

Local Government and Global NGO in a struggle to protect the jungle

*A case study of 'Conservation International'
and the Central Suriname Nature Reserve*

Liset Meddens

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Preface

My initial idea for a Master thesis originated from my visit in Madagascar. There I saw a large multinational mining company operating near a village where people lived from selling a few oranges a day. I was struck by the large disparity that I saw emerging in the increasingly globalizing world we inhabit. How to deal with such large differences of power and interests in one specific place?

With this idea I went to the ENP study coordinator Bas van Vliet who helped me to give a first direction to my research; the suggestion to go to Suriname and the supervisor Arthur Mol. Although the starting up process has not always been easy, the fieldwork in Suriname more than compensated that period. The open and approachable people in Suriname gave me a great insight in real life governance practices between a disparity of my initial idea; a global NGO and a local government. The topic kept my interest until the end of the writing process, which was also thanks to the interesting discussions with my supervisor.

Therefore, I firstly would like to thank Arthur Mol for the fruitful conversations and the great insights he gave me to my research. I really enjoyed the meetings, which gave me support and new motivation to work on this thesis.

Secondly I would like to thank all the respondents in Suriname who shared a lot of interesting information with me. I really enjoyed the interviewing and appreciated the openness of the respondents which was essential for the results of this thesis. Special thanks go to Errol Gezius, who helped me a lot with the interviewing of the local communities in the interior and with whom I had some interesting discussions on the topic.

Thirdly and finally I like to thank my friends and family who supported me during the writing period of this thesis. The home office at Haelen and the support of my parents were indispensable. Special thanks also go to Roy Remme for his useful comments and to Joram van den Boezem for the final editing of this thesis.

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List of Abbreviations

ADEKUS	Anton the Kom University of Suriname
CELOS	Centrum voor Landbouwkundig Onderzoek Suriname (<i>Centre for Agricultural Research in Suriname</i>)
CI	Conservation International
CIS	Conservation International Suriname
CSNR	Central Suriname Nature Reserve
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GIS	Geological Information Systems
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
LBB	Lands Bos Beheer (<i>Forest Service of the government</i>)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MUMA	Multiple Use Management Areas
NCD	Nature Conservation Division
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
RAP	Rapid Assessment Program
SCF	Suriname Conservation Foundation
SNR	Sipaliwini Nature Reserve
STINASU	Stichting Natuurbehoud Suriname (<i>Surinamese foundation of Nature Conservation</i>)
TEAM	Tropical Ecology Assessment and Monitoring Network
TNC	The Nature Conservancy
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
WRI	World Resources Institute
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

Abstract

Biodiversity loss is increasingly of global concern. Most of the Earth's biodiversity is located in less developed states where national governmental institutions are weak. At the same time, global conservation NGOs are becoming increasingly influential to protect globally important biodiversity. These global NGOs operate mainly in those less developed states where they cooperate with local governments to protect high biodiversity areas. This study explores the governance arrangements that arise from these nature conservation conditions in Suriname. The cooperation between the local Surinamese government and the global NGO 'Conservation International' (CI) gave several insights to these governance arrangements. The cooperation between the local government and the global NGO was successful on the establishment of the large nature reserve; the Central Suriname Nature Reserve (CSNR). A large fund supported by international donors became available for nature protection in Suriname. However, a dispute between CI and the Surinamese government on the CSNR management authority caused a stagnation of the cooperation and implementation of the management plans never started. CI positioned themselves too dominant in the management of the reserve, while the government did not want to lose any control. The government had little capacity to cooperate with CI in an equitable way and therefore blocked CI's plans. This study showed that the global NGO was very valuable to internationalize the issue of nature conservation in Suriname. Although large conservation NGOs have been criticized in recent literature, this study did not confirm these concerns. The lack of trust between the institutions appeared to be the largest challenge for successful cooperation between the local government and the global NGO.

1 Introduction

"We live in an era in which the demand for governance arising from human-environment interactions or, more broadly, the quest for sustainable development is growing, while confidence in the capacity of government – the conventional mechanism for handling such matters – to address problems of governance is waning"

- Young & Delmas, 2009: 3

1.1 Nature conservation in weak states

Currently, one of the major global environmental problems is the loss of biodiversity. The stability of the ecosystem earth is dependent on the presence of a diverse natural environment. Biodiversity is in this way of vital importance to life on earth. Despite the increased efforts to protect the earth's natural ecosystems the past years, global biodiversity loss is still not slowing down (Butchard, et al., 2010). Therefore, it is interesting to investigate how high biodiversity areas are being governed currently.

Most of the world's biodiversity occurs within developing countries. These places, identified as containing priority areas for conservation show lower governance scores than other nations (Smith, et al., 2003). Especially in small less developed states, governments are subject to several disadvantages. They face a limited policy capacity, self-interest and corruption among politicians and small domestic markets which make them vulnerable to international market changes (Mol, et al., 2004). Although the protection of the environment is a state responsibility, most of these countries are unable to manage their nature and environment properly (Mol, et al., 2004). However, the protection of these high biodiversity areas is increasingly an issue of global concern; it exceeds the borders of the nation-state. Accordingly, the presence and influence of international nongovernmental organizations aimed at protecting the earth's biodiversity has increased rapidly since the 1990s. These conservation NGOs moved from backstage to the center of international policy making, as they are increasingly setting the global conservation agenda (Rodriguez, et al., 2007). Although most of these NGOs originated in Europe or North America, most of their activities take place in high biodiversity areas in the less developed tropics (Brechin & Jamboracic, 2010). In this way it is interesting examine the cooperation between such a global NGO and the government institutions of such a weak state. Do these institutions successfully complement each other to protect biodiversity in an effective way? What are the challenges and opportunities that arise from this cooperation? To find answers on these questions this study will focus on the cooperation between an international conservation NGO and the government of a small state in development; Suriname.

1.2 Suriname in a changing world

Suriname, located on the northern coast of South America (Image 1) is home to large areas of undisturbed tropical rainforests of global importance. With a population of only 500.000 people,

it is the most thinly populated country of the continent. Most of these inhabitants, approximately 90%, live in the coastal area and 70% of this amount lives in the capital Paramaribo (CIA, 2010). Suriname's land is mainly covered by tropical rainforest, which takes up 80% of the surface. Because only a small percentage of the population lives in the interior, the tropical forests are still in an undisturbed state. Suriname is a unique country in multiple respects. It is richly endowed with several natural resources such as gold, bauxite, oil and wood. Also, Suriname has a unique multi-ethnic society. Because of its slave history, different population groups like the Indians, Hindustanis, Creoles, Javanese, Chinese and Europeans inhabit the country. The Surinamese culture, political system and educational system are largely influenced by the Dutch, who colonized the country between 1667 and 1975 (Colchester, 1995). In recent years, global environmental problems and globalization play an increasing role in the development of Suriname. The biodiversity crisis and the rapid loss of tropical rainforests have caused an increasing international interest in the remaining undisturbed forests (Mol, et al., 2004). Already from the early 1990s the international interest in Surinamese forests arose. Mittermeier (1990) stated 'there is probably a better chance of conserving large tracts of undisturbed rainforest wilderness in Suriname than virtually anywhere else on earth' (in: Colchester, 1995: 7). In this way, different international NGOs became active in the country to assist the government with the protection of their tropical forests. One of these NGOs is 'Conservation International' (hereafter called CI), currently one of the largest conservation organizations globally. This Washington DC based organization was formed in 1987 and by 1992 their first office was opened in Paramaribo. One of the major projects of CI in Suriname was the assistance with the establishment of a large protected area; the Central Suriname Nature Reserve (hereafter called CSNR). This 1.6 million hectare (ha) reserve of global importance increased the protected areas surface in Suriname from 3% to 13% of its land. The cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government with the formation and management of the reserve will be central to this study. It is aimed to investigate how nature is currently governed in these high biodiversity areas, how effective the cooperation between the NGO and the government is, and what challenges and opportunities arise from this cooperation.



Image 1 Map of Suriname (Source: <http://wdfmd.blogspot.com>)

1.3 Problem description

Environmental problems like biodiversity loss are increasingly taking place on an international scale and are increasingly of global common concern. Most of the biodiversity however is located in places where states are unable to protect their natural environment properly. The governments of these weak states increasingly have to deal with issues that take place on an international level. At the same time, international NGOs have become influential in these countries to protect global biodiversity. Not much is known about the practice of these new conditions for nature conservation. How do the global NGO and the local government cooperate with each other? Does the cooperation result in successful nature conservation practices? What new governance arrangements emerge from the current nature conservation conditions? To investigate these questions, the nature conservation practice in Suriname, where CI got involved with the protection of a globally important biodiversity area will be central to the study. The focus will be on the cooperation between the Surinamese government and CI. Therefore, the following research question will be central to this study:

How did the cooperation between Conservation International and the Surinamese Government affect the conservation practices in Suriname?

This central question will guide the study and forms the basis from which the empirical data is gathered and analyzed. The study will examine the cooperation between a global NGO and a local government in order to explore new governance arrangements resulting from the current nature conservation conditions.

1.4 Reading guide

First the methods will be described in chapter 2, the research design, the data collection methods, and the data analysis are explained. Chapter 3 will present the conceptual frame which will place the study in the context of recent literature. Thereafter, the chapters 4 and 5 will present a baseline to the study; a description of the local nature conservation practices in Suriname and an introduction to CI Washington and CI Suriname. In chapter 6 the process of the CSNR formation is explained. Chapter 7 will explore the CSNR management procedures and bottlenecks. Then chapter 8 will investigate the effects of the CSNR formation, the constraints of management implementation and the role of CI. The following chapter will analyze the empirical data framed by the theories and guided by the research questions presented in the conceptual frame. And finally in chapter 10 the conclusions and recommendations of this study are presented.

2 Methodology of the study

To illustrate how this research is designed, this chapter will describe the used methodology. The choices for the different methods are explained. First the qualitative character of this study will be argued. Thereafter the choice for the case study of the CSNR will be explained. Finally a description of how the data was collected and analysed will follow.

2.1 Qualitative research

Qualitative research generally aims to ‘describe, interpret and declare the behavior, experiences, perception and “products” of the involved people through methods which minimize the effect on the natural environment’ (Boeije, et al., 2009: 253). This study explores the resulting governance arrangements from new nature conservation conditions between a large conservation NGO and the government of a small state in development. A case study of the CSNR was chosen, with the focus on the cooperation of CI and the Surinamese government. In this regard both the establishment as well as the management of the reserve was analyzed. In order to understand how these decision making and management processes work, it is necessary to address the perception and experiences of the different involved stakeholders. Qualitative research is focused on the meaning that people give to their social reality (Boeije, et al., 2009). This study was therefore designed as a qualitative analysis. This enabled a flexible method of data collection, where the research was adapted to the circumstances in the field in order to get the most relevant information. In this way the main data collection method was the conduction of qualitative interviews. This will be further elaborated in this chapter in the section on information sources.

2.2 The case study

As already mentioned, this study was set up as a case study of CI and the CSNR in Suriname. This section will first explain the choice for a case study as a study strategy, thereafter the selection of this specific case study will be explained. The section will finally conclude with a description of how the case study was approached.

In general, a case study method allows the researcher to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events (Yin, 2003). This study aims to explore new governance arrangements resulting from nature conservation conditions in the current age of globalization. It tries to explain the real-life situation of increasingly dominant international NGOs and the effects on the local policy making in a small developing state. Therefore, a more in-depth analysis of the characteristics of the large conservation NGO and the effects in the state of Suriname is necessary. A single case study allows the researcher to study the background of events, relations and decisions in more detail. Case studies are often used for exploratory research, to answer a ‘how’ or ‘why’ research question (Yin, 2003). This study will be of an exploratory nature and in the CSNR case the background of events, relations and decisions will be important for the understanding of the newly emerging governance arrangements. Because

of these study characteristics, this study is designed as a case study. The case study will both be descriptive as well as explanatory, it describes the developments which have been taking place concerning the CSNR and it analyzes the newly emerging governance arrangements between CI and the Surinamese government.

The choice for the case of CI and the CSNR in Suriname has different reasons. First, this case is chosen in a specific context, the country of Suriname. As already described, most international NGOs originate in Western countries like the United States or Europe, while their activities mainly take place in the less developed countries in the tropics. Especially small states face disadvantages of governance and are unable to protect their environment properly. Suriname is such a small state in development, home to large parts of tropical rainforest of global importance. Their government institutions for protecting nature are weak, while international conservation NGOs also aim to protect their national forests. The case of the CSNR illustrates the difference of policies and implementation strategies between the government institutions and the international NGO. It also shows the backgrounds and the consequences of the tension in this relationship. Secondly, the study aims to investigate the consequences of new global conditions for nature conservation on a local level. With these new conditions, the increased presence of international conservation NGOs in states where the position of the national government is under threat, are meant. Because both CI and the Surinamese government are central actors regarding the CSNR, this case is appropriate to study their relationship.

The case study will be approached as an example of how an international NGO operates in a small developing state like Suriname. With both global developments and the context of small less developed states as a background, the case will focus on the cooperation between the government of Suriname and CI. The empirical data will be used to draw a picture of what happened concerning the formation and the management of the CSNR. The analysis of this data will be done on the basis of the conceptual framework presented in the next chapter.

2.3 Information sources

The information used for this study is obtained from different sources. This section will explain from which sources the data originates and what methods were used to collect the information. Thereafter a more elaborate description will be provided on the interviewing method, because this was the main method of data collection.

To collect the data in a viable and reliable way, different data sources and collection methods were used. This use of multiple sources in a corroboratory mode is called triangulation, which provides a more convincing and accurate finding or conclusion of any case study (Yin, 2009). First, a literature study was done to identify the research objectives and research questions. This data was collected by a search in the university library and on the internet for scientific sources on the theoretical background of the research. Articles about global transforming governance trends, the developments of large conservation NGOs and governance in small states in development formed a basis for the field study. After this literature study and the identification of research objectives, it was time for the data collection in Suriname. The second and most important data collection method was the conduction of qualitative interviews with the involved stakeholders of the CSNR. The actors concerned with the establishment and management of the CSNR were interviewed. How these actors were selected and approached will be described below. Thirdly, the major texts, documents and other written sources relevant

to the CSNR formation and management were studied. Examples of these documents are the CSNR plan for Management (in two versions), reports of stakeholder meetings and the MoU between CI and the Surinamese government. These documents were used both to complement and verify the obtained information from the qualitative interviews. Finally, observation of the study area was used to complement and verify data, but also to improve the researchers' imaging of the activities and processes concerning the CSNR. Some additional conversations with involved persons in the CSNR process were also used to increase the researchers' understanding of the events and developments concerning the CSNR.

2.4 Data collection

The field study was directed to investigate what had happened in Suriname concerning the CSNR establishment and management, and the role of CI in this process. To this end, the study started with an inventory of key persons involved in these developments. With the assistance of the head of the environmental studies department of the Anton de Kom University, a list of the main contacts was made. A letter with the request for an interview was sent to these key persons. After the first appointments and interviews, the snowball method was used to select the other informants. Each interview concluded with the question for other informants who could provide more information on the research topic. As a formal sampling method, snowball sampling is known to have some serious biases, such as the inclusion of those who have many interrelationships with other individuals (Snijders, 2003). However, in this study the snowball method was not used to select a sample population in order to generalize the results to a whole population. Here the method was used to gather the main information about the management and establishment of the CSNR and the role of CI herewith. In this way, after each interview, the gathered information was processed and on this basis, new interviews were planned. The knowledge of the researcher on the topic increased during the fieldwork. Therefore, the prepared questions were improved, more detailed and directed toward the gaps of knowledge as the interviewing proceeded. Furthermore, the selection of the different respondents was based on the complete representation of all the involved stakeholders in the CSNR process. In total, approximately forty-two respondents from different institutions were interviewed for this research. In table 1 can be seen how many respondents from each institution were interviewed. In Appendix 1, a more detailed overview of the respondents is presented.

2.5 Interviewing method

To be able to construct a complete picture of what had happened concerning the CSNR, the interviews with the respondents were of a qualitative nature. Qualitative interviewing can be defined as 'asking questions and prompting conversation in order to gain information and understanding of social phenomena and attitudes' (Waliman, 2006: 131). As already described, for this research it was important to gather the perspectives and attitudes of the different stakeholders. In this way it was possible to analyze the background of the events and the cooperation between CI and the local actors. Therefore, the interviewing method used was the semi-structured interview, which means that the prepared questions were used as a guide for the interview. All the interviews were prepared separately for each respondent.

Table 1 The number of respondents from different institutions and stakeholders

Institution / Stakeholder	Number of Respondents	Remarks
Forest Service of the Surinamese Government	7	Including the head of the Forest Service and two game keepers of the Nature Conservation Division
Project Implementation Unit	1	
STINASU	6	Including the former director of STINASU at the time the CSNR was established
Surinam's President and Minister of Natural Resources in 1998	2	Mr. Wijdenbosch and Mr. Alibux
Conservation International	3	Including the current director of CI Suriname
Suriname Conservation Foundation	1	Respondent also first director of CI Suriname
Anton de Kom University Suriname (ADEKUS)	3	
Employees Raleighvallen	3	One group interview and an individual interview with the manager
Villagers of Witagron and Kaaimanston	10	Including two Captains and one Basja of the village
Tropenbos	1	Respondent involved in the TEAM project of CI
Environmental journalist	1	Respondent reported on the CSNR
Touroperators	2	
WWF	1	Director of WWF Suriname
Anonymous respondent	1	
Total	42	

The preparation consisted of an introduction of the researcher and the research, a few key topics and a set of questions (See Appendix 2 for an interview example). These key topics were selected after the first exploratory interviews of which most were included in all the interviews. These topics existed of the formation of the CSNR, the management of the reserve, the effects of the CSNR formation and the role of CI. The interviews were carried out in a flexible way; the questions were adjusted to the knowledge of the respondent in order to get the most relevant information. Likewise, the semi-structured nature of the interview created the opportunity to deviate from the fixed questions if the interviewee appeared to have more (in depth) knowledge on (other) relevant topics. Advantages of this interview method are that the investigator received the required information, the interview could focus straight to the point, and follow-up questions on specific topics and causal relations could be asked (Yin, 2003). On the other hand, disadvantages of the semi-structured interview are that bias could occur because of badly formulated questions, reflexivity as a result of the respondent responding what the researcher wants to hear and inaccuracies because of bad memory (Yin, 2003). These disadvantages were avoided by the composition of open-ended questions where plenty of room was created for the interviewee to respond as desired. Furthermore, most interviews were recorded and a report was composed within a short timeframe after the interview.

2.6 Analysis

This section will describe the way the interviews and the other gathered data were analyzed, processed in this thesis and linked to the conceptual frame.

At the start of the analysis first the main topics of interest for the report were identified. These topics became already apparent during the data collection. Therefore, they match the key topics of the interviews mentioned before; the formation of the CSNR, the management of the reserve, the effects of the CSNR formation and the role of CI. Every subject was linked to a color, to be able to mark the interviews. All the interview reports were checked on the presence of statements or passages on the mentioned topics. These sentences were marked in the matching color of the subject. Thereafter, an overview for each of the four topics was made with all the statements of the respondents in the matching color. These overviews were studied, while the general line of argument and specific illustrating statements were distilled from the interview reports. In this way, a few important topics of interest to the study were selected and analyzed on the basis of the interviews in chapter 8. Thereafter, in chapter 9 the empirical data was analyzed in theoretical terms on the basis of the conceptual frame. The analytical framework was used to conceptualize the developments regarding the CSNR. The cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government was analyzed and the effectiveness of this cooperation was evaluated on the basis of the protected area formation effects as well as the effects of protected area management. The challenges and opportunities were found by analyzing the events and characteristics of the cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government.

3 Conceptual framework

To position this research in the context of the recent literature, this chapter will describe a conceptual framework. Here, the theoretical context of the research will be presented, the main concepts will be explained and the chapter will conclude with an analysis scheme. This conceptual frame will form the basis of the analysis of the empirical data, in chapter 9.

3.1 Transforming governance

Recently governance conditions and the context for policy making are transforming. The global era in which we live gives new conditions to the way in which policy making is conducted. There are two important developments, relevant to the present research described in the literature. First, the role of nation-states as sovereign entities for decision making is changing (Castells, 2000a). Governments are increasingly taking part in transnational, polycentric networks of governance. Solutions for pressing problems cannot be found within the boundaries of sovereign polities anymore (Hajer, 2003). Ulrich Beck also states that critical issues of current policy making in every country are largely produced and shaped by globally interdependent processes that move beyond sovereign state territories (Beck, 2006). Although it is said that the globalization of policies reduces the role of the sovereign nation-state, Jänicke (2006) emphasizes that their role has changed, not diminished. 'States remain an important actor in environmental governance although the nature of the tasks at hand and the ways in which they must be fulfilled have changed over time' (Jänicke, 2006:83). Also Eckersley (2005) confirms this view and even argues that democratic states, despite globalization shifts, still have more steering capacity and legitimacy to regulate activities along ecological sustainable lines in more systematic ways than any non-state alternative. The current transformation of governance conditions is formulated by Ulrich Beck (2006) in the following way:

What we are witnessing in the global age is not the end of politics but rather its migration elsewhere. The structure of opportunities for political action is no longer defined by national / international dualism but is now located in the 'global' arena. Global politics have turned into global domestic politics which rob national politics of their boundaries and foundations (Beck, 2006: 249).

Processes of globalization influence the conditions for policy making in sovereign states, as globally interdependent processes increasingly determine day to day issues of peoples and their governments. Castells also sees the role of the nation-state as power apparatus profoundly changing. According to his 'network society' theory, government institutions take part in an international network in which decisions are negotiated by various actors. As key decisions increasingly have a global frame, the role of the nation-state becomes less relevant (Castells, 2000b).

Next to the changing role of the nation-state, there is a second relevant transformation in governance mechanisms today. This transformation is the rise of the global civil society as a key player in global governance. The global civil society can be defined as 'the sphere of cross-border relations and activities carried out by collective actors that are independent from governments and private firms, operating outside the international reach of states and markets' (Pianta & Silva, 2003:6). These civil society groups are non-state actors, mostly organized in NGOs. The past decade the number of NGOs increased rapidly while they moved from backstage to center stage in world politics (McGann & Johnstone, 2006). As argued above, the ability of traditional nation-based institutions to manage the world's problems on a global scale decreased. This development induced the rise of a global civil society (Castells, 2008). Mc Arthur formulates this transformation as follows:

As governance redefined itself as a phenomenon taking place within international political spheres increasingly committed to the advancement of global issues, traditional governments, bound by old borders, were unable to project their governing capabilities across those borders with the same agility that non-state actors could (McArthur, 2006: 55).

In this way, the opportunity for non-state actors to engage and influence international politics in global issues is increased. NGOs function as change agents in governance mechanisms, in which they (co)constitute new social realities, including multiple, intertwined scales of activism and political regulation (Arts, 2008). A clear example of this is directly connected to the theme of this research; NGOs were the first to globalize the issue of deforestation, when governments failed to agree upon international regulation, NGOs took over the initiative (Arts, 2008). In this way, policy making increasingly becomes an outcome of a complex interaction process between state and non-state actors. This development is also conceptualized by the theory of the 'sociology of flows' (Mol & Spaargaren, 2006), which questions the role of the state as regulator of externalities and protection of collective goods. According to this theory, there is a growing importance of uncontrollable and unpredictable global fluids, and therefore individual agencies such as governments become interpreters rather than legislators of a changing nature and environment (Mol & Spaargaren, 2006).

These two relevant developments on a global level – the transformed role of the nation-state and the rise of NGOs – can be seen as the current conditions in which nature conservation takes place on a local level.

3.2 Conservation NGOs

As stated in the introduction, originally national governments are assigned to protect and provide public goods. Nature is such a public good which used to be protected by governments. However, as the problem of nature conservation is increasingly a problem which exceeds national borders, internationally oriented non state actors have become more important players in dealing with this problem. The involvement of environmental NGOs and other civil society groups in global governance has expanded rapidly since the 1990s. This development is explained by various factors, from the development of the information technology to the greater awareness of global interdependence to the spread of democracy (Gemmil & Bamidele-

Izu, 2002). Although this development took place in the global civil society movement as a whole, the focus here will be on conservation NGOs. These conservation NGOs can be defined as non-state actors who aim to 'promote the needs and sustained existence of wildlife, biodiversity, habitat, wild lands and protected areas (such as national parks)' (Brockington & Scholfield, 2010:1). These organizations entered a period of professionalization and membership growth in the early 1990s. For example, in the US, between 1980 and mid-1990, the total constituency of three large conservation organizations (the National Audubon Society, Greenpeace and World Wildlife Fund) together increased from half a million to more than three million. While in the Netherlands Greenpeace, WWF and the largest conservation group quintupled their total constituency from 400 000 to two million (van der Heijden, 2002). As these conservation NGOs increased and professionalized, their role in global conservation governance became more important. These NGOs are increasingly setting the global conservation agenda (Rodriquez et al., 2007). As the agendas of conservation NGOs became more influential, their budgets increased and their activities rapidly grew, questions of legitimacy and accountability of these organizations rose. Jepson points out, 'from the outside these NGOs look and act increasingly like a morph between transnational corporations and government development agencies' (2005: 516). As a result the same concerns of public accountability are directed to these 'green' NGOs as were previously directed to other primary sectors in society (Jepson, 2005). In recent literature, conservation NGOs have received a great deal of comment and debate. Opinions on their activities can be sharply divided. Brockington and Scholfield (2010) summarize the critiques of the deficiencies of conservation NGOs as follows:

These critiques accuse the NGOs concerned of growing too powerful, concentrating funds and influence and getting unhealthily close to larger corporations and oppressive states, while ignoring grass-roots environmentalist groups who could be good allies in fights to protect places from dams or mines (2010:2).

The debate on conservation NGOs is mainly concentrated on two topics mentioned in this quote; the involvement of local and social values in conservation projects and the partnering of NGOs with large corporations. Romero and Andrade (2002) express for example their principal concern that the societal values of forests in less-developed countries will be distorted because of the asymmetric relationship between large conservation NGOs and the local institutions. Rodriguez et al. (2007: 756) also state that 'leadership in conservation has to be decentralized and better integrated in local conditions'. It is argued that conservation is as much a social issue as an ecological one, emphasizing that regardless of the role of local communities, a broader approach to thinking about conservation as an ethical social process is required (Lele et al., 2010). Next to these arguments, the cooperation of conservation NGOs with large corporations is also being discussed. Accordingly, Brechin and Jamboracic (2010) explore the financial corporate support acquired by three large conservation NGOs. He concludes that the \$900 million transferred from private sector to these NGOs between 1993 and 2005 reflects mostly a long-term business strategy known as Corporate Social Responsibility as a response to concerns of accountability. Chapin (2004: 30) expresses also his concerns about these relationships, where he states:

NGOs entrusted with the enormous responsibility of defending the planet's natural ecosystems against the encroachment of the modern world in its most destructive manifestations have increasingly partnered with – and become dependent on – many of the corporations and governments that are most aggressively making this encroachment (2004: 30).

This line of argument is shared by other authors, as Brockington points out that the power of major conservation NGOs is growing while there is a concern that these NGOs have become too closely allied to corporate interests and fail to oppose some initiatives because they rely on the companies involved (Brockington, 2008).

On the other hand, there are also authors who emphasize the strengths and possibilities of large conservation NGOs. Gemmil and Bamidele-Izu (2002) stress for example the strengths of the NGO community. They mention their creativity, flexibility, entrepreneurial nature, and capacity for vision and long-term thinking which sets them often apart from governmental bodies. Furthermore, the above described critiques on large conservation NGOs are only limited substantiated with empirical evidence. As Brockington and Scholfield (2010) state, the debates on conservation NGOs are vitiated by a lack of good data on the nature and activities of the sector. The local practice of the large conservation NGOs has not been studied extensively. Therefore, this study will question these critiques and contribute to empirical data from the work of a large conservation NGO.

3.3 Developing nation-states

As the involvement of large conservation NGOs in world politics grew, their activities on a local level also increased. The conservation activities of these global NGOs mainly take place in nation-states located in the tropics. As stated in the introduction, these countries with high levels of biodiversity are mostly located in the developing world (Smith, et al., 2003). The locations are often social and political 'hotbeds' – places where levels of poverty are high, land tenure and landlessness is insecure, political systems are unstable and/or undemocratic and histories of state-sponsored repression (Brechin, et al., 2002). Most NGOs operating in this context, find their roots in 'western' states in Europe or America. Therefore, the above described developments of a changing role of national governments and a rising civil society should be placed in this context. As Brechin states 'while the conservation movement is certainly not responsible for these conditions, individual interventions aimed at nature protection produce a range of social impacts that can exacerbate rather than alleviate social justice problems' (2002: 44). In this way, the protection of globally important nature areas is complicated by the local governance context. Bierman and Dingwerth (2004) argue that states need to mobilize additional capacities to respond to the consequences of a rapidly changing world. However, the countries with the least resources have the least capacity to adapt and are the most vulnerable. Especially in small states, governance is dependent on external economic powers whereby local nature conservation policies are subject to these international economic developments (Mol, et al., 2004). At the same time, these countries hardly have any influence on policy making at the international level compared to larger powerful states (Mol, et al., 2004). Small developing states face therefore several disadvantages and have fewer resources to deal with increasing global pressures. Nation-states with the least resources and the least

capacity are the most vulnerable and suffer most from increasing global environmental pressures (Bierman & Dingwerth, 2004). Governments in these countries depend largely on the presence of international actors for dealing with international issues.

However, there are hardly any empirical studies who investigate the cooperation between a global conservation NGO and a local government in such a high biodiversity state. The consequences of the transformed conditions for nature conservation are especially in these places relevant to study. Therefore, this study will aim to contribute to increased knowledge on what governance arrangements arise from current transformed conservation conditions in high biodiversity with weak governmental institutions.

3.4 Conservation in developing states: local government & global NGO

The loss of biodiversity is increasingly of global concern. However, most of the earth's biodiversity is located in states where government institutions are weak and the state lacks the ability for proper natural resource management. As the issue increasingly takes place on an international level, the management of the problem exceeds the capacity of these local governments. At the same time, global conservation NGOs positioned themselves as influential players in global governance. These NGOs enter the developing nation-states with high biodiversity areas and cooperate with local governments. However, these large conservation NGOs have received a great deal of critiques in recent literature; they would partner with large corporations and ignore local social values with their conservation activities.

How these global conservation NGOs cooperate with the local government of a high biodiversity state is largely unknown. Therefore, this study will aim to explore new governance arrangements resulting from these transformed nature conservation conditions. To this end, the central question presented in the introduction, will be specified in the following research questions on the basis of the conceptual frame.

Research questions

1. How are the current conditions for nature conservation manifested in the cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government?
2. What effects did the cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government had on nature conservation practices in Suriname?
3. What challenges or opportunities arise from the current nature conservation conditions regarding the cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government?
4. What can on the basis of this study be recommended theoretically for future research and practically to the conservation institutions in Suriname?

These questions will guide the analysis of the transformed governance conditions in Suriname in chapter 9. The scheme below presents an analytical framework with the main study components and influences (Figure 1). The current conservation conditions affect the cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government (question 1), which has an influence on the conservation practice in Suriname. The resulting nature conservation practice in Suriname can be studied by the effects of protected area formation and management which are the effectiveness indicators (question 2). The arising challenges and opportunities arising from

this cooperation (question 3) and the contribution to the literature on large conservation NGOs (question 4) will result from the analysis of the first two questions.




Figure 1 Schematic representation of study components and influences

4 Nature Conservation in Suriname

To provide a base line to the study, this chapter will describe the local conservation policy and practices of Suriname. The local conservation governance practice before CI got involved will be described. The history, legislation, policies and procedures of nature conservation in Suriname will be illustrated.

4.1 Conservation history

The largest part of Suriname's land is covered with forests, approximately 90-95%. Before the arrival of colonizers, this forest was used by indigenous population only for slash and burn cultivation and associated hunting and fishing activities (Lette, et al., 1998). After the arrival of the Dutch colonizers in 1667, the high demand for forest as trade products reoriented the forest management of Suriname.

In 1947 the Surinamese forest service was established under the name of *Lands Bos Beheer (LBB)*, which became responsible for the management of forest areas in Suriname, mainly targeted at the forests in the coastal areas. Because of the economic upturn after the Second World War, the forest production increasingly mechanized. From that time, the forest service institute grew and functioned as an example for the rest of South America (Valk & Ho in Mol, et al., 2004). At that time, the CELOS management system, an experimental system to regenerate forests in order to create sustainable yields, was developed by Dutch and Surinamese researchers (Colchester, 1995). In 1969 STINASU was established, the Foundation for Nature Conservation Suriname (*Stichting Natuurbehoud Suriname*). This foundation is committed to nature education, it facilitates scientific research to improve conservation and they promote and support tourism in the protected areas (STINASU, 2002). The organization was founded as a Quango (semi-NGO), linked to the forest service of the government¹. This construction made it possible to invest financial means directly in the protected areas where they were obtained instead of flowing back to public treasury. In this way, Suriname was one of the first countries to conduct this early form of nature tourism¹.

The nature conservation activities in Suriname started with the establishment of several protected areas, ranging from tropical forests to coastal formations (Conservation International, 1998). Prior to 1975 already nine protected areas were created, of which four along the coast and five in the interior. The selection of these areas was mainly based on the presence of important flora, fauna, geological and cultural features (Baal, 1998). In the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, both STINASU as the forest service of the Surinamese government were organized very well. Internationally they were recognized for their work. Suriname was for example one of the first countries who set up sea turtle conservation¹. However, in the mid-eighties the war in the interior destroyed most of the conservation infrastructure and institutions. These riots in the interior, as well as an unstable political situation and severe economic crisis have had a negative impact on nature conservation activities (Baal, 1998). From

¹ Interview Mr. H.Sijlbing, Former director of STINASU (1997-2003), 01-11-2011

the early nineties the institutions were rebuilt with the support of international and foreign funds. This was also the time when the international conservation organizations were founded in Suriname². They contributed to the strengthening of nature conservation institutions and initiated conservation projects in Suriname.

4.2 Legislation

Nature conservation in Suriname is founded by the early established Nature Preservation Law of 1954. This law provides a basis to protect Suriname's natural richness by the designation of grounds and waters as nature reserve (Nature Preservation Law, 1954). It recognizes that establishing protected areas is important to scientific knowledge, recreation and education as well as for ethical and economic reasons. To be designated as a nature reserve, an area must deserve protection by the government because of its varied nature and scenic beauty; and/or because of the presence of important flora, fauna or geological objects – according to Article 2 of this law. The third Article of the Nature Preservation Law states that the management of nature reserves is the responsibility of the Head of the Forest Department of the Government, who acquires advice from the Nature Protection Commission. This Commission was established to study conservation issues and to propose legislation concerning nature conservation. Accordingly, they initiated the Nature Preservation Law of 1954. Although the Nature Protection Commission still functions officially, their presence is hardly noticeable (Bruining et al., 1977).

Another relevant law to nature conservation in Suriname is the Hunting Law of 1973, in which all wildlife animals, like mammals, bird and sea turtles are protected. In the hunting order, these animals are categorized and hunting seasons are mentioned. Because of practical reasons, this law is only operative in the North and North-West of Suriname (STINASU, 2002). The Police Code of 1915 preceded the hunting law. This law contained a mechanism to establish areas where hunting and capturing of wildlife is forbidden if no permits are issued (Baal, 1998). Furthermore, the Planning Law of 1973 underlined the importance of protected areas. Article 3 of this law indicates the necessity to create spatial conditions for the maintenance of a sound living environment, by securing for instance nature reserves and recreational spaces (Baal, 1998). It also provides a mechanism to establish special management areas. The law on Forest Management (1992) provides the possibility to establish protected forests, such as 'forest shelter belts', 'specially protected forest' and 'preliminary maintained forest' (STINASU, 2002). This law replaced the Timber Law of 1947, which authorized the forest service to manage certain areas as forest reserves (Baal, 1998). However, it was not always possible to avoid the designation of protected areas inhabited by local communities. They claimed their 'traditional' rights and interests in the proposed protected areas. Therefore, in 1986 the Nature Protection Act explicitly included that the 'traditional' rights and interests of the people living in and around the protected forest areas would be maintained (STINASU, 2002).

² Interview Mr. H.Sijlbing, Former director of STINASU (1997-2003), 01-11-2011

Institutionalization of Protected Areas

To designate a protected area, it must be included as a resolution in the Nature Preservation Law.

However, before this decision is taken a formal procedure with several steps should be followed.

According to Mr. Baal, these steps proceed as follows:

1. The proposal is prepared by the forest service of the government, with the positive advice of the nature protection commission.
2. The proposal is sent to the Minister of the Ministry of Spatial Planning, Land use and Forest management (previously the Ministry of Natural Resources was responsible).
3. The proposal is discussed by the council of Ministers.
4. The approved proposal is sent to the President by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
5. The President discusses the proposal with the State Council (advice commission).
6. If the President approved the proposal with a signature, it will be sent back to the Ministry of Internal affairs for publication³.

Box 1 Institutionalization of Protected Areas (Source: Interview with Mr. Baal³)

Next to these laws, in 1990 a Conservation Action Plan for Suriname (CAPS) was published, with the assistance of national and international agencies. The report contained a plan for conservation activities and projects during the period 1991-1995, while it was aimed to ensure the maintenance of Suriname's excellent protected area network and overall conservation program (CAPS, 1990).

4.3 Protected areas

As stated above, nature conservation in Suriname was mainly based on the establishment of protected areas. This is illustrated by the first attempt of nature conservation in Suriname in 1942. A game sanctuary was established to protect nesting scarlet ibis and other birds in the Coppename River estuary (Schulz, et al., 1977). From 1954, the Nature Protection Law functioned as a cornerstone to designate more nature reserves. These first conservation activities were mainly focused on the habitat protection of certain animal species, like red ibis, sea turtles and the deer zip³. By 1975 already nine nature reserves were established by the government, covering almost half a million ha (Bruining, et al., 1977). As stated above, the selection of these reserves was mainly based on the presence of important flora, fauna and geological cultural features, rather than on a systematic and scientific inventory of the area (Baal, 1998). Between 1974 and 1977 the first comprehensive study was conducted, mapping the ecosystems in the lowlands of Suriname. On the basis of this inventory by Drs. P. Teunissen, six new areas were proposed to be qualified as nature reserve and four areas as forest reserves (STINASU, 2002). Next to the presence of important flora, fauna and geological cultural features, the following criteria were used to select these areas:

- The total system of protected areas should contain all known ecosystems.
- The protection of a small number of large areas with a maximum diversity of ecosystems is preferable over the protection of a large number of small areas, which contain fewer ecosystems.

³ Interview Mr. F. Baal, Former head of the Conservation Division of the Government, 29-11-2010

Republic of Suriname Protected Areas




Figure 2 Protected Areas of Suriname, 2003 (Source: CELOS & Narena)

- The protected areas should be, as much as possible, evenly distributed between current and future cultural landscapes.
- With the selection of protected areas, one should take the realistic possibility of 'acquisition' (political, juridical, financial and social aspects) and 'conservation' (management- and feasibility-aspects) of the selected areas into account (Teunissen in Baal & Mohadin, 1997).

Furthermore, with the selection of the proposed areas it was attempted that the areas would be located on larger tracts of public lands and that they would include upper reaches of creeks and rivers, in order to safeguard them from pollution caused by development activities in surrounding areas (Baal, 1998). In Box 1 the process of how the protected areas are usually institutionalized in Suriname is described.

As shown in Figure 2, Suriname's nature conservation system compromises currently twelve protected areas and four multiple use management areas (MUMA's). The areas contain a large diversity of ecosystems, coastal formations and tropical forests. Five of these areas are nature reserves located in the coastal area: Hertenrits, Coppename-monding, WiaWia, Galibi and Peruvia. Three nature reserves are located on the border between the ancient coastal plain and the savanna belt: Boven-Coesewijne, Copi and Wane-kreek. In the interior, there are three nature reserves and one Nature Park: the Brinckheuvel nature reserve, the CSNR, the Sipaliwini nature reserve and the nature park Brownsberg (STINASU, 2002). The four proposed protected areas are located in the west of Suriname. Furthermore, there are four multiple use management areas located in the coastal area. Because of the multifunctional character of these areas, a special form of management is desired. For example conservation of economical, public health, and cultural functions need special management plans to safeguard these values and provide maximum profit for the community (Bruining, et al., 1977).

The responsibility for the management of the protected areas lies with the forest service of the government. From 1963, the service was extended with the Nature Conservation Division (hereafter called NCD), assigned with the task to run the daily management of the nature reserves. However, the already limited infrastructure and equipment capacity of the forest service and the NCD were affected by the economic problems and the war in the interior in the mid-eighties. Since that time, the institutions face a lack of person power and an adequate budget which results in a continuing shortage in means of transportation (vehicles, boats, outboard motors and fuel). The lack of qualified people is mainly due to the very low government salaries, and lack of financial incentives to stimulate fieldwork in remote areas (Draft CAPS, 2001). With the management of protected areas the NCD in general aims to both develop the area as well as meet the needs of the people living in and around the forest (Baal & Mohadin, 1997). Most reserves are aimed to be managed on the basis of a management plan, with the involvement of the local communities. However, due to the poor working conditions in the forest service of the government, the NCD has not been able to adequately control the protected areas (Draft CAPS, 2001). Next to their national efforts to protect their environment, Suriname is also involved in international treaties and agreements; see Box 2.

International Conservation Cooperation

Suriname participates both in global and regional agreements that recognize the vital need for environmental protection. The republic of Suriname participates in the following conventions:

- The Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere (Western Hemisphere Convention);
- The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (1971);
- The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (1973);
- The Convention on Biological Diversity (1992);
- The Amazon Cooperative Treaty;
- The Convention on Climate Change (1992); and
- The Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972).

Furthermore, Suriname participates in bilateral agreements with Brazil, Guyana, and Venezuela. And the Forest Service and STINASU cooperate with several international organizations, such as World Wild Fund for Nature, the World Conservation Union (IUCN), Conservation International (CI), and the Institute for Nature Management (RIN) in the Netherlands (Baal, 1998).

Box 2 International Conservation Cooperation (Source: Baal, 1998)

5 Conservation International introduced

Because the NGO CI is central to the study, this chapter will provide background information about this organization. Next to their general history, mission and finances, the organizations' origins and activities in Suriname will also be described. To be able to place this information in a context, the chapter will start with a general introduction, on the growth of the three largest conservation NGOs. In this way this chapter complements the previous chapter on nature conservation in Suriname, to complete the base line context in which this study is conducted.

5.1 Emerging conservation organizations

In the 1990s several conservation NGOs were established and grew in a short period to professional organizations. The three largest conservation NGOs currently are the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and CI. The largest of the three is the WWF, which was founded in 1961. The organization started with coordination and fundraising activities for the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) (Chapin, 2004). From the early 1980s WWF grew rapidly and with fifty offices and about five million members the WWF network is currently the largest environmental organization on the planet (Brechin, 2009). In the mid-1940s, TNC started up to protect nature areas in the United States (Chapin, 2004). The Washington DC based organization has grown to become the wealthiest environmental organization in the world, with an operating budget of US \$900 million [2005] on a yearly basis (Brechin, 2009).

The youngest of the three, CI, was founded in 1987 by Spencer Beebe and Peter Seligman in Washington DC. Their mission was to conserve the earth's living heritage and its global biodiversity to demonstrate that human societies are able to live harmoniously with nature (Conservation International, 2011a). The founders of CI were working at the international office of TNC and spun off while initiating an organization which focused more on the world's tropical regions instead of nature conservation in North America (Brechin, 2009). CI grew rapidly and is currently working in more than 40 countries on four continents, has more than 900 employees, owns over 30 global offices and it cooperates with more than 1000 partners globally (Conservation International, 2011a). The majority of the locations CI works in are developing nations in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Pacific, where biodiversity is high, needs are greatest and each dollar spent can save the most species (BBB wise, 2011). In the opinion of CI, every person on this planet has the right to a healthy living environment (Conservation International, 2011b). According to CI this can only be ensured by protecting nature and its gifts – a stable climate, fresh water, healthy oceans and reliable food. In order to establish this effectively CI's work focuses on six key areas: a stable global climate; protecting and understanding fresh water resources; ensuring nature's ability to provide food; minimizing pressures on human health; valuing the role of nature in human cultures; and safeguarding the unknown option values that nature provides (Conservation International, 2011b). The

organization operates with a scientific approach to biodiversity conservation and became famous of their hotspots strategy. This concept was mainly based on Myers' study, which already in the 1980s identified 10 areas that were both characterized by exceptional concentrations of species with high levels of endemism. Besides, these areas experienced unusual rapid rates of depletion. He stated:

By concentrating on such areas where needs are greatest and where the pay-off from safeguard measures would also be greatest, conservationists can engage in a more systematised response to the challenge of large scale extinctions impending in tropical forests (Myers, 1988: 187).

In the first years of CI, Myers' approach was used as the guiding principle for their conservation investments (Mittermeijer, et al., 1999). Soon CI expanded the list of hotspot areas and modified the methods of selecting the hotspot areas. Mittermeijers (1988) major tropical wilderness areas approach was added to the view. This approach focuses also on high-biodiversity areas where threats due to human pressure are low. The costs for conservation of these areas are much lower, while these areas are also of vital ecological importance (Mittermeier, et al., 1999). Next to this hotspot and wilderness strategy, the protection of key marine ecosystems is also an important part of CI's work. Furthermore, CI set up 'dept for nature' swap programs, which relieved developing countries from their debt in exchange for commitments to invest in local conservation initiatives. CI also pioneered with the 'rapid assessment programs', determining biodiversity richness of an area in a relatively short period of time. The organizations' philosophy is to conserve entire ecosystems of protected areas connected by biodiversity conservation corridors with multiple sustainable uses (BBB Wise, 2011). This has been an important conservation strategy, because many threatened areas are too small or isolated to maintain populations of many species over the long term. Therefore, this corridor-idea is one of the principles to conserve nature in a sustainable way.



Figure 3 The new CI logo (Source: www.conservation.org)

Recently, CI presented a new logo together with a new strategy and mission statement. With this new strategy the well-being of people becomes more central to conservation activities⁴. The new logo (Figure 3) represents CI's vision of a healthy blue planet, supported by a sustainable, green development path. With this logo

CI underscores that development models that preserve biodiversity are essential. In this way, the organization will continue to build on a strong foundation of science, partnership and field demonstration to empower societies to responsibly and sustainably care for nature, and expand their efforts to make conservation a cornerstone of economic development for the well-being of humanity (Conservation International, 2011).

⁴ Interview Mrs. A. Tjon Sie Fat, current Director of Conservation International Suriname, 12-10-2010

5.2 Conservation International's Funds

CI started its work with some donations from its founding board. In the early years the NGO mainly received funds from individual donations and grant money from foundations, such as the Mac Arthur Foundation (The Bridgespan Group, 2007). In the mid 1990s CI expanded its fundraising strategy and efforts with increased focus on foundations and wealthy individual donors. The above described hotspot strategy was used as a basis for a major fundraising campaign in the late 1990s (Mittermeier, et al., 1999). In 2002 CI received the largest donation made to an environmental NGO in the US. The Gordon and Betty Moore foundation donated US \$186 million, with later an additional US \$75 million to support a campaign to slow the rate of plant and animal extinctions across the world over a period of 10 years (Austin & Reavis, 2004). With this donation the Global Conservation Fund was established, which propelled the effort for global biodiversity conservation to a new level. Thereafter, fundraising activities of CI concentrated on expanding relationships with governments, private corporations, local communities and other stakeholders in conservation (The Bridgespan Group, 2007). The key driver for CI's growth have been the donations from foundations, and as shown in Figure 4 below, the Gordon and Betty Moore grant produced CI's biggest revenue spike (The Bridgespan Group, 2007). The figure shows the revenues only up to 2005, in recent years the revenue trend continued to increase until 2008. In 2007 the total revenue of CI was US \$174 million, in 2008 it was US \$ 240 million and in 2009 the total revenue decreased again to US \$110 million (Charity Navigator, 2011). Compared to TNC and WWF, whose funds also grew rapidly, CI experienced the most surprising growth according to Brechin (2009).




Figure 4 The Revenue trend of Conservation International (Source: The Bridgespan Group, 2007)

Between 1992 and 2005 CI's operating funds increased nearly 10 times from US \$11.6 million to US \$115 million and according to Brechin it is especially remarkable that annually nearly 11% of this budget came from corporations. CI state on their website:

We partner with businesses such as Wal-Mart, Starbucks, and McDonald's to help them establish 'green' benchmarks and embrace environmentally sound practices. These efforts enable them to reduce their impact on critical habitats and create economic opportunities for local communities that respect the need to use natural resources responsibly (CI, 2011: online).

In **Figure 5** the sources of CI's revenue in 2009 are presented. This graph shows that, although corporations cover 9.9% of the income, the NGO is currently mainly funded by foundations.




Figure 5 The sources of CI's revenue of \$116.1 million in 2009 (Source: CI)

5.3 Conservation International in Suriname

In December 1992 CI started up activities in Suriname, under the name CI Suriname (CIS). The local organization, led by director Mr. Stan Malone, started off with small projects in the interior. These ethno botanic projects focused on the development of 'non timber forest products' and included a research program of the International Cooperative Biodiversity Group. The program was called the 'Bioprospecting Program', and was an initiative with the Saamaka and Tareno people, to identify and screen tropical plants for potential medicinal uses on an international scale (Conservation International, 1998). After a while the position of CI was questioned, because of intellectual property rights of the local communities⁵. Therefore, CI decreased its activity for these projects while the Amazon Conservation Team, a division of CI, took over the initiative⁵. Thereafter, CI focused their work increasingly on biodiversity management and research. The first director of CI Suriname, Mr. Malone, clarifies that during the first years of CI




Figure 6 Map of Suriname with proposed logging concessions (Source Sizer & Rice, 1995)

⁵ Interview Mrs. A. Tjon Sie Fat, current Director of Conservation International Suriname, 12-10-2010

in Suriname, the country was in a difficult situation. The war in the interior destroyed the majority of the institutions, development aid was frozen and it was almost impossible to achieve any economic progress⁶. At the same time, Asian loggings multinationals were negotiating large-scale forestry concessions with the Surinamese government (see Figure 6). Because the government was under enormous economic pressure, the international community became increasingly concerned and got involved. CI took the lead to fight these large logging companies and convince the government to manage their forests in a more sustainable way⁷. Mr. Malone states that he, together with CI mobilized people to oppose the plans of the Asian multinationals in Suriname⁶. Subsequently CI together with the World Resources Institute (WRI) wrote the report 'Backs to the wall in Suriname: Forest policy in a country in crisis'⁸. In this report the authors 'strongly recommend the government of Suriname to put the proposed concession agreements on hold and, with immediate help from the international donor community, examine other development options for its forest resources" (Sizer & Rice, 1995: 4). These efforts succeeded, as the large logging concessions were never issued to the Asian corporations. Moreover, another result was the protection of a large area, the establishment of the CSNR, which will be extensively discussed in the next chapter.

Another initiative of CI Suriname is the implementation of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) projects. These systems document and map natural resource use by both the Saramake communities north of the Brokopondo lake and the Tareno community of Kwamalasumutu in southwestern Suriname (Conservation International, 1998). Furthermore, CI focuses on economic development projects to assist the government and local communities to find sustainable alternatives to development. In this context, CI promotes the development of ecotourism projects. In 2000 CI organized, together with the Inter-American Development Bank, a meeting with national and international tourism experts which resulted in recommendations for the development of three key areas for tourism in Suriname. These areas consist of the inner city of Paramaribo, the Upper Suriname River and the Central Suriname Nature Reserve (CSNR) (IDB and CI Suriname, 2000). According to these recommendations, CI invested in the tourism facilities at the Raleighvallen in the CSNR⁷. However, currently the management of the facilities built by CI is transferred to the government and the only activity of CI in the CSNR is a research program. This program, called the Tropical Ecology Assessment and Monitoring Network (TEAM), was set up in 2005 and aims to monitor long-term trends in biodiversity and standardize methods to be able to compare nature trends on a global level (TEAM, 2011). Next to these efforts, CI also contributes to the strengthening of sustainable development strategies of the Surinamese government. In 2009 CI launched the 'Green Development Plan', which provides a framework for environmental sustainability for each sector and aims to create a low-carbon, nature-based economy (Ministry of PDC, 2008). This plan was presented in the context of the UNFCCC framework and would include sources from the REDD (Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) mechanism to support the green development path of Suriname (Conservation International, 2011).

⁶ Interview Mr. S. Malone, first Director of Conservation International Suriname (1992-1998), 03-11-2010

⁷ Interview Mrs. A. Tjon Sie Fat, current Director of Conservation International Suriname, 12-10-2010

⁸ Interview Mr. B. De Dijn, former Head of Research division at STINASU (1999-2004), 01-11-2010

6 The Central Suriname Nature Reserve

The case of the CSNR is central to this study, because it illustrates the described globally transformed governance conditions in Suriname. Moreover, the international conservation NGO CI and the Surinamese government play a central role in this case. The case will be introduced in this chapter. After a general introduction of the reserve, the relevant context to the CSNR formation will be illustrated. Thereafter this chapter will conclude with the description of how the reserve was established.

6.1 General introduction

On July 31st of 1998 the government of Suriname adopted a state decision to establish the CSNR. The explanatory memorandum of this decision the government of Suriname state that they recognize the global importance of tropical rainforests and show their responsibility to conserve these forests both for life on earth in general as well as for the wellbeing and wealth of Suriname in particular (Staatsbesluit no. 65, 1998). With this decision three former small nature reserves, Raleighvallen, Tafelberg and Eilerts de Haan, were united in one large nature reserve containing a surface of 1.6 million hectares of tropical rainforest (see **Figure 7**).

The area is covered by undisturbed primary tropical rainforests and is home to one of the most important watersheds of Suriname's Coppename river system (CI Suriname, 2004). Furthermore, the reserve encompasses significant vertical relief, topography and soil conditions that have resulted in a variety of ecosystems which are of notable conservation value due to its pristine state (Drakenstein, 2003).

The reserve is part of the Guyana Shield, which is currently one of the oldest and most stable geological formations on earth (Final Management Plan CSNR, 2003). This area is the basis of the bioregion of the Guyanas which encompasses one third of the northeast part of the Amazone rainforest and is of special importance because of its endemics, unique ecosystems and its exceptional pristine state. The Guyanas bioregion is one of the world's last undisturbed tropical forests, and has the highest percentage (80-90%) of undisturbed tropical rainforest on earth (Final Management Plan CSNR, 2003).




Figure 7 The Central Suriname Nature Reserve (Source: Stinasu)

The CSNR is an important part of this region, while it covers more than 0.5% of the 250 million ha Guyana bioregion and is one of the very few completely undisturbed reserves in the area with no inhabitants and no human use (UNESCO, 2011). On 2 December 2000 the CSNR was inscribed as a natural heritage site on the UNESCO World Heritage List (see Image 2), because of its variety of ecosystems, the high diversity of plant and animal species, its size, the undisturbed state and its protection of the entire Coppename watershed (Drakenstein, 2003). This means that the reserve is recognized as an area with exceptional and universal value of which protection benefits humanity as a whole (UNESCO, 2011).

Although there are no people living in the reserve, several communities inhabit the surrounding areas of the CSNR. The Kwinti's are living in the villages Witagron and Kaaimanston located approximately 30 kilometres to the Northern border of the reserve. The only access route by land to the reserve is by boat along this village. The Matawai and Saramaccaners are located east to the reserve, in different villages along the Saramacca River. The nearest village, Poesogroenoe is located about 2 kilometres from the reserve (Drakenstein, 2003). The indigenous village of the Tareno's is situated approximately 50 kilometres to the south. Although this village, Peletutepu is closest to the reserve, the village Kwamalasumutu – located 90 km from the southern border – has claimed historical hunting rights within the CSNR (Drakenstein, 2003).

With the establishment of the CSNR, the surface of protected land in Suriname increased enormously. Before 1998 only 3% of Suriname's land was designated as a protected area, the establishment of the CSNR more than doubled this area, now 13% of Suriname's land is protected (Drakenstein, 2003). This area is one of the largest protected areas worldwide (Snijders, 2003), and at the time it was established, it was the largest nature reserve in the Latin American region⁹. Therefore, the decision to protect this area was very important to Suriname.



Image 2 The UNESCO certificate at the Fungu island in the CSNR (Source: L. Meddens)

⁹ Interview Mr. R. Ho Tsoi, Employee at Conservation Division of the Government, 09-12-2010

6.2 Relevant context to the CSNR formation

The idea to unite the three smaller protected areas into one large nature reserve should be placed in a broader context. In the early 1990s several developments took place on both national and on international level which encouraged the establishment of the reserve.

First of all, in the early '90s the economic situation in Suriname was very difficult. Following its independence in 1975, Surinam's poor economic performance and political instability led to an economic crisis, especially from 1980 onwards (van Niekerk, 2005). In 1997 Dutch development aid – which formed a large share of Surinamese income – was suspended. This, in combination with the decreased bauxite prices and an overspending of government institutions led to an instable economic climate in the mid-1990s (Metra, 2005). In this context, the government was searching for ways to increase their national income and stabilize their economy. In 1994, some East-Asian multinationals were invited to explore the possibilities for large scale logging activities in the Surinamese interior¹¹. However, these negotiations on large logging concessions received attention and critique from the international community. As described before, CI played an important role to convince the government not to proceed with these negotiations.

Furthermore, in that same period of the mid 1990s, the idea to make 10% of every countries surface protected area received attention on an international level¹⁰. This idea also landed in Suriname and on 11 September 1997 a major Surinamese newspaper states 'Government wants 10% of its land surface to become protected area' (De Ware Tijd, 1997). It was mentioned that the results of a research on ecosystems in the interior should be a basis for the enlargement of these protected areas. This idea followed from an international workshop with Guyana and Suriname, which aimed to increase effective cooperation and the alignment of conservation management between the countries (De Ware Tijd, 1997).

Another idea which became more pronounced during that time was the corridor principle of nature conservation. Both on a national level, as well as on an international level it became clear that the protection of a small number of large areas is preferable over the protection of a large number of smaller areas. As mentioned before, already in the Nature Conservation law of 1954, the second criteria to establish a protected areas stated; 'the protection of a small number of protected areas with maximum ecosystem diversity is preferable over the protection of a large number of small areas, which contain less ecosystems' (Nature Conservation Law, 1954). During the 1990s it became also clear within the forest service of the government that the protection of complete landscapes is far more effective than the protection of small areas¹¹. This idea met the philosophy of CI, who adopted the corridor idea as one of their core principles. The organization had become convinced with the idea that biodiversity protection would accomplish significantly more by connecting multiple nature areas, the corridor principle¹².

Furthermore, it was also realised that the area linking the reserves Raleighvallen, Tafelberg and Eilerts de Haan encompassed a major part of the Coppename watershed. This area functions as the rainmaker and the source for all rivers in Suriname which means that destruction of this area would affect the entire country¹³. Therefore, the protection of this area was of major importance and was seen as a priority for Suriname's development.

¹⁰ Interview Mr. F. Baal, Former Head of the Conservation Division of the Government, 29-11-2010

¹¹ Interview Mr. K. M. Tjon, Former Head Research Section of the Government Forest Service, 10-12-2010

¹² Interview Mr. R. Nelson, Employee and Co-founder Conservation International Suriname, 22-10-2010

¹³ Interview Mr. S. Malone, first Director of Conservation International Suriname (1992-1998), 03-11-2010

6.3 Formation of the reserve

With these above described developments as a context, a description of how the reserve was established will follow.

During the 1970s Mr. Mittermeijer, an American PhD student investigated the behaviour of monkeys in the Raleighvallen Nature Reserve¹⁴. After finishing his PhD and working for the WWF, Mr. Mittermeijer became President of CI in 1989. The idea to unite the three nature reserves Raleighvallen, Tafelberg and Eilerts the Haan came from Mr. Mittermeijer¹⁶ who lived in this area during his studies^{14,15}. Because of the size and global importance of the area, opportunities for funding on an international level were present. The idea to establish a revolving fund, which could generate financial means for the sustainable development of Suriname and would compensate for the banned logging activities, was presented to the government¹⁶. Furthermore, with the establishment of the large protected area, Suriname would be internationally recognized for their efforts to conserve one of the last undisturbed tropical rainforests of global importance¹⁸. In this way, the country could show the international community that nature conservation is of major importance in Suriname¹⁷. These ideas and the initiative to establish the CSNR came from CI. Although this idea was already developed and presented to the Government of Venetiaan during the early 1990s, the initiative did not receive any attention until the new government of Wijdenbosch took office in 1996¹⁸. Mr. Wijdenbosch explains that Mittermeijer's idea matched his development policy while he wanted to contribute something to the environmental situation in the world. To him, the image of Surinamese environmental policy internationally was also of major concern¹⁸. Also Mr. Udenhout, the Surinamese ambassador in the United States, was familiar with the organization CI and agreed with the idea to establish the large protected area in central Suriname¹⁸. According to Mr. Wijdenbosch the organization was screened thoroughly before he took the decision. He had consultations with the National Assembly and the Minister of Natural Resources Mr. Alibux. After these consultations and many conversations with CI, Mr. Wijdenbosch decided to establish the CSNR¹⁸. Mr. Alibux explains that the plan has been rapidly implemented, because this was the policy of the government of Wijdenbosch; it was known for its decisiveness¹⁸.

On June 4th of 1998 a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed by CI's President Mr. Mittermeijer and the President of Suriname Mr. Wijdenbosch. On the 31st of July 1998 the state decision on the establishment of the CSNR was published. In the MoU the parties agreed to create the CSNR under the Nature Protection Law of 1954, to submit the area to the UNESCO World Heritage list and to create the trust fund for protected area management and biodiversity conservation in Suriname (MoU Gov Suriname - CI, 1998). CI would draft the financial plan for the trust fund and CI would also be represented in the fund's board of directors (MoU Gov Suriname - CI, 1998).

Because of the rapid implementation, there was not much time to follow the prevailing steps of creating nature reserves in Suriname (see Box 1). For example, the nature conservation

¹⁴ Interview Mr. F. Baal Former Head of the Conservation Division of the Government, 29-11-2010

¹⁵ Interview Mr. R. Ho Tsoi, Employee at Conservation Division of the Government, 09-12-2010

¹⁶ Interview Mr. H. Sijlbing, Former Director of STINASU (1997-2003), 01-11-2011

¹⁷ Interview Mrs. G. Landburg, Former Educational Supervisor at Conservation International, 02-11-2010

¹⁸ Interview Mr. J. Wijdenbosch and Mr. E. Alibux, Former Prime Minister of Suriname and Former Minister of Natural Resources (1996-1999), 08-12-2010

commission was not consulted and there was no separate ecosystem inventory conducted of the entire area¹⁹. One of the former employees at the forest service of the government describes that she and her colleagues questioned the establishment of the reserve without an inventory; ‘what if it turned out that diamonds would be found in the area?’²⁰ Others did not care much about the creation of the reserve, the area was uninhabited and not much happened there²¹. However, most stakeholders were positive about the establishment of the reserve. One of the informants even stated: ‘to my opinion, the entire country of Suriname could become a nature reserve’²².

¹⁹ Interview Mr. F. Baal Former Head of the Conservation Division of the Government, 29-11-2010

²⁰ Interview Mrs. M. Playfair, Former employee at the Forest Service of the Government, 03-11-2010

²¹ Interview Mrs. R. van de Kooye, Freelance Environmental Journalist, 05-11-2010

²² Interview Mr. H. Sijlbing, Former Director of STINASU (1997-2003), 01-11-2011

7 Management of the CSNR

When the area of 1.6 million ha was designated as a protected area, the question arose; how to manage this large new nature reserve? Before the establishment of the reserve, the government of Suriname and CI already had some extensive conversations about the management responsibilities²³. However, no decision had been taken on the management authority at that point. The agreements in the MoU with the designation of the area were limited to the development of a management plan and the establishment of a trust fund. Both the plan and the fund have been realized, however the implementation of activities faced some difficulties. How these management processes went will be analysed in this chapter.

7.1 The Suriname Conservation Foundation

As already mentioned, with the designation of the large protected area in Suriname, international funds became available for Suriname. The capacity of the forest service of the government was very limited, while the nature reserve covered an enormous area of 1.6 million ha tropical rainforest with a protected status. Therefore, one of the agreements between CI and the government of Suriname was to create a financial mechanism²⁴. In the MoU the parties agreed to design a trust fund to finance protected area management and biodiversity conservation in the Republic of Suriname. CI would draft a financial plan and would be represented in the board of directors in this fund named the Suriname Conservation Foundation (hereafter called SCF).

Table 2 Financial contributions of the to the Suriname Conservation Foundation

Donor	Amount contributed to SCF in million US \$
UNDP/GEF	9.494 ^a
UN Foundation	1.775 _{a,b}
CI Foundation	2.945 ^a
Surinamesegovernment	3.6 ^{a,c}
WWF	0.245 ^a
Total	18.059

Sources:

^a UNDP (2000) Project of Suriname. Project Document: UNDP Project Number: SUR/99/H__/A/1V/31

^b UNDP, United Nations Foundation press release. Available on the World Wide Web:

<<http://www.undp.org/gef/new/unfPress.htm>> Accessed at 16 March 2011.

^c SCF (2008) Report on the financial statements of Suriname Conservation Foundation for the year 2008.

²³ Interview Mr. J. Wijdenbosch and Mr. E. Alibux, Former Prime Minister of Suriname and Former Minister of Natural Resources (1996-1999), 08-12-2010

²⁴ Interview Mr. R. Nelson, Employee and Co-founder Conservation International Suriname, 22-10-2010

The fund would benefit the NCD of the Suriname forest service or in case the agency ceased to exist, the agency responsible for the management of protected areas in the republic of Suriname (MoU Gov Suriname - CI, 1998). The SCF was established with substantial support of the Global Environmental Facility (hereafter called GEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and CI. The division of the financial contributions are of the main donors are presented in **Table 2**.

The first director of CI Suriname explains that he heard of the GEF during his participation in international conferences and saw this fund as an alternative to Dutch development aid and as a possibility for Suriname to support environmental projects²⁵. The SCF was founded in 2000, with an initial US \$2 million funding of the CI Foundation²⁶. Thereafter the GEF contributed US \$6 million under the project 'Conservation of Globally Significant Forest Ecosystems in Suriname's Guyana Shield Bio-region'. The project started in September 2000 and aimed to set up a management regime and a sustainable source of funding for two globally important and representative sites: the CSNR and the Sipaliwini Nature Reserve (SNR) (SCF, 2008). In 2004 the Surinamese government contributed US \$3.6 million with Dutch Treaty funds to finance the 6 year planned UNDP Project 'Capacity building support to the Suriname Conservation Foundation'. This co-financing was needed for the second contribution of the GEF, an additional amount of US \$3.2 million. Herewith, the aim for a fund of US \$15 million was realised in 2007. The idea was that this endowment would provide an interest of US \$750.000 yearly which would be invested in nature conservation projects in Suriname²⁵. The purpose of the SCF is to support management, conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in Suriname (SCF website, 2011). This is done through supporting activities such as the management of protected areas and buffer zones, activities for nature conservation outside the protected areas and the support of education and scientific research concerning nature conservation and the environment (SCF website, 2011).

According to their statutes, the fund supports at least 65% of their budget to strengthen the government's capacity to manage Suriname's nature reserve, with a special attention for the CNSR and the SNR (SCF Statutes, 2007). The board of the foundation is responsible for the spending and managing of the financial capital. Therefore, the composition of this board and how it is composed is of major importance to the application of the funds. This is described in Article 14 of the SCF statutes, presented in Box 3.

However, what is not presented in this box is the dispensation period for the board members, described in Article 16. Each board member is appointed for a period of two years, while the members cannot be nominated for more than two periods in a row (SCF statutes, 2007). However, section 3 of this article, states that the representatives of the UNDP and CI are not subjected to these first sections of Article 16 (SCF statutes, 2007). This means that these board members can keep their position in the board for an unlimited time. This contributes to a more strategic and influential position of the members of CI and the UNDP in the SCF.

²⁵ Interview Mr. S. Malone, first Director of Conservation International Suriname (1992-1998), 03-11-2010

²⁶ Interview Mrs. A. TjonSie Fat, current Director of Conservation International Suriname, 12-10-2010

Article 14 Composition of the Foundation board

"The board consists of at least seven (7) members, with a maximum of nine (9) members, who will be selected on the basis of the following ratio:

1. Three (3) members will be nominated by the President of the Republic of Suriname;
2. One member
 - 2.1 represents a private non-governmental organization which is settled in the Republic of Suriname and aims to conserve biodiversity; or
 - 2.2 is a member of the public or private higher education institution in the Republic of Suriname and is an expert on the conservation of biodiversity;
3. One (1) member will be selected from the private sector.
4. Two (2) members will represent the inhabitants of the interior of the Republic of Suriname:
 - 4.1 a member will be chosen by the Marron-community; and
 - 4.2 a member will be chosen by the Indian community.
5. One (1) member is representative of Conservation International, or will be appointed by Conservation International;
6. A member is representative of the international donors of the fund. This representative will be appointed by the Development program of the United Nations (UNDP)."

Box 3 Composition of the Foundation Board (Source: SCF Statutes, 2007, Article 14)

7.2 The Management Plan

One of the first projects the SCF supported was the development of a management plan for the CSNR. This was carried out by CI, who worked as a consultant for the government²⁷. CI organized several workshop rounds and stakeholder meetings to prepare the management plan for the nature reserve²⁸. The first stakeholder consultation workshop in July 2000 aimed to place the CSNR on the World Heritage list (Uitvoeringsschema MP, 2004). Here, the first outline of the management plan was developed. Thereafter, two workshops were organized in 2001. First the local community's participatory workshop where the Kwintis, Matawais, Saramaccaners and Tarenos presented their vision on the development of the area (CPW, 2001). The second workshop was used to agree with the participants on different elements of the management plan, including the procedures, the content and the format of the plan. (Uitvoeringsschema MP, 2004). Thereafter, consultants were recruited to develop the CSNR management plan with the preparatory workshops as a starting point. The results of these efforts were presented and discussed during a third workshop in the course of 2002. The final draft of the Central Suriname Nature Reserve Plan for Management was presented in the beginning of 2003 at a more widely announced meeting, where also journalists were invited. The final draft management plan emphasizes the values of the reserve and describes in an extensive way how to deal with these values sustainably.

²⁷ Interview Mr. F. Baal Former Head of the Conservation Division of the Government, 29-11-2010

²⁸ Interview Mrs. A. Tjon Sie Fat, current Director of Conservation International Suriname, 12-10-2010

It starts with a vision for the area shared by the stakeholders, to sustain the reserve's global significance as a tropical wilderness for the benefit of all Surinamese and the world community. Thereafter, the purpose of the plan is formulated as follows:

This Management Plan provides the framework for the effective conservation of the reserve's natural values, the appreciation of the reserve's cultural values as integral parts of the ecosystem, the development of tourism and research uses that will increase the value of the reserve for all Surinamese, and the creation of an organization and management system that will make the implementation of all the other aspects of the plan possible (Draft Management Plan CSNR, 2003:2).

The sections that follow in the management plan contain an extensive description of the cultural heritage characteristics of the area with a plan to conserve these values, a plan for the development of sustainable ecotourism and an operative plan for management procedures, actors and finances. Furthermore, the plan also specifies the institutional context, identifies management zones, and formulates activities for monitoring and research. In the last section, the operative plan for management, a new Management Authority for the CSNR is introduced, the CSNR-MA. It is proposed that this authority determines the policy of the CSNR and becomes responsible for the implementation of the management plan. The CSNR-MA would consist of a partnership between government authorities, local communities, scientific institutes and relevant non-governmental organizations (Draft Management Plan CSNR, 2003). It was proposed that the management authority would be established by the Minister of Natural Resources, together with the relevant stakeholders. This CSNR-MA would consist of a board, which would be the policy-making and -compliance body with the mission to protect the ecological and cultural integrity of the CSNR. To implement the mission, this CSNR-MA board would set up a secretariat for the daily management of the CSNR and for executing the activities to accomplish the goals of the board (Draft Management Plan CSNR, 2003). However, the exact division of tasks and responsibilities for the different stakeholders are not specified in the management plan. Only a list of stakeholders to participate in the CSNR-MA board and a list of characteristics for the CSNR-MA secretariat is suggested (Figure 8). It was stated by several respondents that the intention of CI was to take the lead in this management authority^{29,30,31}. The proposed management structure, as described in the management plan is presented in **Figure 8**.

²⁹ Interview Mr. H. Sijlbing, Former Director of STINASU (1997-2003), 01-11-2011

³⁰ Interview Mr. R. HoTsoi, Employee at Conservation Division of the Government, 09-12-2010

³¹ Interview Mr. P. Ouboter, Professor and Coordinator of the Zoological collection and the Centre for Environmental Research at the Anton de KomUniversity of Suriname, 21-10-2010




Figure 8 Proposed management structure CSNR-MA (Source: Draft Management Plan CSNR, 2003)

The plan finally presents the management budget in the annexes of the report. For the years 2002 – 2007 the costs for administration, investments, research and tourism were estimated ranging between US \$810.605,00 for 2002 and US \$405.374,63 for 2007, while the investments costs would be phasing out after three years. This CSNR plan for management was presented at the described meeting in 2003 and thereafter submitted to the forest service of the government for approval.

7.3 Management plan: the bottlenecks

During the management plan presentation meeting in 2003 where CI presented the draft management plan, it seemed like the final management plan for the CSNR was presented³². However, the plan was not yet approved by the government officials of the forest service. Moreover, the NCD of the government did not agree with the plan as it was presented; two major points of criticism still existed. In the opinion of government officials the management plan was not sufficiently operationalized^{33,34,35}. Furthermore, they disagreed with the proposed management structure. According to the government officials, appointing the CSNR-MA as the responsible body would be in conflict with the 1954 nature protection law³⁵. This law states that the head of the forest service is responsible for the management of nature reserves in Suriname. Therefore, according to them it was not possible to give the full responsibility to another authority than the forest service of the government. At this point the finalization of the

³² Interview Mr. B. De Dijn, Former Head of Research division at STINASU (1999-2004), 01-11-2010

³³ Interview Mr. R. Nelson, Employee and Co-founder Conservation International Suriname, 22-10-2010

³⁴ Interview Mrs. A. Tjon Sie Fat, current Director of Conservation International Suriname, 12-10-2010

³⁵ Interview Mr. F. Baal Former Head Conservation Division of the Government (1978-2005), 29-11-2010

management plan got stuck because of the dispute between CI and the government officials. The crucial question was; who will get the final responsibility to manage the CSNR. CI proposed the new management authority CSNR-MA while the government kept to their 1954 Nature Protection Law. After some time, the President sent someone to the NCD, to tell them to rewrite the plan within a limited timeframe³⁶. In this way the existing plan was adapted to the ideas and preferences of the government on the points of disagreement. The main difference of the new plan was the adapted management structure, as shown in **Figure 9**. In this adapted structure, the head of the forest service of the government was the main responsible body for the management of the CSNR. This adjusted plan was approved by the government and sent back to CI.




Figure 9 The adapted CSNR management structure (Source: Final Management Plan CSNR, 2003)

7.4 Implementation: tourism development

When the CSNR plan for management was finished, and sent back to CI, the implementation of the plan stagnated. The disagreement on the responsibility for the management was not solved, and therefore the proposed activities faced difficulties with starting up. However, there was no constructive dialogue between CI and the Surinamese government, as they only sent the adapted management plan by mail. In this way, it was still unclear who would take the lead and who had the authority to make decisions regarding the implementation of the plan.

During that same period a Tourism Development Plan was developed which included also a plan for the Raleighvallen site at the CSNR. This tourism plan was designed during a workshop in April 2000 organized by CI in cooperation with local partners. During this meeting with international experts from the field and Surinamese participants, three key areas for tourism development were identified. For these areas – the inner city of Paramaribo, the upper Suriname River and the CSNR – specific recommendations were composed for tourism

³⁶ Interview Mr. B. De Dijn, Former Head of Research division at STINASU (1999-2004), 01-11-2010

development. The Raleighvallen was envisioned to become an international tourist destination, which would attract 5000 well-paying tourists each year. These hi-end tourists would pay US\$ 150 each night, which would contribute US \$750.000 on a yearly basis to the Surinamese economy (Pool, 2007). According to this plan, CI initiated the development of tourism facilities at Fungu Island, in the Raleighvallen area. These activities were based on expanding the existing infrastructures and aimed to position the Raleighvallen as a gateway to the rest of the CSNR³⁷. In this context, CI renovated the tourist accommodation Gonini lodge and built a new tourist facility Lolopasy. They also initiated the building of forest bungalows, renovated toilet buildings, installed an ingenious solar energy system (Image 4), installed a water filter and started to build a large visitors centre (Image 3)³⁸. Furthermore, in 2004 the TEAM research project, the international monitoring and assessment programme initiated by CI Washington, became active in Suriname and in 2006 a research station was built in the Raleighvallen area³⁹. With all these activities CI invested over one million US \$ in the Raleighvallen area (Pool, 2007). However, these activities were not funded by the SCF, but by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). In total, a budget of 1.2 million US \$ was scheduled for tourism development at the CSNR. The project aimed to 'expand opportunities for the tourism industry, especially targeting private sector and community-based participation that will have positive impacts for the Surinamese economy' (IDB, 2005: 1). In the meantime it was still not clear who was going to take the lead in the CSNR management, and who would manage the tourist facilities at Raleighvallen in the end. The local partners of CI, the Surinamese government and STINASU wanted to get control over the international funds.



Image 3 Unfinished visitors center at Raleighvallen, initiated by CI
(Source: L. Meddens)

³⁷ Interview Mrs. A. Tjon Sie Fat, current Director of Conservation International Suriname, 12-10-2010

³⁸ Interview Mr. S. Emanuel, Manager of tourist facilities on Fungu-island at the Raleighvallen, 12-11-2010

³⁹ Interview Mr. R. van Kanten, Program Director of Tropenbos, former TEAM coordinator, 02-11-2010

At the same time, CI doubted that these local institutions would spend the money wisely and therefore CI did not want to lose any control over the financial means. This discussion was never solved in a constructive manner. At the same time, it was up to the government to decide who would get the responsibility of the tourist facilities. While this decision was not taken and CI's activities continued to cost money, the Director of CI in Suriname decided to quit the activities at Raleighvallen, and invest the remaining IDB funds elsewhere⁴⁰. In September 2007 a meeting was organized at the Raleighvallen, to officially transfer the management of all the facilities at Fungu-Island from CI to the government. With this transfer, CI ended their support and interference with the CSNR (except for the TEAM research project). From the end of 2007 the responsibility for the management of the facilities at Raleighvallen and the protection of the CSNR were in hands of STINASU and the Surinamese government. The local institutions did receive the management authority over the renovated tourism facilities, but the international funds of the IDB were not available anymore.

7.5 Project Implementation Unit

After CI withdrew from the projects at Raleighvallen, the activity in the CSNR stagnated. The implementation of the management plan did not proceed as expected; therefore a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was established in 2009. The government, together with CI took the initiative to create this unit, supported with funds of the SCF⁴¹. The idea was that the PIU would assist and support the NCD of the government with the management and the implementation of the CSNR management plan⁴². With the establishment of this body, it became clear who was taking the initiative to implement the management plan in the CSNR. The PIU started with 4 employees, one head and three coordinators on the subjects: natural resources; research and monitoring; and facility and community development⁴¹. The original plan was to start off with funds for 3-5 years, thereafter the activities would be able to support themselves and the unit would be extended⁴¹. The PIU held presentations for the different stakeholders about the implementation of the management plan. It was explained what was expected from different stakeholders and what role they were going to play⁴². On the basis of the plan, several project proposals were developed and prepared for approval. However, the PIU was established as a consultant unit, therefore they were not authorized to take any decisions without approval of the government. Therefore, all project proposals would have to be approved by the NCD of the government. Thereafter, the NCD would submit the proposal to the SCF, who would decide to provide the funds for the proposed project.

However, by the end of 2010 only 2 employees were still working at the PIU, the others left because of the lack of progress. According to Mr. Fagon, head of the PIU, the CSNR management plan was not implemented at all since 2009. He states that all project proposals, plans and budgets are still at the forest service of the government⁴². According to the head of the forest service Mrs. Merton, the SCF continually changes the requirements for the project

⁴⁰ Interview Mrs. A. Tjon Sie Fat, current Director of Conservation International Suriname, 12-10-2010

⁴¹ Anonymous respondent

⁴² Interview Mr. G. Fagon, Head of the Project Implementation Unit (2009-1010), 13-10-2010

proposals. Therefore, their motivation decreased to work on these projects⁴³. However, the project monitoring expert of the SCF, Mr. Malone, states that the SCF is solely a financing mechanism which is dependent on the government, and if the government claims responsibility without doing anything, they cannot provide funding while nothing happens in the reserve⁴⁴. Currently, the main activity of the PIU is to develop a business plan to satisfy the SCF and be able to start the implementation of projects in the CSNR.



Image 4 Ingenious solar system installed by CI, currently out of order (Source: L. Meddens)

⁴³ Interview Mrs. Y. Merton and Mrs. C. Sakimin, Head of the Forest Service and Head of the Nature Conservation Division of the Government, 23-11-2010

⁴⁴ Interview Mr. S. Malone, Project Monitoring Expert at Suriname Conservation Foundation, 10-12-2010

8 The CSNR analyzed

As described in the previous chapter, the management of the CSNR did not proceed as it was planned. The CSNR was envisioned to be an example of how an internationally important conservation area could be managed in an economically feasible way. However, the implementation of the management plan stagnated, funds from the SCF hardly became available for the area and not much happened with the proposed projects. Therefore, this chapter will further analyse the actual effects of the designation of the protected area, the background of the implementation difficulties, and the role CI played in these developments.

8.1 Effects of the CSNR formation and management

Because of all the mentioned management constraints and stagnated implementation, it seems like the designation of the area hardly had any effect. However, this should be placed in a broader context, because there was a large difference between the effects of the formation of the reserve and the effects of the management of the reserve. This section will therefore analyse these effects separately.

To start, the formation of the CSNR had several important effects both in Suriname as well as internationally. In Suriname the formation of the reserve meant that the logging concessions from the Asian multinationals could be cancelled^{45,46}. Suriname was in an economically very weak position, while internationally the country was critiqued because of the logging concessions. Therefore, the international fund that came available for a sustainable development path of Suriname was a perfect solution. Both the economic position of Suriname was improved with international funding, as well as the image of Suriname in the world was improved. The establishment of the SCF with over \$15 million US for nature conservation in Suriname was an important effect of the CSNR formation^{47,48,49}. Furthermore, CI promoted the establishment of the reserve on an international level. A meeting with Harrison Ford was arranged in Washington DC to announce the formation of the CSNR. In June 1998 Reuters published an article on the designation of the protected area with the headline: 'Tenth of Suriname to be off-limits to loggers' (Reuters, 1998). And in 2000 the article 'Warm welcome to the jungle' was published in the New York Times, which described the CSNR and the interior of Suriname as beautiful travel destinations (Rogers, 2000). Through these publications and other publicity activities of CI the image of Suriname improved. The country created a 'green' image primary in the US but also in the rest of the world with the designation of the nature reserve; they showed their commitment to nature conservation. Furthermore, the place of the CSNR on

⁴⁵ Interview Mrs. M. Playfair, Former employee at the Forest Service of the Government, 03-11-2010

⁴⁶ Interview Mr. R. HoTsoi, Employee at Conservation Division of the Government, 09-12-2010

⁴⁷ Interview Mr. P. Ouboter, Professor and Coordinator of the Zoölogical collection and the Centre for Environmental Research at the Anton de Kom University of Suriname, 21-10-2010

⁴⁸ Interview Mr. R. van Kanten, Program Director of Tropenbos, former TEAM coordinator, 02-11-2010

⁴⁹ Interview Mr. H. Sijlbing, Former director of STINASU (1997-2003), 01-11-2011

the World Heritage list in 2000 contributed significantly to the increased publicity of Suriname. As a result of this new image and the increased publicity, the country became more known as a tourist destination. However, this effect has not been noticed in the Raleighvallen, as the tourist numbers did not increase since the designation of the CSNR.

On the contrary to the international effects, the CSNR management was less effective on a local level. After the CSNR formation an extensive management plan was drafted, for the protection of the area as well as the development of the area as a tourist destination. The Raleighvallen area was envisioned to become a high-end tourist destination, which would provide income for the sustainable management of the area. However, because of the disagreement between CI and the Surinamese government on the management authority, the implementation of the management plan stagnated. The local effects of the CSNR formation in the area were therefore minimal. As it was stated by one of the respondents: 'despite all the effort and money invested in the development of the management plan, not much happened in the reserve'⁵⁰. This is also illustrated by the effect on the hunting behaviour of the Kwintis who live north of the reserve. When the CSNR was established, the former nature reserve Raleighvallen was enlarged which caused the hunting area of the Kwintis to decrease. However, the presence of gamekeepers and management activities did not increase⁵¹. Although these local communities became more cautious with hunting⁵², they did not feel any change of rules or pressure⁵³. One of the villagers of Witagron declares that since the CSNR was established there had been a lot of promises, like an increase of employment for the villagers, but no noticeable positive development was realized in their village⁵⁴. The one development that has benefitted the community was the building of a jetty by the river⁵⁵. On the contrary, it was stated that the pollution at Witagron even increased after the formation of the reserve due to more tourists who leave their garbage during their travels⁵⁶. Also at the Raleighvallen, the most accessible part of the CSNR where the activities would start, the effect of the CSNR management is minimal. As the manager of the tourist facilities at the Raleighvallen stated: 'we have heard of the management plan just like a fairy tale. The plan contains beautiful things, but hardly anything has happened'⁵⁷. Besides the improved tourist facilities and the unfinished visitors centre, not much changed in the area. The tourist numbers did not increase as expected and the homes of the employees are still of a bad quality (Image 5)⁵⁸. Although more research buildings were built and the road to Witagron improved, the number of active gamekeepers, research activities and tourists even decreased since the designation of the CSNR in 1998⁵⁹. Because Raleighvallen was the first area where activities were to be employed, it might be superfluous to mention that at the other areas of the CNSR (Eilerts de Haan and Tafelberg) no

⁵⁰ Interview Mr. P. Ouboter, Professor and Coordinator of the Zoölogical collection and the Centre for Environmental Research at the Anton de KomUniversity of Suriname, 21-10-2010

⁵¹ Interview Mr. S. Prika, Gamekeeper at CSNR of Nature Conservation Division, 23-11-2010

⁵² Interview Mr. W. Emanuel, F. Clemens, R. Timo and E. Samuel, The Kapitans of Witagron and Kaaimanston, one Basja and an employee of ministry of regional development, 3-12-2010

⁵³ Interview Mr. G. Emanuel (Palika), Kwinti, one of the eldest villagers of Witagron

⁵⁴ Interview Mr. E. Hendrik, Kwinti, Villager of Witagron

⁵⁵ Interview Mr. M. Clemens, Kwinti, Head of the Youth Association of Witagron

⁵⁶ Interview Mr. W. Emanuel, F. Clemens, R. Timo and E. Samuel, The Kapitans of Witagron and Kaaimanston, one Basja and an employee of ministry of regional development, 3-12-2010

⁵⁷ Interview Mr. S. Emanuel, Manager of tourist facilities on Fungu-island at the Raleighvallen, 12-11-2010

⁵⁸ Interview with 8 employees at the Raleighvallen, boatmen, guides and field workers, 12-11-2010

⁵⁹ Interview Mr. S. Emanuel, Manager of tourist facilities on Fungu-island at the Raleighvallen, 12-11-2010

management activities took place since 1998. A remark should be made on the international status of the CSNR which cause that the Surinamese people are much more cautious for destructive activities in the reserve. Because if these activities would be quickly picked up by the media, the international image of Suriname would be destructed.

Although the area is uninhabited, there are several threads surrounding the large reserve, which are thus not controlled at all at this moment. These threads exist of: hunting and logging from the north, gold seekers from the east, bauxite mines in the west, hunting and fishery from the south, the impact and garbage of tourism and climate change⁶⁰. However, it is not clear how serious these threads are to the reserve, which should be investigated for proper control activities.

In this way, there was a large difference between the effects of the management in the reserve at a local level, and the international effects of the CSNR formation. The impact of the CSNR management on a local level was minimal, while the CSNR formation had some important impacts at an international level.



Image 5 Current living conditions of employees at Raleighvallen (Source: L. Meddens)

8.2 Implementation Constraints

As described above, the implementation of the management plan of the CSNR faced some major difficulties. The cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government stagnated at the point of management implementation. Different factors that complicated the cooperation and caused a stagnation of management implementation are mentioned by the respondents. These implementation constraints are discussed in this section.

To start, some of the major complicating factors can be found within the Surinamese Government institutions. An important element, mentioned by several informants, is the lack of capacity within the forest service and the NCD of the government^{61,62,63,64}. As Mr. Baal puts it;

⁶⁰ Interview Mr. P. Ouboter, Professor and Coordinator of the Zoölogical collection and the Centre for Environmental Research at the Anton de Kom University of Suriname, 21-10-2010

⁶¹ Anonymous respondent

⁶² Interview Mr. R. Nelson, Employee and Co-founder Conservation International Suriname, 22-10-2010

⁶³ Interview Mr. F. Baal Former Head Conservation Division of the Government (1978-2005), 29-11-2010

⁶⁴ Interview Mrs. G. Landburg, Former Educational Supervisor at Conservation International, 02-11-2010

there is a shortage of people and means, the government misses a stable frame to implement conservation policies of an international standard⁶⁵. Accordingly, the NCD does not have a standard structure to manage protected areas⁶⁶. Mr. Baal also declares that the knowledge of international donors and the experience of working with these external organisations within the NCD was very limited⁶⁵. It was furthermore mentioned that the government misses effective management strategies⁶⁶ due to several reasons among which the lack of capacity; decisiveness; commitment; a long term vision; and a lack of competent people in important positions⁶⁷. The inability of the government to properly deal with their protected area system was illustrated by the state decision of the CSNR. There are some major mistakes included in the coordinates describing the geographical location of the reserve (see Appendix 3). Although the solution for this problem is not costly, this has not been solved since the establishment of the reserve in 1998.

A second category of factors why the implementation of the management stagnated can be found in relational matters between the different actors. Here, mainly the relation between the donor and the government is of importance. With 'the donor' the SCF is meant, with the remark that CI probably had a large share in the decision making of the SCF. There was a tension between financial means and management authority of the CSNR⁶⁶. The government was afraid to lose control over the area, while the SCF doubted on the intentions and competences of the government and was therefore reticent to provide funds⁶⁸. The relation with the donor played an important role, as there was a lack of trust in the implementation of the management plan⁶⁷. One of the informants illustrated the cooperation between the SCF and the government with the following quote; 'we will give the money, but then you will have to manage properly'⁶⁶. According to government officials the requirements for the SCF funds changed continuously^{69,70}. The SCF probably did not want to provide the funds to the government, because they thought the national institutions were not capable of dealing with these funds wisely. In this way, one of the respondents stated that 'the international funds were insufficiently under control of the local actors; the forest service of the government and STINASU'⁷¹. The lack of trust between the international donors and the Surinamese government contributed to the stagnation of the management implementation. The disagreement on the management authority also originated from this distrust. However, this conflict was never solved⁷² and therefore still plays a role with the implementation of the management plan⁷³. Due to this unsolved dispute, it was never clear who was assigned with the management task. The funds of the SCF did not become available and therefore the implementation could not start.

The last category of constraint factors contains more individual factors that contributed to the difficult implementation of the management plan. A first element is the individual relations

⁶⁵ Interview Mr. F. Baal Former Head Conservation Division of the Government (1978-2005), 29-11-2010

⁶⁶ Interview Mrs. G. Landburg, Former Educational Supervisor at Conservation International, 02-11-2010

⁶⁷ Anonymous respondent

⁶⁸ Interview Mr. G. Fagon, Head of the Project Implementation Unit (2009-1010), 13-10-2010

⁶⁹ Interview Mrs. Y. Merton and Mrs. C. Sakimin, Head of the Forest Service and Head of the Nature Conservation Division of the Government, 23-11-2010

⁷⁰ Interview Mr. R. HoTsoi, Employee at Conservation Division of the Government, 09-12-2010

⁷¹ Interview Mr. H. Sijlbing, Former director of STINASU (1997-2003), 01-11-2011

⁷² Interview Mr. G. Fagon, Head of the Project Implementation Unit (2009-1010), 13-10-2010

⁷³ Interview Mr. R. HoTsoi, Employee at Conservation Division of the Government, 09-12-2010

between people from the different institutes⁷⁴. For example disputes between people from the NCD and CI did not have a positive effect on the proceeding of the implementation⁷⁴. Furthermore, according to different informants a strong person, capable of taking the lead in the process was missing^{74,75}. Such a person could have turned the project around and might have been able to ensure the starting up of the management implementation. Both STINASU and the NCD do not have such a person who could take the lead to bring the project to the next level⁷⁵. In this way the context and circumstances were not ideal to implement a management plan for such a large nature reserve in a small country like Suriname.

8.3 Conservation International and the CSNR

Although several developments, interactions and constraints concerning the CSNR have been described, the role of CI has not received a special focus in the previous chapters. However, the organisations' involvement in Suriname is central to this study and central to the understanding of the CSNR failures. Therefore, this section will zoom in on the role of CI in the CSNR process. Because there is a difference between the international organisation of CI and the local Surinamese foundation, first the main distinction of these two in the CSNR process will be described. Thereafter the visions of the different stakeholders on the organization will be illustrated.

Since 1992 CI was established as a national Surinamese foundation with the first director Stan Malone⁷⁶. The first period he was running the office from his home and one of his efforts was to fight the large Asian logging multinationals⁷⁷. The idea to unite the three smaller reserves into the CSNR came from CI's president in Washington, Mr. Mittermeier. He initiated a lobby on a high political level, and eventually agreed with Suriname's President Mr. Wijdenbosch on the establishment of the reserve. The agreement of the formation of the reserve was anchored in the MoU between the Surinamese Government and CI Washington. This was done by the international organization of CI, because a lot of money was involved in the deal⁷⁸. In this way, CI Washington played a large role in the finances of the CSNR establishment. The first amount of money was provided after the designation of the CSNR, the second after the establishment of the SCF and the third amount of money was transferred after the completion of the management plan (MoU Gov Suriname - CI, 1998). This shows that there was quite some time pressure from CI Washington involved designating the protected area within a short time. Eventually CI Washington transferred more than US \$2 million to the SCF^{76,79} (SCF website, 2011). Furthermore, CI has positioned themselves as influential board members in the SCF, while they are not subjected to the dispensation period of two years (see section 7.1). In this way, CI Washington still plays a role in the spending of the fund's money. Although it is not clear how they exactly execute their influence, it follows from these facts that they play an important role. The local organisation of CI in Suriname was assigned to develop the CSNR management plan. This was done by the director Mr. Stan Malone while Mr. Chuck Hutchinson took over this task

⁷⁴ Interview Mrs. M. Playfair, Former employee at the Forest Service of the Government, 03-11-2010

⁷⁵ Conversation Mr. I. Derveld, Employee at Conservation International, TEAM Researcher, 13-11-2010

⁷⁶ Interview Mrs. A. Tjon Sie Fat, current Director of Conservation International Suriname, 12-10-2010

⁷⁷ Interview Mr. S. Malone, first Director of Conservation International Suriname (1992-1998), 03-11-2010

⁷⁸ Interview Mr. R. Nelson, Employee and Co-founder Conservation International Suriname, 22-10-2010

⁷⁹ Interview Mr. S. Malone, first Director of Conservation International Suriname (1992-1998), 03-11-2010

when Mr. Malone got ill⁸⁰. The consultation workshops organized for the development of the plan were of Surinamese character. This is illustrated by the fact that the participants of the stakeholder meeting in February 2001 decided to use SrananTongo, the local language, as the medium for the meeting (CPW, 2001).

From this division of tasks between CI Washington and CI Suriname follows that CI Washington was mainly involved in the establishment of the reserve and the financial matters, while CI Suriname was assigned with the practical implementation of the plans in Suriname. After the agreement between Wijdenbosch and Mittermeijer, the discussion on the CSNR was transformed to a lower political and organizational level, where the plans stagnated.

The vision of the Surinamese stakeholders on the role of CI in the CSNR process has both a positive and a negative side. To start, the designation of the CSNR nature reserve is viewed in general, by both the national institutions as the local communities in the interior, as very positive. Most respondents realise that CI took the initiative to establish the reserve, and therefore the organisation receives quite some credits^{81,82,83,84}. Furthermore, CI provided the possibility to qualify the CSNR as a World Heritage Site. The success of this initiative meant for Suriname an improvement of their image and more publicity on an international level. According to the former Minister of Natural Resource, Mr. Alibux, CI is fair-dealing with their case of nature protection⁸⁵. Also in the interior of Suriname, some of the activities of CI worked out very well. It was stated that CI works as an eye-opener for the local communities in the interior⁸⁶. CI involves these communities in decision making and therefore brings a mind-shift to the practice of nature conservation activities in Suriname⁸⁷. In this way, the people from CI are better known in the village of Witagron than the people from the national forest service or STINASU. The local villagers of Witagron have a negative view on these governmental institutions, as one of the respondents stated: 'the forest service and STINASU work here for over 40 years, but nothing has improved in that period'⁸⁸. On the contrary, CI is viewed by the villagers as an organization with quite some good intentions⁸⁹. However, they hardly get anything done⁸⁸ because of disputes with the national institutions⁸⁹. At the Raleighvallen, CI renovated the tourist facilities, where they also worked with local communities. The employees at the Raleighvallen view CI as an organisation who gets things done and brings improvement to their situation⁹⁰.

On the other side, CI has also received some major critiques. Although their initiative to establish the CSNR was very good, they positioned themselves too dominantly in the management of the area^{82,91}. Moreover, CI ideally wanted to get authority to manage the

⁸⁰ Interview Mrs. A. Tjon Sie Fat, current Director of Conservation International Suriname, 12-10-2010

⁸¹ Interview Mrs. G. Landburg, Former Educational Supervisor at Conservation International, 02-11-2010

⁸² Interview Mr. H. Sijlbing, Former director of STINASU (1997-2003), 01-11-2011

⁸³ Anonymous respondent

⁸⁴ Interview Mr. R. van Kanten, Program Director of Tropenbos, former TEAM coordinator, 02-11-2010

⁸⁵ Interview Mr. J. Wijdenbosch and Mr. E. Alibux, Former Prime Minister of Suriname and Former Minister of Natural Resources (1996-1999), 08-12-2010

⁸⁶ Interview Mr. M. Clemens, Kwinti, Chair of the Youth organization of Witagron, 08-12-2010

⁸⁷ Interview Mr. K.M. Tjon, Former Head Research Section of the Government Forest Service, 10-12-2010

⁸⁸ Interview with Emanuels Edwin Henrik, Kwinti living in Witagron, 02-12-2010

⁸⁹ Interview Mr. G. Emanuel (Palika), Kwinti, one of the eldest villagers of Witagron

⁹⁰ Interview with 8 employees at the Raleighvallen, boatmen, guides and field workers, 12-11-2010

⁹¹ Interview Mrs. G. Landburg, Former Educational Supervisor at Conservation International, 02-11-2010

CSNR^{92,93}. Although this authority was never given to the organisation, their positioning in the management of the CSNR affected their image in Suriname. Several employees at the forest service and STINASU already had a negative view on international organizations in general. There is not much trust in these organizations within the Surinamese politics. As Mr. Kasantantaroeno, the director of STINASU states ‘we do not believe in international donors, they bring you from one stop to the other’⁹⁴. Also according to Mrs. Merton, head of the forest service, the role and attitude of international NGOs in Suriname is problematic, they bypass the government and work directly with local communities⁹⁵. The dominant positioning of CI only worsened this view on the organization, and the government therefore did not want to lose any control over the area. Moreover, both people from the national institutions, as well as some employees at Raleighvallen began to suspect CI from working with more than one agenda^{96,97}. As CI did not seem to adapt their programme to the national Surinamese agenda, the distrust in the organization rose. At the same time, this dominant attitude of CI originated from a lack of trust in the national institutions of Suriname to successfully implement the management plan in the CSNR^{98,99}. In this way, the distrust between CI and the Surinamese government reinforced each other. Although both actors have quite some common interests which could strengthen each other, this did not happen. The next chapter will theoretically analyse the developments and the role of CI in the CSNR case in further detail.

⁹² Interview Mr. O. Ottema, Former STINASU employee, 12-10-2010

⁹³ Interview Mr. J. Wijdenbosch and Mr. E. Alibux, Former Prime Minister of Suriname and Former Minister of Natural Resources (1996-1999), 08-12-2010

⁹⁴ Conversation Mr. F. Kasantantaroeno, Current director of STINASU, 08-11-2010

⁹⁵ Interview Mrs. Y. Merton and Mrs. C. Sakimin, Head of the Forest Service and Head of the Nature Conservation Division of the Government, 23-11-2010

⁹⁶ Interview Mr. S. Emanuel, Manager of tourist facilities on Fungu-island at the Raleighvallen, 12-11-2010

⁹⁷ Interview Mr. H. Sijlbing, Former director of STINASU (1997-2003), 01-11-2011

⁹⁸ Conversation Mr. I. Derveld, Employee at Conservation International, TEAM Researcher, 13-11-2010

⁹⁹ Interview Mr. M. Clemens, Kwinti, Chair of the Youth organization of Witagron, 08-12-2010

9 New governance arrangements analyzed

Now that the main empirical data concerning the CSNR and the role of CI is described, the conceptual framework can be applied and analysed with this case. This chapter will first apply the general transforming governance theories to the case in Suriname. Thereafter, the cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government is analysed. Then, the challenges and opportunities that arise from the transformed conservation conditions are explored. Finally, there are some conservation governance insights presented resulting from the analysis.

9.1 Transformed governance theory applied

The transformed conservation conditions on a global level are represented in the case of the CSNR in Suriname. The two relevant developments of recent literature mentioned in the conceptual frame are applicable to Suriname. First, the changing role of the sovereign nation-state; the formation and the management of the CSNR were mainly based on an international interest in biodiversity protection. The national forests of Suriname became increasingly of international concern. While the forest service of the Surinamese government was much more locally oriented and lacked human and financial resources they were not able to deal with the international interests. Secondly, the rise of international NGOs; the initiative of the CSNR formation and management came from CI. The conservation NGO assisted the Surinamese government to internationalize the protection of their tropical rainforests. Moreover, the initiative to establish the reserve came completely from CI. They presented the idea to the government on the highest political level and convinced them from the utility of the protection of the large area. The fast designation of the reserve was even stimulated with financial means. In this way, the theories of transforming governance on a global level are applicable to this case. As Mc Arthur (2006) argues that traditional governments, bound by old borders, are unable to protect their governing capabilities across those borders with the same agility that non-state actors can. This was also the case in Suriname, as the capacity of the forest service was far from competent to deal with these issues by themselves. The Surinamese government was indeed taking part in transnational, polycentric networks of governance, while they were no longer the key driver in conservation activities. This was illustrated by the quote of the head of the NCD when he was talking about the establishment of the CSNR 'suddenly you have to join an already driving train'. However, without the agreement of the Surinamese government the establishment of the CSNR would not have been possible. Protected areas are anchored in the national law of Suriname, and therefore CI needed the government to adopt the resolution under the Nature Protection Act of 1954. In this way, CI was dependent on the government and the theory that states remain an important actor in international environmental is confirmed by this case.

9.2 Cooperation between CI and Surinamese government

The above described transformations of conservation governance gave new conditions to nature conservation in Suriname. The cooperation between the Surinamese government and the global NGO CI is central in these new nature conservation conditions. Therefore, this section will analyse the background and the results of this cooperation.

The cooperation regarding the CSNR started on the highest political level; the President of CI Washington presented his idea to establish the CSNR to the President of Suriname. As the country was in a difficult position at that time – economic crisis and international critique because of large logging concessions – they had little room for manoeuvre. Therefore, the plan of CI's president Mittermeijer – which also would provide a financial means for nature conservation in Suriname - was quickly accepted by the government. Some difficult conversations preceded the agreement, because CI wanted more authority over the area than the government could accept. Therefore, the MoU between CI and the government did not include anything about the CSNR management authority. The formation of the reserve had several important effects on an international level; the positive publicity for Suriname, the inscription of the area on the UNESCO world heritage list and the international funds that came available for Suriname. These effects would have never happened without the involvement of CI in Suriname. In this way, CI was very instrumental to bring Surinamese nature conservation activities to an international level. This resulted in both the protection of a large globally important biodiversity area as well as the provision of funds for the development of Suriname. In this way, the cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government showed to have effective results.

After the formation of the CSNR, the cooperation between CI and the Surinamese Government continued on a lower political level. CI Suriname took the lead in the development of a management plan. Although CI made an effort to include the vision of all the stakeholders, they did not find an agreement with the Surinamese government on the CSNR management authority. The government did not accept their position in the management authority proposed by CI. Moreover, although the forest service did not have a competent capacity, they claimed exclusive responsibility to govern the CSNR. CI did not agree with this claim, the disagreement remained and the implementation of the plan never started properly. Neither the people from CI Suriname nor the government officials took the initiative to open up a constructive dialogue on this disagreement. In this way, the cooperation between CI and the government stagnated. From the point that CI Suriname withdrew from the CSNR implementation projects, the cooperation between CI and the government basically stopped. Without this cooperation, the funds from the SCF did not become available for the government, and the situation had not much changed from before the establishment of the reserve; a lack of financial resources at the forest service to employ game keepers to control the area. On the contrary to the formation of the reserve, the cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government regarding the CSNR management on a local level stagnated and was therefore not effective at all.

9.3 Challenges arising from new conservation conditions

The described changed conditions for nature conservation, gave rise to new challenges in policy making. Because these challenges can explain the stagnation in the cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government, these are analyzed here. It is hoped to contribute to a better understanding of what challenges a large NGO and a local government need to overcome for successful cooperation.

As stated, the cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government stagnated because there was no agreement on the how the responsibilities regarding the management of the CSNR would be divided. Both the Surinamese government as well as CI wanted to be in control of the area and the international funds. Firstly, this can be explained by the largest challenge of the cooperation; a lack of trust between the two institutions. This distrust started already with the formation of the reserve, where CI aimed to dominate the management of the area. This probably originated from the lack of capacity within the government institutions of Suriname. The attitude of CI caused distrust within the Surinamese government towards CI. At the same time, the claim of the government to take the full responsibility of the CSNR management increased the distrust of CI in the government. Thereafter, CI withdrew from the activities in the CSNR and the Surinamese government ended up with the full authority on the CSNR management but without access to the funding. These events that urged the distrust between CI and the government reinforced each other, and are therefore represented in a distrust cycle (Figure 10). This distrust is therefore a great challenge to overcome in order to create effective cooperation between a local government and a global NGO. Besides this distrust, there were also some other characteristics of the cooperation between the government and the NGO that challenged successful cooperation.

A second challenge was the differences between the two institutions which played an important role. Mainly the organizational differences between the government of Suriname and CI complicated the cooperation. The large NGO is used to implementing policies rapidly and on an international scale. CI is organized professionally, with substantial funds, capable




Figure 10 Distrust cycle between CI and the Surinamese government

people, a large network and access to updated information. On the contrary, the government of Suriname faces a lack of the majority of these factors for a successful organization. The forest service has a shortage of employees, they lack financial means and they are much more locally oriented. Their working style is based on laws from the 1950s and changes in the organization proceed slowly. CI on the other hand is a much younger and more flexible organization. Their policies are changing continuously and new working methods are also implemented faster. Therefore, the working styles of these institutions did not match and it was hard to find agreement about the management method for the CSNR. CI was in favour of a modern governance style where all stakeholders were involved in the decision-making, while the Surinamese government wanted to base the management structure on the nature conservation law of 1954. Because both parties could not convince each other of their method, the cooperation stagnated.

A third challenging factor in the cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government was the lack of a stable frame at the forest service of the government. Because of the limited capacity of the Surinamese government, they were not able to steer the involvement of the large NGO CI. The national conservation procedures, rules and employees were incapable of managing the involvement of the international organization. In this way, CI was able to impose their ideas on Suriname. The Government was not capable to include these ideas in their own policies and cooperate with CI in an equivalent way. Because of the lack of capacity to deal with these ideas, the government was only able to block the project as a whole, instead of cooperating with CI in an equivalent way. In this way CI was not able to successfully implement their ideas in Suriname and the cooperation stagnated.

Thirdly, the working strategy of CI challenged successful cooperation between CI and the government. In the case of the CSNR, CI's approach was very strategic and focused on fast and effective accomplishments. The idea of the formation of the reserve was directly proposed to the highest political level of the Surinamese government. Although this strategy turned out to be very effective on the formation of the reserve, it caused complications for further implementation of CI's ideas. Because the establishment of the reserve proceeded very fast, this was not negotiated with the people on a lower political level who would be in charge of the management of the area. Furthermore, there was no plan developed for the management authority on the high political level. Therefore, it was no wonder that a disagreement occurred on the management structure and the implementation stagnated on the lower political level.

9.4 Opportunities arising from new conservation conditions

Besides the challenges CI and the Surinamese government faced in their cooperation, there were also some opportunities arising from the transformed nature conservation conditions. This analysis can also contribute to make full use of the opportunities arising from the transformed conditions conservation for successful cooperation.

As already described, the increased influence of CI in Suriname has brought several positive effects to the country. Because biodiversity loss is increasingly an issue of global concern, the national government of Suriname increasingly needs international partners to deal with the issue. In this way, the case of the CSNR shows that several opportunities arise from the transformed governance conditions. In the first place, the internationalization of national issues is stimulated by the involvement of international NGOs in developing nation-states. The forest

service of the Surinamese government was very locally oriented in the 1990s. They had hardly any experience with international donors and were not aware of the possibilities of these donors. As a consequence, the Surinamese government saw the large scale logging of their forests as the single possibility to improve the economic situation of the country. In this way CI was in the perfect position to mobilize the international community to oppose these plans. As they also had a more sustainable alternative with international funding on the table, the choice for the Surinamese government was not hard to make. However, without the assistance of CI, the international community would not have been mobilized and the international funding would not have become available. Therefore, the internationalization of issues can be very important in countries like Suriname. It can make local government officials aware of what the global interest of their national property is. The presence of the international NGO CI defended this global interest while at the same time providing a solution for a more sustainable development path for Suriname.

A second opportunity arising from the transformed nature conservation conditions is the contribution of the large conservation NGO to the improvement of the governments' capacity for nature conservation. As described, the countries where most of the earth's biodiversity is located are the countries with weak government institutions to properly manage their natural resources. Therefore, the presence of an NGO like CI in such a country can be very instrumental in improving the nature conservation institutions. In Suriname the capacity of the forest service is very limited; they lack financial and human resources, which make the proper protection of high biodiversity areas very hard. The continuous shortage of equipment and fuel cause that most gamekeepers are in town, instead of working in the field to protect the high biodiversity areas. With the assistance of international NGOs like CI, the forest service in Suriname can increase their access to international funding. These funds from international institutions like the UNDP and the GEF can be used to invest in the protected area management system of countries like Suriname. This provides the possibility to improve the management of protected areas, which can result in better safeguarded biodiversity which is both of national as well as of global interest.

A final and third opportunity arising from the cooperation between a global NGO and a local government is the increased access to a large network and updated information. International conservation NGOs like CI bring these networks and knowledge to the states in which they operate. As these states have generally weak institutions, they lack the capacity for example to keep up with updated conservation knowledge and they do not have access to adequate experts to investigate their high biodiversity areas. It is therefore a great opportunity for these countries like Suriname to make use of these valuable tools global NGOs bring to their country. This was demonstrated by the example in Suriname of the CSNR inscription as a World Heritage site. This was only possible due to CI's network and knowledge about the UNESCO procedures.

9.5 Resulting conservation governance insights

The transformed nature conservation conditions – where conservation NGOs became increasingly influential in weak high biodiversity states – resulted in new governance arrangements in Suriname. This section will first evaluate the transformed position and influence of CI and the Surinamese government in the conservation practice. Furthermore, these new governance arrangements will be placed in a broader context, to evaluate the

involvement of other stakeholders in a multi-level governance model. This section will conclude with an examination of the literature on conservation NGOs presented in the conceptual frame. Due to the involvement of CI in Suriname, a large nature reserve of global importance was established and international funding became available for nature conservation in Suriname. The small and locally oriented forest service suddenly had to deal with these international powers. Although the large NGO CI seems to have become very powerful in nature conservation on a global level, they were still dependent on the small government of Suriname to be able to carry out their plans. At the point of the CSNR management implementation the government did not agree with CI but was not able cooperate with CI in an equitable way. Therefore, their only possibility was to block the management implementation by drawing the full authority towards themselves. At this point, CI was not able to assist the government anymore and the cooperation stopped. In this way, nature conservation remains a place-bounded activity where the state still have power but with little room for manoeuvre. The international NGO showed some powerful tools to internationalize and protect the threatened forests of Suriname, but in the end they were still dependent on the Surinamese government.




Figure 11 Multi-level governance scheme

If one places the implementation and the development of the CSNR management plan in a broader governance context, with the inclusion of all main stakeholders, an interesting picture arises. The local employees at the Raleighvallen area, where CI started improving the tourist facilities, view CI as an organization who get things done and could improve their poor situation. On the contrary, their vision on the national institutions, the forest service of the government and STINASU, is much worse. These local employees welcome the cooperation with the international NGO, even without permission of their national institutions. The same situation

can be seen in the local village near the reserve where the villagers have a negative view on the national institutions. CI on the other hand, works with the local people and is viewed to function as an eye opener in the interior. Furthermore, as already described, the cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government faced some difficulties. Because of different reasons this cooperation stagnated. If one represents this situation in a multi governance scheme, the picture presented in Figure 11 arises. The connectivity between the international donors and CI with the local villagers and employees is a lot better than the connectivity of these institutions with the national government of Suriname. The national institutions were in the case of the CSNR the complicating factor which blocked the implementation of the management plan. The role of large conservation NGOs was questioned in the literature as described in the conceptual frame. International conservation NGOs were accused of growing too powerful while they would partner with large corporations and ignore the local social values in their working areas. However, these critiques can be questioned on the basis of this case of CI in Suriname. First, the financial means in the CSNR project mainly originated from the GEF. Although it is not clear where the funds of CI came from, most probably there were no corporate interests involved in the CSNR case. This first critique is therefore not applicable to CI in this Surinamese case. Furthermore, CI was the institution that took the initiative to involve local people in the decision making of the CSNR management plan. In the CSNR case, CI was better at the inclusion of local social values in the interior than the governmental institutions were. Therefore, the second critique that large conservation NGOs would exclude local social values is also not applicable to this case. The theories on large conservation NGOs can in this way not explain the stagnation of the management implementation. Following from this research, future studies should focus more on the governmental institutions in these weak states with biodiversity of global importance and how those institutions successfully can be empowered by international organizations like large conservation NGOs.

10 Conclusion and Recommendations

Resulting from the analysis in the previous chapter, this chapter will shortly summarize the conclusions for each research question. The first three questions will deal with the new conservation governance arrangements while the final research question will summarize some recommendations following from this study.

1. How are the current conditions for nature conservation manifested in the cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government?

CI internationalized the issue of nature conservation in Suriname, where the Surinamese government was very much locally oriented. Their national conservation institutions were very weak and could not cooperate with CI in an equitable way. While CI aimed to take the lead in the protection of the CSNR, the government did not want to lose any control over their land. As a result the cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government stagnated. Subsequently, the international funding did not come available and the CSNR management plan was never implemented. In this way, conservation remains a place bounded activity where, though the state institutions are weak and have little room for manoeuvre, they still play an essential role.

2. What effects did the cooperation between Conservation International and the Surinamese government had on nature conservation practices in Suriname?

The cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government was successful on the formation of the reserve, which had some important positive effects on an international level; the inscription of the area as a World Heritage site, the resulting positive international publicity of Suriname and the establishment of a large fund for nature conservation in Suriname. However, the local implementation of these funds was less effective – as the funds never came available for tourism projects and conservation activities at the CSNR. Therefore, the local effects of the cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government were minimal.

3. What challenges and opportunities arise from the current nature conservation conditions regarding the cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government?

The main challenge arising from the current nature conservation conditions is the lack of trust between the Surinamese government and CI. This is shown to be essential for successful cooperation between the local government and the global NGO in Suriname. The main opportunity arising from the current nature conservation conditions was the internationalization of biodiversity protection by a large NGO in a weak state. CI played a very valuable role by taking the issue of nature conservation in Suriname to an international level.

4. What can on the basis of this study be recommended theoretically for future research and practically to the conservation institutions in Suriname?

First, this study does not confirm the concerns on large conservation NGOs presented in literature. The partnering with large corporations and the exclusion of local social values by these NGOs was not applicable to this case. This research shows that the lack of capacity within the national institutions appeared to be the main complicating factor for successful nature conservation governance. Therefore, future research should focus on the governments of high biodiversity states. Do the national institutions of other high biodiversity states also form the main bottleneck for successful nature conservation? How can these governments then best be empowered to ensure the protection of globally important biodiversity areas?

Secondly, a practical recommendation is directed towards the main challenge identified in the analysis; the lack of trust. The cooperation between CI and the Surinamese government should therefore be improved by organizing trust building activities. For example, an open dialogue between the two institutions where both parties can honestly express their interests, concerns and intentions regarding the CSNR. Furthermore, both parties should respect the differences in organizational characteristics and be willing to learn from each other's strategies. Finally, both CI as well as the Surinamese government should realize that they need each other for a successful nature conservation practice in current times of globalization. If cooperation is stimulated in this way, the effectiveness of protected area management can be greatly improved which will benefit both local development as well as global biodiversity protection.

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Appendix 1: Respondents

Institution / Stakeholder	Names of the Respondents	Function
Forest Service of the Surinamese Government (7)	Mrs. Y. Merton Mrs. C. Sakimin Mr. F. Baal Mr. S. Prika Mr. R. HoTsoi Mr. K. M. Tjon Mrs. M. Playfair	Head of the Forest Service Head of the Nature Conservation Division Former Head of the Nature Conservation Division Gamekeeper of Nature Conservation Division (in the Raleighvallen area) Gamekeeper of Nature Conservation Division (in the Raleighvallen area) Former employee at Forest Service (currently working at NARENA) Former employee at Forest Service (currently working at CELOS)
Project Implementation Unit (1)	Mr. G. Fagon	Current head of PIU
STINASU (6)	Mr. Sijlbing Mr. Ramcharan Mr. K. Cyrus Mr. F. Kasantaroeno Mr. B. de Dijn Mr. O. Ottema	Former Director of STINASU Employee at research division of STINASU Head tourism at STINASU Director of STINASU Former head of research division of STINASU Former bird expert of STINASU
Surinam's President and Minister of Natural Resources in 1998 (2)	Mr. J. Wijdenbosch	Former President of Suriname
Conservation International (3)	Mr. E. Alibux Mrs. A. TjonSie Fat Mr. R. Nelson Mr. I. Derveld	Former Minister of Natural Resources Director of CI Suriname
Suriname Conservation Foundation (1)	Mr. S. Malone	First Director of CI Suriname, currently project manager at SCF
Anton de Kom University Suriname (ADEKUS) (3)	Mr. P. Ouboter Mr. F. Vd Lugt Mrs. G. Landburg	Head of
Employees Raleighvallen (3)	Mr. S. Emanuel Mr. Humphry Other employees at group meeting	
Villagers of Witagron and Kaaimanston (10)	Mr. C. Clemens 2 Captain 1 Basja 2 women 3 men	

	Mr. M. Clemens	
Tropenbos	Mr. R. van Kanten	Director of Tropenbos Suriname
Environmental journalist	Mrs. R. Vd Kooije	
Touroperators	Mrs. A. Gummels	Tropical Gem
	Mr. Esaies	Blue Frog Travel
WWF	Mr. A. Moredjo	Director of WWF Suriname
Anonymous respondent (1)		

Appendix 2: Example of interview

Questions Stan Malone (Suriname Conservation Foundation)

Introduction of me and my research: "I am Liset Meddens, a Dutch student 'International Development studies' at the Wageningen University and I am graduating in 'Environmental Policy'. I am in the last phase of my study and I came to Suriname for my graduation research. I focus mainly on the policy development and the management of the Central Suriname Nature Reserve. My research will be focusing on the role of Conservation International (CI) with the management of the CSNR, because it is interesting to see how an international organization operates on a local level in a small country in development like Suriname".

General introduction

An introduction of you, your background and your work at the SCF.

Suriname Conservation Foundation – organizational

1. What is the background of SCF in Suriname? How was the organization established?
2. What are the current goals and activities of the SCF in Suriname?
3. How is the SCF organized? Who participates in the board? How often do they meet?
4. To what extent is the SCF supported by CI?

CSNR – management

5. Where did the initiative came from to unite the 3 nature areas (Tafelberg, Raleighvallen and Eilerts de Haan) into 1 large nature reserve? On what motivation was this initiative based?
6. How did the management of the large area change in comparison to the management of the three smaller areas?
7. What was the role of the SCF with the formation of the CSNR? Were there donors involved with the drafting of the management plan?
8. What is the role of the SCF currently with the management of the CSNR? What happens currently?
9. Which projects were supported by the SCF financially? How are the project proposals handled?
10. What is according to you the effect of the changed management structure in the nature reserve?

CSNR - actors

11. Who are, according to you, the main actors of the establishment of the CSNR? And at this moment with the management of the CSNR?
12. With which stakeholders did you cooperate mostly with regard to the management of the CSNR?
13. What is your vision on the role of CI with the whole CSNR procedure? How do you see the role of CI currently with regard to the management of the CSNR?

To conclude

- Do you have any documents, regarding the CSNR, which I can look into?
- Can you recommend other contact persons for my research?
- Can I contact you, if necessary, in a later stage of my research for more information or questions?

Appendix 3: The CSNR state decision

This picture represents the geographical representation of how the CSNR is included in the state decision. It shows the map of Suriname, while the darker area represents the protected area. There are thus some major mistakes made with the writing up of the coordinates. This problem has not been solved since the establishment of the reserve in 1998.

