranny, Power and (Re)Politicisation". *Third World Quarterly*, 25: 557-578
- Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., and Davis, I. (2004). *At Risk, Second edition, natural hazards, people's vulnerability and disasters*. London: Routledge Part I, pp. 3-124
- Woodward, S. L. (2002) "Economic priorities for successful peace implementation", in: Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild & Elizabeth M. Cousens eds., *Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, pp. 183-214
- Yin, R. K. (2011) *Qualitative research from start to finish*. New York: Guilford
- Zanotti, L., (2010) "Cacophonies of Aid, Failed State Building and NGOs in Haiti: setting the stage for disaster, envisioning the future", *Third World Quarterly*, 31: 755–771

Appendices

Appendix A: Disaster terminology

Coping capacity

Coping capacity is referred to as “the ability of people, organizations and systems, using available skills and resources, to face and manage adverse conditions, emergencies or disasters (UNISDR, 2009: 3)”.

Disaster

“A disaster is the occurrence of an extreme hazard event that impacts on vulnerable communities causing substantial damage, disruption and possible casualties, and leaving the affected communities unable to function normally without outside assistance (Benson and Twigg, 2007: 16)”.

Disaster Risk

“Disaster risk is a function of the characteristics and frequency of hazards experienced in a specified location, the nature of the elements at risk and their inherent degree of vulnerability or coping capacity (Benson and Twigg, 2007: 54)”.

$$DISASTER\ RISK = \frac{HAZARD \times VULNERABILITY}{COPING\ CAPACITY}$$

Disaster risk reduction

“Disaster risk reduction describes measures to curb disaster losses, through minimizing the hazard, reducing exposure and susceptibility and enhancing coping and adaptive capacity. Good disaster risk reduction also continues after a disaster, building resilience to future hazards (White et al., 2004: 1)”.

Hazard

“In general, the concept of hazard is now used to refer to latent danger or an external risk factor of a system or exposed subject. Hazard can be expressed mathematically as the probability of occurrence of an event of certain intensity, in a specific site and during a determined period of exposure time (Cardona, 2003: 37)”.

Risk

“Risk can be defined as the likelihood, or more formally the probability, that a particular level of loss will be sustained by a given series of elements as a result of a given level of hazard. The elements at risk consist of populations, communities, the built environment, the natural environment, economic activities and services, which are under threat of disaster in a given area (Alexander, 2000: in Thywissen, 2006)”.

Social Resilience

Social resilience is defined “as the ability of groups or communities to cope with external stresses and disturbances as a result of social, political and environmental change (Adger, 2000)”.

Vulnerability

Vulnerability is the extent to which an individual, community, sub-group, structure, service or geographic area is likely to be damaged or disrupted by the impact of a particular disaster hazard (Von Kotze and Holloway, 1996)

Community

A community is often defined as a group of people who live in the same geographical area and share common goals. However, communities should not be seen as homogeneous, but instead are heterogeneous entities where inequality, exploitation and oppression are part of people's relationships (Cannon, 2008). Communities exist of a collection of individuals that share some understanding of the world, but those individuals also have their own perspectives and interpretations depending on their own experiences and places in the social system (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002)

Appendix B: Topic lists

Since I have interviewed different groups of people, for which I used different questionnaires I have combined the questionnaires in four topic lists. During my fieldwork period some of my earlier questionnaires have been changed, because topics were missing or some topics were less relevant

1) Topic list for Cordaid partners and local organizations

- Background information of local organization and Cordaid's partner (aim, activities, existence, members)
- Funding of organization
- Challenges for organization
- Collaboration with other local organizations/ international organizations
- Changes after the earthquake for organization (influx of INGOs and president Martelly)
- Relationship with local and national government
- Number of local organizations increased or decreased after the earthquake
- Perception on local and international organizations in Haiti
- Expectations of international organizations
- Linking relief and development

Specific topics for Cordaid partners

- Relationship partner and Cordaid The Hague (before and after the earthquake)
- Relationship partner and Cordaid Haiti (communication, coordination, challenges, improvements)

Specific topics for local organizations

- Names of local organizations in Grand Goave and Lompré
- Names of INGOs in Haiti

2) Topic list International aid workers

- Presence of organization in Haiti
- Time working in Haiti as aid worker
- Reasons for working in Haiti
- Knowledge about Haiti before arrival (social structures, culture, country)
- Programs in Haiti (duration, exit-strategy, challenges, suits local needs, influence on communities)
- Collaboration with local organizations and international organizations (if yes, challenges. If no, why)
- Perception on local organizations/ international organizations/ Haitian government
- Partnership relations with Haitian organizations before the earthquake
- Participatory approaches in program (challenges, positive, negative)
- Building on local structures
- Social cohesion in communities (rural and urban)
- Collaboration with government
- Perceptions of local communities on your organization

- Perceptions of local communities on government (local, national)
- Changes in Haiti after the earthquake (Martelly)
- Challenges in Haiti in general
- Vision on development

3) Topic list for local Cordaid staff (shelter program)

- Working with Cordaid (before Cordaid)
- Shelter program (challenges, negative, positive, improved)
- Local Committees (challenges, negative, positive, improved)
- Participation and local capacities/structures of local people (challenges, effective, efficient, improved)
- Beneficiaries (challenges, most vulnerable reached, benefits for people)
- Involvement of government
- Linking shelter project to other programs (kind of programs, challenges)
- Needs of Haitians
- Changes in Haiti after the earthquake
- Perceptions on international organizations

Appendix C: Overview of local organizations in Grand Goave and Lompré

Local organizations in Grand Goave City

Organization	Aim of the organization	Established	Activities	Members
Bousol (Bourad pou Sove lavi) (Save the lives)	To search for survivors under the rubble and to help the survivors with medical care – now longer-term focus on improving health care provision in the whole area of Grand Goave	13 th of January 2010	They have a mobile clinic to give free medical care in all the 7 sectors in the areas around Grand Goave, also up in the mountains. For serious injuries they send people to the hospital	30 people working for this organization
TKLB (Tete Kole pour Lakay Ka Bel - heads together for a nice place) Legal organization <i>Good relation with the local government</i>	To organize especially sport activities for the youth	Around 1998	Sport activities and championships for the youth (football, basketball)	Before the earthquake they had 27 active members after the earthquake nine
CLAC (Club des Amies des Cultures)	This organization wants to pay more attention to the Haitian culture and to develop Grand Goave City	2005	They have summer activities and activities during the school period. They take children to cultural places around Grand Goave (red mountain) and they organize beach camps	Around 50 members (young people)
FSTL (Fondation souve tymoun lakay - foundation to give children a safe house)	To help the youngsters who are hanging out on the streets. They want to let them create a group of themselves to do some positive things together	2007	Meetings with the children to play and sing with them. Ask children who go to school how their day was. Talk with the children about their behaviour	Seven persons in the board. They have done activities for 200 children, but know only for 60 children

Codagg (Combite pour le developpement et l'avancement de Grand Goave)	To develop their town by cleaning the streets and they organize activities for women and children. They have a special sector for women: Fanm an Aksyon	End of 2009	Clean streets, Mothers day and Flag day activities. Around 300 people come to meetings (Thursday and Sunday)	They have around 50 active members. Around 200/300 people attend the meeting on Sunday
Feme Devwe, (Defensive women)	To inform women in Grand Goave to protect themselves against violence. (A lot of young women in Haiti are afraid when there is no electricity, because they can be raped)	Started before 2003, but they became a formal organization in 2003	They have small credit systems to lend money to women, learn women how to read and write, some women make flowers together and sell them, they talk about health issues, some women cook together	They had around 300 members before the earthquake, but they have closed their office due to political reasons

Other local organizations and associations in Grand Goave City

Organizations/associations	Aim of the organization	Established	Members
APG (Association des Planteurs de Grand Goave)	To stimulate agricultural activities and development in Grand Goave. (They get seeds from FAO)	Before the earthquake	More than 100 members
APPG (Association de Pecheurs de Grand Goave)	To stimulate fishing activities and development in Grand Goave	Before the earthquake	
Asosiyasyon Vodoyzan Gran Gwav	An association that wants to make people understand what Vodou is	2008	
Kovid	This organization is a bit similar to Codagg, but they have a monthly meeting. They also have a health department. They used to help people, but now they have no money anymore	Before the earthquake	
MAP (Mouvement pour Ayiti Bel - for a nicer Haiti)	To develop the city of Grand Goave	Has been established after the earthquake in April 2011	Eleven members
STK (Sector tete kole)	To clean the streets of a specific neighborhood in Grand Goave and to clean the beach	Since 2005	50 to 70 members
KORE Grand Gwav	Pays attention to justice		
OPROGG	An organization that focuses on the promotion of Grand Goave		
JACIPING	Development and water purification in Grand Goave		
KOJAGG	Focuses on sanitation	After the earthquake	
91 (same as MAP, but already exist a little bit longer)	To develop the city of Grand Goave	Has been established after the earthquake by a group of young people	

Local organizations in Lompré

Organization	Aim of the organization	Established	Activities	Members
AGPL (Association young progressive de Lompré)	To develop the area of Lompré	2001	They have some activities for farmers. The government gave them rice, banana, beans and chickens. Also some private organizations gave them some tools to fix the road. And they are building a school	Thirteen people in the board
PJ (Planet Jeune)	To do some activities for young people	2005	They have some cultural activities, and they put some money together to have some activities like a party	Sixteen people in the board
AFVL (Association les femmes vigilant de Lompré)	To pay attention to women who are sexually abused and to give women information about sexual violence	In October 2010	Give women information about sexual violence and what they can do to avoid getting sick	
MPKT (Mouvement paysant Kafou Tikalbas - movement for the people of Kafou Tikalbas)	To develop the area of Lompré and to help INGOs with their activities	After the earthquake	They volunteered for Cordaid activities. Clean the streets, made the roads. Sometimes they also make assessments for INGOs	
APDL (Association Progression de Lompré)	To develop the area of Lompré		Agriculture activities and sometimes they go to the beach with teenagers, just to give them something to do	
Tete Kole (Heads together)			Work on the roads. When the rain falls they team up and work together. They also help children to go to school	
AGR	To have some activities for teenagers in Coalemen			
Cecile house (established by American-Haitian Diaspora)		Before the earthquake		