Think Big, Start Small

Restricted Room for Manoeuvre by Practitioners in Socio-Spatial Planning of Peripheral Regions in Third World Countries

Allert van den Ham
Jan Veenstra
STELLINGEN

BEHOORENDE BIJ HET PROEFSCHRIFT:

THINK BIG, START SMALL

RESTRICTED ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE BY PRACTITIONERS IN SOCIO-SPATIAL PLANNING OF PERIPHERAL REGIONS IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

1. To achieve normative changes in area development policies of recipient countries, a foreign-funded development initiative staffed with expatriates is not an appropriate instrument (this thesis);

2. The main function of regional development practitioners is to engage various stakeholders in the debate on development, facilitate the process of jointly (re)interpreting reality, link that interpretation to new goals and translate these into effective support policies based on shared norms (this thesis);

3. Undeservedly, skills related to communication, negotiation and conflict resolution have received less attention in academic education on regional development than skills pertaining to substantive and procedural issues (this thesis);

4. In the selection process of expatriate development practitioners for overseas assignments more attention should be paid to their positioning with respect to the normative and strategic aspects in previous engagements instead of mainly focusing on the number of years working experience, country experience, preparedness to stay in peripheral areas etc. (this thesis);

5. In an era of globalisation considerable attention has to be paid to the regional aspects of development (this thesis);

6. 'You might just as well say,' added the March Hare, 'that "I like what I get" is the same thing as "I get what I like"?'. (Lewis Carroll (1865/1994). Alice’s adventures in Wonderland, Penguin Popular Classics p. 82). Quite wrongly the absence of protest against certain development initiatives is interpreted as broad support for them.

7. '...civilization is always a process: not a being but a becoming'. (Alex Aronson as quoted by Gita Mehta (1998) in Snakes and Ladders. Glimpses of Modern India. Vintage, London, p.164). The expectation that development practitioners at some time will have accomplished their task is a serious mistake.

8. Taking cello lessons at an advanced age forces to question the feasibility of the concept of life-long learning.

Allert van den Ham, 2000
Stellingen

Behorende bij het proefschrift:

Think big, start small

Restricted room for manoeuvre by practitioners in socio-spatial planning of peripheral regions in third world countries

1. Contradictions and paradoxes, both in theorising and moral justifications, form the creative kindling for furthering human thought and practice, - making life a risky, if not a tragic affair (this thesis' subsections 2.0.3 to 2.2.1).

2. In their minds area development practitioners have been hopping to and fro, like kangaroos, between substantive, procedural, politico-institutional and moral issues, - making their professional life mostly an emotivist affair (this thesis' sections 2.1 and 2.2).

3. Instead of being entrapped by a universal truth and definitely prioritised sustainability criteria, 'planistrators' are continuously in search of shared meanings and grounded knowledge along lifelong learning routes (this thesis' section 6.3).


5. Particularly poetic metaphors and graphic pictures, quietly or anxiously, expose inner-guiding signposts, constituting personal identity themes which in practice we construct and criticise, learn and mislearn, - in short we are closely living by and partly burying again as waste material (Jacobson, 1964; Lichtenstein, 1977; Erikson,1980/94; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Richardson, 1990/96).

6. Our mental frames keep being doctored. We sail on troubled seas but may never be allowed ashore, being captured by our common images and re-fabricating them. Nevertheless, fundamental realisation of our nothingness is not something 'underneath' to be anxious about when these constructs fail enduringly to put us safely ashore (P. Tillich, 1955. The Courage to Be; Assagioli,1965,Part 1; Masao Abe, 1985. Zen and Western Thought, Part II; Arundati Roy, 1997. The God of Small Things, p. 53).

Jan Veenstra, 2000
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Think Big, Start Small

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BANGDA</td>
<td>Department of regional development within the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAPPEDA Tk I</td>
<td>Provincial level Development Planning Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAPPEDA Tk II</td>
<td>District level Development Planning Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAPPENAS</td>
<td>National Development Planning Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHN</td>
<td>Basic Human Needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bupati</td>
<td>Chief administrative government official of a district, or Kabupaten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camat</td>
<td>Chief administrative government official of a sub-district, or Kecamatan</td>
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<td>CANARD</td>
<td>Central and North Aceh Regional Development Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Concentrated Development Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>Desa</td>
<td>Javanese word for a village or rural community, often used interchangeable with the more urban kelurahan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dinas</td>
<td>Office of a provincial government in specific fields (e.g. agriculture, health, industry) at the provincial and district levels. It reports to the governor or the bupati but receives technical direction from the appropriate central government department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBSI</td>
<td>All Indonesia Federation of Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBHN</td>
<td>Broad Outlines of State Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GPV</td>
<td>Gross Production Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRDP</td>
<td>Gross Regional Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICMI</td>
<td>Indonesian Association of Islamic Intellectuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDAP</td>
<td>Institutional Development Assistance Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inpres</td>
<td>Presidential instruction-based subsidies of various types to the local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRDP</td>
<td>Integrated Rural Development Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabotabek</td>
<td>An acronym for the greater Jakarta region comprising Jakarta-Bogor-Tangerang-Bekasi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kabupaten</td>
<td>Sub-provincial administrative district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandep</td>
<td>Representative office of national sectoral department at district level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanwil</td>
<td>Representative office of national sectoral department at provincial level</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Kecamatan administrative division (sub-district) of the Kabupaten or Kotamadya
KORPRI (Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia) Organisation of Indonesian Civil Servants
Kotamadya municipality, having the same status as a Kabupaten
KPS (Kerangka Pembangunan Strategis) Strategic Development Framework
KUD (Koperasi Unit Desa) government-supported village co-operative
LADPM Local Area Development Planning and Management
LDA Local Development Authority
LKMD (Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa) Village Resilience Organisation
LMD (Lembaga Masyarakat Desa) Village Community Council
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
LSM (Lembaga Masyarakat Desa) Non Governmental Organisation
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
NPV Net Production Value
NRM Natural Resource Management
M/E Monitoring and Evaluation
MRDP Micro-regional Development Planning
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
P.D. (Perusahaan Daerah) para-statal under jurisdiction of the regional government
PDP Provincial Area Development Programme
Pemda (Pemerintah Daerah) Regional Government
PMO Project Management Office
Pola Dasar long term development outlines
PPKA (Pabrik Prossing Kopi Arabika) small Arabica coffee processing unit
PPW (Programme Pengembangan Wilayah) Provincial Area Development Programme
Rakorbang (Rapat Kordinasi pembangunan) Development Co-ordination meeting at provincial or district level
RAKORNAS (Rapat Kordinasi pembangunan Nasional) Development Co-ordination meeting at national level
REPELITA (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun) Five-Year Development Plan
RIDEP Regional Integrated Development Plan
Sawah rice field
SBSI (Serikat Buruh Seluruh Indonesia) All Indonesia Association of Workers
Schedops Schedule of Operations
SD Sustainable Development
SDF Strategic Development Framework
Temu Karya Working Session (of UDKP)
TFYP Third Five Year Plan
UB (Usaha Bersama) Literally a 'joint effort', reference to a pre-co-operative
UDKP (Unit Daerah Kerja Bangunan) Area Working Unit for Development
UNSYIAH Syah Kuala University in Banda Aceh
Walikota mayor of a municipality (kotamadya)
After respectively completing our studies in 1966 in Irrigation and Water Engineering at Wageningen Agricultural University (Veenstra) and Geography of Developing Countries in 1982 at the Catholic University of Nijmegen (van den Ham) we both set out to Third World countries to test our received knowledge under practical conditions in remote areas. In the years that followed, we have continued to be involved in various capacities in the 'business' of international development co-operation: in overseas consultancy services, teaching and training in both the Netherlands as well in developing countries, or as manager in a donor-agency. Yet, over the years and irrespective of the particular capacity we were acting in, we have both always been puzzled by the question what we actually drove to do what we were doing: what made us in practice opt for certain objectives and approaches and reject others? To what extent were such choices influenced by our own value-based, normative judgements on what is good or bad for mankind, by prevailing scientific knowledge on what works and what not, and/or by particular conditions that practically limit the variety of options and steer the course of development almost forcibly in a certain direction? In other words, which processes bring about the shifts in thinking about and, more particular in the case of this study, in the commonalities of practical, sustainable development planning and managing of its results? This is quite a big subject, and the mere diversity of environments across the globe and their constant evolution make each generalisation also quite risky. In this study, we have reflected on our experiences at field level and presented our own selective, exploratory perspective on the process of turning practical and theoretical knowledge into practice at field level. We focus on the analysis of common dynamics in the link between our own personal and professional experiences and the scientific and professional bodies of commonly accepted -some would say fashionable- knowledge during the last four decades within the context of the locally prevailing, dominant political, socio-economic and administrative settings. As a result we hope to contribute to a better understanding of what happens where for what reason in the world of planning and management of socio-spatial development efforts to combat poverty at local level. Based on our understanding of that process some suggestions are made for educating future batches of development practitioners.

Although both of us depart from a common theoretical basis as presented in the first chapter, and a certain level of comprehensiveness in terms of the research questions is aimed at in the following parts, it will not escape the attention of the reader that the later sections reflect to a certain extent our different backgrounds and interests. The chapters by Veenstra are written from the perspective of natural resource management with the emphasis on substantive and procedural aspects of development planning, whereas van den Ham focuses more on the organisational and institutional aspects within the context of bi-lateral development co-operation projects. Together, these are hoped to provide a sufficiently broad coverage of the various issues at stake.
Acknowledgements

by Allert van den Ham

This thesis is not the result of a carefully planned research proposal. It is based upon experiences gained and data collected while working in Indonesia between 1984 and 1992; these mostly have been recorded in a pile of reports, notes, articles and diaries. At one time I had planned to do more systematic research but my plans were prematurely interrupted when the development co-operation relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands suddenly were severed and we had to leave the country within thirty days. Back in the Netherlands I was absorbed in family life and my work at Novib (Netherlands Organisation for International Development Co-operation). Writing a PhD. thesis was not any longer part of my priorities, or at least, not until that afternoon in December 1996 when more or less by accident I met Jan Veenstra again. He had been my team-leader during my first stint in Aceh (1984-86) and then had introduced me to a wealth of experience and academic knowledge. Over the years we had regularly kept contact but still it came as a surprise when he called me shortly after our meeting to ask whether I would be interested in joining forces and write down our experiences. In short, this was the start of a process of close collaboration that finally resulted in this thesis. This is the place to thank him very much for dragging me into this rewarding experience and for his meticulous, critical, and above all constructive comments and support. Jan Veenstra also brought me back into contact with Prof. dr. ir. Dirk van Dusseldorp and Prof. dr. Jos Hilhorst whom I had met in the previous twenty years on various occasions as teachers, evaluators and advisors and who this time expressed their willingness to act as strict supervisors of this thesis, for which I express my gratitude.

Writing a thesis has often been described as a lonely job. However, I have never felt lonely while working on it. Even when sitting alone behind my computer in the evening hours and during the weekends, I always felt the presence of the people who had stimulated me to embark upon this ambitious course, who (un)consciously contributed to this thesis over the past 15 years and thus had a hand in making it possible. They are too many to be mentioned one by one but my gratitude to all the colleagues, partners, farmers and friends is none the less for it. Yet, I would like to express my special thanks to a few of them: to Bram Heijboer for the friendship, for offering me a rewarding opportunity to work closely with Indonesian staff and local population in a unique development experiment and for continuously showing his commitment to a worthy cause. Mansur Mohammed Kiran showed me through his personal dedication how to engage farmer communities in a complicated development process. Ton van Naerssen stimulated me to seriously study spatial development theory. Paul Hoebink gave helpful comments on chapter 3. Right from our student days until now Chris Eijkemans was a constant and true companion in my professional and private life and offered useful comments on parts of the draft as did Paul Hoebink. Johan Gaertner spent long hours making this thesis print-ready. I thank them all.

Finally, I express my gratitude to my father who after all made it possible for me to study and become involved in international development issues, and to Ingrid, Niki and Judith for encouraging me throughout the period of the study and bearing with great patience the disruption of our family life.
The time we spend as a family in the Central Highlands of Aceh (1989-1992) definitely have had a lasting impact on my life. It is sad to realise that the same area now is part of a battlefield in what threatens to become a full-blown civil war. It therefore that I would like to dedicate this study to the people of Tanah Gayo.

The Hague, September 2000
Acknowledgements
by Jan Veenstra

This study would never have been written if, along a lifelong route of rural and urban plan formulation pursued principally in the Third World, many persons and agencies had not encouraged me to regularly put on paper the lessons learned from field experience. So it happened that from the land-use planning period 1966-68 in the hinterland of Sierra Leone, West Africa, an article cropped up as being inspired by the Regional Development Planning Course of 1968-69 at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague. Here, threefold thanks go to Prof. Jos Hilhorst who designed this RDP-course, but later on around 1985 put his efforts into the regional planning case of Aceh in Indonesia, and on top of it all during last years painstakingly hammered out the basic pendulum-frame for this very thesis with figures 1.1, 2.1 and 4.1.

From an engagement around 1970 through Berenschot Management Consultants in financial and manpower planning for local and regional government authorities in The Netherlands, emanated another basic distinction laid down and published in a Dutch professional journal. Here, a prototypical three-tiered management system was thrown together as guided and field-tested in co-operation with Wim Smit, Hans Bekke and Diederik v.d. Wall Bake. I am grateful that, with hindsight, among others those Berenschot colleagues shared in practice an inner-guiding identity theme that thirty years ago was laid open, i.e. visualised by a gyrating planetarium and cubic drawing,- later on to be transformed into a cascade or lock image.

A short interlude followed during 1971-72 at the Netherlands Economic Institute in Rotterdam where, among other things, I learned overnight from Bas den Tuinder to estimate the economic worth of foreign-loan investments in sea and river ports, for instance, through 'net present value' calculations. During the seven years thereupon with DHV Consulting Engineers in Amersfoort, The Netherlands,- among many other assignments,- the regional planning case of the Shinyanga Region in Tanzania saw its completion around 1975. The most long-ranging lesson there-and-then grown out of necessity, and stemming from thankful co-operation among others with Pim Engelsman and Henk van Loo, is expressively printed at the title page of this book: “Think big, but start small”. From those days onwards self-containment during socio-spatial planning exercises in the Third World became my personal device, applied as well in the Rada-case of North Yemen. I am grateful to Henk van Loo again who invited me around 1980 as freelance consultant to put on paper a sequential area development proposal starting with (re-)selection and implementation only and merely of a few concentrated project packages,- an idea we both had adhered to also in Tanzania.

Meanwhile the foreign-aid consultancy 'business' was exchanged in 1979 for a part-time professorship at the University of Technology in Eindhoven, The Netherlands, where the colleagues Thijs Bax, Henk Goudappel, Walii van Lohuizen and Harry Timmermans rendered their aid in my wrestling for a constructivist reconciliation along classic sociological lines between different planning styles, c.q. schools of planning theory, as being expressed by this thesis' figures 2.1.1-4. In addition, fifteen years after I received as a student his regional planning lectures, Prof. Dirk van Dusseldorp
asked me to replace him during 1979-80 on his chair at the Agricultural University of Wageningen, The Netherlands. So, together with Henk van Loo, our contained Shinyanga-exercise was put to academic use in the guise of a practical case-study. Here, I recognise most gratefully as well that later on in 1986 Prof. Van Dusseldorp evaluated my ITC-consulting project in Aceh, Indonesia, and from 1993 onwards forcefully guided -with the endless patience of a guardian angel - my quest for a personal, yet non-autobiographical testimony of my lifelong journey along a reflective but remote track.

From 1980 onwards I found an intentionally part-time, yet safe haven with the International Institute for Aerospace Survey and Earth Sciences (ITC) in Enschede, The Netherlands, where training of Third-World government administrators for improving their socio-spatial surveying and planning capabilities could be regularly combined with students' field work in their home countries. Above all, field-tests - on a free-lance consulting basis - of my ITC-teaching led to published reflections among others on the cases of institutional development in Aceh, Indonesia, and of water catchment planning of the Tikar plain in Cameroon, West Africa. So, during 1985/86 I worked closely together with Allert van den Ham on our contained micro-regional approach of the two priority districts of Aceh Utara/Tengah; whereas during last years I am indebted to Allert many thanks for fusing his writing skills and additional field experiences with my insights as laid down in the respective chapters of this thesis. Particularly related to this thesis' section 4.5, I gratefully acknowledge my short engagement with Royal Consulting Engineers Haskoning in Nijmegen, The Netherlands, and keep appreciating the Tikar working contacts with Maarten Vierhout and Harm-Jan Raad.

During the 1990s I was involved regularly through ITC in training and so-called refresher courses on the spot in Wuhan, main-land China, and in the Philippines. There and then, through intense co-operation among others with Jan Turkstra and Erik de Man, I thankfully shared an emancipatory three-pronged approach towards capacity improvement in local area planning and its implementation,- as pictured by figure 6.1 at the very end of this book.

Sharing in the following chapters the happiness of a long-distance runner would have been unthinkable if Ceciel Wolters did not have put my writings on paper during more than a decade: my acknowledgements would otherwise have remained unspoken. Moreover, for expressing the unbearable lightness of our being (Kundera,1984) I retreated sometimes even to a personal citadel as found in this thesis in the guise of poetic intermezzo's: inspired 'from underneath and beyond the great divide', with thanks to Els Wiersma and Frans Cremer. Lifelong living together 'on trek' with different aspirations sometimes becomes unbearable indeed. Here, I apologise for my personal long-winding track, taken by chance though. For whereas I am much indebted to my sister Ineke Kolsters-Veenstra for urging me to break away as an agricultural student from our disturbed family situation at home during the 1950s, my wife later on had to bear during three decades long periods of my absence 'overseas '. To Tinie Veenstra-Strijland go my unspeakable thanks for adhering notwithstanding to the unbearable lightness of our being together.

Maarn, September 2000
Summary

In a first part of this study van den Ham reacts to the increased free-market thinking and makes in chapter 1 a plea for continued efforts in active, public socio-spatial development policies in order to contribute to sustainable poverty alleviation in remote areas. This policy should aim at lifting restrictions, both material and socio-cultural, of people to realise their human capabilities to qualitatively and sustainably change the conditions of life and livelihood. It is argued why, from a development practitioner’s perspective, it is important to understand the dynamics in both development thinking and doing. A research construct is introduced to explore the framework within which development paradigms, policies and practices at normative (“what for” and “for whom?”), strategic (“how”) and operational (“what, where, when, by and with whom?”) level change over time. This change is assumed to be influenced by key-development practitioner’s ‘inner-guiding’ individual beliefs and values, acquired academic insights and practical, learning-by-doing experiences. In practice the proposed policies seem to be very much constrained or stimulated by the development practitioner’s appreciated, influenceable and controllable environment which are subject to changing power relations between the state, the corporate sector and civil society.

In chapter 2 Veenstra elaborates the above research framework by highlighting the various components on the three axes depicting (1) inward-looking personal perspectives, focusing on habitual life-attitudes and roles of both indigenous and expatriate development practitioners (2) outward-looking, professional knowledge bases expanding in substantive, procedural as well as politico-institutional sense and (3) problem and action orientations as tried-out in time at various levels.

In chapter 3 van den Ham reviews at a glance the origins of international development co-operation and the elements that in practice impact upon the outcome of foreign-supported, expatriate-staffed development projects; they relate to identification, organisational setting, the role of expatriate practitioners, co-operation with local counterparts, the time dimension, the role models in transfer of knowledge and “voice, loyal and exit” strategies of the practitioners.

In the second part of the book seven case studies from Africa and Asia, all within the framework of international development assistance, are presented and related to the framework that has been introduced in the previous three chapters. In chapter 4 Veenstra explores his sequential experiences and struggles with emic and etic aspects in the evolving design of development programmes and practices in five projects in Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Yemen, Indonesia and Cameroon with special reference to area development planning and natural resource management. Both in sub-sections 4.6 and 6.3 Veenstra sums up his conclusions from outer and inner learning rounds in socio-spatial planning practices. In reaching after ‘sustainable’ livelihoods, particularly in agrarian societies under patrimonial resource control in Sierra Leone, West Africa, of the 1960s-, strategic and operational incommensurabilities, with hindsight, cropped up as related to large-scale ‘hard’ infrastructure and agro-technical innovations. After actuality had completed its developmental course, shortcomings were,
later on, laid open inside and between knowledge bases used, of corresponding policy instruments (not) employed, of statutory powers (not) granted and skilled personnel, budgets plus equipment (not) available. Above all, incongruity made itself manifest among stakeholders' normative outlooks holding sway at various territorial levels for prioritising their own resource claims. So it happened that in spite of 'common-good and great cause' intentions, 'kleptocratic' life styles both of rural and urban elites in a 'soft-state' setting were to be, distrustfully, endured.

In the case of socialist single-party Tanzania of the 1970s 'integrated' rural development pointed toward self-reliance, poverty alleviation and fair distribution of social and physical infrastructure. These laudable aims were thwarted, however, by a overburdened state-apparatus and the rural populace, of necessity, exiting both into 'black-market' sales of its produce and clientship-like distribution channels for local provision of its basic services, without revenues for the state coffers. So, both the Tanzanian bureaucracy and its open-handed foreign-aid advisors made themselves not responsive and trust-worthy, - in terms of the 'good local governance' fashion of the 1990s. Under these adversary working conditions expatriate area planners were willy-nilly forced to self containment, - for instance, in our 'remote' case of the neglected Shinyanga Region. Here, a prudent step-by-step integration both in planning and eventual implementation was intended 'from overseas' through initially restricting sectoral, time/space, problem and resource development perspectives to prioritised, low-level and small-scale, concentrated area project packages. So, 'for the time being', long-haul normative policy making, including its medium-term strategic issues, were put aside; socio-spatial arithmetics were to prevail through index-number, factor-, and flow-analysis methods; thus entrapped, both expatriate and indigenous planning officers felt their 'rationalising' efforts being frustrated by short-sighted detachment in public choice situations - like ostriches bury sometimes their heads in the sand.

In entering the 1980s, this neutral technocratic habitus was, -depending on politico-institutional contexts-, re-shaped towards those of mediatory brokers and advocates on behalf of beneficiary target groups. In the Rada'-case of North Yemen, 1981/82, phased social differentiation and changing leadership-styles in the long run were accounted for, but immediately shifting gears from operational towards strategic models of resource management emerged as leading theme. Here, in promoting still sustainable livelihoods, foreign development practitioners were to manoeuvre between the 'devil and the deep blue sea' of conflicting policy sets:

- on the one hand, in response to self-interests of national government headquarters and of private enterprise including 'progressive farmers', in favour of politico-institutional stability and free-market economic growth guided 'from above'; and
- on the other hand, in response to local community interests of deprived peasants and herdsmen in favour of equalisation, citizen participation and resource mobilisation 'from below', in combination with local value patterns and natural resources to be left in a well balanced order.

After a decade of Rada'-development efforts, i.e. 1975-85, it was concluded that in spite (or because) of selectively applied, concentrated area project packages local village life remained principally unchanged; that at a higher level of district government implementation capacity improved through ad hoc foreign assistance; but that at the higher sub-national level of the province strategic planning and governance did not find their co-ordinating niche, neither divergent statesman-like leadership.

Therefore, the two case-studies of Aceh in Indonesia, 1977-1986, and of the Tikar water catchment basin around 1990 in Cameroon, West Africa, refrained initially from formulating a medium-term strategic development framework. This is exemplified by prototypical flow charts for rural area planning, related training and implementation
procedures including various production, service and institution building components. Instead of a conventional comprehensive planning methodology 'from above', a zigzag route was (to be) followed of about seven years wherein political commitments, building inter-sectoral engagements, team spirit and trust plus surveying-cum-planning capabilities were to be built up 'from below'. So also in focusing on strategic problem structuring and (training in) management of uncertainty, conflicting policy options were (to be) run into, as differently interpreted and appraised by local target groups and socio-political gate-keepers. Especially under 'fractured' working conditions today where the centralised state is 'rolling-back', and the local citizenry is left to the (still down-played) remnants of its age-old religious, ethno-cultural, reciprocative and patrimonial devices, local planistrators are to frame their own responsive policy prescriptions 'from the bottom upwards', either enrolled as facilitators, mediators/advocates or 'Lilliputian' catalysts/counter-planners. Along this route with overlapping operational, strategic and normative policy domains, shared meanings and grounded knowledge continue to be sought, - rather than that a single universal truth and definitely ordered sustainability criteria are followed.

In chapter 5 van den Ham sets out to show how the practical conditions within which bi-lateral development co-operation projects in Indonesia's West Java and Aceh had to function and the personal attitudes of the expatriate consultants shaped the positions and strategies that have been advocated and implemented over a certain period of time in two development projects in Indonesia. The influence of a generally professed and sanctioned body of scientific insights or changing power relations between the three distinguished domains of the state, corporate sector and civil society was rather modest.

In sub-sections 6.1 and 6.2 van den Ham concludes that the views of the key-players in the development projects can very much be traced to their previous experiences. The extent to which their views can be 'translated' into new approaches towards local area development is only to a small extent influenced by the 'power' of either the normative/inward-looking or the academic/outward-looking perspective of the concerned development practitioners. Effectuating the aspired 'real' participatory development, -implying redistribution of resources and (decision-making) power-, within the context of 'foreign' projects would for example run up against the resistance of vested interests; such an approach, whatever its desirability, can therefore not be pursued. Political room for manoeuvre turns out to be the determining factor in the normative domain. However, there is usually (limited) room at the strategic and operational levels. There it appears that the design and implementation of the advocated strategies and practices is guided by the (normative) disposition of the key players towards the essence of development and their perception of the (strategic) role of the various actors in the development process. These are fed by a commensurate cognitive outlook on reality as well as their practical experiences. Again, substantive 'objective' knowledge bases appear to play only a rather limited role in the actual formulation of programmes and practices. Hence, the foreign-funded socio-spatial development projects 'ploughed through' with limited, isolated and above all 'accidental' (because very much depending on the individual practitioner involved and very specific local conditions capacitating or constraining the potential actors) experiments.

With a view towards the future van den Ham outlines in sub-section 6.4 a changing context for local development practitioners. As in sub-section 6.5 van den Ham explains, this changing context poses new challenges to, and requires new roles to be played by (teams of) future development practitioners. It is suggested that specific capabilities are required to more structurally and successfully address the socio-spatial inequalities from the local level upwards. Development practitioners should not only be technically trained in a number of skills that have traditionally been linked to the
function of regional development officer. They rather should start with acquiring a thorough understanding of the dynamic way normative, strategic and operational dispositions are achieved in practice and can be influenced in an effective and legitimate way. Empathy towards other stakeholder's dispositions and potential contributions as actors in their own right, as well as self-critically reflecting on their own positioning, should development practitioners make more conscious of the link between personal or inner change, and social or outer change. This (un-)conscious reflection on implementation will contribute again to reshaping the perspectives on intended societal advancement and results in new approaches to deal with the outstanding issues. However, development practitioners should be aware that neither their own understanding of reality and their way to deal with it, nor the other stakeholder's positioning and his/her use of the results are fixed or value-neutral. These are all very much influenced by personal and professional life history, inner normative guidelines of individual beliefs as well as values, economic interests, gender, class - all very much time-, space- and context-bound possibilities and constraints. Therefore, it is for development practitioners highly important that they are capable of opening up space for public dialogue on the directions of development. They should be able to analyse the diverse options of the participants and identify the potential conflict of interest that will occur among the various stakeholders, before certain positions getting accepted as "appreciated" and translating them in (normatively) disputable strategies, projects and programmes. In addition to the "traditional" technical skills in economics, regional science, physical geography, public administration, data management etc., communicative and analytical skills as well as abilities in the field of conflict prevention and resolution are needed to (help) translating the normative dispositions in strategic and operational terms. Next to engaging actor groups in shaping development processes, local development practitioners should also be able to facilitate reconciliation of the claims of people living in poverty with those of other contesting actor groups and to integrate them in the framework of (central) state policies. Thus, the development practitioner should facilitate that lower-level needs, aspirations and potentials meet response at the higher influenceable/strategic and appreciated/normative levels with the ultimate aim of creating an effectively enabling environment that continuously facilitates and supports people to build sustainably upon their own strengths.
Chapter 1
In Search of Appropriate Knowledge for Sustainable Poverty Alleviation

Prologue
Over the past 40 years considerable material progress has been made in reducing poverty at a global level. The average infant mortality rate in developing nations has been more than halved. Overall food security has remarkably been improved. Enrolment rates in primary education have increased dramatically. It is estimated that the share of rural families without access to safe water has fallen from nine-tenths to about a quarter. Between 1985-94, China and India, together comprising more than half of the population in the developing world, sustained an average annual per capita growth of their GNP of 7.8 and 2.9% respectively. The Newly Industrialising Countries (Hongkong, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) have made the step into the middle income category in a relatively short period of time and others have already made rapid strides towards joining them. In sum, in many countries a considerably smaller proportion of the population is at present affected by absolute poverty than 25 years ago.
Yet, at the end of 1995, in spite of all development efforts more than 1.3 billion people were still estimated to live in absolute poverty. They live on incomes of less than $1 a day. This is 100 million more than five years earlier. Malnutrition afflicts half a billion people. Every day about 25,000 children die through infectious diseases. Half a million women pass away each year in childbirth. Nearly a billion people are illiterate and nearly a third of the people in the least developed countries are not expected to survive the age of 40. Per capita GNP in the 49 lowest income countries excluding China and India shrank with 1.1% per year between 1985-94. The sometimes extreme well-being of some people still contrasts sharply with the continued and increasing marginalisation of others (IBRD, 1996; Human Development Report, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000). There are clearly winners and losers in the development process. The glass looks half full, with the achievements obtained, or half empty, with what has not been achieved, observes Chambers seemingly desperate (1997, p. 6. See also: Social Watch, 1999; Smillie, 1995, pp. 7-21) and the poor, it seems, will always be with us after all.

The tragic, endured predicament of large segments of the global population is mainly created and reproduced through structural inequalities and therefore to a considerable extent avoidable and the result of impotence and/or lack of political will to act. Poverty is essentially a self-produced political failure (KhiLnani, 1997, p. 11). Powerful actors in the development process are not able, or willing, to devise the appropriate strategies and invest the required resources in structural changes needed for improving both the material and non-material life standards of hundreds of millions of people. However, simultaneously with this dragging stagnation in poverty eradication as far as the absolute numbers are concerned, some advancements, limited as they may be regarded in the light of vast scale of the problems, though, can be observed. To a large extent these advancements are the result of an active (international) partnership between the same actors who, out of the above indicated ignorance and/or unwillingness, fail to address the key causes of poverty, to act structurally in

1 The contribution of international development co-operation to this development is still a hot topic for debate. See: Cassen, 1994
the interests of large constituencies of poor people and to ensure sustained progress towards development for all people. From a poverty alleviation perspective it is therefore rather alarming that the 'old' concept of planned development policies, in the sense of state-led intervention and societal guidance, which often formed the basis for these successes, nowadays seem to be abandoned without a thorough assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of what has been tried and used. The state, and planned intervention as an instrument of the state, have increasingly been characterised as part of the problem rather than a source of solutions (Friedmann and Kuester, 1994, p. 55). The tried approaches seem to be discarded without much analysis of the different policies that could be chosen, i.e. of the room for manoeuvre (Clay and Schaffer, 1984, p. 1), in favour of the workings of the 'invisible' hand of the enlightened self-interest as embodied by the market. Advocates of the minimal state increasingly consider (national) governments as (merely) inefficient, corrupt and an impediment to the beneficial workings of the impersonal forces of the market (Esman, 1988, pp. 127-8).

The economic successes of the Asian Tigers such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore for a long time have been attributed by many proponents of the free market ideology to the virtues of economic laissez-faire policies. Nevertheless, in the late nineties cracks started to appear in the exemplary economic East Asian role model (Guimaraes, 1998). The 1997/8 financial panic has pushed millions in the abyss of poverty, and profound questions have to be and indeed are asked about the assumed sustainability of the model in its present form (see e.g.: Sudarno et al, 1999). Yet, it is difficult to deny that over the years these countries have managed to combine high economic growth rates with a certain level of equity and poverty reduction (Watkins, 1998; IBRD, 1998, p. 2-3). However, a closer look at what really propelled the fast development of these Newly Industrialised Countries reveals exactly the opposite of what is propagated by the neo-liberals. Not the reduction of the role of the national governments as the prime movers of development and their subordination to anonymous market forces laid the basis for a strong performance, but flexible, selective and deliberate, value-loaded, far-reaching and sustained interventions by strong states pursuing coherent, long-term strategies to initiate and nurture a combination of social development and market-reliant economic growth (Dreze and Sen, 1995, p. 19, 3; Leys, 1996, chapter 1; IBRD, 1997; Watkins, 1998; Guimaraes, 1998; Edwards, 1999, pp. 51-59). However, the proven merits of this 'old-fashioned' approach in terms of deliberate structural socio-economic policies that lead to widely (if unequally) shared poverty reduction of the vast masses seem hardly recognised when it is exchanged for the, to say the least, uncertainty of the new propositions based on the inexorable laws of neo-classic economics that put all hopes on private sector led, growth-stimulated trickle-down mechanisms to upgrade the living standards of the poor (Hulme and Limcaoco, 1991, p. 224). A historically long-winding approach which considers the well-being of humanity a common responsibility and which gives way to creative and long lasting interactions between the state, civil society and the corporate business sector, has nowadays increasingly evolved into a reductionist neo-liberal economic thinking. The new formula prescribes market orientation of the state services, privatisation, deregulation, and minimal government to cure the ills of Third World societies and rescue them from debts in which many found themselves as a result of excessive short-term borrowing (Uphoff et al., 1998, p. 1). The market is promoted as the sole distributive mechanism of well-being, of being unavoidable, unarguably required and therefore 'unobjectionable' (cf. Schaffer in Clay and Schaffer, 1984, pp. 148-156). Yet, 1.3 billion poor people have either insufficient social, human or financial power to get access to that market and command satisfaction of their basic needs, or are unable to wrest a socially and morally well functioning life space from the global community. Still, the above tested practices cannot be dismissed lightly. We have to assess their worth and determine what is right about them, and what is wrong. Recently, the pendulum seems to swing back again. Fierce advocates
of market-directed development increasingly now stress the impossibility of sustainable
development without an effective, determined state, be it in the role of partner and
facilitator, not as the sole director (IBRD, 1997; Soros, 1997). The more recent attention
for and avalanche of literature on governance, and particularly on “Good Governance”
seems to prove the renewed interest in the role of the state in development.

Another critical voice about the dominant role of the state in actively promoting devel­
opment has been raised in certain academic circles. According to some social scientists we
can never know reality but can only make (personal) statements with varying degrees of
usefulness to the various stakeholders involved. Common experiences are thus held to be
non-existent (Schuurman, 1994, pp. 17-21). Due to the selective, personal and value-based
interpretations of reality it is supposed to be almost impossible for the state (whether sup­
ported by international aid workers, or not) to respond to the, admittedly, complicated
reality of the poor. Yet, the individual valuation/recognitions of reality and the shared cor­
responding formulation of aspirations can, in our opinion only be legitimised by norms
that have been determined and accepted in a social process. Besides, at a practical level,
one wonders what would have been accomplished today if the erstwhile development
practitioners in local government and (international) aid agencies would not have acted
in the way they did (i.e. in line with the then by them accepted social norms). What would
have happened if instead they would have busied themselves with the detailed analysis of
reality in a post modernist, relativist tradition avant la lettre and subsequently engaged
themselves in an aloof armchair discourse on (de)constructing multiple realities before (if
ever) implementing their projects? Would such an approach ultimately have lead to bet­
ter ‘understanding’ and guided development practitioners and other strategic actors to
the implementation of more effective policies in terms of poverty alleviation? Or would it
have resulted in immobility and ‘whistle blowing’ from the sideline?

That the development veterans of the 1960s, 70s and 80s actually did not plunge
into the detailed examination of each actor group’s perspectives and motives, and did
not complete their efforts with the conclusion that one can never truly know reality,
has apparently not prevented them from showing at least some successes at macro-
and micro-level. At the same time it is highly questionable whether the many dragging
failures of the current development paradigm can be completely attributed to their
lack of critical analysis according to the post-modernist norms2.

We might be optimistic because of everything that has been achieved or, on the
contrary, desperate because of everything that has not (yet) been accomplished and
disappointed because of all the illusions that have to be cleared up. Yet, excluding a major
part of the (future) global population from the potential well-being is immoral, in par­
ticular if the means to address these problems are basically available, the clock is lit­
erally ticking on and for many poor people time is quickly running out3. Commitment

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2 The lack of adequate scientific doubt and self criticism as a basic disposition did, in combination with
a lack of knowledge and deliberate, politically motivated grand visions for a bright future, of course also
tragically generate human misery at scales which was frequently beyond one’s imagination. Van
Dusseldorp (1990) quite rightly acknowledges the limited value of ‘old fashioned’ projects but argues
that they will remain indispensable in the future because there are no manageable alternatives for
development administrations. See also: Rondinelli (1983, pp. 3-5)

3 One might even say that such an exclusion is not only unethical, but illegal as well. In the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as adopted by the general Assembly of the United
Nations (resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1996, and as per 1995 ratified or acceded by 132 states, the
State Parties recognise ... the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his fami­
ly, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.
(Article 11.1) and “Each State Party ... undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assis­
tance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all
appropriate means, including particularly the adaptation of legislative measures”. (article 2.1) .
to empowering those disadvantaged groups and creating the conditions for their self-fulfilment leading to a decent, sustainable livelihood for all is indeed very urgent. It will continue to require massive and concerted action. Policy initiatives to that end will not be value-free but will (necessarily) be based on normative dispositions of all parties involved, i.e. the state, the corporate business sector and civil society.

In the context of the ineptitude of the 'traditional' approaches to realise all the hopes and expectations that they carried with them, it is not surprising that development actors are prompted to find new strategies to realise their old objectives. Yet, the appreciation of the potentials of new approaches requires a permanent reflection on and a critical enquiry of the socio-economic and political-cultural dynamics of previously dominant strategies. It demands an intimate knowledge of the room for manoeuvre to influence the normative, strategic and operational aspects of collective efforts in order to pursue social goals through policy initiatives by field practitioners as well by the disadvantaged themselves.

1.1 Appropriate knowledge bases

Professional development practitioners at field level are, just like everybody else, to a large extent a product of their environments in a state of flux. Their views are affected by their particular cultural, social and moral heritage, political and economic perspectives, intellectual and disciplinary backgrounds, organisational roles, personal and professional histories etc. Here we will not jump to a far-reaching deterministic, 'nature-cum-nurture' conclusion that progress and innovation can merely be reduced to and explained by a cultural, philosophical and scientific tradition and/or a personal historical background and personal disposition. Mankind, and its behaviour, is no passive victim of external forces but possesses agency, a capability to realise goals and values it has reason to pursue (see: Sen, 1993, pp. 56-72). Hence, individuals and, collectively, as mankind act purposeful and produce their own social systems. Yet, we have to acknowledge as well that new ideas are not born in splendid isolation. They are usually firmly rooted in an existing value-based body of knowledge founded on a history of previous human association and involvement. New insights and related norms, standards and policies are not the result of mere accidents. Rather they are the product of a never ending process of interaction with and transformation of the fund of existing knowledge, of scientific, outward-looking perspectives which, among other things, has been built through the work of active and reflective professionals (see: Röling, 1997, pp. 251-253). These scientists continuously radiate an attitude of intense curiosity and doubt, a self-critical awareness and open mindedness within an environment regulated by quasi-programmatic choices but in which enough room for change is available. But progress in approaches, concepts or paradigms has not only to do with the body of knowledge 'out there' on which to build. It also relates to the evolution of the mind-set of these practical and scientific professionals who, through the years, develop their own normative and inward-looking perspectives on reality and on the existing body of knowledge to meet the challenges.

It are not pre-eminently theoretical scientists that are blessed with an inquisitive and sceptical nature. Many practitioners are faced with practical situations for which

4 Commitment in the sense that in view of the public interest individuals deliberately opt for a course of action that will yield a lower level of expected (personal) welfare than alternatives that are also available; this in contrast to the view that public interest is best served by the pursuit of their own self-interest by individuals. See: Sen, 1990

5 Cf. Bhaskar, quoted by Low (1991, p. 44); Fresco (1997)
their personal knowledge of existing theories, approaches or techniques does not, or only to a limited extent, match the very specific socio-spatial claims, concerns and issues put forward by members of a variety of stakeholders involved in the development process (cf. Guba and Lincoln in Palumbo, 1987, p. 208). Sometimes the problem lies predominantly with the individual professional. Then a solution can be found in strengthening his/her capacities through training and education. Improving the accessibility to an organised body of relevant, existing knowledge and experiences is then the main objective. In other instances the existing ‘epistemology of knowledge’ (Schön, 1987, p. 13) is even of no avail at all. Often field practitioners face a situation which cannot be treated as an instrumental problem because often there is not ‘one’ clear-cut problem but there are various ones, often based on conflicting interpretations of these issues and their root-causes by the various stakeholders, even in the face of the same ‘factual evidence’ (Guba and Lincoln in Palumbo, 1987, p. 208). For such a contentious problem structure there is not ‘one’ answer either. It cannot be solved by simply applying one of the conventional professional methods or rules with which the practitioner has familiarised him or herself during education or previous professional experiences. These multi-faceted situations or problems are unique in their existence. In those cases practitioners have to transform or modify the traditional, received answers. In extreme cases, if “the case is not in the book” at all (Schön, 1987, p. 7), an alternative body of epistemology, with corresponding values, that recognises the existing pluralism has even to be devised to ultimately ‘construct’ the desired, appropriate solution.

Field practitioners in Third World countries usually face such ‘unique’ conditions. After all, the problem of poverty and underdevelopment is a complex one and a product of manifold and contingent interactions between socio-cultural, economic, political and physical factors (Brookfield, 1975; Friedmann & Weaver, 1979; Hirschmann, 1984; Hilhorst, 1990; Uphoff, 1992; Leys, 1996). The problems are only “partially amenable to prediction and control” (Fowler, 1995, p. 147) and therefore only partially responsive to ready-made standard approaches as well. Hence, blueprints from the ‘development cookery book’ hardly ever provide the ultimate solution for the time and space bound problems encountered by the 1.3 billion poor and marginalised in the Third World. However, such ready-made solutions may at the same time form the basis for the quest for or the development of an alternative, more appropriate settlement of the problem. Thus, the application of traditional, technical-rational prescriptions, based on a firm belief in a universal cause-and-effect relationship, which is so familiar to the exact sciences, may from the outside sometimes seem to solve a perceived problem. But, due to the recurrent and mutual interactions of the different variables at stake, they often solve one but create other problems. Because of the above limitations, all over the world field practitioners are constantly searching for alternative, more appropriate approaches that will fit the potentials of their areas, overcome the existing constraints and provide matching solutions for the problems they meet.

As development practitioners we ourselves have faced both above mentioned problems of untimely or insufficient access to appropriate bodies of knowledge as well as the ‘misfit’ of existing solutions at hand. When practically engaged in local area development planning and management (LADPM) of resulting policies, -here considered to be the sum of all conscious, purposeful actions aimed at guiding of socio-economic and spatial development at sub-national level and changing existing socio-economic and spatial patterns and disparities in the light of specific objectives (cf. Stöhrl, 1975), day-to-day conditions forced us to ‘artistically’ modify and adapt in an (iterative) process of systematised trial and error known strategies, practices and approaches to the local socio-economic, cultural and physical environment. Or we had to search explicitly for new modes which were previously unknown to us and could contribute to the solution of the particular problems we had to deal with.
Over the years we have benefited from insights gained and published by authors who, in a scientific way, critically examined the application of prevailing approaches and provided the building blocks for new strategies that again could be tested and applied under field conditions. We have also benefited a great deal from the experiences of fellow field practitioners. However, unfortunately only a very small part of the results of their work has been published and is accessible to outsiders. Getting access to their wealth of experience is more a matter of sheer luck to get in touch with the right person, or to find a copy of a relevant paper or report, than the result of systematic search for the required information. And in reality the physical, linguistic and experiential distance remains wide between field practitioners who ‘muddle through’ in their local area development planning and management of resulting policies and the ‘arm-chair’ specialists who are not involved in day-to-day local development activities but concentrate their efforts on broader administrative or theoretical issues (Bendavid, 1973, p. 36; Chambers, 1983, pp. 29-46; Conyers, 1997, pp. 17-23).

To bridge that gap between engagement and reflection, between the field practitioner who is in need of applicable knowledge and the scientist who may supply such knowledge David Hulme (1994, p. 252) makes a plea for a division of labour. He suggests that researchers explore the opportunities for practitioners to modify or even turn topsy-turvy existing strategies. He advises field practitioners to co-operate closely with those who have more time, a broader viewpoint, as well as possess the analytical skills which are required to unravel the complex development processes and build-up generalisations and commonalities. On the other hand, Hulme argues, researchers need to work with those who are closer to the reality of what is being studied, to improve the quality of information inputs to the research and ensure that research outputs are used appropriately in practice.

Such a combined approach of practical action and scientific reflection has its attractive sides, both from a field practitioner’s as well as a academic’s point of view (Chambers, 1983, pp. 44-46). In some cases it has resulted in interesting analyses of and suggestions for the application of scientific knowledge by actors involved in the practice of development. The results of such a combination of scientific inquiry and practical experiences have mainly been put into writing by scientists who had firm roots in day-to-day practice. Rather little, on the other hand, has been published by field practitioners who, in addition to their work at field level, kept in touch with progress made in science and could build upon previous experiences. Being aware of this lack of a confrontation between “the rigorous professional knowledge, based on technical rationality, and the awareness of indeterminate, swampy zones of practice that lie beyond its canyons” (Schön, 1987, p. 3) we decided to take up the challenge and reflect upon our own field experiences in planning and implementation of spatial development policies to make a modest contribution to a research- and practice-based ‘epistemology of knowledge’

6 An early and notable exception to this lack of reflection by practitioners is the contribution provided by Hasan Ozbekhan. In 1968 Ozbekhan seeks to formulate in a still surprisingly actual article the philosophical and contextual content of planning. He attempts to invent the methodological structures and substantive constructs that are required to lay down the foundations of a value-based planning theory that focuses on social betterment while at the same time displaying some evidence of operationality with the real world.

7 For an academic overview of the various modes of application of the social sciences in deliberate interventions in the development process, see Nas (1997).

8 E.g. Friedmann (1966); Hilhorst (1971); Conyers (1982, 1985); Conyers and Hills (1984); van Staveren en van Dusseldorp (1980); Belshaw (1982, 1984); OAS (1984), Honadle and VanSant (1985); Birgergard (1987); Bendavid (1991); Porter et. al. (1991); Hulme (1995); Chambers (1997)

to be used in expanding the collectively shared, mental horizon of field practitioners
(see also: Honadle and VanSant, 1975, p. 89).

Over the years both authors have reflected on their activities in the field. In addi­
tion to other, more specific objectives, these project-based interventions were sup­posed to have an exemplary and experimental function. They aimed at generating new
methodologies and approaches which possibly could be introduced at a larger scale by
the respective governments in charge. However, these interventions were all limited in
time and scope and largely financed by a foreign donor. This resulted in development
exercises with a very special status in the bureaucracy. This exceptional position,
which will be addressed more in detail in chapter 3, resulted in a very special dynam­
ic which not only had implications for the extent to which the proposed methodolo­
dies have (not) been adopted by the local administrative system but also for the degree
to which the conclusions of the case studies in chapter 4 and 5 can be generalised 10.
Where possible we will try to go beyond these contextual limitations and, based on our
own experiences, focus on the analysis of the dynamics of spatial development policies
from both an expatriate and a local practitioners’ perspective. However, our aim is not
to evaluate these particular projects. We will not ask and try to answer the questions
as to what extent the development goals or targets defined during the formulation
phase have been achieved, or how and under what conditions they might have been
achieved. Instead we will concentrate on the particular conceptual frameworks used
in these projects in the context of the prevailing, time-bound, scientific, political and
practical environments in which they were embedded. We will try to find a key for
understanding the wider processes which bring about the (shifts in) thinking about
and practising planning and management of sustainable development.

Practitioners, as Schön (1987, p. 33) has remarked, differ from one another in their
experiences and perspectives, their typical styles of operation etc. But they also share
in varying degrees a collective body of professional knowledge, some common values,
preferences, and norms that are related to practical situations, and sensible goals and
directions for action. However, these common characteristics are not static; they tend
to change over time. These changes in ‘commonalities’, some would say the adaptation
to the latest fads and fashions, appear to affect most practitioners more or less simul­
taneously and can therefore not be considered coincidental. They are a general reac­
tion to the collectively perceived (lack of) impact of previous approaches and to socio­
political changes in society which define the room for manoeuvre for the field
practitioners in the development arena11. In this study it is our intention to reflect on
and interpret the changing aims and practices of local area development planning and
management of resulting policies. This development is considered to be the result of
an incremental understanding of scientific and practical views on ‘what works (should
work) in practice’ and the (relative) shifts in the local area development planner’s own
mental make-ups, within a context of changing power relations between the main
actors in society at large.

11 This (sudden) change in strategies is not unique for the development business. When studying the devel­
opment of private enterprises management guru Henry Mintzberg (1994, p.110) observed that strategy
making is a “…complex, interactive and evolutionary process, best described as adaptive learning. Strategic change
was to be found uneven and unpredictable, with major strategies often remaining relatively stable for long periods
of times, sometimes decades, and then suddenly undergoing massive change. … Many of the most important seemed
to grow from the ‘grass roots’(much as weeds that might appear in a garden are later found to bear useful fruit),
rather than all having to be imposed from the top down, in ‘hothouse’ style”.
1.2 ‘Playing decks’ or perspectives on public resource management

In this study we will analyse the dynamics in the commonalities in socio-spatial development policies and corresponding practices within a project environment as a form of public resource management in a historical context from three interactive, albeit distinctive perspectives:

• The normative perspective focuses on innovation of collective norms, values and objectives (the ‘oughts’). It results in the development of an image of a future which is supposedly based on the legitimate needs and desires of the people and can in terms of the current values be characterised as ‘progress’. Change is guided and directed by a sequence of moral, individual personal choices which at a collective level result in new views and policies on development both as a process and as a goal. These normative views on development for their part set the stage for changes in the strategic and operational perspectives. In terms of socio-spatial development policies the normative perspective deals with identifying national development priorities, defining development objectives and with strategic resource management. Based on these normative, value-based considerations the (national) government administrations and the large (semi) corporate business and the private, voluntary organisations deal at a practical level with a future, more or less research-based, spatial and sectoral allocation of resources within a medium to long term time horizon.

Normative resource management focuses on answering the questions ‘what for and for whom?’. It deals with the formulation and implementation of action-oriented policies and administrative structures responsive to various stake-holders’ ideals, values, needs, potentials, expectations of a grand design of and arrangements for a future society. Of particular importance for responding to the above normative questions are the assumptions with regard to the distribution of the anticipated development and the assignment of roles to the various actor groups in society in realising the expectations. It goes without saying that the degree in which the various views on future socio-economic and cultural arrangements are put into practice has everything to do with each stakeholders’ relative position in the collective power structure and the political muscles they are able to flex over time.

• The strategic perspective takes into consideration the prevailing normative dispositions. It principally aims at bringing about distinct differentiation and socio-structural changes in an operational form. It relates to a qualitatively different level of human consciousness, by explicitly paying attention to man as a social-being, conceptualised as a unique, open, inter-active person who mediates between the actual situation and the dominant normative goals. The strategic-intermediary interest in resource management applies to the meso-level activities of regional administrations, (semi) private firms and voluntary organisations. It concerns the identification of problems and potentials, goal setting, devising structures and strategies for implementing policy, inter-local relations within prevailing time horizons of less than ten years. From a strategic perspective policies should provide answers to questions summarised as ‘how and with whom’, to the question ‘what can be done to satisfy a given normative aspiration?’. The degree in which these policies are specified and rooted in a full-fledged development profile depends on

12 Inspiration for writing this sub-section was drawn from the seminal work of Ozbekhan (1968); see also Smith et al. (1980). For a more detailed conceptual treatment of normative, strategic and operational perspectives, see: par. 2.1.2
the situation as is the intersectoral, area specific analysis of (future) problems and potentials and the administrative/organisational setting undergirding the policy choices. Usually the resulting programmes include criteria for ecological, financial and local administrative sustainability, accountability, operation and maintenance.

• The operational perspective principally directs man’s aspirations for adaptation to a changing environment. This perspective corresponds to the first stage of human self-awakening and idealism with accompanying attention for closed and cut-off knowledge systems such as prevailing in the physical sciences and technology. From a public resource management point of view, the operational perspective relates the above normative and strategic dispositions to executive, short-range management. Decision-making authority is usually placed within the various government agencies that deal with local development (village/district), private establishments and voluntary associations. In accordance with the higher normative and strategic levels, the operational perspective concerns problem-solving. It focuses on the feasibility and implementation of rather small-scale projects with a local impact in physical infrastructure development, agriculture and agro-industry etc. The prevailing time horizon is usually less than five years.

In line with the normative and corresponding strategic frameworks, from the operational perspective location and group specific questions starting with the words 'what, where, when, by and for whom' have to be asked and answered. They usually revolve around access to various resources of a natural, financial, human, social or cultural nature. They focus on efficiency, income and employment creation in agro-industrial production, on a fair distribution of (access to) social and physical infrastructure and services, and, from an organisational point of view, on a rather standardised problem identification, appraisal, (feasibility) planning, implementation, performance monitoring and impact evaluation.

The three above, ideal-type perspectives on, or mental ‘playing decks’ of policy making exist nor develop in isolation of each other. The ‘output’ of any perspective is a (direct or indirect) ‘input’, an infusion of meaning to adjacent perspectives. Each ‘higher’ level (normative versus strategic, strategic versus operational) imposes boundaries on the ‘lower’ level. However, to a certain degree, ‘higher’ levels also depend on ‘lower’ levels for they determine the feasibility of the upper level. For the individual actors playing at the respective administrative levels, it is therefore important to be aware of the pluralism processes and resources they are able to manage, in casu their controllable environment, of the external entities that they can influence in their ongoing interactions, their influenceable environment, and of the entities that cannot be controlled or influenced but have to be understood and valued, i.e. their appreciated environment (Smith et al., 1980, p. 9). In practice development is not a process that is or can be initiated and directed from ‘above’ (from the normative via the strategic down to the operational level) or from ‘below’ (operational-strategic-normative). Usually it is a rather hybrid relationship in which actors in the various environments and their dominant perspectives on future developments (directly or indirectly) influence each other through debate and negotiation, co-operation and co-optation, competition and coalition and patronage. However, from the perspective of a development practitioner who operates at the strate-

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13 Ozbekhan (1968, p. 134) seems to be too rigid about the vertical nature of plans. Holding on to the principle of hierarchy in plans might lead to desirable goals from the perspective of decision-makers at the highest level as well as to consistency in planning and implementation, but presupposes complete information at the top about both the aspirations at grass-roots and the feasibility of planned action to achieve the norms. Practice has learned that this is seldom the case.
gic or operational level, the appreciated environment is the best starting point as it is here where the normative dispositions are taken up that ultimately define the room for manoeuvre at lower levels in the hierarchy (Polanyi, 1962, pp.29-52).

1.3 Changes in prevailing development views and practices

Over the years the dominant development paradigms, and therefore their particular operational, strategic and normative perspectives, as well as the mental frames of the various stakeholders in the development process operating at the different levels, have changed, mainly due to a combination of two mutually influencing processes. New insights in the dynamics of actual development processes resulted in a better understanding of what works and what works not. This learning process usually starts with a commonly shared feeling of (dis)comfort (cognitive and/or normative dissonance) with the current state of affairs or with certain events which then are reconstructed as the result of (the lack of) human action. These practical experiences, both negative and positive, are continuously and consciously (and sometimes also unconsciously) reflected upon by practitioners and, more explicitly, by scientific researchers. This reflection produces a body of accumulated knowledge with regard to generalisations and suitability of (theoretical) assumptions underlying practical, planned development interventions focusing on selected target groups and areas. The (tacit) knowledge about “what happens” is transformed by human agency, into knowledge about what can be “made happen” (Giddens, 1984, p XIX-XXIII, see also Polanyi, 1966). This accumulation of (non-) discursive knowledge and experiences - Giddens would say of knowledgeability - has contributed to a rational, pragmatist and incrementalist, cross-disciplinary and adaptive, 'learning from experience' type of change in development policies with an increasingly expanded explanatory and anticipatory power (Kelly, 1987, p. 278; Hilhorst, 1990 p. 33-34). Knowledge is, in other words, both evolving from the past (experiences) and determining the future’s past. However, practice teaches us that positive experiences do not always lead to the replication of the ‘new’ practice. Neither do negative experiences always result in discarding the ‘old’ underlying concepts, values, methods and behaviour. Thus, due to autonomous and creative role of human agency feedback is taken into consideration, or not; feedback does not always lead to an improved performance at a later stage (Conyers, 1997, pp. 17-19) and positive results do not automatically lead to an overall adoption of the particular body of shared knowledge. However, it is nevertheless true that there is a growth of particular bodies of acquired, common knowledge which proceeds from the practices of (inter)action and reflective feedback into those practices. We will call this the unfolding of scientific or outward-looking perspectives on reality. This (self-) evaluative process, as well as its action-oriented follow-up, is conditioned by the circumstances under which it takes place. These circumstances are in their turn to a large extent created by all prior action in that particular location (cf. Low, 1991, pp. 44-47).

However, the above change in the nature and focus of development practices is not exclusively the result of the structural logic of a conscious, rational, 'external' moni-

14 For the changes in the development paradigms over the time see chapter 2.
15 Long & van der Ploeg (1989, pp. 230) correctly argue that the previous experiences of interventions constitute a kind of individual and collective historical imprint in the minds of all actors involved which severely affects their response towards new policies. For the (limited) impact of evaluation studies on policy changes, see: Weiss (1987).
16 Erroneous approaches to development issues are often a result of an intentionally or unintentionally wrong interpretation of reality by those in power. For examples of these flaws in development policies and the ways they are sustained, see: Chambers (1997, pp. 15-32, 76-84).
toring and evaluation of the impact of previous actions and subsequent adaptation of prevailing approaches. The scope and direction of the change is also heavily influenced by the way the information is received, 'internally' processed and reacted on by the various stakeholders. Moreover, this individual, practical positioning also depends to a large extent on the various stakeholders' powers to realise their respective intentions and on their norms of (expected) behaviour.

The views on the guiding principles of human behaviour are very much rooted in our personal mental frames. These are made up from our past learning and experience, of images and ideas, of constructs of reality, of beliefs, values and preferences (Sprout & Sprout, 1965, pp. 28-29; Chambers, 1997, p. 57). This mental disposition translates into a corresponding normative perception of the past, the present, and the intended, future reality: "what a thing is to an unknowable extent is determined by or influenced by what we think it is" (Pearce, quoted by Uphoff, 1992, p. 18). Individual behaviour is not exclusively guided by a purely positivist ontological disposition, but is more of a relativist, interpretative nature, shaped and guided by age and experience, culture, gender and class. Therefore, human conduct is very much context and life-cycle bound. From that perspective there is not one single, objective truth or reality but there are multiple, individual realities which are regularly reshaped. These realities do limit themselves to individuals. However, there is some degree of congruity among members of a group. They share at a particular point in time common interests and, at least to a certain extent, the same moral points of departure for individual and collective behaviour. On that basis they collectively and cumulatively construct purposes, images, ideas, and modes of selecting issues that concern them and require further action (Sprout & Sprout, 1965, p. 34; Giddens, 1984, 1991; Guba and Lincoln in Palumbo, 1987, p. 210-11; Uphoff, 1992, p. 23; Chambers, 1997, p. 57).

The relativity of reality is most extremely formulated by the post-modernists who consider reality as the sole construct of individuals or of the community to which they belong. In this thesis, however, we acknowledge a physical reality, which is 'out there' but is not absolute. This reality is appreciated according to different individual moral dispositions in a dynamic relationship with a changing social reality which is collectively constructed by human beings and which assumes different shapes under different conditions and personal dispositions. What we usually address as a (seemingly identical) reality has, on the basis of different interests, life experiences and perspectives, distinct meanings to different (groups of) individuals. In other words, the single reality consists of multiple psycho-milieus which give birth to specific social structures that form the points of reference for further action, transformation and (reproduction of realities by the individuals and groups concerned (Giddens, 1984). The specific nature of these, often contradictory, meanings is determined by individual or group motives, their moral values, previous experiences and insights. We will call these the normative/inward-looking perspectives on reality. They affect the core of people's life and give direction to their action and thinking at the three 'playing decks'.

The re-construction of the complex and diverse realities of 'the other', in our case of the target group, by outsider politicians, leaders of civil society or development professionals, -be they pre-dominantly of middle- or high class, local or expatriate, male or female stock-, has often led to reductionist, simple, static but for all 'manageable' approaches to combat poverty18. However, these approaches are deemed to be in-appro-

17 Harold an Margaret Sprout speak of a person's 'psycho-milieu' which consists of images and ideas, derived from some sort of interaction between what man selectively receives from his milieu (via his sensory apparatus) and his scheme of values, conscious memories, and subconsciously stored experience" (1965, p. 28)
appropriate and non-durable. For, even in the case these 'experts' concerned sincerely attempt to come to grips with the changing world, to construct their own realities and related professional commonalities and include what poor people indicate to be their reality, there will always be distortions. Habitual 'expert' conditioning can never fully be escaped (Chambers, 1997, p. 163). This, one might say inevitable mis-construction of the reality of the poor is, however, not totally without validity (even though it does not 100 per cent serve its prime objective). For it is based on a reality, which is as real or, for that matter, unreal as any other. Dominant collective behaviour, embodied in and guided by policies, procedures and (organisational) cultures, is determined by individuals in positions of power or by collectives of individuals who share the same interests and norms (Chambers, 1996, p. 207). Study of these relatively 'wrong' individual conceptions of reality, of the psycho-milieus that provide the basis for these policies, procedures and cultures, will make the underlying personal values, linked to the institutional goals, intelligible. This understanding of the normative dispositions, of the personal beliefs, behaviour and attitudes of the main actors in the policy field is considered to be a prerequisite for influencing the 'best possible' policies as formulated and implemented by powerful politicians and bureaucrats 19.

Here it is suggested that the emergence of action-oriented perspectives on local area development planning and management (LAPDM) of the resulting policies, its corresponding norms, strategies and operational modes, is based on the conscious and unconscious perception and evaluation of reality and previous practical experiences. It is traceable down to the dynamic interaction between normative inward-looking and scientific/outward-looking perspectives on a complex reality. The unfolding of the various approaches for local development planning and management does not take place in a vacuum. The environment within which change can take place and the room for manoeuvre to develop, test and institutionalise new approaches depends to a large extent on the parameters set by previous experiences, by the positioning of the main stakeholders in the development process, their political thoughts, experiences and by the muscles they can flex under various conditions. At the same time, these new approaches bear in itself the tendency to become part of a more or less closed system and serve and perpetuate the positions of the same determining forces within the environment. The above line of thinking is visually summarised in figure 1.1, an image that will be elaborated in figures 2.1 and 4.1.

Figure 1.1 Shaping dynamic commonalities: a pendulum movement

19 See: Crehan and von Oppen (1988)
1.4 The institutional environment: power bases for action

Neither the mental constructs of reality by those in power nor their related norms and interactions with other stakeholders are static: they are constantly contested and change over time. The direction and pace of this change is not only related to the 'interior' and the 'outer' learning processes described. The intellectual, political and economic resources that the various stakeholders in the development arena are able to mobilise in the bargaining process play an essential role in furthering their particular interests as well (Bell in Chenery, 1974, pp. 52-55). This combined strength of the actors within each of the participating domains have a strong influence on, to borrow the terminology of Smith et al. (1980), the capacity to determine whether a (certain part of the) environment has to be appreciated, influenced or controlled. Here we will distinguish three principal domains which, based on their own normative value system and from their own power basis, through various strategic and operational mechanisms determine the direction of development in a society: the state, the civil society and the corporate business sector. Each domain is considered to have its own autonomous and knowledgeable core of organisational constructs that reflect the current dominant values and principles of the main stakeholders, and is instrumental in furthering their own normative aspirations (Uphoff, 1993). Together they form institutions, by which is meant a pattern of relationships between these important social actors and their organisational constructs which society values and supports. Institutions are dynamic and their patterns are therefore very much time- and space-bound.

The state is a broad concept concerned with the public realm and its core centres around a set of political, executive and judicial institutions. From a normative perspective, its task is considered to deal, through debate, consideration, mediation, decision-making and implementation with issues that exceed the regulatory powers of actors in society individually or in an organised framework, such as the business community. In democracies it is the one sector to which society has ceded the authority to use coercive power in the public interest, to tax, to prohibit, to punish and to require participation. However, this power is to be withdrawn again at the discretion of the people (Korten, 1995, p. 97). Acting on behalf of the people legitimises the political role of the state in the decision-making process on collective norms, values and objectives. Its executive function focuses on the translation of these normative positions in feasible policies (strategic) and their implementation (operational). In the Weberian view, the role of the bureaucracy within the state is limited to the formulation and implementation of politically sanctioned public policies. However, in an environment that requires a long time horizon to follow an intervention from inception to conclusion, a bureaucracy that can guarantee continuity, dispose of an institutional memory and a wealth of experience, exercises a great deal of power among the contenders in managing the development agenda. In practice bureaucrats have, in spite of the important role of (elected) politicians, a considerable and not seldom dominant influence on the definition of the guiding normative principles of policies. Yet, the extent to which the political decision-making belongs to the sphere of influence of the bureaucracy depends on the nature of the nation-state and the prevailing (power) relations between the constituent elements of that particular society (Staudt, 1991, pp. 70-77). As far as its executive function is concerned, the state is usually conceived as the agency through which individuals provide themselves with a set of basic public goods which are fundamental to live a decent life and which often exceed the procurement powers and possibilities of individuals and their private associations (cf. Shivakumar, 1998, p. 13). They simultaneously concern all individuals: security, basic social services (health, education, food security), legal protection, economic stability, basic infrastructure, spatial planning etc.

Civil society, elusive as the term might be due to the diversity of institutions and forms of social organisations included (Marris in Douglass and Friedmann, 1998, p. 9),
denotes a public space between the state, the private corporate sector and individuals where the latter are organised in (in)formal, purposeful and role-bound groups that provide the framework for the mobilisation of their resources and the articulation and pursuit of their private or collective social, religious and cultural needs and interests. These groups are an organisational response to the needs of their constituents (Cernea, 1998, p. 10). As such, civil society provides channels for popular participation in the political process, acts sometimes as a mouthpiece for weak and marginalised groups, and builds bridges between various groups in society (OECD, 1997, p. 8). However, civil society is not a level playing field, but more an arena of competing claims and interests between the various constituting groups. Civil society can be considered a network of diverse and dispersed individuals, motivated by voluntary commitments and organised in a plurality of associations. Civil society organisations develop their own base of civil power. They have their own formal and informal laws, traditions and rules which run parallel to and rival other power systems such as the state. Organised religion often governs the social and political life and sometimes even extends into economics, as was the case in the fiercely Islamic Special Territory of the Province of Aceh in Indonesia (see: chapter 5). Clan relationships pervade many aspects of private and public life in Africa (see: chapter 4). However, civil society, as the embodiment of the idea of institutional and ideological pluralism, not only aims at correcting the inherent tendency of governments to expand their control and to evade civic accountability (Gellner, 1994, p. 3/4; Korten, 1995, p. 96; Fowler, 1997, p. 8) but also aspires to counterbalance the corporate sector or even other parts of civil society in their quest for a dominant position in the power structure20. Yet, in other instances it may act in a more corporatist way and co-operate with the government to develop a consensual approach to policy, governance and service delivery (Smillie, 1997, pp. 24-25). An active civil society, creating a rich network of non-market relationships based on trust and shared norms, constitutes an important ‘social capital’ for society. In addition to financial, produced, cultural and human capital, social capital contributes to a generalised sense of trust and reciprocity that undergirds a balanced, efficient and dynamic interplay of forces in society, as Robert Putnam (1993) has shown in his comparative study of twenty regional governments in Italy. These regional governments were virtually identical in form, but implanted in a dramatically different social, economic, political and cultural context. However, their different performance was found to be based in the presence (or, for that matter, absence) of a strong civic engagement of which active, horizontally arranged community organisations valuing solidarity, participation and integrity, were the hallmarks. Access by individual people to social capital (networks, social claims, social relations, affiliations, associations) determines to a considerable extent whether and how they can impact on mediating institutional arrangements, organisational issues, power and politics to increase their access to human, natural, produced and cultural capital. This, in turn, will significantly influence their range of options for achieving alternative livelihoods and thus impact on their capabilities to make life more meaningful (Scoones, 1998; Carney, 1998-a, 1998-b, 1999; Bebbington, 1999, pp. 2035-2039).

20 This characterisation of civil society draws on Gellner (1994) who, however, defines civil society only in relation to the state ("civil society - the idea of a plurality of institutions - both opposing and balancing the state, and in turn controlled and protected by the state...", p.1) and even presupposes a strong rooting of civil society institutions in an economic base. Here however, we consider civil society the sphere in which social movements become organised. The organisations of civil society are (institutionalised) groupings of individuals who do form a countervailing power towards the state and the corporate sector, in pursuit of their own interests and who usually do not have primarily economic objectives. Institutions are considered stable patterns and arrangements of norms and behaviour that persist over time and serve collectively valued purposes. Organisations are structures (collections of individuals) that fulfil roles on order to realise common goals (Fowler, 1992, p.14-15, Uphoff, 1993, p. 614).
The corporate business sector focuses on the private realm of people's initiatives to survive and improve economically. Its core is obviously the private corporation which is the vehicle for its owners to exercise its economic power to pursue, through the allocation and processing of the available resources, the continuity of their operations, a growing market share and ultimately their own profit maximisation. Decisions are mainly left to individuals (often serving specific stakeholder groups) to calculate private advantage without reference to broader interests or the public good. It specialises in functions involving economic exchange-producing goods and services in response to market demand.

Actors within each of these three domains can dispose of distinctive forms of power-state power, social power and economic power-and their significance depends on the resources that the stakeholders each at a certain time in history can mobilise within such a domain (cf. Friedmann, 1992, p. 26-30). In all three domains power is expressed in a different way at various spatial levels. The nation-state can obviously claim sovereign surveillance over a demarcated physical space and its representative institutions exert defined powers at provincial, district and municipal level (Giddens, 1984, 1991). However, due to rapid technological developments, states cannot any longer operate in splendid isolation as if it does not matter what happened beyond their borders. Information, finances and men move at an increasing speed and volume around the globe, leaving the nation state with less and less power to intervene. States, in particular the highly indebted ones, are also increasingly subordinated to the prescriptions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Moreover, in addition to the 'traditional' supra-national structures such as the United Nations and its affiliates and the Bretton Woods agencies, states tend to voluntarily join the globalisation bandwagon by setting-up regional economic blocks such as the European Union and new international structures like the World Trade Organisation. By committing themselves to these legally binding agreements, individual states limit their independent position in policy matters considerably.

Civil society manifests itself both locally, e.g. in the shape of local neighbourhood organisations, as well as in large, national organisations like the national federation of housing corporations. At an international level its sphere of influence is fairly limited, though, with a few exceptions such as the environmental, human rights and humanitarian sector (Green Peace, Amnesty International, Red Cross, some developmental organisations (Oxfam International, CARE, World Vision), the trade unions and religious associations (World Council of Churches).

Parts of the corporate business sector have always exceeded the boundaries of the nation-state and manifests itself nowadays increasingly in an international context (Korten, 1995). It does not necessarily coincide with territorial boundaries and has in fact since long generated a world-wide network of exchange, production and consumption. From a corporate sector point of view systems of (national) political and state power are therefore increasingly regarded artificial (Friedmann, 1992, p. 29).

Actors within the three domains do not operate in isolation, though. Depending on the need they will contest or try to control each other, negotiate or enter into (tempo-

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21 Friedmann (1992, pp. 26-28) distinguishes four domains. However, we consider 'his' fourth domain, the political community, as an expression of the values and aspirations of civil society. Uphoff (1995) distinguishes also three sectors: the public, the private and what he calls the third sector: people's associations and membership organisations. Low (1991, p. 262) identifies only two domains, the public and the private one. According to Uphoff, however, within the private domain one can distinguish the "third sector" from parts of the private sector by the relationship with its constituency which is membership based. Uphoff e.g. considers NGOs that offer services to their clientele to belong to the private sector. For us, however, civil society is an arena autonomous from state or corporate sector domination where multiple, not-for-profit social and political actors can articulate and defend their interests, propose alternative courses of action and enter into a dynamic relationship with (parts of) the state and the corporate business sector. Civil society includes trade unions, religion-based groups, non-governmental development organisations, the environmental movement, human rights groups etc. See also: Uphoff (1993); Smillie (1995); and Fowler (1997).
rary) alliances at different spatial levels to pursue their interests and shape the climate for the formulation and implementation of regional development policies.

Above figure 1.1, our proposed research design for this thesis, is of course a very schematic and simplistic version of the dynamics of change in the commonalities of socio-spatial development planning. In real life, the various stakeholders in the three domains who define the room for manoeuvre to formulate normative dispositions and test and implement new strategies are frequently at odds with and amongst each other. They rarely act in a co-ordinated way (Friedmann, 1992, p. 28). Inter-agency, inter-ministry, or inter-groups struggles to a large extent define the form, institutionalisation and implementation of policy programmes. The various actors often simultaneously play different roles in different domains too and, by doing so, introduce their own personal views which are based on various mental constructs into 'alien' environments: the members of civil society and the corporate sector are both the owners of the state as well, through a multiplicity of programmes, clients of that same state, after working hours members of the bureaucracy and the sector play their role in civil society, the corporate sector at local/national level joins hands with the civil society to oppose the advance of transnational corporations etc. The room for manoeuvre to define and, more important, to implement new directions in development policies, however, is very much determined by the dynamics in the relations between the actors within the domains and the way these relations are remoulded by the on-going struggles for power between them over time. It is the intellectual, financial, administrative and physical muscles that actors in the three domains can flex that ultimately decides which (combination) of approaches get the upper hand. However, these (power) relationships between the actors within the three domains are not frozen. They change in time due to their changing legitimacy and the varying resources at their disposal. To a certain extent the nature of this power configuration is location specific although general trends can be identified. Here it is our intention to assess whether these changing configurations of control, influence and appreciation define to a large extent the room for and the direction of distinct and changing local area development policies.

Development practitioners at field level are positioned right in the middle of this quasi-battlefield where actors with conflicting mental constructs, views, interests and practical experiences contest each other for dominance. While working at micro or meso level they have to manoeuvre and mediate between various mental make-ups and corresponding political agenda's of stakeholders at different spatial levels, their own (constructivist) professional body of knowledge, their political, social end economic interests and the demands of the intended beneficiaries which are based on their own appreciation of reality.

![Figure 1.2. Evolution of contested power-fields.](image)

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22 See: Fowler (1997, p. 22-23 and fig.2.1)
1.5 Reflection versus day-to-day reality

This study deals with the reflection on, and interpretation of the changing aims and practices of local area development planning and management of the resulting policies within the framework of a combination of personal dispositions of development practitioners (Axis 1 in Diagram 1.1), of received professional knowledge (Axis 2) and of an incremental understanding of ‘what works in practice’ (Axis 3). Contextually these changes are bound by relative shifts in the power fields and mental frames among the main groups of stakeholders in society at large. The study intends to throw more light on the factors that define the room for manoeuvre for field practitioners in the development arena. One might seriously wonder, however, whether such an analytical and interpretative exercise is of any use to field practitioners who face a daily struggle with a constantly changing, often almost unmanageable reality. Would these practitioners not gain more from improved methods and techniques to carry out their assigned tasks? From such a perspective field practitioners are considered to be value-free, rational professionals. They are supposed to be involved in decision-making based on neo-positivist, scientifically ‘correct’ and value-free, objective knowledge of the public interest, and would, supposedly, therefore not be helped very much by another work of a more reflective nature. However, above we have already concluded that the reality does not exist. The Weberian dichotomy between fact and value has to be rejected (Friedmann, 1973, p. 42). In the formulation of and implementation of agreed principles, the personal is of prime importance. Interest groups, including professionals, have their own particular aims, goals and targets based upon their own mental constructs of reality and their related problems and potentials. Analysis of the various value-based realities which find their expression in particular norms, strategies and operational modes is therefore required for a development practitioner. He/she must be acquainted with both the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’, and must have norms that permit to define ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in such a way that operational choices can be made (Ozbekhan, 1968, p. 74). Analogous to Low (1991, p. 26-28) who dealt quite articulately with the dilemma between reflection and appropriate ‘tool kits’ when he addressed the need for political theory in urban planning, we can distinguish five arguments why a theoretically solid analysis of (local area development planning and management of the resulting policies) practice should be considered important by practitioners:

• If the common substance and procedures of socio-spatial development policies change and new elements are constantly being introduced while others are dropped, if this change is something to be struggled over, and if the direction of change is subject to influence or control by the actors, including field practitioners, then a thorough analysis of the normative origins and the strategic and operational mechanisms in change is essential.

• To field practitioners the theoretical analysis of practice is not only of purely academic, rational interest, as they, as the bureaucrat/planner, independently or in alliance with stakeholders from other domains, can choose whether he or she will add or withdraw their weight to movements for change, movements which are no more than many people pushing in the same normative direction.

23 Professionals, with their own opinions, as opposed to the political development practitioners who allow their values to influence their work and openly advocate particular dispositions (Low, 1991, p. 23).

24 Here we refer to the discussion on ‘life attitudes’ in sub-sections 2.1.1-3

25 Of course field practitioners are, just like other bureaucrats, “independent actors in the arena of public policy rather than neutral instruments of it”. They are “... as much motivated by personal ends as are business people or labor leaders, seeking career advancement, personal enrichment, or ideological gratification through the exercise of their official functions” (Montgomery, p.108). Their work “...inevitably includes a major normative component, reflecting someone’s, not necessarily the “public’s”, interest”. (Friedmann, 1973, p. 58)
• Field practitioners' knowledge is not neutral. Public policy professionals do much more than 'analyse' and 'solve' problems. Within the broader context of politically sanctioned normative directions as well as their own mental (and sometimes deviating) dispositions, they codify phenomena and inter-relationships between phenomena. Moreover, they develop 'languages' through which these can be observed and discussed. They assign differential explanatory significances to various events, observations or facts, introduce methods and criteria for judging the plausibility of rival interpretations of situations. Finally, field practitioners influence the conceptions of what aspects of existing realities can and cannot be changed, comment -directly or indirectly- on the feasibility, importance, and/or legitimacy of competing political demands and advocacies... Once injected into the bloodstream of politics, these knowledges produce effects that go far beyond those we usually associate with analysis and recommendations.

• Field practitioners deal with issues where there is predominantly more than one interest at stake. One of their roles is to resolve conflicts (of interest) among different stakeholders and by doing so, deploying not only facts but also political values.

• Field practitioners as 'expert' officials are often delegated tasks and expected to satisfy a number of contending parties. This places them in a difficult and politically responsible role which requires an (intimate) knowledge of the underlying motives for the policy makers' positions and actions.

In short, development practitioners are agents of change who seek to influence behaviour; planned development is therefore value-sensitive. Field practitioners have in due time become more politically committed and they have moved closer to an advocacy role (Friedmann, 1973, p. 175; Friedmann & Kuester, 1994, p. 55). Therefore they cannot and must not be allowed to avoid a measure of personal responsibility for what they do. They are a weighty partner in the interactions, negotiations and social struggles that take place between the various actors. Chambers (1996, pp. 207-17, 1997, p. 14) quite rightly points the primacy of the personal out to us, of the personal choice (also to make errors) as the basis for professionalism in formulating and implementing development policies. Moreover, these individuals go via trial-and-error through a learning process of (rural) development and they have to mould this continuous process into a sequence of improving approaches. From these arguments it quite logically follows that the reflection on and awareness of personal development should be high on the agenda for all development professionals, with scope for evolution and change in beliefs, attitudes and policy preferences. However, the challenge is how to reflect on concepts and criteria which are such a trusted part of our professional tools of trade, that we often do not notice or discuss what stares us most in the face. Important is to learn how to learn from previous experiences, how to interpret the environment and based on that information, how to organise and how to act. Field practitioners need to be able to make personal choices about their assumed role within their controllable environment. And, in order to be able to make those choices, they cannot remain inward looking and focus only on those individuals present in given

26 Schaffer (in Clay and Schaffer, 1984, pp. 148-156) points to the fact that many which are presented as legitimising decisions which presumably underlie certain policies are often not quite taken, or taken somewhere else or by someone else at another time. This provides quite some room for manoeuvre to administrators to pursue their own (institutional) goals.
face-to-face encounters and on those elements subject to their control. Hence, to assert their influence they have to take into account also "those who are absent but who nevertheless influence the situation, affecting actions and outcomes" (Long & van der Ploeg, 1994, p. 65). They need as well to be aware of the different mechanisms, the interests and the value- and norm-loaded ideological backgrounds of the contending forces beyond their immediate control that create the field practitioners' day-to-day room for manoeuvre (cf. Low, 1991, p. 31, Smith et al, 1980).

1.6 Focus of the study

This study focuses on practices with respect to local area development planning and management of the resulting policies carried-out in international development co-operation schemes with an explicit aim of reducing socio-economic inequalities. Development has different meanings to different persons or under different conditions. It can be defined in terms of productivity, income distribution, health, life expectancy, participation in decision-making processes, freedom of choice, creating the conditions for the realisation of human personality to be evaluated in terms of reduction in poverty, unemployment and inequality (Seers, quoted by Cohen and Uphoff, 1977, p. 162) or as a capacity defined by what people can do with whatever they have to improve their quality of life (Ackoff in Korten and Klauss, 1984; Sen, 1993). Whatever definition we use, the common denominator seems to be that development has to do with shifting restrictions on the realisation of the human potential to qualitatively change the conditions of life and livelihood. Development concerns expanding the freedoms, the range of options a person has in deciding what kind of life to lead, and the capabilities of people to define, pursue and achieve objectives they have reasons to value: to create a safe and secure environment where citizens can live with dignity and equality (Hilhorst, 1990; Sen, 1993, Drèze and Sen, 1995, p. 10-11, Mahbub ul Haq Development Centre, 1999). The access to the options are to a considerable part determined by the access to the 'social bases of power' that are required to sustain: housing, 'surplus' time over and above the time required for the reproduction of life and livelihood, social networks, appropriate knowledge and skills, information, social organisations, good health, the means to acquire a regular income (Friedmann, 1998, p. 24, Bebbington, 1999, Carney, 1998-a, 1998-b, 1999). Yet, the principle of justice and corresponding individual dignity and freedom, which in the last instance forms the pre-condition for optimally utilising the human potential and morally underlies our personal efforts in development co-operation, threatens for its part to remain a hollow abstraction if it is not accompanied by the capability to function and the material capacity to exercise free choice (Low, 1991, p. 6-7). Therefore this study deals primarily with poverty alleviation in economically backward, remote regions and within these with vulnerable socio-economic groupings which face diverse problems and potentials.

For several reasons we deliberately will not attempt to include a comprehensive study on regional development policies in general. First of all, there are already quite a number of overviews of regional development policies written by Friedmann (1973); Friedmann and Weaver (1979); Mathur (1981); Conyers and Hill (1984); Friedmann (1987); Hilhorst (1990); Simon (1990). We will limit ourselves to the analysis of common dynamics in the link between our own personal and professional experiences and the scientific and professional bodies of commonly accepted -some world say fashionable- knowledge during the last three decades within the context of the prevailing dominant political, socio-economic and administrative settings. However, for the sake of clarity we felt it in some cases useful to trace the roots of spatial development policies in Third World countries in relevant historical circumstances which are not completely part of our own accumulated experience.
Secondly, we will only focus on socio-spatial development policies formulated and implemented at spatially intermediary levels and leave aside national policies as a distinct object of study but treat these as a part of our ‘appreciated environment’. Working at meso- and micro-level poses serious limitations to the professional freedom of development practitioners. They do not only have to take the problems, potentials and constraints of ‘their’ playing deck into consideration, but have to appreciate and act also in line with the financial, administrative, socio-economic and political parameters determined at higher levels in the public administration and political life. Although these conditioning factors often have a far-reaching impact on the regional socio-economic environment (‘downward verticality’), they usually are beyond the direct sphere of influence of the regional politicians and local development practitioners. In the formulation and implementation of development policies from the perspectives of spatially intermediary entities, the development and management of national, strategic functions (and the related, often massive, investments) are therefore not taken into consideration as specific objects of study but as factors which exert a stimulating or limiting influence on local development in the area under study. Dealing with similar issues is practically the prerogative of the national administration, and hence has to be considered part of the appreciated environment. As a consequence, we therefore will not pay much attention to e.g. the role of capital-intensive resource extraction focusing mainly on income generation for the state coffers, to growth-poles, trickling down concepts etc.

This study, on the other hand, deals with the decentralised planning, implementation and management of the resulting local area development policies that are (supposed to) address the poverty issue at local level. It focuses on the formulation and implementation of specific development policies to optimally exploit the development potentials, to address the area-specific physical and socio-economic needs, potentials and constraints administered at the particular spatial level under study (Waterston, 1969, p. 110). This approach ‘from below’ does of course not imply that there are no national interests involved in area specific policies. Special attention for peripheral areas might be aroused by their (potentially) disproportional contribution to the state coffers through resource extraction or for the highly rational purpose of limiting discontent of its citizens, soliciting political support, earning goodwill or reducing the hostility of communities that are (considered) part of the nation state etc. (cf. Hirschman, 1970, p. 63). Nor does it suggest that from local levels in the bureaucracy no attempt is, or should be made to influence the political, administrative and social realities in a country, but merely that affecting normative (inter) national development objectives and corresponding arrangements is usually not the prime concern of local area development practitioners.

1.7 Research questions, methodology and design

1.7.1 Research questions

The background to this study is the apparently decreasing interest for deliberate public investments in development policies as a means to structurally combat poverty. However, there is at the same time growing evidence that the preferred alternative course of (in)action for planned development, i.e. submission to free-market economic prescriptions, will not meet the enormous challenge of alleviating or eradicating pover-

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29 This does of course not imply that regional development administrators cannot or should not make use of all available mechanisms to influence national policies with regard to their territory.
ty as well. This turns our attention once more to the potentials of local area development planning and management of the resulting policies as a tool for furthering socioeconomic justice. While fully acknowledging the, at best, partial successes of previous efforts in the field of local area development planning and management of the resulting policies and with an eye to future developments, the central question of this study is: what processes have influenced the dynamic change in the aims and practices of local area development planning and management of the resulting policies within foreign-funded, international development assistance projects? More specifically the study focuses on the change within spatial development policies as formulated within the context of specific external development interventions, i.e. a number of projects funded by foreign donors and staffed with expatriates in addition to local staff.

In search of congruent dynamics in the development of knowledgeable on 'what actually works' in local area development and thus in finding an answer to the above probing question, the following proposition is put forward: the formulation and implementation of local area development strategies in foreign-aided development projects is mainly influenced by the dynamic interaction between inward-looking, personal perspectives (cultural-philosophical, ethical, epistemological) of key development practitioners on the nature of human development on the one hand, and their (access to) outward-looking, professional knowledge bases (substantive, procedural and politico-administrative) on development issues the other hand. Related to this proposition are the following research questions:

- To what extent have the various elements distinguished in the inward- and outward- looking perspectives on the nature of (planned) development influenced the ultimately proposed and/or implemented policy strategies for local area development?
- To what extent have sequential experiences of (local and/or expatriate) development practitioners impacted upon the formulation and/or implementation of specific local area development policies in the context of subsequent projects?
- To what extent have the specific characteristics of foreign-aided projects impacted upon the formulation and/or implementation of specific local area development policies?
- To what extent have changes in the relations between the overlapping power fields of the state, the corporate sector and the civil society impacted upon the formulation and/or implementation of specific local area development policies?
- What lessons can, in the light of the above developments, be learned for training new crops of local area development practitioners in the 21st century?

The proposed constituting elements of the inward- and outward-looking perspectives on development that guides our research can be summarised as follows and will be addressed in greater detail in chapter 2.

1.7.2 Practice first

"To say one more word about preaching what the world ought to be like, philosophy arrives at the stage always too late for that. As thought of the world it appears at a time when actuality has completed its developmental process and is finished...... When philosophy paints its grey in grey, a form of life has become old, and this grey-in-grey cannot rejuvenate it, only understand it. The owl of Minerva begins its flight only when dusk is falling" (G.F.W. Hegel, 1807, quoted in Leys, 1996, p.3)
As stated before, both researchers have actively been involved in the conception and implementation of the projects which are the subject of the case-studies. From an academic point of view such a dual role of researcher and intervening change-agent, being both simultaneously insider and outsider in a process of participant observation, has advantages and disadvantages (see also: Spratley, 1980). The main advantage of the active participation of researchers/practitioners in structured efforts to realise change lies of course in the access it gives to particular events, to the information and insights it provides in a process that otherwise is hardly accessible to external observers. It provides the opportunity to perceive reality from the viewpoint of someone ‘inside’ the case study context rather than from ‘outside’ (Yin, 1984, pp. 86-87). On the other hand, the disadvantage of mixing the two functions lies in the danger of a potential bias. By analysing processes that to a certain extent have been the result of your own interventions, a more selective, one might even say a distorted perspective on reality may be presented. However, we believe that each presentation of reality is, to a certain extent, a (re)construction, and therefore necessarily selective by nature. Yet, the subjective but supplementary insight that the practitioner can offer outweighs often the more detached, ‘objective’, observer type of scientific approaches.

The study of complex socio-political processes as local area development planning and management of the resulting policies takes place within a multi-faceted, real-life context in which the planner has only a very limited control over the events. Under such conditions the exploratory (“how and why”) of the study favours the use of case studies (Yin, 1993, pp. 3-27). In contrast to surveys e.g., case studies can provide the answer to questions that deal with the (operational) links between the constantly changing socio-political context (e.g. relations between the state, the corporate sector and the civil society), the related and commonly accepted normative, strategic and operational perspectives, and the changing individual or scientific dispositions by dealing with a variety of ‘evidence’ – documents, interviews, observations etc.– over a longer period of time. The cases in chapter 4 and 5 are based on documents which stem from a multi-annual, day-to-day involvement of the two participant-researchers in the presented projects. Data collection at field level, analytical studies, discussions with colleagues and external stakeholders, direct observations, assessments and reflection on relevant practical experiences and scientific literature prepared the ground for the final shape of the project outcomes and their reflection in the published articles. The project results are necessarily subjective and (partially) conditional to external influences. Case studies can therefore not be controlled like laboratory experiments. But if implemented properly, the study of multiple-cases as a research strategy may illuminate important decisions on the courses of action taken and generate enough information to render hypotheses (im)plausible and answer research questions (Yin, 1984, pp. 10-26, 47-48). Through analytic generalisation this may contribute to more articulated theoretical propositions for assessing the practical options for and constraints of local area development planning and management of the resulting policies. However, in line what has been remarked above, the perspective of the reflective participant/observer is at most ‘another’, selective perspective adding to the gradually expanding body of (practical) knowledge. This study takes an exploratory step in that direction by examining conflicting images of the nature of local area development planning and management of the resulting policies and relating these to proposals for changing project methodologies (cf. Hulme, 1995, p. 2).

Moreover, for practitioners “...it still appears unavoidable to sacrifice a certain amount of external validity for relevance and participation.” (Verhagen. 1984. p.).
1.7.3 How to turn received academic and practical knowledge into improved practices?

Development theory can be made intelligible by "recalling.......how the contents of some of the main currents of development theory were determined by who produced them, under what conditions and why". (Leys, 1996, p.8)

"It is one thing to be able to practically reflect-in-action and quite another to reflect on this reflection in action as to produce a good verbal description of it; and it is still another thing to be able to reflect on the resulting description. But our reflection on our past reflection-in-action may indirectly shape our future action" (Schön, 1987, p.31).

Tracing back our past, analysing and assessing 'historic' considerations, decisions and the resulting developments with the advantage of hindsight is always a precarious business. After all, our current appreciation of the considerations that were relevant at that particular moment in time and, for various reasons, led to specific courses of action, is quite likely to be distorted by the present-day's researcher's gradually expanding organised body of knowledge about him/herself and, in a more generic sense, about the subject at stake. This gives the present an overwhelming influence over the (re)construction of what has been. In its effort to understand, re-create and/or assess that past, our mind is always coloured by the particularities of the present (cf. Ozbekhan, 1968, p. 87). Moreover, in the meantime the researcher might have had the chance to collect additional, specific information about what in reality did happen to the particular case under study as a result of policies implemented at that particular time in history. Our diachronic study of the evolution of the aims and practices of spatial development policies within the context of externally driven change, in this case through specifically designed projects funded by foreign donors, is by no means an exception to that rule. However, it is our intention to eliminate as much as possible the danger of reconstructing and thereby retro-actively and inevitably distorting the reality that unfolded itself before our eyes as the context for developing and implementing socio-spatial policies. Therefore, the main text in chapters 4 and 5 consists of documented case-studies which all but one have already been published as articles during the implementation of the projects concerned, or shortly afterwards.

By using case-studies which have previously been recorded for their own sake and developing and applying the analytical framework later, the methodological danger of adopting an 'interpretative straitjacket' (selecting only those data that illustrate an already preconceived point) has been minimised. However, to be able to reflect within the above presented conceptual framework upon our own reflections on action (Schön, 1987, p. 31) these case studies have been completed with new introductions and epilogues. Building upon the general changes in inward-looking dispositions as well as prevailing normative and strategic insights as dealt with in sections 2.1.1-3, 2.2.1-3 and 4.1, the specific organisational and institutional context of foreign-aided projects (chapter 3), the case studies of chapter 4 and 5 will be analysed within the above presented analytical framework before coming to conclusions in chapter 6 with respect to the hypotheses underlying this study and planning and management of local area development in the new millennium.

31 See also Schön, 1987, (pp. 114/15 and 164).
32 See: Veenstra (1970, 1989, 1994); Veenstra and van Steenbergen (1986); van den Ham (1989-a, 1989-b, 1992); van den Ham and van Naerssen (1990). The case of the Central And North Aceh Regional Development project LTA-77 (chapter 5) has only to a very limited extent been documented in an article (van den Ham, 1992) and has for the purpose of this study been compiled on the basis of various internal project documents.
Chapter 2
Emergence of Professional Repertoires for Local Area Development Planning and Resource Management in Third World Countries (Veenstra, Spring 2000)

Common Up- and Down-Swings in 'Planistrators' Mind-sets

2.0 Reader's Guide: getting on a reflective but remote track together

As announced in the preface and in sub-section 1.7.1, in general search for congruent dynamics in some elements of action-oriented LADPM knowledgeability on what 'actually works' along our study axis 3, the following ten propositions P.1 to P.10 and related test-questions are put forward in brief. These will be detailed in present sections 2.0 to 2.2 and thus will streamline our lessons 're-absorbed' in section 4.6 and will lead-up to concluding section 6.3 with a three-pronged capacity improvement proposal. Here, along our three study axes, the common insights required for practical consciousness are given at a glance, but attention is paid more specifically to shifting emphases thereon in practitioners' minds made up by a widening range of interpretations of 'sustainable' area development during the past four decades.

So, in first instance, one finds along our study axis 1, -as discussed in section 2.1-, a blend of personal life-attitudes in practice being built from, but also oscillating between (hardly contingent) cultural-philosophical, ethical and cognitive canons. This leads to subsequent test-questions on 'what for, how and why' practitioners changed and/or kept in self-containment their normative dispositions while proceeding during their careers from one to the other foreign-aided case in chapters 4 and 5.

So again, in second instance, one finds along our strategic axis 2, -as discussed in section 2.2-, an eclectic mixture of so-called substantive, procedural and politico-institutional ingredients, the latter having been discussed in section 1.4 and being further spelled out on canonic rules in sub-section 2.1.3.

In both instances of normative personal views in interplay with strategic views, the intellectual room for manoeuvre by local area planners appears to be restricted. Nevertheless, the latter were to have their individual innermost still directed at, and cultivated by the full range of human capabilities for regularly (re-) fabricating portrayals of man's uplifting role vis-à-vis his/her bio-physical environment, produced social and physical infrastructures, socio-political and cultural settings, -as pictured 'for free' by man's own creative imagination, first and foremost, in section 2.0.

Proposition (P.1) on relativist construction of reality (sub-sections 2.0.1/2).

It is through the interplay between 'outer' realities and 'inner' states of individual sense-making mind-sets, that societies at large from micro-, to macro-levels secure time and again the means for obtaining a 'good life for man', moulded into temporary mental constructs.
Probing question (Q. 1a)

Have practitioners in operational situations of public choice experienced that the level of their lived-by 'interior' self-containment and that of 'sustainable' LADPM process control 'out there', become interdependent and (forcibly) co-determinative?

Proposition (P.2) on threefold process of morphogenesis (sub-sections 2.0.1/3)

Basic principles of human action are gradually balanced and internalised by the interplay of time/space transcending values, canonic rules of theorising and common LADPM practices.

Probing question (Q.2a) (along axis 3 of figures 4.1 and 6.1)

Could, with hindsight, common shifts in LADPM-problem solutions be shown in accordance with other authors: producing 'hard' infrastructure interventions preceding, necessarily followed-up in time by 'soft' people-oriented and politico-institutional approaches?

Probing question (Q.2b) (along axis 2, figure, 2.2.1)

Running parallel with the above operational shifts, could a widening range of 'sustainability' interpretations be shown: of eclectically received substantive, procedural and institutional knowledge bases including typical cross-connections; and of a nesting hierarchy of overlapping moral imperatives vis-à-vis strategic policy-test criteria?

Proposition (P.3) on personal selfhood (sub-sections 2.1.1/2 and figures 2.1.1-4)

Seen through strongly man-centered, anthropological lenses, human selfhood is positioned in fields of tense individual choices: as if in its innermost tacking about antithetical views, first, on its shielded-off but still fateful personal 'cocoon'; second, on its natural environment taken in a mechanic versus organismic sense; and, third, on its societal structures, plus top-down versus bottom-up planning.

Proposition (P.4) on world orientations

Simultaneously, the prototypical self is repeatedly (re)shaping its cultural world orientations; first, by its self-seeking versus global macro-ethical ideas) on 'good and bad' in human action; second, by standardising the logical stock of its own knowledge bases; and, third, by forcefully devising on above cited grounds its collective resource controlling techniques.
Probing question (Q.4a)

Have practitioners demonstrably shown, inside their more or less 'stratified' proto-self, to be aware of personal ethics: by setting arbitrarily, dogmatically or reasonably their own priorities in sustainable livelihood development?

Probing question (Q.4b)

Have LADPM-practitioners in self-reflection along cognitive lines actually become aware to be driven, nay, to balance even between canonic rules of their theorising in a 'naturalistic', empathetical or incremental constructivist way of conceptualisation?

Proposition (P.5) on reconciliatory middle-ground

Practitioners have to function on a middle-ground of four typical resource configurations which simultaneously capacitate principal gate-keepers inside their inner circles:
- of agrarian societies reigned by authoritative leadership with patrimonial control over land and water resources, in propertied hands of a wealthy 'happy few';
- of industrialising nation-states with centralised control over scarce capital and human assets, freely in thrifty hands of merchant and industrial bourgeoisies;
- of welfare states with dispersed control over goods and service distribution, ruthlessly claimed and contested today by private business, public administration and the organised citizenry;
- of global macro-institutional systems becoming established in (over-) ambitious hands of private-cum-public technocracies holding sway world-wide, inter alia through telecommunication and information exchange processes.

Proposition (P.6) on typical LADPM roles (sub-section 2.1.3)

Amidst systems of belief and knowledge, put above into question, practitioners are manoeuvring themselves into typically rule-bound roles and life attitudes of loyal technocrats, detached facilitators, mediatory brokers and advocates, visionaries along side-lines, or radical field activists.

Proposition (P.7) on constructivist pragmatism (along axis 2, sub-section 2.2.0)

Under working conditions of political instability, socio-economic uncertainty and lack of reliable information local practitioners are accustomed to 'muddling through and mixed scanning', i.e. starting with sketchy area development frameworks and moving pragmatically towards specifics as incremental progress is made by trial and error.

Proposition (P.8) on conflicting policy-sets (sub-section 2.2.3)

It is along this instructive route that, in promoting 'sustainable' development in Third World peripheries, resource planning practitioners are to reconcile two potentially conflicting policy sets:
On the one hand, to respond to self-centered interests of national headquarters in combination with private entrepreneurs and progressive farmers favoring politico-administrative stability and free-market economic growth 'from-above'; and

On the other hand, to respond to community interests of poverty-stricken, rural and urban masses favoring equalisation of incomes, know-how and bargaining power, citizen participation and resource mobilisation 'from below', in combination with preservation of local value patterns and natural resource conservation.

**Proposition (P.9) on planning outputs (figure 2.2.3)**

Shared incremental LADPM-learning results in breaking away from controlling short-range operational projects towards strategically influencing, middle-range programmes for grasping ultimately at 'sustainable' livelihood development through normative-valuing, innovative policies kept afloat on the long run.

**Proposition (P.10) on planning 'from below' (sub-sections 2.2.2/3 and figures 2.2.4/5)**

Lacking support from central headquarters but confronted with rural stagnation and dependency of the majority of rural and urban poor on extra-local, political and economic control, local 'planistrators' are to frame their own appropriate policy prescriptions 'from below' and establish a well-grounded cumulative body of grass-roots planning knowledge, gauging indicators and area-specific information.

**Probing question (Q.10a)**

While urged particularly by foreign-aid donors, have expatriate and indigenous local-level planning officers experienced that their brand-new but over-ambitious, strategic area programmes have been de-fused, -like unexploded bombs? And have they learned a general lesson: not trying to change from the omnipotent foreign side, but rather from the domestic side of standing bureaucratic procedures for project/sector/area planning and budgeting?

**2.0.1 Prologue**

Nowadays, towards the end of the sixth decade of foreign development co-operation, no contradiction-free accounts could reasonably be made of the restricted room for manoeuvre in local area development planning and management (±LADPM) of peripheral regions. This holds both for indigenous and expatriate practitioners, including executive sectoral line administrators: called hereafter altogether 'planistrators'. Especially for the collectivity of natural resource specialists, 'hard' infrastructure engineers and economists, as well as of 'soft' managerial and 'soft' community development experts (Conyers, 1985), little elbow-room appears to be left in field attempts to cope with conflict-laden transformation processes. Particularly characteristic for remote and 'residual' regions (Friedmann/Weaver, 1979) are such transitional trends as emerging from population growth and consequent rural-urban migration; from agricultural intensification but also deforestation, land degradation and encroachment by deprived peasants and herdsmen. The latter are entrapped by unequal access to such assets as lending capital, off-farm jobs, public services and infrastructure, -if available
at all. In addition to these tangible adversities of peripheries, institutional shortcomings are worth mentioning as resulting both from extravagant greed in elite accommodation and inner-circle consensus building (reciprocal 'give-and-take' politicking), and from hived-off administrative competencies. The latter are aggravated by weak planning, budgeting, co-ordination and monitoring capabilities inside and between (non-) governmental machineries: altogether multi-tiered rampant at their bottom end, but topped above all by central headquarters.

It is to be noted that this one-swoop characterisation of peripheral backwardness, at first glance being caught in long-winding and far-reaching spirals of poverty and deprivation, focuses upon material and social inequalities as to be combated by 'noble' spatial planning efforts. These efforts are inspired either 'from above or below', depending on optimistic or pessimistic dispositions of the individual, local and central politicians and planistrators concerned. During past decades, the battlefield of discursive knowledge and tacit beliefs, i.e. of conventional wisdoms and paradigms of LADPM-practitioners, has been occupied by rival schools of development thought and practice regarding national-sectoral, regional, rural, settlement and infrastructure planning (Veenstra, 1994/97; building upon UN/ESCAP, 1979). So, the following subsections 2.2.1 to 2.2.3 are written to account for the intellectual up- and down-swings, i.e. rise and fall in outward-looking perspectives (Stöhr/Taylor, 1981; Moris, 1981; Leys, 1996) of dominant LADPM-doctrines and corresponding operational, problem- and action-oriented repertoires. Specific attention will be paid to one of its core elements, i.e. dragging poverty alleviation. Here, too, will be zoomed in upon the common but dynamically moving target along a transformist route: that of sustainable development (=SD) of livelihoods as later on being reflected upon in chapters 4 and 5 along four LAPDM-learning rounds during the past development decades.

Regarding 'sustainable livelihoods' typical combinations of moral imperatives and strategic policy-tests criteria have 'normally' been used in diverse public choice settings. They constitute, and clear up, the multi-faceted frame of planistrators' minds: personal choices seemingly being co-determined by economic, distributive, ecological, political and ethical conditionalities piling up from substantive, procedural and politico-institutional bodies of shared knowledge respectively. Accordingly, as this study's author beliefs (Todaro, 1990, p. 90), development ideals stem from a ceaseless cross-cultural transformation process constituted by a double-edged contingency of intersubjective and context-bound choices (= 'Wahlverwandtschaften'). So it is proposedly (P.1) through the interplay between 'outer' bio-physical, socio-economic and institutional realities and 'inner' states of individual sense-making mind-sets, that societies at large from micro- to macro-levels secure time and again the means for obtaining a 'good life for man', moulded into temporary mental constructs.

To clear up this 'inner-outer' link in human affairs, first and foremost, an inward-looking perspective is to account in sub-sections 2.1.1→3 for the nested hierarchy e.g. morphogenesis (MacIntyre, 1982; Charles Taylor 1989; Archer, 1990) of gradually internalised, basic guiding principles both of an altruistic versus self-seeking moral commitment, and of instrumental versus interpretative canons of 'rational' reasoning (P.2). In first instance, these are considered to basically constitute the contingent background and practical consciousness of LADPM-practitioners' minds. So it is 'at the end of the day' that sub-section 2.1.3 accounts for our mingled, late-modernity LADPM-collectivity of loyal technocrats, advocacy planners, lonely 'whistle-blowers' and radical activists along side-lines sometimes. Altogether they are to find over and over again a well-versed but role-bound 'outer and inner' balance in their real-world policy choices (Uphoff, Esman and Krishna, 1998, pp. vii/138): as endlessly occurring, so to speak tacking back and forth in their minds between a subjective versus objective, interior vs. outer, experience-near versus experience-distant, voluntaristic vs. deterministic, −in
short, between an emic versus etic viewpoint. The blend of successive personal stances depends on individual (counter-)priorities lifelong reshuffling the back of planners' minds, – like mnemonic gyrations in interlocked learning loops (van Dusseldorp, 1993, pp. 43/47, 99, 113/117, 135, 239/241). Referring back to the 'playing decks' of preceding section 1.2, these loops (re)cast the antagonistic 'software' of LADPM-mental frames in continuous interaction with their normatively appreciated (what for), strategically influenceable (how, for and with whom), and operationally controllable milieux (what, where, when, by whom).

2.0.2. Inner-directed account of practical consciousness: author's personal stance exposed.

Again, just as in the aforecited tragic case of entrapped peripheral misery, professionally looked into 'from outside', one could make a compassionate snap-shot of innermost LADPM-selfhood today. So, a double-edged complementarity is sought for in pulling our private self together and picturing a normatively judging T; that is, in speaking up for our inner 'Enlightenment-angle' confused about 'good and bad' of foregone development decades, as follows (after Zygmunt Bauman, 1993, p. 224):

Practitioner's mental frame in turmoil; refer back to section 1.5

His face is turned towards the past. Where we as scientifically trained onlookers still perceive a 'logic' chain of events, he stares bewildered at a catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. This nostalgic c.q. romantic angle would like to stay put, dig up, awaken and heal the dead: make whole again what has been smashed up into senseless pieces. Like a searing passion, however, a storm is blowing from Paradise: it has got caught in his (still scientifically contriving) wings with such violence that our poor angle can no longer, and never again, close them. This irresistible storm, of seemingly eternal necessity, propels him into the future to which his, but also our backs are turned while the pile of our intellectual debris before us grows skyward. This worldwide storm is what we as spatial development collectivity keep calling progress, while moving backwards though into the future.

It has been Elias, however, who according to Bauman again (p. 247) has suggested a reconciliatory inner route along which a safe exit from this stormy-weather situation may be mapped. In controlling the up- and down-swings of optimistic versus pessimistic dispositions, c.q. the multi-voiced cacophony inside our vulnerable self, the late-modern (perhaps, shipwrecked) person could begin thinking more coolly, that is less bewildered. By standing back, autonomously, and protectively fending off his own dreadful fears, – by surveying his own innermost fraught with contradictions and uncertainties, as it were from a safe distance like an artillery officer checking the habitual grid of his Ordnance Survey-map –, he manages in self-containment to turn his thoughts strategically away from his very personal citadel to the human predicament in which he finds himself 'out there'. Anyway, from an 'inner cocoon' normatively appreciating his environment (: which things first, what for?), a well-versed planistrator would put her/himself symbolically on a par with the signposting, c.q. semiotic 'software' of our officer. Thus trying to represent in his own mind the professionally influenceable but risky structure and future direction of the probable flow of events, he discovers just at his doorstep over and over again practical ways of provisional escape. In those down-to-earth operational situations of public choice (Hendler in Mandelbaum et al., 1996, p 400-413) the level of interior self-containment and that of sustainable LADPM-process control 'out there' become, – as a probing question about our fragile condition {:Q.1a} –, interdependent and (forcibly) co-determinative: in short, a temporary idealypical 'Wahlverwandtschaft'. This inner-cum-outer contingency will be grid-like hereafter
typified in sub-section 2.1.2, and beyond provisionally laid out along three study axes
1 \rightarrow 3, as visualised by figures 1.1, 2.1 and 4.1.

Here it should be remembered that everybody carries his/her personal history into
the future. However, by capably contained interaction in real life this 'safe' cocoon is
regularly challenged by fresh, often contradictory information and new experiences.
This forces us to stand back, perceive ourselves double-barrelled from a safe distance
and appreciate our own normative positions with regard to reality. Ultimately, self-
reflection on our own position in the 'new reality' is bound to transform our fabricat-
ed cocoon into a new one which will guide us for some time in the future (Giddens,

In parenthesis, for passing and digesting the following sections, two additional pic-
tures are perhaps helpful as tangible food for thought. For to be tattooed in our mem-
ory as a brain-wave on one's mind, may be the snap-shot taken in 1946 of an innocent
infant standing in front of last World-War's debris in Frankfurt, Germany. This deso-
late child is reflectively looked down at, from a safe distance indeed, by an empathet-
ically compassionate photographer. He, on own tiptoes, capably conjures up at one and
the same moment two life perspectives full-heartedly lived by: that of the war victim
and of the professional camera-man. But in artistically doing so 'for free', the latter
communicates with, c.q. makes commensurable sense to any third onlooker of this
very picture who is perhaps, in turn, compassionately moved or evenly shocked as well.
This creative imagination is thus to cultivate our humanity by turning, with intent,
our very physical eyes towards our 'inner-directed' judging eyes (Nussbaum, 1997,
chapter 4).

More complex, but even cross-cutting three hundred years, Diego Velasquez as Spanish
court painter (1599-1660) has been capable in his 'Las Meninas' to make practical sense
of contingent conditions of men throughout the ages. For besides Velasquez's own self-
fabricated account from where he stands in front of his easel, there are the little
princess and folly lilliputian court-jester looking up at two other actors in turn: the
parental couple which is not fully out of sight because watching from the mirror in
the background. In this time-transcending case any onlooker may be moved - for the
better or the worse - by the family scene which happens to keep personal frames of
mind related; or even condemned towards each other and to its wealthy furnished
environment, both inside and outside this royal cabinet, - as looked down at again by
a fourth observer, brightly 'enlightened' just standing at the doorstep.

The two pictures thus visualise for any creative onlooker a long-standing sociological
notion (Weber, 1905; Vaihinger, 1911; Foucault, 1966, chapter 1). It proposes (P.1) the rela-
tivist construction of reality which, by a combination of self-reflexivity and intersubjec-
tivity, makes intelligible the rich variety of food for thought by which human nature is
driven; that is particularly, the pursuit both of selfless and self-seeking interests by
diverse social groupings at a specific time and locality in history, - as thrown up at the
end of sub-section. 2.1.1, for instance.
2.0.3 Fleshing out three perspective axes: a cool-headed research strategy proposed

As then bound to their own normative and strategically contriving frames of reference, viewed in continuous interaction with their own operational milieux, the authors of this study will focus upon (non-)material inequalities as combated by down-to-earth planning efforts. This interpretative research thus hinges on poverty alleviation efforts in backward areas of Third-World nation-states. This is reported, – by way of comparison spanning about 25 years –, in chapters 2, 4 and 5 for Sierra Leone (1970), Tanzania (1974/75) and Cameroon (1994/97) at the finale again in West- and East Africa, – with interludes of the Yemen-case (1981) and the West-Java, IDAP+CANARD-projects in Aceh, Indonesia (1980/90s). Here, the multiple case-study approach has been recognised in sub-section 1.7.2 as a methodological tool (Yin, 1984, pp 10-26, 47-48); helpful in testing an exploratory research design meant to explicate, – by way of propositions –, com-
monly shared but self-fabricated perspectives along three dimensions (Van Leent, 1963), as explained below. Generally speaking, this very test-case of our research strategy first and foremost is used to clear out the professional lumber-room of multi-layered minds (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, p.12; Pope, Donne and Locke in Baker, 1996, pp. 207-250). In this specific instance of a lifelong self-evaluative quest for LADPM-sustainability, it is to be remembered as well that along men’s life trajectory our ‘cocooned’ mind-sets are at various ‘playing decks’ synchronically working. Repeatedly are reshaped our textual, graphic or metaphorical images for ‘inner-eyes’ world orientation: sometimes as by a brain-wave on the instant of a split second, like a gyrating flash of lightning! However, as will be shown below by figure 4.1, professional LADPM-practices and habitual commonalities unfold themselves sequentially in slowly internalising waves; that is, diachronically: societal inequality struggles all over the globe dragging on for ages already. As quoted in sub-section 1.1 “the poor ye shall always have with you”.

Velasquez: Las Meninas (Prado, Madrid – foto Giraudon)
The study frame under consideration as depicted in figure 2.1 may serve to bring out a synopsis on LADPM-sustainability nowadays sought for. It contains three fanning out axes of which two, viewed in the same plane rightwards, have been elaborated already (Veenstra, 1997). First of all the widely agreed operational problems of reducing area backwardness jump centrally to the eye as combated by standard repertoires of natural resource c.q. agricultural land-use planners, intra-regional, rural settlement and civil infrastructure planners; as well as of (inter-) organisational, and multi-tiered polity c.q institutional development experts, – obviously focused on farming villages, rural towns and peripheral areas in their entirety.

It is to be noted that along problem- and action-oriented axis 3 brought out in chapters 4 and 5, a three-staged time sequence is, with hindsight, explicitly speculated upon by arrows (: Q.2a): as-of-old productive ‘hard’ infrastructure solutions have been preceding, or are necessarily followed up by ‘soft’, people-oriented and politico-institutional solutions actually tried out in ‘three successive generations’ by lower-tier territorial administrations, including non-governmental organisations (Van Dusseldorp, 1993, pp. 120-125; Hume and Limcaoco, 1991, pp 223-233; Johnston and Clark, 1982, p. 224).

Secondly, accompanying these operational shifts along the other rightward axis 2 are stretched out the overlapping theory-cum-value perspectives and policy-test criteria, adhered to by problem-solving LADPM-practitioners in various controllable, influenceable and appreciated domains. Here too, is proposed (: Q.2b) an ‘etic’ i.e. outward-looking expansion of eclectically received knowledge bases (substantive, procedural and institutional/contextual) with assumed co-determinant or ideal-typical ‘Wahlverwandtschaft’ connections: God’s Eye view of real-world linkages ‘out there’ supposedly governing the inner corners of men’s strategically contriving mind, including different conceptual state-market-civil society connections (Etzioni, 1988, chapters 12/13, and Overview; Low, 1991, chapter 10; Giddens, 1984/94; Norgaard, 1984; IBRD, 1997, pp. 2-38).

In an inward-looking personal vein, last but not least, a third ‘emic’ axis pointing downwards is to report speculatively, and in retrospect again, on normative i.e. religio-cultural, cognitive and ethical, in short on personal turn-overs by which LADPM-prac-

Figure 2.1 Negative feedback c.q. inhibitory learning loops of normative and dissonances: (Festinger, 1957) Swinging back and forth.
titioners during their careers oscillate: so to speak, tack back and forth along the three long-winding and 'transformist' learning loops of figure 6.1 in chapter 6 Gramsci, 1966, in Bayart, 1993, chapters 7 and 8). The following chapters attempt to disclose along the three axes of figure 2.1 various deep-rooted world orientations, the corresponding intellectual signposts for applying our scientific armoury, as well as operational LADPM-repertoires that - *proposedly* (: P.2) co-determine mainstream thought and practice: in the contained on-looking instance of this study's authors as resulting from our Dutch middle-class, puritan and humanistic upbringing, our academic education, but above all from testing out, judging and learning from Third-World pilot projects during the 1950/60s, 1970/1980s and 1990s, reaching out towards assumed 'sustainable' LADPM-practices (Lele, S.M. in World Development, 1991, pp. 607-621; Mitcham, 1995, pp. 311-326; Röling, 1997, pp. 248-262; Fowler, 1997, chapters 7/8; Meppen/Gill, 1998, pp. 121-134: SD as cross-disciplinary and – cultural learning process co-determined by a nested hierarchy of overlapping policy-test criteria).

The following sections are written to find – with intervals – some protective, but – temporary turn-over stations along our 'outer-cum-inner' route amidst LADPM-fields of tension. They cover the restless pendulum movements in our own minds pictured textually and metaphorically, but also mapped out graphically. Our study frame is to underline the 'emic-cum-etic' attention paid to both 'interior* meanings of experience-near psycho-milieux, and to experience-distant 'outer' interpretations of operational LADPM-milieux. This double-edged approach is to consciously explore and make practical sense of the dynamic interaction, c.q. dialectics between both (micro/subjective) individual and (macro/objective) structural variables reigning our research object: that is, the antagonistic matter of LADPM-minds (Gagnon, 1992, pp. 229-241; Sanyal and Baum in Mandelbaum et al, 1996, pp. 365-382). Thus, this study's authors attempt, as researching subjects, to solidly represent some collectively shared twists and turns inside LADPM-practitioners' mind-sets: the learning-by-doing pendulum movements of our research construct with inhibitory, normative and strategic swings of diagram 2.1 reigning our malleable, social practices. Here, a transformist c.q. morphogenetic look is *proposed* (: P.2) by which human action is viewed as ceaseless: in terms of its transcending values, canonic rules of theorising, and habitual practices. Subsequent interaction will be different from earlier action, because willy-nilly conditioned by the structural consequences of prior action. Hence, the morphogenetic perspective is not only inter-actively double-edged but sequential too: dealing in endless swings of structural disciplining/social interaction/structural elaboration, – both normative and strategic. Thus in round after shared learning round would be overcome the scholarly 'armchair' dichotomy between subjective (free-will) voluntarism and objective (structuralist/functionalist) determinism: altogether indeed grandiose but obsessive oversimplifications in human 'nature-cum-nurture' debates (Archer, 1990; and Schuurman, 1994, pp.12-55: on Giddens, 1984, and Bourdieu, 1990; Booth, 1994).

In this dual transformative vein, from a distance indeed, inner LADPM-spaces are being mapped out in sections 2.1 and 2.2, as they have been busily but disjointly taken 'on trek' during past development decades in Third-World peripheries (Jantsch, 1975, chapters 6 and 7). Or, zoomed in from nearby on tiptoes: our research object may be conceptualised as if personally living by, and empathetically participating in widely dispersed 'bee-hive' collectivities. While apparently engaged both 'from below' in local micro-action projects and 'from above' in nation-wide macro-policy making and resource programming for eventually combating poverty, – both material and immaterial.

Because the intangible matter of human minds is above all here being grasped at, – instead of positive 'things' like clashing billiard balls being studied –, of intersubjec-
tive necessity sometimes exaggerating, c.q. colourful wordings, (dis)continuous typologies and graphic pictures are to express commonly shared 'inner' movements, in particular of our remote Southern LADPM-collectivities. In thus inscribing along axes 1 and 2 of diagram 2.1 in sections 2.1 and 2.2 both normative and interpretative inner guides, having sometimes tacitly influenced long-winding courses of (non- or even anti-) mainstream professional lives, deliberate use is regularly made of common-sense metaphors (Richardson, 1990; in Denzin and Lincoln, pp. 516-527). Here the device is taken of writing one thing down (like invisible hand; leviathan or night watch; arena of struggle; or multi-layered bee-hive) as stands-in for, -and 'on trek' thus making practical sense of-, something else in one and the same, collectively experienced framework (and thus conceptualising market versus state powers, in dynamic stakeholder interaction inside problematic polity configurations). In the same experiential c.q. habitual sense, lived-by normative and canonic rules (: sub-section 2.1.1-3) and knowledgeable policy-test criteria (: of sub-section 2.2.1-3) are literally to stand in, c.q. put on a par for gauging the morphogenetic trajectory of spatial development thought: thus charting a practical route for the nowadays full-heartedly embraced, but overstocked buzzword of sustainability, - by trial and a lot of (forced) error indeed.

In sum, both authors attempt to deal with, by comparing with hindsight their own case-study texts in chapters 4 and 5, this study's principal research questions and 'first-things-first' propositions on 'what for and how' field practitioners have been faring on the fashionable currents of common LADPM-thoughts focused on 'sustainable' practices. Particularly, it is intended (through figure 4.1) to draw lessons from making intelligible the periodic turns (: when, why, where, what changes happened during past four development decades) along our professional sailing route on the heaving sea of practitioners' minds; that is, inspired though by the cacophony of 'free-floating' opinions on LADPM-policy criteria voiced both in the Northern and Southern hemispheres. By judging our own case-studies we want to map out, from outside and inside, today's internalised mental firmament encompassed by its professional time-, place- and role-bound horizon. This interior 'seascape' emerged in intoxicant waves full of (false-bottom, sometimes) LADPM-insights while we, yet typical shipmates among other fellow-sailors, over and over again woke up from reassuringly sleep; and went on guard while pragmatically dressing up but critically stripping off again fashionable, partly irrelevant clothes. However, we have never given up our argonautic, challenging and uncertain quest for the golden fleece of a tacitly supposed, multi-disciplinary c.q. holistic and healing LADPM-sustainability (Polanyi, Terry lectures 2 and 3, 1966). Last, but not least, in (re)shaping self-critically indeed LADPM-practices animated in tense consonance with personal dispositions, practitioners are invited to be wide awake sometimes in exploring the full range of their experiential faculties to make, - quietly or dreadfully -, explicit common orientational metaphors for charting their planned interventions (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, chapters 20-30; appendix in Argyris and Schön, 1978, pp. 319-331; Morgan, 1986, last chapter 10). Self-imagining poetic calls are welcome intermezzos, too, in this respect for creating both distance and direction.

Favorite Poems of Emily Dickinson. Edited by two of her friends Mabel Loomis Todd and T.W. Higginson (1890)

Exultation is the going
Of an inland soul to sea,
Past the houses, ~
past the headlands,
Into deep Eternity.

I NEVER saw a moor,
I never saw the sea;
Yet know I how the heather looks,
And what a wave must be.
Bred as we, among the mountains,
Can the sailor understand
The divine intoxication
Of the first league out from land?
I never spoke with God,
Nor visited in heaven,
Yet certain am I of the spot
As if the chart were given.

As exemplified with cool but anxious confidence indeed by this study's three-dimensional research compass of figure 2.1 with strategic and normative dissonances: besides taken-for-granted, verbally expressed and metaphorical world orientations, graphic pictures have been partly conditioning, if not over-disciplining the typical 'natural' habits of LADPM-practitioners. Here we have to stay on guard wide awake again, for these (over-) simplifying images, figures and tables are along axes 2 and 1 visualising, and repeatedly (re)framing, hierarchical and horizontal cross-connections in conceptual constructs which guide 'sustainable' practices 'out there' along axis 3. It is to be reminded though that in thus symbolically charting along axis 1 inward-looking sailing routes as LADPM-practitioners, these synthesising and unifying but reductionist canons of shared reasoning signify a deep-rooted but romantic quest for an assumed integral c.q. time- and place-transcending image of sustainable development (=SD): our golden fleece, fictitious grail or near-mystical paradise to be regained (Bell and Morse, 1999, chapters 4-7).

Here, we are to stand on critical guard, beforehand, against sardonic self-ridiculing because a classic self-reflexive paradox has been encapsulated inside the very test-case of our double-barreled research design. For our four-staged SD-exploration as pictured later on by figure 4.1 along three axes of figure 2.1 including textual, metaphorical and graphical representations is, – by way of a three-pronged approach –, to correspond neatly with our 'inner and outer' LADPM-worlds as practically experienced and literally lived by in 'stormy' persistence of one's private and spiritual sustenance (Firey, 1960, chapter IX). Here, too, 'at the end of the day' the authors accept a tragic breach (Heering, 1961) from which mankind, of sheer necessity, cannot escape: although by chance caught inside the canonised iron orb of our shared but self-imagined world orientations, one is still heaving anchors in an emancipatory quest for an all-embracing account of the clockwork of our world. In thus cultivating full-hearted our humanity, one may nevertheless ask: 'What for' are we ultimately making sense of emancipation, self-determination and liberation of bondages (Giddens, 1991, p. 213; Bauman, 1993, p. 213); in square Dutch: 'Waar hebt dit allemaal voor nodig?'

Thus we admit indeed that our study compass stands on a drifting ship: a moving target beyond our self-reflexive grasp. There is no final self-protected (religio-mystical or fixed teleological), only a second-best resting station for 'sustainable' area-development prototypes. These stand, repeatedly reshaped like reductionist torsos, unstable on our rocking boat. In other words there is a diverse richness of, sometimes, false-bottom narratives to be told about a reasonable, instead of a rationalist truth (Toulmin, 1990, chapter 5). Again, it is the persistent but discomfiting quest of a humane truthfulness, fully exploiting our inquisitive minds, which has defused rationalist beliefs in a universal truth which, of necessity, kills its generalisations over and over again (Tomlinson and Woolgar in Lawson and Appignanesi (ed.), 1989; Guba and Lincoln in Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, chapters 1 and 6). From a compassionate poverty alleviation stance we contest this sardonically deceiving, relativist side of post-modernism (Harper/Stein in Mandelbaum et al., 1996, pp. 414-430), and consequently take up a dual sociological notion for finding our own commensurable midway. Along this personal route we have been cruising up and down along axes 2 and 1 towards our moderate 'logic of practice'. We thus exercised both 'inside and outside' a reconciliatory LADPM-steermanship along axis 3 for escaping in our world account both from func-
tionalist, systemic and structuralist objectivism, as well as from free-will subjectivist existentialism (Bourdieu, 1980/90, chapters 1-5; Zoja, 1995. Part IV: Nemesis versus Hybris i.e. fateful vs. over-ambitious).

As in sub-section 1.7.2, we subscribe to another classic, but tragic and devastating message for scientifically trained LADPM fellow-sailors: rationally substantiating essence is running behind experienced existence; the inquisitive owl of Minerva begins its nostalgic flight only when dusk is falling i.e. when actuality is completing its developmental course (Taylor, 1994, chapter 21; Hegel, 1807, in Leys, 1996, pp 3 + 42/44). Seemingly, by exploiting another metaphor, humans are putting their problem ridden real-life cart, of sheer necessity, behind self-created winged horses, – which over and over again (self-) critically are hunted down (Hyden, 1983, pp.2-4).

_Kringloop van het water: Tragic circulation along border-lines_

III
_Aflandig voert de wind ons mee_
laag over open zee,
wanneer met woorden moegestreden,
maar ongekoeld ons bloed van woede blijft
over onzegbaarheid van onze tegenstrijdigheden, -
waarvoor ik in verbijstering steeds wijken moet.

_Zo strijken wij, laag en onderkoeld,_
_over deining van onze tegenheden:_
_dit machteloos verdriet:_
_wanhopig ons verschiet._

II
_Maar halverwege onze overkant_
stijgt al de wind weer op:
met woorden volgeladen
keren wij stormenderhand
koelbloedig terug naar 't vasteland
waar moederlijk met zachte hand
wij elkaar, zolang het duurt, ontvangen.

_Daar op het strand ontladen onze samenzangen zich_  
in oeroude waterbeelden zoals deze, 
toch afkomstig van die overkant: 
over grenzeloze watervlakten heen 
slaat verbeelding bressen in duinenrijen van ons verstand. 

_I_
_Daar op die vloedlijn,_
in ontmoeting aan deze zijde, 
wekt telkens weer de zee ons op 
voor ons gevecht met tegenstrijdigheden, -
en halverwege weer mijn hemelvaart en nederdaling 
voor ontlading in één continue cirkelgang._

38
2.1 Axis 1 with normative inward-looking intentions: our inner semiotic software being exposed (Denzin/Lincoln, 1994, chapter 29).

Once upon a time in the rationalising West, with historical up- and down-swings, our Enlightenment-angel (c.q. owl of Minerva) started to be propelled backwards into the future from the Greek cosmopolis and Roman empire up to and including early- and late-modernity, - nowadays 'colonising' human intellect throughout our world with increasing speed (Stöhr/Taylor, 1981, pp. 47-59). Since those ancient times two innermost development conceptualisations have been waiting in the wings, still undecided (Gellner, 1992, pp. 72-96): those starting off from a commonly agreed canon of theorising, be it pragmatic, rationalist or interpretative and thus validating truthful knowledge; as well as those starting off from moral 'good-or-bad' justifications of planned c.q. knowledgeable interventions, - altogether applicable to our specific area-development cases. Put otherwise, but directly 'ad hominem': Which rationality and whose justice count first in variegated settings of public choice (Maclntyre, 1988); or framed differently: Are we putting either the last first, or the first last (Chambers, 1983/97). In our specific LADPM-instance, personal commitment to the needs and rights of 'weak and voiceless' distant strangers (Corbridge in Booth, 1994, pp. 103-114; Hoch in Mandelbaum et al, 1996, pp. 30-44) makes unavoidable today a prudent but compassionate, and long- versus short-range hold on 'moral sentiments', as set out in following sub-sections.

2.1.1 Habitudes beyond the 'hard' rationalist granite of self-interest: a strongly man-centered, culturalist view (UNESCO, chapter 8, 1998)

In order to arrive hereafter at four directory snap-shots of contingent conditions of man in sharing throughout history public choices, and thus (re)shaping both his/her 'outer' operational and 'inner' psycho-milieux, a prudent prelude is to form the beginning of this sub-section. Both of self-reflective and intersubjective necessity, soul searching gyres are called to mind (Veenstra, 1971, pp. 102-119) as they attempted thirty year ago to bring out a long-ranging and normative valuing grasp at the variety of socio-spatial settings towards which LADPM-practitioners, among others, have been directing their intellectual armoury. For reasons of creating a cool distance, but still searching for 'inner' direction, use was made - as a synthesising tool - of a cosmological planetarium to map out the intangible lumber-room of well-versed but typical LADPM-minds. As exemplified herewith, also animated from inside by poetic intermezzo's, both sub-section 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 try to encapsulate cross-connections in fundamental constructs which govern mental LADPM-frames in particular. For they are based on tense triangles of personal LADPM-choices, but separately exhibit commonly shared dilemmas represented by ideal-typical 'Wahlverwandtschaft' (= relationship-of-choice) figures, c.q. grids.

All in all, the admittedly grandiose 'nature-cum-nurture' snap-shots 1→4 below were tentatively put on paper around 1970, - verbosely and graphically -, in search of some resting stations along 'inner guiding' routes; that is, amidst 'stormy' ontological discords and commonly shared, epistemological dilemmas holding sway at interlocking 'playing decks' of personal selfhood, - including LADPM-minds. This is further discussed in the procedural part of sub-section 2.2.1. Instant food for thought, just like in sub-section 2.0, was thus structured - proposedly (; P. 3-4) - by two antithetical triads for connecting such mutually interdependent entities and properties as shown below (van Nieuwenhuijze, 1963/66; Buckley, 1967; van Peursen, 1968).
• The human self in imagining self-protectively, but breaking away in authentic self-affirmation with intervals from its common bio-physical milieux viewed today in a mechanistic versus organismic sense; and from its collective decision making structures and resource-allocation procedures, 'top-down versus bottom-up', resulting in different styles of rationalising blueprint planning, organisational learning-by-doing, advocacy/transactive, or counter-planning (refer also to sub-sections 2.1.2/3).

Simultaneously, this prototypical self although safely shielded off, repeatedly shapes: its cultural world images constituting with overarching potency, again in threefold: its ethics viewed as being static versus dynamic, and micro/selfish versus macro/altruistic, thus holding up our 'moral sentiments'; its knowledge bases ruled in a (neo-)positivist versus relativistic interpretative sense; and, last but not least, its resource controlling techniques lulling humans practically asleep by 'mimicked' c.q. socially forced devices of a mechanistic, organismic/Gestaltic, or 'free-will' narcissistic/spiritualistic character.

Accordingly, 'longue-durée' shifts in common mental frames were pictured to have taken place by world-wide cross-cultural learning rounds, gyrating between: singular mythical awareness that something is in the holistic minds of pre-scientific men; 'bleached' fragmented awareness what something is, tangible and finite, but aloof 'out there' corresponding to 'scientific facts'; functional, double-barrelled hermeneutic awareness how something is, in social practice commensurably made sense of 'for the time being'; and normatively valuing, macro-ethical awareness what for something is, judged religio-culturally, c.q. theistically, mystically/gnostic, stoic/fatalistically or tragically.

These distinctions of the 1960/70s altogether led up to a 'Wahlverwandtschaft' middle-ground of four intersubjectively agreed rationalities which capacitate predominant types of collective resource management (P.5), nowadays among stakeholders simultaneously at work:

1. in relatively closed agrarian societies where authoritative leadership reigns through 'law and order'; the main tools applied being intuitive c.q. magical devices of control over land and water as scarce resources, stabilised in the propertied hands of wealthy familial aristocracies;
2. in industrialising nation-states where the tools mainly applied are rigidly fixed, materialistic devices of control over scarce capital and human resources, centralised in the thrifty hands of commercial and industrial bourgeoisies;
3. in welfare states where the tools mainly applied are self-regulating organismic devices of control over mass distribution of (affluent) consumer goods and government services, monopolised in the ruthless hands of captains of private industry, politics and public administration (man himself running the risk of being packed away in a managerial society);
4. in global macro-institutional systems becoming established in the (over)ambitious hands of private-cum-public technocracies holding sway world-wide inter alia through tele-communication and information exchange processes, eventually applied both for testing out collectively willed well-being, and mapping hereto scenario-wise (like in club-of-Rome exercises since 1970) commonly shared problem areas in human reality such as dragging poverty, pollution, bad governance and clashing cultures.
Here, one would join still today, after more than thirty years, Polanyi again in his comprehension of hierarchically overlapping, macro- vs. micro-meanings in human reality, as follows. For a stratified 'inner' universe was then-and-there (1962/66, p.49) suggested consisting of all-embracing multi-layered entities inside which each higher basic principle controls the border-lines left indeterminate by the next lower-level principle(s): Russian dolls inside dolls; wheels within wheels. However, because the higher/broader fundamental imperative is 'logically' unaccountable in terms of the lower/narrower one, its 'goodness-of-fit' is vulnerable by false-bottom beliefs (See personal intermezzo: 'Dubbele Bodems'), leading to fatal failures. It could lead to operating credulously 'for free' solely through lower-level principles, and thus walking on thin ice with your 'foolish' head in the clouds (cynical in Dutch 'goed gek'; 'van lotje getikt').

So it is that by digging up, but partly re-burying again, three decades of inter-locked thought and practice, a diverse 'longue-durée' range of human experiential capabilities emerged in shifting antithetical modes and/or morphogenetical stages. That is, age-old, if not timeless, up- and down-swings are becoming, with increasing speed of oscillation throughout today's 'global village', commonly internalised part and parcel of self-reflective human minds, – including afflicted, if not intoxicated LADPM-'cocoon's'. To these soul-searching depth-statements, – as taken together again around 1980/82, particularly in a personal synthesis of following sub-section 2.1.2 –, have been running parallel such 'armchair' observations, as found by chance and providing food for thought along our study axes 2 and 1, respectively.

**Appendix 2.1.0 Poetic Intermezzo's**

**Persoonlijk intermezzo (1980)**

**Geluid: Full-Heartedly Experienced Up- and Down-Swings**

Er klinkt een schallend juichen door onze dagen, dat nauwelijks te dragen, naar oorsprong niet de duiden valt. 
Het zweeft soms aan in lange sterke golven, waaronder wij bedolven, ternaauwernood aansporing ondervinden om door te gaan.

Het blijft op afstand of dichtbij ons leven lang omringen, dwingend opwaarts in steeds wijder kringen de eindeloosheid in.

**Scheepvaart: Ceaseless Morpho-/Bpigenesis**

Gedachten varen af en aan, vervolgen eigen gang en baan stroomop-, stroomafwaarts na ontlanding in wel overwogen of te snel aangevoerde woorden.

Gedachten, in beelden opgeslagen en regelmatig aangevuld waar schepen komen aangevaren, laten zich ruim-schroots en geduldig overladen in woorden die in gaan en staan verouderen en verjaren.

Gedachten volgen eigen gangen, maar woorden azen op gestage of versnelde onafwendbare gedachten-onslagg. 

Ruimtelijke ordening: Grid-Building

Wij bouwen dammen op, creëren ons de ruimte en leven er volop in schuimend bruisen binnen perken van vermeende orde.

Dit is dan ons bestaan: op de vloedlijn van ons leven vanuit zee aan laad te kunnen gaan de stilte tegemoet.

Het is een enkele die dit slechts doet.

**Eigen gedachten: Inquisitive Mind-Sets, c.q. Bee-Hives**

Ineens kwam deze droom toen ik te denken zat, zo mijn gedachten had die ik mijn dromen noemde als bijen om een honingraat.

Hun klank was mij bekend: hun onvermoeibaar zijn, zoete arbeidzaam zijn mijn stilzijn als ik werkte en bloemenzorg in mijn was; ook dat in rijken staat, in stilte weggezet, een konvooorde recht gericht langs bloesemboomen, en binnenin vorstvinnen zijn.

Die zijn mij onbekend. Hun zwang voel ik temeer. Gedachten keer op keer gaan in en uit die steeds door mijn vorstin wordt opgeëist: een hoge ver beminde die legioenen richt, gevoed door vloeibaar licht dat duizenden haar brengen uit ware liefhebberij.

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Dubbele Bodems: Traps of False-Bottom Certainties.

III. Bij keiharde zekerheid van heldere vrieskou bestaan wij het bijna als opgewekte wijsneuzen over ruimtelijke en tijds-begrenzingen van ons omringende ijsvlakten heén te tuimelen.

II. Maar bij invallende dooi en kwakkelend weer verstaan wij nauwelijks de kunst zwemmend ons hoofd boven water te houden.

I. Laat staan dat wij hoog en droog voor enige tijd maar terugvallen op werkelijk vaste grond onder onze wanhopig spartelende voeten.

Verwachting: Foolish/Persistent Compassion

III. Vast ligt dit hart gemeerd nog zich keer op keer bezenteraan stijve steigers van de tijd.

II. Het wachten is op heisen van de zeilen wanneer – ballast van verleden overboord gegooid—onder krakend want, getooid met vlag en wimpels, ons beider boegbeeld hoog zich heffen zal de toekomst in ‘t kompas.

I. Dan zal ook zal halverwege onze reis temidden van de leegten van het water ons lief uit volle borst het later van de nieuwe tijd bezingen ten aanhore van niemand, geheel om niet en niemendal.

Renaissance: Provisional Turn-Over Stations

III. Dag aan dag keren woorden terug tot vast behoren; als beurtschippers die door de jaren heen hun trossen gooien rond afgesleten steigerkoppen: veel gebruikte haltepalen binnen de tijd.

Denkbeelden, in woorden opgeslagen, laten zich door de dagen dragen óndanks gehate regelmaat van beurtschippers die door de jaren afmeren aan palen van de tijd.

II. Dit waren dan mijn vaste punten: gedachten komen aangevaren in woorden die verouderen en verjaren; en beurtschippers die regelmaat betrachten in de tijd.

I. Hier rijst ook mijn verzet: dit woordbeeld mag als trouwe schippershond mijn leven lang mij niet bewaken; verlangen staat weer op om overboord te slaan, ontdaan van alle tijd.

Schalkse terugblik: Double-Edged Innermost

Jij kwam van ver: dit mythische verlangen dat ik in liederen had verpakt van water en van dromen, van bloemembomen, het gaan en komen van gedachten, en binnenin vorstinnen zijn.

Die binnengeur, ons zoet geheim, heb ik voor jaren weggestopt.

Nu weer ontpopt, staan bont gekleurde vinders in mij op die ik met jou wil delen. Zij aan zij gelegen wil ik je mijn vorstinnen laten hoeden die binnenin mij woeden, wil ik je slaan met roeden van plezier.

Persiflague: Sardonic quest

Als kind van deze tijd en op mijn eigen wijze ben ik op zoek naar wat in oude tijden graalridders verbeidden: de schaal waarop de laatste waarheid hun werd aangereikt; de eenheid van het al: ‘t gevecht om niemendal.

Ik stond er bij en keek er naar, maar lach mij nü te barsten.

Illustrations of: No Contradiction-free Accounts Anymore

- By Giddens’ structuration theory (1984, chapter 4) disclosing social constraints/enablements, as well as fundamental and timeless antagonisms/contradictions, both of ‘inner’ existential and ‘outer’ structural opposites, at the very heart of our human condition in ceaseless transmutation. These views were critically taken up by Archer (1982/90) in a morphogenetical sense, –thus joining general systems approaches by Buckley (1967/69) and Maruyama (1963/74: pointing at typical overlapping ‘logics’ for socio-spatial planners viewed ‘from inside’ as hierarchists, individualists and/or mutualists).

- by Crook, Pakulski and Waters (1992, chapter 1), downunder in Tasmania still clinging nostal-gically (?) to Parson’s fourfold functional, transformist AGIL-approach which was dubbed, however, a bio-evolutionary illusion already ten years earlier (Giddens, 1981/84, chapter5 incl. his critical notes)
• by Maclntyre (1982/88 chs.15-17) and Taylor (1989, chapters 3, 21, 25), both perceived at a
cool distance again, because of alleged (credulous/false-bottom?) communitarism, c.q. provin­
cial selfishness; teleological determinism c.q. 'Revelation' foundationalism; as well as of a hedge-
hogged 'great-divide' dichotomy between outward- and inward-looking perspectives of the
'lamentable' natural sciences versus the interpretative human sciences, – passing particularly
border-lines between 'bleached' philosophy, and ethical enquiries based on classic tragic texts
(Corbridge in Booth, 1994, p.105; Isaiah Berlin, James and Geertz in Tully, ed.1994; Nussbaum,
1986, chapters 1, 10-12 and Interlude 2 on the 'fragility of goodness'.

By being thus kept critically updated about our long-range, antithetical human develop­
ment conceptualisations, –triggered as if in a (cross-) cultural learning programme
(Van Peursen, 1970/74, chapters VI and VII)–, area planning practitioners have unavoid­
ably met and tried to stomach an antagonistic set of 'moral sentiments' in its co-evo­
olutionary state of flux, as follows.

**Moral LADPM-justifications: a classic triad again for personal ethics on 'good and bad'
in human action**

In the back of their minds professionals were to scurry back and forth between frag­
mented bits and pieces; that is, giving priority (: Q.4.a) to such 'bleached' rival concepts
as selfish utility, private duty and shared opulence/merit, individual freedom/entrepre­
nerial liberty, 'inner' trust / mutual confidence, distributive justice or equity/fairness,
minimum basic needs, fundamental human rights and world-wide solidarity. As shown
in sub-sections 2.1.2-3 and 2.2.1-3, these more or less dogmatic guiding principles range
from high to low, i.e. from situation-transcending values to area-specific norms c.q. pol­
icy-test criteria. They were difficult to balance by pragmatic, sometimes happy-go-lucky
field practitioners (along our study axis 3); but the more so by outward-looking 'arm­
chair' scientists turning moral imperatives over and over again (along our study axis 2),
often in an haphazard c.q. emotivist manner (McConnell, 1981, chapters 5 and 6 on
Rawls, Hayek, Nozick, Dworkin and Harvey; Nussbaum and A. Sen, 1993: 'Quality of
life').

Looking inward as a development economist, however, Hirschman pinpoints (1977) the
stark contrasts, originally in human mind-sets of 17th and 18th-century Europe (as
Toulmin does in 1990, chapters 2 and 3) between cold and deliberate self-interest which
makes human behaviour reliable, predictable and calculable, and the unpredictable
hot emotions, swollen by selfish sentiments or selfless 'great-cause' ideals. Here, the
variety of inner motives and desires, as opposed to calculating self-interest, shows the
following catalogue of antonyms in rival pairs again such as: animosity versus affection;
relish of telling people vs. being told what to do; passion for superiority vs. self-depre­
ciation; primordial inertness vs. restlessness {to be where the action is}; need for har­
mony and consensus vs. contradiction and conflict {they clarify life by antitheses};
hatred vs. love of change and uncertainty; desire to be different vs. instinctive imita­
tiveness (monkey see, monkey do); obsession to follow vs. to break rules; identification
with victors vs. compassion with victims; envy for success vs. pity for undeserved mis­
fortune: of peripheral 'weak, voiceless people'.

These antonyms of calculating interest-driven behaviour were, two hundred years
before Hirschman, moulded already by Adam Smith and David Hume into a trichoto­
my distinguishing, in addition to self-interest, affection-driven behaviour, and deeds
inspired by 'higher' abstract principles. So, lower passions, middle-range interests and
higher intentions in habitual mixtures were thought to co-determine human action,
–just like in the scriptural expression: 'When I would do good, evil is present with'.

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This ‘verticality’ construct of 17th-century moral psychology (see the cosmological planetarium in Veenstra, 1971, p. 106/7) apparently fell back on ancient stoic philosophy of Cicero, Seneca, etc. that had influenced Smith’s ethical enquiries (Holmes, 1990, pp. 278/279; MacIntyre, 1982, p. 231); however, thus endorsing the stark classic diversity of (ir)rational human motivations catalogued above, and not sympathising with a reductionist, solely interest-driven approach. Here, there is no need to sugar-coat human nature: people sink in hot passions below rational self-interest, just as often as they soar above it in hot-gospeling of altruistic benevolence. As a stop-over station, c.q. provisional escape, in search of a meta-ordered account of the world, nevertheless remained attractive to scientists/planners the classic Aristotelian idea (Etzioni, 1968, p. 24) of arranging existences in a cosmic hierarchy, — both inward- and outward-looking: with dead matter at the bottom; living matter ‘passionless’ interacting with the environment just above it; the moving kinetic, perceiving animal world, next; and finally, on top, man as the maker of his own action-oriented symbols. Each higher realm includes the lower one, and is not exhausted by its distinguishing properties. Man is, presumably, the most all-embracing (telic) being and ceaselessly finds his/her existence at all levels (; Q.4a): a thriving but fragile bee-hive or stratified universe, above quoted as well from Polanyi (1966); or differently framed again: dolls inside Russian dolls.

This ‘inner-cum-outer’ cosmic order, however, sometimes falls into senseless pieces when dreadful inroads are made into man’s protective cocoon of commonly shared perspectives. Human self-affirmation is then threatened by terrifying mass experiences as, for instance, during periods of transformation in European cultural history. That is, disjunction of norms and beliefs caused spiritual anguish, and threatened man to death particularly during such bloodsheds as:

• between Protestant reformers and their Catholic opponents in the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) which turned the Chech and German lands into a charnel house; and

• of World Wars I and II between 1914 and 1945, including the holocausts both of Nazi- and Soviet-concentration camps.

These religious and intellectual, but above all brutal and destructive upheavals have led both John Donne (1573-1631) and 300 years later William Butler Yeats to pick up the ‘feel’ of their times by emblematic expressions of moral decay, as follows (Coser’s Sociology through Literature, 1972, pp 494/495):

'Tis all in pieces, all coherence gone:
Gone all supply of just relations....

Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world—;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity;

For every man alone thinks he has got
To be Phoenix, and that there can be
None of that kind, of which he is, but he.

It is to be noted, that 200 years ago already the ‘western granite’ of universal self-interest, i.e. the narrow pursuit of economic gain, had a broadening political rationale as well. It suggests indeed until and including these days that all citizens, no matter what
their socially ascribed status, have diverse (non-)material concerns that are worthy of co-equal attention. Moreover, it suggests that citizens should distrust expressions of ‘common-good and great-cause’ disinterestedness on the part of principal, sometimes ‘foolish or kleptocratic’ stakeholders; see figure 2.1.1. Such critical distrust is not merely cynical, but profoundly egalitarian and democratic, – at least in its emancipatory potentiality leading towards ultimate liberation ‘what for?’.

In conclusion, – taking ‘inner and outer’ motives together –, towards the end of the 1980s, Amartya Sen (1978/87, 1992) with his meta-ranking ‘armchair’ critique on the standard of living, came ‘onto the horizon’ of the LADPM-flotilla; that is, of the ‘compact majority’ of fellow-sailors being ‘cocooned’ asleep by the fashionable utilitarian compass pointing towards self-sustaining, gainful and equal development nation-wide, – although rural but also urban poverty were dragging on. Against one-times’ mainstream modernisation thought, but in line with his own classic libertarian upbringing and inspired by such humanistic shipmates as Goulet in Todaro (1971/90, pp. 86-97) and the psychologist Maslow (1954), Sen’s threefold measuring-rod is speculatively tried out here along study axis 2 and practical axis 3 which is ‘paved with good intentions’. For answering the classic standard-of-living question regarding what constitutes ‘good life for man’, a threefold normative judgement on mental LADPM-frames is thus proposed; a self-evaluative judgement on ‘good and bad’, that is, as oscillating between utilitarian interests, social self-esteem including sympathetic (‘big-belly’ family/clan) affections, and unselfish c.q. ‘foolish’ commitment to whatever altruistic responsibilities; and thus in the short versus long run giving direction and reasonable room (indeed, prioritising ‘first things first’ in sustainable development of livelihoods):

- For men’s abilities to satisfy immediate basic needs such as food, shelter, clothing, clothing, health, schooling, jobs, social security and political stability; and
- For men’s abilities to string out self-esteem, personal and cultural identity including duties and rewards, respect and honour, altogether kindling a ‘common give-and-take blaze’ of mid-term consensus formation; and
- For men’s abilities to expand the individual and collective range of alternative options and/or free and fair choices for the emancipatory pursuit of novel development imperatives, like world-wide solidarity with voiceless and excluded, distant strangers.

Continuous and pressing indeed, but also inconclusive i.e. undecided has been the babble of voices among LADPM-shipmates during last decades regarding standard-of-living indicators (economic, ecological, social, budgetary); in particular though, regarding their ranking c.q. time-space priority setting for men’s living capabilities to be planned for and evaluated. Here, every person, household, community or nation-state, i.e. any socio-spatial grouping claims and defends rightfully or not its own partial and cut-off, temporarily dominant stand dependent on twists and turns in knowledge and belief systems spotting diverse resource endowments. Here, too, there is no great failure for ‘planistrators’ in the in-ability to babble and to (dis)agree with our conclusive and reconciliatory middleman adage: to be wise as a (self-seeking) serpent and harmless as an (altruistic) dove, i.e. human nature soaring ‘low and/or high’ (Whisson in Grillo and Rew, 1985, pp. 137/138).

2.1.2. Shifts in cognitive guidelines: streamlining our man-centered and stratified universe through a classificatory tool.

‘Normally’ adherents of rival development views, related policy-test criteria and standard-of-living indicators embodied in resource planning practices passionately deny
real-life antithetical options. This attitude rests on a claim that there exists an incontestable underlying structure 'out there', to which things correspond as they are: 'the hard facts'. When academic theories thus serve multi-level development planning, they function as intensely blanketing ideologies:

- expressing a partial truth, selectively produced by methodological canons which one-sidedly establish particular cause-effect relationships;
- obscuring from view other arguments and conflicts, i.e., contestability and unpredictability as real-life phenomena; and thus
- justifying organisational and administrative authority to perform typical contingent resource control by collectively accepted, bureaucratic routines and polity rules.

However, confronted every day with the bewildering landscape of area planning mismatches and an uneasy awareness of contestable truths about our conflict-ridden, apparently unmanageable resource development reality, field practitioners are -at intervals, sometimes- urgently in need of an 'inner' synthesis or, metaphorically speaking; of a guiding ordnance-survey map. A classic philosophical tradition of the sociology of knowledge is here called upon for considering emic-cum-etic shifts in world orientations - held by politico-administrative gate-keepers, socio-spatial planners and resource scientists - in a broad historical and societal context.

Particularly accounting for changing LADPM-contexts, i.e. processes of decentralisation in government administrations, popular participation in development planning and local applications of (geo-)information processing technology, triangular interactions are accentuated as depicted in figure 2.1.1 among:

- the realm of politicians and top-administrators with their more or less philosophical, socio-political ideals (PHI), asking normative questions about what are we planning for, including development objectives, norms c.q. policy-test criteria and standard-of-living indicators collectively agreed upon;
- the rural and urban development problems as actually experienced (ACT) and subjectively viewed by beneficiary target groups asking operational-executive questions such as: where, when and for whom are planned interventions to be implemented??
- the consensus-building practice (PRA) of regional, rural, settlement and infrastructure planners asking strategic questions about how and with whom are we to arrive at 'integrated' area development frameworks in view of the multitude of development objectives and scarcity of resources;
- the realm of one-sided development theories (THE) and bodies of knowledge produced by the 'mélange' of scientists, researchers and natural resource surveyors who concentrate their academic questions on what policy variables do we take into account from which development viewpoint?

The capital letters used in the transactive triangle of figure 2.1.1, bringing out the principal actors and their roles in our Third World planning drama, are explicitly meant to focus on the abstract field of tension of which by antithetical relationships can be made sense in the ceaseless application of:

**THE=** multi-disciplinary knowledge, technical know-how and (geo-)information technology to

**PRA=** designs of problem- and action-oriented, collective resource development programmes and scenarios, in confrontation

**PHI=** with interested, partially idealistic and rationalist programme administrators, and

**ACT=** with continually changing societal problem areas of beneficiary target groups.
Politicians/Top-Administrators with their 'sentiments' and value judgements directed both at the short- and the long-term: WHAT FOR are we doing this

Socio-spatial planners and designers: HOW do we do this and for/ with whom?

Problematic areas in society given priority by urban and rural target groups/users: WHERE and WHEN this is being done?

Scientists/Researchers: WHAT/which variables do we take into account from which (utopian) development viewpoint?

Mutual interaction/tension between mutually opposed but complementary forces

Up- and down-swings of contradictions and antitheses among stakeholders (Giddens, 1984; Jantsch, 1975).

Figure 2.1.1. Public resource management triangle of negotiations and transactions among constituent groups of principal actors concerned, c.q. the stakeholders.

Given the space-, time- and context-bound features of natural resource management in particular, but above all striving for a dynamic conceptual, area-development framework in general-, the triadic contrast of figure 2.1.1 is as a temporary tool tried out on the two separate realms of politics and administration on one hand, and that of science and technology on the other hand. So, collective resource programming as such, viewed as a policy-cum-action oriented practice with spatial/territorial emphasis, is in the back of LADPM-minds conjectured at the intersection of the former two realms. Practical consciousness thus appears in figures 2.1.2/3 to be determined by two triadic sets with four sub-domains, each with its own 'inner' operating engine-room (Op): one set of figure 2.1.2 relates to collective decision making in divergent societal settings inspired by their own socio-cultural potentials and quasi-academic c.q. reductionist development concepts; and the other set of figure 2.1.3 relates to academic group work of currently applied sciences in accordance with scholarly agreed upon canons, leading to different resource planning styles. In dealing with these eight subsets, a development typology is used running parallel to three basic modes c.q. forms of human aspirations, as there are (refer back to 'playing decks', sub-section 1.2; plus triadic, attitudinal sub-section 2.1.1):

III the operational-executive form, directed in the short run mainly by man's desire for stability and pragmatic sustenance of here-and-now regularities and ideologies;

II the strategic form, aimed in the medium run at bringing about socio-structural changes, thus breaking away from the operational form; against the light of/guided personally 'from inside' by

I the normative form, striving for freedom of choice (also for future generations), intellectual emancipation and self-determination, i.e. long-term innovation of collectively held norms, values and development objectives.
To avoid a deterministic evolutionary stance, these basic human aspirations \( \text{III} \to \text{I} \) are proposed as ideal types; that is, as three mutually opposed but simultaneously held real-life attitudes in public choice c.q. 'Wahlverwandtschaften', one of which is apparently dominant in each basic form \( \text{I} \ldots \text{III} \) and rows of figures 2.1.2-4. So, to combat the uneasy awareness by field practitioners of debatable truths about a conflict-ridden, seemingly unnamable LADPM-reality, the classificatory tool\(^1\) of an ideal-type character of figure 2.1.4 is proposed to simultaneously map out some constituent, dilemmatic elements of figures 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, i.e. of practical consciousness as follows.

Within diverse societal contexts, with their own territory-bound institutions, as an asset, all sorts of livelihood ideals are struggling for priority (: P.4-5), such as material wealth for a happy few, social welfare for the masses and general well-being world-wide (PHI/Act). Here, such definitions of well-being as leading in practice to socio-economic indicators, environmental impact assessment, or proportional volumes of sectoral government budgets ought to be considered as intermediary approaches. This is, as these measuring devices might - optimistically be seen in the light of dynamic human aspirations striving for liberation from restrictive material, social and cultural bondages, --but again, ultimately 'what for' are socio-spatial planners aiming at?

Within multi-tiered decision-making procedures, the harmony, coalition and conflict models for public action are (in rivalry at various administrative levels) leading to temporary public consensus (PHI/Op). So, cultural clashes are to be observed everywhere between plural norms and values related to individual freedom, social equity, human rights and environmental solidarity (PHI/Phi). During the past six decades narrowly confined concepts related to collectively planned action have alternately dominated our scientific community: staged economic growth, (re)distribution of socio-political power including basic human needs, ecological balances and self-reliance, from international to local levels (PHI/The).

Here, figure 2.1.3 is meant as an 'inner guide' based on the following 'stratified' propositions on the birth and development of public planning styles (: P.3), but bound specifically to Western (morpho-) genesis of societal guidance viewed in retrospect. Thus, in the beginning was (and still is) the age-old harmony model controlling with overarching authority the collective resource management within sovereign nation-states. This control device spreads its administrative tentacles from central headquarters down the managerial staircase in pursuit of economic growth. This 'Wahlverwandtschaft' link with figure 2.1.2 suggests a rather rigid form \( \text{III} \) of blueprint planning (THE/Op) centering on engineering problems which are usually assigned a contradiction-free, i.e. clearly defined set of development objectives for irrigation and land reclamation, rural roads and electricity supply, etc. This planning practice is dominated from inside by a 'natural' form \( \text{III} \) of scientific rationality (THE/Op) based on formal logic and adhering to what are generally 'mimicked', empirical methods for (ill) treating both our physical and social environment as being lifeless. The 'academic' research question, i.e. which resource policy variables are to be taken into account, is answered by analysing real-world situations on mechanistic sequences of causes and effects, incentives and responses.

An all-embracing, bio-physical form of social planning, apparently grafted on self-regulating cybernetic processes, recently acts in the limelight of area planning practice. This

\[^1\] For tracking back the ordering device used, refer to at the end of this sub-section to attached literature list of Appendix 2.1.1 as found in Veenstra, 1982, pp. 34 and 45. See also: Bertels and Nauta, 1969, chapter 7.
approach is backed up from figure 2.1.2 by such socio-political options as redistribution, environmental protection and popular participation, while falling within the scope of consultative c.q. reciprocal procedures of coalition formation. Consistency between collective objectives loses ground to socio-structural formulation of development problems with a multiplicity of stakeholders’ objectives. Inspired by the natural sciences, the organic stock of concepts (THE/Op) is mainly based on systemic functions and, again, scholarly agreed methods of inquiry, generalisation and policy prescription for acting upon our environment viewed in its self-regulating living state. Here, the ‘academic’ research question ‘how’ is answered by synchronised, (in)directly regulative action devices. In conclusion, ‘hard’ natural scientists do agree among themselves that for verifying or falsifying any truth it must be assumed that the tangible (natural) reality involved is an objective entity ‘out there’ which, at a distance, can be conceptualised in correspondence with an agreed-upon methodological canon, like the empirical cycle or general systems theory.

In opposition to the above (neo-)positivist styles of blueprint and systemic process planning, both intersubjective and society-based dialectic planning styles have been pressing forward during the last decades. Groups of ‘soft’ social scientists (: Q4b), such as symbolic interactionists, critical theorists and neo-Marxists, have lent their particularly emancipatory insights to our rural planning drama, conceptualised as a transactive learning process. For further discussion, see as well our typification in following sub-section 2.1.3.

Anyway, becoming aware in professional life of uneasy social and personal fields of tension (ACT), mindful planners have applied — as illustrated in figures 2.1.1-4 — their own dialectic methods of empathy and ideal-type characterisations (THE/Op), their pluralist democratic ideals of a perfectible, open egalitarian society, as well as socio-psychological c.q. tacit knowledge for conceptualising area-development planning practices (PRA).

Their strategic aim has appeared sometimes to generate rather utopian plans for introducing socio-structural changes, and to implement resource development interventions as genuinely and truthfully as possible. Here, the agreed-upon question of ‘what for’ has received an integrally normative answer from moral insights (credulous/false-bottom?) on full-fledged human autonomy, interpersonal responsibility, and restrained because discarded freedom. Refer particularly to practical caveats put forward by Staudt (1991, chapters 3 and 4) related to clashing, cultural and political contexts in development co-operation, — as exemplified in following chapter 3. So also could not fall on deaf ears the harsh reminders by Flyvbjerg (in Mandelbaum et al., 1996, pp. 383-399): in a machiavellistic manner pointing at ‘Reakationalität, i.e. at the dark side of planning which could not merely be jumped over by leaps of ‘good faith’.

Here we are reminded, too, that in practice the following four reflective states in authentic human action are never to be disjuncted, eventually leading to destruction of collectively meaningful debates. For rational intellect alone is barren; moral judgement alone is self-righteous; open egalitarian society; and opening yourself to others in empathy alone may (mistakenly or cynically) be non-responsive. These four intra-mental faculties may better be held in a triadic tension, so that each may complement and regulate the others. The points of triangulation, or intersection among them may ‘for the time being’ be called sincere encounters with integral meaning:

• where both positivist and dialectic ‘logic’ (THE) is tempered by morality,
• whose reasonable judgement (PHI) is tempered by feeling, and
• whose on-the-spot emotions, sentiments and affections (ACT) are tempered by personal empathy (PRA) of the principal social actors involved.
**Figure 2.1.2. Developmental typology as conceptual framework for the realm of politics and administration (PHI)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set 1</th>
<th>Basic forms in trichotomy</th>
<th>III. Operational form: Sustenance of status quo</th>
<th>II. Strategic form: Structural change</th>
<th>I. Normative form: Innovation in norms and values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHI: Politico-administrative Realm (philosophical ideals)</td>
<td>Trichotomy of politico-administrative rationalisation: WHAT FOR? Forms of social Philosophies organisation</td>
<td>Early capitalist (agrarian) societies: Wealth</td>
<td>Industrial welfare states: Welfare</td>
<td>Post-industrial forms of social organisation: general well-being e.g. 'quality of life'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-set of divergent forms of social organisation (PHI/Act)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Autocratic administrative systems (A+D) based on harmony model</td>
<td>PPBS, popular participation, co-ordination (A-D) based on coalition model</td>
<td>Continued system monitoring based on (global) conflict model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-set of public management procedures (Op): figure 2.2.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Liberal/individualist pursuit of freedom</td>
<td>Socialist ideals of equality</td>
<td>Eco-systemic solidarity, felt world-wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-domain of cultural potential (PHI/Phi)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Concepts of economic growth and employment generation</td>
<td>Concepts of socio-political redistribution of power</td>
<td>Concepts of ecological balances: (inter)national, regional, local.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-domain of quasi-academic Conceptualisation (PHI/The)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Quasi-academic conceptualisation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2.1.3. Developmental typology as conceptual framework for the realm of science and technology (THE)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set 1</th>
<th>Basic forms in trichotomy</th>
<th>III. Operational form: Sustenance of status quo</th>
<th>II. Strategic form: Structural change</th>
<th>I. Normative form: Innovation in norms and values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE: Scientific / technological Realm (knowledge)</td>
<td>Trichotomy of scientific and non-scientific acquisition of knowledge: WHAT? Scientific research programmes and fields of study</td>
<td>Natural and applied sciences</td>
<td>Social sciences</td>
<td>Humanities or cultural sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-set of current academic practice (THE/Act)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Empirical cycle and conceptions of bio-cybernetic systems/ Heterogeneities</td>
<td>Ideal-type characterisations; feelings of empathy</td>
<td>Use of symbolism, related to mystic/gnostic wisdom sometimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-set of Academic work (Op)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Scientists</td>
<td>Dialecticians</td>
<td>Seekers of mystic/gnostic wisdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-set of academic teaching and research programmes (THE/Phi)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Planning by means of control or blue-print planning</td>
<td>Systemic or process planning</td>
<td>Planning by means of transaction or negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-domain of application to the theory of planning c.q styles of planning (THE/The)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Styles of Planning</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All through the preceding propositions and ideal-type cross-connections of figures 2.1.2-4, one may have clung to time- and place-transcending processes of self-awakening and double-barrelled emphases in practical consciousness (like in the preceding, coolly distancing cases of the artillery officer, camera-man, court painter of sub-section 2.0.2), with the 'for-free' intention to endow planned human action with a late-modern form of integral meaning. The use of triadic mental frames has served in this respect, provisionally, as a synthetic method of self-reflection, originating inter alia from gnostic meditation and eastern mysticism (THE/Op). The interpretative logic concerned corresponds to a personal frame of reference that has no tangible connection with our five senses, but on which scholars of the cultural sciences orderly work together on the other side of the 'great divide' between humanities and natural sciences. That is, by using antithetical rules agreed inter-subjectively for the systematic acquisition of wisdom through introspective mirror images, for instance — thus giving truth again its collective 'inner-eyes' validity, i.e. credibility, generalisability and plural responsiveness. 'At the end of the day' it could be suggested from the ideal-type characterisation of figures 2.1.2/3, but particularly from the linking arrows, i.e. transmission belts relating the rich asset of socio-cultural values (PHI/Phi) with academic research and teaching canons (THE/Phi), what any consciously emancipating planner could discover: that forcing one into the disinterested, individualist and liberal attitude III, is taking simultaneously a narrowly confined, positivist stance regarding truth in grinding academic work. Near-mystic rejection of this 'bleached' fixation, however, runs parallel to an open-minded use of synthesising symbols: witness development planning typifications (THE/The) running from forms III.

Figure 2.1.4. Classification of dilemmatic elements in rural area development: inner guiding ordnance-survey map viewed in retrospect.
to I in figures 2.1.2-4, thus setting local area planning practitioners free from uneasy rule-boundness to reduced world perspectives and inherent blueprint policy criteria (Kelly in Palumbo, 1987, pp. 277-295).

No 'great-divide' secrets were thus held back along our emic research axis 1 of figure 2.1: neither during the 1960/70s through the man-centered resource control snapshots 1 to 4 of sub-section 2.1.1, nor during the 1980s through figures 2.1.2-4, on how the cognitive LADPM-habitus changed emphasis on its enabling faculties; that is, in its argonautic exploration proposing and disposing diverse properties of his/her proto-self (: Q.4b), and thus shifting gears from aloof nature-based towards emancipatory culture-based and/or turning both towards outward- and inward-looking actor perspectives. In other words, how the common grind in professional lumber-rooms, along our 'armchair' axis 2 regarding LADPM-practices, in its canonic (etic-cum-emic) emphasis shifted its enabling cog-wheels from a 'naturalistic' functional and/or bio-cybernetic, towards a dialectic and/or an inter-subjectively agreed, 'Jacks-of-all-trade' constructivist approach: 'do-it-yourself' eclecticism holding sway, so to speak, over cognitive gear-boxes during the past two decades.

A thrice-staged learning process is thus being imagined of LADPM-life attitudes thrown into gear, but also tossed about (neo-)positivism, society-based dialectics and intersubjectivist constructivism. This necessarily double-edged image of balancing and internalising LADPM-life trajectories might be amazingly well put on a par with the trice-told travelogue of Guba and Lincoln (in Palumbo, 1987, pp. 202-231). Evaluative programme/project policy studies are under discussion here as characterised (Majchrzak, 1984; van Dusseldorp / Southwold, 1993, pp. 104-116):

• By a multi-disciplinary focus;
• By an empirical and inductive research orientation 'from below';
• By incorporating malleable variables for implementable policy recommendations; and
• By being responsive to study users' expectations, antagonistic values, policy-test criteria, affections and needs.

Since World War I, this type of problem- and action-oriented studies emerged sequentially, i.e. 'generation-like' and adhered to:

• Detached and purely descriptive, c.q. 'hard' mechanistic stances of top-down
• Rational and neutral, arbitrator approaches of the 1950/60s; and
• 'Softly concerned', value-pluralistic social learning of the 1970/80s: creating internal stakeholders' realities over and over again.

The latter planning paradigm in fact (refer back to sub-section 1.1., plus Guba and Lincoln in Denzin, 1994, chapter 6) leads to conflicting judgements, even in the face of the same 'factual' evidence, thus re-shaping the aloof planner/evaluator into a mediator/change agent in a consensus-seeking process. Here, mental constructs of context-bound stakeholders are to be reckoned with and diverse (non-)material concerns of stakeholders are trustfully given co-equal, honest and respectable attention. Thus formal gatekeepers may be antagonised in assessing others' basic needs and constraining (resource) contexts. In conclusion: for a viable collaborative course of action advocacy planning is a must as will be elaborated in sub-section 2.1.3.

Redundant examples of changes in Emic-cum-Etic drives
The same continuum along a lifelong soul-searching trajectory as pinpointed above (: ranging along axis 1 from 'low to high' personal intentions, and from 'hard to soft' cognitive commonalities in public choice treadmills) could be pictured when accounting for emphatic shifts in academic publi-
cations by Bolan. For, starting in 1969 (pp. 301-310) a behavioural and still rationalist inclination appears obvious, in line with Dror's seventeen policy-making steps (1968, chapter 14: rationality not yet in its descent downhill in planning). Next, in 1980 (pp. 261-274), - simultaneously with Forester bringing in Habermas' neo-Marxist communications theory-, Bolan falls back on Schutz' symbolic interactionism, thus focusing on planning practitioners' mind-sets proper in constructing their own theories-in-use; this, in line later on again with the reflective practitioner's view of Schön (1983/87) as referred to in sub-section 1.5 as well.

After all it is not surprising anymore to find both authors, Bolan and Forester, as included in Mandelbaum et al. (1996), together among others with Friedmann, Faludi and Friend carrying planning theory into the 1990s along a variety of commonly shared trails, i.e. of 'hard' engineering and systemic policy sciences, as well as of 'soft' social learning, reform, mobilisation and open-minded emancipation. Most obvious during the 1990s seems 'after utilitarian rationality' the complementarity sought for between interactive constructivist and critical communicative theory, i.e. between the all-embracing aspects in Third-World development studies of agent and structure, emic and etic, micro and macro, subjective and objective, local and global (Schuurman, 1994). In other words: 'correspondence-to-reality' driving downhill, while 'commensurability of life forms' finds its routes uphill towards sustainable livelihoods.

Provisionally summing up now: in order to make this 'sustainable' area development study, - along its squarely crossing axes 1→3 to be fully spelled out yet -, generalisable towards the future (its external validity is here in question), some fundamental criteria are to be made explicit beforehand by which its double-edged self-evaluative research strategy is to be meta-evaluated on its own terms. That is, to make its introspective-mirror frame of figs. 2.1 and 4.1 spanning four development decades intelligible, nay, commensurable for its audience: both of LADPM-scholars along axis 2 and along axis 3 of field practitioners/trainees; both from Northern and Southern hemispheres, operating either from the top or down-to-earth at the bottom of LADPM-structures. Dependent on their own changing, operational and psycho-milieux, this study's stakeholders are thus to validate their judgement of this SD self-examination (Chen, 1990, pp. 60-86; Yin, 1989, pp. 40-46):

- on its responsiveness (= relevant, fair and faithful), i.e. providing useful information in order to improve the quality of area planning operations and, ultimately, to improve society towards the 'good life for man', time-, space- and context-bound;
- on its objectivity (= reliable, factual, confirmable and intersubjectively agreeable), i.e. enhancing ultimately its credibility; and
- on its trustworthiness, i.e. providing convincing evidence that can be trusted because of its internal validity, published and refereed 'true value'.

For generalisation purposes these conflicting meta-evaluative criteria, ranging from rational scientific to political moral and humanistic, have been turned into real-life, but partly illusive LADPM-guides in an increasingly broad and balanced, yet always 'satisficing' way. They thus provide by the persistent sequence of learning rounds over decades more responsiveness and integral 'true value' to pilot field projects and programmes: by checking ultimately on such fragile and vulnerable 'goodness' values (Nussbaum, 1986) as lifting humans from (non-) material inequalities, for instance.

In brief, again, it is noted that for grasping truth about our outer, but above all interior world, - instead of harvesting illusions produced in isolation by individual minds -, it is to be a second-best truth constructed reflectively, shared and agreed upon collectively though. Here, the endless pressure to uncover 'how the world ticks', uncovers nowadays the relativist-constructivist, i.e. fabricated character of truth, in the name of truth itself: as we, objectively, seek to solidly represent reality in our post-modern world, our (neo-) positivist 'correspondence-to-reality' canon is gerrymandering us into
arbitrary fictions, having the last sardonical laugh\(^2\) (Woolgar in Lawson et al., 1989, pp. 138/139). Consequently, as self-reflective professionals at the end of the 1990s we are left to our own multiple methods, or triangulations in qualitative research; that is, like 'Jacks of all trade, or LADPM do-it-yourself' persons we are to produce though a close-knit net of knowledgeable solutions, i.e. emerging 'inner' constructs for problems in concrete public choice settings (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, p. 2/3 and table 1.2). The undergirding interpretive logics denoting particular subject-object ontologies, hermeneutic epistemologies and methodologies, like consensus-seeking constructivism and the emancipatory critical Frankfurt school (Guba et al., in Denzin and Lincoln, pp. 105-117 and Tables 6.1/2), do not leave much manoeuvrable room to freely move between, though. Yet the latter two intersubjectively grounded perspectives form the intellectual backbone for this SD study responding to self-evaluative questions on the genuine elbow-room to manoeuvre. The latter multi-faceted, mental room is, among others in figure 2.1, being co-determined by twists and turns in Southern, but above all Northern operational and internal psycho-milieux; and thus is temporarily being colonised by commensurate partial truths and intrinsic policy-test and control criteria, -sometimes lulling learned professionals asleep again inside self-protective, but gregariously common cocoons.

\(^2\) See Appendix 2.1.0, personal intermezzo: 'Persiflage'.
Figure 2.1 Learning feedback loops tacking about normative and strategic dissonances (Festinger, 1957).
Appendix 2.1.1. References for sub-section 2.1.2 to the Anglo-American Literature in Time Perspective

Classic Sociological Triangle/Development Trichotomy or Trioleate


Typology of Political-Administrative Domain

PI/Act + Op III → I: Social Organizations, and Decision-Making Frameworks


Typology of Domain of Science and Technology

PH/IQ + Op III → I: Socio-Cultural Potential, and Reductionist Conceptualisations as Assets

W. James. The Varieties of Religious Experience. 1902.

Typology of Dialectical and Metaphysical Domain


THE/I Ic. Dialecticians observing human life-worlds encapsulated by the tensions between collective plan formulation, ideals and knowledge.


THE/I Id. Gnostics and Mystics concentrating on human symbolic thinking, metaphors and visualising images thereof.

J. and M. Argüelles, Mandala. Shambhala, Berkeley/London, 1972
Recalling from sub-section 2.1.1 the feeble beginnings of four resource control snap-shots 104 with confirmative vs. rejective attitudes towards experienced reality: risky, if not fateful and tragic punctures in our protective real-life cocoons are nowadays commonly internalised part and parcel of socio-political affairs (Giddens, 1991/94). Whether reminded to be wise like self-seeking serpents or harmless like altruistic doves; whether to be neutral rationalist hard-liners or 'softly' concerned reconciliators: in their own emic-cum-etnic world accounts local planistrators, of necessity, do realise that down-to-earth considerations of a 'politicking' and extra-rational nature 'out there' prevail at the same time. Only through political manoeuvring can planning practitioners take into account the value-laden and conflicting policy criteria governing lower-tier public management. Neglecting the fundamental requirements of political sustenance during socio-spatial plan formulation is the same as designing a car, but overlooking its fuel system! Consequently, in training workshops introducing professional capacity improvements, our LAPDM-collectivity is told to deal simultaneously with a broad range of multi-level, political and institutional issues pertaining to the legitimate 'rules of the game' governing the production, distribution, but above all financing of public goods and services by the different tiers of governance. Here, divergent requirements based on antagonistic schools of political thought on the over-versus under-controlled (local) public sector, or the centralised versus decentralised state apparatus are of prime importance. In briefly discussing some political theories, one is reminded that they represent, too, partial conceptualisations not only on how civil society (and the state plus business sector) at large is, but also — sometimes implicitly — how it ought to be constituted for 'the good' of all citizens. Academically speaking, political knowledge thus provides criteria both for social inquiry and action, i.e. describing and prescribing roles for social actors who happen to be spatial planners as well.

To start with the three-pronged Weberian view on functional rationalities of the free capitalist market, the accountable bureaucracy and the legitimate nation-state (three conceptual vehicles indeed for exercising economic and political power in society at large), a mutually reinforcing, iron-cage relationship in public settings is proposed: with the state supplying legitimacy for the loyal bureaucrat planner, and the latter stability and continuity for the state. This quasi-universal connection suggests a rather rigid form of blueprint planning, typically centering on design and civil engineering problems which for their solution are assigned a consistent and clearly defined set of development objectives. Assuming complete access to information and technical know-how (Q.4b), this type of planners relies on the idealised model of economically rational (wo)man: fully capable of collecting and processing all necessary data; dealing with all alternative planning options; applying a cross-disciplinary range of appraisal criteria; controlling all necessary resources and policy instruments for plan implementation; and apparently surrounded by a stable and predictable physical, economic and socio-political environment. This technocratic planning attitude relies indeed on a 'natural' scientific rationality (refer back to sub-section 2.1.2): based on formal logic (what, if?) and adhering to what are universally agreed-upon, empirical methods for (ill)treat-
ing both our physical and social environment as being inanimate. Along this reductionist route, planners do agree among themselves that for verifying or falsifying any truth it must be assumed that the tangible (natural and social) reality involved is an objective entity 'out there' which, at a safe distance, can be conceptualised in correspondence with an aloof methodological canon, like the empirical cycle or general systems theory (Guba and Lincoln, in Denzin and Lincoln (eds.), 1994, pp. 245 and 105-117).

Breaking away from this orthodox style of research and blueprint planning, both pluralists and neo-liberals, but critical theorists above all, have lent their particularly moral insights to our rural-cum-urban planning drama, viewed as a snake-pit c.q. arena of struggle between (corporate) interest groups. Here, considering an increasingly complex and turbulent environment, and recognising that authentic human behaviour is never fully understandable, predictable and controllable, planners are told to limit the wide range of socio-structural problems and goals, and also to restrict the number of appraised alternatives and interventions in accordance with a few well understood, shared policy criteria. Socio-spatial planners are thus pragmatically bound to strive for public consensus with incremental changes (: P.7), i.e. by improving existing resource management practices in successive rounds of trial and error. So, planning becomes the science of muddling through and disjointed incrementalism, a transactive process of social learning-by-doing, grasping for mental development constructs which are constantly on the move and in need of progress monitoring and impact evaluation through policy-test indicators, to prepare for novel policies becoming assumingly more efficient and effective, i.e. socio-politically more legitimate and responsive (Baross, 1991, pp. 1-39; refer as well to Etzioni, 1967, pp. 385-392).

As a consequence and by way of typically habitual examples, in the pluralist view, land-use planners are seen as mediators of (corporate) interest group adjustment, - like oil and water which can be mixed but never merge-, thus obscuring from view the polyarchic structure of unequally distributed power being fully institutionalised inside capitalist democracies. Here, the entrepreneurial right of economic liberty is explicitly held up against social justice as a criterion for keeping in check private versus public production and consumption of common goods and services in (de)centralising nation-states.

In distrust of the checks and balances of pluralism, the neo-liberal vision regards the (night watch-)state as above political struggle, and representing paternalistically the 'higher public interest'. Here, the stumbling block of -in fact- the modern welfare state is its ungovernability; and 'rolling back the Leviathan of the state' means reducing the over-controlling scope of state functions, - including planning -, and improving the capacities of central government - like an arbitrator or facilitator - to direct a minimal state apparatus in favour of the free-market order as the principal 'invisible hand' for deciding who gains and loses what, when and how (Gellner, 1994, chapters 1, 10, 11, 23, 28, 29).

Precisely regarding this latter bone of contention modern Marxist thought sought to explain how it is that social bondage and injustice, exploitation and poverty, environmental squalor and degradation enter into rural and urban development processes. But when socio-spatial planners, pre-eminently seen as problem solvers, want to improve both material and social living conditions, Marxists invite them not to compromise, but to step outside the rule-laden capsule of political power games. It is puzzling, however, how one gets outside a globalising capitalist context while being caught within it, - like inside a protective iron capsule or eco-spacecraft-, than only by re-negotiating these irresistible Leviathan-rules from an alternative advocacy stand; or from a radical Lilliputian position by reasonably claiming from micro- to macro-level,
territory-bound empowerment (Friedmann, 1992, pp. 158-166; Toulmin, 1990, chapter 5; Corbridge and Edwards in Booth, 1994, pp. 103-114): 'scaling up' or 'act locally, but think globally'.

In the critical Frankfurt school a shift, finally, is seen from the Marxist struggle for human freedom and social justice here-and-now, towards the intellectual struggle against ideological domination repressing, both in capitalist and socialist states, authentic human self-determination. The dilemmas in these politico-economic systems are thus explained again, but the emancipatory capacity rooted in intersubjectively agreed objectivity, human self-reflection and double-barrelled self-awareness is preserved and focused upon: 'looking beyond the trees to envision the wood' in credulous open-mindedness walking on thin ice (refer again to p. 42: "Dubbele Bodems").

With specific reference to the cross-disciplinary mélange of 'western development tourists' working in Third World countries, the caveat is that they are not to adhere closely to the following late-modern prejudices and conditionalities which are more or less tacitly based upon (Bauman, 1993, pp. 240-250; Crook, et al. 1992; Moore, et al. 1994):

- performances inside our affluent welfare states of the Northern hemisphere;
- rather democratic rules of good governance, supported by coalition formation in our current economic set-up with its (openly) structured consultation and public agreement; and
- current ideals about just and fair distribution of social power, knowledge and income, equal opportunities and freedom of choice for everyone incl. future generations.

On the contrary, expatriate field practitioners should be on guard again not to turn their own frustrations with our Promethean Age of Reason, resulting from ruthless equalisation, technocratic planning and ecological failures, into too 'overstocked' i.e. arrogant efforts inside the Third World (Zoja, 1995, p. 190), — thus exercising societal vivisection on a global scale indeed. For practical consciousness tells us that round after social learning round, both indigenous and expatriate planistrators on the spot at various territorial levels in public and private spheres (see figure 2.2.3), are entrapped willy-nilly in the intellectual cross-fires between feuding stakeholder groups:

- on the one hand, of central policy makers and sectoral programme co-ordinators to whom local planners are impassioned to sell their 'quick and dirty' priority-area proposals pushed upwards collectively 'from below'; and
- on the other hand, of academic 'armchair and tooled fishbowl spectators' espousing their disciplinary and clean constructs for a seemingly universal truth, from which field practitioners, —like craftsmen and artists being out for professional integrity,— have to forge a common framework for public consensus-building purposes.

Here, on this messy quasi-battlefield, our mostly lilliputian planistrators are (: P.6) like middlemen in manoeuvring, sometimes simultaneously, enacted roles as typified already above; and in thus rendering on their own improvisational, territory-bound stages (Hulme, 1995, pp. 211-233; Conyers in Helmsing and Guimaraes, 1997, pp. 11-23; Sandercock in Douglass and Friedmann, 1998, pp. 163-184):

- either, loyally collaborating technocrats and detached facilitators inside rigorous state bureaucracies;
- or, mediatory brokers and advocates, as well as action researchers/'Jacks of all trade' producing a close-knit net of knowledgeable problem solutions on behalf of beneficiary target groups inside plural societies;
• 'whistle-blowing' Jeremiahs c.q. Jonahs near Ninevë, lonely along side-lines 'looking beyond the trees to see the wood' in pursuit of a visionary, fatalistic or tragic, 'Wahlverwandtschaft' middle-ground;
• or, radical field activists challenging 'from outside' central guidance systems on basic constitutional or global environmental claims ('rocking even the iron ship of state') and thus promoting 'from below' local conscientisation and community empowerment (Freire, 1972; Alfiler, 1982, pp. 17-25; Frank, 1991; Uphoff, 1992; Korten, 1995).

Reflection on the manoeuvrable room of our scientifically trained professionals 'to effectively speak to power' in various role-playing postures,- resulting eventually in collective action or inaction (Bolan, 1969, pp. 301-310; Collingridge and Reeve, 1986)-, leads to the following conclusions. It is simply not the case today that 'good governance' occurs once the complexities and uncertainties environing area planning have been reduced by dealing with as much relevant (land/water) information as possible in an ever greater mileage of maps and reports along the received and agreed-upon (neo-) positivist route. On the contrary, in order to break through endless, cross-disciplinary bickering about an ever growing number of sensitive macro- and micro-issues, policy, programme and project decisions are taken with the very scantiest scientific expertise in a happy-go-luckely manner. Public consensus around rural-cum-urban development solutions which are valued more than marginally relevant to policy makers and implementers, does appear to be built up incrementally, i.e. through piece-meal engineering: mutual confidence (Putnam et al., 1993) being established after and through a (self-) contained sequence of quick and cheap, that is risky decision-making rounds. During these trial-and-error exercises, the traditional rules and conditions favouring the deep-blue clarity of academic armchair-science are necessarily broken, however (Schön, 1983, chapters 2 and 5) as:
• its intellectually detached 'tender-plant' autonomy, in practice contradicts with well-funded, sometimes 'whistleblowing' advocacy postures taken in policy debates;
• its internal disciplinarity and loyalty is entrenched by canonical rules, i.e. standardised grinds and mimicked kindling 'in a commonly shared blaze'; and
• its low level of scepticism towards conjectures (=Popper's critical realism) inside the same faddish regime often leads to publicly scorned high-cost errors sometimes in risky matters of life and death as, for instance, in transmigration, site-and-services, i.e. land settlement schemes (Hilhorst, 1990, pp. 239-249; Porter et al., 1991).

To the latter cases of rural, but also urban area development planning one of the present authors of this study has given his passionate, albeit sometimes erroneous efforts during the last decades as expatriate, technical-assistance consultant. And, summing up from inside our own stratified universes: we consider in a reconciliatory, but also self-critical sense our life story as one constantly unfolding, mental conversation through an interconnected series of Third-World field experiments. Taken as one expressive gyatory whole never to be 'given up' (Taylor, 1989, chapter 21), the latter hypotheses-testing exercises in local area planning-cum-training determine for us indeed a meaningful, normative and cognitive unity of unique, uncertain and complex case-studies. These inter-subjective experiences have been strung out and cross-disciplinarily expanded to-and-fro in our memory by feedback loops, wheels within wheels: the symbolic visualisation of a double-barrelled approach and sequential working programme (one of us started already years ago dreaming of and confidently 'living by' in the guise of a prototypical gyrating planetarium as inner guiding but time-suspending 'identity theme': Veenstra, 1971, pp. 107; Kok, 1981, pp. 68-69; refer also to Jacobson, 1954/80; Lichtenstein, 1977). However, only now we are trying to re-enter as clear-eyed actors, and reconciliating stakeholders our own improvisational
stage which we could not design instantaneously and crystal-clear in real-life details before; and where both in our outer and interior mental spaces, we found ourselves part of messy c.q. 'stormy' scenes that were not of our making, or liking sometimes. So, as learning-by-doing 'reflective practitioners' we have been always on the move to string out genuinely, like a spiralling spring, our own identity and professional integrity amidst the cacophony of multi-voiced opinions and historically changing public settings, both in the Northern and Southern hemisphere. Ultimately, in charting our inner routes into an all-inclusive human future indeed by trial and error, we have learned to stagger like intoxicated sailors over and over again from one lost paradise to another fictitious garden: uprooting selectively one after another contested tree of conventionally received, scientific knowledge; just like craftsmen and artists do by creative imagination and recurrent transformation of their own 'lived experience' (Schön, 1987; Gagnon, 1992, in Ellis and Flaherty, pp. 221-243).

2.2 Reconciliation of Conflicts in Multi-Level Area Development Planning:
Urging on Sequential Capacity Improvement 'From Below' (Veenstra, 1994/99) guided by Strategic Views along Research Axis 2.

Prologue

The preceding three sub-sections 2.1.1 to 2.1.3 have been suggesting that, as a particular LADPM-collectivity 'on trek' in peripheral Third-World areas, field practitioners by active containment of their interior psycho-milieux vis-à-vis outer operational milieux have been persistently grasping at 'sustainable development', -itself 'on the move'. Especially expatriate planistrators in foreign-funded projects have off and on been digging up, and partially reshaping again in their memory during past decades intellectually shared, useful and waste materials; refer back to the deep-seated cocoons with human 'nature-cum-nurture' contingencies, for instance, but final triadic grid patterns of practical consciousness and comparable life histories of sub-section 2.1.2. And among other purposes, in compassionate combat against dragging inequality and poverty, they have (un)consciously attempted, being out for interim syntheses:

- in first instance, to hold quietly or anxiously together two normative, canonic rule sets, still waiting undecided in the wings of today's cross-cultural learning as related to moral judgements and 'rational' theorising; and rendered in 'wobbling' sub-section 2.1.3 at the finale by differently staged roles and life-attitudes of technocrats, mediators, visionaries and radicals; and

- in second instance, to bring together as presently being reflected upon in this strategic section 2.2 three cognitive LADPM-bodies of eclectic theory-in-use, i.e. three so-called substantive, procedural and politico-institutional mélange with predominantly confirmative but also rejective, c.q. optimistic but also pessimistic overtones; and thus

- in last instance, to make practical sense of LADPM-capacity improvement, simultaneously from micro- to macro-levels, in operational planning-cum-training settings, focused on inter-locking time-space dimensions of action projects, intersectoral programmes and alternative policy options reigning planistrators' minds along study axis 3 of figure 2.1.

So, in first instance, we ended sub-section 2.1.1 with an introspective middleman adage. It concerned harmless 'softies' high in the sky, to be internally balanced down-to-earth with self-seeking hard-liners. Now we are anticipating our cognitive midway in field practices. They are mapped 'out there' with up- and down-swings 'from above and below'; that is, faring cool-headed 'between the devil and the deep blue sea' of noble
one-shot foreign-aided LADPM-happenings 'bottom-up' vis-à-vis the overarching 'top-down magic' of central bureaucratic routines. This reconciliatory route for plan quality improvement is then co-determined by three bodies of practical knowledge, respectively: on the socio-spatial substance of (land, water and infrastructure) development processes; on the (extra) rational aspects of collective decision-making and budgeting procedures; and on the contextual rules of political power games. The latter are played by 'gatekeepers' inside and between state bureaucracies, private business and civil society under such labels as development administration, 'big government', and 'good governance' today (Hyden, 1983; Esman, 1988; Moore, 1993/94; IBRD, 1997), -as normatively touched upon in the preceding subsection 2.1.3, but earlier already in section 1.4.

Instead of paying specific attention to their multi-disciplinary planning information needs this section 2.2 considers local development administrations according to their general management functions, by which policies are made, resources are allocated, and area-wide sectoral interventions are coordinated, implemented, controlled, monitored and evaluated. By addressing two groups of area plan administrators, i.e., lower-level field practitioners and central programme controllers, a first series of propositions is launched in subsection 2.2.1 on rival schools of development thought, and on blueprint versus process planning. This leads to a three-pronged approach successively directed towards detailed project planning, strategic area programming and sub-national/sectoral development policy formulation, altogether containing divergent time/space perspectives.

A second series of propositions in subsection 2.2.2. deals with regional development planning 'from above and below'. Here, in a socio-spatial sense, resource planning practitioners were to reconcile principally conflicting sets of policy options (: P.8): those favoring political stability and free-market economic growth, versus those accounting for distributive equity, citizen participation, preservation of local cultural identities and natural resource conservation. In a procedural sense, three sequential planning rounds are suggested: starting off from narrow project-shopping-list routines; turning towards strategic area planning; supported finally by problem- and action-oriented policy studies (:P.9). After a short discussion of integrated rural development, forms of government decentralisation and participatory planning, subsection 2.2.3 contributes to debates on policy options in urban and rural settlement, as well as in infrastructure planning, thus illustrating dilemmas in strategic LADPM-priority setting.

So, instead of being fragmentarily instructed from above by sectoral policy guidelines and annual budget ceilings, local field staff is to gradually establish its own well-grounded cumulative body of grassroots planning knowledge (: P.10), supported by a multi-disciplinary range of action-oriented 'sustainability' indicators generated by rapid rural data collection and processing techniques. As an exemplary case, in subsection 4.5.3 is given a description of a reduced regional planning procedure for the Tikar water catchment area in Cameroon, W. Africa.

2.2.0 Changing context of local development administration, and divergent information requirements based on organisational learning loops

The urgent need for Third World countries to improve both material and social living conditions for a growing population makes the deliberate allocation of collectively available resources unavoidable. Therefore, adoption of an efficient and effective, problem- and action-oriented approach to public development planning is of utmost
importance, particularly at sub-national levels of regions, provinces, districts, urban and rural neighbourhoods. Here, local government administrations have been (over) burdened during the last decades by area-specific resource development tasks; this, in addition to traditional routines of upholding law and order, raising public revenues on behalf of the central treasury, and operation and maintenance of physical and social infrastructures (roads, water and electricity supply, schools, hospitals, housing, agro-livestock services, etc.). It is to be particularly emphasised that recent drives towards decentralisation in public resource management not only increase quantitatively the workloads of local bureaucracies, but also diversify qualitatively the statutory tasks, the authority structures and planning capabilities needed at lower government levels. As will be explained below according to long-standing distinctions made between planning theories (McConnell, p. 14), this changing context is accentuated by:

- conflicting resource development views, shifting in substance from staged economic growth and distributive/basic-human-needs concepts towards local self-reliance and environmental protection.
- ‘bottom-up’ community participation in public decision-making and planning procedures, but simultaneously by a growing ‘top-down’ squeeze on local government (expenditure and revenue) budgets: the central power of the purse pressing hard for local financial autonomy and self-sufficiency (Davey, 1983, pp. 163-179).

All in all, these opposing forces result in an increasing demand for urban and rural area development planning, its inter-sectoral coordination, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation between and within these local government machineries themselves. Obviously, from inside shortcomings result from limited administrative capabilities and hived-off legal competencies of sub-national bureaucracies for coping with external transformation processes currently taking place in Third World countries at large: population growth and rural-urban migration, agricultural intensification, land degradation and encroachment by deprived peasants, deforestation, and unequal access to public services, lending capital and natural resources. The commonalities of these conflict-laden processes (threatening notably such transitional border-line zones as rural-urban fringes, coastal deltas, wildlife-park buffer zones, seasonally contrasted ‘transhumance’ and piedmont areas) require a typically co-determinative research and survey approach: multi-disciplinary, multi-tiered and multi-annual, - both with hindsight and in a co-evolutionary future study perspective (Zinck and Farshad, 1990/95).

A crucial aspect of local administrative organisations is their own information processing capacity, i.e., generating and managing area-specific (geo-)information in giving priority to planning small-scale interventions such as community (drinking) water supply, mother and child care, local crop and livestock promotion, etc. Here, the matching point between (non)governmental organisations and their eventually computerised geo-information bases (Burrough, Conning and Hall, 1992, pp. 17-25 and 87-102) for area development purposes is of prime interest. It is also observed that lower-level institutions ‘dictate’ their own decentralised requirements for spatially-bound information, while in turn these organisations themselves are influenced by information leading towards so-called single- and double-loop organizational learning and hence towards administrative capacity improvement (Argyris and Schön, 1978, pp. 7-29, etc.). These interactions are indeed not static: during sequential learning rounds local institutions may require different, multi-disciplinary categories of (geo-)information, serving a wide range of activities from law-and-order routines to innovative rural and urban development tasks to be performed. Below in figure 2.2.0 single-versus double-loop learning is depicted.
**Single-loop learning** rests in an ability to detect and correct error in relation to a given set of operating norms:

![Diagram of single-loop learning](image)

**Double-loop learning** depends on being able to take a 'double-look' at the situation by questioning the relevance of operating norms and values:

![Diagram of double-loop learning](image)

Figure 2.2.0 Single and Double-loop learning (Morgan, 1986, pp. 84-93)

Step 1 = the process of sensing, scanning, and monitoring the environment  
Step 2 = the comparison of this information against operating norms.  
Step 2a = the process of questioning whether operating norms are appropriate.  
Step 3 = the process of initiating appropriate action.

Within the field of opposing forces this section 2.2 is to address, apart from routine-like executive concerns of sectoral line officers, two kinds of LADPM-concerns (Bendavid-Val and Waller, 1975, pp. 16/17; Conyers, 1985, Tables 2 and 3):

- of those actors at the bottom end who are regularly engaged on the spot in Third World area development planning, as full-time members of indigenous and/or expatriate (consultant) teams; as complementary to concerns
- of those actors at the top who are concentrating their efforts, either on intellectual consistency and scholarly planning techniques as 'armchair' academicians, or on large-scale programme controlling issues in central headquarters of national resource planning and budgeting systems.
The group of field practitioners tends to be heavily involved morally, emotionally and intellectually as typified by section 2.1, in everyday problems of 'selling' their regions' interests to (inter)national authorities, as well as in convincing locally powerful elites to support 'integrated' area plan proposals. Since virtually all the professional literature is generated for and controlled by the intellectual top group, members of the 'residual' field activity group often complain that this knowledge base fails to address their most pressing concerns. Under working conditions of political instability, socio-economic uncertainty and lack of reliable information, field activists are proposedly (: P.7) accustomed to 'muddling through', i.e. starting with sketchy regional development frameworks and moving pragmatically towards specifics as incremental progress is made by trial and error. In contradistinction, 'scientific' plan administrators seek complete information and are very careful to state that the perfection of their planning methodologies and resource control systems is, among other things, limited by the quantity and quality of data sources for plan formulation and monitoring (McCall, 1992, pp. 15).

Of course, these over-simplified contrasts between operational-executive field staff in sectoral functions and trial-and-error planning activists at the bottom, vis-à-vis 'neutral' programme officers at the top organised in interdepartmental committees need not always exist in practice. Mutual appreciation of the typical roles played and productive cooperation between resource surveyors, plan formulators, implementers, controllers, operators and evaluators would enable multi-level area development planning to reach for the moving livelihood target called 'for the time being': sustainable natural and human resource management.

Therefore, as abstracted from an extensive body of literature and based upon lessons learned in the Third World during the last decades, the following sub-sections consist of propositions regarding (the theory and practice of) general development planning, regional, rural, settlement and infrastructure planning. In sum, the following main propositions are launched countering figs. 2.2.4/5 below:

- In order to combat in a socio-spatial sense Third World urbanisation trends, well-informed rural development policies are to be formulated and implemented, both 'from above and from below', as stemming from a diversity of regional development problems, potentials and intellectually consistent versus trial-and-error strategies.
- Particularly for rural area development in peripheral regions, decentralised decision-making procedures are to gradually include community participation in local problem solving; establishment of area-specific planning information systems; training local planning staff; monitoring plan implementation and evaluating development impacts in order to build up local resource management institutions, both governmental and non-governmental.

Finally, it is proposed (: P.8) that in promoting genuine development in Third World peripheries, resource planning practitioners have to reconcile two potentially conflicting policy sets (Moris, 1981, Table 7.1):

- on the one hand, to respond to self-centered interests of national headquarters in combination with private entrepreneurs and progressive farmers favoring politico-administrative stability and free-market economic growth 'from above'; and
- on the other hand, to respond to community interests of poverty-stricken, rural and urban masses favoring equalisation of incomes, know-how and bargaining power, citizen participation and resource mobilization 'from below', in combination with preservation of local value patterns and natural resource conservation.

Letting bygones be bygones for cool-headed practitioners of section 2.0: staged economic growth, modernisation and redistribution theories have painted a too optimistic picture of urban industrialisation and the route 'from peasant to farmer' as the single universal (in fact western) development path for societal evolution. In contrast to evolutionary theorists, adherents of the dependency, centre-periphery and domination theories have too heavily concentrated on international factors of overriding influence upon internally polarising forces at sub-national, i.e. regional and local levels.

In advancing ecological conservation and institutionally sustainable resource development, long-term time horizons could hardly be reconciled with short-term human aspirations striving for socio-political stability, and for continuation of polyarchic, natural resource exploitation processes including inherent capital- versus labour-intensive technologies.

Here, spatial resource planners are to be mindful of the ideological mixture of academic disciplines, i.e. of economists, sociologists and eco-biologists operating from different development concepts and idealistic policy-test criteria such as economic efficiency and gainfulness, social equity and distributive justice, cultural adoptability and political legitimacy as well as ecological sustainability and biological diversity. Thus, just as will be spelled out in section 4.1, collective resource decision making and development planning are today inspired by a multi-disciplinary range of agreed-upon methods of scientific inquiry, data collection and analysis, cause-effect and incentive-response generalisations. As a consequence, the planners bicker about antithetical policy prescriptions and rationalisations for local-level problem solutions (Maclntyre, 1979). It is to be remembered, though, that in his early theory on resource use Firey as an 'armchair' social scientist pictured already in 1960 (pp. 99-105+193) the persistent conflicts between policy-test criteria such as:

- Ecologically balanced sustainability and bio-diversity; as distinct from
- Cultural consistency; i.e. socially fair, solidary and secure; religiously adoptable; and politically legitimate; as well as
- Economical efficiency.

Observations on entire social belief and knowledge systems, both in Northern and Southern environments in state of flux, led Firey to conclude that the above quoted criteria of calculative self-interest in resource exploitation, alternate in resource conservation with 'moral sentiments' c.q. other-directed altruism, a point also discussed in sub-section 2.1.1.

On the same policy matters Webber (1965) leaves the question open whether an abundance of information will take away decision-making uncertainties in spatial planning, - still those days rationally strived for. The intrinsic meaning of information arises indeed from characteristic personalities, who use it differently under various world orientations and institutional circumstances. In this personal respect Friedmann touches upon four faculties inside human mind-sets to be kept in tense balance in 'transactive planning dialogues' (1973, p. 179): rational intellect, moral judgement, sympathetic feelings and affections, other emotions and sentiments, - aspects of decision-making, discussed in sub-section 2.1.2.

Striving for a general theory (social, political, economic and regional) Isard et al. concentrated on utility optimisation games simulated for (over-) simplified 'rational man'
From Below': Fair, Just, and Equal

Medium-Range Redistribution+
'From Below': Fair, Just, and Equal
(1970s/80s)

Long-Range Environmental Protection and
Biological Diversity: Ecologically Sustainable (1980s/1990)

Day-to-Day Politically Legitimate, Stable and Secure 'Law and Order':
Responsive and Accountable, Multi-level institutions both public, (semi-)private and voluntary.

Figure 2.2.1 Shifts in antagonistic development views and stand-in policy-test criteria: an ideological hotchpotch in triadic format.

(1969), -preferably dressed up in consistent mathematical garment. Ascribed to these socio-spatial models of human behaviour were such universal albeit unranked policy criteria as economic efficiency, social solidarity, security and fairness, politically legitimate power and moral rectitude/honesty. Ultimately, weighting and priority setting (meta-ranking) among those guiding principles depend on to-and-fro interactions by different characters and types of personalities (pp. 822-829) inside specific decision-making situations in state of flux. These make the latter unpredictable and uncertain, i.e. beyond practical grasp. Later on in 1973 Isard admitted that his optimal space-time development models seemed to have imbedded in them increasing social injustice: another moral criterion being overlooked (: P.2-4). The same scepticism toward universal (individual, group, organisation and even societal) decision-making modelling in time and space, -dressed in mathematical, utilitarian or functionalist garb-, later on even has been voiced by Holland (1977, chapters 1 and 8).

In brief, 'scientifically' trained agriculturists, town-and-country planners and regionalists continued during past decades to be uneasily taken by the questionable role of their hard-technological as well as people-oriented area development interventions (: Q.2.a-4.b). Answers still continued to be sought on such disquieting questions as: 'What happens to poverty, unemployment and inequality' (Seers, 1969). At the same time, man's freedom of public choice in lifting restrictions along routes towards human betterment, both material and immaterial, appeared very much constrained: just because of long-standing interactions, - time-, space- and context-bound-, between stakeholders' outward- and inward-looking perspectives, i.e. between prevailing 'inner' psycho-milieux and 'outer' operational milieux. Unavoidably, from sub-section 2.1.1/2 crops up again man's manoeuvrable room being clearly restricted, indeed hemmed in by four collectively shared 'rationalities', altogether capacitating extreme types of public resource management 'out there'. That is in a culturalists view, twists and turns in autocratic versus divergent leadership's control over critical production factors (land/water, labour, capital and meaningful know-how) are being co-determined by 'inner' guidelines of humane time-transcending values plus strategic policy-test criteria for the pursuit of 'innovative' development imperatives. Of particular influence
since World War II have been accompanying shifts in emphasis on cognitive LADPM-guides in collectively shared development knowledge; that is, as discussed in sub-section 2.1.2 changing gears from rationalist positivism (correspondence-to-reality drive) towards society-based dialectics (open learning-by-doing communication, and equality among societal stakeholders sought for), plus inter-subjective constructivism seeking consensus, based on commensurability of life forms among gatekeepers and beneficiaries through government decentralisation and public participation, for instance.

Specifically pinpointing the nation-state level of plural societies at large, a long-ranging policy prescription has been influencing during the 1970/80s LADPM-views in public choices; that is, in meta-ordering 'first things first' in collective resource management, as exposed by the central row of figure 2.2.2. Here, optimistically, a 'longue durée' development path is hypothesised, - labeled 'redistribution before growth' (Adelman, 1977, p. 8), - along which phase-after-phase public redistribution would be (near-autocratically and one-sidedly) instituted of the most important factors of production, before fully reaping these factors' growth potential. Although thus attempting to placate three complementary 'Wahlverwandtschaft'-packages III & I, - of preceding figs. 2.1.2/3 worldwide directed towards fair distribution of 'modernisation fruits', - this universal, near-mechanistic proposal overlooked 'co-evolutionary' shifts in normative and cognitive frames of shared reference, - as mapped 'underneath' by the bottom rows of figure 2.2.2. This, disjunction consequently, cropped up in the socialist case of sub-section 4.2.2 with forced villagisation in Tanzania of the 1970s. Deep-rooted world views, both etic and emic, have thus been proposed to be at work simultaneously, but with overlaps through many generations, along a development path connecting, instead of short-cutting, different societal configurations and leadership-styles. This route would according to Adelman avoid much human suffering, but none the less be thrown with break-away

Figure 2.2.2  Collective resource management stages (or modes) in long-term perspective.
social movements and counter-elites falling in line against temporary domination of critical factors in resource control technologies, supported in turn by strong cultural, but above all 'scientifically' rationalising views. Again, however, which rationality and therefore whose justice has been counting first (refer to sub-section 2.1.1) at the back of planistrators' minds, i.e. both of indigenous and foreign actors including their learned commentators later on in sub-section 4.2.1?


As brought out 25 years ago already in a positivist systems’ view, collective decision making could be proposed as being synonymous with public management, and to entail all levels, from (inter) national to local, with regard to long- and short-term time horizons.

Here, the three-tiered cascade system or integral lock image of figure 2.2.3 is conjured up as if haunting the minds of socio-spatial planning practitioners engaged either at the bottom or the top end. In different settings all over the Third World, all sorts of public and private information packages for policy making, development planning and plan implementation are thus traveling up and down between various decision-making levels, as indicated by the circular arrows. The following functional elements are distinguished in figure 2.2.3.

At all territorial levels of government and private organisations standard decision-making cycles A-E are repeatedly and simultaneously swinging around like sluice-gates, -thus representing five public management roles. Otherwise seen, they are like tangent wheels within wheels turning around as follows (Chester Barnard, 1938):

A = Policy making on such contested problems, development objectives and alternative courses of action as rural/urban employment generation, income distribution, supply of public services and physical infrastructure, environmental protection, etc. This, accounts, too, for compartmentalised knowledge bases, one-side technology know-how, conflicting values of powerful interest groups and unstable institutions.

B = Area Programme and Action Project Planning for allocating, among other things, renewable natural resources (land/water, forest/vegetation, fishery and livestock/wildlife resources) in combination with capital/infrastructures, human/institutional resources, equipment and managerial skills.

C = Communication, inter-departmental coordination and community participation for channeling policy making and resource allocation outcomes (A + B) into and between organisations, both vertically and horizontally, thus pressing for local organisational change sometimes.

D = Control of policy and programme/project implementation (among others) through land use zoning, water rating, wage structures, credit schemes and legal statutes of (watershed) development authorities, including enforcement of norms and standards collectively agreed upon.

E = Internal monitoring and impact evaluation of management functions A-D regarding such policy-test criteria as economic efficiency, distributive effectiveness, political acceptability and ecological sustainability as just dealt with in preceding, socio-spatial lines.

At this point it is to be realised that planning per se contains rationalising elements of all five processes A-E. However, some of these elements are emphasised by specific planning professions operating from different concepts and ideals of collective consump-
tion, production and politico-administrative behavior. Particularly physical (town and country) planners have been concerned mainly with zoning regulations, building codes, etc. in order to program and control \((B + D)\) specific urban and regional land uses.

Similarly, economic development planners have paid attention to employment and income generation \((A + B)\), whereas accountants usually focus on expenditure and revenue programming and budgeting \((B + D)\). Subsequently, the following definition of planning emerges along these systemic lines: public planning entails a multi-annual process of successive rounds to systematically identify the specific development problems and goals, to explicitly select a multi-disciplinary range of policy-test criteria, to appraise alternative development options and means, to identify available human, capital, natural and institutional assets, and to implement, monitor and evaluate future policies, programmes and projects collectively decided upon.

N.B. In exploring, balancing and internalising a widening range of inward-looking faculties, practical LADPM-consciousness is -proposedly (: P.9)- driven upwards by shared incremental learning: thus aspiring, against common cascade-currents, to break away from controlling short-range operational projects towards strategically influencing, middle-range programmes for grasping ultimately at 'sustainable' livelihood development through normative-valuing, 'innovative' policies kept afloat on the long run. Furthering human thought and practices thus makes professional life a free-floating and risky, nay, tragic affair.

\[\text{Figure 2.2.3. Public resource management: a set of locks joining normative policies to operational projects.}\]
Note in figure 2.2.3 the action areas 1-3 specified along the vertical axis and, as in preceding sub-sections 1.2 and 2.1.2, accentuating three basic forms (I-III) of human aspirations in collective decision making and planning. The Roman numerals in front of the brackets refer to one of the three dominant forms, assuming that they prevail in the particular action area concerned, over and above the two other forms. In this case, we see that in area 3 the dominating form III consists of operational-executive, short-range project management striving mainly for efficient resource utilization at relatively stable micro-levels of government administration (district, village), private businesses and voluntary associations.

Here, the main questions posed (what, where, when, for whom?) require concrete action on shelter which, for example, dominates this particular area 3, without being completely screened off from strategic and normative forms II and I.

The second area of action is dominated by strategic intermediary, middle-range programme management, striving for effective socio-cultural changes at meso-levels of rural regions and urban municipalities, (semi-) private firms and cooperatives. In this intermediate case, wedged between normative policies (I) and action projects (III), the all important question is: how, in view of the multitude of development objectives and scarcity of resources do we intently arrive at 'integrated' rural/regional development frameworks? Ideally, in the first action area I, normative valuing, long-range policy making dominates at both national and international macro-levels. Despite frequent attempts to drown the fundamental question in floods of strategic and operational issues, the following can still be heard: what are we developing for? What are the innovative, distributive or emancipatory implications of our (intersectorally co-ordinated) development policies which we are implementing more or less legitimately at various administrative levels?

Ideal-type distinctions, thus summed up regarding territorial resource management in public-cum-private spheres, are jeopardized by the apparently autonomous behaviour of:

- Dominating semi-government authorities, such as those in the national capital, regional port or other metropolitan centres.
- Influential central agencies such as finance, the army, public works, railways, etc.
- Powerful international private corporations dealing with oil, diamonds, electronics, wholesale trade, etc., but international financing agencies as well.

We propose, nevertheless, that the three basic forms of public resource management (I-III) appear to be simultaneously present in a more or less latent, yet integral or haphazard state at the back of planistrators’ minds. This includes both ‘inner and outer’ conflicts involved at all levels of spatial resource management in both government and private settings. This also includes the (extra-)decision-making processes A-E and planning techniques which are seen to be alternately emphasised at different levels (I-III) of the various institutions concerned.

Ultimately, feed-back and feed-forward loops (as indicated by circular arrows) are to react inside the collective management system upon solving conflicts and problems, but also upon seizing opportunities by the socio-political actors, i.e. representatives of groups in various formal and informal, inner-party circuits. Here, too, it happens that more or less rational trade-off devices, but above all influence, power, interest and leadership skills, of these collective gate-keepers come to bear upon the allocation of public resources in debate and negotiation of multi-level decision-making situations. Public and private management situations are thus primarily typified internally by contractual networks both of interpersonal and inter-institutional co-operation, com-
petition, bargaining, co-optation, coalition, brokerage, etc. directed more or less towards collective consensus. Here remain outstanding the cross-cultural ideal-typical comparisons of formal and informal organisations by Riggs (1962), Eisenstadt (1963) and Inkeles (1960, i.e. on a homogenising industrial culture) as edited and introduced by Landsberger (1970). Here-and-now digging, with hindsight, into those heyday ‘modernisation’ mind-sets, - noteworthy, with Northern ‘sustainability’ interpretations of the 1950/60s-, Landsberger departs from a crude systemic, input-output construct grasping at one broad conceptual stroke for:

- Internal structural configurations, standard management roles and decision-making processes (= A & E in figures 2.2.3); as related to
- organisational/administrative outputs, i.e. goods and services delivered, job satisfaction and social power; being altogether, -by eventual cause-effect relationships, influenced from outside by society at large; as analysed in turn on
- natural and human assets at its actual disposal and under powerful control leading up to wealth, welfare, etc. (refer back to figures 2.1.2 & 4);
- its technological level, i.e. man-nature orientations;
- its modal personality structures, i.e. values, life-attitude, motivation and cognitive perceptions c.q. knowledge bases; and
- socio-economic, demographic and (plural, elitist or corporatist) politico-administrative features.

Regarding practical LADPM-behaviour, - rather than taking a neutral academic ‘armchair’ posture-, field practitioners of the 1950/60s have been inclined to a hard-technological man-nature stance at the societal ‘playing deck’. By discrediting the rich variety, -both normative and cognitive-, of personality types, as well as of power spaces converging or growing institutionally apart between state bureaucracies, societal groupings and private businesses, their intellectual armoury clearly signposted the transformative route through (agro-) industrialisation, urbanisation and accompanying (de-) centralised nation-building.

Regarding this route Inkeles (in Landsberger, p. 288) has been most outspoken by speculating on a socio-cultural homogenisation process; that is, pre-industrial men, in personally breaking away from traditional folks’ way of thinking, feeling and (family/clan) affections, would be trapped into universal patterns of personality values, self-affirming attitudes and perceptions as externally induced in ‘modernising’ public settings, - of the contingent American or western way of life, for instance. World-wide regularities in human behaviour in response to standard stimulus conditions were then-and-there proposed, -corresponding again to Landsberger’s systemic stock in trade quoted above: the same mechanistic key in its behavioural lock, -metaphorically speaking; being sustained, but artificially fabricated for the ‘longue durée’ exit route to the ‘promised land’ of modernity.

Both Riggs and Eisenstadt have consciously taken another methodological way out: respectively, by constructing and practically spelling out for Southern societies in transition an ideal-type ‘Sala’ model. In view of the diverse universe of human experiences, they herewith singled out public administrative behaviour, - as different from the ‘Bazaar-Canteen’ model standing for traditional ‘reciprocative’ market exchanges of goods and services: the economy of family/clan affections. For making intelligible, -but not in practice manipulating yet-, the heterogeneous mixture of traditional and modern characteristics, the following administrative features of the ‘Sala’ model are worth mentioning as cautionary signposts for local planistrators, both foreign and indigenous.

First, arbitrary formalism appears rampant caused by ‘soft’ state powers c.q. low levels of law enforcement, opening the door to corruption (Myrdal, 1968).
Second, formal functions of public administration, standing credulously for a secure and stable 'law-and-order' regime, incl. developmental service delivery, co-exist and overlap with sympathetic feelings rooted in family, religious, ethnic or other communal (business) groupings. These patrimonial macro-cum-micro traits are cause and effect of family loyalties, through co-optation and nepotism, as well as of communal group solidarities which thus contradict universalistic norms and regulations paying 'in good-faith' co-equal attention to all members of society at large; refer to sub-section 2.1.1. In the same vein, on the border-lines between public and private fields of interest, one finds substantial 'kick-backs and fringe-benefits' granted to 'inner-circle' gatekeepers. This becomes clear also in the Sierra Leonean case of sub-section 4.1.2 with sometimes extravagant group behaviour of indigenous elites straddling between rights and duties both of public and private sectors.

Herewith are thus, again, anticipated both our West- and East-African case-studies reflected upon in sub-section 4.1.2 and 4.2.2. But, at the same time, 'lived-by' connections are exemplified as below stemming from our earlier micro-macro 'bee-hive' metaphor of sub-section 2.0.3; that is, from a stand-in verticality construct bringing out, both etic and emic, public choice relationships (="Wahlverwandtschaften") through the managerial cascade- or staircase-fabrication of figure 2.2.3, as an 'inner guide' followed by the LADPM-collectivity 'on trek'.

'Inner-eyes' example for Figure 2.2.3: Notes on Regionalisation of Sierra Leone (Refer to; Valeton, P. (1981) Sierra Leone. K.I.T. Landendocumentatie nr.5, Staatsuitgeverij, The Hague, Netherlands, pp.37-79).

III. Planning practitioners could observe in Sierra Leone today a hierarchic order of central places. At the one extreme, an important role in the rural scene is played by numerous parent villages and towns functioning as headquarters of chiefdoms. Because of the clan affections and interests of both ruling and non-ruling families in cash-crop lands surrounding these old ancestral towns and (shrines in) villages, they heavily influence the socio-political and micro-economic milieux of ruralities.

I. At the other macro-extreme, Freetown is the primate city in the urban scene and provides the socio-economic and politico-administrative centre for the making of final, binding decisions in Sierra Leone as a whole.

II. Grouped around this capital city and port are the regional administrative and economic centres such as Makeni in the North, Koidu-Yengema in the East, Kenema in the South-East and Bo in the South.

This polarised system of development is largely dependent on stakeholder decisions taken by traders, administrators, European businesses and both the traditional and newly-formed elite, i.e. on commerce, transport, subsistence and cash crop farming, exploitation of minerals and politico-administrative changes both when the country was a British colony and since its independence in 1961.

In West Africa during the 1960s stemming from our western Age of Reason, Icarus' self-made flight and Prometheus unbound betterment of mankind, c.q. our 'inner shortcuts to progress' (Hyden, 1983) jumped glaringly to our eyes. For neither 'hard' infrastructural corridors, nor nation-wide macro-regionalisation constructs building on technological innovation, capital accumulation in urban centres, etc. (UN/ESCAP, 1979, pp. 23-28) have proven as a 'modernising' stone of wisdom 'from above and abroad' to succeed as sustainable 'stand-alone' solutions for poverty and inequality-, neither in Southern nor Northern hemispheres; that is, on their own, the granite of self-interest and utility principles merely reinforce the more-of-the-same 'static expan-
sion' of hierarchical 'emic-cum-etic' orders as exemplified above, - to join Boeke's dualistic vision (1953) dating back though to Dutch colonial times in Indonesia between World Wars I and II.

The socio-political side of this dualistic, in fact centre-periphery coin was not denied by social scientists like Eisenstadt, - followed up later on by regionalists like Friedmann (1966/73) and Hilhorst (1971). They point towards the predominant place of state bureaucracies in processes of political modernisation of emerging nation-states. Although in those days viable, unified political frameworks and consensus-building were mindfully conjured up, the rift between traditional and modern elites, their negligence of consensus, and competing interest groups like the army, churches and other narrow oligarchic groupings could not flatly be denied either to dominate both socio-economic and politico-administrative structures: altogether pointing, tragically though, towards negative 'big-belly development' disadvantageous to the ordinary populace.

Paradoxically, doors were thus in academe thrown open for state bureaucracies still extending their scope of activities and leadership roles, both at local and central levels, -depending on two conditions (Eisenstadt, 1963, p. 229):

- First, some basic unitary political framework, a relatively unified political élite, and a certain degree of political consensus must exist.
- Second, purely institutional interest groups like the army, churches, (diamond) mining corporations, etc. must be relatively weak in comparison to other functional groupings in society at large, such as trade unions, free press, smallholder cooperatives, etc.

That is, an often non-contingent public choice situation with spatially dispersed power centres, would facilitate the sustenance of stability and continuity. For widening the ‘modernising’ scope of government activities, technical capacity improvement through ‘scientific’ and vocational training would circumvent ‘white-collar’ overstaffing, - but not nepotistic staff appointments; and would induce though novel (parastatal) types of economic entrepreneurship, as well as generate professional activities and political (counter-) leadership both at central and local levels. Over-faithfully, Eisenstadt suggested that the bureaucracy would itself gradually stimulate societal diversification of functional groupings, i.e. independent public opinion and local leadership as countervailing socio-political powers, -both at central and local levels again. While, admittedly in nowadays’ terminology this would generate conflict between ‘civil society’ and ‘state bureaucracy’, functional diversification within a relatively unified political framework would help modernisation.

Summing up, then: sitting comfortably on the North-South fence, western ‘armchair’ scientists were haunted by egalitarian ideals of a plural, still polyarchic society (see sub-section 2.1.3) while simultaneously in the back of their minds, paradoxically, ran parallel solid ideal-types of ‘cleptocratic economies of family/clan affection’ plus inner-circle élite accommodation, - well-known even in the Dutch low countries (Lijphart, 1968). By so safely residing in aloof deep-blue clarity on top of their canyons, they left field practitioners in low indeterminate swampy zones to their own practical devices for ordering ‘first things first’ in local area development of our West- and East-African cases of sub-section 4.1.2/4.2.2. As a result, our research construct of figure 2.1. swung ‘back to normal’ by (over-) steering during the 1970s on a distributive, but with hindsight hardly ecologically viable point of the compass.

In order to combat the typical adversities of Third World rural regions, well-versed area planners have, quite arbitrarily still, relied upon theoretical constructs of regional economic growth externally or internally based, of agricultural modernisation and polarised centre-periphery integration, as derived from historical experiences in industrialised countries (see figure 2.2.5 later on). Misapplication of these industrial- and urban-led policy prescriptions over recent decades left ill-treated Third World peripheries with the following unresolved problems:

• Lack of local decision-making and planning capacities, and of 'proper' territorial control over their own resources.
• Continued polarisation of development in a few urban core areas, resulting in spatial concentration of social benefits and market forces.
• Severe damage to rural ecologies and physical environments caused by increasing population pressure and unrestrained exploitation of natural resources.
• Boom-bust phenomena associated with heavy specialization in one or a few export commodities.
• Spatial enclave effects, i.e., failure to translate government investment projects into broad-based rural development because of leakages of local savings and the brain-drain from rural regions to urban cores and abroad; and
• Increasing spatial manifestations of rural-urban inequalities.

Mindful of this bleak picture, the typology of figure 2.2.4 could be employed as the conventional stone of wisdom 'from above'. It differentiates nation-wide regional development problems, main features and subsequent development planning strategies for spatial resource management: please compare with qualifications for Table 1 in sub-section 4.1.2 on Sierra Leone’s régionalisation. Particularly in the latter case, it has been learned with hindsight that any government is, in the first instance, forced to limit nation-wide regional development efforts 'from above' because of the following constraints put as caveats:

• Simultaneous overall establishment of a socio-spatial and administrative planning system creates red-tape rigidities and socio-political tensions unfavorable for continuous adaptation to a turbulent environment, both at home and abroad.
• Scarcity of skilled personnel to properly survey and plan, and also implement, monitor and evaluate regional development strategies, programmes and projects.
• Scarcity of capital resources to finance nation-wide large-scale infrastructural investments.
• Inability of a vertically, sectorally organized government administration to rapidly adapt to the territorial decentralisation required for such nation-wide efforts.

It will therefore be necessary to list a country's regions according to the 'legitimate priority' that could be attached to their development planned from above, and act upon it more or less uncontested. In case of actions being undertaken, i.e., resource surveys, plan formulation and implementation for typical regions' transformation, the following policy recommendations can be made. If the development objective of national and regional government authorities and local interest groups is to spread economic activities over all sub-regions and districts, and if the existing regional centre is strong and well located for supporting such a distributive objective, a spatial development strategy would be dispersion of the planned social and physical infrastructure invest-
ments from sectoral headquarters in the regional capital over the area's secondary and tertiary centres. Among these central places the ones closest to the district's boundaries will have highest priority given the objective of socio-economic expansion—all this subject to its long-term sustainability: non-viable (re-)settlement schemes, difficult to uphold drinking water and health care services and impassable feeder roads would be improper (see sub-section 4.2.2).

On the other hand, if the development objective is to consolidate the district's production and consumption structure, rather than its spatial expansion, the investments related to exploitation of natural resources will preferably be concentrated either in one central growth point or along a dominating transport corridor. It should be remembered that the 'legitimate' socio-spatial strategies in question are 'inner-mirror' snapshots of the resource management modalities in which the country's centre-periphery relationships find themselves. When the nation's dominating structures, i.e. central cadres, banking and marketing institutions as well as transportation and communication networks, are exploited mainly for extractive purposes, strategic planning proposals will differ in emic-cum-etnic substance from the ones that are accepted for societal guidance in case the distributive elements have become important, leaving aside environmental protection and local religio-cultural identity raising fundamental interests as well.

Example of LADPM-knowledgeability around 1970, i.e. of 'inner-mirror' images connecting, instead of short cutting resource control modalities.

"Summarising we may say that a country's spatial system is defined by the existence of a number of interrelated spatial sub-systems, one of which acts as the dominant sub-system or centre, the other ones performing the role of the dominated. As put forward in section 2.1, the emergence of these spatial sub-systems is explained in economic terms by factors such as transport cost and economies of scale and of agglomeration, whereas the emergence of relations of domination is

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<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>Stratalization of economic growth, inefficient absorption of semi-urban migration into labour force, inadequate physical, economic and social infrastructure in cities</td>
<td>Sustained urban and rural economies leading to structural poverty; inability to support populations at adequate levels of living</td>
<td>Creation of new industrial matrix, transport corridors, irrigation works, agricultural communities, including basic administrative and social exercises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development problems</td>
<td>One or more clustered cities; agriculture for export and support of urban populations; capital-intensive industrialization and farming; adequate market organizations, and intercity and farm-to-market transportation</td>
<td>Low productivity and capitalization; fragmentation of agricultural holdings; old farming practices; small potential resource bases; selective outward migration; widespread apathy and fatalism in relatively isolated village communities; sub-standard services</td>
<td>Population movement into new areas; agricultural, forest and mineral development; weak settlement pattern; strong dependencies on outside world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main features</td>
<td>Spatial integration through carefully selected secondary and tertiary growth points and urban development corridors, including the direct surroundings with their own economic specializations</td>
<td>Consolidation of activities and reactivating distressed areas by investment (return flow) incentives; selection of intermediate growth points and rural resettlement projects along the perimeter, including necessary service and rural development packages</td>
<td>Multi-functional expansion of activities into resource region; establishment of strong focal city and transport and communication linkages with outside world; Popular bottom-up approaches in and around small district towns</td>
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</table>

Figure 2.2.4 Regional development planning characteristics 'from above' in substantive sense.
explained by differences in power among the sub-systems. The latter factor is principally based upon differences in access to information. Both the way in which available information – especially concerning production and communication technology – is used, and the prevailing value system determine to what degree decision-making is centralised and what part of the populations is engaged in functions that are mainly characterised by their executive aspect. As will be elaborated, the value system of the dominant centre determines the character of the domination relationships. It thus seems that the sub-systems are organised into a hierarchical structure of three dimensional nature: the decision-making space in which the two first dimensions refer to area and which occur on a country's territory while the third dimension is decision-making power. This three dimensional space has a maximum over the system's centre and relative maxima over the centres of the sub-systems, the minima occurring between them and at the country's frontiers. (Hilhorst, 1971, chapter 2).

Mismatch of spatial development strategies and instruments.

Last, but not least, the following lessons have been learned on the effectiveness of measures actually taken to implement socio-spatial deconcentration strategies, as planned from above during the last decades. Here, first and foremost, sustained political and budgetary commitment has been an outstanding precondition for such simple but dramatic, very visible and omnipotent investment programmes as:

- Creation of urban-industrial growth centres and related physical infrastructure in peripheral regions to alleviate strangulation around primate capital cities.
- Multi-purpose river basin, land reclamation and desert development schemes to boost agricultural production and reduce population pressure elsewhere.
- Construction of a new national capital and/or transport corridors to better distribute consumption and production nation-wide.
- (Re) Settlement, internal migration and villagisation programmes (mis)matched with so-called integrated rural development (IRD) and community self-help approaches around district service centres as in the Shinyanga-case in Tanzania, discussed in sub-section 4.2.2.

![Figure 7-1 Sketch Map Showing Regulated Markets and Subyards in Poona District, India. Source: E.A.J. Johnson, Market Towns and Spatial Development in India, New Delhi: National Council of Applied Economic Research, 1965, p. 81.](image-url)
Apart from becoming bureaucratically rigid, national obsessions—just like in the western scene placing (ultimately in 1968) an American astronaut on the moon—these physically appealing, multi-annual enterprises have—for better or worse—employed various policy instruments. For instance, land use regulation, related to investment licensing by negative controls of a zoning map, has often resulted in locations being selected just outside the prohibited zones—but still in or near core cities for industrial, agricultural, housing, storage or service activities.

Similarly, work and residence permits to restrict migration to primary cities, as well as labour use subsidies to create employment in intermediate towns, are saddling Third World administrations with the enormous tasks of managing these negative control devices, and raise ethical questions on individual freedom of mobility. These negative measures are complemented by direct provision of housing and social amenities in some selected growth centres, by improvement of rural living conditions through land settlement schemes and supply of basic services, such as, clean drinking water, electricity, feeder roads, primary health care and education, as well as by generation of agro-industrial employment.

As a consequence,—signing a blank cheque though on socio-economic and financial absorption capacities of rural regions, but nevertheless combating even stronger concentration and urbanisation tendencies,—tax holidays, location subsidies, investment credits and import tariff reductions have become popular devices.

However, problems have been identified as follows:

- Proliferation of remote areas eligible for favoured treatment encourages an excessive spread of (agro-) industrial locations—thus diluting the effectiveness of infrastructural and financial incentives.
- Subsidies are to make up a substantial proportion of total variable production costs, thus compensating for higher transport costs of raw materials and/or finished products to and from remote areas.
- Financial incentives may encourage manufacturing in inefficient locations, thus forcing governments into additional export subsidies in competitive world markets.
- Termination of tax holidays and subsidies may lead industries to shift back to core regions: 'hopping kangaroos' with big bellies are here spoken of (Hilhorst, 1996, p. 24) for making a difference between 'good or bad' measures taken.

All in all, central plan administrators and intellectuals (mis)guided by these socio-spatial strategies and policy instruments have not been able, at least not within a tolerable time span, to improve or even stabilize levels of living in Third World peripheries. Here, rural regions have not been considered as the source of self-sustaining economic growth, but were treated as administrative areas composed of production zones: policy criteria for local resource use being 'top-down' determined by elitist interest groups residing mainly outside agrarian societies. So, it was proposed that these regions were to be 'functionally integrated' into the (inter)national economic system through production for export. Regional strategies therefore focused on development of trunk roads, particularly to the capital city and port, on modernisation of agro-livestock production, and provision through rural towns of public services and industrial dispersion. However, these prescriptions of both figures 2.2.4/5 have been silent about institutional reforms needed: land and water (re)distribution, government decentralisation, devolution of political power, popular participation and community self-help—in short, about people-oriented and equity enhancing policies and projects. Apart from other factors at work as shown in following sub-section 2.2.3, the result has been rural stagnation and planned dependency of the majority of the rural and urban poor on extra-local, political and economic control.
Local grassroots planning as an antidote

Thus, in the last instance, district and regional planning officers as well as their colleagues/sectoral managers, but also radical field activists, are thus urged (: P.10) to frame their own appropriate policy prescriptions ‘from below’. The latter are meant as an antidote for, or complementary to, conventional propositions ‘from above’ shown in figures 2.2.4/5. Grassroots precepts might prove to be particularly suitable for peripheral Third World areas, that in the near future cannot expect to benefit from ‘top-down’ industrial enclave development, and thus are to be employed as second-best strategies ‘from below’ while competitiveness in the world economic system is built up. Called also ‘trials for selective spatial/territorial closure’ (SSC), the following substantive ingredients are considered for regional strategies ‘from below’.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Consequences of Theories</th>
<th>Basic policy propositions concerning development processes</th>
<th>Associated concepts/planning tools/approaches</th>
<th>Implications for rural regional development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Economic base theory</td>
<td>Regional development is externally induced; Economic growth is generated by production for export on the basis of comparative advantage</td>
<td>Export base models; Economic base multiplier analysis; Location quotient computations</td>
<td>Regions are viewed as open systems, specialising in cash crop production for export of natural resources for production to satisfy extra-regional demand both in foreign and domestic markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (Macro) economic growth theories</td>
<td>Growth promoted by optimal (sectoral/regional) capital investment allocation to (inter)nationally determined production possibilities</td>
<td>Social transaction accounts; Tinbergen planning model (NICORs* for sector industries); SCBA ** on capital investment; Mix-and-share employment analysis</td>
<td>Regions viewed as production zones producing to meet national development objectives and targets; specialisation in production according to regional resource endowments; rural areas seen as labour reservoirs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Polarised development (theory of diffusion of innovations; central place theory; industrial location theory; ‘propositive form’ concept)</td>
<td>Spatially ‘unbalanced’ development is expected; in initial stages of economic growth polarisation and strong core-periphery structures emerge</td>
<td>Growth polarisation strategies: (i) intermediate – size cities as ‘counter-magnet’ to prime cities; (ii) lower order centres as focus for development ‘from below’</td>
<td>Rural areas neglected under resulting ‘urban bias’; rural stagnation accepted as ‘natural’; rural areas see as passive beneficiaries of urban-industrial growth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ‘Modernisation’/neo-classical and Marxist stage theories</td>
<td>Agriculture is ‘traditional’ and represent unproductive forces</td>
<td>Urban-based accelerated industrialisation</td>
<td>Rural sector may represent: Labour reservoir for modern industrial sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Rural settlement and agricultural land use theories: refer to subsection 4.2.2</td>
<td>Efficient allocation of agrarian activities can be determined by inter alia, theories of special competition</td>
<td>Von Thunen/Christaller models; agricultural land use zoning with distance/transport cost as key factors</td>
<td>Neglect of non-market oriented production; zonation of rural areas for specialised (plantation) market production</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * NICOR = net incremental capital: output ratio ** SCBA = social cost: benefit analysis

Figure 2.2.5 Regional development theories: implications for rural regional development planning.

• For example, provision of broad and equal access to land and other available natural resources through land reform.
• Assignment of priority to the satisfaction of basic human needs (food, shelter and basic services), but reducing dependence on outside inputs by promoting local trade, transport and service facilities.
• Promotion of productive activities, exceeding regional demand (export-based), priority being given to:
  • full employment of local labour and natural resources.
  • regionally adequate technologies which are to minimise waste of scarce resources while maximising the use of regionally abundant resources, taking

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into account local cultural patterns and value systems as well as conservation of
renewable natural resources: land, water, forests, pastures, etc.

- Competitiveness in extra-regional markets by qualitative product differentiation,
rather than by purely quantitative price competition in standard mass production.
- Introduction of national credit and pricing policies which offer terms of trade and
loans favourable to natural resource utilization in agriculture, forestry, fishery, animal
husbandry, etc., especially in peripheral regions.
- Improvement of intra-regional transport systems, intermediate city functions
(growth poles) and rural-to-rural transport and communication facilities.
- Introduction or revival even at district, village and neighbourhood levels of com-
munal decision-making structures for self-determination and self-reliance regard-
ing integrated resource allocation, storage and processing of regional produce, allo-
cation of regional surpluses, savings, etc.

While (or perhaps because) egalitarian societal structures, regional consciousness and
local empowerment are pipe-dreamed SSC preconditions, a self-seeking lack of support
from central governments in Third World nation-states forms the major reason why
rural regional planning 'from below' has made little progress on a large territorial
scale, and then only during relatively short, revolutionary periods. In addition, for-
earn development assistance should be mistrusted for turning the donors' planning
frustrations with the western scene (resulting from among other things democratic
equalisation, welfare state consumerism, ecologic failures and ruthless infrastructure
planning) into too innovative experiments in the Third World, thus exercising societ­
vivisection indeed on a global scale; refer back to harsh warnings in sub-section 2.1.2/3.

Propositions on conventional versus reduced working procedures for integrated area planning:
a plea for staggered territorial institution building and organizational learning

Provincial and district planning officers all over the Third World have been urged dur-
ing the last decades to formulate their own medium-term strategic frameworks.
Notably, foreign aided, integrated area development plans were supposed to counter-
act the 'black magic' of shortsighted annual routines of project-shopping-list proce-
dures and fragmented sector programming and budgeting, predominantly guided
from central headquarters in national capitals; refer to LRD-sub-section/graph later on.

Both indigenous and expatriate field practitioners have seen, however, those brand-
new strategic frameworks, constituting over-ambitious 'out of the blue' inter-sectoral
project bundles being de-fused during the 1980s, like unexploded bombs (A general les-
on has thus been learned: not trying to change from the omnipotent foreign side, but
rather from the domestic side of standing bureaucratic procedures for project/sector/area
planning and budgeting,). In practice lower-tier area development planning seems to
manoeuvre between two extremes, i.e., between the 'devil and the deep blue sea' of:

- on one side, central policy guidelines, statutory rules and regulations rigidly gov-
erning the bureaucratic operations of annual planning and budgeting routines,
actually weeding out sectoral project lists pushed from below; and
- on the other side, quasi-academic one-off happenings of comprehensively
constructing an integrated area development blueprint comprising a heavy load of
intersectoral project packages, which leave many questions on their consistency,
implementation and replication unanswered.

For early lessons learned refer to Caiden and Wildavski (1974, chapter 10): "Converting obstacles into oppor-
tunities".
So, to start with, conventional regional planning procedures will be dealt with, but later on their reduction and adaptation to specific rural settings will receive increasing attention through the critical observations made on steps 1 to 13 of attached figures 2.2.6/7. Academic prescriptions by would-be neutral adherents of a consistent methodological canon indicate that — after the necessary selection of a priority region (2) — the area development team should begin its tasks with an inventory and analysis of both central and local development objectives and policy issues, of human, natural and capital resources, (non-) physical infrastructure, etc. Macro- and area-specific diagnoses together lead to an assessment of development problems, potentials and constraints (5). Problem structuring in its turn is followed — along with eventual feedback loops — by selection and formulation of a regional development strategy (6) which subsequently determines the selection and framing, in (pre-)feasibility terms, of inter-sectoral project packages to be implemented, monitored and evaluated (13 + 12). Particularly foreign assisted, single-region planning exercises including the multi-disciplinary hodgepodge of resource surveyors, socio-spatial planners and programme controllers/evaluators (often temporarily jetted in from abroad) were to be mistrusted because of their time-consuming work and costly team management. Here, difficulties have been encountered in applying the broad conventional prototypes of the 1970s as detailed in figures 2.2.6/7, to specific Third World rural peripheries. As an example, the internal inconsistencies of applying the Israeli “Rehovot Approach” of integrated rural development (Weitz, 1979) to a predominantly rural region in the Orinoco basin plains of Venezuela have been documented by Belshaw (1983, pp. 9 and 19), as follows.

Re steps 1-3 of macro-diagnosis: Contradictory voices abound over such diverse topics as what would constitute the (exact border-lines of the) priority planning region, the macro- as well as area-specific development objectives, target groups, constraining policy issues and resources to be expressed by planned per capita growth rates for the regional income, net savings and investments, (sectoral) labor participation, production, consumption, service delivery and poverty indicators. Because of the isolated single-region emphasis, the existence of inter-regional linkages for migration, land encroachment and broad ecosystems’ imbalances, as well as for agro-produce marketing, transport and processing, for provision of farm inputs, consumer good supplies and financial flows has been neglected.

Re step 4 of area-specific diagnosis: In land use planning, mismatches have been noted between land suitability classes and smallholder farming systems, being mapped at inappropriate scales.

In this respect, land tenure relationships, land reform, agricultural commodity price shifts and labor wage differentials have usually been overlooked. So, the relative competitiveness of local manufacturing vis-à-vis extra-regional enterprises, located in larger urban centres of contiguous regions, has seldom been analyzed.

Re steps 5-13: Sustainable livelihood development based on human, natural and institutional resources pointing towards strengthening local community participation and self-determination, public administrative capacities, decentralised statutory powers and financial absorptive capacities requiring in turn the progressive improvement of a planning data base, sequential plan (re) formulation, implementation, on-going evaluation, on-the-job training of local administrators, etc. - has been hastily omitted altogether in ‘out of the blue’ single-shot happenings.
Consequently, the external adversities of, and internal planning limitations for rural-led regions in the Third World suggest reductions and shifts in emphasis to be made in local area development procedures, i.e. a staggered, three-pronged approach, again climbing the ladder in figure 2.2.3 'from the bottom upwards'. Step by adaptive step lessons are thus taken at heart as laid down in earlier publications originating both from 'inner' personal and inhibitory social learning loops in foreign-aided LADPM-pilot exercises 'out there'. Please, refer to the following chapters 4 and 5 with our case-studies synthesized ad interim as resulting from a lifelong process of changing professional insights.
As an antidote against fragmented sector planning, the ambitious notion of 'integration' in connection with rural development planning, particularly in our cases of sub-section 4.2.2, 4.3.2 and 4.5.2, suggests the following process steps to be taken during one, eventually foreign aided, one-off happening (Ruthann, 1975, pp. 9-16; Livingstone, 1979, pp. 49-53; Birgegard, 1987, pp. 1-15).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Steps (in approximate time sequence of figure 2.2.5)</th>
<th>Associated Planning Activities, Methods and Techniques</th>
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</table>
- Inter-sectoral input-output relations within the region, including labour, capital and commodity flows. |
| **Step 4. AREA-SPECIFIC DIAGNOSIS**                           | - Demographic analysis: birth, mortality, natural increase rates; net rural-urban migration patterns; age cohort structures  
- Geographical distribution of agro-economic zones, urban and rural service networks; centrality analysis on rural access to social and physical infrastructure; refer to figure 7.  
- Natural resource assessment: hydro-geological survey; agro-meteorological analysis; land suitability classification and land use surveys, utilizing indigenous knowledge systems as well  
- Rural micro-analysis: farming systems and household economy studies through rapid rural surveys; village systems analysis; commodity market, factor market and enterprise analyses  
- Rural institutional analysis on behavior and performance by "gate-keepers" in collective decision making and control: refer to figure 1.  
- Assessment of recent public sector policies and on-going projects, their effects and impacts according to stated development objectives. |
| **Step 5. RURAL PROBLEM STRUCTURING**                        | - Economic growth, distribution and environmental consequences of recent patterns of collective resource management: incidence of deprivation, and rural poverty causation analysis; refer to Gregory (1967, Chapter. 7) and Birgegard (1980). |
| **Step 6. PRELIMINARY STRATEGY FORMULATION AND SELECTION**   | - Reconciliation of national and regional development Objectives, their assumed effects and impacts as well as magnitude of required resources in view of development. Problems, potentials and constraints: receipt of central planning resource ceilings, physical and social planning norms; submission of cases for revisions hereto; regional revenue raising estimates.  
- Identification of major policy shifts, and of potential projects: phased decentralization - both functional and territorial - and popular participation; analysis of top-down sectoral initiatives relevant for the region  
- Iterative matching of identified project packages, resources, policies, their effects and impacts: analysis of expected costs and benefits of alternative development strategies, with subjective probabilistic.  
- Dialogues with responsible policy makers leading to choice of preferred linear regional development strategy: strategic choice approach in Third World planning. |
| **Steps 7-13. DETAILED PROJECT GENERATION, FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ALONG THE PROJECT CYCLE** | - Project formulation and appraisal on following aspects:  
  - social cost: benefit or cost; effectiveness analysis.  
  - agro-technological and engineering feasibility incl. applied research priorities.  
  - planning standards and norms for physical and social infrastructure, guided by rural and urban settlement plans; refer to relevant propositions hereafter.  
  - environmental impact assessment.  
  - institutional feasibility with special reference to rural poverty alleviation: popular participation and self-determination, reform of internal structure and operating procedures of standing organizations as well as inter-institutional jurisdictions.  
  - indicators and interventions for (particularly deprived) target groups: women, children, cultural minorities!  
  - distributive outcomes and impacts of projects.  
  - reorientation of linear strategy choices in light of increasing micro- and macro-planning information, of shifts in national policies and inter-regional coordination on large-scale multi-regional projects.  
  - Five-year development, and rolling regional action plans (1-2 years) being prepared, and negotiated for (foreign) funding; formal procedures for major projects only.  
  - Design and introduction of appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems for regional plus implementation and operation, review and reformations (: Casley and Kumar/IBRD, 1987), including a geo-referenced base-line data bank being built up.  
  - High- and medium-level manpower planning and budgeting; in-service and on-the-job training programmes; "appreciation-lever training for politicians and community leaders through workshops and seminars; popular literature, other media and public meetings for target groups involved in plan formulation and implementation.  
  - Design and introduction of effective financial accounting, auditing and inspection measures. |

**Figure 2.2.7.** Detailed Design for Rural Regional Planning Procedure (Free from Belshaw, 1983, Appendix 1.2).

Propositions on integrated rural development (IRD), government decentralisation and participatory planning

As an antidote against fragmented sector planning, the ambitious notion of 'integration' in connection with rural development planning, particularly in our cases of subsection 4.2.2, 4.3.2 and 4.5.2, suggests the following process steps to be taken during one, eventually foreign aided, one-off happening (Ruthann, 1975, pp. 9-16; Livingstone, 1979, pp. 49-53; Birgegard, 1987, pp. 1-15).

- Complete multi-sectoral area coverage in surveying and planning of administrative units and/or agro-ecologically defined zones, such as watersheds.
- Multi-objective and multi-disciplinary (sometimes antithetical and sectorally divergent) plan formulation.
- Comprehensive resource assessment and programming.
- Inter-sectoral linkages and interdependent project activities, being strived for simultaneously during plan implementation.
• Combination of surveying, planning and implementation into such conventional procedures as visualised by figures 2.2.3 and 2.2.6/7.
• Deliberate establishment of a locally cooperating, government planning machinery.
• Community participation in all stages of this IRD exercise.

Practical hurdles were to hamper, however, LADPM-sustainability, such as:
• Hived-off organisational perspectives, c.q. the lack of vertical and horizontal inter- and intra-agency coordination, both technical and budgetary, plus local shortages of surveying, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation skills, qualified and well-paid executive officers, equipment, etc.
• Running out-of-phase between the visible infrastructural 'hardware' being implemented ‘from the top’, whereas the ‘software’ of community-based institution building ‘from below’ dragged behind;
• Slow motion and lack even of financial absorption c.q. spending capacity of local administrations, as confronted sometimes with omnipotent donor agencies from abroad;
• Sectoral imbalances in public expenditures, both capital and recurrent, between ‘directly and indirectly' productive spheres reflecting, particularly during the 1970s, the dogmatic pressure sometimes ‘from below' on such basic human needs as primary health care, rural drinking water supply and road building, with emphasis upon universal primary education.

So, it has been learned that in search for an appropriate planning methodology and related techniques, IRD projects have been successful, if at all, simply because of the omnipotent intensity of all sorts of assets devoted by both local management and foreign technical assistance. When attempts were made to independently replicate IRD projects on regional and national scales, the intensity of skilled staff and institutional resource input could not be sustained, thus emphasising necessarily sequential rounds in capacity improvement ‘from below' (Anker, 1973, pp. 461-484; Lele, 1975, pp. 175-192).

In distinguishing typical forms or rounds of administrative decentralisation, two major dilemmas are to be considered, i.e., physical location and accountability of planning staff, leading to four alternatives as suggested below (Honadle and VanSant 1985, pp. 12-21; Uphoff, 1986, pp. 209-227; and Conyers, 1990, pp. 15-34). For departing from the ‘norm’ of centrally guided, planning and budgeting routines which annually cull sectoral project lists, functional workloads are first shifted to field offices, although the 'power of the purse' remains in central headquarters. Next, delegation and/or privatisation of specific functions, i.e., marketing of agricultural produce, electricity supply, watershed or metropolitan plan formulation and implementation by official decree and statute, might grant government corporations and (semi)private enterprises a partial autonomy. Finally, locally elected authorities with their own borrowing and revenue generating capacities represent the form of decentralisation of which the strengths and weaknesses are easily understood in terms of degree of internal and external coordination, leadership and morale, popular participation and relative autocracy; in other words, in terms of speed, efficiency, effectiveness and political adequacy of collective decision making and societal guidance, i.e. of the territorial organisation of power (Friedmann, 1973.a, pp. 174-180 and 235-254; Mauzy, 1975, pp. 84-112; as based on Esman, in Montgomery et al, 1966, regarding Malaysia and India).
Popular 'bottom-up' or participatory planning is, first, called upon as a means to improve the planning process leading to (van Dusseldorp, 1981, pp. 25-88; Conyers, 1982, pp. 103-135):

- Enlargement of the existing knowledge base through local group interviews, self-surveys and action research (Rapoport in Human Relations, 1970, pp. 499-513).
- Promotion of alternative problem solutions, i.e., innovation through local consultation in working committees.
- Commitment to local project formulation, implementation, maintenance and operation through self-help contributions in labour, cash and kind.
- Local acquisition of political decision-making power

Next, considered as a basic human right by which people determine their own well-being, citizen participation leads to:

- Awareness in local communities/neighbourhoods that their problems could and should be successfully acted upon.
- Self-education for 'liberation of the oppressed'.
- Nurturing the participatory planning process.
- Mutual trust between local population and government agencies, thus building up 'social capital'; refer to Putnam, 1993, in section 1.4 and 2.1.3.
- Shift from passivity towards self-esteem.

Partly because of limited resources allocated for community participation, emphasis has been given to small-scale self-help projects which were rarely capable of making a significant impact on the rural economy. Moreover, planning practitioners were to realize that introduction of voluntary participation in planned development processes, seemingly aiming at greater equality, will require socio-structural changes, particularly in local power structures. Those involved in organised participation have to take the risks of adopting new social roles, open-minded attitudes and capabilities, sometimes opposed to existing ones. Specifically for the rural poor and weaker groups in a society, risk absorption capacities in an economic and social sense are very limited.

The nested hierarchy of urban and rural centres as inserted below, clearly indicates in our study cases of chapters. 4 and 5 that debates on socio-spatial policy options fall into four broad categories regarding:

- The largest urban centres of more than 1-5 million inhabitants.
- Intermediate regional growth centres and industrial growth poles.
- Sustainable and functionally integrated district and locality towns vis-à-vis their rural hinterlands.
- Village service centres providing basic facilities in their rural surroundings.

Since the 1930s it has been a fashionable western belief that with increasing city size, diseconomies (such as rising land values, rents, costs of urban infrastructure, noise and pollution, crime, poverty and political unrest) outweigh economies of an enlarged urban scale. So, the conventional wisdom developed of attempting to restrain the growth of primate cities and of dispersing urban industrial functions, in particular to regional and district towns. During the 1970s it was argued by the World Bank, however, that in Third World situations where capital, institutional resources and technical skills are scarce, cities of eight million people or more should be allowed to grow. Four main arguments are advanced to support this big-city conviction. First, mega-cities generate faster macro-economic growth rates. Second, whereas per capita incomes rise in direct proportion to city size and even where high urban unemployment exists, the survival chances of the poor are greater because of increased participation in the informal sector and access to social support systems. Third, the costs of social overhead capital tend to fall with increased city size. That is to say, where these costs of (overloaded) urban facilities do actually rise, macro-economic productivity is rising still faster by reason of external economies of scale: big cities yield a greater net return per worker or inhabitant than smaller towns. Finally, it is argued that while problems of mega-urbanisation do exist, these are less a consequence of large-scale inefficiency and distributive injustice inherent in big cities, than of intervening factors such as the physical form and structure of cities, uncontrolled land speculation and pollution, weak municipal management, poor utility cost recovery and taxation policies, and so on.

In other words, while it may well be possible for urban planners to formulate full-fledged strategic frameworks for coping with major urbanisation problems, it may not be possible to implement them in Third World countries where public land-use controls are highly influenced by powerful interest groups, i.e. the economy of family/clan affections; and where local revenue sources are scarce; refer to authoritarian 'straddling' elites in sub-sections 2.2.1 and 4.1.2. By inference, though, the conventional wisdom to curb primate city growth may in practice be the only policy option.

A scaled down compromise position can thus be found in the promotion of secondary growth centre strategies. Here, restrictive measures aimed at diverting economic growth may actually result in a national loss of jobs if alternative locations are not genuinely viable and competitive. Except where heavy industrial complexes have been built, the means for activating growth poles were generally too weak to divert manufacturing activities from core regions. Particularly in relatively small and poor countries, trickling down of innovations along the centre hierarchy in favour of so-called propulsive industries has not taken place, nor has horizontal spread fared better.
Figure 2.2.9 Hierarchy of centers: an example with rough size indications.

On the contrary, from lower-ranking central places economic growth ‘normally’ filters upward in response to agricultural developments in their direct surroundings. Here, other structural factors are to be taken seriously, particularly among smallholders, as related to (distortions in) land tenure, access to credit, storage and transport facilities, national price policies, etc.

In conclusion, it appears that regional growth centre policies have their greatest prospects of success in Third World contexts in which a system of significantly sized, intermediate cities already exists; and where mutually complementary instruments are directed towards changing newly designated core areas from being exploitative to distributive: towards increasing their positive impact throughout their hinterlands and towards tackling both urban and rural poverty directly, instead of being policy instruments solely for maintaining spatial domination and inequality, as shown by Freetown’s rise in sub-section 4.1.2. again.

In support of measures to develop the bottom end of the settlement hierarchy planning officers have advocated both ‘from above and from below’ the functional integration, both vertical and horizontal, of district and locality towns of which the urban functions are seen as a possible impediment or encouragement to sustained and self-reliant development of a ‘progressive farmer’ society. Promotion of an economically rational form of spatial organisation is emphasised for banking and marketing, dispersed rural industry, decentralised administration, agricultural services, social and physical infrastructure, etc. Peasants (just like a myriad of honeybees clustered in a colony around omniscient queens) if provided with intersectoral investment packages along a multi-tiered structure of rural centres, could in a short time raise themselves to thriving farmer communities.

This optimistic picture of the transformation from peasant to farmer has been haunted by many misconceptions of producer and consumer behavior in Third World

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Radius of influence in km</th>
<th>Serviced area in sq. km</th>
<th>Population in center</th>
<th>Population in service area</th>
<th>Survivals</th>
<th>Public utilities</th>
<th>Infrastructures</th>
<th>Antitectural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Principal</td>
<td>state, area</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>services</td>
<td>piped water supply, power system, general electricity supply</td>
<td>international roads, intercontinental airports, terminal railway stations, national bus services</td>
<td>modern large industries, import/export enterprises, international banks, national services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>city</td>
<td>region</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>services</td>
<td>jet pipes, principal hospital, importance of center, ministries</td>
<td>national and regional roads, national airport, major railway stations, regional bus services</td>
<td>agro-industries, distribution, service, national, regional, local services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>district</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>512,000</td>
<td>services</td>
<td>piped water supply with treatment, general electricity supply</td>
<td>regional and district roads, railway, minor railway stations, district bus stations</td>
<td>small-scale industries, electronic commerce, credit facilities, district services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local-</td>
<td>Sub-district</td>
<td>sub-district</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>services</td>
<td>water supply, secondary educational institutions, department, weekly market, individual businesses</td>
<td>district and local roads, local bus stations</td>
<td>cottage industries, fishing, small trade, money lenders, local services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Village</td>
<td>local</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>services</td>
<td>school, health service, rural administrative services</td>
<td>shallow wells or boreholes, pit latrines, individual businesses</td>
<td>water supply, sewage systems, credit facilities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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rural areas, where deprivation traps and vicious circles of poverty are rampant. For rural households, the five clusters of disadvantages are clearly interlocked, i.e., poverty, physical weakness, peripheral isolation, vulnerability to natural, social and economic vagaries, as well as lack of bargaining power. Efficiently intermeshed, local markets do not exist: the marketing, storage and transport system is 'dendritic', i.e. dominated by (price setting of) middlemen and traders all along the chain. Finally, it must be repeated that rural centre investment clusters are most successful in already settled areas where topography, physical conditions, population distribution and densities, incomes, preferences and tastes favour rising development thresholds.

In promoting basic village facilities in Third World peripheries planning practitioners have obviously to reconcile two conflicting sets of infrastructure policy options, giving priority:

• on the one hand, to paternalistic development views of national headquarters in combination with those of local entrepreneurs favouring politico-administrative stability and free-market economic growth 'from above'; and
• on the other hand, to community interests of poverty-stricken, rural and urban masses favouring equalization of income, know-how and power, citizen participation and resource mobilization 'from below', in combination with conservation of local value patterns and natural resources.

These priorities suit various interests and, by inference, lead to different (geo-)information needs from (inter-)national to local levels, thus determining minor versus major socio-structural changes to be incorporated in plan formulation, implementation, operation and maintenance of:

• Clean drinking water supply, including waste water, garbage and excreta disposal.
• Primary and preventive versus secondary and curative health care.
• Primary and functional versus secondary and university education.
• Poverty-alleviating feeder roads versus rural-urban 'dendritic' road networks for 'enlightened' agricultural transformation.
• (Non)Renewable energy supplies, i.e. oil, natural gas, coal and nuclear-based versus biomass, solar, hydro-electric and wind-driven.
• Rural industrialisation in growth poles versus in rural centres, including regionally adequate technologies.

Four main types of long-term effects are actually strived for by improving village water supplies including waste water, garbage and excreta disposal:

• changes in the public health situation;
• economic time savings in collecting drinking water;
• spin-offs from horticultural production and from water supply employees engaged; and
• decreasing rural-urban migration.

Moreover, different interests and views prevail regarding public standpipes versus private house connections, water rating structures, and private versus public ownership of local drinking water supply systems.

Complementary to fully-equipped regional hospitals, delivering predominantly curative services of high quality to a 'happy few', primary health care stands for preventive services necessary for achieving health for all, such as:

• local provision of essential medicines;
• immunization against the major infectious diseases and injuries;
• maternal and child health care, including family planning;
• promotion of proper nutrition and food supply; and
• education concerning prevailing health problems and habits.

Efforts to reconcile basic education 'for everybody', preservation of the natural and cultural heritage with specialised manpower training have resulted in an educational explosion as manifested by unemployed drop-outs, school leavers and graduates, by diploma inflation, lack of qualified teachers, shortage of school buildings and teaching materials, etc. Functional education, as an alternative option addressing problems of daily rural life at community level, has not been successful either, because the indigenous curriculum fails to prepare pupils for the formal 'diploma disease', and teachers are not prepared to act as local change agents. It might be concluded that — apart from minor internal educational reforms — until the various stakeholders in society as a whole are prepared to close the rural-urban gap in incomes and standards of living, there can be no hope for the functional alternative which would serve the needs of rural communities.

The role to be played by rural transportation in regional development has been interpreted as contributing to:
• economic growth, income and wealth distribution within and between regions;
• increase in the kinds and amounts of goods and services available to producers and consumers;
• development of the industrial and agricultural base, capable of satisfying domestic requirements and exporting a surplus so as to earn foreign exchange; and
• creation/maintenance of employment.

These development objectives have led to a wide range of rural road selection criteria, eventually focusing on rural poverty alleviation as well, in order to screen project proposals on their strategic development contribution.
Chapter 3
Foreign-Aided Projects in Practice

3.1 Technical Assistance in International Development Co-operation at a glance

After the second world war the analysis of what often has been labelled "the development issue" was for a long time dominated by the assumption that a lack of human, natural and financial resources was the main constraint for the progress of poor countries. More or less tacitly it was taken for granted that it was well known what development really was about: it was everything what over the years had been achieved in the 'developed' North about transforming the economies of the poor countries and making them more productive. This idea of development was based on the conviction that it is quite possible to act collectively and influence the course of development by planned interventions. While acknowledging that country- or area-specific conditions certainly play a role in this process, this supposition about the almost universal character of the desired development more or less automatically dictated the type of the interventions that were required to achieve the promised paradise. In other words, in this view development is considered a set of predictable, commonly desired outcomes that can be achieved through the ordering of a set of inputs which are supposedly required to achieve the planned objectives in a linear, cause and effect way. (Biggs & Neame, 1995, p. 31-32; Fowler, 1995, p. 145). In this mechanical view, the vehicle for achieving this alluring good life for all was the nation state. In those post-world war II days the state was assumed to play a far more prominent role in rebuilding the devastated European nations than civil society or the corporate sector. As a matter of logic, it was quite commonly agreed, in the underdeveloped nations in the South one had to invest sufficient resources in the development of the state as well. Then the state, as a guardian of collective welfare, would apply the same working principles as the Northern countries had done before (and at that very moment still did) to achieve the required economic growth. Basically, in those days hardly anybody in the mainstream of international relations thought there was a particular need for the developing countries to elaborate their own model but to follow 'conventional (Northern) wisdom'. Neither, it was assumed, did they have to go through the trial- and error processes, as their former colonial masters had been forced to do at home. For they could tap from the most up-to-date professional competence to speed-up their development process. As Western knowledge was (to a large extent) supposed to be based on universal, value- and context-free principles, hence a transnational process of induced learning from experience was considered an important tool in the development process. “Good advisors and technical experts would formulate good policies, which good governments would then implement for the good of society” (IBRD, 1997, p. 1; see also Waterston, 1969; Edwards, 1999, pp.28-45) And as far as the dearth of resources was concerned, the well endowed developed countries of the first and the second world were prepared to make ample human and financial resources available to implement such an international effort and realise these ambitious plans for progress.

The willingness to put quite substantial resources at the disposal of developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America stemmed from various considerations of a humanitarian, political and/or economic nature. The idea of an altruistic, moral imperative to help those living in 'primitive and stagnant' conditions had always been present among a considerable part of the Western population but got a new impetus
after de-colonisation. Religious attitudes with regard to injustice, and political feelings of international solidarity translated themselves in political demands on the state to organise and institutionalise international development co-operation.

Simultaneously, in the wake of World War II the cold war had developed. After the defeat of Germany in 1945, the United States had engineered through the 'Marshall Plan' a massive economic intervention. Its overall political aim was to prevent the Soviet Union to extend its communist influence in war-torn Western Europe and to establish a stable and pluralist Europe based on a strong market economy. Subsequently Asia, Africa and Latin America became the next battleground for the two ideological protagonists in their quest for influence and power. Hence, the experiences with the Marshall Plan for Western Europe, which was in many practical ways a model for later ideas about development aid (Leys, 1996, p. 8), had an important impact on the thinking on international relations. Development assistance became a firm weapon in the political considerations of depriving the communists of their actual and potential "mass base" in poor countries. The available assistance depended very much on the strategic position of the developing country concerned on the chess board of the two power blocks.

Last but certainly not least, there was the economic need to safeguard a reliable supply of raw materials for the industrial nations and create new markets for western investment and consumer goods. Development assistance was considered an important instrument to build up the required physical, administrative and economic infrastructure and open up the local markets for western commercial interests. In that way development co-operation would contribute to the socio-political and economic stability of developing countries in which (foreign) business investments could thrive. As a consequence of the deficiency of savings to implement the required (productive) investments ("savings-gap"), the shortage of foreign exchange to purchase the required resources to speed up the economic development process ("trade-gap") and the insufficient human capacity to use available resources productively and decrease human suffering, financial support schemes as well as externally funded and expatriate staffed technical assistance projects and programmes started to thrive in the 1950/60's.

In chapter 1 and 2 it has been indicated how the change in practised development approaches is the combined result of, on the one hand, a process of learning from practical approaches and, on the other, a personal influence of important stakeholders. The scope for these approaches is determined by the power relations between the three main domains in society, i.e. the state, the corporate sector and civil society. In chapter 2 it has been elaborated how, as a result of outer and inner learning processes, changes in normative, strategic and operational perspectives have been incorporated in

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1 However, in due time civil society developed an elaborate system of non-governmental, charitable channels to support development initiatives in third world countries which take place outside the realms of Northern and Southern governments.

2 Of course, these considerations went, mutatis mutandis, for the Soviet Union and its allies, too.

3 There is quite a wide body of literature that seriously questions the appropriateness of projects as instrument for achieving development objectives in a sustainable way (see e.g.: Long & van der Ploeg, 1989; Crehan and von Oppen, 1988; and, for an overview and reply, van Dusseldorp, 1992, pp. 116-120). This debate will not be covered here. In spite of all the, often justified, criticism, projects are still the primary and successful means through which governments of developing countries attempt to translate their plans and policies into programs of action. Moreover, they are important channels through which international assistance organisations invest their resources (Rondinelli, 1983, p. 4-5). After all, "projects will be with us for ever" concludes van Dusseldorp (1990, p. 336).
personal dispositions and in time been translated into various area development theories and related practices (see also chapter 4 and 5). However, practices as developed and applied in the context of international development co-operation are not the mere result of the incorporation of new theoretical and practical insights resulting from feed-back loops, but to a considerable extent they are also shaped by very practical, external and internal conditions under which these interventions take place.

Over the years, much information has been gathered about the nature and performance of technical assistance, mainly through (meta) evaluations of projects and programmes in the field of international development co-operation. Forty years of experience in and evaluation of technical assistance in development co-operation has resulted in an enormous quantity of accumulated knowledge on the (lack of) technical, social, cultural considerations in strategies applied in specific development projects. And as the development sector is most probably one of the most evaluated sectors anyway, enormous amounts of money will almost certainly be spent in the future on the evaluation of technical assistance projects as well. However, judged from a determined though inevitably fragmentary scan of the vast literature on technical assistance, it is striking that projects are usually assessed from a rather limited scope. Socio-economic and technical aspects of projects usually receive ample attention. Yet, the executive arrangements of projects, which in practice to a considerable extent determine the degree of success or failure and the sustainability of the new practices developed under the wings of bi- and multi-lateral technical assistance agreements, seem to be more widely discussed than systematically studied and reported on. Evaluators seem to be content with general references to project-specific aspects, in particular when the project has failed to deliver the planned results. However, out of an anxiety not to jeopardise the sensitive relations between the various actors in the development co-operation arenas, failures are often concealed. The publication of too harsh statements on the practical performance of the donor, the recipient country and (to a less extent) the implementing agencies is therefore quite often precluded in 'objective' evaluation studies.

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4 Although in practice it turns out to be difficult to define what exactly is a programme and what a project, here we consider a programme an organised set of related activities directed towards the attainment of a defined objective. Programmes are usually implemented through a number of location-specific projects. A project is a logically ordered sequence of location-specific, interrelated development activities and resource inputs designed and implemented to achieve clearly defined objectives (targets) over a specified time and at a specified cost under the responsibility of a demonstrable management unit (Conyers and Hills, 1984, pp. 11-12; van Staveren & van Dusseldorp, 1980, p. 330; van Dusseldorp, 1992, p. 101-2; Hulme, 1994, p. 213).

5 According to OECD sources more than a third of official development assistance (ODA) is spent on technical assistance (van der Velden & Zweers, 1998, p. 351).

6 This chapter draws heavily on own experiences, oral information from practitioners and students of technical co-operation as well as a number of reports on technical assistance of a more (meta) evaluative nature, notably Quarles van Ufford and Razoux Schultz (1988); Forss et al. (1988); Danida (1988); Deco (1989); van den Ham (1992); van Dusseldorp (1992); Berg et al. (1993); Wilson and Nooter (1995). For an early indication of the problems of and dilemmas in international co-operation in regional development issues in Indonesia, see: A. Majid Ibrahim and H. Benjamin Fisher. Useful were also historic analyses of development projects and case studies like Veenstra and van Steenbergen (1986); Hilhorst (1992) and Porter et al. (1991). For a general overview of the impact of technical assistance on development, see: Berg et al. (1991) and Cassen, 1994, ch. 6, pp. 143-173 For a recent, brief comment on Dutch technical assistance, see: Hoebink en van der Velden (1997); and van der Velden & Zweers (1998).
3.2 The identification of foreign funded development projects

Most international initiatives in the field of technical development co-operation depart from the assumption that, in addition to financial constraints, the recipient countries still lack the technical and administrative capability required to realise their development objectives in time on their own strength. One of the most important objectives of technical co-operation, on which we will focus here, is therefore to build (permanent) local capacity. One way to achieve that objective, it is to develop “exemplary” systems and approaches that can be implemented by an appropriately developed institution without external support and deal with similar issues in the future. In other words, technical assistance focuses foremost on achieving the much wanted sustainability of the implemented as well as the coming development policies and projects.

Technical assistance is usually provided within the context of time- and space-bound projects. These projects are guided by terms of reference in which both the donor and the recipient country subscribe to (a number of) objectives, agree to allocate a certain amount of human, financial and other resources within a detailed time frame and specify the working principles, authorities and mutual responsibilities.

In practice, donor countries allocate a budget for financial and technical co-operation with a certain country. As a next step, programmes and projects are identified and within the budget a specified amount will be earmarked for them. Due to the multi-annual and cyclical character of most multi- and bi-lateral assistance projects, there are always a number of projects in the pipeline as well as under implementation. Within this process, one would say, the recipient countries come up with proposals for joint activities. After all, their problems should be solved, needs be satisfied and potentials be utilised. However, reality learns that in many cases the donors dominate the identification process. The responsible administrative bodies in the recipient country are often simply not able to manage their country’s technical co-operation inflows. The towering volumes of technical aid overwhelm in many cases the capacities of the responsible local management entities. This not only refers to quantitative aspect of the management of increasing flows of foreign aid but also with respect to the administrative requirements and the technical level of sophistication that is required from the recipient countries by the donors. Another reason for the relative lack of input of the recipient country in the identification process, is that for bureaucratic mandates, technical, socio-political or economic reasons, donors often have special preferences on which sector or area to support in which way. The bureaucrats from the donor agencies habitually prefer to maintain tight control over the selection of projects and frequently also the management of technical co-operation. In practice, many recipient governments become passive repositories of donor-driven projects, although it has to be said that in general they have also been rather content to let donors determine what is à la mode. The result of the not co-ordinated preferences of a handful of donors is an “eclectic mixture”.

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7 On the need to reinvigorate institutional capabilities, see: van Steenbergen (1992), IBRD (1997, part three).
8 Here we will draw from Honadle and VanSant (1985, p. 2) to define sustainability as the extent in which project-initiated goods and services are still delivered and maintained five years past termination of donor resources, the continuation of local action stimulated by the project, and the generation of successor services and initiatives as a result of project-built capacity. Sustainability should be analysed from an ecological, financial/economic, socio-political as well an institutional point of view.
9 This is what Hume and Limcaoco (1991, p. 224) observe with respect to Integrated Rural Area Development approaches, but it is true for other approaches as well.
spatial and sectoral priorities as well as conceptual frameworks and strategies. To
make matters worse, these preferences are frequently adapted to the ideas and obses­
sions of (ever rotating) donor personnel who usually fancy to begin new efforts over
sustained follow-through and hence constantly introduce new organisational fads and
fashions in the implementation of the donor agency policies (Honadle and VanSant,

“In the beginning the emphasis was laid on basic needs. This led to a focus on ‘facilities’
planning. This point of view was left after six months after the back-stopper informed the
resident team in Aceh by telephone that “in the Netherlands the basic needs approach was
“out” and they better stop it”. The work that had been started at the beginning was not
finished” (IOV mission report, 1986, p. 6).10

In the realm of international development co-operation the identification of specific
projects and their location is often presented as a rational choice. It is introduced to
us within a framework which is based on a (supposedly) systematic and more or less
comprehensive analysis of sectoral and spatial development needs, potentials of the
recipient country and (token) consultation of the various stakeholders. Yet, it is often
the result of an erratic political process in which the above mentioned institutional
interests and preferences of the donor countries play an important role (see e.g.: IOV-
1994). Rather than seeking to make and follow deliberate, well-researched, and com­
prehensive development plans, it is a process of interaction between a wide range of
actors, including (short-term) consultants, engineering firms, and expatriate, develop­
ment practitioners, local as well as donor country bureaucrats and political elites, that
shapes the outcome of the final decision-making to give priority to what action
(Rondinelli, 1983, pp. 120-124). And although this this process in the end does result in
an official, written agreement signed by the participating partners, in practice their
objectives and expectations often do differ considerably with all kinds of negative
consequences possible during the operationalisation of the project.

“The initiative to submit a project proposal on forestry issues (in the Kali Konto water­
shed area on East Java/AvdH) sprang from contacts between the Indonesian Directorate
general of Forestry and the Dutch Directorate for Landuse Planning and Fisheries.....
Initially, these contacts did not involve the Embassy in Jakarta or the Directorate General
of International Development Co-operation, which did not improve the atmosphere around
the inception of the project.....The identification of the project was in the hands of (the
Indonesian agency/AvdH) Perum Perhutani. ...... On the part of the (Dutch/AvdH)
Directorate of Landuse Planning and Fisheries it was denied flatly that there had been any
kind of influencing and it was argued that it actually was an Indonesian initiative”
(Quarles van Ufford & Razoux Schulz, 1988, pp. 4-7).

“The initiative for the Institutional Development Assistance Project (IDAP) sprang from an
initiative of a Dutch economist of the Netherlands Economic Institute, who came in contact
with the rector of the university of Banda Aceh. The ‘professional’ preference for planning
of the former and the old wish to strengthen regional planning capacities and stimulate
development of the province of Aceh of the latter, seem to get well along” (Quarles van
Ufford & Razoux Schultz, 1988, p. 35).11

10 Translation by AvdH.
11 Translation by AvdH.
All parties involved have their own institutional, private or commercial interests to further a certain cause. In the political-bureaucratic arena of international development co-operation each actor has different levels of influence, depending on the power it wields and the resources that it can manipulate and control under the prevailing conditions (Hulme, 1995, p. 213-216). Moreover, once the decision has been taken to support a certain sector or area, vested interests to continue project activities are automatically created. The likelihood that follow-up projects in the same field will be initiated as a matter of course, is therefore greatly increased and is often irrespective of the actual need for continued support and/or the potential for further development.

This highly personal or partisan style of project identification does not mean that donors habitually push 'their' projects through, if only because local (personal) interests in the recipient country play an important role in the decision-making as well. Nor does it mean that such an identification process automatically produces 'bad' projects. Rather it indicates that it cannot automatically be assumed that there is always a broad based constituency for project initiatives. The 'ownership' of projects is not always as broadly shared as successful implementation might require.

That many of these donor-led, 'private' initiatives are not flatly rejected by those who will be responsible for the implementation of the projects certainly has to do with hierarchic, vertical relations within the recipient bureaucracy. Even though one is convinced that the prospects for a successful project are doubtful, it is simply not done to oppose the decisions of those 'positioned' in higher echelons who have been part of the informal brainstorming and bargaining process preceding formal identification. It certainly has also to do with the mere fact that most technical assistance is provided on a grant basis and the project costs do not press on the current central and/or local budgets. As a positive aspect, this exceptional position of development co-operation within the domain of local public finance stimulates experiments and pursuance of potentially interesting developments, or, for that matter, taking bigger risks than usual. Yet it escapes rigorous priority setting of the type that often takes place if the above bureaucrats involved in decision-making would have been forced to use (parts) of their 'own' scarce regular budget allocations. The contribution from the counterpart organisation that is usually allocated to the project is mostly small and often comes on top of its current budget; thus there are hardly any opportunity costs for the partner organisation involved. This trend to accept what is offered is again supported by the financial incentives that countries often pay to staff involved in projects and the potential positive influence of successfully implemented projects on their conduit. Negative results, on the other hand, can under these circumstances always be blamed on the experimental character and the dropping of the project from a higher level without properly taking the local conditions into account. Finally, the 'acceptance' of projects by agencies which have not been involved in their inception is sometimes reinforced by the kick-backs that are to be gained in the implementation process as well.

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12 The sustainability of the project in the long run, however, hinges on the ability and willingness of the recipient country to finance the recurrent costs after completion of the donor-funded initiative.

13 With all negative consequences for maintenance after withdrawal of the donor: "The responsibilities attached to maintaining massive infrastructure facilities inherited from well-funded Australian experts overwhelmed the local authorities in terms of technical capacity and resource availability...so it is not surprising that they will shoulder responsibility for maintenance with little enthusiasm. ...it is the failure to consider the institutional implications and requirements of the project at the appraisal stage" (Hulme & Limcaoco, 1991, p. 228).
The result of such an identification process that has been thought up by high level bureaucrats and foreign experts without fully involving the agencies responsible for the implementation, is that the 'parachuted' projects are perceived as alien. They are often not only psychologically, but also in actual practice, considered donor projects, or at least central government projects, rather than locally rooted initiatives. Moreover, there is a widespread agreement on the conclusion that external technical support only works if something is moving locally already; in these cases some further 'pushing' can have an impact (Wilson & Nooter, 1995, p. 129). The consequence of unwanted implantation of projects in a local context is a weak sense of ownership "... that [will spawn] -understandably- weak local commitment and frequent indifference to project sustainability" (Berg, 1993, p. 31).

Involvement of many actors in the identification process usually leads to a variety of wishes and interests; ideally all of them are taken into account in the project objectives. However, limited resources require priority setting. Therefore, when it comes to the assessment of this 'hotchpotch' of objectives, the allocation of resources and the implementation of corresponding lines of action will often reflect the imbalanced, some would say unequal, position of the donor agency, their managing agent, the expatriate project team, the recipient agencies at central government level and the implementing agency at local level (let alone the ultimate beneficiaries). As resources are limited and all stakeholders have their own, often mutually conflicting objectives, priority setting implies allocating resources accordingly. It implies satisfying some interests at the expense of others. This painful process of denying one or more partners what they think is due in the project, often results in the above lack of ownership by some of the official stakeholders, and in some cases generates the bones of future contention. Thus, due to this (often) partisan character of projects, including self interest, projects often become "... a seething mass of contending perceptions, divergent personal and institutional strategies and polarized interests..." (Porter et al., 1991, p. 198), with all possible consequences for the sustainability of the initiative.

3.3 The implementation of foreign technical assistance in development projects

3.3.1 The organisational setting

The above indicated way of identifying projects will usually have a profound impact on the institutional setting of the project. In a scramble for (scarce) resources initiators of programmes and projects often have all reason and also the power, to place projects in their own agency or, in the agency that they, for whatever purpose, consider to be the most appropriate one for achieving their goals. This choice is irrespective of whether practically this agency is also the most appropriate one for implementation.

"...already at that time the question was put forward whether this service (Perhutani/AvdH) would be the most obvious partner for a project which was supposed to have a broader purpose than just improving forestry management. However, it seemed politically hardly achievable and simultaneously confusing if one would have looked for another counterpart organisation than the initiator on the Indonesian side." (Quarles van Ufford/Razoux Schultz, 1988, p. 6 about the Kali Konto project on East Java)

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14 However, priorities are not fixed but can and often do shift during the implementation of a project (see e.g. van Steenbergen en Veenstra (1986); de Valk & Sibanda (1986) and Porter et al. (1991).
15 Translation by AvdH. In addition, one might, of course, also wonder whether the selected Dutch agency was also the most appropriate one to implement the project...
The involvement of such an ‘inappropriate’ agency on the basis of personal contacts and the sheer (temporary) availability of foreign donor assistance not only has an impact on the sustainability of the initiative. It also means a lost opportunity to improve the performance of the ‘appropriate’ agency and it often creates long-lasting tensions in the inter-agency relations due to a (perceived) infringement on the bureaucratic sovereignty of the ‘neglected’ agency.

The organisational context within which the project is placed, to a large extent determines the access to the various “capitals” (Bebbington, 1999) and hence the impact of the project on its environment. Appreciating the fact that for most problem-solving a certain co-ordination and co-operation (also in future funding) among sectoral agencies is required, being placed in the wrong agency almost automatically implies a lack of authority and power to command a contribution from the other actors as well. Moreover, in such cases there is hardly any prospect for incorporation of the project achievements into the responsibilities of the appropriate line agencies and their recurrent budget. For every department determines its own scale of priorities and distributes its budget and manpower among the various initiatives accordingly (Weitz and Applebaum, 1969, p. 2). Thus, by ‘implanting’ a project in a certain agency without the clear support of the other relevant agencies, the sustainability of the project output can seriously be questioned, irrespective of its proven quality.

Due to their nature, externally funded initiatives are usually less bound by indigenously prevailing normative, strategic or operational considerations of the kind that have been explored in chapter 1. This bureaucratic freedom provides the required room for experimental programmes and projects which are built on previous learning experiences elsewhere and focus on the development of innovative approaches. However, the direct impact of such ‘footloose’, foreign technical assistance dominated projects on the routine policies of the counterpart organisation tends also to be smaller to the extent that it operates more independently and at a distance from or even by-passes the routine bureaucratic machinery. The ultimate ivory tower, with a usually devastating impact on sustainability of the project after withdrawal of the donor agency, is the temporary arrangement for project management through the parallel (project) agency with its own objectives, responsibilities, procedures, budget and staff. These structures are usually established on the pretext that existing institutions are too weak to implement the project plans, although practice compels us to acknowledge that donors and implementing agencies consider this construction often a guarantee for keeping control over the project as well. However, whatever the reason for its establishment may be, nothing is more deceptive than the success of an ‘enclave’ project that bypasses established institutions and arrangements and in no way is impeded by locally prevalent bureaucratic procedures, limited financial possibilities and an inadequate institutional infrastructure (Honadle and VanSant, 1985, p. 79, 107, 115).

3.3.2 The expatriate practitioners

Capacity building as one of the main objectives of technical assistance is based on the acknowledgement of the validity of inner- and outer- (social and professional) learning processes as described in chapter 1 and 2. It presupposes a demand that cannot adequately be met domestically and a supply of scarce resources that can be acquired abroad, in our case of knowledge and experience. The identification of the demand side, questionable as it sometimes may be, has briefly been touched upon in the previous sub-section. Within the context of technical assistance, the supply side of the
resource looked for, is personified by the team of expatriate consultants. The dependence on expatriate development consultants as a source of knowledge and experience is assured during the conceptualisation of the project: during the days when the medium- and long term goals are decided, when more or less sophisticated approaches are introduced, in other words when the human resource implications are determined (Porter et al., 1991, p. 199). The expatriate practitioners will have gone through a certain inward-looking, personal development path, have accumulated a body of appropriate knowledge and experience and developed a certain practical habitus (see: chapters 1 and 2). Yet, it always remains debatable whether they have individually and/or collectively something valuable to offer to the project and, more important, to the concerned counterpart organisation the demand of which is defined by very specific local needs and potentials.

"Spatial strategies are especially weak in all but two or three of the studies, perhaps reflecting both the difficulty of spatial planning in an archipelago and the fact that very few of the foreign consultants were experienced in this discipline when they arrived in Indonesia. ... at most a dozen of the approximately 150 foreign consultants involved ... were themselves trained formally in regional science or planning at a graduate level" (A. Majid Ibrahim and H Benjamin Fisher, 1979, p. 120)

"... the expatriate chief of party for technical assistance team was a technician without management skills. His performance was so poor that the team was perceived by local residents as a group of individuals pulling in opposite directions." (Honadle & VanSant, 1985, p.21)

"Also a remark by one of the Indonesian informants that the "experts" had learned a lot pointed to the fact that team members were not always considered experienced authorities of whom one could or was willing to learn" (IOV, 1986, p.7)

The selection of the implementing team of expatriate consultants by the donor (in consultation with the recipient country or otherwise) is rarely based on an exclusively rational assessment of the technical qualities of the proposed team members and the agencies they are related to. As a result, quite a number of expatriate 'advisors' have been sent out who were technically of dubious quality. There usually is a prevalence of men that bias their practice in favour of the male over the female sex, even though the target group consists mainly of women. The expatriates often lack the familiarity with the local conditions or the sensitivity to local cultures to make technical assistance a success (see also: 3.3.3). However, within the local context it is also the 'practical' appropriateness of the approach as proposed by the consultant - which comes forth from his/her own inner- and outer learning experiences as well as the appreciation of the normative, strategic and executive context of the new working environment- that to a large extent dictates the ultimate sustainable impact of a technical assistance programme.

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16 In addition to their role as sources of knowledge and experience to the counterpart organisation most expatriates play a more or less tacit role as guard of the proper spending of donor money.
17 Translation by AvdH.
18 Usually a combination of various factors such as proximity to the implementing bureaucrats, (lack of) previous engagements, closeness to the identification process, price, as well as institutional and individual quality of the bidding agency and its team determine the outcome of the selection process. However, for commercial consultancy bureaux it is not uncommon to change the 'winning' project team shortly after the tender procedure has successfully been completed or the project started.
Without exception the expatriate team operates in an alien environment and, in the case of local area development planning and management, at a more or less remote location. The relative social and physical isolation places high demands on the social chemistry within the team and the individual social navigation capacities of all its members. The team members often hardly know each other, do not only have to cooperate closely but frequently also live next to each other. The expatriate practitioners are, however, only selected on the basis of their technical competence and practical experience, not on their proven stability, flexibility, adaptability and social skills, and their accompanying dependents are not taken into consideration at all. Due to the proximity of the expatriates in both private and professional life and the absence of an alternative social environment, tensions can be built up rapidly and do easily extend from one sphere to the other and back, thereby influencing the working relations and thus the outcome of the project.

Due to the difficult availability of suitable expatriate experts, vacancies are often not filled for considerable periods. Moreover, as bureaucratic procedures required for issuing working or residence permits, are usually rather time consuming, programme teams are in practice only seldom at full strength all through the complete project period. Often this gap is filled by inputs from short-term consultants. Although well planned short-term assignments of specialists can be invaluable for the project, the ad-hoc inputs of short-term experts standing in for the resident expatriate frequently better serve their employers' revenues than furthering the project objectives in a structural way.

In their analysis Veenstra and van Steenbergen (1986, p. 26-27) portray a particular period of the IDAP project as a 'flight-deck' for short term expatriate consultants. 'A complaint, however, on these outsiders' contribution was their disregard of the terms of reference drafted by the permanent project-members and their counterparts. ...Moreover, the efficiency of the short-duration missions was reduced as they were not acquainted with the area.' Finally, the input of short-term consultants resulted in a long list of reports but simultaneously in fragmentation of efforts.

The discontinuity in the residents team permanent presence, and the inability of short-term consultants to fully fill this gap, severely hampers the (timely) achievement of a sufficiently integrated project output in time. During the remaining period of the project it puts considerable pressure on the expatriates to substitute participatory approaches and the longer term goals of developing individual and institutional capacities for a more top-down and hands-on approach.

3.3.3 Co-operating with counterparts

Technical assistance by expatriate experts always implies a certain transfer of knowledge to their local colleagues, if only by sharing a common working space and casually exchanging views on project matters. But involving local colleagues consciously and systematically in the conceptualisation of approaches, formulation of policies and implementation of jointly designed plans is very time consuming. It requires a good interpersonal relationship and proceeding with much caution by both sides. For in the long run it demands quite some tact and patience to keep in good shape a relationship.
which in theory is equal - two colleagues facing the same challenges and of whom one should, after some time, take over the work of the other - but in practice is based on a considerable difference in knowledge, experience and reward (van den Ham, 1992, p.124-25). Of course, in practice there should also be a preparedness to share knowledge and information, and thus power, with local colleagues, which is not always the case (see 4.2.10). Moreover, transferring skills and knowledge requires certain ‘educational’ abilities on the part of the expatriate expert. In many cases, however, they have neither the knowledge nor receive much “ego gratification” (Morss, 1982, p.12) from capacity building work. Moreover, frequently linked to an inability to fathom and appreciate the essence of the various local (sub-)cultures of which the bureaucratic culture is not the least important, many expatriates in due time do not get very well along with their counterparts. They fail to diagnose issues and related solutions in the local context. Locked in their own western mental framework they are frequently impatient and distrust their local colleagues when faced with bureaucratic slowness, (perceived) ineffectual management or corruption (Danida, 1988, p. 54). Consequently, capacity building through technical assistance requires quite some preparation, both from the organisational as well as the human resource point of view and more often than not, a considerable tightrope walking aloft to make it a success.

As shown above, projects identified by the higher echelons of bureaucracies are regularly implanted in, or sometimes even flatly imposed on local agencies. These recipient agencies, in particular those located outside the capital, are often ill-prepared, under-resourced and ill-equipped to implement their regular tasks, let alone to embark upon such an ambitious venture. On the one hand, this is inescapable and intricately linked to the notion of technical assistance. For, if the agencies would be well prepared, well equipped and have competent staff at their disposal there would most probably be no need for technical assistance.

Yet, if the technical assistance focuses on capacity building of the local institution and if sustainability is high on the agenda, there have to be local counterparts to cooperate with the expatriate experts, to mutually share experiences and to gradually develop an appropriate body of knowledge. In practice, though, recruitment and retention of dedicated local personnel, able to absorb the external input and transform it in a high level, locally acceptable and feasible output, seems often to be almost insoluble (Hilhorst, 1994, pp. 164-65). Nevertheless, counterparts with a reasonable educational background, organisational status and career prospects are a crucial pre-condition for the ultimate success of any technical assistance project.

In practice counterparts are quite often not at all, or only in name available to work with the expatriate practitioners. However, in those cases where good counterparts are assigned to projects, they are often soon transferred to other, more responsible and/or financially more rewarding positions, or are hardly available for the project because they must attend to numerous other pressing activities in their line agencies (cf. A. Majid Ibrahim and H. Benjamin Fisher, pp. 121-122). Many a project is therefore saddled with no or with counterparts who are either technically or hierarchically no match for the expatriate expert. This gap between expatriate and local expertise is often reinforced

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20 Culture is here defined as “the collective mental programming of the people in an environment” (Hofstede, quoted by Staudt (1991, p. 36). On local bureaucratic culture, see e.g. Riggs (1970), on various aspects of sub-cultures, see Staudt (pp.) and on the practical aspects of public administration in developing countries, see van Dusseldorp (1992, pp. 60-68).

21 Simultaneously this shows again the exceptional position of projects within a line agency and the limited value which is often attached to externally driven development initiatives.
by the, at least relatively, advanced technologies that are introduced within the proj-

ect context.

"This disappointing counterpart situation was not likely to serve the project purpose of
capacity improvement through on-the-job training" (Veenstra en van Steenbergen, p. 29)

Frequently it is not only the 'professional' distance between the expatriate and the
local expatriate that has a profound impact on the capacity building process, but also
the physical distance between them. The isolated administrative and financial posi-
tion of projects within the organisational structure of the host organisation is usually
due to a lack of adequate working space and often results in housing 'the project' in a
building at some distance from the line agency's premises.

In one case the expatriate team leader was pressed to rent a house in a residential area,
owned by the head of the host organisation, thus separating the resident expatriate
team from the line agency22. This severely hampered the day to day contacts between
the expatriates and their local colleagues in the line for and with whom they were sup-
posed to develop an exemplary working methodology. Later, due to pressure from the
donor side, premises more or less adjacent to the main building of the host agency
could be obtained and contacts greatly improved (van den Ham, 1992, p.122)23.

Where the mutual transfer of knowledge is supposed to take place through day to day
coopération (on-the-job training) in analysing the conditions, developing strategies for
change and (organising) the implementation of project activities, physical separation is
obviously an impediment to achieve this objective. However, it does not only contribute
to the negligence of capacity building but can also lead to the expatriate consultant's
increased professional isolation and result in a narrow-minded, technical focus on the
multifaceted reality as well. The danger of a (too strong) dominance of the expatriate's
habitually partial /subjective observation of the local realities and the possibility of the
project's reliance on inappropriate, 'alien' ideas and solutions is of course inherent to
this type of technical assistance. It is reinforced by the above mentioned exemption of
technical assistance projects from the prevalent normative, strategic and operational
imperatives which guide the routine work of the host agency. As a result it are often the
expatriate technical advisors, carrying their own different socio-cultural, technocratic
and political baggage with them, who introduce the proposed reforms rather than
their bypassed local counterparts. Yet, expatriate advisors are almost always recruited
on the basis of their technical skills rather than on the basis of interpersonal attributes
such as empathy, cultural sensitivity, and adaptability, or their command of the local
language, knowledge of the socio-cultural structure, administrative setting etc. The
project output therefore risks to be technically exemplary but lacking an awareness of
local conditions, practices and needs, and therefore in reality politically very sensitive
within the local context. As Berg (1993, p. 30) remarks: "Institutional development aims, by
definition, at inducing changes in human and institutional behaviour, and such changes may
come into conflict with the existing bureaucratic norms and values or may threaten organizational
alignments and coalitions". But irrespective of his/her characterisation, strong counter-
part involvement is always indispensable to counterbalance the expatriates' one-sided

22 Apart from the location issue, this example draws our attention also to the fact that the local politics of
project management often require that resources assigned for successful operations be discreetly
deployed amongst (local) elites whose support is crucial for realisation of the project's objectives
23 Translation by AvdH.
inclination to (over)emphasise the technical (=strategic) merits of the proposed changes with a strong perspective on their socio-cultural, political (=normative) and local administrative (=operational) appropriateness and feasibility.

Above has already been referred to the assumed non-hierarchical character of the relationship between the expatriate consultant and the local counterpart. In practice, however, this relationship most certainly turns out to be a hierarchical if only because the expatriate consultant has been invited to come over to display his/her knowledge and experience and act as a teacher/supervisor to the local staff. Other factors play a role in shaping the working climate as well. Expatriates have a different cultural background, a much better remuneration, - they are often considered a sort of luxury guestworkers in a pool of misery (Conyers, 1997, pp. 11-13). They have different life attitudes and corresponding life styles with living standards and consumption patterns that are not compatible with those of the average population, including the local counterparts. Some issues, trivial as they may appear in view of the complexity of the field problems faced by the project staff, though, can make or break the working relationship between local and expatriate experts:

"Expatriates have usually much better access to equipment. Vehicles are a particular problem. The use and abuse causes frequent problems and mistrust. It is common that both sides perceive the other as using the cars for illegitimate purposes: expatriates by using it for vacations and locking it when they go on home leave, local staff for private transport and family purposes. Often, it seems that both groups have valid reasons for complaint, but basically the problem arises from the fact, that in countries where access to transport is a privilege, the expatriates have always much earlier access. There are cases, where cars included in Technical Assistance Projects may be more important than the Technical Assistance Personnel". (Forss, p.120)

This unequal position as far as access to resources is concerned extends itself also into the domain of management and finances. The expatriate consultant is technically merely the implementor of the technical assistance component, as is the local counterpart on the part of the recipient country. Yet, the exclusive control and one-sided decision-making powers on the appropriation of technical assistance funds by the expatriate team leader, with often merely a token role of the counterpart organisation, is often greatly contributing to the lack of interest in the joint operation. This lack of access to project funds again contributes to the limited ownership of the project by the local agency. It is usually only to a very limited extent compensated by the availability of so-called counterpart funds, the monetary contribution of the recipient country to the development project24. On the other hand, real joint management or at least mutual knowledge about the spending of both the technical assistance and the counterpart funds seems to contribute considerably to the mutual trust and sense of ownership of the project.

"....there was a structured attempt to increase communication to maximum degree. Staff meetings were held frequently, and staff problems or complaints were openly discussed. Reports, memoranda, and correspondence, except strictly personal material, were posted. This approach contributed to a well-informed and well motivated staff" (Honadle & VanSant, 1985, p. 62 on a Save the Children rural development project)

24 This unequal position can even be aggravated by the recipient country itself. In one case the formal counterpart at national level placed its financial contribution to the project in the hands of the expatriate consultant for fear of misappropriation by their fellow country men at lower levels in the hierarchy.
3.3.4 Time pressure

The impact of technical assistance on the local capabilities of the counterpart organisation which is expected to implement the new methodology or maintain the facilities, is, as practice learns, heavily influenced by the pace at which innovations are introduced. The slower the pace and the more intense the interaction between the various stakeholders, the greater the likelihood of successful adoption and institutionalisation. Yet, by nature projects are strictly bound to a fixed, limited time table. In particular when time becomes precious and the project is, for various reasons indicated above, running behind schedule, the expatriate team often changes gear. It will take all measures to meet the dead-lines and comply with the donor pressure to adhere to the agreed disbursement scheme and remove every constraint which hinders and delays expenditures (Chambers, 1996, p. 209-10). However, such a rapid implementation rate frequently outstrips the capacity of counterpart organisations. It then calls for increased expatriate control and staffing, and adversely affects local learning and accommodation to changes.

"An approach that is technically or economically inefficient in the short run may turn out to be efficient over time as a result of learning and skill effects" (Porter et al., 1991, p. 124)

25 Translation by AvdH.

3.3.5 Process versus the product at the end of the day

Regardless of the good intentions on the part of the managing agents, donor country as well as local bureaucrats, there is the tendency to play down the fact, which is revealed sooner or later, that recipient agencies often cannot match the assumptions on which projects are based; promised host country resources are not forthcoming, either because the required resource level is unrealistic, or because the government, in spite of earlier agreements, chooses not to provide them (Honadle and VanSant, 1975, p. 8, 11; Porter et al., 1991, p. 130). At the expense of the capacity building process, the expatriate experts then frequently become implementers and managers to a degree which, at least formally, was never intended, but deemed necessary to achieve at least the stated, relatively tangible objectives of the project. Regardless the objectives of capacity building through on the job-training, joint implementation etc., the more or less tangible 'product' in reality often gets more priority than the 'process' of working toward achieving the intended product.

When expatriates take the lead in implementing projects, these usually become (overly) dependent on their energy, enthusiasm, entrepreneurial spirit and dispositions. The dissatisfaction of the expatriate experts that, due to factors beyond their powers, something tends to slip out of their hands (professional pride!) is certainly not the least important factor in this process. For these expatriates regard themselves professionals with an urgent need to do something and to be seen to have done something within the limitations of time and budget that form the context for realising the project objectives (Chambers, 1983, p. 31-33). It is the legitimisation of involvement of the (expatriate) experts themselves, whose very right of existence is based on their ability to bring about some observable and measurable change (Crehan and van Oppen, p. 125) Fear for a negative, external evaluation certainly plays a role, in particular if commercial interests are at stake.

25 Translation by AvdH.
"If you are employed by a bigger contractor, you mainly work towards the Dutch evaluation" (Dutch expatriate consultant, quoted by Quarles van Ufford & Razoux Schultz, 1988, p. 57)

For evaluators have often no problem in identifying the lack of tangible results. On the other hand, they are usually less skilled in identifying the background of the disappointing results (was it the incompetence or laziness of the expatriate consultant, or his/her impotence due to the local conditions?). Evaluation missions are often too short to assess in a reliable way complicated processes of capacity building through on-the-job training: reliable base-line data are absent; evaluators frequently insufficiently master the local language to discuss complex matters; have an inadequate knowledge of the administrative structure and the local culture to appraise the various options which faced the project team etc. And last but not least, there is the pressure of the expatriate’s employer to keep its track record in order to remain eligible for future assignments (van den Ham, 1992, p. 126). The final result is that the demands on expatriate personnel to concentrate on the more visible or measurable work divert attention from the longer term goals of developing local individual and institutional capabilities - in other words, “rhetoric for capacity building and resources for physical production” as Honadle and VanSant (1985, p. 65) sourly notice.

However, in spite of the laudable objectives agreed upon at the start of the project by the initiators, the day-to-day counterpart organisation sometimes considers itself to be more burdened than assisted by the imposed development assistance co-operation. It therefore may not at all be that interested in a transfer of knowledge, capacity building or other intangibles which do not automatically further its immediate, day-to-day interests. In those cases the expected outcome of the technical co-operation for institutional development, harder to identify and measure, is not considered equally desirable by both the donor and (one of) the counterpart organisations26.

The Dutch funded technical assistance project IDAP (Institutional Development Assistance Project/AvdH, for more information, see: chapter 4.4) was to improve regional planning methodologies and practices. However, “With ad-hoc assistance by short-term specialists projects were formulated and appraised. ......that were accepted for Dutch foreign funding and direct implementation. These projects became the visible results of the foreign team’s efforts at regional development planning. On several occasions the BAPPEDA (Provincial Development Planning Board- the local counterpart organisation/AvdH) expressed its preference for such tangible results. They clearly raised IDAP’s prestige” (Veenstra, 1989, p. 530).

In other cases, (local) expertise is scarce, not the least because local experts are not available as they do not wish to work in remote and isolated areas and/or have left for better paid employment or in other professional fields or in the capital. Then expatriate consultants are considered too well paid to completely back out of the (supposed) technical operating responsibilities of their host agency and limit themselves to the ‘luxurious’ job of strengthening capacities whereas the remaining local staff has to do the tedious and laborious -the ‘real’ work- tasks and even get paid considerably less as well! In those cases, the local recipient agencies consider the expatriate development practitioners to be paid large amounts of money to solve the problems, not to put them back onto their clients’ desks! (Porter et. al, 1991, p. 199, Hilhorst, 1992, p. 165-66).

26 In one case Dutch expatriates consultants were even accused of being “stingy” because they only produced reports and never left behind something tangible, such as a nice office building, at the end of the project period (personal experience).
3.4 Role models in transfer of knowledge

3.4.1 Expatriate and local practitioners on loyalty, voice and exit

Human behaviour is affected by the norms, values and customs collectively embraced by the actor's social environment. In addition to social class, education, generation, gender, etc., this 'collective mental programming' influences people's thinking, feeling and acting (Hofstede, 1993, p. 9)\(^{27}\). However, the degree to which these factors govern individual behaviour varies considerably and depends to a large extent on personality features as well. Yet, it is undeniable that most people from Northern Europe or America, where most development consultants originate from, have in general a different attitude towards e.g. authority, individual responsibilities and risk management than people from other cultural backgrounds. These different foreign dispositional mind-sets in turn lead to the propensity to assume certain role models which might not so easily be assumed by people who have been 'programmed' by endogenous cultural settings and/or who function under different (working) conditions. For analytical purposes we will here follow Hume (1995) in his modification of Albert Hirschman's (1970) terminology of "Loyalty" (leaving things as they are), "Voice" (modifying existing practices) and "Exit" (proposing alternative concepts and courses of action)\(^{28}\).

As mentioned above, foreign development practitioners are by and large introduced into local development processes to make up for an assumed lack of local capacity to improve certain processes\(^ {29}\). In other words: they are assumed to contribute to changes for the better. When positioning themselves somewhere on the continuum from Loyalty via Voice to Exit, foreign development practitioners have therefore functionally the propensity more to side with Voice and Exit and do (can) only seldom adhere to Loyalty. This professional inclination to resort to change is furthermore supported by the critical attitude towards status quo and authority, the willingness and luxury to be able to take risks, the desire and expectation to quickly reap the results of changes etc. which are so common and indeed are nurtured in Northern Europe and the United States. Finally, due to their temporary assignment and their expert status, foreign development practitioners can afford to articulate their critical opinion and to propose modifications, rather than sticking to or escape from an objectionable state of affairs. For even when vested local interests are at stake, they have nothing to lose by helping to bring about change.

In contrast, due to their own particular "mental programming", local counterparts are much less inclined to challenge existing practices and corresponding vested interests. Voice and Exit can be costly, in particular if you can marshal only limited influence on the bargaining and decision-making process within the organisation (Hirschman, 1970, p. 40-41). For questioning the wisdom or impact of certain practices is likely to bring the challenger into a tense relation with their agencies and more particular with certain higher ranking protagonists of those practices, who have their own interests to defend and who determine the career of their subordinates. In other

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\(^{27}\) As the five most important dimensions of national mental programming Hofstede (1993) mentions power distance (which deals with the acceptance of inequality), individualism (as opposed to collectivism), masculinity vs femininity, uncertainty avoidance and long term versus short term behaviour.

\(^{28}\) Hirschman's use of the concepts of Loyalty, Voice and Exit are used to coin the reactions of customers to changes in the quality of products and services of both commercial enterprises and non-profit organisations.

\(^{29}\) For a more functional analysis of the possible behavioural roles played by foreign and local development practitioners in development projects, see Honadle & VanSant (1985, pp. 33-40).
cases initiatives for implementing real, in contrast to formal but not enacted or enforced, political-administrative decisions aiming at change may violate other, less outspoken loyalties of a religious, ethnic or social nature (Riggs, 1970, pp. 154-58, van Dusseldorp, 1992, p. 61). This conflict avoiding behaviour leads amongst junior- and mid career officials - so different from foreign experts who will leave after completing their contracts!-, quite often to the propensity towards Loyalty as they continue to be part of their local social networks and will have to further their careers within the agency. Voice and Exit focusing on structural and far-reaching changes belong therefore more to the realm of those officials with an extensive controllable and influencable environment both in within the organisation and who can afford to ‘upset’ their own outside social networks. Yet, though these top levels take the ultimate responsibility for the changes, they are of course often fed by inputs from their Voice or Exit inclined staff.

This leaves us with an odd couple: the Voice or Exit inclined foreign development practitioner and his Loyalty focused local counterpart both facing a common task within the context of their joint, change-oriented project. Due to matters of sovereignty and exclusion of formal decision-making structures and processes, foreign development practitioners lack the political cloud which is required to enact structural changes. However, if they really want to contribute to change and action in development instead of passivity and conformism, they need to collaborate closely with their local counterparts, for “voice to function properly it is necessary that individuals possess reserves of political influence which bring into play” (Hirschman, 1970, p. 70-71). So it is that local development practitioners who are motivated to alternative options (Voice) but are restrained by being part of the system without any viable option to back out of it, can use the foreign counterpart to alert the agency to its failings without risking their own positions. The sustainability of the outcome of development projects hinges thus to a considerable extent on a well articulated foreign Voice/Exit perspective that is, more or less tacitly, backed by endogenous support for structural changes. Structural changes induced within a donor-funded project context therefore requires a (tactical) alliance between Loyalty, Voice and Exit.

3.5 Conclusion

Above, from both the inside and the outside a number of factors have been reviewed that can have a considerable impact on the final output of foreign donor assisted projects. None of these factors will be totally alien to expatriate development workers. Experienced practitioners will have developed their own way to mitigate their impact on the sustainability of their efforts to contribute in various ways to development. Yet, whatever small, these external influences do have an impact on the responses of the project teams to the challenges they meet. In other words, irrespective whether it concerns interventions at normative, strategic or operational level it are not only the changing inward- and outward looking perspectives on the development issues against

30 As a matter of fact this public adherence to existing bureaucratic norms and values but at the same time the private subscription to change is the opposite of one of Riggs’ (1970, p. 161) features of the prismatic society (public adherence to the “rational” norms of a modern, “refracted” bureaucracy but private subscription to a more subjective, particularistic set of norms vested in a rigid hierarchy).

31 Some years ago, at a seminar on local area development planning in Indonesia, an American development consultant was reprimanded by the responsible Director General for being “too Javanese”, i.e. for being too much accustomed to the local way of disguising problems through semantic constructions, and not blunt enough in the American way, “for which we have hired your services”.

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a background of (shifting) power relations between the main stakeholders in society (outlined in chapters 1 and 2) that influence local area development planning and the implementation of the resulting policies within an international development assistance context. The contents, structure and sustainability of the propagated local area development approaches are, as has been shown, in variable degrees co-determined by the organisational setting, and the staffing of these international development cooperation projects as well.
Chapter 4.
Reflections on LADPM-practices along Axis 3: staggering backwards into the future along four historical learning-by-doing loops.

4.1 Prologue: How the medium moulds a culturalist message

With specific reference to ‘sustainable’ plan formulation and implementation, it remains this study’s aim to make intelligible the common twists and turns in contingent, inward and outward looks of the set of agents concerned. - as pictured by triangular figure 2.1.1 and inner guiding grid of figure 2.1.4 in sub-section 2.1.2. Here, recalling also figures 2.2.1 and 2.2.3, our principal research questions remain to be answered: what for and how, which time- and situation-transcending values of sub-section 2.1.1., plus multi-disciplinary mixture of policy-test criteria, norms and standards have been emphasised in definite contexts, - and thus have co-determined, if not over-conditioned sometimes, the ‘natural’ LADPM-habitus. Here it is, that ‘normally’ adherents of divergent development approaches in dealing with local-level area management practices conjecture five ‘logical’ expert steps, as follows to be taken:

• Partial c.q. emotivist conceptualisation (by a substantive, procedural, contextual/institutional mix-up) of ‘really-felt’ problems, initially instigating academic scholars and professional planners near-intuitively on their rule-laden methods and techniques of inquiry; but also resulting in
• Explanatory cause-effect and incentive-response generalisations, which warrant predictions (what, if); leading up to
• Strategic goal-effect prescriptions for problem solutions as differently viewed by various rural and, mostly absent, urban stakeholders; and
• Pre-established policy-test criteria regarding impacts of socio-spatial strategies, sectoral policies, instruments, programmes and action projects to be implemented; and, ultimately
• Re-appraisal of resource-use assumptions made through process monitoring and theory-driven evaluation ex-post, based on verifiable policy-test c.q. standard-of-living indicators (Chen, 1990, pp. 39-76).

By thus tracing back in their memory, according to these five reflective steps, the built-up mélanges as laid out along this study’s axes 1 and 2, LADPM-practitioners become aware along our axis 3 of the tense shifts a \( \rightarrow \) d, as proposed by figure 4.1; that is, questioning themselves how eclectically expanding theories-in-use were willy-nilly, from axis 2 to axis 1 and vice versa, related then-and-there to their own time/space-transcending values, situation-specific norms, strategic development objectives, policy-test criteria, etc. In short, how knowledgeability was transformed anew and ‘appropriately’ linked up with life-attitudes, differently acted out in diverse professional roles from micro- to macro-levels. Figure 4.1 thus visualises how both indigenous and expatriate practitioners by leaps and bounds have been (re-)constructing and commonly internalising their synoptic prisms c.q. ‘inner-eyes’ images oscillating along and between this study’s axes 1 and 2, -while along axis 3 irresistibly still moving backwards all together though into future. In other words, how as a ‘residual’ collectivity they learned by trial and error from testing out both ex-ante and ex-post evaluation criteria in plan formulation and implementation processes. The latter have been proposed to focus alternately on sustainable states of human wealth, welfare, well-being and ultimate ‘quality of life’: indeed ‘on trek’ along a shared but long-winding route passing diverse public choice stations a \( \rightarrow \) d of practical consciousness.
2.1.1 - 3 PERSONAL LIFE-ATTITUDES OSCILLATING

2.2.1 - 3 STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO INFLUENCEABLE ENVIRONMENT

6.1 - 4 INTER-LOCKING REPERTOIRES FOR CONTROLLABLE ENVIRONMENT

*Figure 4.1* Looking back at shifts in electrically expanding insights: How to catch all sortd and conditions of LADPM-practitioners under one close-knit net of knowledgeability, tacking both normatively and stratically about study axes 1 and 2.
For, busily but disjointedly, thus combining some inner-guiding metaphors of preceding sub-section 2.0.3 and stand-in policy-test criteria of figure 2.2.1, the remote area-development flotilla has been tacking back and forth under ideological flying colours; that is, under protective but also disquieting tutelage of successively:

a. 'gainful and efficient' technological modernisation in substantive sense, and concomitant socio-cultural homogenisation towards 'progressive farmers' and industrial men of the 1950/60s; as criticised, because of resource depletion and pollution plus poverty problems arising, and thus complemented from the 1970s onwards by

b. 'fair redistribution' with/before economic growth including ILO's basic human needs (=BHN) 'from below', and 'eco-sustainable' natural resource management.

Both 'uplifting' flags were joined, because of novel but problematic information ceaselessly generated 'from inner and outer contradictions', by:

c. 'responsive' (inter-)departmental and organisational learning, shifting from single- towards multi-purpose loops during the 1980s; as complemented again, particularly after the liberation from containment but globalising Soviet-Bloc collapse, during the 1990s

d. by 'trustworthy' good governance being out for legitimacy, accountability to stakeholder groupings down- and upwards, and macro-institutional transparency being (credulously?) backed up by professional integrity.

Not at all as an aside, it is noted here that these laudable but increasingly multi-coloured approaches are necessarily urging on area-specific evaluation criteria and indicators, - while inequality and poverty per se remain to drag on, and (fundamentalist c.q. ethno-) cultural clashes threaten to downgrade an all-inclusive, genuinely diverse human future. Anyway, as conjured up by figure 4.1, in authentic self-affirmation field practitioners regularly broke away from the compact LADPM-majority as accounted below: orthodox c.q. homogenising theses ceaselessly countered by heterodox c.q. divergent antitheses in collective resource control processes, under way towards temporarily sustainable resting stations a → b → c → d.

4.1.1. The rational/utilitarian one-way route 'from peasant tot farmer': juggling between this study's axes 1 ↔ 3 during the 1960s in Sierra Leone.

Before coming to deal with socio-spatial and normative trains of thought followed in making Sierra Leone's regionalisation proposals, a preamble is to introduce the water-controlled rice farming emphasised at the end of sub-section 4.1.2. For bending eventually the 'road to progress' for the 1960s and 1970s in Sierra Leone the FAO land-use planner credulously tried to 'scale up' his inland-valley swamp schemes (Isaac, 1971, pp. 73-78); that is, as a technological innovation, from their genuine micro- towards structural macro-levels through the strategic regionalisation alternatives, – to be solely taken though as his own free-floating frame of reference around 1970 in academe. Leading up to these ambitious proposals practical fieldwork had previously been undertaken at the beginning of the 1960s as land/water surveyor in re-allotment schemes of the great Dutch river district1, as well as in irrigation projects of the Tadla plain between Fez and Marrakech in Morocco2. That is, in both cases an 'inner-eyes' capability was called upon by which, at a cool distance, individual sense could be made of contingent, local-community livelihoods, both in the Netherlands and 'overseas'. As another source of inspiration in the mid-1960s, the sociology of knowledge

2 Refer in App. 2.1.0 to: 'Ruimtelijke Ordening'.
and relativist ‘freischwebende intelligenz’ of Mannheim (1929/35) were encountered, as well as Firey (1960) with his overlapping bodies of knowledge, – thus forming an early preamble to culturalist ‘nature-cum-nurture’ designs and figures 2.1.1 to 2.1.4. In the same personal vein, a preface was written in 1965 for the last MSc. research paper on “Urban and Regional Planning in and around Calcutta, India”, as follows:

Het is in deze dagen méér dan een gewoonte geworden zich een beeld te vormen van de alledaagse werkelijkheid met behulp en door middel van natuurwetenschappelijke, economische, sociologische, psychologische en godsdienstwetenschappelijke modellen. Men spreekt dan van de homo economicus, socialis, religiosis, etc. en is zich gelukkigerwijze bewust van de deelwerkelijkheden, die men hier als gespecialiseerde wetenschapsbeoefenaars analyseert om tot een inzicht te geraken in het samenspel van onderling afhankelijke factoren, die het concrete terrein van de alledaagse verschijnselen beheersen en beïnvloeden. Men beseft tevens, dat vanuit de verschillende vakgebieden en disciplines langs deze weg een bijdrage wordt geleverd tot een abstract begrijpen en mede hierdoor mogelijkerwijze concreet verstaan3 van het geheel van de menselijke werkelijkheid.

Dit begrijpen en verstaan ook in een geïntegreerd verband tot uitdrukking te brengen in een toegepaste techniek, heeft op het gebied van de natuurwetenschappen, economie, sociologie en psychologie geleid tot een interdisciplinair comprehensieve benadering van concrete regionen van de menselijke werkelijkheid in geografisch, administratief of etnografisch afgepaalde gebieden.

Men zou hier dus kunnen spreken van een regionale wetenschap en techniek, die resp. in de behoefte aan “integratedness” voorziet, en tevens tegemoet komt aan het streven naar toepasbaarheid. Het kan ook zo worden gesteld, dat een artistiek of religieus4 beleefde besef, dat verwevenheid en interdependentie van factoren en verschijnselen binnen de menselijke werkelijkheid meent te moeten onderzichten, zich nu óók afgewogen uitdrukken wil binnen deze werkelijkheid in tastbare, zichtbare, – kortom concreet vormen.

De abstracte relaties, die langs wegen van een omschreven vorm van objectiviteit (zie ook voetnoten) worden verkregen, en als algemene wetmatigheden worden gepresenteerd, zoekt men zo te realiseren in concrete structuren van bouwwerken, landschappen, organisaties, openbare budgetteringstelsels, etc. Hier dreigt de volgens bepaalde methoden ontwikkelde beeldvorming van de alledaagse werkelijkheid prerogatief en toonaangevend te worden t.o.v. deze werkelijkheid; hier ook behoren waarschuwingssignalen op rood te worden gezet, waar immers wetenschappelijke constructies niet slechts als hulpmiddelen worden gezien om een begrijpelijke, – zij het kunstmatige orde op te bouwen temidden van de chaotische rijkdom aan verschijningsvormen van de menselijke werkelijkheid; maar abstracte relaties en modellen overmoedig worden gehanteerd als zijnde een conforme c.q. identieke, in tegenstelling tot een symbolische5 of artistieke6 weergave van deze werkelijkheid.

Aldus beschouwd is wetenschapsbeoefening een zéér kunstzinnig handwerk, dat zich gebonden weet aan regels en technieken, die slechts als middelen mogen worden gezien om tot een weergave van voorlopige en tijdelijke aard te geraken van bepaalde werkelijkheidsgebieden. Het zal duidelijk zijn, dat de esthetische waarden en levensvervulling, die gelegen kunnen zijn in de uitoefening van dit artistieke ambacht, in het geheel niet in het geding zijn. In tegendeel: om voortdurende aanmoediging vragen!

Aan de hand van boven geschetste inzichten zal daarom met het nodige voorbehoud c.q. scepticisme gebruik worden gemaakt van wetenschappelijke modellen en hun abstracte relaties om een concrete landstreek te beschrijven in India. Het betreft hier een grote metropool, Calcutta en het

5 Jung, C.G. (1937) Psychologie en godsdienst. J.J. Veen’s Uitgeversmij, Amsterdam, pp. 68, 95/96
bijbehorende achterland, zoals deze eenheden geografisch, sociologisch, economisch en administratief zouden kunnen worden onderscheiden. Dat hierdoor aan de doorleefde werkelijkheid van de ‘man in the street’ en ook aan de eigen ervaringswereld7 van wetenschapsbeoefenaars in en rond Calcutta géén recht wordt gedaan, vormt de bewust gekozen werkbasis, die ten grondslag ligt aan deze scriptie voor het ingenieursexamen in de “Stedebouwkunde” aan de Landbouwhogeschool te Wageningen. Gebruik zal worden gemaakt van wetenschappelijke begrippen en technieken om op het spoor te komen van richtlijnen, die in de betreffende landstreek kunnen leiden tot verhoging van de leefbaarheid, zoals deze wordt opgevat door de miljoenen mensen in dit gebied.

Aldus zal het wetenschappelijk handwerk in het begrijpelijk en verstaanbaar maken van een bepaald gebied van menselijke werkelijkheid de beperkingen moeten ervaren, die het zijn opgelegd juist uit hoofde van de persoonlijke keuze van het in te nemen, ‘objectieve standpunt’ t.a.v. deze werkelijkheid.

Here, just as in the ‘free-floating’ regionalisation case of Sierra Leone later on, a fundamental but risky cheque was prematurely being signed: beyond the canons of empiricism and aloof systems approaches in a cognitive sense, leading up to empathic interactionism; as well as beyond outright Marxist materialism towards the critical ‘Frankfurt’ theory of intellectual emancipation, self-determination and an open-communicative, egalitarian society for creating -optimistically- a decent livelihood for co-equal men in a moral and political sense. Not surprisingly, reference is made back as well to sub-sections 2.0.1/2 with nowadays’ culturalist conceptions of ’sustainable development’ (Todaro, 1990; Nussbaum/Sen, 1993; UNESCO, 1998); that is, the classic public choice connection proposed between inner and outer states of individual minds, by which societies at large are being capacitated to obtain a locality-specific ‘good life for man’ (: P.1). Instead of these persistent and double-barrelled views upon the rich variety of human cognition and intentions, positivist utilitarian and instrumental flags (over)ruled the waves for our LADPM-flotilla during the 1960/70s.

Nevertheless, searching at the beginning of the 1970s for a synoptic inner-mirror image, practical sense was to be made of an unranked fuzziness; that is, of afore mentioned overlapping bodies of knowledge and area-development strategies ‘from above and below’ as in an emotivist manner being linked up with haphazard combinations of fundamental but opposed values and situation-specific policy criteria: both in a substantive and procedural sense, concerning long- and/or short-term time perspectives and applicable from macro- to micro-levels of territorial administrations. So, as made clear in sub-section 2.1.1, basic food for LADPM-thought was provided by constructing a fourfold reconciliatory middle-ground of intersubjectively agreed rationalities 1 → 4; that is, of complementary paradigms c.q. collectively shared belief systems which ‘for the time being’ co-determined predominant types of resource management, service delivery and information processing, – apparently at work simultaneously at the back of planners’ minds during the past five decades.

The overriding ‘sustainability’ images by which development practitioners have collectively been living, are thus to be sketched and authenticated by case-studies, as enclosed in following sections 4.1 to 4.5 and commented on as follows. To start with, directly after World War II ‘hard-technological’ repertoires were principally followed in practice: in line with rival schools of area development thought of sub-section 2.2.1. While during the 1950/60’s full-heartedly (but credulously) living up to ancient enlightenment ideals of ‘good life for man, and a perfectible egalitarian society’, this primary road ‘paved with good intentions’ (Porter et al. 1991; Hilhorst, 1990, Table 7.1

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and pp. 213-258) regarding backward area planning, was in a tragic sense equally mal-
constructed indeed 'from overseas and from above' – as demonstrated by the FAO land
use planner/author of following sub-section 4.1.2. on Sierra Leone. For natural resource
and agricultural land use surveys as well as related plan formulation and implementa-
tion practices of civil and agricultural engineers were moulded by the grand intel-
lectual, bio-synthetic templet of comprehensive river-basin approaches (Friedmann,
1966/73; Friedmann/Weaver, 1979); as well as they were driven by functionally inte-
grated area development models (Mosher/Weitz, 1969/79; Johnson, 1970, chs. 6-9).

Accordingly, at the boxed-in end of following sub-section 4.1.2. traditional subsistence
peasants in Sierra Leone have been conceived as, and urged to transform their behav-
iiour into that of modern cash-crop farmers through technological innovations around
hierarchically ordered central places, -just like thrifty honeybees grouped around
omniscient queens in their space-bound beehives: metaphorically speaking, in
substantive sense. In the same view, regarding 'residual' backward areas town-and-country
planners and regionalists shared the common guiding principles of nation-wide
self-sustaining economic growth. However, as dealt with already in sections 2.2.1-3,
rival paradigms and related rural policy-test criteria contentiously tried as well to
rightly stand in on deck of our LADPM-flotilla (Firey, 1960; Anker/Griffin, 1973/74;
Moris, 1981, Table 7.1: technocratic, reformists and radical strategies).

All in all, -as if during the 1950/60s outsiders were unconscious of tragic myths
about Icarus' over-ambitious flight into the sky towards the sun, or Prometheus'
unbound betterment of mankind-, in next sub-section 4.1.2. on Sierra Leone state
bureaucrats were notified 'from overseas' as follows. That is, notwithstanding ethno-
clientelism and regional polarisation between North, East and South writ large
(Hayward and Kandeh, 1987, pp. 44-50) to let their decision making be guided by two
proposed nation-wide infrastructure development corridors, as spelled and mapped
out in order to arrest the splitting-up process of feuding elites. This 1969/70-text, from
our study axis 1 already in its 'final regionalisation notes' animated by explicity man-
centered normative thinking, cautiously avoided a radical materialistic 'armchair'
stand. For, based on its preceding a long-winding historical examination anyhow, self-
reflective doubts were sounded of risky (politico-administrative, ethno-institutional
and budgetary foreign-exchange) dissonances in disfavour of the proposed régionali-
sation scheme: "blank cheques being signed". Refer particularly to caveats put forward in
discussing figures 2.2.4/5.

Particularly helpful, in writing these critical notes of the 'long durée', have been political scientists
as well as public finance and administration specialists like Riggs with his transitional 'Sala-model
(1961) followed by Kilson (1966, chs 14-17) and nowadays' Bayart (1989/93) with reciprocal 'big-
belly' élite accommodation; refer to the contractual networks of interpersonal cooperation, compe-
tition, bargaining, cooptation, coalition and brokerage. So, Dror (1968) could not go unnoticed; nei-
ther Myrdal (1968) with his ‘third world of soft-state planning' and Waterston (1965/69) with his
seven operational planning steps 'from below', as followed up by Caïden and Wildavsky (1974, chs.
1, 6/7 and 9/10); all learned experts taking their own behaviouristic, multi-disciplinary or ideal-typ-
ical, normative stands on commonly envisaged dilemmas along our study axes 2 and 3, –as excerpt-
ed from Landsberger (1970) in preceding sub-section 2.2.1.

A complete list with references is found in Veenstra, J. 1969. The relevance of the Centre-
Periphery model for more than 150 years of pre-industrial developments in Sierra Leone, West
Africa: towards a regionalisation of national development efforts. Research paper with maps and
4.1.2. Historical notes for an eventual regionalization of national development efforts in Sierra Leone, West Africa.

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Prologue
This is a study of the spatial consequences of socio-economic and politico-administrative changes during more than 150 years of pre-industrial developments in Sierra Leone, and is presented with the purpose of drawing up both inter- and intra-regional development plans and strategies. During the various phases of pre-colonial settlement, an undifferentiated settlement and land-use pattern seems to have been characteristic between A.D. 1400 and 1600, while from about 1600 to 1900 stockaded war-towns grew up dominating within their own areas of influence, and situated in the hinterlands of European coastal trading posts. By the 1920s, Freetown was becoming the central place and port of a developing system of urban centres superimposed upon the crystallized, but rural war-town pattern. This polarization depends on stakeholder decisions made by traders, administrators, European commercial firms, and traditional and new élites, i.e. on commerce, subsistence and cash-crop farming, exploitation of minerals, and politico-administrative changes under British colonial rule and since independence in 1961. A subdivision of Sierra Leone is finally proposed into three main regions and nine subregions, each with its own development strategy.

The first phases in the peopling of Sierra Leone: A.D. 1400-1900

Friedmann (1966, p. 8), in sketching a simple model of how the economic space of a nation may be changed over several historical transitions, starts off by assuming an economically and socio-politically empty space to be colonized from the colonial mother country overseas. The oral traditions, however, of most of the fourteen tribes inhabiting Sierra Leone today suggest a pre-colonial immigration into the forested coastal areas, west and southwest of the Guinea Plateau of which the Koinadugu and Kono Plateaux form a part (Clarke et al., 1966). Only the Limba and Sherbro would seem to have been established in the country before A.D. 1400. Most of the other tribal groups came in a series of immigrative waves between the 16th and the end of the 18th century, probably pressed into these largely uninhabited areas as refugees from the political upheavals which periodically shook the grassland empires of western Sudan. The first immigrants are said to have come to Sierra Leone during the 15th century as hunters and collectors rather than as agriculturalists in the tropical rain forests, though they may have practised shifting cultivation incidentally when circumstances allowed. These early immigrants arrived in small bands hunting wild animals (elephants and bush cows), which, in contrast to game conditions today, were in plentiful supply. The small bands of hunters, little larger than the immediate family, used to set a pattern of life which was suited to the natural environment and which is still followed in some parts of Sierra Leone today, where trapping game and wild animals and fishing in the inland swamps and rivers is a less laborious way of earning a living than is cultivation.

One may suppose, however, that in this early period (A.D. 1400-1600) some temporary settlements had been developed into permanent sites, consequently attracting more outsiders so that more huts were set up, and that the settlement grew into a large village under the leadership of the original, would-be successful pioneer/hunter and his kin. As the size of the habitation increased, so did the need for fresh sources of food; and because hunting was the main occupation, expansion was favoured, for young men would venture off on their own and find fresh sites in the vicinity. But they retained their connection with the parent village, visiting it from 

\textit{time to time to pay respects and homage}. Thus, the picture emerges of numerous parent villages – each with its outlying hamlets, subsisting on a combination of hunting and growing a few grains of supplementary food-, which not only preceded in time but also made possible the second and more militant phase (A.D. 1600-1900) in the peopling of Sierra Leone.

For in fact each new wave of immigrants caused small-scale wars and the frequent alignment and re-alignment of tribal areas. Moslem tribes from the northern guinea savannah belt seem, thereby, to have taught the weaker tribes coming from southern directions how to enclose already existing villages with palisades, how to become overlords, in short, the needs of social security and defence which are most responsible for fixing settlements at one site for long periods. As more and more immigrant groups arrived, a transition was subsequently made from temporary shelters of hunters at the one extreme to the fixed location, bush-fallowing agriculture at the other extreme, – the latter being the common system for Sierra Leone today.

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From accounts of 19th-century explorers it is clear then, firstly, that the local chieftain and his company of warriors lodged within stockaded war-towns. Intertribal wars, caused by disputes over boundaries, resulted in regular killing of original, local leaders who were not able to withstand the invaders. Chiefs derived their power and authority mainly from their own prowess and that of their followers and warriors. Thereby it appears consequently as if relatively large hegemonies or confederacies grew up in certain regions under the general leadership and administrative control of a single, dominant chief whom the local rulers acknowledged as their overlord on socio-religious grounds or on agreement of reciprocal, military assistance in case of war.

Secondly, a tendency was observed to over-farm lands in the immediate vicinity of war-towns and their outposts, short fallows producing soil deterioration and food shortages. Competition for land and the fears of attack meant, that stockaded villages frequently exceeded by far the optimal size (about 500 inhabitants) governed by factors such as the quality of the land, the period of fallow necessary for soil regeneration, and the distance which farmers were willing to walk to the furthest farmed fields. Thirdly, an increase in the practice of slavery was noticed in order to staff satellites which were as a rule under the direct control of chiefs' followers, but still too far from the parent village to be considered by common people as being safe. Slavery, – as an outcome of and reason for inter-tribal wars, – made the cultivation of land feasible on a far larger scale than was likely by smaller groups of freemen whose needs could be satisfied by less arduous methods than were required in upland rice farming which consequently became the predominant form of agricultural industry.

Last but not least, slaves were also increasingly used as one of the few "currencies" of universal value in exchanges for salt, tobacco, metalware, textiles and liquor with European slave traders entering Sierra Leone's interior from the coastal trading posts. The principal developments during the 18th and 19th centuries along Sierra Leone's Atlantic coast were entirely tied up with the growth and decline of various European trading posts built initially as large slave and pirate settlements in the mouths and estuaries of creeks and rivers on defensible island sites, or under protection of powerful, locally dominant chiefs. In the later 19th century trade was vigorous and complexly organized. Northern trade in particular had a distinctive character: caravans brought gold, ivory, rubber, hides and other goods from the Fouta Djallon, Kankan and
Sangara in the Sudan, mostly for export through Freetown. War-towns where caravans gathered or where goods were exchanged, like Falaba, Kabala and Bumban, thrived on trade, their chiefs gaining prominence and strength. A regional trade also existed, and local people carried cloth, kolanuts and salt north on the long-distance routes leading into the Moslem savannah belt, or came down to the coast with cattle, leather goods or locally woven cloth. Thereby it was estimated about 1840 that some 15,000 slaves were shipped annually to America from numerous Spanish trading posts on the small islands dotting the creeks and adjacent waters of the Sherbro river’s estuary, and from Turner’s Peninsula.

The rise of Freetown to primate city

The quest for a perfect society which dominated the thinking of English humanitarians of the Enlightenment of 18th-century Europe, led these Englishmen in the 1770s and 1780s to strive not only for Parliamentary reforms, establishment of schools for the working classes, etc. at home, but also to look abroad for abolishing the slave trade and making plans by which ‘Africa would produce both wealth and happiness for mankind’.

Thus, the private initiative of a certain Granville Sharp and his humanitarian supporters seeking to create in the West African colony of future Sierra Leone a living memorial to their own uplifting values, led 300 to 400 free Black Poors who felt themselves lost in London, about 1200 former American slaves of African descent from Nova Scotia, North America, and about 600 members of an Afro-West Indian community which originated in Jamaica, to settle in the newly founded and planned, urban settlement of Freetown during the 1780s and 1790s. In 1808 Freetown and surrounding areas on the south end of the Sierra Leone river’s estuary became the Crown Colony of Sierra Leone for which the British Crown assumed full responsibility, while in 1807 the slave trade abolition bill was approved by the British Parliament providing for the suppression of the slave trade, the capture of slaving vessels on the high seas and the enlistment or apprenticeship of the recaptured slaves in the city of Freetown or in nearby rural villages.

The picture of Freetown in 1807, then, is that of a small community of about 2000 negro settlers, living a westernized life as near as possible to what their humanitarian benefactors expected of them. The Christian church organizations were centres of social life, providing a field of activities in which the free negro settler could acquire status and exercise leadership. These settlers mingled socially neither with the indigenous Africans around them, with whom they felt they had nothing in common, nor initially with the recaptured slaves disembarking in Freetown. This self-consciousness of negro settlers as being alien to all around them and the corresponding assumption that their way of life was to be copied in its westernized standards, was enhanced by the fact that they had the full backing of the British colonial administration.

Government expenditures on construction of Freetown’s roads, harbour works, warehouses, etc., and on administration to the extent that they were spent in winning tribal chiefs for maintaining order in their spheres of influence on the coast and in the interior, thus increasing the security of rivers, estuaries and Freetown’s hinterland, were more conducive during following decades to the promotion of trade than of agriculture. Moreover, the agriculturalists under the recaptives and negro settlers used the land allotted to them by the British Government for shifting cultivation, which led automatically to soil erosion of the lateritic soils on the steep slopes of the mountainous Peninsula of Freetown. Trials of large-scale plantation agriculture around Freetown failed during the whole 19th century, while the lure of slave trade caused an indifference to agriculture. Finally, the 19th century laissez-faire philosophy helped to arrest agricultural development in the Sierra Leone Colony, but favoured trade and commerce.
Thus by the 1840s commerce was basic to the Freetown city and its pattern of employment, while trade rose sharply in volume and value in the 1850s and 1860s with palm oil and kernels, kolanuts, groundnuts, gold and hides comprising the principal exports in substitution for slaves. The Freetown city population grew from about 2,000 inhabitants in 1807 to 20,000 in the 1860s and 1870s, while in these latter years the Crown Colony as a whole amounted to 40,000 or 50,000 inhabitants increasing to about 70,000 around 1890.

Entrepôt and exchange functions were also performed, however, by private European trading posts along rivers and estuaries where in the early 19th century exports and imports could be stored and exchanged as efficiently as in Freetown. Bonthe, for instance, with a population of about 4,000 inhabitants, still handled about 67% of the Sierra Leone palm kernel exports in 1899 because of its favourable location in the centre of the Sherbro river transport network and near a rich palm-producing area south of Freetown. The groundnut and rubber areas behind Conakry in what is now Guinea stimulated the further development of this rival port north of Freetown. Nevertheless, the early advantage of accommodating larger ships because of the physical suitability of its harbour, the special warehousing and wholesaling arrangements prevailing in Freetown because of, among other things, British government interference, and institutional factors worked effectively in drawing trade to Freetown, illustrating how this city in particular helped to co-ordinate and augment trade throughout its vast hinterland in the 19th century. The long-distance traders rarely sold their high-value goods like gold, ivory and hides outside Freetown because this trade required specialized knowledge of quality and of European markets, and so a few large merchants monopolized buying; these specialized merchants were also among the few importers of such commodities as guns and powder, prized highly by long-distance traders. The big Freetown-based merchants, moreover, built ties with kings, chiefs and others who traded on the coast, and sought even through representatives in the Legislative Council to use British Government resources to facilitate trade through missions to the interior, and fêtes and stipends for chiefs who co-operated in trade. Therefore, as the 19th century advanced, Freetown came to be considered by the indigenous African governments as the political and economic seat of a kingdom, and this by both smaller states and powerful kingdoms as distant as the Fouta Djallon in nowadays Guinea. Finally, besides integrating through commerce the different socio-political and economic systems in the war-like interior, Freetown further polarized trade through its growing non-farming population for which rice in particular was brought from coastal areas far to the north and south of Freetown, thus helping to link them with the city.

The integration and polarization processes set in motion throughout Freetown's vast hinterland were disturbed, however, by the competitive, colonialist territorial claims of the British and French governments lodging in Freetown and Conakry respectively. This led in the 1880s and 1890s to subsequent diversion of the high-value, long-distance goods movements away from Freetown, to the British government establishing in 1896 the Sierra Leone Protectorate in order to determine politico-administratively its legal area of tariffs and trade, and to government rail building in this area between 1895 and 1916. This, in turn, led big European companies, and Lebanese and Indian entrepreneurs to gradually take over the trading functions performed along the coast and in the interior by independent Europeans, and by Creole middlemen who formed (as an amalgamation of descendants of the early negro settlers and liberated, recaptured slaves) the westernized, black bourgeoisie originating in Freetown.

Lack of commercial capital, in the first instance, prevented the Creole and European, Freetown-based businesses from achieving returns on large-scale operations that gave the big European companies increased internal economies. It also made it difficult for these small and medium businesses to take full advantage of external economies pro-
vided by rail and steamship transport, and by financial and other service agencies
becoming increasingly grouped in Freetown.

For almost as quickly as the rail moved to a town, so did the Lebanese traders and
European companies. By the 1920s, eight of the big businesses were represented by
branches at Blama, seven at Pendembu, six at Segbwema, and three or four at several
other commercial and administrative centres like Makeni, which four were the most
important railway stations for palm kernel traffic in those days. The closer connection
with Europe meant finally that Freetown became a centre of decision-making on place­
ment of funds allocated by international companies, and the British government to
their head offices in Freetown, and to branches and departments in the provinces
along the railway line and in the rivers' estuaries. Thus, by the 1920s Freetown was
becoming the central place in a developing system of railway and river towns,
super­imposed upon the crystallized pattern of numerous war-towns.

In addition, the revolutionary development of minerals, mainly diamonds, iron ore
and bauxite, since the 1930s have also to be mentioned, as well as the booming road
transport developments, and government introduction of new cash crops such as
cacao and coffee, which altogether with the concentration of educational facilities in
the southern part of nowadays Sierra Leone have caused a strongly felt inequality
between the southern Mende and northern Temne tribal areas.

The rise to authoritarian dominance of traditional and new élites alike

The vigour of the French encircling movements pressing into the interior from the
Conakry base and threatening to interfere with the inland markets of the Sierra Leone
Crown Colony in the same way as happened to the Gambia in what is now Senegal,
forced the British colonial government to proclaim the Protectorate over the whole of
Freetown's hinterland in 1896, and this forms the independent state of Sierra Leone
today. Five administrative districts were initially provided for under the jurisdiction
of five District Commissioners to be seated in towns which were traditionally the stockad­
ed strongholds of leading chiefs. These war-towns, such as Bandajuma, Karene, Falaba
and Panguma, already served before 1896 as major police centres on frontier roads
('pathways mainly for the use of hammocks') established by the British government.
These war-towns functioned, then, as bases for British control over surrounding areas,
i.e. the numerous chiefdoms of paramount chiefs and their confederacies. Military
enforcement of the Protectorate Ordinance of 1896 stipulating suppression of slave-deal­
ing, collection of a house tax, British arbitration in chiefs' local disputes, etc. was need­
ed after the House Tax War or Mende Rising of 1898, however, but did not change the
pre-Protectorate viewpoint of the British colonial government, taking as axiomatic the
need to maintain the chiefs' authority. In fact the British conception of indirect rule,
introduced officially in 1937 in order to transform the earlier Protectorate administra­
tion which was officially deemed to be geared too much to the preservation of only law and
order, would otherwise have been rather meaningless as a theory of colonial local admin­
istration supposed to fit, through the chiefs, novel distributive tasks such as provision of
goods and services to the rural and urban populace, construction of roads, schools, etc.

This first transformation in Protectorate administration merely increased the
already existing points of friction between chiefs and the rural masses, and conse­
quently enabled the chiefs even to modernize a fair part of their sources of authority
and power. Chiefs pursued their own wealth, namely through forced or customary
labour employed on their own land, through illicit taxes and extravagant administra­
tive expenditures, and in this way provided themselves with modern houses, automo­
biles, etc., as was officially reported in consequence of the inquiry into peasant tax
riots of 1955-56. Thus, despite the traditional, rural environment wherein chiefs per­
formed their ruling functions backed by the British colonial government, their
incomes and 'kleptocratic' style of life were to have much in common with those of the modern urban groups; this turned out to be of significance for the 1950s when the Protectorate chiefs joined the newly educated Protectorate elite in forming the Sierra Leone People's Party, which under the leadership of Dr Milton Margai became, after independence in 1961, the dominating political party until the general elections of March 1967 when the opposition party under the leadership of Mr Siaka Stevens took over after a military interregnum of 13 months in 1967-68. The consequences of a fusion of chiefs and the new Protectorate elite, mainly civil servants of direct kin of these chiefs, could be foreseen already in the 1950s: ruling families' domination in Sierra Leone's socio-political and economic development for years to be followed through an anxiously pursued, authoritarian single-party regime, constituting after independence a dictatorship of the Protectorate bourgeoisie which had replaced the privileged Creole bourgeoisie of the 19th-century Crown Colony of Freetown's Peninsula.

Next, it should be remembered that the British rulers, misguided by the chiefs' role in a socio-religious sense, recognized for politico-administrative conveniences that titles to land were implicitly vested in the rural community as a whole through the paramount chief or certain large family groups acting as custodians. In this way they favoured the chiefs and ruling families in an economic sense although in the traditional system the latter did not differ in this respect from the non-ruling families.

For as an outcome of the settlement phases between A.D. 1400 and 1900 ownership of land could originally be claimed only by the descendants of the hunters, warrior chiefs and warriors who first settled the country, and represent the nowadays ruling chiefs and families. Subsequent settlers, however, who were allotted land which had previously been brought under cultivation already by the original land owners, were considered to be under the protection of their landlord. Their right to occupy and use such land became progressively greater, the longer they remained with him. This second class of subsequent settlers and strangers, usually from other parts of the country, can be called land holders. As a general rule, the living memory is the only way of substantiating claims of land owners and land holders, whose latter rights are limited to personal occupation and use, i.e. usufruct of the soil.

The slaves of the second, war-like settlement phase were allocated land to cultivate on their own account and for their sustenance. It was recognized that their tenure, i.e. their right to use a part of their master's land, was secure as long as they satisfied his requirements. The domestic slaves were to become increasingly considered as land holders after the proclamation of the Protectorate in 1896. The tendency is finally observable for the land holders to merge into the propertied class of land owners as time goes by.

The land tenure system as it exists today can therefore also be described as follows. Land rights are held by corporate family groups and are vested in the person of the heads of these groups, the symbolic and religious representation of these family heads' position being the single ancestral shrine sited in the compound of the head of the family, - often in the township around which family lands and villages are clustered. The smallest areas to which land rights do refer, are commonly those of an individual man with his wife and children, whereas the largest areas sometimes comprise of several square miles and several villages around a town of a ruling family. In the latter case, individual family heads maintain virtually autonomous rights over their land within the total corporate family group, but these rights cannot be abinated out of the family group. Nevertheless within family lands a large number of families occupying and using land (originally land holders) do so by right of marriage relationships to the central patrilineal family, for instance, or simply as strangers and guests, but this status also is commonly strengthened by subsequent marriage ties. It was hinted at already that in the traditional situation rights to land originally derived from marriage ties developed through time into autonomous patrilineal rights, and that this process was essential to
a viable disposition of land and human resources in a system where rights were subject to the rise and decline of power over people and areas. Thus rights of chiefs and chiefdom tribal authorities, more than fully recognized by the British colonial authorities in the early 20th century for politico-administrative purposes were those of a sanctioning, legal and political authority. In particular, then, young men are discouraged today from working the land under the prevailing rigid and authoritarian conditions, while the distributive functions of an independent government such as the launching of land improvement and mechanical rice cultivation schemes, even in a would-be co-operative setting, are hampered by the interests of local leaders in land, supported as these are by present party politics overriding administrators and technical officers.

Finally, due to the concentration of large-scale capital and managerial skill in the hands of expatriate, commercial and mining companies, the traditional and new elites are by their 'straddling' life style predestined to turn to the government's human and material, but especially financial resources for both entrepreneurial and professional developments in their own interest. But government resources are limited, resulting in the use of corrupt methods to secure them by and in favour of the very politico-administrative élites and their allies which are seemingly still obligated to respect the claims of corporate family members in less favoured positions, these claims being grounded in socio-religious value patterns honoured by the tradition-bound masses in rural and urban areas alike.

Notes on eventual regionalization of Sierra Leone (see table 4.1.2 and maps).

First of all, an hierarchic order of central places is to be observed today in Sierra Leone wherein at the one extreme numerous parent villages (201 to 500 inhabitants), and towns functioning as headquarters of (sections of) chiefdoms (501 to 1000 inhabitants) play an important role in the rural scene with its socio-political and economic micro-environments because of ruling and non-ruling families' interests in cash crop lands surrounding old ancestral towns and villages. At the other extreme, Freetown forms the primate city in the urban scene, and is the socio-economic and politico-administrative centre of final decision-making for Sierra Leone as a whole, around which Makeni in the north, Koidu-Yengema in the east, Kenema in the southeast, and Bo in the south are grouped as the regional, administrative, economic and service centres. Thus, because of common interests of numerous rural central places – or poles of influence and dominance – in agricultural activities, a relatively homogeneous socio-political space is observable in Sierra Leone with a log-normal town size distribution and Freetown as the seat of central government; the former space is linked through party politics with the administrative and economic spaces with a primate city size distribution and Freetown as the very primate city (Berry, 1961).

Next, whereas the socialistic, revolutionary attack on this dualistic, institutional framework as this occurred during the 1950s in Guinea, bordering on Sierra Leone – remains to be evaluated, this radical solution is to be kept in mind only as a last recourse.

Thus the viewpoint is taken here that evolutionary approaches accounting for the dominant position of traditional and new élites alike will fruitfully contribute to socio-economic and political developments in Sierra Leone. Thereby, a short-term developmental view (5 to 7 years) is to be suggested instead of long-term perspectives because structural changes have nevertheless to be the target, and the results of the general elections of 1967, i.e. the apparent defeat of the Sierra Leone People's Party, may form an historical turning- and starting-point hereto. Sierra Leone seems to be dependent, then, for development purposes to a large extent and for the time being on the dominant, private entrepreneurs and government administrators who are to be given incentives for investments and efforts focusing on exploitation of renewable resources by the central government, i.e. on the promotion of agriculture, and of
agrobased, small-scale processing and manufacturing enterprises – and not as usual on the construction of houses, prestige, etc. Although trickling-down effects in favour of commoners in urban and rural areas will be consequently few, the central government may be faced with a splitting-up process of the powerfull elites in antagonistic blocks (divide and rule) because of or through its regional development policies.

For these reasons the regions and sub-regions presently to be defined in Sierra Leone can be considered as tools in the hands of central and regional government authorities for playing the decision-making game on investments for societal purposes through a given set of priorities. Therefore, it is proposed herewith to place on top of the list with national priorities the overall integration of various regional sub-systems into the national system through an economic policy aiming at import substitution, diversification of exports and domestic production, and at concentration of applied research, executive services’ efforts, qualified personnel and funds on these sub-systems where investments could be expected to yield the highest returns as well as trickling-down or spread effects in favour of regional sub-systems not directly concentrated on. Herewith are taken into account – leaving attempts to international regionalization out of considerations – the fact that since 1966-67 the Sierra Leone Government has been launching programmes:

- regarding changes in its own fiscal policy, reorganization of the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board, changes in prices of agricultural exports, in monetary policies of the Bank of Sierra Leone, and ultimately changes towards nationalizing expatriate mining companies taking effect from March 1970.
- regarding infrastructural investments, in cooperation with o.a. the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, in the national road transport system, in an hydro-electric installation near the waterfalls of Bumbuna – in short, seemingly for purposes of development of the Kono District.
- regarding phasing out the government railway where, due to road transport competition and discrepancies between the total annual volumes of up – and down – traffic freight, expenditures have been annually exceeding revenues as a rule since 1927 already.

In addition, the decreases and increases in importance have to be mentioned of (un)-processed agricultural produce, and diamonds and iron ore in Sierra Leone’s export basket: proportional change in percentages of the value of domestic exports from 29%, and 39% and 31% in 1938, to 16%, and 62% and 21% in 1965, respectively.

It is noteworthy that Freetown today handles mainly the imported, relatively high-value manufactured goods (merchandize like building materials, petroleum, etc., but also rice and other provisions), while specialized mineral ports like Pepel in the Sierra Leone river’s estuary, and Point Sam in the southern Sherbro river transport system handle the bulk of low-value, mineral exports.

This leads the author to suggest a development corridor to be aimed at between two core regions (Friedmann, 1965, p. 41-43), between the northwestern core region of the Freetown and Bullom Peninsulas and of the coastal rice growing areas along the lower courses of the northern Scarcies rivers on the one hand, and the herewith proposed core region of the Kono District in the east, on the other hand. By suggesting this, it is realized that a blank cheque is in fact being signed for future developments to be strongly tied up with the Tonkolili road under construction between Magburaka, Matotaka and the mechanized diamond mining areas of Kono District. But also questionable is the availability of private capital for investments in Sierra Leone, instead of sending savings abroad, by Lebanese traders and diamond-based foreign enterprises, as are the special qualities and skills of the tribally distinctive, Kono labour force trained on the spot in various industries and trades, but well aware, too, of its macro-economically strategic position in and around the diamond mining areas.
It might be obvious, nevertheless, that for the time being national development efforts are most likely to be concentrated spatially along two axes: the existing Freetown – Bo – (Kenema) highway connection to the south, and the Freetown – Lunsar (Makeni) – Magburaka – Kono highway connection to the east. And, indeed, there are historically explainable, socio-economic and politico-administrative forces at work conditioning in the short run nothing else than a spatial development model for Sierra Leone clearly and strongly centered on the Freetown, and southern, diamond mining and cash-crop growing, Mende areas alone. These forces are not easily to be counterbalanced by those being felt and heard outside Freetown in the non-Mende, Northern and Eastern Provinces in particular, but which may be reinforced and even reconciled in a politically and socio-economically controlled manner by consciously handling the alternative development model suggested by the author. In case the Northern Region presently to be defined might be deemed to have attracted too little attention in this alternative model, – leaving aside the functions to be performed herein by the Eastern and Southern Regions, – other alternative, spatial development models and, consequently, regional development strategies should be conceived as guidelines for economic and social investments from private and public sources.

Finally, it is thought to be consistent with aforemade remarks, that in all the nine sub-regional units and three regional sub-systems hereafter to be defined the existing and/or future cash crop patterns are focused on, and thus neither the agricultural subsistence sector of Sierra Leone’s economy, nor the government sector which actually depends for its revenues upon the economically productive capacities of either the cash-cropping peasantry, or expatriate capital and entrepreneurs involved in mining and commercial activities.

Table 4.1.2 Proposal for eventual regionalisation of Sierra Leone (Veenstra, 1969); see attached map with impression of decentralised, spatially polarised, development model and compare with figure 2.2.3 plus boxed example as ‘inner guide’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and type of Sub-regions</th>
<th>Name of corresponding district or province</th>
<th>Soil province</th>
<th>Hierarchical order of central places, based mainly on functions performed (Cloke, 1986)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Freetown Urban Area</td>
<td>North-western part of Western Area</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>1st rank: (more than 100,000 inh.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freetown</td>
<td>C, E, F, G, H</td>
<td>2nd rank: (2,001 - 10,000 inh.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Western Area</td>
<td></td>
<td>3rd rank: (4,001 - 2,000 inh.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3 Eastern region

4.3.1 Eastern region

4.3.2 Eastern region

4.4 Southern region

4.4.1 Southern region

4.4.2 Southern region

4.5 Upward-transitional region of Pujehun, Boishe and Moyamba

Bo, (Kono District)

Bo, (Kono District)

Pujehun, Boishe and Moyamba

Pujehun, Boishe and Moyamba

Njala, Talarm, Ruffin, etc.

Njala, Talarm, Ruffin, etc.

Njala, Talarm, Ruffin, etc.

Njala, Talarm, Ruffin, etc.

Njala, Talarm, Ruffin, etc.

Njala, Talarm, Ruffin, etc.

Njala, Talarm, Ruffin, etc.

Njala, Talarm, Ruffin, etc.

Njala, Talarm, Ruffin, etc.
Further qualifications, and development strategies (Dijkerman, 1967; numbers and capital letters correspond with table and maps 1+2)

Ad 43.1. Area unchallenged in its primacy in all aspects of Sierra Leone's life: capital city, chief port, chief area of commercial, industrial, administrative, service and political activities, highest degree of urbanization, etc.

Ad 43.2a. Core region suggested in view of flourishing trade from cluster of urban population along lower courses of Scarcies, and from Bullom Peninsula with Freetown Urban Area, in locally produced rice, vegetables, cassava, pineapples, citrus, poultry products, pork, etc., and in fish of a pelagic, estuarine and inshore character. Vegetable growing only to be encouraged in some valleys of Freetown's Peninsular Mountains, and touristic potential to be developed of this Peninsula's beaches. Reclamation works to be undertaken along Scarcies in mangrove swamps for rice cultivation. Citrus, bananas and pineapples, rice and vegetables, and coconuts and cassava to be grown on the uplands, in the inland valley swamps, and on the beach ridges respectively. The urban cluster of population around Mambolo and Rokupr to be looked at as to be promoted in rank, and made more independent of the dominant Freetown Urban Area, because of its mainly agro-based industrial, and politically explosive potentials.

Ad 43.2b. Spread effects of the Marampa/Lunsar iron ore mine are known to have faded out today since exploitation started in the 1930s. Permanent land use patterns to be introduced in the eastern parts of this agricultural frontier region: tree crops to be grown on upland slopes, rotational farming on riverain terraces, and animal-drawn rice cultivation in inland valley swamps. Makeni possibly to be indicated as future agro-based industrial centre in addition to its commercial, administrative and service functions. Swamps and river terraces of boli-lands west of Makeni to be predestined as future national 'granary' (rice, groundnuts, cassava, sweet potatoes, beans, etc.) through adequate fertilizing, mechanical ploughing, and water control measures. Makeni possibly to be indicated as future agro-based industrial centre in addition to its commercial, administrative and service functions. Swamps and river terraces of boli-lands west of Makeni to be predestined as future national 'granary' (rice, groundnuts, cassava, sweet potatoes, beans, etc.) through adequate fertilizing, mechanical ploughing, and water control measures.

Ad 43.2c. Bearing in mind its inaccessibility, this peripheral region deserves special attention, not in the last place for strategic reasons: situated along the national northern and northeastern borders with Guinea, and diamonds and cattle having been smuggled over these borders for decades already. Promotion of mechanical rice cultivation, road construction, animal husbandry, citrus, vegetable and tobacco growing, etc. to be taken in hand in an integrative way.

Ad 43.3a. Along the proposed Kamaron-Worodu road connection are to be supplied from sub-region 4.3.2.c (partly irrigated, short-duration) cotton, citrus, and jute substitutes for purposes of small-scale processing, canning and manufacturing in the absolutely to be improved, urban environment of Koidu-Yengema area. As growing consumer market this area will need poultry and livestock products, rice, groundnuts, vegetables, etc. produced in 4.3.2.b/c, 4.3.3.b/c. and its direct surroundings.

Ad 43.3b/c. Development of labour-intensive type of water-controlled, inland valley swamp farming (rice, vegetables, maize) to be stimulated in Kailahun and Kenema Districts, and improvements in upland cocoa, coffee, oil-palm and timber production, in order to bring about more stable land use and employment patterns, as well as resettlement of Kissy families from their own, densely populated, tribal areas to other sub-regions of Sierra Leone. In addition to the Forest Industries' factory in Kenema city agro-based industries are to be encouraged, such as an instant coffee factory.

Ad 43.4a. Due to native diamond digging, mechanized foreign diamond mining and cash crop developments in Eastern Region during 1940s and 1950s, Bo core region lost ground in a socio-economic sense. Bo city's urban functions in particular, initiated
during the early days of British colonial Protectorate, are to be reinforced by including
native diamond digging chiefdoms west of Nimini and Kambui Hills within the sphere
of influence of Bo city. Thus, attention is to be paid to extension of a feeder road to
Njala-Kamboya up to Sewa river for connection with Boajibu, and to upland cocoa, cof­
fee and oil-palm cultivation in the Bo District as a whole, as well as to water-controlled,
mixed swamp farming (combination of small-scale pig raising, poultry farming, and rice,
vegetable and maize growing) based on good water resources at the western foots of
Kangari Hills along the road Bo-Yele.

Ad 4.3.4.b. Besides integrated policies for expansion of water-controlled, inland valley swamp
rice and vegetable farming area, and of suitable upland areas under rubber, oil-palm
and coffee cultivation, or forest reserves, a development programme is needed for the
Pujehun District; this is needed to tackle in a strip of 10 to 20 miles wide and running
parallel to the Atlantic coast all technicalities of empoldering, reclamation works,
dikes, and of waterways for transport of agricultural produce on one side, and of
mechanical rice cultivation, sugar-cane, banana, pineapple, citrus and coconut growing
on the other side. For piassava from Pujehun and Bonthe Districts is to be struck
from the list with Sierra Leone's exports as a vegetable fibre, so that through import
substitution sugar-cane in particular is to become a domestic earner of foreign
exchange in the hands of peasant farmers and small-scale processors.

Maps 1 + 2 of Sierra Leone (Soil Provinces, A - P; Dijkerman, 1967). Scale. 1:2,600,000
A - SOILS OF THE PENINSULA MOUNTAINS FROM NORITE AND GABBRO
B - SOILS OF THE SANDY BEACH RIDGES AND LAGOONS
C - SOILS OF THE COASTAL SWAMPS
D - SOILS OF THE ALLUVIAL GRASSLAND FLOODPLAINS
E - SOILS OF THE RAISED BEACHES AND COASTAL TERRACES
F - SOILS OF THE INTERIOR PLAIN FROM ACID IGNEOUS AND METAMORPHIC ROCKS
G - SOILS FROM THE ROKEI RIVER SERIES UNDER SECONDARY BUSH
H - SOILS FROM THE ROKEI RIVER SERIES UNDER SAVANNA
I - SOILS OF THE BOLILANDS
J - SOILS OF THE ESCARPMENT REGION FROM GRANITE AND ACID GNEISS UNDER SECONDARY BUSH AND FOREST
K - SOILS OF THE ESCARPMENT REGION FROM GRANITE AND ACID GNEISS UNDER SAVANNA
L - SOILS OF THE UPPER MOA BASIN
M - SOILS OF THE PLATEAUS FROM GRANITE AND ACID GNEISS UNDER SECONDARY BUSH AND FOREST
N - SOILS OF THE PLATEAUS FROM GRANITE AND ACID GNEISS UNDER SAVANNA
O - SOILS OF THE HILLS AND MOUNTAINS FROM GRANITE AND ACID GNEISS
P - SOILS OF THE HILLS AND MOUNTAINS FROM THE KAMBU SCHISTS

4.2. Rural settlement planning by forced resettlement c.q. villagisation schemes in Tanzania, East Africa.

Integrated rural development (IRD) exercises addressing backward Third-World areas have been particularly emblematic for the poverty-oriented, mostly donor-driven development efforts of the 1970s. Then, the global perspective on absolute poverty could be summed up very succinctly for the Third World as follows: (McNamara/World Bank, 1975):

- 900 million individuals subsist on incomes of less than US $ 75 a year. The heaviest concentration of absolute poverty is found in the Asian Third World countries. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia are particularly afflicted, one out of every two individuals in these countries being immersed in absolute poverty;
- 700 millions individuals out of the 900 million live in the rural areas. More than 50 million out of the 100 million families farm less than one-fragmented- hectare. One of the most innovatory rural development strategies is therefore, to bolster both the economic productivity and the social living standards of small farmers region-wise as in the case of the Shinyanga region, but also of the Mwanza, Kigoma and other regions in Tanzania. These foreign-assisted area development programmes would distribute both economic and social services to millions of people in newly-established settlements, and include credit and marketing systems, primary schools, health centres and water supply; they also involve clearing the area of tsetse fly, bilharziasis, etc. and carrying out adaptive (agricultural) research and training on the spot;
- 200 million individuals live in absolute poverty in the cities of the Third World which accommodate a total of 700 million urbanities. Both population and urban growth are coming to the forefront here.

Because, though the total Third World population was increasing by about 2.5% a year, the urban population was growing indeed at nearly 5%, half of this urban growth being due to natural urban increase, and half of it to migration from rural areas. The marginal nature of this country-to-town migration deserves, however, emphasis in that, being hypothetically equivalent to only one-sixth of the rural population growth, this migration would double the urban population growth. For stemming, among other purposes, this rural-urban exodus 'Operation Planned Villages' was most forcefully effectuated all over Tanzania during the period July-October 1974; and thus stands out here as full-heartedly experienced case, including reflections in retrospect by indigenous and foreign planistrators. That is, sub-section 4.2.2. may by considered emblematic, albeit paradoxical again for trying paternalistically to bend mental frames of the peasantry as well as of its local officedom towards socio-economic and politico-administrative modernisation along socialist lines of communal (ujamaa) village life. These lines followed, in accordance with sub-section 2.2.3 along our study axis 2, the laudable flying colours of brand-new rural settlement and blocklevel planning in Israel and India of the 1960/70s respectively (Mwapachu in Coulson, 1979, pp. 1-15 and 114-127).

4.2.1 ‘Great leap forward’ after the Arusha-Resolutions of 1967 under Julius Nyerere

After his sojourn in Sierra Leone, the Dutch regional development planner/RIDEP-teamleader of Shinyanga’s Plan of Action of following sub-section 4.2.2 still stood in 1974/75 for a fuzzy mix-up of theories-in-use; however, very much contained at arm’s length, c.q. hived-off from his political (TANU) overseers, counterpart administrators,

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8 TANU = Tanganyika African National Union, those days’ sole political party on the Tanzanian mainland.
parastatal managers, - but particularly from the limited pool of skilled colleagues/govt. planners at regional and district levels. For a sobering 'leadership code' both for the vanguard single-party officials and sometimes well-versed, but frequently transferred local planistrators resulted in isolated top-down governance (Hyden, 1983, chs. 2 +3). Eventual on-the-job knowledge transfer by foreign experts was held off and also not in the commercial interest of the expatriate consultant team which was hardly prepared or inclined to exercise countervailing powers 'from below' (DGIS/IOV, 1992, chs. 2, 4 and 9; Rakodi in Simon, 1990, ch. 8).

Thrown into those 'Wahlverwandtschaft'-circumstances it was simply untimely and 'going out of your mind' in taking stakeholders concerned, -by self-reflection as in subsection 2.0.1 → 3-, at a cool-headed distance; and in thus commending them a double-edged look from their 'inner-directed eyes' at the influenceable but risky structure and future direction of knowledgeable flows of events. Then-and-there it was simply 'not done', -was ostracised even-, to openly question what was 'good or bad' in president Julius Nyerere's well-intended series of position papers with TANU-applauded policy guidelines (Coulson, 1979, chs. 1+8). During 1967-72 these socialist policies focused on self-reliance: leading up to nationalisation of banks, sisal estates (for avoiding price drops in world export markets), private industries (for import substitution), insurance and trading companies. So, a budding liberal democratic order of the 1960s was dashed; a merchant (Asian) bourgeoisie was taken aback; and an entrepreneur-weak state-apparatus became overburdened; thus strangulating both the 'invisible hand of the market' and local community-based initiatives; and thus also creating, as a well-known consequence, both 'black markets' and clientship-like distribution channels for all sorts of collective goods and services. In brief, the Leviathan of the state presented by an emerging bureaucratic bourgeoisie and - credulously-assisted superfluously by foreign advisers, - among others, region-wise in ujamaa village planning exercises which seldom saw the required capital and human resources for their implementation, -made itself not 'responsive and trust-worthy' anymore; and thus induced the ordinary populace to exit to its age-old 'reriprocatfve' exchange economy, without revenues for state coffers. These safe-playing patrimonial tendencies were reinforced even when the sixteen (16) long-standing Cooperative Unions and 1300 primary farmers' associations through one single PMO/TANU-radio announcement of May 14, 1976 were replaced all over Tanzania by an amalgam of Crop Authorities/Marketing Boards, wholesale Regional Trading Companies and about 8,000 Ujamaa Village Councils. However, these were technically and morally weakly prepared for their TANU-dominated tasks in self-reliant governance, i.e. in guiding agro-livestock production, communal service distribution, cost recovery and fiscal/budgeting activities (Verhagen in Intermediair, 16-2-1979).

Nevertheless, these fatal, if not tragic necessities as commensurably made sense of, albeit from lessons taken after actualities had passed their long-winding courses (see sub-section 2.0.3), were still timely brought to the floor by the Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning of the University in Dar es Salaam (BRALUP, Nov. 1974). During a meeting in late 1974 early warnings were put to all expatriate regional planning teams, taking the innovatory World Bank report on Kigoma's 'Integrated Rural Development Program' as an example. First, in a politico-institutional and procedural sense, the multi-tiered organisational structure for regional planning in Tanzania was highlighted; refer later on to figures 4.2.1/2. To this complex and top-heavy configuration figure 4.2.3 could be added: the 'official path from below' for project proposals in 1974 (Moore, 1986, pp. 162/3; refer also to Bantje in Intermediair, 9-12-77).
Second, both Prime Minister's Office and foreign donors, as the alleged custodians of Tanzania's common good, were warned by BRALUP not to make peasants dependent on government by promising, but not being able to provide and maintain necessary physical infrastructures and social services in villagisation, forced overnight by the army with sabre-rattling: not to strangle the hen with golden eggs, both in terms of domestic food supply and export crops for foreign exchange.

Third, in trying to drag both peasants and herdsmen out of their vicious circles of poverty and resource exclusion, their peculiar socio-economic and agro-ecological niches should be carefully looked into innovations should not be imposed but well tested out step by step, both for large-scale state block farms and smallholder schemes.

Finally, on 'integrated' rural planning a plea was sounded to take very much into account decentralised implementation capacities, – if any.

These pleas for 'getting signals right' in villagisation, both in well-intended TANU/foreign 'oughts' and in restrained resource control, did not fall on deaf ears; but were very much co-determined c.q. frustrated by the strangulating, hived-off circumstances as sketched above. Shinyanga's skeleton and final planning reports thus threw up a shopping list of pre-feasible, i.e. not yet bankable projects, sector by sector: very much compartmentalised indeed.

'Integration' during the surveying stage in late 1974 was based mainly on secondary data collected from govt. offices at central and local levels, with the exception of a windshield-inventory of existing services, utilities and roads in and around central places being newly established; refer to the self-contained aloof arithmetics of Tables 4.2.6–11. Step by step 'integration' both in planning and eventual implementation ‘from below’, nevertheless, was intended by putting 'first things first' and thus, in first instance, restricting sectoral, time/space, problem and resource perspectives to prioritised, so-called CDAs, i.e. concentrated development areas; refer to Bendavid-Val's early CSP-approach of 1972/3, and to subsequent lessons learned during 1981-82 and 1989 in the case-studies of Rada/N. Yemen, and of Aceh/Indonesia of sections 4.3 and 4.4. In all these cases the logical expert steps of section 4.1 were being (re-)tested: first, real-life problems to be conceptualised and locally agreed upon; second, an overall strategic framework to be thrown up; and, third, visible action projects to be quickly implemented, evaluated and revised.

Lessons learned after actualities had passed their long-winding IRD-course.

In view of the culturalist, – both relativist and constructivist, – stance taken throughout the preceding sections, it will again be hardly surprising that locally agreed-upon but contradictory guidelines for 'integrated' rural/regional area planning, – but above all concentrated, yet forced villagisation that actually co-determined Shinyanga's RIDEP-exercise, led then-and-there already to re-thinking. This brought about restricting and toning down the comprehensive leap forward as blue-printed by TANU-leadership. Instead of a rush-job, gradual learning-by-doing and a staggered budget-outlay approach were deemed advisable, – as chosen in the same foreign-assistance vein for Tanzania's Iringa Region (Belshaw, 1982).

For making practical sense of politico-institutional complexities, socio-economic uncertainties plus vagaries in agro-livestock production, 'mixed scanning and muddling through' are proposed to be a remedy. However, in both regional cases of alleged integrated rural development planning were low-level administrative and/or agro-eco-
logical areas narrowly focused upon, - initially, for the short run. Herewith it is admitted that for the long run broad policy dilemmas regarding gainful modernisation, fair redistribution, environmental protection, plus responsive and trustworthy governance remained undisputed, i.e. were ideologically put to silence. Thus left aside were also such medium-term strategic issues as (Uma Lele, 1992, chapter 12):

- Enduring commitment to better-off and/or to poor smallholders' agro-livestock production, versus to large-scale estates and ranges including a labour versus capital-intensive approach.
- Balancing export with (traditional) food crop production and its domestic processing; as well as
- Expansion of acreage versus its intensification in (remote) regions of high or low potential growth.
- Balancing short-term priority given to visible, physical and social infrastructure, incl. coverage of its recurrent costs, as against long-term gains through indigenous capacity improvement moving step by step from project via strategic towards policy planning; in other words
- Following a project-by-project approach, or withstand macro-economic and physical vagaries through sectorally integrated policies and investments in human and institutional 'capital', incl. knowledge improvement on the constraining socio-cultural and political environment.
- Balancing an (over-)regulating and centralised, public sector role with private sector liberalisation and non-governmental community-based initiatives at the grass roots.

In this respect very early warnings in favour of building socio-spatial management 'from the bottom upwards' were to be remembered, as follows. For based on analysis in USA's Mid-west on the functioning of (hinterlands of) central places from a rural development point of view, Galpin pointed out as a human geographer (1915) that well-informed planned action is required to bring about 'appropriate' socio-spatial structures; therefore, establishment of a suitable form of community government forms a crucial step (Johnson, 1970, pp. 278 + 417). Falling in line herewith during the 1930s while introducing a new system of Native Administration built on existing sociopolitical micro-structures during British rule in eastern Nigeria, Lord Cameron as a prominent colonial officer concluded: "For allowing wider participation by the local people, build from the bottom; do not attempt to crown a king at the top, and then (by retention of chieftainship: refer to emerging élites in Sierra Leone of sub-section 4.1.2) to try to find something underneath on which it might – perhaps – appropriately be placed" (Hyden, 1983, pp. 112/3 + 166-172).

Neither 'something underneath' nor elaborate (inter-)national macro-structures on top, however, can be expected to fall in place accidentally, – just like rain does not fall of a sudden gratuitously out of an empty air. Particularly, where a patrimonial and pre-industrial modality of reciprocative family and clan affections prevails, civic rights and duties supporting the very separate development of private and public domains can hardly be promoted. For lineage and authoritarian leadership hamper a 'transformist' road for free and divergent entrepreneurs plus general managers/statesmen, – eventually coming on to (partially accepted) charge in societal guidance; refer back to respective configurations and leadership – styles in the top row of figure 2.2.2. It has been learned, with hindsight however, not to become fully enthralled either by the industrial and managerial mode of western development thought and practice. That is to say, by propagating the 'invisible hand of the market' to be entrusted – credulously – to thrifty commercial and industrial burgeoisies; refer now to substantive sub-sections 2.2.1 and 2.1.1/3 where the full range of human capabilities to be cultivated is touched upon. In spite of good intentions in Tanzania during the 1970s, by walking on
thin ice both conceptually and morally, lacks of 'goodness-of-fit' in lopsided, indeed massive village need provision (refer to sub-section 2.2.3) apparently resulted from ruthlessly overstocked, societal vivisection at an international scale through a flourishing 'foreign-aid business'.

Against this – ideological mainstream the historical anthropologist S.F. Moore tried to uncover in an eclectic manner (1986, pp 10/11), through tiptoed close-ups during Nyerere’s presidential hey-days (1968-84), long lasting cultural traits, – in state of flux though. A dynamic view is thus presented on deep-rooted protective meanings, feelings and emotions at the local base of indigenous polity among Chagga people of Kilimanjaro. A tale is being told on hundred years of immediate policy concerns in shifting power centres at the top regarding (colonial) law and order, socio-economic welfare and distributive justice. Consequently, 'longue-durée' changes in politico-institutional settings are reported for the episodes of German (1896-1910) and British rule (1916-61), but especially after independence under TANU-leadership. During this period of socialist hubris and standardised design for decentralisation and western homogenisation, Moore follows down-to-earth the persistent endurance, – melting down but simultaneous recasting again-, of socio-political configurations inside and between, sometimes inimical chiefdoms. Under endlessly changing circumstances both chiefly resource control and ‘prescribed altruism, but violence and witchcraft too, were preserved on the base of ‘native customs' and patrimonial ideals of a cosmic order. Fundamental traditions are thus clearly shown to be readily available for local bricolage, – just like souped-up automobiles are crafty constructions made out both of new and old parts: a temporary amalgam of cultural traits.

A case in point are the smallholder cooperatives which between World Wars I and II grew into federative unions on the base of primary chiefdom coops including respectively coffee and cotton marketing, crop improvement and processing activities, – both in Chagga country of Kilimanjaro and in Sukuma lands of Mwanza and Shinyanga regions (Uphoff, 1986, pp. 129, 202 and 316). After abolishment of all (federations of) cooperatives in 1976 local Chagga family and clan control continued. Ordinary farmers still brought their produce for sale to the same place, including illicit transactions which intensified differences between relatively affluent land and cattle owners on one side, and the deprived poor on the other side at the bottom of the heap (Moore, p. 124/8). In conclusion, both chiefly lineage control and old geographical/political/administrative frameworks of the chiefdom are being reproduced, – even in the case later of the cooperative ujamaa village councils: the biggest mistake of President Nyerere’s twenty-five-year rule (Uphoff, 1986, p. 225; Hilhorst, 1990, pp. 213/7).

Of no avail, however, have been laments about thus creating at sub-regional levels of district, ward and village an institutional vacuum; that is to say, about an undifferentiated ‘something underneath’ made up for and by Tanzania’s single-party state government which itself during the 1970s appeared, like a balloon, to be suspended in mid air, – matters made worse by superfluous inflation of foreign donor aid. The strength of local traditions nevertheless forced TANU-officialdom soon after independence already to work through pre-existing lineage clusters: local taxes even for some time being collected ex-chiefdom by ex-chiefdom. The TANU-party structure was formed on the same local base: posts being filled by active party men down at the ladder, where there were found any (Moore, p. 147/8). This suggests what was to come: syncretism between (symbols of) old and new institutions which were fabricated in terms of a populist ideology committed to socialism. The new hierarchy of administrative officials was run from the top down of the party apparatus concerned with rural ‘development’, but seldom functioning as planned at the various territorial levels
(Moore, p. 161/314); refer to attached figures 4.2.1/2 by Belshaw (1982, p.148) where at various national/sectoral, rural district, ward and village levels a complicated politico-administrative interplay was made manifest between TANU-overseers, 'integrated' rural planners and operational-executive officers. According to TANU-doctrine, local development plans were supposed to originate with the peasantry from village and ward levels upwards. Happy coincidences of 'spontaneous' peasant interest in 1974, however, had been produced by suggestions emanating from the regional party organisation/development committee, as shown in attached figure 4.2.3. Top party echelons could thus point to popular sources of their plans, and to their (foreign) funding needs. Local party meetings, ill attended, constituted merely 'ratifying bodies public' giving populist legitimacy to decisions made elsewhere.

Here, the paternalistic mental models that development planners and administrators had of village life are interesting artificial constructs in themselves, – running counter to the localised patrilineage as a self-contained micro-universe of densely interconnected personal networks. If these lineages continue to be safe havens, a full circle of hundred years may be closed. In old areas of (re-) settlement alliances among local patrilineages may once again become one of the bases for micro-political 'big-belly' factionalism in a kinship arena (Moore, p. 226). Villagisation thus constitutes a step backwards by fragmenting what was once a growing socio-political coherence at regional levels designed for cooperative mobilisation: top party fabrications re-invigorating indeed bottom-level localism, which deliberately is still played down (Moore, p. 309).
Figure 4.2.1 Key Components in the Organisational Structure of Regional Planning in Tanzania, 1973-77.
Figure 4.2.2 Possible Relationships between Regional Planning, Integrated Rural Development Planning and Other Forms of Economic Planning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Disaggregation</th>
<th>National Planning Activity</th>
<th>(i) National Planning</th>
<th>(ii) Sectoral Planning</th>
<th>(iii) Regional Planning</th>
<th>(iv) Rural Development Planning</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1. National Level</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Rural and Urban Areas</td>
<td>National Objectives and Plans</td>
<td>Rural - Urban Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rural - Urban Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sectoral Level</td>
<td>Inter-sectoral Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sector Plans</td>
<td>Regional Plans</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Regional Level</td>
<td>Inter-regional Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. National-scale Sectoral Activities</td>
<td>Large Sectoral Projects</td>
<td>Sub-regional Multi-sectoral Area-based Projects</td>
<td>Regional Sectoral Programmes</td>
<td>Village Development Plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Rural/Concentrated Development Areas</td>
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<td>4. Regional-scale Sectoral Activities</td>
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<td>D. Local Communities</td>
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Note: The figure shows bottom-up planning and feedback flows only.
Figure 4.2.3 Official path of local proposals for development, 1974. Source: oral description by development official in Moshi.
4.2.2. The Surge in Regional Development Planning, with Special Reference to the Neglected Shinyanga Region in Tanzania, East Africa (Veenstra, 1976, pp. 61/62)

Introduction to problems of local area planning

During the last decades there has been a tendency for regions to link up their political ambitions with their economic aspirations and consequently to institutionalise planned regional or subregional development. On the one hand, this surge in subnational regional planning results from the fact that as local economic and social problems remain unresolved by the central government, regional development pressures grow. Using unfairness or neglect by the Government as an argument to support demands for increasing resource allocation, the regions compete for funds, projects and special programmes to be provided 'from the central basket', — thus underlining public choices to be made on a regionalised approach to development (Waterston, 1974).

On the other hand, Tanzania's drive to decentralise its administration and economy since 1972 originates from the rather depressing experiences of the 1960s, whereby a lack of coordination between and inside (semi) governmental organisations, but above all over-centralisation of decision-making powers in ministerial headquarters of Dar es Salaam, were to handicap the planning and implementation of local development projects. After the government re-organisation of 1972 (inter) sectoral development policies, plans and projects are supposed to be prepared and implemented respectively:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>by political development committees</th>
<th>and by technical development teams</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>headed by the Regional and Area Commissioner resp. at regional and district levels</td>
<td>headed by the Regional Dev. Director (RDD) and District Dev. Director (DDD) at the same levels.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The timely and adequate staffing per region of the technical development team by functional officers — in fact, the 10-15 sectoral officers formerly employed by the individual ministries — was to pose serious personnel problems: 20 regions times 10-15 planning officers in agriculture, livestock, natural resources, health, education, transport, industry, etc. actually makes 200-300 posts to be manned by highly qualified specialists. Not to speak of the district development teams: 4-5 districts per region (20 in number) which makes 800-1500 qualified officers needed. This situation led the Tanzanian Government to request and obtain technical assistance from abroad, specifically for the preparation of the Third Five Year Plans (TFYPs) for the 20 regions, on the basis of which the government itself — through the Dept. of Development Planning (Dev. Plan.) in the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Prime Minister's Office (P.M.O.) — is supposed to compose the national TFYP 1975-80.

From the beginning of 1974 onwards the Tanzanian Government therefore submitted requests to, and finally obtained from the Government of The Netherlands, among others, a multi-disciplinary expatriate consultant team to prepare the Shinyanga Regional Integrated Development Plan (RIDEP) in alleged cooperation with the regional functional staff headed by the RDD. The RIDEP Documents for the Shinyanga region, which is located south of Lake Victoria, consist of a Main Report and ten Annexes A-J brought out in April 1975 as follows by DHV/ILACO Consulting Engineers in The Netherlands.
The RIDEP-Methodology, i.e. a hybrid theory used

A variety of concepts or metaphors of the region has been used in regional development planning, as is explained below (Friedman, 1956; Hilhorst, 1971).

Firstly, a somewhat mechanistic orientation is discernible if one sees the region as analogous to a well programmed clockwork. Thus the ‘true’ region is identified with a distinctive folk culture, the region being an expression of the folk who occupy it and who give it a functional character through their naturally organised, technological and rationalised forms of life.

In (factor) analysis then the (sub)region is found to be a definite geographic area because it possesses the largest possible degree of homogeneity indicated in three ways: A-C.

A. According to the largest possible number of applicable characteristics for analysis:

A.1 Physical characteristics such as rainfall, evapotranspiration, surface water and ground water, physiographic land types, watersheds, soils, cropping patterns and yields, etc. as found in RIDEP Annexes B, D, and H, for instance.

A.2 Socio-institutional characteristics such as family, farm and village size, land use and tenure, utilization of tractors, fertilizers, improved seeds, schools, health centres, cooperatives, road and railway transport, public markets, consumer goods, shops, etc. as found in RIDEP Annexes B, E, F, G and J, for instance.

A.3 Administrative characteristics referring to areas falling under the competence of territorial governments with regard to project preparation and implementation, spending of development expenditure and collecting of statistical data at village, ward, divisional and district levels, – boundaries of which are partly shown on the attached map 3, for instance.

A.4 Economic characteristics such as per capita and sub-regional incomes, population and sectoral labour force data, turn-over of credit and marketing organizations, agricultural produce prices, etc. as are found in RIDEP Annexes A, B, C and J, for instance.

B. According to the largest applicable number of regional planning objectives such as:
B.1
an equal vs. distorted distribution of employment, farmers' income, social services and economic activity over the regional space, taking into account budgetary and man-power constraints, and

B.2
testing at the same time the coherence of national sector plans against the regional fabric and its resources.

C.
According to the largest number of specific regional problems to be solved such as over-grazing and rural water supply, subjects which are dealt with in RIDEP Annexes C and H respectively.

Obviously, from the viewpoint of characteristic factors (A), planning objectives (B) and problems (C), only a purely agrarian economy could be considered sufficiently homogeneous to qualify as a 'true', i.e. relatively closed and static mechanism.

Therefore, listing, classification, scoring, weighing and final ranking of the afore-cited characteristics, i.e. of factors drawn from a series of variables, have been applied in the RIDEP Annexes A, B, E, G and H; in combination with the testing of national planning objectives against the regional background this has led to a distinction of homogeneous zones in the Shinyanga region, as explained in RIDEP Annex A.

Secondly, taking into account the urbanisation process, the clockwork concept of the region held by the preceding, intuitive orientation is carried a little further towards recognizing that in regional planning one must seek not solely the extensiveness of the periphery, but also the centre. Thus the town is considered to be a point of the utmost geographic importance, for the urban centre tends to focus the economic flow of men, commodities, energies and information that pass through a region, concentrating them, diverting them, rerouting them, in short, exerting a close and controlling influence over the socio-economic development of a region - regarded here as a dynamic reality.

The urban centre is seen as analogous to the heart of the body (= region): a specialised and strongly controlling mechanism which pumps the life blood of energy, people, banking and commerce to all parts of the nodal region. Or, in a more static sense again one could speak also of polarised regions, the urban centres representing the poles in a magnetic field, i.e. spheres of influence. Communication with, and interference of other contiguous regional systems, but above all dominance of the capital (metropolitan) region of the nation concerned - in our case, Dodoma/Dar es Salaam in Tanzania - is not overlooked in this organismic orientation; refer to characteristic qualifications for Table 4.1.2 in preceding sub-section 4.1.2 on Sierra Leone's regionalisation.

As the larger towns in the settlement hierarchy of the Shinyanga Region become more diversified, i.e. heterogeneous in their functioning, the smaller towns and communities within their sphere of influence also become more specialised. Some will grow into mining or lumbering centres, others into specialised government service centres or (agro-) industrial or rural trading centres. Whereas the primary centres of the utmost decision-making power in this hierarchical system are the regional and district headquarters, all the second- and third-order communities within their economic reach are mutually dependent upon one another, in particular upon the four Shinyanga district centres - thus forming one interdependent whole, like the stratified universe of a beehive: refer back to sub-section 2.2.1/2.
Especially in its Annexes F and G the RLDEP-focus is consequently shifted from a relatively closed and homogeneous, static and rural region towards a relatively open and polarised, dynamic and urbanising region. In this view the nodal nervous system of the region, and of the nation as a whole, is the transportation and communication system concentrated in development axes and corridors for the ingathering of raw materials, taxes and information, on the one hand, and for the distribution of capital and consumer goods, government services and innovating know-how, on the other hand.

The Shinyanga RLDEP-methodology chosen and visualised in Figs. 4.2.4/5 simply uses simultaneously the theoretical orientations of the homogeneous and polarising region, whereby the evolutionary perspective upon the Shinyanga region together with a balanced emphasis upon technical (engineering), socio-economic, budgetary and administrative aspects determines what data are to be collected and processed during the following study phases 1-4.

Phase 1: Data collection, and factor and flow analyses respectively aimed at distinguishing:
   a. present homogeneous sub-regions, and
   b. a future polarised (concentrated) settlement pattern, transport networks and main corridors.

Phase 2: Testing regional planning objectives at national, sector and sub-regional levels for the short and long run.

Phase 3: Action programming in priority areas for regional government departments and services for the short run (budgets, manpower, organisation).

Phase 4: Quantitive study programmes in specific research areas for the long run.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concept of the homogeneous region</td>
<td>Priority and Specific Research Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept of the polarising region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 4.2.4. RIDEP-methodology: milestones, components, phases and expected outcomes.*
**Figure 4.2.5. Plan of Action January/February 1975 for Shinyanga RIDEP-team.**
Staggered Shinyanga RIDEP-budget outlays per sector in space and time: 'first things first'

The search for some comparable development indicators for the economy of Shinyanga region vis-a-vis Tanzania as a whole has led to the following results.

Table 4.2.1. Indicators for Shinyanga's Relative Backwardness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Indicators →</th>
<th>Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in 1972</th>
<th>Number of inhabitants in 1972</th>
<th>Labour force as percentage of total population in 1974</th>
<th>Registered employment outside agriculture in 1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shinyanga R.</td>
<td>360 Shs</td>
<td>1.03 million</td>
<td>54 %</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>700 Shs’</td>
<td>14.1 million</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although the relative backwardness of the Shinyanga Region becomes clear from these figures, the potentials, i.e. comparative advantages of the Region to meet national development objectives and to partly solve national problems, should be kept in mind. For in view of a worsening Tanzanian balance of payments during recent years, caused mainly by the world-wide oil price increase but also by large food imports, the Shinyanga region - among others - can be called upon to assist:

- firstly, in improving the national foreign exchange position by pushing cotton and meat production for export, and hide and skin processing for domestic leatherwork, for instance; and
- secondly, in becoming self-reliant in food supplies by stimulating sorghum and maize production of peasants, - exiting to parallel markets, though.

In calculating the optimum TFYP 1975-80 capacities of the economy of Tanzania and of Shinyanga region to absorb capital investments from national ministerial, semi-governmental (parastatal) and regional development sources, the following assessments are made. Recurrent costs of development projects are excluded, anyway.

The Tanzanian Government proposals for investments during the TFYP-period 1975-80 represent altogether 13,900 million Shs (Daily News, 14 Dec. 1974), so that Shinyanga region - beside its comparative advantages in the directly productive sphere (RIDEP Annexes A, C and I) - has reasons to strive at least for an overall development investment budget of 300-400 million Shs. excl. recurrent costs during the TFYP-period. See the 370 million Shs in the last column of the table below. The areas in the indirectly productive sphere (RIDEP Annexes E, G an H) are, however, to be taken into account as well.

Table 4.2.2. Optimum TFYP Development Investments estimated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables →</th>
<th>GDP 1974 estimated</th>
<th>Capital/output ratio assumed constant</th>
<th>Govt. Preference for GDP growth rate per year</th>
<th>Optimum TFYP Dev. Investments needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>12,246 m. Shs</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10,400 m. Shs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinyanga (agricultural)</td>
<td>340 m Shs</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>140 m. Shs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(non. Agric.)</td>
<td>150 m. Shs</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>230 m. Shs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>490 m. Shs</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>370 m. Shs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, by comparing the economically optimum absorbing capacity per year during the future TFYP-period with govt. development budget allocations in the past, the following picture presents itself.

Table 4.2.3. National and Regional Development Budget Allocations 1972-75/80.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allocations</th>
<th>TOTAL OF</th>
<th>BREAK DOWN OF Tanzanian Development Budgets allocated to:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1973</td>
<td>52.4 Shs</td>
<td>27.7 Shs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-1974</td>
<td>82.9 Shs</td>
<td>38.7 Shs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1975</td>
<td>145.3 Shs</td>
<td>60.4 Shs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1980</td>
<td>13,900 =</td>
<td>2,500 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>178 Shs</td>
<td>33 Shs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Assumed average population per year during 1975-80 for Tanzania 15.5 million and Shinyanga region 1.2 million inhabitants.

Firstly, it should be noted that in accordance with the decentralisation policy the share of Regional Development Expenditure (c) in the total Tanzanian Development Budgets is steadily growing from 12% in 1972-73 to about 20% in the TFYP period: 'power of central purse' relaxing?

Secondly, the rapidly growing share of parastatal development expenditure (e) should be mentioned, as well as the fact that the parastatal organizations finance their development projects not only with government funds but also by drawing from their own resources and by borrowing from the semi-governmental banks. Thus, in the process of decentralisation, the development role of parastatals becomes as important as the role played both by national ministries and regional governments.

Thirdly, the disadvantageous position of the Shinyanga region (d) expressed in per capita Regional Development Expenditure (RDE) vis-a-vis the other regions (c) is evident, this being about half of the national RDE average. Considering also the fact that real spending of the national ministries (b) and parastatals in Shinyanga region is far below the national average as well, it means that Shinyanga is one of the neglected 'residual' regions in Tanzania.

If the Region were to be granted a Regional Development Budget (d) for the TFYP-period which was at least in proportion to its share of the total population in Tanzania (7%), about 180 million Shs would be made available from the 2,500 mill Shs to be nationally set apart for Regional Development Expenditure (RDE).

Thus apart from arguments related to the comparative advantages of the Region, and the arrears in social services and infrastructure, the Shinyanga government might recognize for the TFYP period:

• as upper investment-limit, the 370 million Shs for purely macro-economical reasons, thus including ministerial and parastatal capital investments;
• as an upper RDE-limit, the 180 million Shs because of equal distribution of government capital funds spatially tried for nation-wide by PMO.

Lastly, the administrative TFYP absorbing capacity of the Shinyanga region might be considered as the lowest RDE-limit, being estimated from the last 3 budget years as: \([25,723,000/3] \times 5 = 43\) million, or about 9 million Shs yearly during the period 1975-80. Nevertheless, taking as a starting point for equalisation purposes the afore-cited 180 million Shs as the maximum RDE, i.e. 30 Shs per capita per year, and the recent increase of the 1973-74 resp. 1974-75 RDE from 8 million to 12.6 million Shs (or + 57%), a somewhat slower increase in the next five years is preferable because of shortages of capable government manpower to spend the RDE. Thus the following staggered picture presents itself for the TYYP-period.

Table 4.2.4. Shinyanga's Administrative TFYP Absorbing Capacity: Staggered.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage of staggered RDE Increase</th>
<th>Yearly RDE for Shinyanga Region in million Shs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973-1974</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1975</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1976</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1977</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-1978</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-1979</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1980</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TFYP Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>183.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sectoral distribution of Regional Development Expenditure within the Shinyanga region during the period 1972-75 has been as follows. An average total of 11% was spent in the directly productive sectors of agriculture, livestock, natural resources, commerce and industry. In the indirectly productive sectors 30% was used for water development, 20% for roads, 17% for education, 15% for health and 1% for cooperatives. It may be concluded that in view of the central PMO directives a larger RDE-share than 11% should become available for the agro-livestock and industrial sectors in the region.

By dividing last years' RDE by the number of inhabitants per ward, division and district in the Shinyanga region, the following impressions are gathered. A spatially unequal RDE-distribution exists between wards; variation between 0 and 56 or more Shs per capita occurs. The divisions with district headquarters have received the highest RDE, while the differences between the other divisions are still considerable, varying between 2 and 58 Shs per capita. Finally, the RDE per district during the last years amounted to:

1. Shinyanga District 26 Shs per capita
2. Kahama District 26 Shs per capita
3. Bariadi District 22 Shs per capita
4. Maswa District 15 Shs per capita

Conclusion: government capital investments might be less concentrated in regional and district headquarters, for instance, by emphasising the construction of rural dispensaries in the health sector so that more people could have easy access to medical services in second- and third-order centres; see last paragraph. Besides, investments in water supply schemes could be increasingly directed towards domestic users with pri-
vate connections who have to pay for water consumption (urban schemes; see RIDEP Annex H) in order to cover at least operation and maintenance (o/m) costs with the water revenues.

Besides the sectoral and geographical RDE-distribution a distinction can be made for the TFYP-period between regional development expenditure to be used for

- capital investment costs of new development projects;
- 'extra' recurrent costs generated by new projects in the long run.

Moreover, funds, personnel, vehicles and equipment destined for continuing old programmes and projects could be partly used in executing new TFYP-projects.

The following recommendations can thus be framed in regard to the location and the RDE-funding of TFYP-projects:

First priority is to be given to new agro-livestock and small-scale industrial development projects inside CDAs (see explanation given below); for this, use can also be made of financial resources, personnel, equipment, etc. coming from previous programmes.

Second priority is to be given to developing the indirectly productive infrastructure (water, roads, schools, health centres); in the first instance within CDAs and in the second instance within the most backward areas.

Third priority is to be given to reinforcing the continuing previous programmes outside the 12 CDA's and the most neglected areas in Shinyanga region.

Omitting the sectoral government development objectives which can be studied in detail in RIDEP Annex A, the step-wise approach towards selecting the 12 CDAs of map 3 can now be summarized. However, for the present it should be noted, that contradictory RIDEP-guidelines are to be harmonised, - if not to be 'integrated'. Refer to policy-test criteria of figure 2.2.1.

On one hand, an equal distribution of development funds over the whole of the national and regional space is to be aimed at. But, since development funds and qualified manpower are scarce, and a concentrated bundle of development projects located within specifically limited zones is supposed to be more efficient than individually isolated projects haphazardly spread over the regional space.

On the other hand, socio-economic zones are to be selected in order to tap specific development potentials with the minimum resources available.

Consequently, for the selection of backward and so-called Concentrated Development Areas (CDAs) are used as inputs:

1. One composed rank for the social infrastructure per ward, i.e for the indirectly productive sectors of education, health, roads and water supply. See factors A.2/3 of preceding paragraph.

2. One composed rank consisting of the Net Production Values (NPVs) per capita of the farming population per division in 1975/76. See factors A.1/4 of preceding paragraph.

3. The ranks of concentrated villages in the Shinyanga region (RIDEP Annex F), of which centrality rank-2, or 20 secondary centres have been chosen as most 'appropriate' to function as radiation points as well as focus points for all sorts of development efforts in the CDAs, and later on in the divisions concerned. See last paragraph of this section 4.2.2.
Finally, in setting up Table 4.2.5 as attached and in presenting map 3 it was clearly realised:

- on one hand, that in the most backward areas with the composed rank I development efforts would have long gestation periods of more than, say, five years;
- on the other hand, that in the most advanced areas with rank III development efforts would be directed towards already privileged parts of the Shinyanga region.

Table 4.2.5 Number of wards with a specific rank of social infrastructure, NPV agriculture in Shs per capita, and the number of secondary centres.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composed Rank of Social Infrastructure</th>
<th>No secondary centre in the ward</th>
<th>One potential secondary centre in the ward</th>
<th>One existing secondary centre in the ward</th>
<th>Total Number of wards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thick line = most backward area with second priority II; boxed in plus Shadowed text in cells = concentrated development areas with first priority (CDA)

Subsequently, in the RIDEP Annexes B-J are found:

- the preliminary selection, or description of development projects;
- the preliminary location of development projects within the priority areas;
- rough estimates of capital and recurrent cost of development projects.

As a final result Tables were developed, showing a sectoral breakdown of TFYP funding requirements and potential of Shinyanga RIDEP-projects in a nutshell, as discussed at district, regional and national levels during March, 1975.

The following RIDEP-stage (1976) will make a specific bundle of development projects feasible, i.e. acceptable for (international financing agencies and for RDE funding. The financial gap between the foreign RIDEP counterpart team estimate of 447 million on one side, and the local RDE estimate of 182 million Shs on the other side, could then be bridged.

The following may be observed in regard to the perceptible lack of sectoral balance in the TFYP Regional Development Expenditure. In the directly productive sectors, development programmes aimed at providing agricultural inputs such as improved seed, fertilizers and credit, and marketing, storage and transport facilities, etc. could only be exe-
cuted successfully where farmers were trained to use these inputs and facilities efficiently. The same holds true for the extension of cultivated land, a measure which is acceptable where knowledgeable farmers have used their land to the utmost. Consequently, the RIDEP counterpart team has emphasized the relatively inexpensive rural training function for the TFYP-period in their Annex B, in addition to improvement of input distribution and of agricultural marketing and credit institutions in Annex J.

In the indirectly productive sectors the large amounts of government expenditure – theoretically needed for health, education, roads and water supply – reflect the national government objectives as conscientiously worked out in detail in the RIDEP Annexes E, G and H according to various technical alternatives, and priorities directed dogmatically upon provision of basic human needs; refer to resp. policy options in subsection 2.2.3.

The spatial distribution results which can be expected during the TFYP-period from the RIDEP-RDE for Shinyanga region were finally brought together. It will be self-evident that the sectoral imbalance remains. However, it should be added that very expensive development projects such as large-scale irrigation, dairy production, forestry development, salt mining or cement production could not be taken into consideration at that moment, simply because of the very low level of resource endowment, including the shortage of qualified manpower and managerial skills in the Shinyanga region.

Last but not least, the equalisation effects of the Shinyanga RIDEP proposals for the future are expected to be far more positive in a spatial sense than those of the Shinyanga RDE in the past, – whatever that geographic spread may be worth in terms of real outcomes (Wulf, 1974); "thinly spread butter wasted before the cake is eaten"?

**Improvement of Nutritional Standards for Shinyanga Region and calculation of NPV's per division 1975 - 1980.**

The present average daily energy intake per capita has been assumed to amount to 2,000 calories, which is 10-15% below the recommended intake according to F.A.O. standards. Based on this assumption, the present average per capita production of the rural population has been estimated to amount to 120 kg of maize, sorghum, or millet, 57 kg of dry weight of cassava or sweet potatoes and 18 kg of groundnuts or pulses per year.

These quantities leave sufficient margin for wastage, planting seed, requirements of the urban population and a small reserve for stock-forming.

The net per capita consumption of these basic crops will meet approx. 80% of the daily energy and vegetable protein requirements at the present levels. It has been supposed that the balance will be met from the consumption of sugar, fruit, vegetables, meat, milk, eggs etc.

In order to comply with the recommended energy intake standards, the annual per capita production of the rural population would have to be increased by approx. 10%. It has been planned to reach this target by 1980. Hereto, calculations of Gross and Net Production Values per capita of the farming population are shown in attached two tables, – excluding animal husbandary contributions.
Table 4.2.6  Estimated total and per capita G.P.V. and N.P.V. of the farm population in 1975/76 (at economic prices and costs) in Sh.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District and Division</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Total G.P.V. (Sh. 1,000)</th>
<th>Per Capita G.P.V. (Sh.)</th>
<th>Total N.P.V. (Sh. 1,000)</th>
<th>Per Capita N.P.V. (Sh.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>G.P.V.</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Cash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(current price)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(constant price)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District and Division</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Total G.P.V. (Sh. 1,000)</th>
<th>Per Capita G.P.V. (Sh.)</th>
<th>Total N.P.V. (Sh. 1,000)</th>
<th>Per Capita N.P.V. (Sh.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>G.P.V.</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Cash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(current price)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(constant price)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2.6  Estimated total and per capita G.P.V. and N.P.V. of the farm population in 1975/76 (at economic prices and costs) in Sh.
Table 4.2.7 Projected total and per capita G.P.V. and N.P.V. of the farm population in 1979/80 (all economic prices and costs) (In Sh. 1,000).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Population Total (in 1,000)</th>
<th>Total G.P.V. (in Sh. 1,000)</th>
<th>Per capita G.P.V. (in Sh.)</th>
<th>Total costs of inputs (in Sh. 1,000)</th>
<th>Average costs of inputs per ha</th>
<th>Per capita N.P.V. (in Sh.)</th>
<th>Total costs of inputs (in Sh. 1,000)</th>
<th>Average costs of inputs per ha</th>
<th>Per capita N.P.V. (in Sh.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>82,300</td>
<td>2,826</td>
<td>81,374</td>
<td>11,312</td>
<td>10,461</td>
<td>8,780</td>
<td>8,780</td>
<td>10,461</td>
<td>8,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kajiado</td>
<td>88,000</td>
<td>2,886</td>
<td>79,874</td>
<td>10,685</td>
<td>10,685</td>
<td>9,409</td>
<td>9,409</td>
<td>10,685</td>
<td>9,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mombasa</td>
<td>107,100</td>
<td>14,273</td>
<td>105,827</td>
<td>19,946</td>
<td>19,946</td>
<td>17,180</td>
<td>17,180</td>
<td>19,946</td>
<td>17,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total East</td>
<td>277,400</td>
<td>17,989</td>
<td>269,075</td>
<td>41,042</td>
<td>41,042</td>
<td>37,349</td>
<td>37,349</td>
<td>41,042</td>
<td>37,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East</td>
<td>56,800</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>56,030</td>
<td>7,212</td>
<td>6,923</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>6,923</td>
<td>6,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyanza</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>2,014</td>
<td>1,909</td>
<td>1,744</td>
<td>1,744</td>
<td>1,909</td>
<td>1,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>36,500</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>35,977</td>
<td>4,211</td>
<td>3,989</td>
<td>3,570</td>
<td>3,570</td>
<td>3,989</td>
<td>3,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Nyanza</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>1,418</td>
<td>10,582</td>
<td>1,785</td>
<td>1,658</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>1,658</td>
<td>1,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Nyanza</td>
<td>28,500</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>27,882</td>
<td>3,421</td>
<td>3,173</td>
<td>2,870</td>
<td>2,870</td>
<td>3,173</td>
<td>2,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total North</td>
<td>60,500</td>
<td>1,164</td>
<td>58,336</td>
<td>1,785</td>
<td>1,658</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>1,658</td>
<td>1,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total East</td>
<td>149,900</td>
<td>1,814</td>
<td>137,614</td>
<td>4,014</td>
<td>3,780</td>
<td>3,520</td>
<td>3,520</td>
<td>3,780</td>
<td>3,520</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Sh = Kenya Shilling; G.P.V. = Gross Production Value; N.P.V. = Net Production Value; Total costs of inputs = All economic prices and costs; Average costs of inputs = Total costs of inputs / Population.
Domestic Water Supply with special reference to Improving Health Standards.

The physical goals set for the Third Five-Year Plan by the Central National Planning Commission include the following in regard to water:

"Emphasis placed on cheap water schemes that will involve large numbers of people: 52% of rural population must have clean water by 1980; urban water supply must serve 88% of the urban population by 1980."

In Shinyanga region all urban water supply systems are in need of major extensions or overhauls. Extensive new works should be designed, for which a design period of 10 to 20 years should be taken into account. This would obviously imply that the entire (100%) urban population of 1980 will have piped water. The goal of having 52% of the rural population supplied with clear water means that some 643,000 people should be supplied by piped systems or at least from improved sources. This means that an additional number of 504,700 rural people will have to be supplied with water during the TFYP-period. In slight deviation from the official goals, the following approach has been chosen:

a. supply the entire urban population with piped water;
b. supply the entire population of rank-2 villages with piped water; see following paragraph.
c. supply with piped water those rank-3 villages that will be supplied from river wells within the cadre of the Shallow Well Programme, partly financed and staffed by DITA of the Netherlands Government.

It is understood that the Shinyanga Shallow Well Programme which is already in operation, will yield a total of 1,500 shallow wells or river wells during the TFYP-period, thus catering for a population of about 1,500 x 500 or 750,000 people, which is about 50% more than needed to reach the TFYP target. Furthermore, the expected number of 300 shallow wells to be constructed annually leaves about 200 shallow wells available for livestock watering in 1980, apart from about 40 charcos (small water reservoirs) supposed to be built in self-help schemes.

To estimate the costs involved, the following assumptions have been made:

- investment costs for shallow wells/river wells with hand pump: Shs 10,000 a piece;
- investment costs for piped shallow/river well schemes: Shs 170 per caput served;
- investment costs for piped borehole schemes: Shs 220 per caput served;
- investment cost for piped charco/dam schemes: Shs 300 per caput served;
- opportunity cost of capital: 10%.

The estimated investment costs, and operation and maintenance costs are as follows.
Table 4.2.8. Summary of investment costs and O & M costs for domestic water supply (= WS).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Investment Costs</th>
<th>O &amp; M Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shinyanga-town W/S</td>
<td>28,250,000</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kahama-town W/S</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maswa-town W/S</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malampaka W/S</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bariadi-town W/S</td>
<td>7,500,000</td>
<td>375,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Urban W/S</td>
<td>46,850,000</td>
<td>2,730,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shallow wells with hand pump, ditto with distribution system</td>
<td>13,090,000</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>boreholes with distribution system</td>
<td>16,150,000</td>
<td>807,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>charcos/dams with distribution system</td>
<td>946,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Rural W/S</td>
<td>35,676,000</td>
<td>1,134,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle Watering Facilities</td>
<td>790,000</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>83,316,000</td>
<td>3,893,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although there is no doubt that improved water supplies usually do improve public health, often to a dramatic extent, any quantitative approach must be based on a careful evaluation of the health situation for unimproved, as well as improved supplies.

However, any evaluation, either from a budgetary or a public health standpoint, of the medical consequences of improving the water supplies, will generally be subject to substantial errors. The extremely high cost of conducting scientifically sound medical surveys on areas both with and without improved water supplies, being a multiple of the cost of improving the supplies themselves, has hampered data collection. (Saunders and Warford, 1974).

Therefore, it will be clear that a discussion on the potential benefits of water supply to human health has to be of a descriptive rather than prescriptive nature. There is no doubt though that supplying relatively pure water in abundant quantities can considerably reduce the incidence of a large number of water-related illnesses which now occur frequently in the Shinyanga region.

Resettlement, Villagisation and Abuse of Rural Centre Planning in Sukumaland

The concentration of the rural population in Maendeleo (Development) villages is at present one of the major political aims of the Tanzanian Government. This villagisation is considered to have a stimulating effect on the development of the country’s rural areas and to positively influence the prosperity and well-being of its population, because:

- a larger section of the rural population can profit from nearby social services, while the concentration of services should stimulate the interaction between the various service units;
- a larger population concentration could well justify the installation of public utilities, like clean drinking water supply, whereby the living conditions of its residents would be improved;
- the framework for economic development could be strengthened and production increased by concentrating supporting services in centres with an adequate infrastructure.
After 'Operation Planned Villages', i.e. forced resettlement of the population during 1974, 87% of the total regional population lived in concentrated Maendeleo villages. After completion of the resettlement programme in the course of 1975, notably in Kahama District, almost the entire population of Shinyanga region will be living in concentrated settlements.

This concentration of the population in Maendeleo villages demands a RIDEP classification of settlements, based on a sound hierarchical centre plan, which will enable the regional and local authorities, including army's abuse of RIDEP-maps, to promote equal social and economic development in the entire Region for the benefit of its whole population. The hierarchical centre plan therefore:

- highlights the present inequalities in levels of social and economic services between the various parts of the region;
- enables a balanced approach to be made towards establishing social and economic services at various levels throughout the entire Region;
- facilitates the selection of social and economic development projects;
- indicates the most suitable location for these projects.

One of the major assumptions on which the hierarchical centre plan has been based, is that after the resettlements of 1974 and 1975 the population will not be forced to move again in the near future, unless this should be necessitated by very weighty reasons related to non-viability of newly created village areas (Belshaw, 1981). Another basic assumption is that only concentrated Maendeleo villages have been considered to be centres in the sense of the RIDEP centre plan. Their number of inhabitants has been based on present (December 1974) population figures as far as Shinyanga, Maswa and Bariadi Districts are concerned, and on estimated population figures after the resettlements in 1975 for Kahama District.

For the classification of settlements five types of centres have been distinguished: primary, secondary, tertiary, quaternary and lower-order centres. Table 4.2.16 indicates that each type of centre:

- is considered to provide a certain minimum of social and economic services, as well as a certain minimum of public utilities;
- will be located along a certain type of road: trunk or farm-to-market road;
- has a specific sphere or radius of influence, and a number of inhabitants within a specific range in this service area; thus recognising the dynamic role of centres.

For each Shinyanga district hierarchical centre plans have been developed for the present situation (based on data collected mainly at district level during several visits to the four district headquarters and additional field trips), as well as for the proposed future situation. The latter plans have been derived from those for the present situation, taking into account the basic assumptions of Table 4.2.11, and applying criteria developed to enable ranking of the settlements. These criteria, which are summarised in Tables 4.2.9 and 4.2.10, differ slightly for existing centres of each specific rank and those to be newly formed, and are based both on population figures and distances. The present and future plans for centres have been visualised on maps as likewise found in Van Dusseldorp's ILRI-publication no. 15, 1971, maps V, VI and IX.
Table 4.2.9. Criteria for centrality ranking of potential centres.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential rank of centres</th>
<th>Population in service area more than:</th>
<th>Village population more than:</th>
<th>Distance to centres of the same rank more than:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-primary</td>
<td>(all existing primary centres and Bariadi)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-primary</td>
<td>(all existing primary centres with the exception of Bariadi)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-secondary</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>25 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-tertiary</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-tertiary</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-tertiary</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-tertiary</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-quaternary</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-quaternary</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-lower order</td>
<td>(all remaining villages)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2.10. Criteria for lowering in rank of existing centres.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential rank of centres</th>
<th>Population in service area more than:</th>
<th>Village population more than:</th>
<th>Distance to centres of the same rank more than:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-primary</td>
<td>(none)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-secondary</td>
<td>(none)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-tertiary</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-tertiary</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-tertiary</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-quaternary</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-quaternary</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-lower order</td>
<td>(none)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At present Shinyanga Region has a total number of 389 centres. Four percent of the total regional population live in primary, i.e. urban centres, 4% in secondary centres, 34% in tertiary centres, 29% in quaternary centres and 29% in lower-order centres. In the proposed future situation the number of urban or primary centres will increase from 4 to 5, the number of secondary centres from 9 to 20, of tertiary centres from 105 to 128 and of quaternary centres from 125 to 156, while the number of lower-order centres will decrease from 146 to 80. By then 5% of the total regional population will live in primary centres, 8% in secondary centres, 43% in tertiary centres, 35% in quaternary centres and only 9% in lower-order centres.

The development from the present centre plan to the future centre plan demands a certain number of changes in the rank of specific centres; these will have consequences for the centres to be changed in rank, notably as far as social and economic services, public utilities and connecting roads are concerned. Adoption of the future hierarchical centre plan will necessitate the creation of additional social services, economic services and public utilities in, and an improvement of roads to, the centres which will be promoted in rank. On the other hand, the level of services, public utilities of and roads to the centres which will be lowered in rank will not be developed further and may even be lowered – as long as the social and economic cost is not too high.
Table 4.2.11  Proposed rank and type of centres.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank Type of centre</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Social and economic services</th>
<th>Public utilities</th>
<th>Type of road</th>
<th>Radius of influence</th>
<th>Population in service area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Primary</td>
<td>region, district</td>
<td>hospital, secondary school, reg./district headquarters commercial centre</td>
<td>Piped water supply, public electricity</td>
<td>trunk road, territorial main road</td>
<td>75 km</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Secondary</td>
<td>division</td>
<td>rural health centre, primary school, training centre, divisional headquarters, trading centre</td>
<td>Piped / water supply</td>
<td>local main road</td>
<td>25 km</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Tertiary</td>
<td>ward</td>
<td>dispensary, primary school, ward headquarters</td>
<td>adequate water supply</td>
<td>regional road</td>
<td>10 km</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Quaternary</td>
<td>local</td>
<td>primary school</td>
<td>water supply</td>
<td>unclassified road, track</td>
<td>5 km</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lower order</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>village school, primary society, cooperative village, dip/cattle trough</td>
<td>water supply</td>
<td>minor track</td>
<td>2.5 km</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.  Organisational and institutional learning coming into view: constructivist pragmatism thrown into gear

4.3.1.  Introduction to social learning in Rada-case'

During the 1970s and 1980s conversations and field testing continued regarding foreign-aided ‘integrated’ rural development planning (= IRDP). This has been conjured up by emic-cum-etic life-stories of ‘armchair’ scientists and by an interconnected series of case-studies put in perspective. Both inner and outer frames of LADPM-minds likewise continued to be recasted, as if ancient myths about Icarus’ ‘reckless flight and Prometheus’ betterment of mankind were still being reabsorbed all along our collective North → South route. So it happened, – as experimented with in preceding RIDEP-cases of Shinyanga and Iringa Regions in Tanzania-, that both indigenous and expatriate practitioners of necessity pressed hard for reduction in over-reaching planning and implementation ambitions. This was overtly expressed by limiting – initially – the intersectoral packages of rural-cum-urban plan ingredients, by staggered rolling-budget time horizons and by wisely cutting down to ‘appropriate’ number and size the planning areas concentrated on, – successively at the level of farming villages, (sub)district towns and of regions/provinces in their entirety.

Along the same strand, the initially ‘quick and dirty’ but visible ‘hardware’ components like water supply and transport infrastructure were being de-emphasised. This happened in favour of people-oriented, social services like health and education, but above all environmental protection, as well as of such ‘software’ as internal bureaucratic reorientation and professional capacity improvement. Altogether these fell in line with western (‘iron-cage’) development administration and an open-minded, sometimes false-bottom attitude towards plan-performance monitoring and impact.
evaluation. Of necessity, again conceptually, border-lands were thus run into, – as reflected upon later on during the 1990s, of the functionally (de-) centralised, legislative and polity domain encompassing politico-institutional reforms from micro- to macro- and even global levels of ‘good governance’ (Helmsing, 2000, chapter 6; Riggs, 2000: Basic parameters in exporting good governance). To be remembered from subsection 2.1.3 were also the multitude of personality traits and dispositions, both of field practitioners and scholars alike, being clearly enrolled inside their own unfolding and fluctuating psycho- and operational milieux. Refer back to our reader’s guide of section 2.0: propositions P. 6 and P. 7.

Therefore, for the time being, could not be overlooked in foreign-donor designs for ‘sustainable’ IRDP-projects the conceptual aids as alternately used for ‘organisational learning’, – and visualised by single and double loops of figure 2.2.0 at the beginning of section 2.2 for instance. So, by putting its own self-made fabrications below in perspective, our mingled LADPM-flotilla continued faithfully its course during the 1970s and 1980s, being guided by the quasi-universal image of ‘big government’ served by scientific management and rational, Weberian bureaucrats. From complementary angles already lurking around the corner since the 1920/30s, however, came along in the industrialising Northern hemisphere other cross-disciplinary outlooks driven by such leading constructs and metaphors:

* as dynamic inter-personal group behaviour, linked horizontally and vertically by interlocked working committees, cooperative unions and associations, for instance;
* as ‘satisficing’ man in plural and disjointed, social settings, leading both to incremental ‘muddling through’ and double-barrelled ‘mixed-scanning’;
* as symbolically meaningful culture constituting socio-political arenas of power struggles, elite accommodation and conflict resolution;
* as self-regulating open organisations like the human brains, central and peripheral nervous system, – put on a par with information processing man in safely embracing ‘cocooning’ both his/her inner and outer mental space.

Under-girdings for shifting outlooks on collective learning, mobilisation and reforms: ‘winged horses on the hoof’ in time perspective

- Deel II. Theorie en praktijk van bestuurslijke organisatie, pp. 31-166: scientific management, Weberian bureaucracies, human relations, participative management, power and conflict, general systems theory.
The following sub-section 4.3.2 is to bring out by five paragraphs the amalgam of prevailing mental constructs, held both by area development planners and politicians, that was found in place in the capital Sana'a and at the remote IRDP-location in Rada North Yemen around 1980. This takes the format of a 'Plan of Operations' intended to build 'from the bottom upwards' by collective learning rounds, in professional vogue during these days. That is, although phased societal differentiation in a normative-valuing sense is grasped at later on in following para 4 along the horizontal axis of figure 4.3.4, first of all immediate direction is sought in paragraph (1) by figure 4.3.1: pinpointing the principal move from an operational towards a strategic modality of resource management. Linked-up, both figures 43.1 and 43.4 try to address clearly by three sequential leaps, as if urging upwards along the managerial staircase of figure 2.23, from their first beginning onwards the common IRDP-objectives: shifting in priority over time as 'pressure groups' of figure 4.3.3 change their (dis)positions and resource endowments. The latter resource use has been laid out in paragraph (5), leading up to selection of concentrated development areas and packages of figure 43.2. Again, not to be overlooked from inside could be changes 'underneath' in personal ethics (de-) emphasising but co-determining still the phased RIRDPI-implementation of short-term action projects built up towards a strategic area profile for 'modernising' Rada's socio-spatial fabric. Hereto were to be remembered from sub-section 2.1.1 moral imperatives oscillating between satisfying basic needs, striving for self-esteem and cultural/patrimonial localism, as well as for free and fair choices left for future generations. At the very same time, LADPM-knowledgeability was to be increasingly propelled by double-barrelled empathetic actor perspectives and by emancipatory plus solidarity drives, – as proposed in the classificatory devices of figures 2.1.2 -» 4 and leading up to 'participative management', – if any in the Rada-case.

Here, overt rivalry with sabre-rattling even, plus dogmatic wrestling among RIRDIP-parties formed daily food for renewed thought plus conflict resolution in all the three action fields I -» III of figure 4.3.4. So, it will be no small wonder, – by taking at the moment preceeding chapters 1 -» 3 in their entirety for granted -, to half-way cut short the long-winding story to be told along the lines of figure 4.1. Rule- and role-boundness of LADPM-steermanship in its shared theorising, its moral justifications and in its personal dispositions of loyalty vis-à-vis radical break-aways are thus put aside (: P.2-6). Instead of these normative dilemmas, strategic and operational issues are below touched upon, – as if hand-picked from our cheered orchard.

Fluctuations in the outflow of male emigrant-labour from Rada' – among other districts from all over North Yemen-, determined around 1980 very much off-farm incomes; see section 5.

Apart from refrigerators, radios, TV-sets and even automobiles bought, water-pumped qat production (by man) and vegetable growing (by women) thus scored high on the RIRDIP-agenda of market-oriented crops. In contradistinction, agro-livestock activities for local subsistence purposes represented a well-balanced rainfed system, tested on water conservation methods for generations already.

Physical infrastructure like water supply from boreholes and farm-to-market roads were locally demanded, – sometimes under threat of guns-, by sheiks and self-help village associations, c.q. LDAs. In the absence of responsive government machinery at

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9 Refer in Appendix 2.1.0 to: ' Eigen Gedachten'.

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provincial and district level, the Dutch bilateral RIRDP could only and solely fall in place institutionally by leaning upon 'something underneath'; that is, on community based resource mobilisation through 15%-30% sharing of construction costs and land property transfers for road building. In contra-distinction at international level during the Cold-War containment era, roads laid out towards the frontier between the conservative and liberal state of North Yemen and socialist South Yemen were closely watched on satellite images, – available at the instant to the USA-embassy in the capital city of Sana’a.

In conclusion, during the RIRDP-course of ten years, i.e. 1975-85, district implementation capacity improved in operational and maintenance sense through ad-hoc foreign consultancy, Dutch financial inputs but also training of indigenous Yemen staff. Strategic governance at the provincial level of Al-Bayda’, however, did not find its ‘properly’ coordinating niche, neither its divergent administrator / entrepreneur nor statesman/diplomat highly wanted for, as suggested at the end of section 4 in following ‘Plan of Operations’.

Executive Summary of main conclusions for parties directly engaged.

In this Plan of Operations\textsuperscript{10} 1981-1982, firstly, the institutional setting of the Rada’ Project is taken into view in order to reconcile the diverging IRD-standpoints (Integrated Rural Development) of the parties concerned; i.e. of the local, central Yemen, and Dutch authorities. These RIRDP-parties each play their own role in the four phases of collective RIRDP-development, as detailed later on in section 4:

Phase 1: initial phase of expansive start-up : 1977-1979
Phase 3: strategic phase of concentrated development areas : 1982-1983
Phase 4: outward-looking phase of innovative expansion at the level of the Al-Baida’ Governorate/province : 1984-1986

Next, in order to select and set strategic guidelines in Phase 3 for future RIRDP-activities, five Concentrated Development Areas (CDAs) are placed in a specific order of priority. Section 2 is based on the scoring methodology, explained later on in section 5 and applied to the Rada’ District, resulting in:

CDA no. 1 Al ‘Arsh/Wadi Hubabah;
CDA no. 2 South Western Plateau;
CDA no. 3 Wadi Tha;
CDA no. 4 Wadi Husun/Ar Rin;
CDA no. 5 Wadi Amad.

Finally, section 3 consequently shows, in matrix format, the service packages to be ascribed to the five CDAs of paragraph 2. These service packages, and supporting research and training activities, are sketched in detail in (excluded) chapters 6-12 where the five hard-core and four supporting RIRDP-sections present their own Plans of Action 1981-1982. In writing this Plan of Operations\textsuperscript{10} as a whole, three main parts have been distinguished:

PART I: dealing with strategic RIRDP-policy recommendations in following sections 1→5;

PART II: dealing with the hard-core RIRDP-sections of Agriculture and (6→9), (excl.) Livestock, Women’s Participation, Roads, and Water Supply;

PART III: dealing with the supporting RIRDP-sections of Socio-Economics, (excl.) (10→12) Administrative and General Services, Workshop, and Construction.

\textsuperscript{10} For Plan of Operations’ requirements refer to sub-section 4.4.3 later on.
(1) Four sequential RIRDP-development phases 1977-86

Falling back on the rather abstract explanations given later on in section 4, it can be concluded that, within the institutional RIRDP-setting, the following six parties play their own manifest roles:

2. Provincial, District and Local Development Authorities (=LDAs) in Rada’ Town;
3. Traditional leaders (Sheikhs/Aquils) in near-autonomous sub-districts;
4. Local village committees and associations, in the various zones of the Rada’ District;
5. RIRDP-section heads, scientifically backed up by EUROCONSULT, Arnhem;

These six parties have played, and will continue to play, their own roles during the four successive phases of RIRDP-development, as later on pictured in Figure 4.3.3 of section 4.

RIRDP-Phase 1 (1977-1979) made use of personal leadership skills and expansive establishment in the physical, socio-cultural and political Rada’ setting. During this phase operational and executive project decisions were required, which were directed towards solving local problems of a short-term character.

RIRDP-Phase 2 (1980-1981) emphasised the administrative and planning functions of internal project management. In the Yemen environment where organisational strength is negligible, standardisation and formalization minimal, and 'hit and run' approaches are often unavoidable, the project has had to consolidate itself through programme planning and standard controls.

RIRDP-Phase 3 (1982-1983) is typified by the project-management role with emphasis on diversification in the middle-term and strategic policy making. It demands both a considerable freedom of action and, at the same time, clear guidelines for all the RIRDP-parties.

In the Yemen situation, where at the provincial and lower government levels 'underneath' almost every kind of 'development administration' is absent, a project like RIRDP needs more than information and guidelines to be able to plan and succeed in the long run. It also needs to acquire a 'radar antenna' position from which it can itself produce guidelines and insights for future action, in addition to its 'direct, concrete' and short-term service activities. In this phase the latter should become increasingly integrated with each other and more effectively adapted to the development needs of the area.

Taking all this into account, proposals and recommendations have been made:

1. to continue applied research in order to improve the service of the sections aimed at the RIRDP-objectives of economic growth, and development of social and physical infrastructure;
2. to expand evaluation and monitoring, section by section, for purposes of learning and even amusement, in order to facilitate integration with the ongoing executive RIRDP-activities (see paragraph 3);
3. the Socio-Economic Section, in particular, is to guide strategically the Rada’ project as a whole by collecting and analysing information to arrive at:
   • the selection of concentrated development areas and villages (see paragraph 2, and 5 later on);
   • pre-investment studies in co-operation with specific RIRDP-sections, for bilateral or multilateral funding agencies.
4.3.2. RADA' Integrated Rural Development Project (=RIRDIP)

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE

KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

PLAN OF OPERATIONS, July 1981 – December 1982

LOCATION MAP
BERGER / KAMPSAY
<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project-Management Modes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Operational-Executive for Short-Term:</strong> 1-5 years?</td>
<td><strong>Convergent Administrator/Planner introducing programme planning and control</strong></td>
<td><strong>Entrepreneur improving service capacities and strategic project guidelines</strong></td>
<td><strong>Statesman/Diplomat institutionalising the Rada' project through a Steering Committee at provincial level</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Goal-Setting for Middle-Term:</strong> 7-10 years</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 4.3.1 Summary of RIRDP-Development Phases 1-4, and predominant Project-Management Modes, Roles and Activities.*

From following para 3, it is clear that there are outspoken contradictions between the normative ERD-concepts, long-term priorities and short-term preferences of all the parties concerned. The central Yemen authorities, strongly backed by provincial (governor) and local authorities and village committees, exercise much pressure on the project to extend its services to the provincial level, to increase or at least maintain its implementation capacities, and to increase its data collection on those subjects which can be translated into (pre-) feasibility reports (which in turn can be used to obtain funds for co-financing project activities in such fields as dam-building, larger-scale broiler production and road construction). On the Dutch side, however, there is apparently much hesitation for immediate commitments in this operational-executive direction, and a preference to support those activities which are in the field of strategic planning and advice. However, there is little use in planning and advising if implementing govt. agencies to plan for and advise to are non-existent at provincial and district levels.

**RIRDP-Phase 4 (1984-1986).** In order to bring the strategic guidelines for the project more in line with each other, emphasis should be laid on the dialogue with the relevant Yemen authorities. Therefore, in order to find out which ideas about Rada' development are held by the technical implementation agencies and government departments at the central level, the Steering Committee was proposed (see appendix 4.3.1.). This Committee would be formed at the level of the Al-Baida' province with representatives of various ministries and under the probable chairmanship of the governor. Here again it appears that another type of public management is required: that of the
statesman/diplomat whose skills are primarily in perceiving and normatively interpreting the broadening RIRDP-environment in order to select "task spaces" through a Steering Committee. That is, horizontally cutting across the functionally and vertically structured government departments at central, and eventually provincial and district levels.

(2) Five concentrated development areas (CDAs)

In line with the main project tasks, as taken together in preceding para 1 and Figure 4.3.1., in particular regarding strategic development phase 3, data have been collected and are reported in para 5 by the Socio-Economic Section. The scoring methodology applied to the village infrastructure in the Rada' District, and explained points 1-7 of section 5, has resulted in distinguishing a geographical zone with intermediate development potentials. From this 'intermediate' zone five areas have been strategically selected for concentrated RIRDP-activities; refer to priority-area selection methodology in sub-section 4.2.2, and later on in 4.5.2. The following three steps have been taken to select five CDAs with a distinct order of priorities.

Step 2.1 Selection and Scoring of Discriminating Factors

Careful screening of the available data for the Rada' District has led to Table 4.3.1, which shows the scores attached to the classified characteristics of six variables to be grouped as follows:

2+3. Natural Resource Base (Univ. Press, Tables 2.2 and 4.5)
4. Social Infrastructure
5+6. Physical Infrastructure

Table 4.3.4 given in following section 5, shows the final scores given to 141 Rada' villages.

Step 2.2 Selection of 'intermediate' villages: adage of 'first things first'.

By adding up the separate scores for the 141 villages, without any complementary weight, a final score was reached ranging from two to eighteen points, as shown in Table 4.3.4. It was realised that:

- in the most backward villages (scoring 2-5.5) RIRDP-development efforts would have long gestation periods of more than five years;
- in the most advanced villages (scoring 8-18) RIRDP-activities would be directed towards the already favoured qat zone in the Rada' District.

Therefore, it was decided to concentrate the RIRDP-efforts on the 'intermediate' zone with final village scores between 6 and 7.5 points. In this zone the largest number of people can be reached who are relatively deprived of social and physical infrastructure, but sufficiently endowed with natural resources for agricultural and livestock development with help from outside.
Table 4.3.1. Summary of Discriminating Factors and their Scores (see Table 4.3.4 in section 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Distribution/ Settlemen Sizes</th>
<th>Soc</th>
<th>Co</th>
<th>Ro</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100-250 Inhabitants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250-500 Inhabitants</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-1000 Inhabitants</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-2000 Inhabitants</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-10000 Inhabitants</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Step 2.3 Selection of Five CDAs in the Intermediate Zone

Financial resources, means of transport and qualified governmental manpower available for integrated rural development in the Rada’ District are scarce. Without fully neglecting other parts of the district, RIRDPA-activities are preferably to be directed towards the following five concentrated development areas:

CDA no. 1. Al ‘Arsh/Wadi Hubabah
Seven ‘intermediate’ villages can be reached from the Extension Centre in Draibah

CDA no. 2. South Western Plateau (Sabah)
Seventeen ‘intermediate’ villages can be reached from the proposed Extension Centre.

CDA no. 3. Wadi Tha.
Five ‘intermediate’ villages can be reached from the proposed Extension Centre.

CDA no. 4. Wadi Husun/Ar Rin.
Five “intermediate” villages can be reached from the proposed (rangeland) Extension Centre.

CDA no. 5. Wadi Amad/Wadi Mansur
One “intermediate” village can be reached here.

(3) Strategic guidelines for the five CDAs

In rural development ‘Integrated’ could be interpreted in two ways:

• Coordination of (non-)governmental agencies in a multi-sectoral, inter-organisational and budgetary sense. In the specific Rada’ case this has been translated into bringing together and reconciling the six RIRDP-parties at the level of the Al-Baida’ Governorate: see the phased institutional RIRDP-development in sections. 1 and 4, as well as the Dutch and Yemen Budgets 1981-1982 presented in Tables 4.3.2 and 4.3.3.

• Synchronisation of various bodies of scientific knowledge and professional specialisation, preferably area-wise. In Rada’ District this means that the five selected CDAs are to geographically integrate the services and supporting research activities of the five hard-core RIRDP-Sections. These activities have been derived from excluded chapters 6-9 of PART II and are brought together, as service packages in Figure 4.3.2. This does not mean, however, that outside the five CDAs other parts of the Rada’ District will not be given RIRDP-attention during the coming years of the Plan of Operations.
Figure 4.3.2 leads to the following strategic guidelines for Rada's integrated rural development service packages to be delivered.

(a) Extension and veterinary services by the Agriculture and Livestock RIRDP-Sections, concentrated on cereal and fodder production (sorghum, wheat, alfalfa), serve the ultimate IRD-objective of strengthening and protecting the economic resource base in all the CDAs.

(b) Extension and veterinary services by the Agriculture, Livestock and Women's Participation Sections, concentrated on vegetable production and the chicken programme, serve the IRD-objective of income generation for rural women in CDAs nos. 1, 4 and 5.

(c) Construction and maintenance of drinking-water supply systems and feeder roads within and between villages by the Water-Supply and Road Sections, serve the ultimate ERD-objective of improving the living conditions through physical infrastructure in the CDAs nos. 1, 2 and 3; refer to respective policy options in sub-section 2.2.3.

(d) Rangeland management studies, including tree production trials, by the Agriculture and Livestock Sections are to serve the ecological IRD-objective of protecting the natural resource base in the CDAs nos. 1 and 5.

(e) The same objective is considered for all CDAs in (ground)water management research for irrigated agriculture and drinking-water supply, to be carried out by the Agriculture and Water-Supply Sections: there will be border strip and sprinkler irrigation trials, and groundwater-level and flood measurements in wadi's for dam construction.

(f) Village surveys by the Socio-Economic Section, including traffic counts, in cooperation with all the hard-core RIRDP-Sections, are to lead to the determination of needs in the five CDAs for:
   • social and physical infrastructure (schools, health clinic, roads, drinking-water supply);
   • local village associations (= LDA's).

Both the general and specific information collected is to result in pre-feasibility studies for:
• off-farm employment opportunities, including the required training facilities;
• dam-construction sites;
• feeder roads to be designed and built;
• installation of drinking-water supply systems, etc.

For all these guidelines, broken down in specific services and research activities per section and CDA as shown above in Figure 4.3.2, recurrent and capital RIRDP-budgets have been calculated as presented later on in Tables 4.3.2/3.

The project submitted a budget totalling YR 13.75 million. This budget was diminished to YR 10.54 million by the Ministry of Agriculture (=MoA). This amount was then forwarded to the Ministry of Finance. This Ministry cut it again to 6.3 million on the arguments that a) total project expenditure up to July 1981 was too low to justify the requested amount, and b) heavy equipment and great investments should be paid from Dutch funds, as is understood from the agreement between the two countries; refer to appendix 4.3.1.

Since two important tenders on the Yemen budget did not materialise earlier than in August, the argument on project expenditure cannot be upheld. Since The Netherlands refused to pay for heavy equipment and a new office, and the MoA sees no alternative
than to proceed with the purchase of such equipment for the Road Section, this Ministry has announced that it will maintain its proposed budget. For this purpose arbitration from the Prime Minister's Office as well as from the Governor will be requested if needed. The recalculated budget of a total of YR 10.54 million is given in Table 4.3.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CDA</th>
<th>Ch. 4 AGRICULTURE</th>
<th>Ch. 5 LIVESTOCK</th>
<th>Ch. 6 WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION</th>
<th>Ch. 7 DRINKING WATER</th>
<th>Ch. 8 ROADS</th>
<th>Ch. 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic Serv. For Improvement</td>
<td>Supporting Research</td>
<td>Promotional - Commodity Yrt. Serv. For Improvement</td>
<td>Introduced by</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA no. 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non. 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In sorghum, wheat and vegetable production</td>
<td>Directed towards improvement of quality and size of vegetables &amp; oil seeds</td>
<td>In intensive milk production + extensive meat production + election programmes</td>
<td>4. Adult education - training women on the Use of Spinning wheels</td>
<td>Construction of schools, lyceums, Piping Systems, Pump Installation, Rose-silage, etc. in School Villages</td>
<td>Recording and measuring of rainfall, groundwater levels, Drinking Water Quality, Irrigation Water Quality &amp; Erythritol, Fish resources in Wadi's and Dam (Hill) Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA no. 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non. 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In wheat production</td>
<td>Ideas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of Road from Sudan to Fug-han Town</td>
<td>Construction of Road from Wadi to Enna - Seneh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA no. 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non. 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In sorghum, wheat and fruit tree production</td>
<td>Ideas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of Road from Wadi to Enna - Seneh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA no. 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>non. 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In sorghum, wheat and vegetable production</td>
<td>Ideas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of Road from Wadi to Enna - Seneh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA no. 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>non. 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In sorghum, wheat and vegetable production</td>
<td>Ideas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of Road from Wadi to Enna - Seneh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

↔Mutual relationships between Service and Research Packages in Five Rada's CDAs

Figure 4.3.2. Integrated Service and Research Packages for Five CDAs in Rada's District.
Table 4.3.2  Budget for the Dutch funds of the project: 1 July 1981 to 31 December 1982 (in Dfl. 1000).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I  Salaries</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Gen. Expenses</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1347.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Buildings</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>740</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Roads + Water</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>1.842</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Equipment</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>218</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Lands</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Transport</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1408</td>
<td>2007.5</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>5350.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This budget is presented according to Items of the Yemen system. Expenses of expatriate manpower, air travel, insurances, as well as posts which possibly will be used for expatriate manpower (miscellaneous) and training are presented separately.

Table 4.3.3.  Provisional budget for the Yemen funds of the project: 1 January 1982 until 31 December 1982 (in YR 1000).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I  Salaries</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>621(^1)</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>3500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Gen. Expenses</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>107(^2)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Buildings</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>490(^3)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-(^a)</td>
<td>1010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Roads + Water</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>1.268</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Equipment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Land</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>255(^4)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Transport</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1106</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>3244</td>
<td>2047</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1307</td>
<td>1208</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>10540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 = Incl. Miscellaneous,
2 = mostly under Item V,
3 = extension centre under construction,
4 = mostly under Item IV,
5 = 490 taken from Item IV, originally for new office,
6 = land for new office.
(4) Development of External RIRDP-Integration

In order to place the four phases of institutional RIRDP-development in a proper time perspective, first, the 'partners' in rural development are positioned in the triangular field of tension given in Figure 4.3.3. Next, a sketch is presented of public decision making in general, by distinguishing three modes of public resource management and five distinct decision-making processes, which work simultaneously at various government levels.

Finally, the first two modes of collective decision making have led to the suggestion of four RIRDP-development phases within the institutional Yemen setting, as found in Figure 4.3.1.

The field of tension between RIRDP-parties

The relationships, and also the tensions and controversies between the RIRDP-parties can be placed in a triangular field of tension, in which the dynamic relationships between the RIRDP-parties are described by the arrows, as shown in Figure 4.3.3.

This picture can be explained by a description of the stakeholding parties; the numbers between brackets refer to the differentiation made in preceding paragraph 1.

(1, 2, 3) Central policy makers and chief administrators of both the Yemen and Dutch Government promote their own rural development objectives vigorously. Strengthening the economic resource base in agriculture and animal husbandry, and reinforcing the implementation capacity of the government administration appear to be mainly adhered to by the Yemen administrative headquarters in the capital, Sana’a. At the governorate and district levels of Al-Baida’ and Rada’, however, the delivery of water-supply systems and feeder roads are considered more important in the short run.

(4) Finally, all these parties contribute towards solving problems of the rural and urban underprivileged.

(5.1) The RIRDP-activities are principally aimed at all these IRD-objectives together. After having concentrated on RIRDP-expansion during the start-up phase (1977-1979), the heads of the nine RIRDP-Sections are now directed towards consolidation (1980-1981). The following two project phases will be of strengthening the service and research capacity in some concentrated development areas (CDAs) in the Rada’ District (1982-1983), and eventually in the Al-Baida’ governorate (1984-1986); see preceding paragraphs 2 and 3.

(5.2) After establishing facts and data, -preferably in the emphathetic manner of this Annex, - researchers, trainers and surveyors will make their knowledge available to decision makers, Rada’ project planners, and ultimately to rural and urban target groups living in the various geographical zones of the Rada’ district as analyzed in paragraph 5.

(6) The Dutch authorities have been emphasizing the improvement of the quality of life of the underprivileged, taking into account long-term ecological (range-land and groundwater) and agricultural growth considerations. Time and again tensions built up during RIRDP-evaluation sessions in 1979 and 1981, whereby parties could be reconciled on two or three of the four objectives for integrated rural development (IRD) but seldom on all four.

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Politicians, Administrators, Local Leaders, promoting personal and collective rural development objectives a-d

Rural/Urban Target groups within critical problem areas of RADA District

Hard-Core Activities

Supporting Activities

Agric. Livest. W.S. Roads Women

Researchers and Trainers with their complementary / antagonistic bodies of scientific knowledge. Refer to figure 2.2.1

Mutual relationships and tensions

Figure 4.3.3. Triangular field of RIRDP-Relationships, refer back to Figure 2.1.1.

Modes and processes of public resource management (refer to procedural figure 2.2.3 of chapter 2, including its practical note)

The RIRDP-parties, represented by their own negotiators, play their public resource management roles simultaneously at different levels (international, regional/provincial, local/project) according to three modes of collective decision making, differentiated as shown in Figure 4.3.4.

III Operational-executive, short-term resource management: ideally clustered at micro-levels of local government, village associations and sub-local project within a 3-5 years' time perspective.

II Strategic-intermediary, middle-term resource management: predominantly clustered at regulative meso-levels of regional and provincial administrations and voluntary development associations and cooperatives within a period of 7-10 years.

I. Normative-valuing, long-term resource management: ideally clustered at macro-levels of (inter)national government administrations including their departments and business corporations, with a time horizon over 10 years.

Besides these three basic modes of public resource management which are supposed to be simultaneously at work on all governmental levels, there are five decision-making processes which dominate the scene of the three basic management arenas:

A. More or less fragmented Policy Making regarding economic, social and physical infrastructures in rural areas;

B. Sectoral Programme Planning regarding scarce resources like capital, manpower, land and water, public decision-making powers. This follows Policy Making in the various rural development arenas, i.e. III, II and I;
C. Communication and coordination regarding decisions made within a vertically organized, or horizontal project-management structure;
D. Control regarding the implementation of decisions collectively made through standardization and enforcement of norms, laws, regulations, salary scales, etc.;
E. Evaluation or re-appraisal of the results of the collective decision-making processes A-D.

The modes and processes characterize the public management roles played by the RIRDP-parties in triangular Figure 4.3.3. A phased approach towards institutional RIRDP-development is proposed hereafter on the basis of Figure 4.3.4. The RIRDP-parties are presented horizontally, while the 'playing decks' show the differentiated collective management activities from implementation and maintenance to reconnaissance activities of the parties concerned. Figure 4.3.4 is not to be interpreted so that public resource management modes III-I and, playing decks III-I typify the individual 'RIRDP-partners in development' separately and solely. The modalities and roles played are at work simultaneously, and predominate only the successive Rada’-project phases.

<table>
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<th>Key to Decision making functions in Figure 4.3.4.</th>
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Four phases of institutional RIRDP-development (refer to Ansoff, 1969, pp. 61-72; Veenstra, 1971, pp. 110-119)


Within relatively closed, local communities traditional leaders such as sheiks and aqils hold the reins in day-to-day village management, sometimes directing and controlling autocratically or charismatically. Communication between those governing and those governed remains relatively direct and personal. However, during the last decades relatively clear-cut differentiations have been observed in Yemen with respect to the tasks of:

- ad-hoc village committees with openly conflicting, cultural and socio-economic development perspectives (A);
- government machineries at national, provincial and district levels, which are slowly becoming organized along formal lines of command, but predominantly concerned with stability through control (D).

During the initial stage (III) of organizational growth both of public administrations and local village institutions, a great premium is put on the quality of authoritarian leadership, the ability to communicate and the skill to identify the best abilities in people, and to motivate them personally to exercise these abilities to the fullest. In short, getting things done through people instead of formal organizations.
Figure 4.3.4  Phased development of relationships between RIRDP-parties and overlapping resource management modes (refer back to Figures 2.2.3/6, and in Annex C to Figure C.3: Bottom-up vs. Top-down pictures).
In day-to-day confrontation with their own operational milieux, Yemen key decision makers are to assess the need for internal organizational strength as negligible, since standardization and formalization are minimal. For internal changes, temporary measures are taken, (such as staff meetings and calling in outside consultants), or financial resources are temporarily allocated in the form of ad-hoc (IRD-) projects lasting not longer than five years: “Hit/Miss then Run” occur frequently, but “Law and Order” make the rule.

In contrast, but also complementary to this regular Yemen administrative milieu, the Rada' project had made a start, first to expand and later on to consolidate itself through programme planning (B) and standard controls (D); thus the RIRDP is focused internally on performance and its measurement, rather than on intuitive human attitudes and responses (C). This calls for the inward-looking role of the convergent manager-administrator with an objective understanding of the internal workings of the RIRDP-organization, and of the operational variables (manpower, capital, functional division of tasks) which are critical to its success.

Programme planning (B) calls for another role of the management: skill in designing an organizational structure relating (groups of) people to resources, and thus maximizing the RIRDP-organization's achievements. Within this formal structure the manager-planner develops guidelines and regulations, programmes, plans of action and budgets which will assure a correct functioning of the structure in meeting the ultimate IRD-objectives: i.e. preservation of the economic resource base through the Agriculture and Livestock Sections, and delivery of services through the Sections of Roads, Water-Supply, Women’s Participation and Socio-Economic Surveys.

II. Predominantly Strategic RIRDP-Management: 1982-1986

Three conclusions can be drawn from the institutional RIRDP-setting as sketched above.

Firstly, forced by socio-economic changes induced from inside and outside, communities in the Rada’-area are increasingly becoming adrift. They are with sabre-rattling frank about their short-term needs, which are made known through their village committees and other local associations. Secondly, the central Yemen government is becoming hierarchically organized and split up according to the specialised management functions (A-E), and technical knowledge and skills vested in departments and (semi-) public corporations. Finally, after an initial pioneering and expansive period (1977-1979) the Rada’ project has been internally consolidated (1980-1981), based on the Plans of Action 1980-1981 of the various Sections, as supported by specification of functions and internal regulations.

It should be noted that antagonistic forces are at work here. On the one hand, 'naturally' following from ongoing processes of nation building, ministerial government departments in Yemen are organizing themselves vertically and centrally in the capital city of Sana'a. On the other hand, the Rada’ project is considered to be a temporary measure, by the Dutch authorities, which delivers regular governmental services and consultancy advice to integrated rural development at provincial and district levels, where the central Yemen governmental departments are poorly represented, or non-existent.

Whereas in mode III, management roles have been predominantly oriented towards short-term delivery of services, in mode II the entrepreneur-manager is now directed on
middle-term and strategic policy making (A) in order to cope with a continuously changing environment. Strategic policy making is to produce guidelines for public action directed at the future. This process (A) again follows five decision-making steps, as seen in Figure 4.3.4. The other processes can also be divided into decision-making steps.

A.1 Definition of the development problems at hand.
A.2 Systematic analysis of the situation in order to visualize facts and estimates, but also values when these are part of the situation and relevant to a subsequent choice.
A.3 Delineation and calculation of known alternative courses of action, carried out in two steps:
- isolation and description of known alternative courses of action;
- establishment of the consequences of alternative courses of action.
A.4 Deliberation through an eventual redefinition of the development problem, and an appraisal of the known alternative courses of action.
A.5 Conscious selection of guidelines for public action.

An innovative RIRDP-Section for Socio-Economic Surveys, has been established for steps A.2-A.4. This section will carry out scientific data collection, analysis and reporting of information useful in the overall management system, both in an operational (III) and strategic sense (II). As far as government administration as a whole is concerned, an illustration has been given by Figures 2.2.6/7 in ch. 2. In these procedural charts a conventional series of policy-making decisions (A), sectoral studies, surveys and programme planning activities (B) are presented in a logical sequence referring to:
- The national level of resource management mainly concerned with national development problems, objectives, sector surveys and programmes, budgets and man-power, etc.;
- The regional level of resource management mainly concerned with rural/urban development problems, goals, priority areas, population and employment projections, survey of settlement patterns, social, economic and physical development potentials and infrastructures, administrative organization and finance, etc.;
- The local project level considering the feasibility, design, implementation and maintenance of bundles of projects in the various regional sectors such as agriculture, livestock, water-supply, roads, etc.

Clearly, a time span of 5-10 years is needed to complete this series of staff activities; that is, to strategically guide IRD-operations in the various regions of the Yemen Arab Republic, whereby central guidelines for regional and provincial planning and control (B+D) are to be conceived and distributed, and are to be administratively implemented through successive Five-Year Plans, sector by sector.

Turning now from the central Yemen government level to the Rada' project, falling under the sectoral regime of the Ministry of Agriculture, the following steps in the RIRDP-history are to be faced, which are strategically directed outwards.

There are three categories of 'radar antenna' information which should be given attention by the specific RIRDP-subsystems (refer to figure 4.3.2.):
- **Applied research**, i.e. field tests are to be continued in order to improve the servicing operations of the various Sections aiming at IRD-objectives of economic growth and infrastructure. See the Plans of Action in Part II of this report.
- **Evaluation and monitoring** is to be expanded section by section for purposes of learning, and even amusement, in order to become more integrated with the ongoing executive RIRDP-activities.
The Socio-Economic Section in particular is to strategically guide the Rada' project as a whole by collection and analysis of information aimed at:
- the selection of concentrated development areas and villages;
  see paragraphs 2 and 3;
- pre-investment studies, in cooperation with specific RIRDP-sections, for purposes of co-financing by bilateral or multilateral funding agencies.

Although the parties indicated at the strategic playing deck II of Figure 4.3.4. are far from behaving according to the conventional 'routing' for rural/regional development planning, it might be concluded that the Rada' IRD-project is taking 'logical' steps to:
- regularly define sectoral and overall Rada' development problems properly;
- analyze the Rada' situation systematically; that is to say, village by village, and zone by zone;
- delineate alternative courses of action, either on the institutional RIRDP-setting or on the concentration of development activities on certain zones and villages;
- appraise the known alternative courses of action, either on the institutional RIRDP-development or on the area-wise socio-economic development;
- propose guidelines for public action: the Steering Committee at Rada' /Al-Baida' Governorate level in an institutional sense, as well as the concentrated development areas and villages in a socio-economic and geographical sense, are illustrative cases.

I. Predominantly normative -valuing RIRDP-Management

Arriving at the most abstract and detached dimension of IRD, it must be emphasised again that the different Rada' IRD-phases and steps do not represent a sequence in time, but a difference in focus or attention during RLRDP-development. Operational-executive matters predominantly crop up during the start-up (1977-1981): expansion and consolidation. Strategic policy making (A.1-5) will dominate the scene during the coming years, on the one hand supported by, and in direct contact with, the regular servicing capacity of the project (III). On the other hand, normative long-term decision making also has its influence: playing deck I deals with searching and establishing values, norms and objectives which are consistent with development problems of a changing environment. This involves penetration into areas of human value dynamics, of economic, social and ecological development objectives, and so on. This indicates a norm-seeking field of tension for selection and definition of IRD-objectives among and between the parties concerned (See Figures 4.3.3. and 4.3.4.).

World-wide, but also 'tailored' to the Rada' case in the Yemen Arab Republic, the ultimate IRD-objectives can be summed up as follows:

a) Raise productivity in the rural sector, of which agriculture may be the main activity in most Third-World countries at their initial stages of development. This economic growth objective has been translated in the Rada' case as: to strengthen or preserve the economic resource base of the area.

b) Ensure equitable income distribution and provide sufficient employment opportunities. This distributive objective has been formulated in the Rada' project as: to contribute to the achievement of a minimum level of the quality of life for the total population in the area.

c) Establish better social, economic and physical infrastructures in the rural areas, and ensure that the majority of the rural people benefit from them. In the Rada' area this means: to contribute to the development of hard-core social and physical infrastructure in the area.
d) Institutionalize political and administrative capability, including decisive participation of rural people in decision making and in collective activities. In the Rada'/Yemen case this means emphasizing in the long run the organizational and technical implementation capacity of the government administration at local levels, i.e. of its own soft-ware.

It has to be accepted as a part of daily human life that all the four IRD-objectives can never be fully implemented at the same time and the same place. This holds especially for such antagonistic values as:

- the individualistic concept of economically gainful action (a); Firey, 1960, Man,
- the social concept of income redistribution (b/c); } Mind and Land,
- the ecological concept of preservation of natural resources (e); Chs. II en IX

Here it appears that again another role of the public manager is coming to the foreground: that of the statesman-general manager whose skills are primarily in perceiving and normatively interpreting the broadening RIRDP-environment for selection of "task spaces". Public choices involving economic, social, political and cultural changes in order to carry out extensive public projects to fight rural poverty, (for instance through the proposed provincial Steering Committee), must be made. This statesman-manager, assessing the need for change as continuous and major, will tend to differentiate innovative and anticipatory subsystems clearly, and integrate them closely into the inter-organizational network as a whole; see the inter-organizational field of Figures 4.3.3/4.

Finally, it appears that many RIRDP-decisions will be of such a breadth, that all the management roles (traditional leader, administrator, planner, entrepreneur and statesman) will be in demand at all levels of governmental administration, simultaneously and continuously.

(5) Selection of RIRDP – Development areas (refer to earlier sub-section 4.2.2 as well with CDAs)

The Rada' District is characterised by socio-economic features such as a high emigration rate (one of the highest in the country) and a low potential for improvements in traditional agriculture (due to the low average yearly rainfall which in addition is very irregularly spread over the successive years). Both characteristics are probably linked to each other. Besides the common features, there are differences within the district as well. The population is not evenly spread in the district, nor are the social services in as much as they are provided. Accessibility to most villages is low, with the exception of the villages near the asphalt road Dhamar-Rada'-Al-Baida' and a few main feeder roads. The Dhamar-Al-Baida' Road was officially inaugurated in 1980. The main source of livelihood, besides income from emigrant-workers in South Arabia, is agriculture and livestock keeping which, in the greater part of the district, is linked to agriculture and in a sense subordinate to it. Agriculture is unevenly developed. At one extreme it is well developed with high investments in deep boreholes for irrigation, has 'modern' labour relationships, and is market oriented. The stimulant qat is mainly produced and vegetables. The other extreme is a subsistence agriculture, which is mostly rainfed with limited irrigation only, and traditional tenant relationships. Another differentiating factor is the extent to which the existing agriculture can be developed further with outside help, i.e. by an extension service.

Scoring methodology

To some of the differentiating factors a score has been given and combined to form one final score. Those areas with an intermediate final score, that is those areas where the
largest possible number of people are reached, who are relatively deprived of social services and where further development of agriculture and livestock is possible with help from outside, are the areas on which the RIRDP should preferably concentrate its activities.

One more differentiating factor which is very important is the participation of the population in socio-economic development efforts. The presence in a village of a local self-help association, on which the LDA organization (= Local Development Association) is based, should have been measured in a separate score and included in the final score. This could not be effectuated, as only aggregate data on a provincial level were available to the RIRDP.

All scores including the final score are discussed separately and in more detail in the following paragraphs. A basic map shows the population distribution and the network of roads and tracks in the district. Furthermore a special map is added for each score, including the final one, -altogether being excluded from this paragraph 5.

Besides the final score the division of the district in 7 subdistricts, should be taken into account in defining project policies. The district level is the lowest level of central government administration. The subdistrict is the highest level – the most encompassing unit – of an organization based on a completely different set of principles: tribal structure. Each subdistrict is a fairly autonomous entity. Some subdistricts have one influential sheikh at their top; others have two or more important sheikhs, who often are each other’s rivals for priority setting in their area. A subdistrict with two sheikhs also has two political-administrative centres. The influence of these sheikhs affects all the aspects of life, and consequently every effort for socio-economic development. Notwithstanding the influence of the sheikhs, the basic unit in the subdistrict is the village or a cluster of two or three smaller settlements. Each village resembles an independent republic, sovereign in its own territory. Mapped out, the subdistricts were shown of Rada’ District with their centre or centres, which are in fact the home village of the most important sheikh or sheikhs. Please, compare with the micro-role of parent villages and chiefdom towns in sub-section 4.1.2 on Sierra Leone’s regionalisation, as ‘lived by’ in procedural sense and taken together in an exemplary box of sub-section 2.2.1.

One final remark has to be made. Our indication of the areas and the villages on which to concentrate project activities in the Rada’ District has been based on limited and often scarce information. Yet compared with the level of information we had before the RIRDP started, significant progress has been made. This becomes even clearer if the same exercise that has been reported here, should be repeated for the Al-Baida’ province as a whole. We know that the population and agriculture are concentrated somewhere around Al-Baida’ town and in Juban, but there is no map on which villages and settlements are indicated. There is also no information whatsoever about social services, agricultural areas etc. Therefore if the project is to be enlarged and policies have to be defined for the Al-Baida’ Governorate as a whole, this information should be collected in 1983.

Population c.q Settlement Score

The population of the project area, can be divided into 5 categories scored according to the total number of inhabitants of the towns and villages. These 5 categories/scores are: medium towns with 2.000 to 10.000 inhabitants, small towns with 1.000 to 2.000

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11 Refer to: Hoff, R.H. (1981), Noord-Yemen. Landendocumentatie nr. 3. KIT, Amsterdam, ch. 4.
inhabitants, large settlements with 500 to 1,000 inhabitants, medium settlements with 250 to 500 inhabitants and small settlements with 100 to 250 inhabitants; refer to Table 4.2.11 in preceding sub-section 4.2.2.

These 5 categories account for 84.1% of the total district population. The smallest settlements with less than 100 inhabitants, which are left out here, only account for 15.9% of the population despite their large number (283 of the 424 villages and settlements in the district). The data are based on the 1975 census. A breakdown below the district level of the figures of the 1981 census is not available. Furthermore, this census was meant for the election of the members in Parliament, so its results might be less suitable for other purposes.

Although the population has increased in the last 6 years, we have assumed that population growth, emigration, rural-urban and intra-rural migration has not significantly altered the proportions of the population distribution in the district.

The list of villages and settlements (see Table 4.3.4) was taken from the CPO brochure on the 1975 census in the Al-Baida' province. Not all the villages and settlements in this brochure are on the map made by the RIRDP. Instead of the theoretical 84.1%, 73.9% of the total population is actually accounted for in our scoring exercise. For the subdistricts the percentage is: Ar-Riyashiyah 80.6%, Al-'Arsh 91%, Rada' 91.8%, Sabah 91%, Qaifah Al Ghunaim 37.6%, Qaifah Muhsin Yazid 50.7% and Qaifah Al Mahdi 47.9%.

The percentage of the population that is accounted for differs substantially in the different subdistricts, because the population is more dispersed in the Northern and Eastern parts of the district where natural resources are very limited. These parts have been less well mapped.

However, as the aim of the RIRDP is to concentrate its activities on, and to reach, as many people as possible, the population score serves its purpose.

Social Services

Two scores are used to measure the level of 'modern' social services in the villages and settlements. The first is based on the state of education that is offered, and the second on the quality of drinking-water supply systems. Unfortunately both scores are very rough. The education score measures modern education only and does not take into account the traditional system of qoranic schools and faqih teachers. This does not mean that this traditional system is useless, on the contrary. Furthermore, the score is based on the presence or absence of a school building. It should have been based on the way these buildings function: that is on the number of teachers (Yemen and non-Yemen) and their qualifications, the school equipment available, and the actual number of students, boys and girls, of class attendance, etc. As such detailed information is not available, at least not for the majority of the schools in the district, the score was limited in its measurement. The score measures secondary, preparatory and primary education, with a lower score for a primary school under construction (irrespective of the stage of construction and the prospects for a quick termination of the construction). The lowest score is for villages with no school at all.

The second score measures the quality of the 'modern' drinking-water supply system. The existing traditional systems with their qualities and their shortcoming are not taken into account. This score presumes that a modern drinking-water supply system encompasses the following elements: a collectively-owned shallow well or deep borehole which

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gives enough water of good quality, a pump and motor to raise the water to the central reservoir and finally a distribution network to lead the water to the houses. Such a system should be complemented by a sewage system as increased use of household water always leads to sewage problems. There is not a sewage system anywhere in the district as far as we know. Rada' Town is not an exception to this. Therefore, this element has been left out, as in general all hygienic aspects of the drinking-water supply system have had to be left out. This is most unfortunate, but a survey focused on related health aspect has not yet been completed; refer to water-related diseases in sub-section 4.2.2.

The score does take into account the planned boreholes for drinking water in the present RIRDP-programme, which started in the beginning of September, 1981. In general the score reflects the past activities of the RIRDP. Only partly however, as drinking-water supply systems have been improved by the villagers themselves without help, or with help from the IDA, the Ministry of Public Works or others. The score extends from zero to three.

Summary: The aim of the RIRDP is to improve the living conditions of the rural population and to concentrate its activities on those groups which are in the greatest need of improvement. The scores on schools and drinking-water measure the present state of social services. This notwithstanding the fact that day-to-day educational activities on a formal level, like health-care, are excluded from the RIRDP-programme proper.

Agriculture

The following criteria have been used to differentiate between the agricultural zones of the district.

1. crops grown;
2. availability of water, irrigation or rainfall;
3. intensive versus intensive agriculture;
4. relative importance of livestock and crop production;
5. climate, if different from the Al-Khabar climate, i.e. the measuring station;
6. market, or subsistence orientation;
7. prosperity of the area;
8. possibility for improvement with help from outside through an extension service.

These criteria are not independent and several of them overlap, but they are sufficient for a pragmatic division of the Rada' District. At the end of each description, a score is given to the zone using a 5 point scale.

Zone 1. Qat growing area West of Rada'.
Qat cultivation is the dominant economic activity, making this zone strongly market oriented and very wealthy. A very high proportion of the land is irrigated, mainly from boreholes. Score 5.

Zone 2. The North-Western Basalt Plateau.
A semi-desert zone with a very scattered crop production in a few places, where runoff water or irrigation is available. Sorghum is grown for subsistence. Livestock production is at least as important as agriculture. Score 1.

Zone 3. Wadi Tha.
Wadi Tha is a large oasis in the basalt plateau; it has permanent surface water for irrigation and very good wells. Sorghum, wheat, alfalfa and fruit trees are the main crops, the latter being grown for the Rada' market. Being a small and densely populated area, incomes from agriculture are probably not much higher than elsewhere. Score 4.
Zone 4. Area around Rada', Wadi Husun, Wadi Matar, extending into Wadi Ar Rin. In this area irrigation from shallow wells is important. Crops grown vary somewhat from place to place, and production for the market is important, except in the most distant areas. Alfalfa and vegetables are the main cash crops, sorghum is the dominant subsistence crop. Salinity of land and water is a problem in some places. In the southern parts livestock is of minor importance; towards the North it plays an increasingly important role, especially in the parts bordering the NW rangeland area. Score 3.

Zone 5. The North-Eastern Rangeland area. This is a semi-desert, with semi-nomad sheep and goat production and hardly any agriculture. Score 1.

Zone 6. Area between Wadi Mansur and Bani Zayed, along asphalt road. An area of scattered agriculture with a few somewhat larger wadis. Irrigation plays a role in some of the small wadis. Most crops are grown for subsistence only, but there is a little production of vegetables for the market. Score 1.

Zone 7. Wadi Mansur. A large wadi with some irrigation, but salinity may become a problem in some places. In some wells the water table is dropping dramatically. Sorghum is the dominant crop, but vegetables are becoming important. Livestock is very important and the area can be described as one of settled nomads. The climate seems somewhat warmer and dryer than at Al-Khabar, but run-off in general brings sufficient water to the fields, making the wadi an exporter of sorghum. Score 2.

Zone 8. Wadi Amad. A wadi north of Wadi Mansur with very good wells, but a level of agricultural development lower than in most other parts of the district. The population, present agriculture, and importance of livestock make it similar to Wadi Mansur, but vegetable production is more important here. Score 3.

Zone 9. The lower area south of Rada' (Al Arsh). Here settlements are large, making extension easier than elsewhere. Rainfed agriculture is of medium potential, but where wadi floods can be diverted yields are higher. Irrigation is important along the wadis. Sorghum and alfalfa are the main crops grown for subsistence only. Some steep valleys have frost-free fields which may become important for vegetable production as production peaks can be avoided there. Livestock is less important than in the North and East, but still provides a sizeable part of the farm income. Score 3.

Zone 10. Frost-free wadis of the South East. In the south-east part of the district there are a few wadis where frost never occurs. Also they have relatively abundant water for irrigation. Sorghum and alfalfa are the main crops, but vegetables could become very important here. Livestock is more important than in zone 9. Score 3.

Zone 11. The south-western Plateau. A large zone, with an important part of the population which, until recently, was difficult to reach. Temperatures on the plateau are somewhat lower than in Al-Khabar, making the area less suitable for sorghum production, wheat becomes a more important crop. Livestock is very important. The potential for irrigation is insufficiently known. Most of the agriculture is for subsistence only, as markets are too far away. Score 3.

Zone 12. The South-Eastern Wasteland area. A very sparsely populated area, with very few resources. Crop production is almost absent. Score 1.
Boreholes

Strengthening the agricultural score, is the score for the presence and number of deep boreholes. The deep boreholes for the drinking-water projects are not included in this score.

This score measures the readiness to, and the possibilities of, investing capital in the exploitation of deep groundwater layers. The investment possibilities regard both the availability of capital and the prospect of returns to the capital invested. The majority of these boreholes are found in the zone where qat is produced on a commercial basis (Agriculture Zone 1). In one village there are as many as 12 deep boreholes. There are very few in the zones where vegetables are grown for the market as well.

The highest score here is four, the lowest zero.

Summary: The aim of the RIRDP is to improve agriculture where improvement is possible and where outside help can be useful. The score on boreholes together with the agricultural score support this RIRDP-objective.

Roads

As all villages and hamlets in the district are linked by one or more tracks they can all be reached by car, although not by all cars and vehicles (such as, for example, a drilling rig) and not irrespective of weather conditions. The towns and villages for which these two limitations do not apply are those connected by the main asphalt road Dhamar-Rada'-Al-Baida’, or by the main feeder roads constructed by the RIRDP, (i.e. the Sabah Road from ‘Azzan to As-Sudan, the Rada’ Acces road, i.e. the road from Al-Musalla’ to Rada’ via the hospital, the Rada’ Ring Road and the so called Project Road i.e. the road from the main asphalt road to Al-Khabar and the RIRDP compound).

The distinctive feature, from the viewpoint of connection and accessibility in the Rada’ district, is the situation of a village vis-à-vis one of these roads. The highest score is for towns and villages situated immediately along these roads. The lowest score for those villages farthest away. The distance has been measured in a straight line, and the score runs from three to zero.

A number of tracks in the district or parts of them have been improved, mostly the main bottlenecks. These improvements were carried out privately by the villagers themselves, or with outside help, e.g. from LDA, RIRDP or the Army. These improvements are much less expensive than the construction of the main feeder roads such as those built by the RIRDP. However, they are nevertheless of a different kind than the category of main feeder roads and asphalt road, provided that maintenance is done properly on the main feeder roads.

Summary: Improving living conditions includes improving communications and accessibility. For the actual implementation of many activities of the RIRDP, improved accessibility and communications are a precondition. The road score translates these aspects.

Final Total Score

The scores on settlement size, schools and agriculture each have an extent of 5, the others of 4. This means that in the final score the factors “population” and “agriculture” have been given a heavier weight than the other scores. The actual final score
ranges from two to eighteen points, see Table 4.3.5. This final score becomes clear when seen in combination with the Map of the district.

Most villages with a high score (e.g. 8 – 18 points) are located in the centre of the district: Rada' town and its immediate surroundings, and the villages West and South of Rada' Town. The lowest scores (2 – 5 points) indicate villages which are located near the borders of the district. The intermediate scores (villages with six and seven points) are found in between the centre of the district and its borders; in fact in three zones: Wadi Tha; Wadi Husun, Wadi Matar, and in the subdistricts of Sabah and Ar-Riyashiyah which is the area with the largest number of intermediate scores. It is to be noted that these three zones with intermediate scores coincide with the proposed alignments of respectively:
1. the Sabah-road;
2. the road to Wadi Tha;
3. the road to Husun and Matar.

Table 4.3.4 Differentiation of Final Scores according to adage: 'First things first'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Final total score</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Total nr. of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Scores</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Scores</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>High Scores</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>141 Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>141</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4.3.3.
Summary of Meetings Concerning the Planning for RIRDP for 1982, Office of Deputy-Minister of Agriculture (MoA), 1 and 9 September 1981, Sana'a, North Yemen

Present: Mr. Moqibil - Deputy Minister of Agriculture
D.G. Agriculture (Noman) 1+9 September
D.G. Planning (Ansi)
Dr. Musbasher - adviser MoA (1 September)
Mr. Said - dviser planning (9 September)
Dr. Qabili - vice DG Agr. (9 September)
J. Veenstra (consultant) - for RIRDP, Plan of Operations (P.O.) 1981/82
H.L. van Loo - G.M. RIRDP, Euroconsult
Abd. Hobabi - co-manager RIRDP
M'd Sirhan - RIRDP

During the first meeting (1 September), Veenstra was introduced and he gave some information on the purpose of his visit. The discussion centred for some time whether or not the MoA could provide guidelines which could be used to take into account Yemen planning procedures and criteria when making our RIRDP-operational plan 1981/1982.

Guidelines were promised (and obtained the next day; however, they hardly were the kind of information that was sought for).

The Deputy Minister explained that efforts were going on right at that moment to come to a 5-year plan for the Ministry, including the several projects.

Considerable time was spent on the idea of coordinating boards for major projects. Van Loo wanted some action on this point because we are discussing this subject now already for considerable time. Veenstra asked on what level such boards should operate. Van Loo asked that someone would be appointed to take action. The Deputy Minister explained that a new department for integrated rural development projects would be made most probable. The DG of this department will be responsible. For the time being, Dr Ali Noman was appointed and Dr Qabili should take his place if Dr Noman is not here: Hit, Miss and Run.

The first task of Dr Noman will be to write a letter to the Ministries concerned and to ask them to appoint someone as a member. The rank should preferably be not lower than Director-General; however, it was explained that it is difficult, statutorily, for the MoA to give orders to the other Ministries. A financial problem which still has to be solved is the 'presence allowance' or 'meeting-bonus'.

Second meeting (9 September)

Participants apparently were prepared. It was stated at the beginning of the meeting that the Plan of Operations for 1982 indeed would be important because it would become addendum to the administrative arrangement between Holland and Yemen.

Veenstra put forward some questions which are of importance when making a plan for the next year, and some outline for the years thereafter. Reference in this respect was made to the coordinating board discussed during the previous meeting and the scale of the project both in geographical coverage and in subject matters.

The Deputy-Minister took up the idea of the board again. One board should operate at the national level, for all projects. Chairman: The Minister of Agriculture. As for RIRDP, a board at the provincial level will be created, chairman: governor. They cannot make separate boards for every project or activity (usually the same word in arabic; even building a house can be: a project). As for RIRDP, the project should develop so as
to cover the whole province of Al-Baida' but at the same time this should not go at the
cost of existing project activities. Of course, this cannot be done at once and the proj­
ect should start preferably in the field of drinking water and roads and, not to forget,
pre-feasibility studies to enable other donors to send manpower or funds.

Since this will require additional funds and equipment, the Euroconsult G.M.
RIRDP is asked if he can ask Holland to provide a D-9 bulldozer. He (GM) states that it
must be well understood that he nor Mr. Veenstra represent the Dutch Government:
they cannot promise or commit.

Further, there are no funds nor is there agreement on actual work in Al-Baida'; it
cannot be the aim, as Mr Moqbil already indicated, to diminish present activities just
to expand and as for the D-9, Mr Moqbil himself was there when Holland refused to
include this in the Dutch allocation.

The Yemen side appreciates that Veenstra and Van Loo cannot commit the Dutch
government, but it would be appreciated if they could persuade the Dutch side to
increase their contribution so as to expand the project. Mr Van Loo says that he thinks
chances are extremely dim as long as the Yemen contribution to the project remains
so low. How Yemen could pay for such a provincial project, if they have already prob­
lems now with the Rada' district project?

However, he will convey the message. Also the Deputy-Minister announces that he
will contact the Dutch chargé d'affaires for this purpose. Also, it would be nice if a
commitment could be obtained from Holland to continue its assistance for the project
for another 4 years.

The idea is that certain activities will be executed as separate projects, but the
RIRDP should prepare pre-feasibility studies and give supervision. At present the
Deputy-Minister thinks especially of dams. The G.M. explains that there are serious
problems connected to the building of dams, especially because of the silting-up prob­
lem.

Mr. Said asked in general how the relation between general manager (Van Loo) and
co-manager (Hobabi) in the project was now regulated. This is done in accordance with
Decree 48.

Major attention was given to the fact that Holland has promised to make pre-feasi­
bility studies for other activities in the province of Al-Baida' as well as to provide a
'complete study of the project covering the entire province'. There was hardly any dis­
cussion here, as Mr. Said was adamant that this could not be a point of any doubt since
it was included in the last Plan of Operations and part of the administrative agree­
ment.

The G.M. was asked to remind the Dutch side of this agreement.

Some attention was finally given to the aspect of training. Hobabi suggested to take
up contact with the Ministry of Education to see if they could give advice on how to
make an institute within the project. In this institute training should be given for
mechanics as well as other disciplines.

Henk L. van Loo

RIRDP General Manager
Euroconsult
4.4 Theory and Practice of Foreign Assistance to Regional Development Planning: The Case of Peripheral Rural Areas in Aceh, Indonesia.

Jan Veenstra* 1989, pp. 523-542

Summary

This study deals with the pilot case of Dutch technical and financial assistance to the provincial planning board in Indonesia's most western Special Territory of Aceh. With specific reference to the two districts of Aceh Utara and Aceh Tengah, the picture of dependency relationships is sketched for rural peripheries in the Third World. Here, area development planning efforts have not successfully addressed persistent problems, either because they were based upon urban-biased policy prescriptions wrongly transferred from the northern hemisphere, or because rational-comprehensive planning procedures were, too arbitrarily, blueprinted. Focusing upon the latter misapplication, a practical working procedure is presented for managing, through five stages, a multi-annual and rationalising exercise, such as Dutch assistance to improving regional planning methods employed by low-level administrative units in peripheral rural regions. There follows a critical review of nine years of Dutch regional planning assistance by comparing theory and practice of three approaches applied to the two districts of Aceh Utara/Tengah. The Dutch lessons learned underline inter-sectoral programme preparation, institutionalisation and training components. A 6-7 years working procedure for future foreign-assisted district planning projects is proposed.

4.4.1 General Introduction to Aceh Tengah/Utara and a staged Regional Planning Methodology [further insights are found in sub-sections 5.2, 5.3.1-6 and 5.4.1].

The following pages deal with a practical case of Dutch assistance to regional development planning in the Special Territory of Aceh, which is Indonesia's westernmost province. This institutional development assistance project (IDAP) started in 1977 and ceased to be a separate project in 1986. During the nine-year life of IDAP the focus was only on two districts (kabupaten) within the Aceh province: Aceh Utara and Aceh Tengah situated on the north eastern side of the Aceh Territory, as shown on the map. With regard to the special status granted to their province, it is well known that through the colonial era and afterwards the Acehnese have demonstrated a strong local self-consciousness and a continuous drive for political autonomy. Strong trade relations have developed with the adjacent province of North Sumatra, and especially with Medan. In these external contacts Aceh has been the supplier of rice, coffee and other agricultural products, traded for all sorts of imported goods. Medan has also historically played an important role as a service centre for higher education and health care.

Lohkseumawe, the district capital of Aceh Utara, is located halfway between Medan and Banda Aceh along the coastal trunk road, asphalted for all its 700 km. Takengon, the capital of Aceh Tengah, is situated at an altitude of about 1,100 metres above sea level at Lake Tawar, connected to Bireun in the alluvial plain by the only main road of this mountainous district. Within Aceh province the kabupaten of Aceh Tengah is thus oriented principally to Aceh Utara, which in turn has a strong economic orientation towards Medan.

* Mr. Veenstra is a lecturer in Urban and Regional Planning at the International Institute for Aerial Surveys and Earth Sciences (ITC), Enschede, The Netherlands.
Over the last decade the Acehnese economy as a whole has remained practically agriculture-based, as can be seen from the employment and production figures of Tables 4.A.1/2, if one excludes the huge income derived from the natural gas and oil fields in the province. It appears that Aceh, even with the large-scale fertilizer industries based on gas near Lhokseumawe, is still not very industrialised. The relatively large size of the transport sector as compared to trade might well reflect Aceh’s extensive transport needs and outward orientation, i.e. dependency. Even Aceh Utara, where only two per cent of employment is found in large-scale industry, and another four per cent in small-scale industries, is comparatively under-industrialised. Aceh Tengah seems almost fully rural-led by its high-quality coffee exports.

Excluding the impact of liquefied gas and oil exports and related local industries, which altogether show no ‘down- or up-stream’ relations of any importance inside Aceh’s economy, one arrives at a list of features which is quite similar for rural regions of Third-World countries in general (Belshaw and Douglass, 1981): non-urbanised,
non-industrialised, poverty stricken, high ratio for transport costs, sizeable subsistence production and consumption, and sensitivity to vagaries in the physical environment and in primary product markets. Third-World rural areas are typically 'peripheral' in the sense that they have little bargaining power in the market place, weak political influence in state affairs, are inhibited in the adoption of new technologies, and subject to strong influences by external economic factors. In order to combat these rural adversities it has been observed that regional development planners have quite arbitrarily relied upon socio-spatial constructs of regional economic growth, agricultural modernisation and rural-urban integration as derived from historical experiences in industrialised countries. These mainly urban-biased constructs in the guise of rural policy prescriptions, and ultimately development projects, thus became ill-informed planning efforts in rural peripheries of the southern hemisphere; refer to para 2.2.2: propositions 'from above and below', particularly figures 2.2.4/5.

**Table 4.4.1. Employment per sector in Aceh Utara and Tengah, 1984.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Mining &amp; quarrying</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Miscellaneous</th>
<th>Theoretical labour force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Utara</td>
<td>135,843</td>
<td>16,843</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>9,080</td>
<td>10,679</td>
<td>16,313</td>
<td>70,136</td>
<td>253,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>(60%)</td>
<td>(6%)</td>
<td>(2%)</td>
<td>(4%)</td>
<td>(6%)</td>
<td>(6%)</td>
<td>(28%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Tenga</td>
<td>43,630</td>
<td>2,009</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,704</td>
<td>8,117</td>
<td>8,918</td>
<td>66,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>(65%)</td>
<td>(4%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(6%)</td>
<td>(12%)</td>
<td>(13%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Table 4.4.2. Gross domestic regional product (GDRP) per Sector, Aceh Province. Current prices (Rps 1 million)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>90,871.57</td>
<td>512,896.41</td>
<td>447,389.39</td>
<td>606,746.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and quarrying</td>
<td>32,010.67</td>
<td>1,281,632.27</td>
<td>1,705,417.09</td>
<td>2,833,424.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Mining oil &amp; gas</td>
<td>31,743.73</td>
<td>1,279,042.94</td>
<td>1,701,028.74</td>
<td>2,827,488.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Quarrying &amp; saltmaking</td>
<td>286.94</td>
<td>3,569.02</td>
<td>3,467.00</td>
<td>5,972.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>6,773.27</td>
<td>29,701.36</td>
<td>35,853.75</td>
<td>73,380.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Large- and medium-scale</td>
<td>492.65</td>
<td>3,612.21</td>
<td>7,630.12</td>
<td>20,105.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Small-scale and cottage</td>
<td>6,281.32</td>
<td>23,089.15</td>
<td>31,314.66</td>
<td>53,274.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>4,682.97</td>
<td>1,155.63</td>
<td>2,303.76</td>
<td>5,021.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity and Drinking Water</td>
<td>366.59</td>
<td>30,758.86</td>
<td>47,722.62</td>
<td>43,860.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communication</td>
<td>18,559.88</td>
<td>78,761.49</td>
<td>133,844.01</td>
<td>201,369.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>14,948.64</td>
<td>45,903.84</td>
<td>116,255.86</td>
<td>186,236.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank and other financial institutions</td>
<td>297.00</td>
<td>3,724.19</td>
<td>8,744.67</td>
<td>10,749.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House rent</td>
<td>4,948.81</td>
<td>11,066.61</td>
<td>13,853.67</td>
<td>21,690.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>16,000.77</td>
<td>53,263.44</td>
<td>78,473.87</td>
<td>97,877.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>2,422.28</td>
<td>7,087.04</td>
<td>15,956.38</td>
<td>20,009.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDRP</td>
<td>192,133.61</td>
<td>1,061,363.94</td>
<td>2,806,884.36</td>
<td>4,102,113.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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This misapplication, or by-passing even of substantive bodies of socio-economic knowledge in policy making over recent decades has left these southern peripheries with the following unresolved problems in the 1980s and 1990s:

- lack of local decision-making and planning capacities, and of proper control over their own resources;
- continued polarisation of development in a few urban core areas;
- severe damage to rural ecologies and physical environments caused by increasing population pressure and unrestrained exploitation of natural resources;
- boom-bust phenomena associated with heavy specialisation in one or a few export commodities;
- spatial enclave effects, i.e. failure to translate government investment projects into broad-based rural development because of leakages from rural regions to urban cores and abroad; and
- increasing spatial manifestation of rural-urban inequalities.

Mindful of this bleak picture, the Dutch-funded technical assistance project was to improve the regional planning devices, if any, employed by the provincial planning board in Aceh (BAPPEDA). For the successful management of such a multi-annual and rationalising planning exercise general guidelines indicate (from Figures 2.2.3 to 2.2.6/7): that the development co-operation team should begin its task with an inter-sectoral inventory and analysis of central and local development objectives, policy issues, planning and budgeting procedures, physical resources, potentials, problems and constraints. In theory, this cross-sectoral diagnosis, comparing tentative goals with available means through development indicators or standard criteria being ranked and mapped, leads to the selection and formulation of a regional development strategy, overall development framework or profile. This medium-term strategic framework determines sub-sequently the selection and framing of inter-sectoral development programmes, or integrated project packages to be implemented, monitored and evaluated in some exemplary priority areas.

In order to summarise, with hindsight, the stumbling blocks IDAP actually met in practice along its lengthy regional planning route from 1977 to 1986, the ideal working procedure as indicated above was split into five planning study stages (Van Steenbergen and Veenstra, 1985/86). Figure 4.4.1. shows the actual versus desired steps and time required for a planning exercise such as IDAP that is directed towards low-level administrative units of provinces and districts in peripheral rural areas of highly centralised Third-World countries. The cascade-like diagram presents a required sequence over 6-7 years, consisting of five (pre-) planning and (small-scale) implementation stages. This sequence might be prolonged, or interrupted after one of the early steps have already been taken. The latter might be the case when political commitments, planning study capacities – both foreign and domestic – and/or essential data and study logistics needed locally are deemed too weak for project continuation. This judgement should ideally be made by a joint bilateral evaluation mission fielded from outside. Last but not least, it should be noted from our diagram that the entire planning methodology follows a spiral-like search process, or cyclic progression as illustrated by the arrows. During each learning-by-doing stage or round new data, development criteria and working hypotheses are introduced calling for adjustments of earlier findings. Consequently, these new process inputs lead to reconsideration of terms of reference for short-term consultancies, of the resident team’s composition, provisionally selected subdistricts for integrated rural development packages being already formulated and implemented.
**Figure 4.4.1** Diagramme showing actual, and desired stages for regional/rural planning-cum-implementation process.
In what follows IDAP's history is generalised into a *managerial prototype* for technical assistance aimed at improving the planning practices of regional planning boards. This multi-annual working procedure, inclusive of a pre-planning and a team preparation stage, might be used for identification of future foreign-assisted district development planning efforts.

### 4.4.2 Institutional Development Assistance Project, 1977-1986

The project's formal goal was to improve on-the-job regional planning. IDAP was officially attached to the local university (UNSYIAH) instead of the provincial planning board in Aceh, i.e. BAPPEDA. This, however, prevented a proper pre-planning and preparation of the project. Confusion was created by charging IDAP with capacity improvement both on the academic (educational and research) side of UNSYIAH, and on the practical (regional planning and project formulation) side of BAPPEDA. This plagued all subsequent IDAP phases, thus preventing, from the start, an assessment of BAPPEDA's genuine need for technical assistance and its capacity to participate in this foreign-assisted project. At the onset IDAP was scheduled to last from 1977 till 1979. After three extensions it ran on for another seven years. There are three main phases distinguishable in this nine-year period:

- sketchy sectoral surveys and project identification during 1977-1981;
- elaboration of a medium-term development profile during 1982-1983;
- selecting priority locations and drafting integrated development plans for these prioritised rural areas during 1984-1986.

**Sketchy planning studies and ad-hoc project identification: 1977-1981**

During its first two years in Aceh the expatriate IDAP team consisted of three Dutch economists, devoting much of their time to capacity improvement at the local university in Banda Aceh which, after all, was IDAP's formal counterpart organisation. Because some of the Indonesian UNSYIAH lecturers were simultaneously functioning as BAPPEDA employees and/or IDAP counterparts, it was tacitly assumed that by improving the university research capacity BAPPEDA planning capabilities were being increased as well.

On the BAPPEDA side the IDAP team embarked upon a number of planning studies supposedly guided by a 'problem orientated approach' (Bendavid-Val and Waller, 1975). This multi-step method was outlined in a manual offering an interesting dialogue between data collection and problem analysis, on the one hand, and policy, programme and project formulation, on the other hand. Each analytical step is followed by a policy decision, which determines the focus of the subsequent analytical steps. This methodology demonstrated, however, the following drawbacks in both scientific research and public decision making at sub-national levels:

- identification of explicit development objectives and primary problems was a short-sighted and arbitrary affair, plagued both by political and administrative interests, i.e. 'hidden agendas in back pockets';
- as non-specialists the three IDAP economists were expected to devise solutions to technical problems;
- as the method is topic, not location, orientated it is less suitable to regional planning; problems surpass regional borders, and inter-sectoral integration is difficult to accomplish;
- the respective policy, programme an project steps were outside the administrative competence of the expatriate IDAP team, as well as of BAPPEDA;
• the multi-step approach puts high demands on timing; the more so when specialist consultancies from outside have to be relied upon;
• the many survey steps were time consuming.

During its planning studies the team soon encountered two hindrances: the low availability of full-time Indonesian counterparts, and the dearth of relevant and reliable statistics. The problem-orientated methodology for doing the planning studies turned out to be impractical. Medium-term strategic programmes were not formulated, and only a small-scale industry study was finished in the end. However, this did not prevent the IDAP team from identifying projects related to some of the problems IDAP had come across. Projects identified in various details were: a coffee-processing-cum-marketing-cum-extension project; a pumplift-irrigation project; the rehabilitation of a medium-sized irrigation scheme; vocational training courses and an extension centre for small-scale industry; the construction of 50 kilometers of feeder roads in the mountainous coffee-producing area; and a pilot sugar-cane processing unit.

With ad-hoc assistance by short-term specialists these projects were formulated and appraised. With the exception of the irrigation scheme they were accepted for Dutch foreign funding and direct implementation. These project proposals became the visible results of the foreign team’s efforts at regional development planning. On several occasions the BAPPEDA expressed its preference for such tangible results. They clearly raised IDAP’s prestige. Unfortunately, however, this type of haphazard project generation did not properly serve the goal of improving regional plan quality by the provincial planning board. For one reason, the projects were to be financed from a foreign budget. Hence they fell outside what might be considered routine planning at provincial level. For another reason, BAPPEDA is not a project implementation body. Even project identification is outside its scope and belongs to the mandate of the sectoral departments. The increasing number of counterparts that the project drew from the sectoral departments in this period demonstrates that point. In addition, the numerous short-term contributions from visiting specialists who created an ‘anthology’ of unrelated project-cycle inputs, put a heavy burden on the permanent team members. The parallel job performance by the three IDAP expatriates, attached to one or two UNSYIAH faculties as well as to BAPPEDA sections, makes it understandable that the grand IDAP design of the first operational phase 1977-1979 called for an IDAP extension of a minimum of two years from 1979 to 1981 (see: stages 2 and 3 in Figure 4.4.1).

Last but not least, it was observed that as soon as project proposals had been accepted by BAPPEDA and Dutch aid, the question of responsibility for their implementation arose. The question remained unsettled for a year. In the meantime some projects were activated under the aegis of the IDAP, while others were designed in greater detail. This interval came to an end in 1982 when a separate Dutch-funded project was launched, i.e. the Central and North Aceh Rural Development project (CANARD). CANARD should give shelter to the various proposed projects on their way to implementation (see stage 4 of Figure 4.4.1).

Elaboration of a strategic development profile: 1982-1983

As the establishment of the CANARD project was announced, the IDAP team was urged to reconsider its approach of improving regional plan quality by the provincial planning board. The team was advised to make a medium-term development profile for the two districts. A district development profile should present a reference document for public intervention, and would possibly be included in the provincial five-year development plan 1984-1988 for Aceh as a whole.
At first, however, no decision was made on the contents of this profile plan; neither on the subjects, nor on the depth of analysis. This indecision might be attributed partly to the lack of pronounced regional development planning procedures and priorities in the Acehnese context. Meanwhile, a number of planning studies were started. They differed from the ones in the first stage because they had a larger coverage than their sketchy predecessors. The studies (by expatriates) were:

- a land evaluation survey (Beek, 1978), resulting in land suitability maps for Aceh Utara/Tengah at scales 1:100,000 and 1:50,000 which proved inappropriate for area-specific project identification in agriculture, forestry, etc. In addition, farm surveys had to be executed for collecting primary data on farming practices, household incomes, etc;
- a rural facility survey regarding education, roads, drinking water supply and a service centre hierarchy (Roy and Patil, 1977; ESCAP, 1979; and Rondinelli, 1985);
- a spatial and physical development study and plan for Lhokseumawe town and surroundings to tackle pressing industrial pollution problems caused by natural gas and fertilizer production.

Finally, in 1985 an outline for the medium-term development profile of Aceh Utara/Tengah was completed by a Dutch consultant. The envisaged strategic profile was to cover eight policy areas. The topics were derived from discussions with IDAP team members and planning board officials and – to a considerable extent – from IDAP studies already under preparation. The outline acknowledged that this was academically speaking, a topsyturvy procedure. The proposed policy areas were: small- and medium-scale industrial development; river basin development and management; agricultural development; fisheries; industrial pollution; energy supply and demand; social infrastructure; and urban planning, housing and physical infrastructure. Base-line surveys had to be completed on these eight problem areas, and supplemented by general information on demography, employment and incomes in the two study districts. In the end, however, base-line surveys were finished only on industrial, agricultural, physical infrastructure and social service developments. The other problematic policy areas were hardly touched upon during this phase, and nothing that resembled a medium-term development profile 1984-1988 was produced. The following planning study limitations became obvious:

- Low administrative capacities and individual skills for executing base-line and in-depth surveys, data processing, mapping and reporting, as well as for formulating strategies, programmes and projects, both on the Indonesian counterpart side and on the side of Dutch resident team members and their short-term consultants.
- Inability to formulate and consistently follow a multi-annual inter-sectoral working procedure, or step-wise surveying, planning and implementation methodology. Especially missing was an explicit indication of the degree of (mapping) detail, as well as time horizons, with which strategical frameworks, programmes and projects should be presented.
- The dearth of socio-economic data broken down into provincial, kabupaten, and kecamatan (subdistrict) level. Unforgiveable in this respect has been the neglect of yearly government spending capacities, central versus local sources of available funding, and of annual planning and budgeting procedures; refer to outlays in Table 4.3.3 and to staggered absorption in Table 4.2.4.
- The vertical, Jakarta orientated character of the latter annual routines to which both BAPPEDA and sectoral departments at provincial and kabupaten level statutorily adhere. Medium-term, i.e. five-year planning documents as recently produced at provincial and sometimes at kabupaten level, are speedily contracted out by BAPPEDA to the local university of UNSYIAH as 'one-off happenings', lacking inter-sectoral persuasive power and local administrative status.
The counterpart situation inside and outside BAPPEDA: although since 1983 IDAP was attached to BAPPEDA's research section only, and consequently was limited in its spin-off effects inside the BAPPEDA as a whole, full-time Indonesian counterparts had never been made available. These part-time Indonesian teammembers had to spread their time and efforts thinly over various jobs in order to earn a sufficiently high income.

These limitations lead to the practical conclusion (Waterston, 1969/71) that the formulation of a medium-term strategic development framework for a peripheral rural region should be initially suppressed in any planning methodology to be introduced from outside into any highly centralized Third-World government administration. Throughout the IDAP history, 1977-1983, this strategic input has proven to be too ambitious and comprehensive. Western rational planning principles are inappropriate for the planning practices in common use by BAPPEDA in the Special Territory of Aceh. Strictly structured base-line and in-depth surveys are nevertheless deemed desirable steps in a multi-annual managerial sequence, whereas a small number of projects for immediate small-scale implementation should be demonstratively pushed 'up-bound the runway' long before the desired regional study sequence of 6-7 years is running towards its finale. In accordance with this practical proposition the desired stages 1-5 have been detailed in Figure 4.4.1.

**Integrated development plans for priority subdistricts: 1984-1986**

In order to build particularly upon desired stages 3 and 5, IDAP's workload shifted from the unfinished development profile towards micro-regional development planning (MRDP). This entailed, first, the selection of priority subdistricts (kecamatan) for concentrated development efforts; and, second, the formulation and institutionalisation of integrated project bundles for some of these rural priority subdistricts. The rural-led contents of these MRDP steps were marked by specifically constraining factors such as:

- The problematic development setting of Aceh Utara caused by the enclave-like industrial expansion around Lhokseumawe town. This gas-based investment project was entirely decided upon from outside by various ministries in Jakarta, and by the headquarters of the domestic and foreign oil companies involved. The new gas and fertiliser-related export sector finds itself in an enclave: economically, since it remains without trickling-down effects and links to existing activities in its direct agrarian surroundings; and socially, because it houses its non-Acehnese employees in camps, physically separated from the pre-existing peasant society and provided by their own water and electricity supply, health services, luxury shops, etc.

- The encroachment upon the natural resource base (water, soils, forest, air) of both kabupaten Aceh Utara/Tengah. For, on one side, both the industrial and urban sector and the agricultural and irrigation (double-rice cropping) sector are increasingly competing for water supplies from rivers and groundwater in the alluvial coastal plain. On the other side, in the foothills and mountainous areas both forest concessionaires licensed by Jakarta and wild settlers/shifting cultivators longing for land are causing deforestation and erosion problems up-stream, as well as down-stream water shortages, silting up of irrigation systems, salination of river mouths, etc. In addition, industrial air and water pollution have been observed around Lhokseumawe.

- In contradistinction, the weak counter-acting position of BAPPEDA is to be observed in Aceh, too, both in terms of unskilled rural and regional planners and of explicit area-specific planning procedures. These weaknesses explain IDAP's institutionalisation drive towards improving BAPPEDA's data collection and regional planning capabilities.
As a consequence, the new exemplary MRDP methodology started in 1984 with secondary data collection on a number of sectors and long-lasting socio-economic constraints, physical potentials and politically legitimate problems of target groups and small rural areas in Aceh Utara/Tengah.

If the existing data did not suffice, they were supplemented by in-depth surveys through pilot and formal questionnairing in tentatively selected sample areas, i.e. sub-districts, urban and rural centres, river catchment areas, etc. Sectors on which data were gathered were: demography; employment and incomes; non-agricultural employment; physical and social infrastructure; settlement hierarchy; agricultural development; forestry; fisheries; pollution control; and river basin management. These issues resemble the eight policy areas of IDAP's phase two. In fact, some of the base-line surveys which had been taken up during that period were used as inputs in the micro-regional development planning exercise. The idea was that the survey results had to be strictly structured towards translation into sectoral criteria to differentiate between the respective 32 subdistricts. The kecamatan were ranked on these criteria and presented on maps by different colours according to their priority for sectoral development investments. Next, the index numbers on the different criteria were weighted and added up, thus producing the subdistricts most entitled for concentrated development efforts in the budget year 1986-1987. Note that, before adding up, a weight factor 1,2 or 3 was attached according to the quasi-academic relevance of the respective sectoral indicators for the Indonesian development objectives of economic growth and/or social equity.

Eventually one pilot round of priority subdistrict selection was completed. Criteria finally scored and mapped out were as follows: an educational standard; a road standard; agricultural income; agricultural potential; rate of deforestation; shortage of safe drinking water; value added in small-scale industry per unit and per employee; expected growth in un(der) employment; and an electricity standard. Refer back to the Shinyanga/Tanzania and Rada/Yemen cases in sub-sections 4.2.2 and 4.3.2.

For some of the seven concentrated development areas (CDAs) that were prioritised in the first demonstration round, a list of projects was drafted. The projects were identified either by informed intuition, or by the service infrastructure (schools, roads) lacking at a particular site. Initially, these small-scale projects were to be funded from sectoral Indonesian development budgets. To facilitate their identification the magnitude, bottom-up and top-down procedures and distributive patterns of the 1979-84 provincial development budgets were subject to an overall kecamatan survey. Apart from domestically financed projects, a proposal was made for assistance to the agricultural extension service under the Dutch-funded CANARD project. For institutionalising purposes permanent working committees were founded during 1986 by formal decree. These consisted of representatives of the district-level planning boards, sectoral departments and some selected subdistrict offices. Inter-sectoral committees had to ensure at kabupaten level the acceptance of project proposals in the multi-level Indonesian appraisal machinery, as well as their co-ordinated implementation in the prioritised subdistricts from 1986 onwards.

The MRDP method, whereby integrated project bundles were allocated to prioritized CDAs, was meant to be an exemplary one; the method had to be repeated annually. For this reason the method was demonstrated during an inter-connected series of seminars for planners and administrators at provincial and kabupaten levels, and at an extensive development planning course at the local university of UNSYIAH. In the latter case MRDP course topics (Veenstra, 1982, p. 44) were directly linked to current development planning practices as experienced by IDAP staff in working up supposedly integrated kecamatan plans in Aceh Utara/Tengah during 1985. This pilot MRDP course
was meant to try out a series of practical training topics for later application to on-the-
job and off-the-job training in the Indonesian language in various kabupaten through­
out Aceh. Consequently, course participants indicated selected core readings for trans­
lation, in order to incorporate the MRDP course in a reduced and simplified format
into BAPPEDA training programmes at kabupaten level (Zetter, 1981).

The micro-regional planning method has some strong points. It respects BAPPEDA’s
statutory position as a co-ordinating body at district level. Every sectoral department
can be invited to deliver an input to the selection of the priority subdistricts in the
guise of a standard criterion. Another merit is that year after year the project propos­
als enter the Indonesian shopping-list routine, and the elements of the final IRDP bun­
dles are allocable to the sectoral departments that have the actual spending power for
implementation.

A number of limitations have to be noted as well. The micro-regional planning
method is limited in its project impacts: these will usually not surpass the subdistrict
boundaries. A second limitation is that the method gives no clue as to development
strategies chosen for the district as a whole. Therefore, such a development profile
should be a necessary complement. A medium-term development profile might also
suggest special ‘radar antenna’ studies that permit the identification of government
interventions at kabupaten and provincial levels, regarding industrial pollution,
up-stream erosion in river basins, and down-stream water shortages, for instance, –
just like in phase II of the Rda’-case in sub-section 4.3.2.

A modest follow-up

During all nine years (1977-1986) 28 man-years have been granted by Dutch aid to the
permanent IDAP team, and 19 man-years to short-term consultancies consisting of a
‘flight-deck’ of 61 separate missions. These consultancy missions have varied in dura­
tion: 1-2 man-weeks (20 per cent); 3-4 man-weeks (25 per cent); 5-8 man-weeks (23 per
cent); 9-16 man-weeks (12 per cent) and longer than 16 man-weeks (20 per cent).
Although the Institutional Development Assistance Project came to a standstill during
1986, a modest follow-up was envisaged for 1987-1989. This follow-up consisted of one
single expert attached to the CANARD project. His task came down to consolidating
the results of phase three: increased incorporation of on-the-job MRDP training cours­
es; and IRDP implementation through inter-sectoral working committees, following
from new cycles of priority-area selection as well as related IRDP data collection and
processing for regional planning at kabupaten levels all over Aceh. Reference is made
to sub—stages 5.3 and 5.4 in the cascade-like diagram of Figure 4.4.1, as well as to Badan
DIKLAT* courses for BAPPEDA district-level planning staff all over Indonesia.

4.4.3. Lessons from nine years of IDAP management experiences

Based upon the instructive experiences of the Institutional Development Assistance
project we can depict a working procedure for technical assistance to institutional
development within a regional planning board. The respective development horizon is
6-7 years, which is more than the time usually dedicated to this type of projects. A 6-7
year time-horizon, in our opinion, is more appropriate to the gradual process of insti­
tution building ‘from below’.

* Badan Diklat = Education and Training Body of Ministry of Home Affairs in Jakarta (Toyiman
Stages 1 and 2 of pre-planning and team preparation in Figure 4.4.1

Before presenting this multi-annual management procedure one essential observation has to be made on institutional development co-operation. The history of IDAP demonstrates how inadequate preparation can cripple a project from the start. Specifically in cases like IDAP, haunted by foreign ideas of technical and financial, but above all institutional development assistance, an official request should include terms of reference containing:

- a delimitation and characterisation of the ‘rural-led’ peripheral region selected for foreign assistance;
- a short description of the type of development that is envisaged, i.e. agricultural intensification, industrialisation, social and physical infrastructure development, etc.;
- a list of human and physical resources including domestic funds that could be utilised in achieving that development;
- an outline of the available secondary data base, of previous planning studies made and obstacles encountered in the proper use of these data and studies;
- an indication of how eventual regional planning outputs fit in with national and sectoral plan formats, and with annual planning and budgeting procedures, existing organisations, manpower, etc.;
- an indication of the time horizon, and degree of (mapping) detail in which the planning outputs should be expressed, i.e. strategy, programme or project formulation within a (multi-) annual time perspective.

Upon approval of the request it is necessary to field a preliminary mission for two to three weeks, consisting of a regional planner, a development economist, and an agro-resource specialist. Whenever possible, the expatriate candidate team leader for the regional planning improvements should be included in this high-level mission, which will work according to the checklist (see Appendix 4.4.1). Based on existing data and previous study reports a quick pre-diagnosis will indicate for the pilot improvement region and districts concerned their proper area-specific development objectives, available financial and (non-) physical resources, potentials and (budgetary) constraints. This is to counteract the general planning guidelines and budget ceilings coming from central headquarters annually. In consultation with regional and district political and administrative authorities, the expected surveying and planning products are to be defined in advance in terms of:

i) standardised survey reports to be written on policies, data and area-specific projects identified in the various productive and service sectors (from agriculture to education and roads), and in different overall subject matters like demography, settlement pattern, employment and incomes.

ii) accompanying thematic maps to be produced per sector and subject matter;

iii) different plan formats, as indicated by the region’s own terms of reference for improving its planning machinery, i.e. single projects, a long-term strategic framework, and inter-sectoral programmes for priority zones to be selected. The latter two formats are to counterbalance the current project shopping-list procedures by pinpointing medium-term leading sectors and priority areas.

Related to surveying, mapping and planning outputs as agreed upon, a series of training inputs can now be projected, both on- and off-the-job, as summed up in a multi-annual sequence at the bottom of our checklist. For this purpose short-term courses are currently offered at various training institutes in Third World countries and abroad.

For closely marrying surveying-cum-planning outputs with training inputs a globally framed improvement methodology should be put on paper. This working procedure
is to group the various elements of our appended checklist into a sequence of rounds, tentatively covering two Five-Year-Plan periods for instance. Besides identification of projects for early implementation, preference is to be given to provisional selection of priority areas and inter-sectoral programmes, followed later on by laying the foundations for strategic development frameworks for region and districts. The latter two exercises, however, are to be strictly directed towards the problematic development themes found in region and districts and shown by the pre-diagnosis, e.g. land degradation, unequal access to social and physical infrastructure, etc.

Institution building, i.e. organisational and communication improvements should also be planned. In this respect, the statutory surveying, planning and implementation powers, inclusive of available manpower and budgets, should be clearly spelled out year upon year to produce innovative outputs such as area-specific inter-sectoral programmes and medium-term strategic frameworks. The latter two plan formats necessarily lead to inter-sectoral Working Committees to be nominated successively at district and regional levels for safeguarding, i.e. interlocking their design and implementation.

In order to stimulate inter-sectoral exchange of information on progress made and to enhance co-operation, an interconnected series of workshops or seminars should be held to report at district and regional levels on obstacles met by the working committees in making both micro- and macro-regional development plans. This task list being accomplished in close co-operation with local authorities, the preliminary mission can after some weeks write a multi-annual Plan of Operations broken down by budget year, as well as an Administrative Agreement to be signed for technical and financial assistance granted by the foreign donor country through central headquarters to the region or district. Besides planning outputs to be improved according to an established time schedule, the Plan of Operations should spell out:

- the composition of the expatriate team consisting of resident key team members and short-duration consultancies, their job descriptions, time schedules, etc. The resident core team should consist of a regional development planner/team leader, an agricultural economist, physical planner and/or public administration/budget analyst;
- the responsibilities of each of the co-operating parties: foreign donor, recipient central headquarters, regional and district authorities; refer to Fig. and Table 4.3.3.
- the items to be made available by the parties concerned, i.e. foreign and domestic personnel, technical information, equipment, offices, houses, transport, services, together with time schedules including recruitment, labour permits and appointment formalities required; the costs estimated for all these items including services in kind to be provided by each of the financing parties, and broken down per budget year.

It may take quite some time to detail all the desirable points of a formal Administrative Agreement and Plan of Operations, but the essential elements as laid down in our appended checklist are negotiated during the preliminary mission of three weeks. While these initial formalities may go on for half a year, or even two years, the expatriate core team should be recruited, and respective team members appointed by the relevant donor and recipient agencies. Preparatory arrangements and team meetings are thus to take place under the chairmanship of the team leader so that:

- an extensive briefing is presented on the objectives, methodology, sensitive issues, data availability, etc. for the planning of the region or district concerned;
- a search for relevant literature is instigated;
- the team composition takes into account the stages of sectoral inventory and analysis, project identification, feasibility studies, detailed design, schedule of opera-
tions, implementation. Both resident key team members and short-term consultants have to prepare their own job descriptions and time schedules in consultation with the teamleader;

• an overall working schedule for the years to come is tentatively discussed on the basis of our checklist, resulting in a cascade-like diagram of 6-7 years; refer to Figure 4.4.1

• the logistics for the successive study stages are thoroughly scrutinised.

Finally, it is to be emphasised that three core teams are to co-operate on the spot for 3-6 years at least, namely: a permanent group of full-time counterparts/local administrators/planners; the resident expatriate core team of 3-4 experts; a restricted group of short-term specialists/consultants, representing a knowledgeable pool of expertise abroad.

Stages 3, 4 and 5 of a managerial prototype in Figure 4.4.1

Derived from IDAP's history the following working procedure will give an indication of what might be further desired from institutional development assistance to upgrade the performances of regional and district planning bodies. This managerial prototype might serve as a guideline, too, for identifying future institutional development projects like IDAP. The procedure supposes that mistakes which were made in the IDAP project, the energy wasted and activities unfinished, are avoidable. To a certain extent the wastages can be attributed to inadequate preparation, the absence of a multi-annual perspective, the unrelated character of surveys during the three phases, too detailed project design before transfer to CANARD, and the unfinished state of the development profile.

In other important respects the desired working procedure differs from the actual course of events of the IDAP project. It includes, from the beginning, a systematic training component with constituent elements. Our managerial prototype leads also to an estimate of foreign manpower requirements. Its tentative figure comes down to 26 man-years, most of it by permanent team members, for they are better equipped to transfer general knowledge and technical know-how. This figure is nothing more than an indication, since there are many factors that impel a reduction or enlargement of the expatriate team, or alter its composition. Continued foreign assistance might be ensured through a bilateral Steering Committee at central level consisting of representatives of all parties concerned. This Steering Committee should evaluate the progress being made, the surveying and planning capacities being increased, the budgets and manpower being made available, and the political commitments being maintained. This Committee should make judgements on prolonging or interrupting the sequence of improvements set in motion in consonance with the Plan of Operations; refer to 'Hit, Miss and Run' tactics of App. 4.3.1, particularly phase III.

From the outset it must be realised by the initiators of any planning improvement that both planning officers and their sectoral colleagues at regional and district levels are strictly bound by the rules governing the current planning and budgeting machinery in Third World countries. Innovations in standing working procedures as put forward by the preliminary mission in its Plan of Operations, and agreed upon by an inner circle of central, regional and district officials, should be communicated to a broader audience of regional and district staff increasingly involved during the following 2-3 years. Therefore, an initial workshop should be organised in the pilot region in order to arrive at a consensus and time schedule concerning (refer not back, but forward now in time to figure 4.5.4).

• the limited number of problematic policy issues to be tackled inside the region, with specific reference to a typical district. Here, a choice has to be made regarding
the priority district initially to be taken up as a planning improvement unit, functioning as an example for the other districts in the pilot region;

- the secondary data base and thematic maps to be improved for a limited number of sectors and subject matters such as population, settlement pattern and past government expenditures, broken down into divisions and subdistricts.

A standard layout for the survey data reports, and mapping scales ranging from 1:250,000 to 1:50,000 should be devised, as follows (see also 'Remarks' in Fig. 4.2.5; and study steps 1.1→4 in Figures 4.51/2):

- current policy guidelines and objectives 'from above';
- specific regional and district objectives and targets 'from below';
- secondary data available being inconsistent, leading to
- primary data to be collected through in-depth surveys (on existing land use, farming systems and transport flows, for instance);
- general or area-specific projects accordingly suggested for early implementation.

Also needing to be scheduled are (refer to stages 3 and 4 in Figure 4.4.1):

- the integrated project bundles to be aimed at in a series of priority areas to be successively selected;
- a local inter-sectoral Working Committee to be nominated for the exemplary district in order to safeguard the surveying, design and implementation of inter-sector programmes to be newly introduced;
- the training inputs to be provided related to:
  - secondary and primary data collection, processing, mapping and reporting;
  - substantive issues in general, regional and rural development planning, inclusive of the respective 'tool kits' (Bendavid-Val, 1983); and
  - small-scale sectoral project generation.

This task list arrived at by the initial workshop's audience is now being commented upon from experience. For problematic development themes, bringing out the complex of constraining factors typical for the pilot region and exemplary district, are not that easily established through a quick (pre) diagnosis by professional planners (not to speak of reaching consensus in the political domain on the overall strategy for tackling the main problems). Instead of rationally heading straight for comprehensive coverage of key themes, an overall strategy and key projects to be identified 'from above', one should reasonably commence 'from below' with a limited number of surveys for principal sectors and some overall subject matters related to one exemplary district only. Inside this district provisional selection of two or three concentrated development areas, our so-called CDAs, should be given priority. For the later purpose, the standard survey reports and maps are to be focused clearly upon processing a limited range of 10-15 discriminating criteria chosen per sector and subject matter. (Refer forward to Fig. 4.5.3). In addition, the CDAs selected at the end of the day are to reflect in part the complex of constraining factors hampering regional development. Involvement of all sectoral district planning officers in this data collection, processing, reporting and selection procedure is crucial in order to build up persuasive power, team spirit and local status for this down-to-earth planning innovation.

In order to be well prepared for these procedural steps to be taken, stages 3-5 will start with the indicated training inputs, whereas for purposes of information, communication and local inter-sectoral co-operation a series of seminars should report and decide upon: the inadequacy of available secondary data; the selection of sectors and locations to be surveyed in depth for early project identification; the choice of 10-15 discriminating criteria for CDA selection; the provisional selection of CDAs; and the integrated bundle of projects to be budgeted, implemented, monitored and evaluated in each CDA.
In this way the seminars and standing District Working Committee are ultimately intended to function as institutionalizing instruments.

Stage 6: working towards a strategic development framework

The basic idea of the preceding stages 3-5 has been, on the one hand, that, steered by the inter-sectoral working committee and equipped in advance by appropriate knowledge and know-how, the exemplary district administration initially is to become acquainted with the planning innovation 'from below', called CDA, including the integrated project packages. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that during the repeated selection of these CDAs constraining overall factors had to be accounted for; and that during the annual budgeting of integrated CDA programmes the Central guidelines had to be reflected:

• In terms of normative ends to be reconciled, namely growth- and equity-, as well as natural-resource conservation objectives.
• In terms of large-scale interventions (trunk roads, multi-purpose dams, etc.) addressing the comparative (dis)advantages of the region.
• In terms of ongoing sectoral resource programmes for agricultural production and public services, operating from national and regional levels downwards.

These latter guidelines, projects and programmes 'from above' are now to be dovetailed with and incorporated into a medium-term strategic framework for the exemplary district, thus marrying the rather shortsighted, annual CDA programmes 'from below' with a multi-annual guiding image for the district's future 'from above', viewed primarily now from the top of the local district administration. Because of acquaintance with new crafts and co-operation built into the local planning machinery 'from below' during stages 3-5, stage 6 is intended to work towards a district development profile, i.e. an indicative five-year development plan for the district as a whole. The regional level is not assigned proper planning and budgeting tasks, but is found in a supervisory function at district level through representation on technical working committees, so that: central objectives, planning guidelines and large-scale projects including budget ceilings are paid attention to; and area specific development problems typical for the whole region are partly represented by the CDAs, e.g. land use improvements in some selected farming systems only are tested out.

A few lines are needed on the substance of the district development profile. It has already been noted that a medium-term planning exercise is to establish development priorities for sectors and target groups in micro-zones. A development strategy is to formulate objectives, problems and broad steps to address constraining factors. This is in view of the scarce human, financial and natural resources available. Therefore, the restrained series of standard survey reports produced during stages 3-5 in some sectors only, as well as the in-depth surveys subsequently executed on selected farming systems and rural transport flows, for instance, are now to be extended to all directly and indirectly productive sectors. In addition, the overall socio-economic subjects are now to be tackled full-fledged:

• population projections per lowest administrative unit;
• employment and incomes generated sector by sector;
• accessibility to services located mainly in line with the district's settlement pattern; and
• government spendings and revenues in/from the district's sub-units during the last five-year period.

Not to be excluded from the study efforts of stage 6 are the lessons to be learned from projects implemented and carefully monitored during preceding stages. As a conse-
quence, to bring out the required study and monitoring reports, based eventually on supplementary sample surveys, additional on-the-job training as well as foreign technical assistance from outside might be deemed necessary by the guiding steering committee. According to our checklist this transfer of knowledge and know-how again is to be related to: the formulation of a crude five-year district development framework; and monitoring and evaluation of single projects and inter-sectoral programmes.

Last, but not least, a series of workshops should inform a broad regional and district staff audience (including local politicians):

• on the secondary and primary data collected and processed, including the 'tool kits' employed and mapping analysis;
• on the study reports produced with regard to sectors, subject matters and projects/programmes monitored and evaluated ex-post;
• on the leading (sub-)sectors, key projects and sectors indicated in the rural- or urban-led district for another five years to come.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning steps</th>
<th>Data collection, Analysis and reporting</th>
<th>Plan formulation</th>
<th>Planning outputs' implementation, Monitoring and on-going evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural Planning Components</td>
<td>Sequential Rounds of: Collecting and processing secondary data, leading up to:</td>
<td>Sequential rounds of: Quick identification of visible projects for early implementation; Preliminary strategic framework with leading priority areas for region and districts as a whole; Inter-sectoral project bundles/programmes for priority micro-zones</td>
<td>Sequential Rounds of: Quick and visible project budgeting, implementation, etc. per sector; Inter-sectoral programmes implemented in priority zones, supervised by inter-sectoral working committee per zone; Strategic development framework supervised by standing regional and district administration, thus justifying on-going sectoral resource programmes operating from the region downwards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production in: Agriculture * food crops * cash crops Animal husbandry Fishing Mining Manufacturing * small-scale * large-scale Consumption of: Education Health care Drinking water supply Sanitation Road transport Energy/Electricity</td>
<td>In-depth surveys on human, natural and financial resources, potentials, problems and constraints per division/subdistrict; Secondary and primary data processing, mapping and reporting; Provisional selection of priority micro-zones and early projects.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization/Institution building Including popular participation at: - regional level - district level - sub-district level - village level</td>
<td>Sequence of rounds: - Pre-diagnoses, pre-planning, preparatory arrangements for executing multi-annual working schedule for improving rural planning capacities at regional and district levels. - On- and off-the-job training in * Secondary and primary data collection, processing and reporting; * Sectoral project identification, appraisal, design, budgeting, implementation, etc. * Substantive issues in general, regional and rural development including 'tool kite', aimed at * Formulation of regional/district development framework; as well as * Formulation of inter-sectoral programmes for prioritised micro-zones * Monitoring and evaluation of projects and programmes in standing administration * Workshops/seminars from regional level downwards for communication on progress in data processing, project generation, area priority setting, strategic framework, etc. * Establishing locally cooperating, inter-sectoral working committee(s) per priority zone.</td>
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* This tabulation supposes vertically the mutual interaction (→) between the three rural development components of (agro-) production, consumption and institution building (Johnston and Clark, 1982, p. 224). Horizontally, the sequential rounds are enumerated for improving both the knowledge base and inter-sectoral programmes/projects being formulated, implemented, etc. in ceaseless learning-by-doing rounds; refer to figures 4.5.4 and 6.1 later on.
4.5 Reduced Regional Planning Study for Tikar Plain in Cameroon (Veenstra, 1994, pp. 157-168)

4.5.1. Background of the planning study (refer in sub-section 2.2.2 to figure 2.2.4, column 3).

Located along the north-western border of Cameroon and Nigeria, the Tikar plain has experienced (through spontaneous immigration during the last decades) a rising population pressure, ranging from 10 to 50 inh./km$^2$ on its relatively fertile soils (: 4,000 km$^2$). This problematic situation, typical of a *rural resource frontier* region in the Third World, has been aggravated during recent years by the construction of a reservoir for national river control and down-stream electricity supply purposes. This artificial lake (Mapé) keeps permanently flooded 250-500 km$^2$ of gently undulating land, formerly cultivated for subsistence and cash crop production, as well as grazed by nomadic cattle herds. As a consequence, thousands of peasants have haphazardly been (re)settled in the Tikar plain without adequate provision of infrastructure and proper assistance in substitution of their coffee plantations.

In order to counter-balance downward trends in sustainable production and living standards, the Ministry of Planning and Territorial Development in Yaoundé distributed during 1988 terms of reference for a regional planning study of the Tikar plain as a whole. Subsequently, technical and financial study proposals, made among other international consultants by Haskoning, The Netherlands, and its local sub-contractors, were finally selected as an innovating, in fact reduced approach towards rural development planning of the endangered plain. For the consultants’ endeavour US$ 675,000 was made available by the EEC in Brussels, Belgium.

4.5.2. Assignment to Dutch consultant, and experts’ performances

During 1989, the proposed project team of ten (10) experts was to be strictly managed along a reduced working procedure of three main study phases (I-III), taking up three months each, i.e. inter-disciplinary inventory and diagnosis (I), inter-sectoral and multi-annual programme design at pre-feasibility level (II), and bankable project identification (III) inside some priority zones for the next operational years (1990-1993). The synoptic chart of figure 4.5.1 presents the actual performances of the inter-disciplinary working groups A-E as laid down in respective maps 1-16 and Reports A-D. The crucial idea behind the reduced, in fact nine-month working procedure is clearly brought out by study steps 1.1-4 of figure 4.5.2: results of field surveys had to be strictly structured towards translation into problem-related factors, or criteria for selection of some priority investment zones in the Tikar plain.
**Synopsis of experts and their performances, i.e. report contents during Tikar planning study phases I – III, March – December 1989.**

**Methodology**

- **Step 1.1** Study on an isolin producer, income (FCFA 250,000,000), leading to further elaboration of the base line.  
- **Step 1.2** Study on inter-lin producer, income (FCFA 300,000,000), leading to further elaboration of the base line.  
- **Step 1.3** Study on mixed producer, income (FCFA 150,000,000), leading to further elaboration of the base line.  

**Phase II**

- **Step 1.1** Study on an isolin producer, income (FCFA 250,000,000), leading to further elaboration of the base line.  
- **Step 1.2** Study on inter-lin producer, income (FCFA 300,000,000), leading to further elaboration of the base line.  
- **Step 1.3** Study on mixed producer, income (FCFA 150,000,000), leading to further elaboration of the base line.  

**Phase III**

- **Step 1.1** Study on an isolin producer, income (FCFA 250,000,000), leading to further elaboration of the base line.  
- **Step 1.2** Study on inter-lin producer, income (FCFA 300,000,000), leading to further elaboration of the base line.  
- **Step 1.3** Study on mixed producer, income (FCFA 150,000,000), leading to further elaboration of the base line.  

**Figure 4.5.1** Synopsis of experts and their performances, i.e. report contents during Tikar planning study phases I – III, March – December 1989.

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**Reference:**  
A. Le Hell, Fish and forestry in Cameroon and in Cameroon, in sharp contrast to the Tikar plain and to adjacent rural areas.  
B. Le Hell, Fish and forestry in Cameroon and in Cameroon, in sharp contrast to the Tikar plain and to adjacent rural areas.  
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X. Le Hell, Fish and forestry in Cameroon and in Cameroon, in sharp contrast to the Tikar plain and to adjacent rural areas.  
Y. Le Hell, Fish and forestry in Cameroon and in Cameroon, in sharp contrast to the Tikar plain and to adjacent rural areas.  
Z. Le Hell, Fish and forestry in Cameroon and in Cameroon, in sharp contrast to the Tikar plain and to adjacent rural areas.
| Planning stage | Step 4: Problem structuring: Focusing criteria of priority-setting | Comprehension | | | Qualification | | | Evaluation | | | Implementation |
|---------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Environment/urban setting | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Human resource | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Institutional and financial resources | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Working group of stakeholder and target communities | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Biological and physical conditions | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Natural resource development potential | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Marine-park zone of real estate/urban setting | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Service demand | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Social demand | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Economic demand | | | | | | | | | | | |

**Figure 4.5.2  Reduced Procedure for Problem Structuring, Goal Setting, Discriminating Factors for Area Selection, and Identification of Priority-Area Project Packages for First Executive Round of 1990-92.**
An obvious distinction has been made in figures 4.5.1/2 between problem diagnosis through analysis of secondary data and field surveys (Phase I), and proposing problem solutions B.2.1-D.3.4 through logically selected, multi-annual improvement programmes (: Phase II).

**Phase I of Inter-disciplinary Inventory, Problem Diagnosis and Priority Area Selection**

During the analytical study phase I, March-May 1989, reports and thematic maps have been produced on:
- The (re)settled population, permanent vs. seasonal migration and employment;
- The existing boundaries and (in) formal organisation of traditional chiefdoms, districts, departments and provinces extending their respective administrations haphazardly into the Tikar plain;
- The existing market structure for trade in agricultural produce, fish and livestock, as well as eventual self-sufficiency in local food consumption.

In the same way, based on aerial photo interpretation, soil sampling, laboratory analysis, local questionnairing and secondary data available, synthetic maps and reports were produced on:
- Soil and mapping units, vegetation types, and actual land suitability classes; and
- Nomadic livestock rearing: the marginal Mbororo lifestyle, excessive grazing pressure, graziers' income (US $ 300/cap/yr.) and government interventions;
- Fish production, income (US$ 350/hh/yr.), marketing and processing mainly related to the artificial lake in the Tikar plain; clash with Nigerian fishermen;
- Soil types sensitive to erosion, water-related human diseases and wildlife preservation;
- The rapid deforestation of various vegetation types, as caused by fires for crop and grass production; by selective cutting of timber, round and firewood production; and by inundation of the reservoir;
- Water availabilities per river catchment area in the Tikar plain, as well as quantitative and qualitative gaps in provision of primary and secondary education, health services, drinking water and rural roads.

The first three study months were synthesised in a project management paper pinpointing (refer back to IRD-hurdles in sub-section 2.2.2):
- on the one hand, the limited administrative capacities, as well as lack of reliable data and government funds (as derived from Reports A.2 + 6) for comprehensive rural plan formulation and implementation in the Tikar plain as whole; and
- on the other hand, the urgent problems of population and grazing pressure, their multi-faceted causes and effects (as derived from Reports A.1, B.3, C.3 and D.2) to be initially counterbalanced by inter-sectoral project packages designed for some carefully selected priority chiefdoms only.
ELEVEN (11) CHIEFDOMS/ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS OF ANALYSIS AND RESOURCE PROGRAMMING IN THE TIKAR PLAIN.
As brought out by Rep. A.2 and map 1, the eleven traditional chiefdoms in the Tikar plain were to function indeed as basic administrative units of analysis and programming for the five working groups (A-E) altogether. From these low-level planning units, four (4) were selected as short-term priority action zones (see map 2) for the next study phases (II and III) on the following scored criteria (= Steps 1.3/4 and figure 4.5.3):

- being representative of the different development problems of the plain as a whole, i.e. susceptible as exemplary zones for pilot interventions and action training;
- showing high population densities and growth through immigration and/or resettlement;
- demonstrating local dynamism by a chiefdom development committee, capable of raising and managing its own community development funds;
- endowed with suitable soils for agro-livestock developments; and
- inadequately provided with primary education, health services, safe drinking water and local markets centres refer to sub-section 2.2.3.

**Phase II of medium-term programme design for the period 1991-96**

Agreement on observations and proposals, made in favour of the reduced rural planning approach, paved the road for the multi-annual programming of problem solutions by the study team during phase II. Here, the respective series of Reports A.5 until D.3, and maps 3-16 culminated in the global inventory of proposed interventions A.6.1-D.3.4 of Report B.6; see our synoptic chart again of figure 4.5.1.

Particularly from Report A.6, it has been concluded that qualified planning staff is very much limited, leading towards institutional development proposals (refer to figure 4.5.4 later on):

- on the one hand, for (foreign assistance in) establishing a Tikar regional co-ordination and monitoring committee leaning initially on chiefdom community development workers from abroad, stationed in the four exemplary priority zones; and
- on the other hand, for an interconnected series of on-the-job training workshops of three weeks each during three years (1990-1993) in order to transfer surveying, mapping, plan formulation and implementation, monitoring and evaluation skills to an inter-sectoral group of local government staff in the Tikar plain.

Calculation of physical production levels of various land suitability classes for different crops (maize, groundnut, cassava, rice, coffee, etc.) in combination with financial analysis of eleven farming systems specified as to cropping patterns and cycles, land preparation, capital and labour inputs, and farming incomes averaging US$ 2,500/hh/yr, led to four agricultural improvement programmes being proposed as follows:

- Increased use of selected planting material and plant protection chemicals;
- Increased use of chemical and organic fertilisers and soil amendments;
- Generalisation of the second cropping cycle in farm cultivation; and
- Improvement of the preservation and transformation of agricultural products: coffee husking, maize and rice milling, cottage palm oil production and processing of cassava into dried chips and tapioca, – altogether through smallholder co-operatives.

In the same vein, – making use of logical frameworks for selection of interventions, their verifiable targets, inputs and outputs, as well as hidden assumptions –, future improvements were specified in the (organisational structure for) production, preservation, processing and marketing as related to animal husbandry, fishery and (agro-)forestry, incl. environmental protection and additional studies needed; refer to figure 4.5.2.
At the finale of study phase II, the detailed review of Report B.6 on total programme costs for the Tikar plan as a whole during the period 1991-1996 revealed an estimated amount of FCFA 8,130 million of which:

- 20% was to be invested in the four productive sectors of agriculture, animal husbandry, fishery and forestry;
- 35% was to be spent on social infrastructure, i.e. education, health and drinking water supply; and
- 45% was to improve the disturbed rural road system around the artificial lake.

Total programme costs for five years per Tikar inhabitant amounted to FCFA 206,000, decreasing to FCFA 100,000 in the very four priority zones only i.e. US $ 330/inh. in the short run.

Reconciliation of Development Views in Tikar Planning Study.

Apart from some haggling about the exact delimitation of the geographical entity of the Tikar plain, because of its typical regional frontier functions, the 1989 study team was strictly managed indeed along the planning steps 1.2-4, as shown by the self-explaining figures 4.5.1/2. Some remarks are to clarify, however, professional stances taken by the interdisciplinary working groups A-D. For, although study report A.1 revealed extremely high population pressures on (north) western mountainous plateaux being the main cause of continuous peasant immigration into the Tikar plain, direct migration control, for instance, by issuing seasonal or permanent working permits for the plain was not envisaged:

- Because effective demographic control, including nomadic herdsmen, was considered too heavy a task for local authorities;
- Because restricting individual mobility was considered politically unacceptable, i.e. illegitimate, as running counter to individual freedom: a cherished common value in Cameroon!

Instead, institutional strengthening was given all emphasis, including local community participation and dynamism in self-help fund raising by chiefdom and village development committees, as expressed in a discriminating selection factor A.2 under planning step 1.3 In glancing through the second row B of this figure 4.5.2, it is to be kept in mind that during 1990 lowland coffee production in the Tikar plain was very much endangered by a heavy drop of robusta coffee prices in international markets. In this domain B of agro-livestock production, socio-cultural clashes between Mbororo pastoralists and settled agriculturists are a common phenomenon throughout Africa (Masai herdsmen in Kenya). So is natural resource depletion, as depicted by the third row C. Ultimately, downward trends in sustainable production and rural incomes jeopardising economic growth are undermining service delivery and cost recovery potentials, i.e. a fair (spatial) distribution of schools, health centres, boreholes and feeder roads all over the Tikar plain: rural deprivation being rampant!

This gloomy picture is hopefully counter-balanced a.o. by foreign technical and financial assistance being channelled towards intersectoral project packages implemented during 1990-92 in four priority action zones, i.e. chiefdoms preliminarily selected on the basis of attached figure 4.5.3. The discriminating selection factors of step 1.3 in figure 4.5.2 were presented in figure 4.5.3 horizontally in the French language whereas all the eleven Tikar chiefdoms were placed vertically. Additional clarifications in English make the following reconciliation of priority-area selection criteria in figure 4.5.3 obvious. First and foremost, discriminating factors are strictly and exemplary problem- and goal-oriented, as required by our reduced planning approach; at the same time, they are
option and programme/project oriented in an operational-executive sense as illustrated by elaborated interventions A.6.1-D.3.4 under step 1.4 in figure 4.5.2. Moreover, core problems, resource constraints and development potentials did influence indeed proper factor scoring substantively downward or upward in such a way:

- That the urgency of population dynamics received high priority: possible top score \(30 + 30 + 30 = 90\) for factors A.1.1-3;
- That the existence of dynamic grass-roots' institutions was highly appreciated: possible top score 60 for factor A.2;
- That economic growth endowments for agro-livestock production possibly scored \((30 + 30 + 30) = 90\) altogether by factors B.1.1-2 and B.3;
- That disadvantageous distribution ratios and walking distances to public service points maximally scored \((90 + 20 + 30) = 140\) altogether by factors D.2.1-3;
- That functioning (inter-)regional markets were considered of great importance, both in an economic and distributive sense, and thus received a maximum score 60 by factor D.4/A.4.

Among these selection factors the rural infrastructure component was assigned a predominant weight (: score = 140) relative to other development policy criteria (: scores 60-90), resulting in four pilot chiefdoms being singled out for concentrated investments of US$ 12.5 million during 1990-92. From this estimated amount 50% was to be channelled into improving the social and physical infrastructure, disturbed by inundation of the artificial lake Mapé.

4.5.3 A 'lilliputian' approach towards capacity improvement

In order to gradually relax the shackles of top-down control by central headquarters and enable lower-level self-determination, the conventional sequence of planning activities 2-13 represented in figures 2.2.6/7 were to be adapted; and closely tied to standing bureaucratic planning and budgeting routines, as exemplified by the West-African case of figure 4.5.4 in Cameroon and detailed in the programme design of figure 4.5.2. Particularly in view of Tikar's disintegrated administrative structure, but generally accounting for the limited availability of government funds and qualified planning staff, measures were to be taken at three institutional levels: against the cascade-current 'from its bottom upwards' as follows.

In the course of 3-6 years, at inter-provincial level, i.e. for the geographical entity of the Tikar water catchment basin as a whole, an inter-sectoral steering and monitoring committee (SMC) were to be put up reinforced by a qualified foreign volunteer/rural plan co-ordinator and his local counterpart, as well as by a mother-and-child health care officer/female volunteer from abroad, taken in as catalysts/animators'.

This regional SMC, consisting of representatives of the central planning ministry, provincial and district heads and technical sectoral officers is to safeguard the annual plan formulation, budgeting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of pilot programmes with proposed interventions (A.6.1-D.3.4 in figures 4.5.1/2) to be executed in the exemplary priority chiefdoms initially selected. Here, mobilisation and co-ordination are to take place of foreign donors (: EEC, FAO, UNICEF, Federal Germany, etc.), sectoral government agencies, - above all of local communities involved in the multi-annual planning procedure of figure 4.5.4.
## Tableau du choix préliminaire des zones d'action prioritaire / Table with preliminary choice of priority action zones

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Table 4.5 Table 6 Table 7

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<th>Zones d'Action Prioritaire Preliminaires</th>
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<tr>
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<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
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<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>300ha²</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>40</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Koula</td>
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<td>40</td>
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<td>Koula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasor</td>
<td>300ha²</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Nasor</td>
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</table>

**Figure 4.5.3** Preliminary choice of priority action zones (=ZAP).
Planning rounds 1-3

Components of learning-by-doing process

1. Multi-level and intersectoral institution building:
   - Regional, i.e. inter-provincial (SMC)
   - District (DDCs)
   - Chiefdom (CDCs)
   - Village (VDCs)

2. Start up, information + community participation

3. On-the-job training of second-tier planning staff through three workshops (Veenstra, 1982, p. 44)

4. Staggered introduction of monitoring + on-going evaluation = M/E

5. Building up local planning data use

1. First round of 1990-1992 priority area resource mobilisation, plan implementation, monitoring and evaluation

   Intervention A.6.1.: Establishment of regional SMC, as well as revival of priority-chiefdom and local village development committees. Appointment of regional plan coordinators and priority-chiefdom development workers' 'animators'.

   Intervention A.6.2.: Annual seminars to be organised for some days at district and priority-chiefdom levels.

   Intervention A.6.3.: First operational workshop subjects to be dealt with during strategic planning workshop 1992:
   - Identification, formulation, monitoring + evaluation through logical frameworks of priority-area project packages: classic project cycle/treadmill
   - Foreign + domestic programme budgeting and implementation
   - Antagonistic development views on budgeting and implementation
   - Secondary + primary data collection, processing and reporting including questionnairing
   - Problem structuring + selection of problem-related factors for area priority setting, and choice of preferred strategies.

   Intervention A.6.4: M/E of first round of four project packages

   Intervention A.6.5.: Standard data list and maps to be established for priority-area project packages + strategic development framework to be formulated for Tikar plain.

   → A.6.6. Second project planning round executed

2. Second round of 1993-1996 priority area selection, plan formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation


Closing seminars organised around strategic framework

Subject of third policy-oriented workshop of 1993:
- Theories, strategies, objectives for regional development planning including typologies of sub-regions
- Structural elements of rural poverty; rural development planning approaches and techniques
- Rural settlement policy options, including drinking water, primary health care and education, feeder roads, rural energy supply and small-scale rural agro-processing

A.6.7. Integrated strategic framework formulated 'from above and from below'.

Figure 4.5.4. Operational-cum-strategic planning and budgeting procedure for Tikar plain, Cameroon, 1990-1996; refer back to IDAP's Appendix 4.4.1, but also forward to figure 6.1 in conclusion.
At the same time, at district level, the expatriate Tikar plan co-ordinator/catalyst and his locally nominated planning colleagues are to merely steer by the three existing district development committees (DDCs) during their annual budgeting meetings in favour of 'integrated' priority-chiefdom plan implementation. Refer to IDAP's working committees of 1986 in sub-section 4.4.3.

Last, but not least, emphatic revival of rural village structures, local leadership and of traditional chiefdom councils is to be aimed at. Hereto, inside priority zones, existing village development committees (VDCs) were to be given an official status and fresh start, instigated by specifically appointed, priority-zone co-ordinators/chiefdom development volunteers from abroad. These expatriate community development workers are to catalyse particularly the respective priority chiefdom councils (CDCs) including local technical staff, – thus favouring action research for participatory planning and grassroots implementation of the exemplary project bundles (A.6.1-D.3.4). Refer to participatory IRD-lines at the finale of sub-section 2.2.2.

In order to mobilise and regularly inform all public and private parties directly concerned with Tikar's experimental planning-cum-learning process (1990-96), annual seminars of 2 to 4 days each are to be organised at district and priority chiefdom levels.

Particularly taking advantage of the annual routine meetings held by DDCs all over the plain, explanations were to be given on the selection and identification, and eventual (foreign) funding, of the first round of four priority-chiefdom project packages by some of the principal expert consultants mentioned in our synoptic chart of figure 4.5.1.

In the same vein (but with the assistance of the newly appointed Tikar plan co-ordinator, his two regional planning colleagues and local community development workers), district and chiefdom seminars were to be held in 1992 and 1993, dealing among other things with:

• progress made by and lessons learned from implementing pilot interventions in the four priority zones;

• building up a local data base for long-term Tikar planning purposes; refer to Paats (1987) as stemming from Ann. III in Van Staveren/Dusseldorp (1980).

• retreat of foreign project funding and chiefdom development volunteers from the first round of four priority chiefdoms 1990-92;

• subsequent re-selection of a second round (1993-96) of about three other priority zones in the area

Running parallel with the successive rounds of local seminars, three on-the-job training cycles (1991-93) are proposed for a limited group of about 25 senior sectoral planning officers, who preferably are at district level the 'seconds in command' inside their own agencies, i.e., agriculture, animal husbandry, education, public works, etc. Three training workshops of three weeks each are to deal with a wide range of short- and long-term rural planning subjects, as spelled out in the propositions of sub-sections 2.2.1-3, and to be presented by an interdisciplinary group of expert trainers/consultants who will use as case-study materials the reports A-D and maps 1-16 listed in figure 4.5.1.

The learning-by-doing process of figure 4.5.4 cannot effectively be adjusted without (Clayton and Pétry, 1981, pp. 1-11 and 253-260):

• Monitoring, defined as a process of measuring, processing and communicating operational information on project performances, external conditions and impacts; and
• Evaluation, i.e. determining cause-effect relationships between project inputs and outputs including external constraints, using logical frameworks as an analytical tool for determining strategic effectiveness c.q. efficacy.

Our Tikar regional plan co-ordinators and local community development workers are to be on guard in advance, however, against introductory failures in monitoring and evaluation (M/E) systems usually associated with (Bamberger and Hewitt, 1990):
• A poor system design, i.e., production of more M/E data than are needed or can be analysed;
• Inadequate staff, equipment, transport, etc. for M/E activities such as early base-line surveys;
• Substantial delays in processing and analysis of data and in presentation of M/E results;
• M/E reports remaining untouched, i.e., unused by local sectoral officers who feel themselves threatened by M/E results!

Despite conflicting imperatives of plan evaluators and administrators, M/E processes (directed both towards area programme and action project data collection and analysis) contribute principally to inter-sectoral efforts at district and priority chiefdom levels, as explicated in figures 4.5.1/2, to improve secondary data initially used to:
• structure development problems and objectives for the Tikar plain as a whole (study phase I/step I.2);
• establish a standard list and portfolio of synthetic and thematic maps representing problem-related factors, or scored policy criteria for priority-area re-selection during 1992 (original study phase I/steps I.3+4)
• identify budgeted project packages B.2.1-D.3.4 per priority chiefdom (original study phase II).

Ultimately, becoming well versed by three training workshops during 1991-93, supported by foreign technical assistance and project funds, plus provided with an improved data base, the ‘second-in-command’ group of senior sectoral officers were to take over the second round 1993-96 of continued planning in, say, three other Tikar chiefdoms to be selected. Here, the same planning steps and study phases as presented in figure 4.5.2 could be adhered to, but taking into account the lessons learned from trials and errors during 1990-92. An independently operating SMC is to organise instructive seminars (again, at district and newly selected chiefdom levels) to reinforce local village and chiefdom structures and to co-ordinate local and foreign funds made available for newly formulated project packages, being monitored and evaluated, etc. with continued assistance of regional plan co-ordinators and local community development workers becoming well-versed on the spot.

Note that the repeated selection of priority zones is not considered to be a final objective on its own. On the contrary, the two sequential rounds of priority package formulation and implementation are to serve the main aim of building ‘from the bottom upwards’ local planning capacities and a reliable data base for the Tikar plain as a whole. This is to leave the bureaucratic routine of annual project shopping lists behind and to strive for a multi-annual development strategy (well understood by the local administration) which by itself comes to grips with rural planning weaknesses typical for specific parts of the Third World. As a consequence, national long-term planning guidelines, large-scale interventions and programmes (such as the artificial lake Mapé designated ‘from above’, i.e. from central headquarters in Yaoundé) are to be incorporated into a five-year development strategy for the entire catchment, thus integrating the rather short-sighted annual priority-area packages ‘from below’ with a long-term
strategic framework for the entire plain 'from above'. Because of acquaintance with new crafts and team spirit built into the local planning machinery from below during 1990-96, the inter-provincial SMC is now to work towards an indicative five-year Tikar development framework 1997-2001. Finally, a series of seminars during 1995-96 should inform a broad audience, including politicians and senior officials from national to local levels, on the following topics.

- Secondary and primary data collected and processed, including (computer-assisted) production of synthesised and thematic maps;
- Study reports produced by sectoral working groups with regard to socio-economic, institutional and project funding topics of domain A, likewise found in our synoptic chart of figure 4.5.1.
- the agro-livestock, forestry and fishery production sectors of domains B and C in our chart;
- rural infrastructure sectors of domain D in our chart.
- Leading (sub)sectors, key projects and supporting programmes ultimately indicated by the Tikar strategic framework for another five years to come: 1997-2001.

Here, referring back to our reader's guide of section 2.0, propositions P.9 and P.10: to set local planistrators free from their functional bondage to central headquarters, a revision or topsy-turvy twist in lower-level area planning is suggested:

I Away from narrow project feasibility, implementation and progress monitoring through logical frameworks (Rosenberg and Hagebroeck, 1972, pp. 1-32; Callewaert, 1988; Bell, 2000, pp. 29-31);
II Towards focusing on core problem structuring and strategic area development choices to be made (Van Steenbergen, 1990, pp. 301-304; Hickling, 1987, pp. 1-26); ultimately;
I Supported by action-oriented policy studies (Majchrzak, 1984; Guba and Kelly in Palumbo, 1987, 202-233, 270-295) laying initial emphasis on conflicting policy options, means and instruments, as well as on interested stakeholders, their available resources and controversial values.

It is to be remembered that instructive feed-back and feed-forward flows of (geo-) information, as brought out by figure 2.2.3, but also by the specific Rada figure 4.3.4, were to support national policy making, sub-national area programming and action project design and implementation, each of them smaller in territorial and time perspective than the former. Systemic rationality tells us that, ideally, these decision-making and planning outputs take on definite shapes and mapping scales along the main diagonal 'from above and from below' — with mutual overlaps by management cycles D and E—in order to crystallise ultimately in local development interventions for shelter, agriculture, forestry, social and physical infrastructures. Here, it is to be remembered, too, that the different sectors for delivering (non-) government goods and services are usually screened off from each other, so that a bureaucratically fragmented image emerges not only of local but also of national resource management and planning. As a consequence, in adopting nevertheless an emancipatory (geo-) information training approach for sub-national development officers in specific settings all over the Third World, a series of successive courses is to be centered on the multi-disciplinary integration of data from various types of surveys and studies, climbing step-wise the territorial planning stairway, principally 'from the bottom upwards' as follows:
Output III. The detailed information type at a mapping scale of 1:10,000 or less, addressing the small-scale and location-specific project feasibility and implementation planning at sub-district level, in anticipation of higher order plans II + I;

Output II. The semi-detailed information type at a mapping scale of 1:50,000, addressing mid-level strategic pre-feasibility programming of inter-sectoral interventions at district and provincial levels; ultimately reaching out towards

Output I. The reconnaissance information type at a mapping scale of 1:100,000 or more, addressing macro-policy guidelines framed at sectoral/sub-national levels.

As a consequence, too, in order to fully complete this staggered, three-pronged approach in practice, it would be necessary to consider nation-wide a government decentralisation exercise of 5-6 years. This would be in conformity with a politically sustained, innovative period of structural change within which central guidelines for lower-level policy making, plan formulation, co-ordination, community participation, control and evaluation were to be conceived, distributed and administratively completed through national five year plans. This is in conformity as well with on-the-job and off-the-job training programmes aimed at gradually increasing the application of geo-information and remote sensing technology to development planning procedures and methods currently in use from macro- to micro-levels by (non-) governmental organisations.

So, instead of being fragmentarily instructed from above by sectoral policy guidelines and annual resource ceilings, local field staff is to gradually establish its own well-grounded cumulative body of grassroots planning knowledge, supported by a multi-disciplinary range of action-oriented policy indicators, generated by (rapid) rural data collection and processing techniques (FAO/WCARDD, 1980; UNCHS, 1995, vol. 1-3).

4.6. Re-absorbing ancient myths on Nemesis versus Hubris
(Zoja, 1995, Part IV).

'At the end of the day' here-and-now personally re-absorbing ancient myths of Icarus' flight and Prometheus' unbound betterment of mankind, this study's author sums up own inner and outer learning rounds, as internalised by a series of synoptic prisms of preceding figure 4.1. These self-containing synopses guided and led step by step along down-to-earth study axis 3 all through the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s:

• Along the 'hard' technological and positivist, yet free-floating regionalisation construct for Sierra Leone in sub-section 4.1.2, Table 4.1.2 with two maps; as being scaled down with hindsight
• Along the hybrid methodology, yet aloof plan of action 1974/75 in Shinyanga, Tanzania of figures 4.2.4/5; and Tables 4.2. 6-11;
• Along the phased operational-cum-strategic project design in Rada/North Yemen 1981/82 incl. different leadership-styles required in staircase-figure 4.3.4, and constituent plan components of figure 4.3.2;
• Along the 'actual versus desired' stages in Aceh/Indonesia 1975/86 of cascade-figure 4.4.1 and checklist with production, service and institutional plan ingredients of appendix 4.4.1, presented as a managerial prototype; to arrive in Cameroon.
• At the reduced, yet social learning approach 'working from the bottom upwards' from figs. 4.5.1/2 towards fig 4.5.4 emphasising shifts over time in planning studies in vogue.
Consequently, this never ending account is taken together in our concluding section 6.3 by figure 6.1 (Veenstra/Turkstra, 1996/99, pp 289/417) for which the under-girdings are to be summed up now in line with ten propositions and six probing questions of section 2.0. That is, all along the instructive sequence of five area development cases the persistent reconciliatory adage has been 'to strike a balance' among inward- and outward-looking perspectives held both by indigenous and expatriate stakeholders concerned, - thus striving for temporary congruity in public choices made for securing 'good life for man' (: P.1).

Having been personally engaged during past decades in the 'foreign-aid business', particularly in 'residual' and remote area planning exercises, the 'overseas' author of the 

Sierra Leonean research paper of 1969 admits to have been skating on thin ice. Because practical consciousness, - later on being reinforced-, points with hindsight to normative, strategic and operational incommensurabilities of large-scale 'hard' infrastructure and agro-technological interventions being thought up. In reaching out for 'sustainable' livelihoods, particularly in agrarian societies under patrimonial resource control in West Africa of the 1960s (: P.5), strategic and executive caveats were to be put forward, as found in sub-section 2.2.1 to 2.2.3. Shortcomings inside and between conventional knowledge bases and of respective policy instruments (not) used, of statutory powers (not) granted and skilled personnel, budgets, equipment (not) available, were thus later on laid open (: Q.2b). More bewildering though appeared the manifest incongruity of stakeholders' mental frames, allowed at various territorial levels to put up priority claims. Room was thus granted, arbitrarily or dogmatically, for enabling men to satisfy basic human needs, socio-cultural pride and self-respect, or even for 'producing happiness for mankind' in Enlightenment style, - while at the same time 'kleptocratic' life styles both of rural and urban elites in a 'soft-state' setting were gruntingly endured (: Q.1a and Q.4a: on self-contained ethics).

In the peculiarly modernising case of single-party and socialist Tanzania around 1970, the flag-ship of 'integrated' rural area development lifted its flying (normative and strategic) colours in support of self-reliance, poverty alleviation and fair distribution of social and physical infrastructure (: Q.2a), - if at all being produced, operated and maintained. For becoming bogged down by nationalisation of critical production and service sectors, - thus, by an over-burdened state-apparatus-, the ordinary farming and cattle-herding population exited to 'black-market' sales of its produce and into age-old clientship-like distribution channels for local provision of its basic services, without revenues for state coffers. Meanwhile superfluously in good faith assisted by foreign-aid advisers, - especially region-wide in co-operative village planning exercises which seldom saw the resources made available for their implementation, than only under army's sabre-rattling-, the Tanzanian bureaucracy made itself not 'responsive and trust-worthy': considered characteristic, nowadays, for 'sustainable' development.

Under these uncertain working conditions expatriate planistrators could hardly collaborate with, - were even kept at arm's length by-, their political and technical overseers in Tanzania. Leave alone, that local counterparts could be taken at a reflective distance to (re)consider the risky structure and future direction of well-known flows of events. Thus, held off in self-containment (: Q.1a), aloof arithmetics prevailed in the 'integrated' rural planning exercise of the neglected Shinyanga Region. Nevertheless, step-by-step 'integration' both in planning and eventual implementation, was intended (: P.7 and P.9) by the expatriate advisers through initially restricting sectoral, time/space, problem and resource perspectives to prioritised, low-level and small-scale, concentrated development areas (CDA's). Thus, it was aspired to break away, later on, from short-range action project-control towards strategic middle-range programmes for grasping ultimately in the long run at the still moving target of 'sus-
tainable livelihood development. This long-haul perspective including its medium-term strategic issues remained undisputed, i.e. was ideologically put to silence. So both expatriate and local planning officers saw their strategic planning efforts frustrated (Q.10a: on de-fused programmes).

Finally, noteworthy for those days around 1970, was the hybrid methodology employed, i.e. both mechanistic and bio-organismic orientations followed to analyse the 'true' region, as if it were: either a well functioning clockwork of an agrarian folk society with its own 'rationalised' forms of life; or, a living organism (to be) built up from various heterogeneous parts, including a settlement hierarchy linked up by transport / information flows. Both socio-spatial concepts of homogeneity, and related index-number or factor-analysis methods, as well as of heterogeneity plus flow analysis were to constitute the statistical techniques and secondary data used: arithmetics in the driving seat (P.4 and Q.4b: on cognitive tight-roping).

In entering the 1980s, however, cognitive guidelines changed from aloof empiricism and bio-systems approaches towards 'soft' social learning and reform, community mobilisation and open-minded emancipation on empathetic and/or dialectic grounds. Thus, all sorts and conditions of people were to be reckoned with: both of weak target groups and of mighty socio-political gatekeepers. So, 'hard' technology and infrastructure were de-emphasised in favour of social services, drinking water and local farm-to-market roads, for instance, - accompanied by long-term environmental protection, popular participation and bureaucratic re-orientation plus professional capacity improvement (Q.2a and Q.2b). So also, neutral 'scientific' planistrators c.q. facilitators were to re-shape their 'natural' habitus, - depending on politico-institutional contexts though-, towards mediatory brokers and advocates (P.6: on typical roles).

In the Rada'-context of conservative and liberal North Yemen, 1981/82, phased societal differentiation in the long run (P.5), but immediate emphasis on changing gears from operational towards strategic models of resource management, emerged as leading themes. Here, in promoting 'sustainable' development in Third-World peripheries particularly foreign field practitioners were to reconcile two conflicting policy sets (P.8):

- On the one hand, to respond to paternalistic self-interests of national headquarters in combination with private entrepreneurs and 'progressive' farmers favouring politico-administrative stability and free-market economic growth 'from above'; and
- On the other hand, to respond to local community interests of poverty-stricken rural and urban people in favour of equalisation, citizen participation and resource mobilisation 'from below', - in combination with local value patterns and natural resources to be left in traditional, well-balanced order, - while threatened from outside though.

After one decade of Rada'-development efforts, i.e. 1975-85, it was to be concluded that tribal village life remained principally untouched, whereas only selectively in concentrated development areas basic services and infrastructure were provided. At higher territorial levels of the district, government implementation capacity improved in operational and maintenance sense through ad-hoc foreign technical assistance and financial inputs, but also training of executive Yemen staff. At the highest sub-national level of the province, however, strategic governance did not find its coordinating niche, neither its divergent administrator/entrepreneur nor statesman / diplomat ideally wanted for: army's officialdom at the spot stifling progress in modern Enlightenment-style (Q.10a: on de-fused programmes).

Equal disability was experienced along the various stages of IDAP's history, 1977-1983, in Aceh/Indonesia. Particularly the formulation of a medium-term strategic development framework was to be initially suppressed as part of a planning methodology to
be introduced from outside into a peripheral region, itself closely tied up into top-down bureaucratic planning and budgeting routines. This strategic input had proven to be too ambitious and comprehensive, i.e. inappropriate for common planning practices used at provincial and district levels in Aceh. Therefore, strictly problem-, action- and locality-oriented surveys were deemed desirable to start up a multi-annual cumulative sequence (: P.10). Following from this area-specific data collection and questionnaireing a restricted number of projects for immediate small-scale implementation was to be demonstratively pushed: long before an eventual full-fledged regional planning exercise was running to its end. Thus, in line with (sub-)district planning experiences gained earlier in Rada'N. Yemen and Shinyanga/Tanzania (: Q.1a), seven concentrated development areas (CDAs) were prioritised in 1985, out of a total of 32 sub-districts. A list of social and physical infrastructure projects was drafted, sometimes by informed intuition, in order to be funded from sectoral Indonesian budgets. In 1986, by formal decree, intersectoral working committees were founded to ensure at district level the acceptance of CDA-project proposals in the multi-level Indonesian appraisal machinery, including their co-ordinated implementation. As was proposed later on also in Tikar/Cameroon, an interconnected series of local seminars demonstrated step after learning-by-doing step this micro-regional project development method for planners and (top) decision-makers (in)directly concerned, while practical training materials for on-the-job capacity improvement were being tried out.

So it happened that around 1990 both cases from Aceh in Indonesia and the Tikar plain in Cameroon, in combination, led up to prototypical flow charts for rural area planning, related training and implementation procedures (figures. 4.4.1 and 4.5.4), including checklists with the various production, service and institution building components required (appendix 4.4.1 and figures. 4.5.1/2). Herewith, local field practitioners were to refrain initially from sketchy, i.e. skeleton area development profiles, but move pragmatically from small-scale problem- and area-specific action projects towards a medium-term strategic framework arrived at 'from above and below' (: P. 7 to P.9). Along this zigzag route of about seven years political commitments, binding inter-sectoral engagements, team spirit and trust plus surveying-cum-planning capabilities were to be built up. So also, in focusing on strategic problem structuring and (training in) management of uncertainty, conflicting policy options and instruments are run into, as differently interpreted and appraised by local target groups and socio-political gate-keepers (: P.5 and P.8). Especially under fractured working conditions today where the centralised state is 'rolling back, and the local citizenry is left to the (still down-played) remnants of its age-old religious, ethno-cultural, reciprocative and patrimonial devices including 'prescribed altruism', local planistrators are to frame their own responsive and legitimate policy prescriptions, either enrolled as facilitators, mediators/advocates, visionaries or 'lilliputian' activists/ counter-planners (: P.6 on typical roles).
Rondreis 1961: Recasting old dreams in endless conversation (endings of section 2.1)

III
Van Groningen tot Rome
staan huizen langs de weg,
en waterbuizen dromen
in ruisen langs die weg;
zo stroomden oude dromen
door mijn gedachten weg.

Van Rome tot Athene
nam dit gestadig af;
ik hoorde mensen wenen
waar niemand water gaf;
waar huizen zijn verdwenen
neemt droogte dromen af.

II
Tot Belgrado te komen
is reizen langs de hel,
inferno’s van een droogte
en eenzaamheid zó fel,
dat daar wel moesten komen
gedachten, scherp en fel,
het vast en zeker weten
van pijnen langs de weg
die slechts zijn te vergeten
in nieuw gegoten dromen
van water en van leven;
dan pas gaan pijnen weg.

I
Daarna terug te keren
waar nieuwe dromen staan,
is een voortdurend weren
van huizen binnen gaan
en luisterend mij keren
waar oude dromen gaan.
Chapter 5:
Local Area Development Planning and Management in the Province of West Java and the Province of the Special Territory of Aceh, Indonesia

5.1 Personal perspectives

The very basis of the normative, inward-looking perspective on socio-cultural and professional development as introduced in 2.1. is formed by one’s upbringing, the and during the various stages of education and the position a person occupies in the social structure. Having been born in a middle-class, Calvinist milieu, great importance was attached to values in the social domain and much emphasis was put on the individual responsibility for personal development and for individual contribution to progress of society in general, and of those the less affluent in particular. These ‘family values’ were strengthened during my high school days through the nature of the educational system which stressed the humanistic ideals of rational and social behaviour. However, in this personal environment that emphasised individual freedom in restraint, no particular analytical and political framework was offered to explain the occurrence of grave injustice in the world, let alone options how to solve that paramount problem. Later on, as a freshman in the 1970s at university I became active in the Third World solidarity movement focusing on the undemocratic situation in Indonesia, an engagement that profoundly contributed to a permanent interest in international politics. In particular the socio-political aspects of the problems of poverty and human rights, in particular in Indonesia, grasped my attention and became a lasting part of my normative frame of reference. At a more scientific level the introduction to the grand theories not only provided an explanation for the existing conditions but also a claim on the ability to indicate possible future developments. At that time the most dominant ‘schools’ within development studies could, in one way or another, be linked to modernisation, dependency or Marxist paradigms. Although the all-embracing character of the grand designs certainly had their attractiveness to somebody looking for answers to the profound questions linked to grave social injustice, the explanatory power of the above schools of thought was too limited to finally seduce my eclectic mind to embrace one of them wholeheartedly. In addition, development studies at Nijmegen’s Catholic University was of a rather reflective sort, with little, if any, attention for active involvement in the combat of socio-spatial inequalities at grassroots level (see e.g.: Huizer, 1976, 1978; Kleinpenning, 1978, 1980; van Naerssen, 1978, 1983). Yet, I had the feeling that I also had to become directly engaged myself in the struggle against poverty and human misery. To that end, I started to attend Wageningen Agricultural University’s Sociological Department that offered courses in (practical) development planning. It introduced me to a broader spectre of sociology of knowledge, development planning theories as well as practices. Thus it and gave me the first sense of what it might mean to be a regional development planner. Moreover, the diversity of schools of thought and their underlying assumptions paid attention to during the course, the consideration of various sectoral approaches, administrative settings, bureaucratic behaviour, political contexts, macro- and micro-aspects of development etc. even strengthened my distrust of the popular grand designs. It gave an overview the great variety of development approaches and planning frameworks, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. Thus Moreover, it reinforced the tacit interest in phenomenology that I had...
developed during the final stages of my Human Geography study but which was not very popular in those days. The attractiveness of the phenomenological principle was the assumption that knowledge of reality is based on perception. Due to the individual nature of perception the ideal of absolute objectivity is declared false. However, in practice the multitude of individual perceptions and related human action results in social rules and institutions that provide predictability and reliability about the behaviour of others and, the other side of the coin, reduce uncertainty for all actors. These inter-subjective practices and forms of life are rooted in a consensual expression of shared experiences, values, and aspirations of (groups of) members of a society, often with more or less the same social position (Bernstein, 1976, pp. 228-229; Korten, 1999, p. 32). This inter-subjective structure of reality can be distinguished through a human quality which enables us to recollect similarities (Koningsveld, 1976, pp. 45-49), and provides us with a sense of objectivity which, although basically false, is a fundamental tool to live by and to give sense to reality. This 'recollection of similarity' is as a capability firmly rooted in a historic and social context. The idea of phenomenology, of a relativist perception of reality, in combination with inter-subjectivity accommodates the variance in and pursuit of interests of diverse socio-spatial groupings in society at a particular time in history, as well as of these same social groups at different moments in history and within diverse (ethnological) contexts. As such this combination is capable of dealing with agency and with different human practices as implemented by distinct actor groups even though they belong to the same class or ethnic group. Simultaneously it avoids the trap of the post-modernist, exclusive focus on the primacy of the individual actor as the only valid unit of analysis, which does not seem to contribute much to the solution of the severe problem of poverty. Logically, a phenomenological perspective also rejects the rigid straight-jackets of modernisation (Rostow, 1962; Soja, 1968; Broek and Webb, 1968), as well as dependency and Marxist thinking about development in the Third World (Baran and Sweezy, 1968; Frank, 1969; Laclau, 1972; Szentes, 1973; Amin, 1976; Warren, 1980; Wallerstein, 1974).

Phenomenology is a relativist epistemological paradigm focusing on individual and group perception and appreciation of reality which is feeding normative dispositions ('what for') in a particular way. Thus, it should lead us, in terms of strategic policies ('how'), consequently away from top-down, blueprint planning which essentially involves a central, so-called rational determination of the public purpose (Friedmann, 1984, p.189) and which is largely unresponsive to diverse, local and social preferences and rationalities. Instead, phenomenology gives ample room to value-pluralism and constructivism and hence to different moral commitments of both planners and other actors in the development process which possibly lead to different objectives. It, and guides us to value-based participatory approaches of development planning and management of its results, as follows.

1 Paraphrasing Sen (1993, p.117) when he describes the dilemma in studying the diversities in inequality, we can state that when taking all individual perceptions into consideration, we might most probably end up in total confusion. The demands of practice indicate discretion and suggest that we disregard some diversity in the perceptions while concentrating on the more important viewpoints and confine attention to inter-group variations r.

2 the term 'agency', in the sense of the capability of individual actors to process experience and devise ways of coping with life through the purposeful manipulation or generation of resources, incl. social relations (Long & van der Ploeg, 1996, p. 66), though, became familiar to me much later (see also: Sen, 1993, pp. 56-72).

3 and the "...ultimater consequence that social research is no longer possible. In order to carry out social research (and social action!AvdH) the scientist needs abstract concepts but according to postmodernist critique these are either projections or based upon so-called shared experiences of a group of respondents which were deemed to be non-existent" (Schuurman, 1994, p. 18).
Participation is a fundamental human right. Development policies are not at all neutral and impeccable. They should therefore be brought to the public arena and be subject to questioning (Schaffer, 1984, p. 158). There, everybody is entitled to inject into the development process the richness—including the subjectivity—of their values and needs, and participate in one way or another in decision-making processes that vitally affect his or her life individually or that of the social group at large. As such participation is a matter of ethics. Based on normative grounds it is a goal in itself and of intrinsic importance to an inextricable part of democratic governance processes of which it is an inextricable part. But participation has also an instrumental role to play and can be considered is also a means towards the end of effective and efficient development policies that looks to the creative initiative of people as a genuine development resource and to their material and spiritual well-being as the end that the development process serves (Korten and Carner, 1984, p. 201). The analysis and articulation of the multiple, complex and often contradictory needs and potentials as well the definition and promotion of priorities by the various stakeholders is most likely to increase the understanding of reality and enhance the quality and impact of the development interventions. Where genuinely implemented, it should be able to has been agreed that it improves the mobilisation of resources and energy of local people who are often left out of the organised development process. The directly engaged local actors/decision-makers are usually not only more knowledgeable than local and 'external' development experts to what problems and needs they face. To a certain extent, they are also quite knowledgeable of the opportunities and potentials the target group has at its disposal to overcome these constraints, although they may lack the overview of the options offered by new technologies, wider spatial interrelations etc. The interaction of the various perspectives of those involved in the joint analysis of the conditions, the negotiations in priority setting and the implementation of the development interventions generates specific forms, directions and rhythms of change (Long & van der Ploeg, 1989, p. 236). This simultaneously contributes to a process of mutual learning and better understanding of the rapidly changing images of reality by the various groups of beneficiaries as well the development professionals involved. Thus it would enhance the appropriateness of (future) development interventions as these supposedly would better fit in with the conditions actually encountered in the various arenas. Participation of the stakeholders, often organised in local coalitions, in planning, decision-making, resource contribution, implementation and maintenance/administration, distributing the assets and intangible benefits and evaluating the (results of) development efforts (Cohen and Uphoff, 1977, pp. 6-10; Uphoff et al., 1979, pp. 6, 33-34) is also considered to correlate with an increased 'ownership' of the development efforts. This process would ill enhance the sustainability of the development intervention as well. In sum, co-directing the development process would ill gain for the target group a measure of collective influence over their own destinies (Uphoff and Esman, 1974, p. 67).

As a matter of consequence and simultaneously as a precondition for real participatory development processes, there is a need for a substantial, appropriate decentralisation of the governance system. Advocates of a strong central government usu-
ally argue that such a powerful central authority is required to protect the state from des-integration and the population from arbitrary treatment, to provide the skilled manpower that local level governments are lacking. Only in that way, a proper administration of the area and guaranteeing a (re)distribution of public goods according to generally accepted norms could be ensured (cf. fig. 2.2.8). But experience has proven that such conventional, centralised and comprehensive forms of governance, based on the conviction that a strong state is needed to plan and impose those plans, tend to generate an information overload, long response times, filtering and distortion of (insufficient) information, a failure to grasp spatial connections in sectoral planning and to be unresponsive to local needs, in particular in the field of socio-economics. As already shown in sub-sections 4.2.1-3, rigid, nation-wide development models have demonstrated not to be very useful if knowledge is always and everywhere incomplete, if each decision will have unforeseen and unintended consequences, and weak (central) development administrators are unable to control all forces that dynamically interplay and affect the outcome of the development intervention at local level (Friedmann, 1992, p. 79; Rondinelli, 1983, pp. 6, 74-88). Decentralisation, on the other hand, offers the opportunity to contribute to accountability, efficiency and community participation. Devolving power, functions and resources to a decentralised government will, theoretically at least, offer more scope for the appreciation of individual and (inter-subjective) group perceptions of reality and the defined needs related to these (varied) realities. It is assumed that hence it will permit a broad-based participatory, in contrast to a participatory opportunities that will be only be captured by local elites and used primarily for their benefit, identification, tailored design, decision-making, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of development policies (Cohen and Uphoff, 1977, pp. 39-56). Decentralisation would facilitate simultaneously both an improved responsiveness and engagement of the administration towards specific 'local' views of reality, preferences and expectations, and simultaneously and of the affected publics towards the initiatives of the development administration. It would increase the accountability towards the relevant constituencies and, it would offer the opportunity to adjust local needs and potentials on the one and resources on the other more precisely, and adapt implementation to experience. Moreover, decentralised, participatory processes would provide space for negotiated change about the objectives, approaches and costs in view of the uncertainties and complexities of constantly transforming environments, and thus for incorporating experience in, necessarily experimental working practices (Korten, 1980, 1984; Rondinelli, 1983). However, whether these potentials will also be realised in practice, depends of course on the quality of the local government in terms of its administrative competence and on the political will to respond to local priorities and be exposed to close scrutiny by the end-users. With hindsight, it is interesting, though, to observe that the overwhelming attention in those days for decentralisation and participation within state planning processes and structures, mainly stemmed from the disappointment with the then fashionable development approaches. As an alternative to the centralisation and top-

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7 It is duly noted that some policies can not effectively be carried out through decentralised structures whereas others, in particular location-specific activities where routine, standardised procedures do not apply, have a better chance to sustain if responsibilities are devolved to local level (Montgomery, 1983, p. 232).

8 However, what is presented as decentralisation is often not more than deconcentration (see 5.4.4 for the example of Indonesia). This may make for better access of rural people to decision-makers but not necessarily for a bigger share in decision-making (Uphoff et al., 1979, p. 69).

9 Whether these potentials will also be realised in practice, depends of course on the quality of the local government in terms of its administrative competence and on the political will to respond to local priorities and be exposed to close scrutiny by the end-users.
down planning, a participatory and bottom-up approach was appealing and theoretically convincing but, nevertheless, only to a very limited extent based on sustained experiences (cf. Stiefel and Wolfe, 1994, p. 4). The fact that the costs of participation in terms of time, forgone income opportunities, money and other contributions, in tensions with neighbours and increased local inequalities can become excessive relative to their associated benefits, was either not realised or played a minor part in the deliberations about preferable strategies (Uphoff et. al., 1998, p. 77; Mohan and Stokke, 2000). Illustrative in this respect is the fascination with prescriptions for and descriptions of the decentralised government structures, their (potential) positive impact on local development as well the elaboration of the plethora of problems that could be encountered while implementing participatory planning and decentralised administrative systems (see e.g.: van Dusseldorp; 1981; Stöhr & Taylor, 1981; Conyers, 1981, 1982, Rondinelli & Cheema (eds.), 1983; Galjart & Buijs (eds.), 1982). At that time in history, however, comparatively limited attention is (or could be) paid to the results of real life practices in decentralised development administration and the promotion of popular participation at a larger scale10.

Faced with the failures of centralisation and top-down development approaches on the one hand and both the sometimes convincingly ascribed as well the proven widely acknowledged advantages of direct participation and decentralisation, on the other, the puzzle is why it apparently takes so much trouble to introduce decentralisation throughout the administration and implement participatory methods of governance. And then the answer is that the nature of decentralisation is not only so much technical and administrative but also, and foremost, political as it involves a transfer of substantial authoritypowers and powers from the centre to the local level (Griffin, quoted by Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983, p. 13; Honadle and VanSant, 1985, p. 17). Moreover, participation implies automatically representation which requires (formal) structures with (some) authority - not a feature authoritarian Third World regimes are very fond of. Institutionalised participation at local level may also strengthen local social inequalities and power relations by providing local elites a formal platform to further their interests (see: Mohan and Stokke, 2000).

Equipped with the above normative guiding principles and intellectual knowledge, and gaining new experiences all along the road, I embarked upon my career and tried to define, in interaction with many others who had their own particular life history, along axis 3 of our study frame (see figures 1.1, 2.1 and 4.1) appropriate approaches to local area development and management of resources.

5.2 Historical and political context of the projects

Throughout Indonesia's history the state has always had a prominent position in the economy. In the Hindu-Buddhist (7th-15th century) era complex political and bureaucratic state structures facilitated the building of religious edifices and the construction and organisation of elaborate irrigation systems that were required to produce an agricultural surplus to feed the growing population (Missen, 1972, pp. 51-52, 97-109). When in the 15-16th century Islam gained a firm foothold in the archipelago through Indian traders, local power brokers on the coast line converted to the new religion. It was this political power that made trading wealth possible. The overseas trade, in its turn, was an important (tax) base for the rulers and their officials (van Leur, 1983, p. 92; Missen, 1972, p. 116-117). Later on, throughout a period of almost four centuries of

10 Although at that time some encouraging experiences were reported from socialist countries such as China, which later on turned out to be less rosy than pictured. See e.g. Sartaj Aziz (1978).
(semi) colonial relations between the Netherlands and the vast and diverse archipelago which was later cemented into the Indonesian state, a firm link was established between political and commercial power. Later, from the late nineteenth century onwards, the state gradually withdrew from direct involvement in economic affairs. It left that domain to non-indigenous private capital and concentrated on establishing a physical and legal/administrative environment conducive for investors (Robison, 1986, pp. 6-10). After independence, the new Indonesian government set out to counter the foreign and local Chinese domination of the economy by engaging itself directly in various sectors of the economy. In 1957 this involvement got a further boost when the government expropriated the extensive Dutch economic interests, followed by the nationalisation of British, American and other Western businesses in 1963-65. The nationalised enterprises were transformed into Indonesian state corporations. The state became de facto the biggest actor in the economy. It defined its role as: "the coordination and regulation by the state of all sectors of the Indonesian economy, state, private and cooperative, to ensure the integration of investment and production into the wider social and political goals and needs of Indonesia" (Robison, 1986, p.71). This central role of bureaucrats in allocating credit, licenses, monopolies, contracts and other concessions on the one hand, and owning and managing enterprises on the other, only increased after general Suharto effectively disposed Indonesia's first president Sukarno and established his 'New Order' administration in 196511. State capitalism, in close co-operation with a small group of associates from the private sector, constituted the driving force behind large industries, resource extraction and estate agriculture. Through the growing regulation of and intervention in the management of the (agricultural) co-operatives, which already had started in the late 1950's, the government increased its grip on the village economy in order to achieve self-sufficiency in food, to keep prices down in order to prevent inflation and support the industrialisation drive (Williams, 1980, p. 15; Rahardjo, 1981, p. 7). In the late 1980s and 1990s the prominent role of the government and army in directly managing enterprises decreased somewhat. In appropriating the biggest slice of the increased economic production, it was replaced by a small private sector elite which could dispose of excellent, high-level contacts with the highest political powerholders. Through patronage this elite managed to obtain, with an almost insatiable appetite, politically secured economic privileges which were subsequently often exchanged for a degree of equity in investments made by a relatively small number of domestic conglomerates and foreign companies. For the large pool of petty commodity producers and those traders without the appropriate political connections, little room was left to assert their economic interests and to become engaged in more sophisticated methods of production.

On the political scene it was the then president Sukarno who, during the period of Guided Democracy (1959-66), introduced authoritarian rule to Indonesia. He enabled the executive to dominate the legislative, thus effectively banning parliamentary democracy. Installed after an alleged coup d'état in 1965 and a bloody carnage in which hundreds of thousands people lost their life, the 'New Order' regime of the new president Suharto quickly brushed aside every idea of restoring parliamentary democracy. More than hundred thousand of (perceived) opponents were held prisoner for many years (May, 1978, pp. 27-40, 91-159). Economic development clearly took precedence over political development. Coercion continued to be a main characteristic of the new Order government, resulting in persisting one-sided power relationship between state and civil society that perpetuated itself in social structures which are increasingly far-reaching and total (von Magnis-Suseno, 1985, p. 73).

11 When mentioning bureaucrats it should not be forgotten that considerable part of the bureaucracy was controlled and staffed by the army which simultaneously also had its own business interests.
The hallmark of Suharto's New Order has been the successful extension of state power to all corners of society. Supposedly to make up for the weaknesses of civilian institutions the military was to dominate the bureaucracy, the state- and army-led economic enterprises and politics for a long time.

In the meantime, political parties became stylised and subordinate. A government-sponsored 'merger' limited the existing broad spectre of political parties to only three and their activities were severely curtailed; they were not allowed any longer to develop activities at sub-district and village levels. All mass organisations, including these three political parties, had to subscribe to the state ideology Panca Sila and the executive board of each of these organisations was to be officially registered. The government was given the right to freeze the activities of any organisation if it disturbed political order (and it was of course up to the government to determine what was considered a disturbance), or received aid from foreign parties without government approval (Law on Mass Organisations, 1985). An active role of civil society in organising society was not stimulated and actively opposed as well. Rigid censorship was implemented in the name of securing stability.

Notable characteristics of the New Order regime have been: the commitment to planned development, the entrenchment and centralisation of authoritarian rule by the military, the appropriation of the state by its officials, and the exclusion of political parties and civil society organisations from effective participation in the decision-making process. State-society relations combined repression -of those who did not want to cooperate- with co-optation and responsiveness (Liddle, 1985). The vacuum of civil institutions was filled with state-sponsored, corporatist political organisations that provided ample room for the incorporation of social and economic interest groups. Such 'functional groups' operated as institutions of control, mobilisation and patronage in the fields of labour, business, the civil service, youth, religion and a variety of other areas (Robison, 1986, p. 107). The whole range of non-governmental, not-for-profit initiatives which is now, in the 1990's, commonly known as civil society had played a central role in the independence struggle and the early days of the young republic, but in the course of time became more depolitised and controlled. On the part of the New Order authorities it was at best a matter of repressive tolerance, and that tolerance went only as far as to guarantee that its influence never gained much prominence in the decision-making process on key political and developmental issues. As a result, organised popular participation in development by articulating the people's interests and stimulating their active involvement in carving out their own development path, was almost absent at all levels.

12 The Panca Sila state ideology consists of five pillars: nationalism, social equity, faith or belief in God, humanism and democracy.

13 Corporatism is here defined as "a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised and licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports" (P. Schmitter, quoted in Mas'oed, 1989, p. 18).

14 The protection of the workers' interests was monopolised by the state-sanctioned FBSI (now SBSI) whereas independent unions which sprang-up in a reaction to the corporatist union were crushed. The Corps of Civil Servants of the Republic of Indonesia, KORPRI, is the only sanctioned association for government employees and its membership is mandatory; the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, is officially recognised as the sole channel of communication between the government and the business sector etc. (Mas'oed, p. 18-21) Islam as a political force was effectively marginalised for more than 20 years, until the government promoted the establishment of the association of Islamic intellectuals (ICMI) under the leadership of a prominent minister to co-opt the Muslim middle-class and canalise their aspirations etc.

15 In the words of Emil Salim, then the, supposedly liberal, minister for Population and Environment: "...if the differences (between the government and Non-Governmental Organisations[AvdH]) concern more "philosophical" matters, like differences in ideology or differences in national aims, then clearly any LSM (the Indonesian acronym for NGO[AvdH]) with those sorts of differences with the government will not have the right to exist" (1983, p. 71).
Civil society organisations, some with a membership of several millions like the Islamic organisations Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, were effectively sidelined and their activities mainly confined to the social and spiritual realm. In short, the New Order regime emasculated political parties and stifled civil society, and resorted to an all-pervading top-down approach to development (Hardjono, 1983, pp. 58-60). In addition, the main power-brokers succeeded to subordinate the judiciary to its interests. Thus, the lack of independence of the judiciary contributed to the emergence and expansion of a outwardly legitimate power base of a small elite during the New Order.

Paradoxically, the repression of fundamental human rights, the over-exploitation of the environment and the increase of the gap between the rich and poor which occurred under Suharto, went hand in hand with a per-capita GDP that rose by an average of 4.3% annually from 1965-88, one of the highest sustained growth rates of any country in the world. From 1988 onwards, the economy grew by almost 7% a year. A successful family-planning programme and measures to increase rice production dramatically reduced malnutrition and infant mortality. Illiteracy also declined significantly. But perhaps the greatest achievement is poverty alleviation. Some economists estimate that more than 70% of Indonesians lived in poverty in 1970. By 1990, this figure had dropped to about 15%.

5.3 Towards training and planning in West Java

As indicated before, people involved in development issues construct in the course of their life their own set of beliefs about the practice of development work: in their social environment, in university, during their working life. My first professional assignment as a development practitioner led me to Indonesia, to the Special Territory of the Province Aceh, on the most-western tip of the island of Sumatra. Here, the Institutional Development Assistance Project JTA-33 was in its last phase (1984-86) charged with developing an exemplary planning-cum-training approach for planning boards at district level and proposing bundles of projects and programmes eligible for funding. In Aceh, like in many other peripheral regions throughout the world, the capacities of the planning agencies as well as the availability of reliable and appropriate data were very limited and the application of advanced, quantitative, systematic and comprehensive planning techniques would have been futile. The essence of the advocated planning approach was therefore simple: planning skills and reliable development funds are scarce, hence collect enough data via limited base-line surveys and focused in-depth research to identify the "long lasting socio-economic constraints, resource potentials and legitimate problem areas". For each sector standards associated with social-equity (access to services and infrastructure) and economic growth (present and potential) were developed and weights given. Each sub-district was assigned a score for each sector. By adding all the separate scores on the variables for all the sub-districts a ranking could be made. The sub-districts with the highest priority score were allocated the 'concentrated development area' status and were to receive priority in development

16 For informative overviews of the history of the IDAP project with its shifting aims and approaches, see: Veenstra and van Steenbergen (1986); Veenstra's 1989 article on IDAP has been included in this thesis in subsection 4.4.

17 Yet from a previous phase in the IDAP project a detailed land evaluation study for two districts was available. This expensive study provided a qualitatively invaluable input into the planning process. However, the study was carried out by a Dutch institute, by Dutch students under Dutch supervision. Moreover, it was beyond the grasp of the local Acehnese planners so the processing and analysis of the data was dependent on the Dutch expatriate team as well.
policies. Based on the above research, the anticipated budget availability and projects already in the pipeline, new projects and programmes were identified and presented in spatially integrated pre-feasible packages (van den Ham, 1985, 1987).18

The development of the methodology, the collection and processing of the data and the writing of the reports was firmly in the hands of the expatriate team with the local planners mainly in the role of travel companions, interpreters and data collectors. Likewise, the corporate sector as well as the local population, whether in their individual capacity or organised in existing civil society organisations, were firstly considered a source of the data that were needed to construct 'the' problematic reality that needed to be addressed in order to contribute to the attainment of the national and provincial development objectives. If there was any substantial input from local experts, be it under supervision of the expatriate team, in the analysis and subsequent formulation of plans, it came mainly from students and staff of the local university who were linked to the project as consultants. Although the results of the IDAP studies were at intervals presented and discussed at meetings of sectoral agencies at district and provincial level, they remained the product of a rather orthodox, positivist research model which lacked the political dimension which might be so characteristic for day-to-day agenda setting.

When the Indonesian-Dutch LTA-47 West Java Regional Development Planning Project in 1986/87 was charged with proposing an appropriate, district level exemplary planning-cum-training approach for the Sukabumi region, the previous experience in Aceh was instructive in sharpening the focus of the program.19 On the one hand, there was the recognition that methodologies aiming at formulating more or less comprehensive development plans were inappropriate for the young planning agencies in Indonesia. Therefore, a low-key, local area approach was to be preferred above ambitious medium- or long-term plan formulation which was considered out of the scope of daily work of the regional development planning boards at district level. The surveying-cum planning approach had therefore to be tailored to the time and manpower constraints of the planning teams and, most of all, it had to be relevant for further use by the planning boards in question. However, the approach introduced in Aceh covered (deliberately) only a limited number of sectors, perspectives, leaving out others. It aimed also at (small) administrative areas as the focal point for action, selected by adding-up all priority scores in separate sectors. In providing public goods that promote economic and social development there was hardly any room for other actors than the state, nor was there specific attention of that state for any special target group or sector. Then, projects were identified in the selected concentrated development areas according to the needs and potentials as identified in the baseline survey and the in-depth study: if sub-district A was selected on the basis of a total score, the sectoral reports were reviewed and it could e.g. be proposed that the road from X to Y be upgraded, an elementary school built, a bank established, better extension provided etc. In other words, it were not the most pressing problems or best opportunities within those development areas that were used as a starting point for the formulation of an 'integrated' problem solving c.q. opportunity utilising approach but a total score on various, not closely related criteria. It seemed therefore more appropriate to speak of a multi-sectoral approach and a concentration of functions that might achieve efficiencies as a result of their mere spatial co-existence, than of a deliberate integration of diverse functions to attain the potential synergies in the region (cf. Livingstone, 1979, p. 50; Montgomery, 1983, p. 232). Moreover, the deliberate focus on the present

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18 For an overview of the methodology introduced in the IDAP project, see: sub-section 4.4 and Veenstra, and van Steenbergen (1986).
19 Of course the observation of the limited capacities and the proposed focus on priority areas were not new, see also sub-sections 4.2 and 4.3. The following considerations come from van den Ham (1987).
conditions inside small administrative regions in comparison with norms set for these administrative regions, might divert the attention from the role a certain area/sector could play in a larger spatial framework. Moreover, it could lead to the neglect of problems and/or potentials that exceeded the borders of the sub-district or that could only be resolved by decisions at a higher administrative level (meso-level policies addressing industry, agriculture, environmental pollution etc.).

In implementing the IDAP approach in Aceh, it was the staff of the provincial development planning board and the local university that did the main work on the Indonesian side, limited as it may have been. Within the administration the development planning boards in general and those at district level in particular had a weak statutory position vis-à-vis the sectoral agencies. It seemed therefore doubtful whether a medium-term development plan composed single-handedly by the district development planning boards (and their university and expatriate colleagues) would ever be included in the sectoral budgets and, therefore, would ever be implemented.

Finally, it seemed highly questionable whether the Indonesian authorities would ever implement nation-wide an approach that had been tried-out on their territory but that had not really succeeded in wielding their attention and that required quite some changes in political and administrative mind-setting before it could be introduced widely.

Based on the above considerations the West Java Regional Development Planning Project opted for the Strategic Development Framework Approach. It was evident that within the existing political, economic and administrative context the local governments lacked both the capacities and the resources to formulate comprehensive, integrated plans, let alone implement them. It was therefore required to introduce a replicable, modest methodology that would take into account the existing responsibilities, decision-making structures and procedures of all the participating agencies, and the budgetary constraints they faced at that time. By focusing on the problems and potentials of strategic targets communities, on target sectors and target areas it would be possible to formulate a development programme that involved a delivery of an appropriate combination of goods and services to that particular target group in that designated area. By bringing together diverse administrative functions it would furthermore be possible to achieve synergies and efficiencies that were not likely to occur as a result of their mere co-existence in a region (Montgomery, 1983, p. 232). The methodology would build upon and strengthen the available skills of a variety of local development practitioners and challenge them to produce in a systematic way qualitatively better planning products that could be absorbed in the routine planning and budgeting system. Finally, the Strategic Development Framework Approach would not only involve local development practitioners in a more systematic way in preparing well-articulated development plans and thereby giving some new meaning to the concept of decentralisation. It would also 'force' these urban-based administrators (at least for the project-period) out of their offices, bring them in touch with those poor target communities who often live far off, in remote villages that can be reached only via dirt roads, rivers and paths and where no hotels are available. These are the places where hardly any government money is spent, no government staff is stationed or development projects are at hand (cf. Chambers, 1983 pp. 13-23). In other words, it should stim-

20 See also Hilhorst, Ballot & Hekstra (1985, p.6).
21 This relates in particular to the Regional Development Planning Boards (BAPPEDA) which in development co-operation funded projects often were charged with formulating development plans but which, according to their statutory function, should focus on co-ordinating and integrating the planning products of the sectoral agencies and link with operational decision-makers. Concentrating on these functions would increase the chances of implementation of the resulting plans and avoid the discontinuity which might occur if a specification of each stage of the project cycle is attended by a separation between planners, implementers and decision-makers.
ulate the administrators to consult those people who are generally treated as supposedly grateful recipients of development efforts but who are never asked for their opinion and as such hardly count in the (political) decision-making process. However, it was clear from the onset that the Strategic Development Framework Approach was definitely not the ideal participatory development path and 'empowerment' strategy such as advocated by development specialists like Korten, Friedmann, Cheema and Rondinelli, Chambers and many others. Yet, to implement this pragmatic local level consultation with the consent and support of the responsible Indonesian authorities was by all involved in the project considered a major step forward in a country that was known for its authoritarian, top-down and bureaucratic way of policy formulation. Moreover, by operationalising the poverty focus through identification of the needs and potentials of groups and concentrations of households experiencing poverty and by raising the existing local institutional development capacities to respond to that situation, a strategic contribution was to be given to the attainment of the normative development objective of social equity which in practical terms usually was subordinate to stimulating regional economic growth.

5.3.1 System, structure and participatory development planning in Indonesia

Introduction

Indonesia is one of the largest countries in the world. Its many islands, with a total surface of 2 million km², stretch 5,110 km along the equator. The island of Java is the heart of the country. It comprises only 6.6 per cent of the total area but contains more than 60 per cent of Indonesia's people, giving it a population density of around 800 per km². Java and the smaller islands of Madura and Bali constitute what is often called 'Inner Indonesia', in contrast to 'Outer Indonesia', the other relatively sparsely populated islands surrounding them. The population density of Kalimantan (27 per cent of the area of the country), for example, is only 12 per km² and of Irian Jaya, in the very eastern part of the country, even less.

Two main ecosystems are usually distinguished: wet rice cultivation, dominant in 'Inner Indonesia', and dryland agriculture, including shifting cultivation, in 'Outer Indonesia' (Geertz, 1963; Missen, 1972). These ecosystems to a large degree explain the differences in population density. About a quarter of the population can be considered as urban. The urban system is characterised by primacy. The position of the capital city, Jakarta, with 8 million inhabitants in its metropolitan region, Jabotabek, is outstanding. Other important cities, such as Bandung, Surabaya, Semarang, Medan and Palembang, have populations of 1-4 million each.

About half of the population live from agriculture, which contributes only 25 per cent to the GNP. Rice is the main staple and is cultivated on small parcels of land. The average farm occupies only 0.7 ha, while on Java the majority of the peasants cultivate less than 0.5 ha. Since colonial times, Indonesia has exported agricultural commodi-

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22 Sub-sections 5.3.1-5.3.16 are largely based on a number of articles that have been published in the course of several years and which highlighted Indonesian regional development planning in general, in the province of West Java in particular and several stages and aspects of the West Java Regional Development Planning Project LTA-47 project (van den Ham 1989-a, 1989-b, van den Ham and Hariri Hady 1989-b), van den Ham & van Naerssen (1990) & van den Ham, van Naerssen & Ratering Arntz (1990). It has been tried to keep the original fragments as intact as possible and to add or change only for editorial purposes. This explains both the absence of references to relevant literature that was published later or simply not available to me at that time, as well as (outdated character of some remarks/sentences (e.g. "present" which relates to the time of writing, or targets set for 1994. These are now of course out of date but were very much reality at the time of writing the articles.

ties like rubber, palm oil, coffee and tea, mostly originating from the outer islands. After 1965, however, the economy became highly dependent on two other resources: oil and foreign aid. Due to favourable prices on the world oil and gas markets, the country experienced a boom during the years 1973-85. At the beginning of the 1980s, oil and gas (a sector dominated by foreign investments) generated three quarters of the export earnings and one fifth of the GNP. The flows of foreign aid are co-ordinated by the Inter Governmental Group of Indonesia (IGGI), consisting of the main members of the OECD and international donor agencies. In 1989 the IGGI donated and lent annually around US$ 4 billion. With the collapse of world oil prices and a debt service ratio that increased to more than 40 per cent in the 1987, the country cancelled many large development projects. It again focused its attention on the agrarian export sector and started export-oriented industrialisation as well. In 1988-9, the industrial sector overtook oil and gas as the main source of foreign-currency earnings. The annual economic growth rate recently exceeded 5 per cent again. The GNP per capita is currently around US$ 550, one of the lowest in the region. Poverty is still particularly rampant in the countryside of 'Inner Indonesia'.

When reviewing the various options for regional development planning in Indonesia, decentralisation would probably feature in almost all planners' recommendations. This is not surprising, of course, for how could a highly centralised, top-down approach be successfully applied in a country as large and diverse as Indonesia? The physical and economic conditions outlined above seem to make a decentralised approach to development planning rational. But, as is shown later, this apparent rationality is surpassed by another rationality of a more political nature that aims to defend centralising forces.

5.3.2 Bhinneka Tunggal Ika

It is clear that, in a country like Indonesia, the diversity in ethnicity, culture and religion is great. For centuries, coastal trade linked the islands to one another. Yet, strong unifying forces never evolved. The Netherlands East Indies, the entity created by the colonial regime, was an artificial one that as a matter of fact was achieved only at the beginning of the twentieth century, when the Dutch succeeded in ending the Aceh War (1904). It is not surprising, therefore, that regional feelings in Indonesia are strong. On the other hand, separatist movements are not manifest nowadays, although they do exist for specific reasons in Aceh, Irian Jaya and in East Timor. These cases aside, one can say the unified state of Indonesia is generally accepted. But a delicate balance still exists between central and regional forces, and the motto on the national coat of arms, 'Bhinneka Tunggal Ika', which means 'Unity in Diversity', expresses this well.

Under colonial rule, Jakarta, or Batavia as it was called, developed as a focal point for governing the Netherlands East Indies. Although in some areas of the outer islands, especially in eastern Indonesia, the Dutch governed by indirect rule, the system was essentially a centralised one. During the war of independence, the Dutch favoured a federation of autonomous Indonesian states. By applying a divide-and-rule policy, they hoped to be better able to defend their interests in Indonesia. The forces of independent Indonesia, however, developed differently. As Ichalsul and Nasikun (1988, p. 25 remark:

"Revolution and the war for independence in opposition to the existence of the colonial government, was an extremely important process in the nation building of an independent Indonesia. This process created solid criteria for the type of national leadership, political

23 Debt service ratio is total debt to gross exports of goods & services. For more details on macro-economic development, see: World Bank, 1987.
attitudes, national values and objectives for the future, and the form of government that was ideal and appropriate for the Indonesian situation. All of this bore a single consequence, that is, that centralisation, apart from all its weaknesses and faults, was more dominant than decentralisation in the spirit of the Indonesian political life after Independence. Nation building, which appeared in the credo of a united nation, overcame the premises of decentralisation, such as the principle of efficiency, rule of law, and especially, community participation in government in the autonomous areas”.

During the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, the country faced several rebellions in various parts of the archipelago (Pluvier, 1978). These armed conflicts had their roots not only in ethnic, religious and cultural differences but also in discontent about Javanese domination of the political system and the distribution of resources. One of the grievances was that, while both mineral resources and agricultural commodities stem mainly from the outer islands, the revenues went to Java. None of the rebellions was successful, but they had considerable impact on the political constellation. In order to cope with decentralising forces, the provinces were granted authority over all matters that were not legislated for at central-government levels, by way of the provincial assemblies in 1957. They were also to be allowed to elect provincial governors. However, after only two years, president Sukarno established a centralised structure more in line with his ‘Guided Democracy’, by Presidential Decree in 1959. More specifically, governors were to be appointed by the president.

In many respects, the coup d’état of 1965 represented a watershed in the history of independent Indonesia but the relationship between central government and the provinces retained its centralised character. As is shown in the next sub-section, the structure of interaction between the central and the lower tiers contains some elements that reflect decentralising tendencies. However, the actual workings of a structure depend on the wider socio-political system. Structuring government by legislation and defining the tasks and authorities of its constituent elements is one matter; implementing a policy is quite another, and relates to other dimensions of the decision-making realm. Vested interests, power relations and state ideology belong to the system that ultimately determines the actual value of a structure. Only three political parties are allowed to compete for the favours of the voters. The elected members of the People Consultative Assembly, together with a sizeable number of appointed colleagues, in turn elect the president every five years. Yet, in practice, the role of the political parties in policy-making is limited compared to that of the two other interlinked actors in the Indonesian political landscape: the military and the bureaucracy. Therefore it seems more appropriate to characterise Indonesia as a military bureaucratic state (Robison, 1978; MacDouggal, 1982). While the structure suggests a form of parliamentary democracy, in reality it is used to legitimise the system that works the other way round. In fact, the core of the socio-political system consists of ‘a nearly total control by the Presidency over both the army and the bureaucracy and over important sectors of the economy through state enterprises or trusted managers who are privileged with monopoly licences’ (Schulte Nordholt, 1987, p. 53). The creation of new structures, whether meant to decentralise or not, will only make sense when accompanied by changes in the system. Keeping this relation between structure and system in mind, our attention is now turned to how regional development planning in Indonesia actually functions.

5.3.3 The structure of government and development planning

Four levels of government can be distinguished: the province, the district (Kabupaten) and municipality, the sub-district (Kecamatan) and the village (desa or kelurahan). Larger cities (kotamadya) are considered to be at the same level as districts. As the capital city, Jakarta is an exception and possesses provincial status. During the first five-year plan,
REPELITA I (1969-74), thought was given to the relationship between central and local authorities and to the question of how to allocate development funds to the regions (Sanders, 1971; Hariri Hady, 1988)\(^{24}\).

The relation between authorities at various levels was finally arranged by Law No.5 of 1974, which defined the structure of local government\(^{25}\). Provinces and districts are administratively autonomous regions, which means that they have elected representative bodies. The heads of the regions, respectively the governor of the provinces and the bupati of the district or the walikota (the mayor) of the municipality, are, however, appointed by the president. They are charged with the co-ordination of all activities of regional, sectoral agencies in the field of planning and implementation. Simultaneously they, as a representative of the central government, are assisted by branches of national sectoral departments. In that capacity, these dignitaries take the main decisions and the influence of the regional parliaments is small. At the provincial level, the Provincial People's Representative Council advises, the governor decides and the president is the one to whom one is ultimately accountable. This arrangement places the governor in the ambiguous position of simultaneously representing central government, by virtue of his presidential appointment, and supposedly also the regional population, by virtue of his function. The same duality can be found at the level of implementation. In each province, central-government departments have branches (Kanwil - kantor wilayah - meaning regional offices) that implement centrally administered and funded programmes. They report both to the governor and to Jakarta. Next to them, each province has its own sectoral agencies (Dinas) administering the regional funds. The same structure exists at the level of the Kabupaten where the head of the district is directly responsible to the governor and only in an indirect way to the regional council, and at the level of the Kecamatan. However, no representative council exists in these sub-divisions. At the lowest level, the status of desa is defined as semi-autonomous. The head of the village is elected by the village and thereafter appointed as a government representative by the head of the district. A special committee, the Village Resilience Organisation (LKMD, acronym of the Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa) performs an advisory function. It usually consists of the local elite and some village officials. Important matters are supposed to be discussed during meetings of the Village Community Council (LMD - Lembaga Masyarakat Desa), in which all adults officially participate. All together there are 66,000 villages, 3,300 sub-districts, 300 districts and 27 provinces in Indonesia.

Up to the end of the first Five Year Development Plan (REPELITA I, 1969-74), development planning in the region was the sole responsibility of sectoral agencies. Through their representative offices at provincial (KANWIL) and at district (KANDEP) level these central government departments planned, implemented and monitored their projects and programmes. Sectoral planning was also carried out by the provincial and district services (Dinas). Although under the competence of the provincial governor or district/municipality head, the Dinas received their technical guidance from the relevant central government department (MacAndrews, 1986, p.25).

In many ways the results of the government programmes have been impressive. In the early days of the New Order (1966-) many people lived in a predicament. Under those conditions the needs were so evident that hardly anything could be done wrong in distributing the government blessings over the country. Everywhere people needed roads, schools, health posts, fertiliser, pesticides and credit. Supported by favourable oil prices the government was able to embark upon an ambitious programme for the (re)construction of both physical and social infrastructure, initiate new economic

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\(^{24}\) REPELITA is an acronym for Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun, meaning five-year development plan.

\(^{25}\) For an overview of administrative structure at various sub-national levels, see Soewarno Handajaningrat & R. Hindratmo.
activities and increase the efficiency of others. Due to government interventions elementary education and basic health services could be provided to almost all children in a relatively short period, many so far inaccessible places could be absorbed in the national transport network and, according to government calculations, self sufficiency could be reached in rice production. However, without the intention of disparaging the positive impact many of these more or less uniform national crash programmes have had on the general welfare conditions of the Indonesian people, it has to be remarked that the important objective of equal distribution of development had only partially been attained. Both in social and in spatial respect the gap between the extreme values seems often to have been closed only partly and in some cases even widened in the course of time. Hence the need for a more area specific approach to development planning.

It was not only that the aggregate outcome of the development efforts did not live up to the expectations, the qualitative performance of government initiated development activities had not been unequivocally positive, too. At project level many successes could be observed but quite a number of less successful cases as well: projects that did not exactly suit or even conflicted with the needs of the intended beneficiary groups, that were environmentally harmful, located in the wrong spot, physically substandard etc. Though not extensive, a number of factors could be related to this weak performance:
- (over) ambitious government plans with very high sectoral targets linked to a limited absorptive capacity of the relevant administration and a lack of control (Hariri Hady, 1988, p. 3)
- lack of co-ordination in planning between the sectoral agencies resulting in a piecemeal approach to complex problems;
- insufficient adaptation of national policies to regional and local conditions;
- insufficient participation of the population in planning, monitoring and management of the projects.

Solving the problems of co-ordination, adaptation of development activities to the local conditions and paying more attention to the socio-cultural aspects of development required special policies, involving wider participation of the people in the development process, inevitably called for reducing the emphasis on national planning and for paying more attention to strengthening of the local apparatus. To shift the emphasis of the national development objectives from economic growth towards even development and a just distribution of welfare, new planning approaches had to replace the rigid centrally administered sectoral ones. In other words, it required “a recognition of specific development problems and potentials in different regions, special attention to backward regions, the increasing participation of the regions themselves in development planning” (MacAndrews, Fisher & Sibero, 1982, p. 86).

At the national level, BAPPENAS (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, meaning National Development Planning Board) in Jakarta had been authorised to devise and to monitor the five year plans. It is here that co-ordination of sectoral planning from the many ministries took place. To provide those area-specific answers in 1974, planning boards called BAPPEDA (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, meaning Regional Development Planning Board), were, linked to the Governor, set up at provincial level, followed by the creation of similar boards, linked to the head of the district/municipality, at the district level in 1980. The latter are known as BAPPEDA Tingkat II (level II,
to them distinguish from the boards at the first, provincial level). These planning boards have the responsibility for planning, with the emphasis on the co-ordination of all (sectoral) planning within a spatial context, research, and development management which is defined as monitoring and evaluation of development projects and programmes (Toyiman, 1980, p. 212). They had no specific programmes of their own to manage (MacAndrews et al., 1982, p. 93). The BAPPEDAs are to report directly to the governor, the Bupati/Walikota respectively, who in turn report to the president through the minister of Home Affairs (MacAndrews, Fisher & Sibero, 1982, p. 86).

In other words, bureaucratic structures for horizontal, area planning were created at the provincial and district level. The above-mentioned representative branches are instrumental in this. Now, this is where the conflict between structure and system becomes paramount. In theory, all development activities undertaken by the sectoral agencies should be co-ordinated and integrated by the governor's and the district head's staff, via the BAPPEDAs. In reality, vertical links within the departments and ministries, defined mainly by the flow of funds and the career prospects of its staff, are proving to be much stronger than the horizontal relations with the regional authorities. The development strings in the regions are therefore pulled largely by those who control the purse: the central government departments and their representatives at lower levels. Their budget usually makes up the bulk of all regional expenditures, leaving only a small portion for the regional policy makers to exercise their discretionary rights over expenditure.

Part of this small portion involves the direct allocation of the national Development Budget to the regions. During REPETLA I (1969-74), procedures were established to transfer funds from the central to the lower levels. These subsidies were meant to increase the experience of the regional governments in implementing those development projects that were considered their responsibility but for which they lack the financial resources. They were also specifically meant to stimulate development in the rural areas. The allocation was arranged in a Presidential Instruction in 1970 and the programmes are therefore called Inpres (Instruksi Presiden) programmes. They comprise about one sixth to one seventh of the national development expenditures and involve two kinds of subsidies. The first is related largely to unspecified block grants to provinces, districts and villages (area grants), while the second category, grants for specific sectoral projects in the regions (health, education), was added in the mid-1970s. It is clear that the opportunities for local decision-making in development planning are greater with the former than with the latter.

During the years of the oil boom, more development funds became available and Inpres programmes expanded steadily. But this growth was accompanied by the shift from area to sectoral grants. While in the mid-1970s 85 per cent of the grants fell into the first category, ten years later the balance was 60:40 in favour of the latter (Booth, 1988, p. 11). So in reality, Inpres moved more and more in the direction of blueprint sectoral projects, carried out by the regional authorities but approved and paid for by the central government. When Inpres started, some observers considered it a promising initiative to give local governments more say in development planning at lower levels. However, after two decades, one can only reach the conclusion that Inpres contributes but marginally to enhanced local decision-making.

28 Basically the co-ordination function of the BAPPEDAs entail: "assisting the sectoral agencies in putting together a "package" of interrelated and mutually reinforcing projects for any given region in terms of function, objectives and spatial relationships; and, ensuring that the planned implementation of the various projects is synchronized so that the projects are implemented in a functional logical order of time" (Toyiman, p. 218).

29 See a.o. Morfit (1986); Bali Regional Development Plan LTA-30, p. 5; Bintoro Tjokroaminoto (1987); Sjafrizal (1987); Kompas 1, 2, 29 September 1987; HASKUNING et al. 1988-a.
Although possibilities for decentralised decision-making within the structure of government and administration theoretically do exist, in reality the planning system is strongly centralised. Top-down planning still prevails. Governors, heads of districts and mayors have large powers while the influence of provincial and district councils is limited. At the lowest level, the head of the village acts as a representative of the government and the village meetings are mostly a matter for the village elite.

There are several reasons why the system of decision-making does not allow for significant participatory planning. The historical background explains much. Feudalism and the accompanying attitudes had a long history, particularly on Java. Dutch colonial rule even strengthened hierarchical structures. Also, the diversity of ethnic groups, cultures and religions, often regionally vested, is great and at the central level there is always the fear for national disintegration. Moreover, for reasons of recent history, the Indonesian government has successfully sought to maintain control of political, religious, labour and non-governmental organisations. Their role is severely curtailed, specially in the rural areas. "In this way only the bureaucracy could serve as an instrument for communication between the government and the grassroots level" (Grijpstra, 1989, p. 3).

Nevertheless, there are some initiatives and efforts to delegate decision-making to the lower levels of the government and to accommodate the pressures from the regions. In this respect we should also mention the role of development co-operation. The World Bank and other multilateral agencies, together with the bilateral donors, have had a strong influence on development planning since the beginning of the New Order. These circles support initiatives to achieve decentralisation and fund programmes initiating it. The main arguments are that when local authorities are involved, efficiency in planning and implementation of programmes and projects will increase. Also it is thought that the lower income groups can be reached more easily within a decentralised structure.

5.3.4 Bottom-up planning procedures

The Ministry of Home Affairs, took the initiative to establish a bottom-up planning structure. Procedures were introduced to facilitate the inclusion of proposals for development projects and programmes at village level in the regional budgets. At village level, proposals originating from ward and neighbourhood level are discussed by the Village Resilience Organisation (LKMD) during annual village discussion meetings. After a (political) approval by the Village Community Council (LMD), they are forwarded to the sub-district. No financial or other limits/directions are set for the bundle of proposals from the Desa or the Kelurahan.

The intention is that the proposals of all the villages in the sub-district are then thoroughly vetted in a joint meeting (Temu Karya) of the UDKP (Area Working Unit for Development). This meeting is chaired by the Kecamatan-head, guided by the district BAPPEDA (Tingkat II) and attended by representatives from the sectoral offices present at sub-district level as well as all village heads in the sub-district. At this meeting the sectoral agencies propose their priority projects and BAPPEDA announces which of the proposals from the previous year have been awarded funding and are to be implemented in the current financial year.

30 The bottom-up planning system has been formalised with the Decree No. 4 of the minister of Home Affairs (INMENDAGRI No.4/1981). For its procedures, see: Peraturan (1982).
31 Some issues with respect to the relation between bottom-up planning and budget allocations have later on been addressed by van Steenbergen (1992-b).
32 On UDKP planning within an overall planning framework, see: ESCAP, 1986, pp.49-71.
In the next stage, the prioritised project proposals for the sub-districts are discussed at a forum of the district BAPPEDA and the sectoral agencies in the Kabupaten/ Kotamadya (Rakorbang II). BAPPEDA Tk. II completes an overview of the current problems and an analysis of the performance of previous projects. The Inland Revenue department makes an estimation of the income from local taxes to be collected and the INPRES funds likely to be received. This is the first opportunity for all the sectoral agencies to add their own project proposals to the list. After deciding which proposals will receive priority and will be forwarded to a higher level for financing from which funding source, the final list needs to be approved by the District People's Representative Council.

Then the project proposals are submitted to the provincial level, where BAPPEDA Tk I, together with the sectoral agencies of the province, screens and modifies the list (Rakorbang I). Moreover, these sectoral agencies have the task to bring the proposals from below in line with the national policies and available budgets. Project proposals of mutual interest are aggregated in macro-regions and discussed at a regional consultation of neighbouring provinces. Those proposals from all the provinces that have cleared all these hurdles are finally forwarded to the National Development Planning Board BAPPENAS in Jakarta and reviewed in a National Consultative Meeting (RAKORNAS). In consultation and co-operation with the national ministries concerned, it is decided which projects will be implemented in the following year.33

The elaborate procedures (to be implemented annually) made it likely that many constraints would hamper proper decision-making along the intended lines. Not only did all the officials who had to participate in the process require training (which they often did not get) but also the socio-political climate mentioned earlier effectively achieves that participation by the people is limited to the LKMD, which practically means the 'tokoh-tokoh masyarakat', or local elite. In practice the ordinary people only participated in the KT and RW (ward and neighbourhood) meetings, if these were organised at all. Moreover, proposals from the lowest level are frequently deleted from the list, even after the formal approval by the LMD, or new proposals added after the LKMD meeting. So even if the population has been involved in the formulation of the proposals, they have little or no say in the alternations at this stage. Usually they are not informed about them at all. Often the projects proposed by the LKMD are the same as in the previous year(s). Apparently these proposals have not (yet) been implemented. Under those conditions the population clearly considers it not opportune to add new items to the list. Furthermore, the administrative apparatus is not yet ready to activate the system countrywide. Actually, it seems that the procedures are applied faster on the island of Java than elsewhere. Yet, in spite of all the shortcomings, each year hundreds of thousands of people become involved in generating, processing and forwarding development proposals to higher levels. Functionally, however, most observers seem to acknowledge that in spite of the good intentions the centralised, sectoral and top-down planning system has remained intact.

It appears that the majority of the proposals forwarded by the LKMD can be classified as 'social' (health care, education, religion, community welfare and the like).34 After the review/approval by the LMD, however, the composition of the limited list of proposals becomes more balanced as far as 'social' and 'physical' (roads, bridges, communications) projects are concerned. The majority of the proposals from the villages

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33 For an overview of the bottom-up planning mechanism incl. a time schedule of all the steps described above, see: Westvlaams Economisch Studiebureau, 1984 and, HASKONING - LIDESCO, 1987, p. 5.

34 No extensive evaluation of this bottom-up planning system had been carried out at the end of the 1980s. Remarks made here are based upon experiences gained throughout the years and the more specific observations made when studying the process in one Kabupaten and one Kotamadya on the island of Java (Allert van den Ham and Hariri Hady (1989), HASKONING et al., 1988-a).
themselves are small scale, although substantial differences in size of the proposal can be found, and have a strong sectoral bias. Generally the projects proposed by the villages are confined to their own territory. Projects on a larger scale, say an irrigation scheme for a couple of villages, are seldom generated. The meeting at Kecamatan level, the UDKP, would be the first obvious forum to provide a somewhat larger (spatial) framework for development of the villages. In practice the UDKP limits its activities to selecting proposals. Integrating them seems to be out of its scope. Moreover, the number of proposals referring to productive investments is usually negligible.

At Kecamatan level the share of the ‘physical’ proposals again increases substantially. The ‘social’ ones get even less priority. The share of ‘economic’ proposals remains small. This shift in attention from ‘social’ to ‘physical’ appears to be influenced by the tendency at Kecamatan level to formulate the proposals in such a way that they suit existing sectoral, top-down policies. And as the formulation of the ultimate list of proposals is the discretion of the Camat, not of the meeting, he tends to select on the basis of the likelihood of them being financed from higher, sectoral sources, rather than on actual needs or potentials of the villages. Moreover, ‘physical’ projects are easier to implement than the ones aiming at difficult to measure objectives like ‘improvement of the health conditions’. And last but not least, ‘physical’ projects give quick returns in terms of tangible results and contribute to the status of those involved in ‘bringing’ the projects to the Kecamatan.

At the levels of the sub-district and the district one can observe a further shift from ‘social’ to ‘physical’ project proposals, probably due to the fact that the district officials try to formulate proposals in such a way as to suit the existing national, top-down and sectoral policies. In other words, the heads of the sub-districts, and at higher levels, the heads of the sectoral agencies, decide on which projects will be forwarded to the provincial administration, based on their assessment which proposals have the best chances of attracting funding from the central government budgets. And, as a matter of fact, such projects as buildings and roads are easier to plan and implement than social budgets that, for example, aim to increase the quality of education or community development. Again, at these higher levels, there exists a remarkable lack of proposals of a more economic nature. Accustomed to top-down procedures, it also appears that they find it difficult to accept proposals from the villages. The shift from social to physical projects means that, in practice, the villages receive other things than what they requested. It provides another illustration of the argument that simply creating structures for increased participation often merely has a symbolic function and does not guarantee effective implementation at all.

It is striking that in proposing and prioritising project proposals at provincial and district level the existing policy frameworks for development planning, the POLA DASAR (long term development outlines) and the REPELITA (five-year development plan), both prepared under the responsibility of the BAPPEDAs, are seldom or never used as a reference, guide or filter for the selection of proposals from below. However, at district level the provincial BAPPEDA presented their analysis of the problems as a framework for the assessment of potential projects. At provincial level the participants in the RAKORBANG I were presented an overview of the main functions of each provincial Development Region (a grouping of a few Kabupaten and Kotamadya) as to facilitate a more area-oriented screening and selection of proposals. Yet, the proposals mostly still have a shopping-list character and do only fit to a limited extent with the intended area specific approach. Moreover, they pay only scant attention to the influence of factors beyond the boundaries of the respective development region, or, for that matter-

35 This has later been illustrated with budget figures for the province of Aceh by van Steenbergen (1992-b, p. 220-221).
ter, to the impact a project might have across the 'borders' of the development region. Seen from this perspective, it is of utmost importance to train the planners of the BAPPEDAs and the sectoral agencies concerned to think and to act in spatial terms. They should be able to analyse and integrate proposals from the lower level within an appropriate spatial development framework. If not, it is unavoidable that programmes and project proposed to the central level will continue to have a shopping list, sectoral and haphazard character because, as had already been observed before by Rondinelli and Cheema (1983, p. 16): "Simply creating decentralised structures for development decision-making and announcing new procedures for participation in development planning and administration do not guarantee they will be effective....."

The limited participation of the local population may be caused by the lack of effectiveness of the bottom-up planning system up to now as well as by the feeling that the LKMD does not really represents their interests. The lack of 'target group' specific proposals generated by the LKMD seems to support this assumption. If that is the case than we have to look for other ways to provide a setting in which all socio-economic groups can get involved in decision-making and gain a voice for themselves. Up to that moment the political climate in Indonesia may not have been very conducive to mobilise local people into organised structures for group action and self development on the basis of mutual interest. Yet, independent interest groups, i.e. farmer groups, water user associations, handicraft co-operatives etc., might prove to be indispensable in achieving a better articulated expression of the needs and potentials of parts of the community and increase their bargaining position vis-à-vis the (local) authorities. By organising themselves, not as different actors but as representatives of a particular part of the community, the people may be more able to "..reject paternalistic interventions, to act for their own development and assert themselves more strongly in the dialogue with the local governments....." (Cernea, 1988, p. 9). To achieve the desired level of articulation support to these interest groups by voluntary organisations may be needed. This support can be understood as training and assisting the local people in analysing their conditions, formulating their aspirations, mediating between the people and the government as well as promoting awareness among the local community and motivating them to participate actively in the planning and implementation of deliberate development efforts.

The present lack of interest in local level planning on the part of the population may also be caused by frustration with past efforts. Usually these efforts did not achieve all that was hoped for. It caused people to loose confidence in the use of submitting new proposals. Moreover, the burden of an annual cycle of 'consultation' and planning at a moment when the results of the previous round has not become visible yet, frustrates a sincere interest and a preparedness of both the local administration and the population to seriously invest time and energy in it. To avoid overly high expectations about the results of bottom-up planning, extension activities clarifying its potentials and limits as well as clear indications about time lines and the order of magnitude of the funds that can be expected for local projects seems therefore to be a must.

On the other hand, frustration and the resulting lack of interest in bottom-up planning is also caused by the very limited influence of the village on development policies implemented by the government. This is demonstrated by the shift from 'social' projects as proposed by the LKMDs to 'physical' projects as forwarded to the highest level by the authorities concerned. In practice the people get other things than they had asked for without any opportunity to appeal against the decisions. The data from

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36 Moreover, it is wondered whether an open discussion and project identification at the lowest level is not hampered rather than promoted by the presence of higher level authorities whose role might be to assist the meeting but who in reality often dominate it.


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Sukabumi support Tjondronegoro's earlier conclusion that "Specific local needs tend to become increasingly blurred as they reach higher-level administrators..." [38]. To acquire the lasting support of the population, the people should not only be given the opportunity to express their opinion about the course of development, but also see at least some of their proposals accepted. On the part of the government this requires opening up the minds of the planners to the local people's knowledge of their own living conditions, their needs as well as potentials and constraints [39]. Such a responsive atmosphere may best be created at the lower levels of the administrative hierarchy. An indicative budget setting per district, a continuation of the current decentralisation drive of government functions and a matching devolution of budget allocating powers seems to be a pre-requisite for shaping an administration at district level that is responsive to inputs from below and willing to take the uniqueness of every problem, potential and constraint into consideration.

Although an open-minded administration is a must, it is not enough to bring about development in an efficient and effective way. The bureaucratic, cumbersome project cycle that has to be passed through annually, should be simplified and preferably, as to decrease the workload, to get a multi-annual character. The planning authorities should also be equipped with the tools to analyse and integrate the (expressed) needs, potentials and constraints of their area within an appropriate spatial framework. Such an operationalised and preferably medium-term development framework serving as a guide and filter for development proposals from below and above is usually lacking. In its absence the proposed projects and programmes cannot but have a shopping-list like, sectoral and haphazard character. By now the existing long- and medium-term planning documents (POLA DASAR and REPELITA) can hardly function as a framework for development planning, as they only consist of a rather global description of the conditions in the district, as well as a number of loosely connected objectives that are rarely specified. Cost estimates, an analysis of the resource base and a specification of the needs and potentials of the various socio-economic groups are usually lacking. At this moment the Kabupaten and the Kotamadya still seem to lack the administrative skills to formulate such a medium-term regional development plan [40].

5.3.5 The West Java Regional Development Planning Project LTA-47: the project setting

The West Java Regional Development Planning Project with the code number LTA-47, was part of an extensive programme in development co-operation between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands [41]. On the Indonesian side the Indonesian ministry of Public Works, and within it the Directorate General Cipta Karya was the project holder. Its Directorate of City and Regional Planning provided technical and administrative support to the project. To fulfil its obligations in the implementation of the project the Netherlands Government engaged the services of HASKONING-LIDESCO consultants. The Directorate Cipta Karya charged the Provincial Development Planning Board BAPPEDA Tk I of West Java with the execution of the Indonesian contribution. Later on, the BAPPEDAs of Kabupaten en Kotamadya Sukabumi became also involved.

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[38] Quoted by Grijpstra, 1989, p. 3.
[39] Besides this opening up of the administration from "without" Blair (1986, p. 44-45) indicates the need for opening up the administration from "within", i.e. creating an environment which is conducive for accepting that each project is essentially unique and for reporting setbacks, suggesting solutions and devising innovations by the officials.
[40] For the structural weaknesses of the BAPPEDAs, see: Grijpstra 1989, pp. 8-12.
The objectives of the project were threefold:

- It was to assist BAPPENAS in the further formulation of regional development policies at the level of West Java and of the development regions within West Java, in close co-operation with BAPPEDA.
- Secondly, it was to assist BAPPEDA in the identification of priorities and subsequent formulation of programmes and projects for future domestic and/or foreign funding for a selected planning region.
- And lastly, it had to strengthen the planning and co-ordination capability of BAPPEDA in West Java.

During the first phase of the project, the focus of attention would be on a macro study of the province of West Java. It should include a medium term reconnaissance of its main economic problems and, related to that, the identification of sectoral and spatial priorities for the West Java development regions. The second phase would deal with identifying investment projects and additional programmes in one of the seven development regions, which should be selected on the basis of the outcome of the macro-study. For that development region investment funds would then be forthcoming. Later on, strengthening of planning and co-ordination capability of the BAPPEDAs was added as an objective of the second phase.

Here we will deal mainly with the second phase of the project during which methodologies had to be elaborated for the generation, design, organisation, follow-up and control of a coherent set of sectoral programmes and projects consistent with the policies developed and recommended in the first phase of the project. These methodologies were to take into account the principles of planning from below. Moreover, they should also be in line with Indonesian standard operational procedures.

5.3.6 The Strategic Development Framework approach

From mid-1986 onwards the West Java Regional Development Planning Project LTA-77 (1986-88) focused its attention on formulating an appropriate methodology for planning at district/municipality level on the one hand as well as writing a Medium Term Development Plan for a Development Region, in this case Sukabumi.

To attain the latter, development priorities had to be identified, programmes and projects formulated. These were to be included in the regional development plan for the years 1989-94. The plan was to present a thorough analysis of the present conditions, the future prospects, set development priorities and present a consistent set of programmes and projects. With a well reasoned medium term development plan at its disposal, it was supposed that the administration involved would increase its bargaining position vis-à-vis other regions for scarce development funds. In support of the plan a number of baseline surveys were undertaken that ultimately resulted in an analysis of the dynamics of the problems, constraints and potentials faced by Sukabumi. Under the assumption that no mayor policy changes would occur, the studies provided the building blocks for a scenario to forecast the conditions in 1994. This picture of the envisaged situation in 1994 made it possible to assess the feasibility of the development objectives in force and adapt or specify them where deemed necessary. The next step was to formulate a strategy to eliminate the constraints and utilise the potentials for further development. Once the strategy had been elaborated into projects and programmes, the envisaged situation in 1994 after implementing the new policies could be presented and compared with the desired situation. Finally this project was also intended to serve as a prototype for future plans in other regions.

42 On the general need for capacity building among BAPPEDA staff, see also: Toyiman (1980).
This related directly to the aim of strengthening the planning and co-ordination capabilities of the West Java Regional Development Planning Board. Consequently, the methodology of plan formulation was seen as crucial. Hence, it was decided to combine both the 'training and coaching' and the 'exemplary planning' approach in one project.

To meet the above challenge, the West Java Regional Development Planning Project LTA-77 (1986-88) opted for the Strategic Development Framework (SDF) approach to formulate in a participatory and appropriate way an integrated set of projects and programmes for the Development Region (district and municipality) of Sukabumi in the province of West Java (See Figure 5.1).

The SDF had been born out of necessity. District authorities in Indonesia were not yet ready for their prescribed task of formulating a comprehensive regional development plan. The limited availability of development funds, skilled manpower, regionally recorded data and time for activities with a longer time horizon were the main constraints for formulating the prescribed full-fledged, comprehensive regional development plan by the (district) authorities. The SDF approach therefore aims at deliberately limiting the working load of the planners to a rational selection of target areas, target groups and target sectors. This means that, for the time being, a number of possibly relevant topics are deliberately left out of consideration.

**Figure 5.1** Sukabumi Development Region.

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44 The first steps on the path of developing and applying the concept of Strategic Development Planning have been set in the North Sumatra Regional Development Study. PADCO and USAID elaborated it in the LGU-II project into a complete training-cum-planning approach (PADCO, 1985; Mangan, 1988; Mattingly, 1989, pp. 420-422). Here we will confine ourselves to the considerably revised approach to the Strategic Development Framework concept, as applied in Sukabumi by the Indonesian-Dutch West Java Regional Development Project (LTA-47). This project was implemented by BAPPEDA West Java and HASKONING-LIDESCO consultants in co-operation with the Indonesian Agency for Personnel Education of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Most written material (training manuals, progress reports etc.) on the Strategic Development Framework (Kerangka Pembangunan Strategis - KPS) is only available in Bahasa Indonesia (HASKONING-LIDESCO, 1987, 1988-c).
A SDF covers a time span of 3-5 years. It consists of a spatial framework wherein the needs and potentials as perceived by selected target groups are related to specific projects and programmes in some selected key sectors. The perceived needs and wishes are investigated. Later on, some backward areas and promising sectors are selected while omitting others. In this way the SDF tries to determine areas, communities and sectors that can provide an optimal contribution to the attainment of the national development objectives of equal development, sufficiently high economic growth and distribution of welfare as well as national and regional stability. As a matter of course this implies that the selected 'strategic' target communities are either (very) poor or in possession of not (yet) optimally used development resources.

By emphasising the selection of the most strategic target communities (in terms of deprivation as well as of potential), backward areas and promising sectors, the SDF approach aims to optimise the use of the limited resources. Selecting only those groups that can provide a maximum contribution to attainment of the development objectives of social equity and economic growth implies a rational effort to maximise the effectiveness and efficiency of the development process.

In the SDF approach, the target group, and within it the household, forms the basis for planning. Once the needs and potentials as perceived by small farmers, landless agricultural labourers, fishermen, estate workers or small merchants are known, planners and target communities together can identify the development activities required to solve those problems, to utilise the potential, plan supporting activities and anticipate future results. The emphasis on the target group's perception of its own needs and potentials as well as of the solutions and courses of action required, marks a new form of popular consultation at local level in Indonesia.

Although still far away from popular participation in the sense of fully taking part in, and being able to influence the decision-making on the development in the region, this kind of policy formulation, based on direct consultation with the target group, is a major improvement over the present system in which planners single-handedly identify the development issues and matching policies and practices. By focusing on particular target groups, backward areas and promising sectors, the SDF approach provides a tool for operationalisation of the objective of equal development and distribution of welfare which has hitherto been underexposed in Indonesian development policy. Moreover, in addition to participation in the traditional annual 'bottom-up' planning cycle, which in practice does not seem to benefit the weaker sections of the village population a great deal, the SDF therefore provides the target groups with an opportunity to exert influence on the direction of the development process in their immediate environment: by participating in the identification/formulation phase of the SDF, their aspirations are channelled into the public decision-making domain and the target groups themselves can join in defining the topics that are going to be tackled in the following years.

The SDF for Sukabumi was formulated by an joint team consisting of planners from BAPPEDA Tk I and Tk II and the sectoral agencies. For it had been observed before that if the BAPPEDAs formulate development plans on their own, the sectoral agencies tended to be reluctant to incorporate these plans into their budgets. By broadening the functional basis of the formulation team through including specialist staff from the sectoral agencies, it was hoped that the technical quality of the plan would be improved and simultaneously the ownership of the plan by the sectoral agencies increased as well as their commitment to the funding and implementation of the proposed projects and programmes from their own budgets.

5.3.7 The case of Sukabumi: conditions and trends

At the request of the Indonesian authorities, the West Java regional development planning team focused its attention on the Sukabumi Development Region. This region
comprises the district and the municipality of Sukabumi on West Java’s southern coast, Sukabumi stretches from the Indian Ocean in the South and West, as far as the Kabupaten Cianjur in the East and the flanks of Mount Pangrango and Mount Salak in the North. It covers an area of 4,179 km² and contains a population of 1,827,000 in 1985. Since the construction of a detour of the ‘Grote Postweg’ in the nineteenth century, the mountainous area of Sukabumi has been firmly linked to the economy of West Java. Rubber and tea developed into its most important products.

Much has changed since the colonial days. When the estate sector more or less collapsed in the turbulent days after independence, Sukabumi was dragged along. Its decline did not stop after the New Order regime took over in the mid-1960s. The economic growth of Sukabumi had been consistently slower than that of the province of West Java. In 1977 its contribution to the West Java GRDP was still 4.6 per cent; by 1986 it had dropped to 3.6 per cent. This compared unfavourably with its share of the population (5.9 per cent) and the land area (9.4 per cent). Per capita the GRDP of Sukabumi in 1977 still amounted to 76 per cent of the provincial average (excluding oil and gas); in 1986 it had decreased to a mere 61 per cent. At that time, the per capita GRDP amounted to Rp. 280,962, whereas the average inhabitant of West Java could count on Rp. 457,659. These figures indicated that economic development had not been evenly spread across the province, and that a district as Sukabumi could justifiably be considered a backward development region within the province. The income distribution in Sukabumi, on the other hand, was probably more even than in West Java due to an under-representation of sectors with high value added and high wages.

Development within Sukabumi had also not been spread evenly in space. Developments in the northern part had been strongly influenced by the presence of the Bogor-Sukabumi-Cianjur road, which links it to the national capital, Jakarta, only two hours’ drive away. Moreover, this part possesses good soils and abundant water supplies. A string of centres developed in this area and, in time, it became the economic and administrative heart of the region. The southern part of Sukabumi, on the other hand, is characterised by less fertile soils and relatively limited groundwater availability. Nevertheless, the formerly sparsely populated South had increasingly been opened up for food-crop cultivation by landless farmers. The production capacity of the estates had deteriorated severely over the years.

Sukabumi is still largely a rural area. This was not only reflected by the small share of the population living in urban areas (21.5 per cent in 1985) but also by its economic structure. It is true that the share of the agricultural sector in the GRDP had decreased considerably from 44.6 per cent in 1975 but, at 35.1 per cent at present, it still ranked quite high. The dominance of the agricultural sector was still more apparent from the employment figures: in 1985 more than 377,000 people (56 per cent of the working population) derived their main income from agriculture. At the same time, these figures reflect the low value added per worker in the sector. Other important sectors from an employment perspective were trade (12.1 per cent) and public administration (13.3 per cent).

The growth of the agricultural sector had mainly been realised in the food-crop and smallholder estate-crop sub-sectors. To a considerable extent, this had been accomplished by an extensification of the harvested area. Recently this trend has stopped abruptly, indicating that nearly all suitable land is now in use. In contrast, the planted area of the large estates had declined by 6,884 ha, or 22 per cent between 1980 and 1986! This has partly been caused by the cumbersome procedures to renew land leases and obtain investment credits. But other, usually politically well connected private estate companies did obtain land leases and credits but invested the funds in other, more profitable enterprises and left the estates idle. The population census of 1980 registered some 194,000 households as farming their own or someone else’s land. Of these only 22 per cent had access to an area larger than 0.5 ha. whereas 53 per cent had less than 0.25 ha. Another 148,500 households were classified as agricultural labourers.
The industrial sector in Sukabumi used to be dominated by small-scale enterprises. Since 1975 a transformation has taken place. Due to differential growth rates of large and medium industries that produce mainly for the provincial/national market, and the small ones that cater for the local inhabitants, the former dominate the output of the manufacturing sector. Yet small and home industries provide employment for 54,000 and the large and medium industries only for 9,500 workers.

In spite of government intentions, the region's location (half an hours drive from the main toll road) and its endowment with favourable climatological conditions as well as great natural beauty, tourism is still a minor economic activity in Sukabumi. This is attributable to rather basic physical infrastructure that, while adequate to support the present level of activities, provides little stimulus to further economic development.

In environmental terms, Sukabumi has paid a high price for its economic development. Continued deforestation of the mountain slopes and delay of reforestation have resulted in erosion, loss of productive land, loss of water storage capacity in the soil, flash floods and a reduction of river basin floods. Over-extended land use has aggravated these problems. Extensive quarrying has turned vast areas into unproductive wasteland. There is an increasing danger of land slides in zones of geological instability. Discharge of industrial waste is causing growing water and air pollution.

Population growth in Sukabumi during the 1970's and 1980's had been slightly higher than in West Java as a whole, resulting in a population of 1,826,556 in 1985. Population density, on average 437, differed widely with 235 inhabitants per square kilometre in the Southeast, 919 in the Northeast and 9,927 in the Kotamadya. So far, Sukabumi has been able to absorb the majority of the growing labour force, though underemployment is still rife. The limited migration to the cities concerns mainly those with (relatively) high educational qualifications.

Standards of education are low in Sukabumi. Almost all types of education lack sufficient numbers of teaching staff and vocational education is almost absent. Secondary education is characterised by a comparatively low enrolment of females.

Indicators show that health conditions in the Kabupaten Sukabumi belong to the worst in West Java. The Kotamadya, on the other hand is in the provincial top league.

5.3.8 Sukabumi in 1994

Considering the human and physical resource base and the trends outlined above, a projection could be made of the conditions in Sukabumi in 1994. Two important considerations were taken into account, i.e. stable economic conditions and unchanged development policies. The former assumption refers mainly to stable prices for oil and other major export products, implying more or less constant government budgets, whereas the latter points to a practically unchanged interdepartmental and spatial distribution of public funds.

Although the sawah area was expected to decrease due to its conversion into non-agricultural land, the total rice production area was projected to remain stable due to the increased and improved irrigation. Dry crop cultivation is expected to grow moderately. The production of estate commodities will grow, especially toward the end of REPEDITA V (1989-94) when new tea and coconut plantings would start producing. Animal husbandry was expected to remain stable or decrease slightly. Although the coastal stocks of fish and lobsters had been depleted due to heavy exploitation, deep-sea fisheries was to grow fast, a.o. due to the construction of a harbour and related facilities in Pelabuhan Ratu.

Until now industrial growth in Sukabumi had mainly been realised by local capital investments. Further expansion would become increasingly dependent on non-resident entrepreneurs. No plan for attracting non-resident capital was envisaged, howev-
er. Industrial growth was therefore assumed to slow down in comparison with the former Five Year Development Plan.

The developments in other economic sectors (trade, transport & communication, construction, government and defence) were not expected to deviate significantly from the pattern observed during the last five years.

The above observations led to a projection of a declining economic growth performance of Sukabumi; the annual rate of growth, which was still 6.4 per cent during 1982-6 and 5.9 per cent during 1985-9 was expected to slow down to 5.4 per cent per annum during 1989-94. With economic growth in West Java at 7 per cent, the 1994 GRDP per capita in Sukabumi would be only 57 per cent of that of West Java, considerably down from 61 per cent in 1986. With an average employment elasticity of 0.34, a 5.4 per cent annual growth in GDRP would create 69,000 new jobs during REPELITA V (1989-94), more than 21,000 short of the projected need. This meant that only 76 per cent of all new entrants on to the labour market in Sukabumi would be absorbed locally.

With the present level of investment and routine expenditures, the quantitative aspects of primary education (pupils/class, teachers/class ratios) could be improved considerably. In lower secondary education, the picture looked bleaker. Without any additional investments, the government had the option of either increasing the number of pupils per class significantly and by doing so reducing the quality of education, or limit the intake of new pupils, causing the enrolment to drop from 38.6 to 34.2 per cent. Conditions in higher secondary education were expected to remain at the same level. The budget allocated to vocational training was expected to remain small, thus hampering the development of a skilled workforce. No real attempt would be made to redress the relatively small participation of girls in secondary education.

Further improvement of the health situation was very much thought to be a matter of education, immunisation, sanitation and other preventive measures. Due to the financial constraints, the shortage of medical personnel was expected to continue, as would the present emphasis on curative treatment.

Except in the case of some of the smaller urban centres no major improvements in water supply, sanitation and housing might be expected. Exploitation of soil and mineral resources would continue in search of economic benefits. In absence of a coherent conservation strategy substantial damage to the environment was to be expected.

Finally, it was not expected that the present gap in development between the 'North' and the 'South' would be closed. On the contrary, the major construction activities on the Cirugug-Sukabumi-Cianjur through-road would only consolidate the pre-eminent position of the northern part of the development region. It was clear that a substantial effort would be needed to close the gap between the Sukabumi Development Region and West Java as a whole. As a matter of fact, it was not realistic to expect a substantial increase in both private and public investments.

5.3.9 Development goals and objectives 1989-94

The main goals of REPELITA V (1989-94) can be summarised as equal development and distribution of welfare, economic growth and dynamic stability at all administrative levels. Still being rather general in nature, these goals needed to be specified to appraise their feasibility and assess the required inputs in terms of funds, manpower and time.

As from 1974 Indonesia has committed itself to the principle of growth with equity (pembangunan dengan pemerataan). For Sukabumi it is therefore crucial to diminish its growing internal social and spatial disparities as well as to close the gap with West Java. To attain the latter condition the economy of Sukabumi had to grow faster than elsewhere in West Java. Its GRDP would have to grow at no less a pace than 13.7 per cent a year to make up the arrears to West Java by 1994. Indicators of health, education
etc. also showed the need for major efforts to close the large gap between Sukabumi and West Java.

On the other hand, it was not realistic to expect a spectacular increase in government budgets in real terms. Yet, development does not spring from public efforts only. On the contrary, with respect to generating economic growth the private sector plays the leading role. Without being over-pessimistic, however, an evaluation of the major potentials as well as its prior performance threw serious doubt upon the inclination of the private sector to increase its investments in Sukabumi. The aim of bringing it up to the level of West Java seemed therefore hard to realise, at least in the medium term. Maintaining Sukabumi's relative position towards the province seemed the maximum attainable for REPELITA V (1989-94). Yet, if the administration seriously wanted to deal with spatial inequality and would be prepared to redistribute its expenditures accordingly, a moderate improvement of Sukabumi's position relative to West Java should be possible.

Still, would it then at least be possible to reduce spatial and social imbalances within Sukabumi? A shortage of public funds and private investments also formed the main constraint for reducing spatial and social imbalances in Sukabumi. In the 1989-94 Sukabumi Regional Development Plan, it is argued that by distributing the limited funds to the most pressing needs, it should at least be possible to prevent the widening of the gap as far as the accessibility to a number of public services was concerned. By carefully analysing the potentials and constraints of poor communities in backward sub-districts and distributing the funds accordingly, it should be possible to stimulate economic development in these areas, albeit on a very limited scale. Here the concept of strategic development planning could prove to be valuable.

Productive employment is crucial for supporting one's life. To provide productive employment for a labour force that was expected to grow at a rate of 2.3 per cent per year, and prevent any further widening of the social gap was the greatest challenge facing Sukabumi in the near future.

Environmental and socio-cultural conditions do co-determine the pace and direction of development to a great extent. Changing or destroying the fragile balance may negatively affect the quality of life and endanger the sustainability of development. To conserve and improve the quality of life, enough space should be given to local initiatives. Moreover, restoring the environmental damage caused so far, appraising future policies on their ecological implications and adapting them accordingly will be crucial for maintaining or improving the present living conditions.

To formulate and implement a development policy that is well adapted to the local conditions, devolution of decision-making powers to a responsible and well prepared local administration is a prerequisite. Whereas some developments on the decentralisation front could be noticed, it still left a formidable job to be done in strengthening and equipping the formal and informal institutions at local level for their new tasks.

The overall development aim for Sukabumi as formulated within the framework of the Medium Term Development Plan 1989-94 could therefore be summarised as follows: To maintain and, where possible, to improve Sukabumi's level of social and economic development vis-à-vis the other Development Regions in West Java.

Important elements in realising the overall aim would be the achievement of the following goals and objectives:

- to create full productive employment;
- to prevent any further spatial divergence within Sukabumi and decrease, where possible, present imbalances in potential for income generation, infrastructure and social services;
- to restore and preserve the environmental balance;
- to strengthen the institutional capabilities of the government and the private sector.
5.3.10 Conflicting objectives

Once the present situation and the trends were known and the goals and objectives which specify the desired conditions at the end of the plan period had been decided on, a strategy to reach these goals could be formulated. However, such a strategy only indicates the required course of action in a general way and needs to be elaborated into development policies and programmes.

The potentials and constraints as described above, however, could be assessed from more than one angle. Different points of view would result in different evaluations of the present situation and hence in different goals, objectives and priorities. It is therefore of utmost importance to evaluate the expected developments in the context of the desired future situation and identify potential conflicting objectives.

Additional labour absorption in the agricultural sector would be limited. High hopes had to be placed on further development of both resource-based and footloose industries. Yet, most potentials for industrialisation and development of labour intensive agriculture can be found in the northern part of Sukabumi. Realisation of such a development would therefore accentuate the present uneven spatial pattern of development. Moreover, such a concentration of activities would most likely enhance the occurrence of environmental hazards. Emphasising spatial distribution of development, on the other hand, would support the preservation of the ecological balance. Development of the relatively backward South and parts of the North, would imply development of the agricultural sector and a more permanent and intensive agricultural production system. If invested in the relatively developed North, however, the same amount of public funds would probably generate more economic growth and employment.

Employment creation through growth may lead to major conflicts with spatial equity and environmental protection. The goal of employment creation is, however, too important to be tampered with. The negative effects on the environment can for a large part be remedied. The remainder has to be accepted as a price for employment creation.

These considerations mean that a careful balance should be established between required growth which maximises employment creation on the one side and environmental protection and spatial equity on the other side. Growth in agriculture should obtain enough attention in order to realise some regional dispersion. Regional equity should for an important part be translated in extending infrastructure and services for the population in the less developed areas.

5.3.11 Development strategy

The low productivity and low remuneration of most workers and small farmers were the main problems in agriculture. In ameliorating this situation priority should be given to improving the production conditions, know how and management capabilities, and increasing the investments. There was a great need for improved and increased agricultural extension, rehabilitation of the production forests, protection of sloping agricultural land by planting perennials and evicting unproductive estate companies. Moreover, attention should be paid to a better supply of inputs and credits, better marketing channels, agro-industries for smallholders production and private investments in animal husbandry.

The manufacturing sector in Sukabumi lacked sufficient business capital and suffered from a low level of technology. Changing these conditions requires attraction of investors from outside. To rope these outside industrialists in for location in Sukabumi, an active promotion policy should be conducted with speedy renewal and extension of licenses, cutting local red-tape and providing industrial zones with good
access, utilities and communication facilities. In addition better extension services and appropriate credit systems should be set up and co-operation between local industries and vocational training institutes called into existence.

To re-animate Sukabumi's ailing tourism sector and provide recreation opportunities to West Java's fast increasing population, existing facilities for day-tourists should be improved. Preparations should start for both a hill and a seaside resort. A Sukabumi Tourism Board should do the promotion and assist in improving the performance of the sector.

The spatial distribution of physical infrastructure, utilities and service centres over Sukabumi was uneven. Due to the lack of proper sanitation and water supply, the occurrence of contagious diseases was still high. Accessibility of certain areas was difficult due to lack of infrastructure. This calls for better roads and transport facilities, improved city planning, better spread of facilities over the rural service centres and kampung improvement in the urbanised areas.

Further improvement of the health conditions required staff training programme in preventive health care, higher immunisation grades and more attention to the educational aspects of the use of clean water, sanitation utilities etc.

Educational problems comprised both the quality and the quantity of the education offered. Solving them meant recruitment of the primary school teachers and extending primary and secondary facilities to the rural areas. Extension should be conducted to increase female participation in secondary education. And vocational training should be improved in co-operation with the sectoral departments and industries concerned.

The government service concerned was rather top-heavy. The bottom-up planning system fails to convey the aspirations of the people. This partially explained the limited adaptation of the government development programmes to the needs and potentials of the people. Co-operatives functioned only to a very limited extent. Priority should therefore be given to improvement of the local government capacity in planning, management (incl. monitoring) of the development process. To convey the aspirations of the people NGOs should be stimulated to play a facilitating role in formulating and implementing development programmes. And officials involved in the implementation of the bottom-up planning process should be trained and upgraded.

5.3.12 Envisaged situation in 1994

To provide full productive employment to 830,000 persons in 1994 an additional 97,500 new jobs had to be created. With an average employment elasticity of 0.34 this implied an annual growth of the GDRP of 7.5 per cent. This would also stop the decline of Sukabumi's income position relative to West Java. To realise this growth rate an estimated investment of Rp. 1,145 billion would be required. The government was expected to provide 15 per cent of this amount.

If the development policies as outlined above would be implemented, it was envisaged that in 1994 the agricultural sector would still be dominant in terms of employment and remain so in the long run. Due to the relatively low added value of this sector, however, the income difference between the population active in the agricultural sector and other sectors would increase. This would have also economic consequences: low agricultural incomes produce low purchasing power in the rural areas and dictate an outward looking development in search for markets beyond the borders of Sukabumi.

However, a high economic growth of 7.5 per cent would be in conflict with the objective of more spatial equity. Growth would achieved mainly in the Northern part of Sukabumi and around the harbour of Pelabuhan Ratu. Only the estate sector, inland fisheries and horticulture could be expected to contribute to a certain spatial distri-
bution of economic development. In most backward areas special projects and programmes directed towards the most disadvantaged groups should be implemented. Additional measures to enhance development in these areas focused on the provision of additional social and economic facilities to its service centres. In 1994 this should result in better communication and (vocational) education facilities, improved infrastructure, water supply etc. in the most remote areas.

5.3.13 Application of the Strategic Development Framework approach

The SDF for Sukabumi has been formulated by a combined team of planners from the BAPPEDA Tk I and II and the sectoral agencies at Kabupaten/Kotamadya level. To facilitate the formulation of the SDF by this local team of planners, a training-cum-planning programme has been designed. In a two weeks (out of a total of five weeks) classroom training the participant planners in Sukabumi were therefore introduced to the main features of development and planning theory, the SDF approach and simple methods of gathering, analysing and processing data. Having acquired new knowledge and skills, the participants returned to their own offices. They gathered there secondary data related to the present conditions and potential in all Kecamatan. The information obtained was presented in the form of scores per Kecamatan on a limited number of indicators. These indicators reflected either equity conditions (accessibility to public utilities, housing etc.) or potentials for economic growth (present land use, non-irrigated paddy fields etc.). By means of ranking, lagging Kecamatan were identified as well as Kecamatan with good potential for further economic growth. To determine which Kecamatan would become the focus of more detailed research, these rankings have been integrated. In this way a number of Kecamatan could be selected that scored high on the ‘deprivation’ ranking but did also have potential for further economic growth (HASKONING-LIDESCO, 1987).

The second and third part of the on-the-job training focused on fieldwork, i.e. gathering of primary data. Before visiting the ‘strategic’ Kecamatan the participant planners met in the classroom again. There they received an interview training and became acquainted with the different features of poverty and tradition, the vulnerability of poor people towards development as well their strength. Most crucial, however, they were acquainted with the fact that poor or deprived people are no passive objects of pity but usually well aware of the causes of their predicament and often do know solutions to their problems. It is this admission of the fact that planners can learn directly from the people they are supposed to serve, instead of the planners teaching the local population what is good for them, that underpinned the fieldwork. Moreover, the civil servants should realise that the myth of the omnipotent government had already been wrecked and that government alone has a very limited capacity to change the position of those lagging behind structurally.

As the resources available were limited, not all villages could be visited. A sample had to be drawn based on interviews with the Camat, the doctor, head of the education department, NGOs etc. At the local level formal and informal leaders were the main source for the identification of poor socio-economic groups. From these socio-economic groups a sample of households was visited and interviewed. Stress was laid on the problems and potentials as well as on the courses of action to be taken to improve their living conditions as perceived by the respondents themselves.

The interviews provided an indispensable input for formulating a realistic SDF that was well-tailored to the problems and potentials of the selected target groups. Besides, this immersion method confronted the planners, who stayed in the villages for at least a week, directly with the often distressing living conditions of the target group. In Indonesia as well as elsewhere, planners frequently plan from behind their desks or on the basis of quick field surveys and disputable information from the local authorities.
This fieldwork provided an opportunity to come into direct contact with those who had not or less profited from previous development efforts.

The problems, potentials and constraints of the target group as identified when processing and analysing the primary and secondary data had to be examined in more detail and, when needed, supplemented by additional data. Solutions to the problems and options for the utilisation of productive resources had to be determined and reviewed in consideration of the current development objectives, present policies, budgets and impact on the position of the target group, natural environment and spatial structure. Only then the interrelated courses of action could be grouped according to target group, need, potential and location and included in a Strategic Development Framework eligible for inclusion in the district Five Year Plan V (1989-94).

5.3.14 A Strategic Development Framework for Sukabumi

Based on the score of a number of indicators representing the potentials (soil types, land that potentially could be opened up, increase in the industrial labour force, product diversification, savings, credit, etc.) and the equity conditions (sawah/person, quality and provisions of roads, electricity supply, agricultural productivity levels, environmental conditions, service level, health, education, etc.), five target sub-districts could be identified. In addition two sub-districts in the municipality were selected (see Fig. 3.1).

Two of the rural sub-districts, Parangkuda and Kelapanunggal are located in the North of the Kabupaten Sukabumi. Fieldwork in these two reasonably accessible areas identified landless agricultural labourers (daily income Rp. 9-1200/day) and small farmers (< 1 ha) as the main target groups. General problems observed are low health standards and a lack of infrastructure. The target groups were confronted with low production levels in irrigated rice cultivation as well as annual and perennial dry crops, and a lack of employment opportunities outside the agricultural sector. Potentials were identified for coffee, melinjo and hybrid coconut production, and inland fisheries as well as bamboo handicrafts. By contrast, the three other rural sub-districts, Sagaran ten, Cidolog and Tegal Buleud, are located in the south-eastern part of the Kabupaten. The last one, bordering the Indian Ocean, is relatively isolated. The problems and potentials of these areas were different from those in the northern areas. These predominantly agricultural sub-districts were less densely populated, the soils are generally of a poorer quality and, because of the more eccentric location, they had less potential to cater for the large market of Metropolitan Jakarta (Jabotabek). In general, they suffered from a low level of health, education, water supply, electricity and other infrastructural services. More specifically, the target groups could be characterised by a low productivity of their agricultural enterprises, a less diversified production structure and poor educational background. Potentials for further development comprised the re-use of the extensive fallow private estates (though very sensitive due to political implications), improvements to the productivity of the smallholder estates, and increases in rice, vegetables, fruit and livestock production. For the most southern district, Tegal Buleud, major potential for prawn hatcheries was identified.

In general, the two sub-districts of the municipality of Sukabumi were characterised by a limited water supply and sanitation facilities, a lack of cheap housing and a slow industrial development. The SDF target groups in the kotamadya, small farmers, street vendors and labourers, experienced low productivity due to pests and absence of appropriate irrigation, the lack of proper business facilities and readily available credit, and limited skills. By improving the modest irrigation system and providing essential inputs, the low agricultural productivity was expected to increase. Providing credit to small industries would eliminate a major bottleneck for their expansion, whereas creating favourable business locations for hawkers would eliminate one of their main problems.
5.3.15 Further improvements

In the end, applying the SDF approach in Sukabumi provided a number of proposals tailored to the needs of selected target groups in a limited number of areas. This is clearly not enough if the formulation of a full-fledged regional development plan is at stake. A SDF is not an overall Medium Term Regional Development Plan. It focuses only on a limited number of Kecamatan, target groups and sectors that should be given preferential treatment. But what will happen to the other areas? You clearly cannot strike them out of the government policies for the next five years. The same applies to the needs of other disadvantaged communities living in somewhat more prosperous areas, or the potential contributions to regional development by sectors that are not the domain of the poor and/or that are not present in the identified strategic areas? And how do the (sectoral) functions given to a Kabupaten in the bigger framework of the province relate to the SDF?

The SDF should be considered a further specification of the policies required to improve the living conditions of certain disadvantaged socio-economic groups living in less developed areas. It merely contains a number of well argued, concrete proposals for projects and programmes that should be given priority if social equity is to be attained and the position of a substantial number of poor people ameliorated in a coherent way. A future improvement would be to supplement the SDF with a more sectoral approach. Major potentials and problems outside the strategic areas should be identified, analysed and treated accordingly. The result would be a plan covering the main potentials of the region and the needs of its poor residents. Finally such a plan should also take into consideration the (sectoral) functions given to the district within the broader spatial framework of provincial and national development.

5.3.16 Conclusions

The regional problem in Indonesia is characterised by contrasts between densely populated 'Inner Indonesia' and thinly populated 'Outer Indonesia'. The great diversity in ethnic groups, cultures and religions, which are often regionally localised, are also thought to jeopardise the unity of the nation. Moreover, the 'New Order' that came to power in 1965 steadily legitimised tight control of the various socio-economic groups. In short, there is not much space for participatory planning at present.

Therefore it is not surprising that development planning is strongly centralised, hierarchical, sectoral and top-down. Institutions that could theoretically counter centralism, such as the People's Representative Councils at the provincial and the district levels and the Village Community Councils, have not played a crucial role in the decision-making process up to now. The BAPPEDAs (Regional Development Planning Boards) though, have direct access to the most important decision-maker at the respective levels (governor/bupati) who could potentially exercise the power to influence sectoral agencies. However, in practice the planning agencies at both levels lack funds, skilled manpower, authority, and usually the most important factor, an articulated vision on the desirable developments for their area. As a result they are hardly in a position to directly or indirectly influence and achieve horizontal co-ordination of ministerial branches and local offices. They have no power to decide on the allocation of the regional INPRES funds.

On the one hand, the political reality may explain the centralised government structure and the limited devolution of decision-making powers to the lower levels. Spatially and socially unbalanced development, as in the case of Sukabumi, however,

45 For Sukabumi see: Pemda Kotamadya dan Kabupaten Sukabumi et.al. (1988).
seems to make a more prominent, active role for the regions in the future inevitable. From a development point of view, it is argued that decentralisation of decision-making will increase the efficiency of development policy and will better suit the needs of the regions as well as their deprived groups. In this respect, several initiatives to strengthen the position of both BAPPEDAs were taken during the past decade. Also, new planning procedures were introduced in 1981, offering potentially greater possibilities for bottom-up planning.

However laudable the endeavour to decentralise development planning might be, it does not guarantee a more equal distribution of resources among social groups. Six years after its nation-wide introduction, the "bottom-up" approach to planning seemed not very successful. Popular participation in formalised structure did not appear to have achieved all that was hoped for. Main causes for the lack enthusiasm for participation in the planning process seems to be the frustration over the meagre benefits that participation seems to bring for the village in general and for the target groups in particular. This disappointment may have its roots in three factors: continued dominance of top-down planning, unreasonable expectations about the benefits of popular participation for the villages and insufficient consideration of the interests of particular target groups by the village authorities.

To achieve more direct participation in bottom-up planning, organising villages with mutual interests in independent organisations might be a precondition for effectively increasing their bargaining power. To avoid frustration over anticipated benefits that are not met, a strong need exists for ample information about the possibilities of bottom-up planning and the budgets that can be expected for development purposes.

Further decentralisation of decision-making and budget-allocation powers seem to be another prerequisite for safeguarding a continued contribution of the people to planning, implementation and maintenance of development projects. The administrators at lower levels in the hierarchy may be the most open to initiatives from below. Moreover, because of their intimate knowledge of the area, they are in the best position to judge the feasibility of the projects and programmes proposed by the villages. Yet, a sine-qua-non for good performance of district administrators is an open, be it critical, attitude to the vast accumulated knowledge of local people about the world in which they live.

The government has its own responsibility for enhancing development. With the present level of knowledge and skills in the districts, however, the desired full-fledged development plans and the much needed intersectoral co-ordination seems still far away. For the time being the maximum attainable seems to be a skeleton plan outlining the present problems and potentials, the desired future structure and the major projects to be implemented. For a limited number of Kecamatan more detailed projects and programmes, well tailored to the needs and potentials of identified target groups can be formulated.

The target group approach may take place within the Strategic Development Framework (SDF) which starts from the idea that development funds, time and manpower are now and in the foreseeable future scarce. Therefore not everything can be done at once. Choices have to be made to guarantee a certain impact. For that reason development efforts are to be concentrated spatially, in a limited number of Kecamatan, socially, on one or a few target groups, and functionally, on a few target groups, on a few promising sectors. This concentration of development efforts aims at maximising its contribution to the achievement of the national Indonesian development objectives of social equity, economic growth and dynamic stability.

The final SDF comprises an analysis of the present conditions and potential of the Kabupaten, a selection of strategic Kecamatan, target groups and sectors, as well as policies, programmes and projects to address the identified problems and potentials. It provides a framework for reviewing and evaluating past development activities and
may enhance the determination of realistic targets. Moreover, the SDF may also serve as a consistent guide and filter for project proposals generated in the annual bottom-up planning process. It provides an opportunity to change the shopping list-like character that marks the present proposals. The SDF may also prove useful in assessing the appropriateness of national sector policies for the region under study.

A quality SDF requires strong support from the sectoral agencies. To achieve this support it is necessary that all parties considered crucial for development of the district are involved in all stages of the formulation of the SDF. For the BAPPEDAs this leaves the particular task of co-ordinating the sectoral activities and integrating the output in a consistent framework.

Training is necessary to enable planning officials from the sectors as well as the planning board to formulate a SDF. For this training-cum-planning approach has been developed with alternating on- and off-the job training.

If a skeleton-type of medium regional development plan is required, the SDF should be supplemented with sectoral studies in a spatial context. The sectoral approach should tackle in more detail those sectoral problems encountered during the formulation of the SDF and study major sectoral potentials and problems of target groups in areas that have not been prioritised in the SDF. It should also deal with the role of the district in the larger provincial framework.

If direct participation in planning with formalised structures still faces insurmountable constraints, institutionalisation of the communication between the planner and the target group seems not only to provide an important contribution to the qualitative improvement of the planning documents, but also to contribute a new dimension to popular consultation in Indonesian development planning.

The decisive case in point is to what extent regional authorities feel responsible for changing the position of poor communities in their region. In this respect, it is both interesting and important to follow the efforts to decentralise development planning and to observe the actual operation of bottom-up planning procedures in Indonesia.

With the Strategic Development Framework (SDF) approach, an example has been given how, with limited resources, regional planning can enlarge the capacities of planning officers in the region and also include low-income groups in development planning. The SDF approach focuses on particular target communities, not only in terms of potentials but also deprivation. Its stresses promising sectors but also backward areas. In this way it provides a tool for operationalising the twin objectives of economic growth and redistribution of welfare. Moreover, it offers a framework for channeling the perceptions and aspirations of the identified target communities into the domain of public decision-making. It offers an alternative to development planners at lower level where, largely as the result of the existing socio-political system, direct participation in planning within formal structures faces many constraints. The plan does not rest upon utopic brain waves; instead it aims at gradual improvement which can be absorbed and supported by the local population and institutions. But even then, realising its objectives requires a tremendous effort of all parties involved in developing Sukabumi.

**5.3.17 Looking back ten years after: reflecting on action in West-Java**

Formulating an agenda for sustainable development and selecting approaches for tackling the burning issue of socio-spatial inequality is as much based on moral and political convictions, on rational knowledge, as on intuition, and what the spirit of the times requests from us. Opting for planning 'from below' and focusing on poverty eradication followed logically from what appealed to feelings of reason and justice and to what world wide experience in this field taught us. Yet, with hindsight one might say that, certainly at that time, there was not too much factual evidence that partici-
patory approaches could also be implemented at a larger scale over a longer period of time and still generate all the predicted advantages. In other words, participation was still more a belief than a tested and trusted strategy and appealed to feelings of reason and justice. In Indonesia the trend was not different. The Dutch-Indonesian bilateral aid programmes, implemented by consultancy bureaux that belonged to the congregation of 'believers' and who willy-nilly had to conform themselves to mainstream development thinking to survive in a competitive commercial market, were usually in line with the new thinking. Hence, they focused on praiseworthy and then widely supported objectives. Yet, everybody involved knew that it was quite impossible that the structural changes that were required to sustainably eradicate poverty would ever be achieved through these foreign-aided interventions. For there was a number of preconditions of a more political nature that had to be met before these project objectives would ever become reality, and it was quite unlikely that these would be realised in the short term. The administration had to further its own interests, the interests of those groups on which it depended for support. The perpetuation of this support demanded the maintenance of the status quo (cf. C.L.G. Bell, 1974, p. 52; see also subsection 3.3.1). As a consequence, all stakeholders in the project would in practice settle tacitly for equally laudable, but less radical objectives.

To a certain extent the West Java Regional Development Planning Project LTA-47 had also to cope with this phenomenon. As an Indonesian-Dutch entity, it was supposed to deal in the normative domain with the burning issue of social equity and, in the strategic domain, with developing a methodology for planning from below. Simultaneously, it was clear to all observers of the political arena that those Indonesians who monopolised the power were not the least interested in actual (re)distribution of the fruits of development or prepared to share power by including citizens and lower-tier officials in decision-making. Under these conditions no (local or expatriate) bureaucrat would ever get the possibility to seriously advocate his/her own radical normative dispositions and the related structural changes that would be required to attain social equity (see also sub-section 2.1.3). These changes would demand a transformation of the political constellation, and without such a far-reaching shift there remained only room for suggesting adaptations to the existing structure that would not put the essence of the system at risk. Working within such a reformist framework cannot result in structural changes of the system. However, exemplary, rational ('what if') suggestions for largely procedural, piecemeal adaptations to the structure are not altogether useless. Precisely because they fit within the existing procedural framework, they can contribute significantly to improvement of the current administrative practices and as such contribute (indirectly) to the achievement of the development objectives.

In the case of the Strategic Development Framework approach important elements were the operationalisation of the appreciated and normative social equity objective by consistently focusing on poverty and the consequent incorporation of a target group focus. This entailed a certain degree of popular participation. Yet, admittedly, the actual influence of the poor on the analysis and project formulation still depended on the whims of the bureaucrats. There was no possibility for appeal, not directly through the project structure nor indirectly via free elections and a truly representative government. The target group therefore definitely did not share control over decisions and the allocation of resources that affected their own lives, which was at that time impossible to realise within the then political conditions in Indonesia (cf. Fowler, 1997, p. 16).

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46 One might of course argue that projects, let alone projects staffed with expatriates, are not in the position to table (the consequences of) such normative issues. Yet if so, they should not be charged with working in such a context.
Nevertheless, the project certainly paid attention to the needs and potentials of people living in poverty and to the local corporate sector and, to a lesser extent, to organised civil society (cf. sub-section 1.4). As such it provided, given the prevailing socio-political circumstances, a framework for concerned regional planning. However, these actor groups were mainly addressed as beneficiaries that were supposed to react to the initiatives of the powerful state and not as independent actors that might, where needed in co-operation with others, play their own part in furthering development. This was completely conform the prevailing view that the prime role in development rested with the state. However, LTA-47 was just a pilot project. And if we leave aside the possibility of influencing normative dispositions at national level, you may still wonder whether it would have been possible at all to influence structurally the strategic ("how") domain from a project perspective which is basically operational ("what, where").

When at the start a clear consensus at the top level of the bureaucracy about the room for changing the system and its modus operandi is lacking, the only option for a project like LTA-47 to contribute (modestly) to structural change at all is through 'Voice'-like behaviour (Hirschmann, 1970; Hume, 1995 and sub-section 3.4.1) of local staff and expatriates. To accomplish this you need strong alliances and intimate relations with individual 'Loyal' but 'Voice'-inclined, compassionate local top officials who are, when "sufficiently aroused" (Hirschmann, 1970, p. 58), prepared to bring into play a considerable reserve of political prestige in their (more) extensive controllable and influenceable environment (Smith et al, 1980; see also chapter 1. and 3.)\(^{47}\). It is simply not enough to develop a methodology, outline a strategy and trust that rational arguments, whatever appropriate they may be, will be decisive in changing strategic dispositions.

Looking back, it must be concluded that the West Java Regional Development Planning Project LTA-47 has too much focused on its controllable environment and its 'human capital' at hand and lacked 'social capital' and a specific policy to play the role of broker and to make use of and/or expand vertically its influenceable environment in Jakarta, both where it concerned the strategic ('how') and the operational ('what, where') level (cf. Bebbington, 1999). The latter is important as well, for Jakarta is not only the political and administrative centre of decision-making, it is also a dynamic metropolis that exerts a dominating influence on developments in considerable parts of the surrounding province of West Java\(^ {48}\). Having a stronger presence in Jakarta, however, to advocate at the appropriate political and administrative levels the proposed strategic policy reforms has never been a real option for the project staff. With hindsight, one might relate this lack of attention for the strategic aspects of the project to a number of factors. First of all, there were the terms of reference which did not really address the expected outcome in this respect. In its Terms of Reference it had been stated that LTA-47 had to develop methodologies to generate, design, follow-up and control a coherent set of programmes and projects, but nothing about these methodologies taking root. As no specific monitoring took place on this issue, no serious attention was paid to it as well. But even if it would have been prioritised, the contracted consultant would have had little reason to increase, without extra compensation, its workload. For that was already almost too big to and had already lead to serious tensions among the members.

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\(^{47}\) It was the main reason to publish a review article of development planning from below in Indonesia and introduce the SDF approach in an article in the Indonesian periodical Prisma (1989, no.45, pp. 72-83), with as co-author the then highest ranking bureaucrat responsible for regional development in the national development planning Agency BAPPENAS.

\(^{48}\) In functional terms it is better to speak of the area of greater Jakarta, in Indonesia better known as Jabotabek (Jakarta-Bogor-Tangerang-Bekasi), i.e. Jakarta plus a number of surrounding districts. Jakarta is a separate province whereas Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi are part of West Java. You might wonder, however, how it is possible at all to develop a meaningful regional development plan when the most dominant factor is formally not part of your domain of study.
of the expatriate consultant team about the correct balance between the required in-depth research and the production of concrete results within the agreed time-frame. Focusing on new areas of attention would only divert scarce human resources from what had been agreed upon in the Terms of Reference and would logically be a precarious topic at the time that extension of the project was still under discussion (cf. subsection 3.3.5). Yet, it simultaneously has to be said that at this point also the organisational positioning of the LTA-47 project within the Indonesian administrative context would also seriously have thwarted the possibilities for such an advocacy strategy.

First of all it was quite difficult to serve and satisfy four different masters (i.e. Public Works, BAPPENAS, BAPPEDA Tk. I and BAPPEDA Tk. II) at national, provincial and district level who are hierarchically not linked to each other and all had to defend their own interests in the arena of struggle which LTA-47 turned out to be. But the agencies that would potentially benefit from better practices and therefore should have been interested in playing that advocacy role, i.e. the BAPPEDAs at provincial and district level, for and with whom specific development plans would be developed, were very reluctant to do so as well. In that respect it was of great importance that neither the BAPPEDAs nor their 'mother' department (their influenceable environment), i.e. the Ministry of Home Affairs, had ever structurally been involved in the decision-making in the identification/formulation phase of the project. Hence they lacked any serious feeling of ownership. The absence of Home Affairs became particularly noticeable as there was Moreover, no direct administrative or hierarchical relation between the various actors involved, i.e. between BAPPENAS, Public Works, BAPPEDA Tk. I and or BAPPEDA Tk. II. Moreover, the one BAPPEDA official that had participated in the formulation of the project description and the subsequent negotiations between the bi-lateral authorities concerned and left the organisation before the project had become operational. As a result the BAPPEDA staff considered the project to be identified in the Jakarta circles, and, where it concerned Sukabumi, in the Jakarta-Bandung circuit, and imposed upon them without any real decision-making power or access to the accompanying project budget. For the latter was controlled by the ministry of Public Works which did hardly play any functional role in the project. When it later on became clear that, in spite of the (tacit) promise from the Dutch authorities, there would be no extension of the project to fund the implementation of (parts of) the policy recommendations of the LTA-47 team, the interest of the Indonesian counterpart at management level to participate enthusiastically in the project did not increase for obvious reasons either. Thus, the expatriate team had, except knowledge which could contribute to increased human capital, little to offer to the Indonesian participants in terms of financial rewards, social capital, social standing or career prospects. This was clearly reflected in the limited interest of the core decision-makers to pursue the strategic objectives of the programme.

49 It is the task of Home Affairs, among others, to supervise and support the development of local level development planning agencies and their functioning. It can therefore, to a certain extent, be called “a national ministry with a local agenda” (Morfit, 1986, p. 59).

50 It lead also to a reluctance to become wholeheartedly involved in the project through staff assignments, information which could only be overcome through pressure from ‘Jakarta’. The importance of access to projects funds finds its basis partly in the system of incentives and monetary rewards which are needed to augment the inadequate salaries of the civil servants and partly in the possibility to embezzle funds as well (see: MacAndrews, 1986, p. 32). In that sense the situation became even more complicated when the Indonesian project director entrusted the so-called Indonesian counterpart funds to the Dutch team leader because he did not trust his own staff!

51 Hilhorst (1992, p.174) gives two versions as to the main reason for this unilateral decision: “The first is that the project was unable to produce an interesting introduction to the problems of West-Java when the new director of the Indonesia desk came to visit the project after barely one year of project operations. His own opinion is, however, that the effectiveness of technical co-operation in regional planning should be considered questionable, in view of the little influence the provinces have in national decision-making”.

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Within the appreciated political, administrative and procedural context, it could be considered the project’s main task to contribute to the improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of public resource management. The point of departure for the Strategic Development Framework ‘leg’ of the project was the existing structure of the bureaucracy and more specifically the organisational capacities of the counterpart organisations (the BAPPEDAs). The first aim was to match what the state tried to do to with what it practically was capable to do, and the second one was to increase and improve the number of things it could do efficiently by reinvigorating the participating agencies, not unlike the advise from the World Bank ten years later (IBRD, 1997). Thus the rationality of planning practice was adapted to its conditions: it sacrificed comprehensiveness to overcoming a specific organisational bottleneck (cf. Friedmann, 1973, pp. 15-16). Once a certain level of skills and experience had been acquired, it was thought, further sequential strengthening of the capacities and step-by-step introducing more sophisticated techniques could be considered. The training part, wholly conducted by experienced Indonesian trainers, focused on the sensitisation of the participants to the need to adopt, as it were as a new ‘lifestyle’ (see also sub-section 2.3), a more inclusive way of working, and on the operationalisation of the existing development objectives. This capacity building should be considered the most important part of the SDF approach as implemented in Sukabumi and not the end product of a bundle of targeted projects and programmes (Grijpstra, 1989, p. 32). The training was particularly important because it aimed at engaging all the concerned government agencies in pragmatic terms as the principal actors, each from its own sectoral and functional responsibility, from the beginning to the end in a common endeavour to formulate an integrated spatial development plan. It thus aimed at avoiding an (artificial) dichotomy between planners (where ever they were organisationally located in the Indonesian context), implementors and those on whose behalf the intervention is intended (see also Schaffer, 1984). It pledged to effectively ensure that all government actors, each of them from his/her own functional responsibility, were involved in shaping and implementing the plan (see Porter et al., 1991, pp. 131, 198). Due to the combination of training through lecture-discussion methods combined with experimental learning through cases, role playing and a continued practical application to their real and current work-related problems and the conduct of training at or near the project sites, the Indonesian counterparts considered the SDF-output definitely their plan. It boosted not only the confidence of the BAPPEDA II staff and their social status vis-à-vis the sectoral departments (Grijpstra, 1989, p. 33) but also the confidence of the staff of those sectoral departments who in daily life have as much to deal with overly centralised structures and decision-makers as their BAPPEDA counterparts. This sense of ownership at the provincial and district level, however, could not be was not extended to the other elements of the LTA-47 output. These more macro-oriented studies were to be used by the agencies at provincial level to advocate support at national level, in particular with BAPPENAS. Due to time constraints and the above indicated

52 Nevertheless were the normative aspects of development in the Indonesian context a hot item during the training, which was quite in contrast to the original training LGT II programme where the assumption was that “...government technicians need to know not so much the theory ..., but rather require a single set of operational procedures which they are capable of carrying out in order to produce the output expected of them” (Mangan, 1988, p,87).

53 An important element in that respect were the short “beneficiary-oriented (field) studies” (Honadle and VanSant, 1985, p. 47) that aimed at increasing civil servant’s understanding of the perspectives, priorities and behaviours of target groups.

54 Even the suggested implementation of the plan with financial support of the Netherlands Government could not bring the BAPPEDAs to support the programme very actively. They might have had a farsighted view, as the intended support has never been realised. Bits and pieces of the SDF have been realised with local Indonesian funding, though.
lack of interest and technical abilities of the provincial agencies these plans were basically formulated by the LTA-47 expatriate resident team or, where the team ran short of technical expertise, by short term consultants (HASKONING-LIDESCO, 1988-b, 1988-c). The learning effect of formulating those plans on the Indonesian counterpart at provincial level was therefore very limited. The great majority of the potential users lacked the required technical knowledge and experience to make the most of the relatively advanced planning documents as well (van den Ham, 1992, p. 122).

In sum, and referring to the research questions of sub-section 1.7.1, one may conclude that the approach towards capacity building within the LTA-47 project could directly be traced to my previous, both positive and negative experiences within the IDAP project in the province of the Special Territory of Aceh. It resulted in the adoption of some key features of the IDAP project in (parts of) the LTA-47 project, such as the dominant focus on small scale, selective interventions. However, to remedy the perceived weaknesses of the IDAP approach, it lead also to the inclusion of popular consultation in the project strategy, in a different role for the expatriate consultants (non-implementing) and local practitioners (responsibility for implementation), in the inter-disciplinary character of the local team etc.

Different methodologies and underlying assumptions were employed towards attaining the three main objectives of the project. The first one was to do a macro study of the province of West Java, including a medium term reconnaissance of its main economic problems and the identification of sectoral and spatial priorities and related investment projects and programmes. The second objective was to assist BAPPEDA in the identification of priorities and subsequent formulation of programmes and projects for future domestic and/or foreign funding for a selected planning region. The third objective was to strengthen the planning and co-ordination capability of the BAPPEDAs by designing and implementing a replicable, modest methodology that would take into account the existing responsibilities, decision-making structures, procedures and constraints of all the participating agencies.

To achieve the first two objectives, the project team largely employed rather 'conventional' methodologies focusing on interventions based on fairly mechanistic extrapolations of more or less verifiable trends. The assessment of the present conditions, the identification of (presumably) relevant factors and the interpretation of their relative future importance was firmly in the hands of the expatriate consultants (although they of course consulted scores of local informants) as an attachment to the state, and rooted in a more or less neo-positivist attitude towards the 'objective' knowl-
edgeability of reality. Their perception of a developing West Java and their suggestions for influencing that course was at times exposed to the opinion of selected bureaucrats and scientific observers, who might (at best) have a (slightly) different view on the perception of the relevant factors and presented trends. But questions related to the type of development that was desirable for West Java and meaning of the officially approved development objectives, in a normative sense, for its diverse population were hardly posed. Slightly different was the second phase when the analysis of conditions and trends by the expatriates and local bureaucrats assigned to the project was supplemented by perceptions of target group representatives on both their problems and the potentials to solve them. Thus, through structured interviews, observation and short studies by NGOs, at least a superficial impression of the relevance of the identified factors for the daily life of the identified target group could be included in the decision-making process on the investment proposals.

The attention for popular participation in the LTA-47 development planning efforts stemmed as much from the conviction of some of the consultants, from the Terms of Reference as well as from what the spirit of the times suggested us as worthwhile to strive for. However, in spite of the objectives of the project agreed upon by both bilat-
eral project holders, the room for manoeuvre was from the onset very much restrict-
ed by the existing politico-administrative culture that did not permit any challenge to
the distribution of access to and control of various assets. As a result the involved proj-
ect staff settled for less daring project objectives. However, their attainment was seri-
ously hindered by the complicated administrative framework of the project, that can
directly be related to its foreign character, and which was constantly contested by
bureaucrats who defended their organisational as well as their own (petty) interests.

5.4 Between strategy and implementation: the case of the Central Aceh
Smallholders Coffee Development Project

In the case of the West Java Regional Development Planning Project LTA-47 a wide gap
existed between the normative and strategic dispositions of the expatriate project
team, on the one hand, and those of the decision-makers at central level, on the other.
Within an appreciated environment that did not correspond with my moral disposi-
tion towards poverty alleviation and equity, and an influenceable environment that
for various reasons indicated in the preceding sub-sections could hardly be influenced,
there was at that level for an expatriate consultant not much scope for contributing
in a structural way to poverty alleviation.

However, in 1989 an opportunity arose to join a project in Indonesia's Northern-
most Province of the Special Territory of Aceh that operated within a politically well
accepted strategic and administrative framework. Although it had to function within
the same (unsatisfactory) appreciated political, bureaucratic and administrative
macro-environment it seemed to offer enough room for manoeuvre to adapt the pro-
grame to the local needs and potentials. As it This intendedpromised to be a fusion of plan-making with plan implementation during the course of the action itself
(Friedmann, 1973, p. 60), it promised to become an attractive follow-up to my activities
under the umbrella of IDAP (see sub-section 4.4) and the West Java Regional
Development Planning Project LTA-47 (sub-sections 5.3.1-5.3.17). It combined action at
both strategic ('how') and operational ('what, where') levels.

The bilateral Indonesian-Dutch Central Aceh Smallholders Coffee Development
Project LTA-77 did explicitly not aim at changing national policies or administrative
procedures. Micro change in Central Aceh was not inevitably expected to induce macro
change. The project aimed at strengthening the capacities of the local administrators
and local communities within the existing administrative framework in combination
with direct poverty alleviation. With capacity building as one of the main objectives,
it would provide the opportunity to build upon the positive experiences that I had
gained in two previous projects, IDAP and the West Java Regional Development
Planning, with bringing diverse local officials, each with his/her own distinct func-
tional responsibility, in the centre of the project as the principal actors. The previous
experiences had shown that the impact of the training-cum-planning exercise on indi-
viduals had been more substantial than that on organisations (cf. Friend & Hickling,
1987, p. XII). It thus pleaded for a continuation of this human centred approach but
link it to day-to-day practices as implemented by the local administrative agencies. The
Aceh project promised to offer the possibility to combine the role of a 'voice' inclined
reformer, that placed the emphasis on creating an appropriate social and administra-
tive climate for enabling the rural people to contribute to and benefit from improved
public policies, with that of a 'loyal' bureaucrat who focuses on the implementation of
agreed policies (cf. Anker, 1973, p. 483). It opened-up the opportunity to co-operate
with local administrators, and simultaneously develop and implement approaches to
promote social awareness among the local communities, induce local people to
analyse their conditions, formulate their own aspirations, negotiate with the govern-
ment; in other words: to participate actively in furthering their own development. With the various Acehnese administrative stakeholders (who had shown sincere interest in the project during the preceding phase) as the main focus of attention, the project’s influenceable environment was also more within reach than in the West Java case. Finally, it also bridged the arbitrary separation between knowledge and action, between planning and implementation which had characterised the West Java project and frustrated quite a number of actors in the project who at some stage found out that planning was not be followed by implementation.

The Central Aceh Smallholders Coffee Development Project LTA-77 promised an suitable framework for paying more attention to managing implementation. It pledged to move away from elaborate planning exercises, to develop a first hand familiarity with the problems and potentials in the area, and with the prospects people ‘who will ‘gain and lose’ in the development process’. It would focus on developing a network of interpersonal relationships based on confidence while formulating and implementing promising approaches designed in close co-operation with all the stakeholders. Yet, there would be enough room for adaptation of the plans if reality would require to do so. In short, it provided the opportunity to contribute to the implementation of a local development approach which had been inspired by ideas about social learning, and transactive planning and farmer behaviour as advocated by authors as James Scott (1976), John Friedmann (1973, 1981, 1984), Dennis Rondinelli (1983), Robert Chambers (1983) and David Korten (1980, 1984) (see also subsection 4.3.1).

5.4.1 Central and North Aceh Rural Development programme LTA-77: origins of the project - the wider socio-political context

Within the Indonesian context the province of Aceh has always been a special case. Based on a distinct cultural identity that is vested in strong orthodox Islamic beliefs, the Acehnese have invariably claimed an independent position within the various concepts of the nation state that have floated around in the East Indian archipelago (see: Snouck Hurgronje, 1906; Benda, 1983). The Dutch colonial regime could only establish its authority very late in history and at great cost. Even after ‘pacificating’ Aceh in early years of the twentieth century, they had to have their troops almost standing by to keep control of the area. After the Japanese occupation during the second world war the Dutch decided not to spend any scarce resources on re-establishing their authority in this mutinous area and did not return (van der Veer, 1980, p. 301). In the vacuum after the Japanese capitulation, militant, populist Islamic groups killed most of the

55 Except if explicitly mentioned, the information with respect to the Central And North Aceh Rural Development/Aceh Tengan Smallholders Coffee Development Project PPW/LTA-77 comes from personal observations over the period 1984-1992 during which I was able to visit the project regularly and had the privilege to be fully engaged in the project for the last three years. Other important sources of information were the following reports: Schedule of Operations (1984), Working Paper for the Meeting of the Board of Directors; Subject the Organisational Structure of the Project (1986); Participation of beneficiaries in Rural Development Undertakings (1986); Regionale Ontwikkeling Aceh, Indonesië; smallholder coffee development project (1987); bi-annual and quarterly progress Reports 1981-1992; Quaries van Ufford and Razoux Schultz (1988); Farming and Dynamics of Coffee Cultivating Communities in Kecamatan Bandar and Bukit (1989); Project Document PPW/LTA 77 II (1988); Project Document and Budget Proposal Phase II PPW/LTA-77 (1989); Report of the evaluation mission (1991); Proposal After Care Phase Aceh Tengan Smallholder Coffee Development Project (1991); Study Pra-kelayakan Perusahaan Prossing Kopi Arabika (1991); Ontwikkelingsamenwerking tussen Nederland en Indonesië in Aceh (1991); Kelayakan Prossing Kopi Arabika (PPKA) (1992); Final Report Rural Development Advisor/Team leader (1992); correspondence and internal project memoranda (1983-1992) my diaries and personal communication with various stakeholders (1984-1999). Again I have tried to stick as much to the original texts with only editorial changes to make the text readable.
traditional Acehnese leaders, the uléebalang, who had been co-opted in the Dutch colonial administration and had tried to resume their traditional social, political and economic role after the Japanese had surrendered (Reid, 1979, pp. 187-215; Boland, 1971, p. 70). Local Acehnese had once more confirmed their image of independence minded people who were able and prepared to initiate a 'social revolution', irrespective of what was going on in the rest of the country. In 1953 a new rebellion erupted, this time directed against the new central government in Jakarta. The immediate cause for this revolt rested in the compromise that had to be struck between the promised autonomy and central government interference (van Dijk, 1981, pp. 269-339). The uprising in Serambi Mekkah ('veranda of Mecca') as the Acehnese proudly call their area, was inspired by a strong desire to assert the Acehnese cultural identity which is inextricably bound up with Islamic religion. The rebels did not succeed in establishing their ideal of an Islamic State of Indonesia or of an autonomous Islamic Province of Aceh within the (secular) Republic of Indonesia. Yet, in 1959 the province of Aceh was granted the status of Daerah Istimewa (a special administrative area). It received some autonomy in religious affairs, in questions of adat (customary law) and in matters of education, on the understanding that this autonomy would not come into conflict with the national constitution (Boland, 1983, p. 74). However, this limited autonomy did not satisfy all Acehnese. In 1977 the Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh) Movement was established. Initially it did not gain much momentum, but in the early 1990s it became increasingly active in violent resistance. It invoked a strong reaction from the central government which perceived the separatist movement as a threat to the unitary state. In return, this 'iron fist' approach strengthened the Acehnese feeling that they were actually colonised and exploited by 'Java'. This again considerably contributed to the confirmation of a distinct Acehnese identity among the majority of the population. However, within the Special Territory of the province of Aceh, ethnic and cultural minorities, most notably the Gayo who inhabit the mountainous Central Aceh district, tried to protect their own identity by selectively assimilating to mainstream Acehnese thinking (Bowen, 1984, 1988, 1991).

The concern about potential political unrest in Aceh made the central government pay special attention to this peripheral province which had economically become very strategic as well after the discovery of huge gas deposits on the Northern coast. The reason for the Dutch involvement in assistance to regional development (planning) activities in the province of Aceh, however, had also very much to do with the close relationship between an influential Dutch advisor to the Ministry of Development Co-operation and his high ranking colleague in BAPPENAS who later was to become governor of Aceh. The project area included the mountainous upstream part of the Peusangan watershed (the district of Central Aceh) and, downstream, the economically important district of North Aceh with its strategic deposits of gas. The production of LNG and chemicals in a high-tech enclave was mainly managed by expatriates and non-Acehnese Indonesians with a life-style that very much differed from that of the local population outside the compounds. The cultural and socio-economic gap that was about to develop with the still 'traditional' hinterland and that could easily inflame the lingering tensions, was a concern of the provincial planning agency, should be taken into account in any development framework (Hilhorst and Specker, 1983, p. 2). Thus, the Institutional Development Assistance Project (IDAP, see also: sub-section 4.4. incl. map 4) and, later-on, LTA-77 were to address this anticipated socio-spatial inequality (Veenstra and van Steenbergen, 1986, p. 8). Moreover, projects like these would con-

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56 For the impact of the rebellion on the district of Central Aceh, see: Bowen, 1991, pp. 114-118.
57 For an early account of the Aceh Merdeka movement see Indoc (1981); for recent developments, see various issues of FEER and TEMPO (1999-2000).
tribute to the legitimisation of central government in the eyes of many a suspicious Acehnese.

When in the 1980s the IDAP development planning specialists started their fieldwork in Central Aceh they could hardly have avoided to investigate the potentials of the coffee sector, if only because it is omnipresent in the area. The high altitudes of 4,000-7,000 feet, the fertile soils and abundant rainfall throughout the year very much favours the cultivation of high quality Arabica coffee. In the colonial times coffee had been introduced by the Dutch. Along side the tea and pine plantations (for resins and turpentine) these coffee estates had their own processing facilities. In 1933 coffee estates were already operating on 13,000 hectares of land which were worked by estate workers, mainly ‘imported’ from Java. The local Gayo population quickly adapted to the new opportunities and opened up new villages in the forests where they planted export-quality coffee as well (Bowen, 1991, pp. 76-77). After Independence in 1945 the estates were dismantled and distributed among the Javanese and Gayo residents. Due to a lack of experience and organisational capacities, proper management of the coffee gardens and central processing of the produce quickly disappeared. However, coffee remained the mainstay of the local economy. In the early 1980s the district was covered with some 28,000 hectares of, mainly, Arabica coffee which were worked by some 25,000 families. Almost every family in the district grows coffee. In addition, many of them also own a small plot of land on which they cultivate staple crops that are partly traded on the market and partly meant for self-subsistence. These farmer households are essentially smallholders whose coffee gardens seldom exceed the area that the family can manage. There are no land-less families but of their own free will, and abject poverty is therefore almost non-existent in the area. Due to the rather even spread of the land ownership wage labour is relatively scarce in the Central Aceh coffee cultivation, except in the harvest period when seasonal labourers come to the district. With an average production of 500 kilograms of clean coffee per hectare, the total income generated by the coffee producers in Central Aceh was in the early 1980s estimated at some 40 million US dollar per annum. With the growth of its coffee sector, Central Aceh thus became increasingly integrated into the world economy. Income levels of the Central Acehnese coffee growers were from then on quite dependent on external factors (such as frost in Brazil) that influence the developments on the volatile global coffee market.

Based on their research of the conditions in the highlands of the district of Central Aceh in Indonesia’s Westernmost province, the team of IDAP planners identified the obsolete processing techniques and inadequate crop husbandry as major constraints for improving the quality of the locally grown Arabica coffee, and hence for fetching higher prices on the world market by the smallholder producers. The application of wet processing techniques and better cultivation practices, it was assumed, would improve the quality of the coffee, increase the productivity of the gardens and expand the options for marketing dramatically. To that effect a coffee development centre with research and extension facilities as well as a pilot ‘wet’ processing plant were planned in the village of Pondok Gajah. To improve the collection of coffee beans, a

58 Speculations that Central Aceh had to be rewarded for its political support to the GOLKAR party whereas other districts in Aceh were fierce PPP supporters, making independently minded Aceh in the 70’s and 80’s with Jakarta the only provinces with parliaments dominated by the opposition, could not be confirmed. The support of Central Aceh to ‘Jakarta’ can be attributed to the minority position of the local Gayo and second and third generation of Javanese migrants, with their distinct cultural and religious identities, within ethnic Aceh and their preference for continuation of the stability of the status quo. Interestingly this position continued in 1999 when Indonesia held for the first time since 1955 free elections and all Acehnese districts voted the opposition parties in power, except for Central Aceh.
programme to upgrade fifty three kilometres of feeder road in the coffee area to all weather roads was foreseen. The identification of these two projects (as well as two additional projects in adjoining district of North Aceh) was very much stimulated by the desire of the Dutch officials at the Ministry of Development Co-operation as well as the Acehnese authorities to do 'something concrete' as a reaction to the series of 'intangible' planning reports written under the IDAP project (Quarles van Ufford & Razoux Schulz, 1988, pp. 34-37). The legal and administrative basis for this new project was provided by the Provincial Area Development Planning Programme.

5.4.2 The administrative context: the Provincial Area Development Programme

In collaboration with the Ministry of Finance and BAPPENAS, the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs (department of regional development-BANGDA) introduced in 1976 the Provincial Area Development Programme (PDP) to strengthen the capacities of local government agencies. It put a special fund at the disposal of the provincial BAPPEDAs which were seen as the primary agencies with both the mandate and the (envisaged) capacity for co-ordinating sectoral programmes at the respective spatial levels. The responsibility for implementation of the programme rested with the Governor, and in practice with the BAPPEDA of the province in question. In 1977, USAID agreed to sponsor a number of these PDP projects. The initial programme was devised as an experiment for a period of ten years. The aims of the programme were twofold:

- Training and institution building by developing expertise in local and regional development planning at the provincial and district level. Government officials involved, especially the staff of BAPPEDAs, should obtain experience by giving them responsibilities and funds to plan and implement projects, i.e. learning by doing.

- Initiation of projects focusing on lower income groups in the rural areas, i.e. to increase the income of rural poor in the project areas, using the approach of integrated rural development.

In other words, the programme combined the idea of decentralisation of planning with concepts such as target communities and basic needs and did not remain restricted to very specific and limited tasks as prescribed under the INPRES programme (see: chapter 5.4.4 and Morfit (1986). According to Ichalsul and Nasikun (1988, p. 30):

"PDP was expected not only to be able to increase the ability of the regional governments to articulate regional needs, but also to be able to increase the ability of the entire regional development bureaucracy to develop a planning system from the bottom".

Hence, PDP was associated with bottom-up planning procedures.

The 'American' PDP approach focused on small pilot projects that, if successful, would be duplicated elsewhere. The majority of the projects were located at the sub-district and village levels. Using a combination of government statistics and surveys, the poorest districts within provinces were identified. Once these had been selected, determination of the poorest sub-districts followed. Within these sub-districts, the poorest villages were identified, after which poor families were selected (Weinstock, 1989, p. 2). The several thousand small projects included many sectors, including food crops, estate crops, small scale irrigation, livestock, fisheries and small industries. Usually, the crops were subsidised for the first year and if they continued, participants

59 Parts of sub-section 5.5.1 are based on an article that has earlier been published by van den Ham and van Nerssen (1990).
could borrow money in the successive years with support of a credit system (MacAndrews, Fisher and Sibero, 1982, p. 9). The BAPPEDA staff and other government officials were involved in the selection, design, implementation and evaluation of the projects. So everything was in their hands from the start. However, both long and short term expatriate consultants were assigned to each of the 8 'American' PDP provinces to provide training programmes in planning and management, and to assist in project development. The training contained a strong practical component by linking theory with experience gained in project implementation. As a result, at the level of institution building, the capacities of the BAPPEDAs to supervise projects at the local and regional levels and to take responsibility in managing their own project's budget were supposed to increase.

Regarding the upgrading of BAPPEDAs and other government institutions, PDP was considered successful. MacAndrews, Fisher and Sibero (1982, pp. 95-6), who stood at the basis of the American funded PDP programme were rather quick to conclude that already

"by the early 1980s it was clear that it had achieved a significant degree of success and was becoming adopted as a model for local area planning in Indonesia"\(^\text{60}\).

However, whether the innovative PDP approach would sustain once the special funds had stopped to flow was later on seriously questioned (Schiller, 1988, van Steenbergen, 1992-a, p. 39).

The administrative PDP framework provided the opportunity to provincial and district agencies, but in particular to BAPPEDA, to become involved in all stages of project development, without being impeded too much by national directives or targets\(^\text{61}\). This proved to be an attractive context for decentralised programmes and projects funded by other donors as well. One of these was the Central and North Aceh Development Project LTA-77, supported by the Netherlands government\(^\text{62}\).

Though working within the administrative PDP context, a major difference with the USAID approach was that the LTA-77 projects involved substantial sums of development funds, were rather complicated and had a longer time horizon. Thus LTA-77 aimed at decreasing the (supposedly high) administrative costs compared to the realised output and at contributing to a more cost-effective way of planning and implementation. Moreover, its projects were supposed to make a serious contribution to the achievement of the national development objective of poverty eradication and to invoke serious interest of the technical agencies in structural way\(^\text{63}\). When compared to the American conception of PDP one might say that, relatively speaking, more attention was paid to the 'product', particularly by officials at lower levels in the local administration who expected themselves to be assessed on the basis of 'tangible' out-

\(^{60}\) For the impact of PDP in terms of poverty alleviation, see Schiller (1988).

\(^{61}\) Honadle and VanSant (1985, p.15) state that "PDP focused on building the planning capacity of the host organizations by implementing a sectoral array of sub-projects and using that experience as a learning tool. Thus, a characteristic of this version of PDP is to reject the planning/implementation dichotomy and instead foster a learning-by-doing attitude toward rural development". Although this is correct and as such a laudable objective it doesn't mesh with the Indonesian administrative system which stipulates that BAPPEDA is a coordinating agency and not a spending department and as such created sometimes serious animosity among the sectoral agencies.

\(^{62}\) The Central Aceh Smallholders Coffee Development Project was one of the sub-projects of the Central and North Aceh Development Project (CANARD) LTA-77 which only in 1989 became an administratively separate project.

\(^{63}\) Morfit (in: MacAndrews, 1986, p. 73) observed that "funds from (the American/AvdH) PDP projects are small compared to the total development budget expenditure in each of the ten PDP provinces, and the much larger national development budget projects continue to preoccupy provincial technical agencies".

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puts. LTA-77 was simultaneously a pilot project and it was not. It was not considered merely a try-out to be multiplied if successful. Its accomplishments were a yardstick for measuring success in itself and to be treated as such. On the other hand, it had all the characteristics of a pilot-project as it served for the Indonesian counterpart organisation as a means to acquire the necessary experience to initiate similar type of interventions on their own. However, it is highly questionable whether, due to the considerable financial and human resources devoted to investments, organisation, management and technical assistance, these interventions were replicable at all without external technical and financial support. This applied also to the essential access to higher echelons in the government structure (see below) and to the freedom to tailor programmes to local needs under the conceptual PDP umbrella; practice shows that such principles frequently are (have to be) sacrificed to administrative convenience when projects are multiplied and mainstreamed within the bureaucratic system (cf. Ruttan, 1975, pp. 15-16).

The goals for which the PDP programme had been set up were important to the Acehnese BAPPEDA. Having the Dutch funded LTA-77 project functioning under the PDP structure offered the provincial BAPPEDA, a relatively new and still weak institution but with an ambitious top-level management, the opportunity to acquire hands-on experience in co-ordination (cf. Weiss, 1987, p. 50). Moreover, it would give this non-spending agency without any real political power, access to considerable amounts of project funding. That would allow it to retain and reward good BAPPEDA staff and, through channelling funds to technical departments, improve its standing in the administrative hierarchy and contribute to the very legitimacy of its position and that of the responsible civil servants themselves.

The adoption of the PDP format for LTA-77 facilitated a close relation between the project and the administration at various levels. At district level the Indonesian and expatriate project staff were linked as advisors to relevant Indonesian counterparts in the line-agencies who had the formal responsibility for the (sub)projects. At provincial level the team-leader was closely associated with the BAPPEDA Tk I officials. Jointly they had a close relationship with the national bureaucracy. In other words, the hierarchical structure at the Acehnese side was organisationally reflected at the Dutch side and at each level the expatriates shared the dilemma’s and challenges related to co-ordination and fine-tuning with their Indonesian counterparts at the relevant level. As the team-leader was associated with the provincial BAPPEDA and frequently in contact with the Jakarta circuit, he could provide relatively easy access to the highest decision-making circles. This link not only strengthened the position of the Dutch expatriate advisors in the regional technical agencies. It also improved the position of the (staff of the) participating technical agencies who could now increase their 'visibility' by a better access to their superiors at provincial and in some cases even at national level (Quarles van Ufford and Razoux Schultz, 1988, pp. 40-41).

In this way, the Dutch team-leader of LTA-77 not only played an important role in co-ordinating and supervising the co-operation between Dutch teams and their counterparts. Influenced by a previous learning experience in a complicated bi-lateral project in Burkina Fasso, he personally invited the chairman of BAPPEDA to sign a letter in which it was committed to the paper that LTA-77 was Aceh’s project and, hence, decision-making its discretion (it was not part of the Administrative Arrangement between the Indonesia and the Netherlands)\textsuperscript{64}. He also facilitated the co-ordination and co-operation between all the relevant Indonesian and Dutch stakeholders at the various levels of administrative, political and economic decision-making for local problems can only in a limited number of cases be solved locally; the nature of problems and

\textsuperscript{64} Personal communication/AvdH.
solutions often not only require a horizontal co-ordination but also a firm vertical relation. The projects implemented under the LTA-77 umbrella were used to give shape to this horizontal and vertical integration of problem solving and mobilising the existing potentials. Of course such a role can more easily be played in a relatively small administrative environment such as Aceh than in large bureaucracies like in West Java where personal relations are more easily submerged under prescriptions and procedures. Quarles van Ufford & Razoux Schultz (1988, p. 43) also notice that it is remarkable that the team-leader could take such a crucial role without antagonising his Indonesian counterparts. They attribute this to the fact that he, just like his team members working at lower administrative levels, right from the start of the project declined to assume any formal responsibility within the Indonesian context and consequently stated that he worked under the authority of the Indonesian project leader and in that respect referred to him as "my Acehnese superior" (see a.o.: letter to the Netherlands Embassy, 22-6-1987). Whatever action was to be undertaken within the Indonesian public administration, it was carried out by the BAPPEDA. The team-leader did continue to play his role of advisor and was respected for his technical expertise but above all for his passionate plea for the farmer community, although this did not always coincide with the interest of his Indonesian counterparts. Sub-ordination to the Indonesian counterpart’s authority was supposed to contribute to the sustainability of the initiatives. More fundamentally, however, this attitude was rooted in respect for the identities and responsibilities of the agencies and their staff, and for the sovereignty of Indonesia (letter of the LTA-77 team-leader to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14-1-1989). Therefore, a transfer of responsibilities and of power, whether or not related to a first step in a withdrawal strategy that dominates so many donor-recipient relations, has never been a central issue. Due to the scale of operations and the demonstrable link to a growing Gross Regional Domestic Product the project could very much command the attention of Acehnese politicians and bureaucrats and to a certain extent also of relevant circles in 'Jakarta'. With continuity more or less guaranteed and the responsibility firmly embedded in the Indonesian camp, the well functioning of the project, including that of the Dutch expatriate advisors, became also the self-interest of the Indonesian project managers. The expatriates did not have an immediate interest in (re)positioning themselves structurally in the hierarchy of the political/administrative system. Although they functioned as a 'linking pin' between various levels and domains, they were therefore not perceived as a functional threat by the Indonesian staff involved and could concentrate themselves on strengthening the institutional capacities at all levels, and improving the co-ordination of planning, implementation and decision-making in general. They were seen as part of the joint project, as was shown in the almost natural way of inviting the Dutch team-leader to take part in the consultations concerning the Indonesian budget allocation in Jakarta.

5.4.3 The first phase: 1984-1989

The general objective of the Smallholder Coffee Development sub-Project had been defined by the Indonesian and the Dutch sponsors as:

"...contributing towards the improvement of both the quantity and the quality of Arabica Coffee in the existing producing Area in Aceh Tengah" (Schedule of Operations, 1983, p.10).

However, the formulation of this 'coffee project' had been mainly a donor affair whereas the Acehnese authorities were merely informed of the intentions. Yet, when the Dutch donor finally gave the green light, the new team leader and the counterpart organisation BAPPEDA decided to take an unusual step: as the provincial government
and their agencies had hardly been more than spectators for the identification phase, they more or less dissociated themselves from the available reports. They started formulating the project 'from scratch', this time under the responsibility of the envisaged project holder BAPPEDA and with a high Acehnese participation. Their aim was to adjust the originally formulated plan to the local needs, potentials and constraints, to put the project in a regional perspective and address the issue of participation of the local farmers. They considered the organisational implications of the proposed set-up incl. the corresponding responsibilities and to increase the sense of local ownership of the planned Central and North Aceh Rural Development (CANARD) programme LTA-77 (Progress Report 1981-1984, pp. 4-5, Veenstra and van Steenbergen, 1986, pp. 31-33, 45-48). In this way the eventual shape of the project became the accomplishment of a small group of people. These local and expatriate development practitioners were, as it turned out, going to dominate decision-making at field level for more than a decade and to provide guidance and continuity for development of the project. The new sense of ownership of the local government was indicated by their effort and success to secure considerable and increasing annual contributions from the Indonesian budget to the project to cover local costs.

One of the core components of the LTA-77 coffee project was a central extension unit, focusing in principle on all coffee growers in the district. It aimed at selecting and introducing new varieties and at improving crop-husbandry. The envisaged central processing and milling unit, instrumental in increasing the added value of the coffee, was to cater for the farmers living nearby the location of the plant. The factory, which would later on become a para-statal and named Perusahaan Daerah Genap Mupakat (P.D. Genap Mupakat), had the status of a pilot project, as only a small portion of the coffee growers in the area would be able to benefit. One of the stated aims of the project was to serve as a reference in the planning and implementation of the final goal, which was to cover the whole area with the required processing- and milling plants, and to have the farmers involved in that process.

The project aimed at economic resource development in combination with a poverty focus (a minimum of 70% of the world market price for coffee to be paid to the farmers) by introducing (technical) innovations in farming and processing and offering new marketing opportunities to, supposedly, instrumentally rational farmers. Coffee of potentially high quality was ubiquitous in the area. However, compared to international standards, cultivation and processing techniques were quite deficient. In such a situation one could indeed hardly escape the conclusion that technical solutions could offer a way out in dissolving the constraints for increasing the productivity and improving the quality of the final product. Farmers would definitely recognise the new opportunities for increasing their incomes, it was assumed, and therefore the project called:

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65 In his Short Term Mission Report of February 1983, the conclusion of the discussions between the BAPPEDA and the future team-leader was formulated by the latter as follows: "It is observed that this project has not been formulated as yet, though a great number of studies have been written.... It is concluded that it is the right and duty of BAPPEDA to formulate what must be done and how. BAPPEDA can call in expatriate specialists to assist in the formulation". In his negotiation with the Dutch Ministry and prior to his appointment, the team leader conditioned his appointment to the granting of a "carte blanche" to carry out the project in an "Acehnese" way, whatever the implications. This was granted.

66 In addition to the coffee project, LTA-77 also had the responsibility to implement other projects identified by IDAP, notably on pump-lift irrigation and small industries in the coastal district of North Aceh.

67 Small in the sense of a small portion of the total number of coffee growing farmer households in Central Aceh, i.e. those living in the vicinity of the project site. No socio-economic or technical criteria were applied to selecting participating farmer households.

68 Although it remains curious that, at least to my knowledge, no serious attempt has been made to answer the question why Indonesian private entrepreneurs have not invested in improving the quality of processing to fetch higher prices on the world market, as their competitors in other Arabica growing countries did.
"for the most enlightened farmers to constitute the target group of the Processing- and Milling Units of the Project" (Schedule of Operations, 1983, p. 5).

Yet in spite of the technical approach of the project, the team leader did not hide that his ultimate aim was the economic and social emancipation of the farmers through control over and self-management of their productive resources:

"...the most important activity to be conducted in the Aceh Tengah coffee area is that of rural extension, aiming at assisting the farmers to set up and to learn how to run various kinds of farmers organisations, such as Kelompok Tani (farmers groups) [AvDH] and co-operative societies. In addition this programme should focus on saving and credit schemes, on self help projects and in general on all sorts of activities that can be expected to enhance community participation in the development of Aceh Tengah (......). However, "...vigilance in this evolution is a must. Rural extension is not just agronomy, though agronomy should be part of it.... Rural extension ...is to support any initiative deemed conducive towards the improvement of the standard of living in Aceh Tengah's coffee growing area and/or deemed inducing increased farmers' participation in the institutionalisation of their assets in production and marketing" (Progress report, Jan-June 1987, p.12). "It concerns a large production area, exclusively exploited by small-holders, whereas the marketing of the coffee is in the hands of a few powerful and rich people whose interests not always run parallel to that of the coffee farmers" (letter to the embassy, 22-6-1987, my translation).

In this respect, the project aimed at a participation of the target group in managing the plant. Again, all hopes were put on rational farmers:

"The idea is to establish during the first Project year a Farmer's Society, a kind of Pre-co-operative (which ultimately will become a Co-operative) which, through its representation on both the Project's Board of Directors and Executive Board, will be directly involved in the Direction and Management of the Project. The members of this Society will constitute the target group of this Processing- and Milling (and Marketing) Units of the Projects. A certain degree of open-mindedness, spirit of enterprise and the best possible experience of improved procedures and techniques are judged to be the required characteristics of the members of the Target Group, which should evolve from simple beneficiary to partner and, ultimately, to partial or total owner of the undertaking" (Schedule of Operations, 1983, p. 5).

In the formulation of the project and its first years no specific attention was paid to the diverse socio-political interests of the target group, the gender aspect (JOV, 1986, p. 14), or the considerable cultural diversity of the local population. In itself this is remarkable enough as a successful project would have serious consequences for the labour input of both men and women in various stages of the production cycle of coffee. Only halfway the project period research was initiated to obtain more information at household level about the various farming systems, trade mechanisms, co-operative development and the observation and appreciation of various farmers communities on project related matters (Farming and Dynamics of Coffee Cultivating Communities, 1989). More specifically, the participation of the farmers would focus on:

"The yearly negotiation of the agreement between the Project management and the Farmer's Society concerning the basic price for red coffee berries, quota, quality requirements, conditions, etc..."; and

"...the yearly study of the Project's balance as well of its organisational and technical performances and constraints by the Project's direction and Management together with the Farmers Society, on the basis of the Auditor Report and the Monitoring Report. At that
occasion, decisions will be made concerning the distribution of forthcoming profits, c.q. decisions to balance forthcoming losses, on the basis of exhaustive information concerning the entirely completed campaign. This will equally be the key moment to test the farmer's willingness and capability to acquire ownership" (Ibid., p. 17).

It was foreseen that the farmers, through their Society, would eventually have the opportunity to acquire partial or total ownership of the Central Processing and Central Milling Units,

"...in the degree of its capabilities and willingness and under the co-ordination of the Board of Directors" (Ibid., p.12).

Right from the start the expatriate and local extension staff of the LTA-77 project had been working on organising farmers in a pre-co-operative which would represent the interests of the coffee farmers vis-à-vis the project and other authorities concerned. Later-on, Entan Pase, was formally established as a single commodity co-operative focusing on protecting the interests of coffee growers at various levels. It got a seat in the board of commissioners of the P.D. Genap Mupakat. In 1987 the management of the P.D. Genap Mupakat entrusted the coffee berry supply entirely to the Entan Pase co-operative. The central position of the this co-operative within the project context was formally once more acknowledged when the Indonesian government decided to transfer 20% of the equity of the plant to the KUD Entan Pase members69. This to the outspoken frustration of the Dutch team leader who considered such a 'hand-out' to just a token group of farmers without a reciprocal, tangible investment or other obligation from their side a mere act of political patronage and counterproductive70. In his view it would ultimately undermine the willingness of farmers to invest in this or similar projects, continue the farmer's dependency on the government and not contribute to the development of an independent, resilient and healthy entrepreneurial class of farmers. In practice, this 'gift' to the farmers, represented by their co-operative, hardly increased their sense of belonging to the KUD Entan Pase or loyalty to the factory, if only because in Indonesia these co-operatives, Koperasi Unit Desa (=KUD), are merely creations of the government which operate under its stringent management directives71. They produce few returns to the members, are considered important vehicles for extending government control into the local economic sphere and play a very prominent role in corruption cases. As a result the KUD's enjoy little or no genuine popular support72.

To facilitate co-operation between farmers and project, the project staff trusted that the invisible hand of the price mechanism would do its beneficial work among all farmers, irrespective of the socio-economic or cultural context they were living in. In other words, the human factor was assumed to work in line with the goals that had

69 KUD is the Indonesian acronym of Koperasi Unit Desa - Cooperative Village Unit.
70 For the provincial government this was a rather cheap gesture as the assets of the P.D. Genap Mupakat had been provided under a loan agreement between the central government of Indonesia and the Netherlands.
71 In the early project documents farmers are often described as "loyal" or "disloyal", depending on their regular supply of good quality coffee to the project. However, a consultant pointed to the fact that the (lack of) supply has not much to do with loyalty or non-loyalty but is the result of the quality and nature of the relationship between buyer and supplier. Pricing is important, though not the only determining factor in creating adherence to the KUD and the P.D. Genap Mupakat (Farming and Dynamics in Coffee Cultivating Communities, 1989, p. 35). The scant feeling of ownership of the KUD Entan Pase on the part of the farmers might of course have been changed if the P.D. Genap Mupakat would ever have paid dividend to its shareholders.
72 "...nowhere in the villages a sense of belonging towards the KUD Entan Pase (the co-operative linked to the P.D. Genap Mupakat(AvdH)) could be observed or registered, except, of course among the Inner circle of the KUD staff (Farming and Dynamics of Coffee Cultivating Communities, 1989, p. 34).
been specified in the model by the project staff themselves, i.e. profit maximisation and for example not risk aversion, input minimisation or debt servicing (cf. Roling, 1997, p. 249-250). The farmers were to spend extra time in more selective harvesting and were expected to offer only high quality coffee to the plant for wet processing. However, this extra time investment would be compensated with less work in pulping the coffee themselves at their premises and a considerably higher price that would be linked to current prices on the world market. Through a labour intensive process of collective pulping, fermenting, soaking, skin- and sun-drying, milling, grading and continuous sorting, the coffee produced by the factory would acquire a very high quality. The extra premium which it would fetch on the world market was to be passed on to the participating farmers. The farmers have always acknowledged that the PD. Genap Mupakat had contributed to the stabilisation of prices and to transparency of price setting. Yet, the new factory was for them just one more sales channel which had to be taken into account in addition to traditional traders who had entered into various forms of long-standing patron-client relationships. These were partly based on extending seasonal and emergency credits. Although these debt relationships create a framework within which strong demands can be made by the money lenders, they are generally considered mutually beneficial; however, changing them incurred a political effort that probably was materially too costly. Even though some (moral) force is involved and traders have relatively large profit margins, the peasants gain from reliable marketing - and other services provided by the traders. In this palette of diverse social and economic assets, the LTA-77 project was just one more option for the farmers to be included in their frame of reference. And it was indeed a welcome additional marketing channel because even if the farmers decided not to sell to the PD. Genap Mupakat, they would benefit from the higher prices that were the result of the fierce competition between the factory and the traders who had up to then always set the prices themselves.73

The attention paid by the Indonesian-Dutch project to upgrading the coffee production in the area was as such not unique. With World Bank money a programme with accompanying infrastructure had been set up for promoting the rehabilitation and rejuvenation of the coffee gardens through the line agency for estate crops (Dinas Perkebunan)74. Through the ministry for Co-operatives, a separate factory for the 'wet' processing of Arabica coffee had been established nearby as well75. Yet, at the start of the LTA-77 programme this 'duplication' was apparently not considered a problem. Needs as well as potentials of the area were believed to be so huge that there would be enough room for many separate initiatives. Access to foreign funding and expertise as well as the opportunity for the ministry of Home Affairs (RAPPEDA) to become involved in implementation matters as well will without any doubt have played an important role in this decision as well. However, in the LTA-77 schedule of operations (1983, pp. 8-10) the intention for co-operation and mutual support between all the parties active in upgrading the coffee sector is clearly outlined. At one time it was even proposed to include the responsible managers of the Estate Crops agency and its factory in the board of directors of the

73 To capture part of the local coffee market, the project at one moment started to extend credits through the KUD. Due to mismanagement and corruption of the staff of the co-operative, and the fact that the money was considered by the farmers as "aid-money" and perceived as one more "hand-out" which but for formal reasons would be claimed back, the scheme bitterly failed.
74 Though the Agency for Estate Crops did not live up to the expectations, as a later LTA-77 Evaluation Mission commented (1991, p.3).
75 This factory did not function for a long time, mainly due to corruption and mismanagement of the board and the related KUD as well as an administrative structure that obstructed adequate responses to the market. Nevertheless it remains strange that in spite (or because of?) the big input of the Indonesian counterpart in the formulation of the LTA-77 project parallel structures have been set up by (rivaling?) Indonesian agencies.
LTA-77 project (it never happened though). The activities of the LTA-77 extension unit were to work in support of the Estate Crop agency’s programme on appropriate cultivating techniques incl. better pruning, applying fertilisers, insecticides and fungicides and selectively harvesting and better processing of the coffee berries.

The implementation of the Project’s policies was first of all the responsibility of BAPPEDA at provincial level, be it in conjunction with all other relevant sectoral authorities. Implementing a programme is quite unusual for a planning agency, let alone implementing a programme that was “to be developed as a commercial enterprise” (Schedops, 1983, p. 17), although, as we have seen, it was not uncommon at all for the Indonesian government to be directly involved in commercial enterprises (see subsection 5.2). At district level the Estate Crops Agency acted as the project leader under the guidance of the provincial BAPPEDA.

In practice the intentions with respect to horizontal co-ordination and co-operation could never fully be realised. Quite soon after the onset of the project its staff started to complain about the lack of interest shown by the local Estate Crops Agency and their extension centres. The subordination of the project to the provincial BAPPEDA and its allegiance to the Ministry of Home Affairs did not stimulate any active evolution from Estate Crops’ agency staff as well. The decentralisation of decision-making powers of the project’s flag-ship, the milling and processing unit, to a semi-autonomous P.D. Genap Mupakat, i.e. out of the orbit of any local line agency, did not increase their willingness to co-operate either. In 1987 one could hardly speak of any working relationship at all. Moral co-ownership of the project had definitely disappeared. Effectively, there evolved a parallel structure in agricultural extension that later on disseminated even different agro-technical messages. Yet, in the LTA-77 documents the emphasis on the need for close co-operation at field level is stressed time and again. Even when finally in 1992 the project’s research activities were incorporated in the line under the technical and institutional guidance of the Ministry of Agriculture’s department for Estate Crops’ formal Indonesian coffee research station on Java (which had been worked towards by the expatriate team leader consistently since the beginning of the project), the relations with the Central Aceh’s Estate Crops agency continued to be sour. This lack of co-operation more and more turned into friction and was to a considerable extent due to weak leadership on the part of the local Estate Crops Agency which at no time displayed any vision on the opportunities that an alliance between the project and the agency would possibly offer for the Acehnese coffee sector in general. Of course there was a risk involved as well: the Estate Crops Agency had a fixed position within the bureaucracy with all advantages involved, whereas a potential alliance with the LTA-77 project (whose expatriate staff had little to lose and much to win) also involved uncertainties in terms of standing in the eyes of the farmer community, increased transparency and accountability etc. The animosity between project and agency can also to a considerable part be attributed to an incompatibility of local personalities in the top of both organisations who competed for public acknowledgement of their political and societal leadership. Finally, by including all stakeholders in the discussion about problems, potentials as well as the utilisation of available resources, the transparency did increase but only by limiting the latent scope for misusing inputs for personal gain. The project became (part of) the arena where these battles were fought.

5.4.4 The second phase 1989-1992

The central government guidelines for REPELITA V (1989-1994) emphasised the need to improve co-operation and co-ordination not only at national level but also with and among government agencies at provincial and district level. Ultimately this should lead to the realisation of a:
"regional autonomy that is visible, dynamic and responsible" (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara, 1989, p. 83).

It is also indicated that:

"In the framework of the stimulation of regional development the role and participation of the population, including village organisations shall be promoted immediately, as should be the case with the role of regional governments in the development process. For this purpose it is necessary to strengthen the capacity of the entire government apparatus at both regional levels, especially in the framework of the policy to give shape to regional autonomy that is more visible and responsible. Simultaneously both levels of regional government should increase their capacity to make development expenditures among others by acquiring funds in a realistic and orderly fashion and by opening up new sources of government that do not compete with the national interest" (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara, 1989, pp. 62-63).

Yet, laudable as these objectives and well fitting in the thinking of development theory at that time might have been (see sub-section 2.2), in the Indonesian context it could seriously be questioned whether, possibly with the exception of a few 'enlightened' bureaucrats, there was enough political will to change the conditions on the part of the same decision-makers who had until then favoured a very centralised and top-down approach. The same applied to the above issue of (horizontal) co-ordination and cooperation. In practice, both in Indonesia as elsewhere, bureaucrats neither think all alike nor share the same interests. Each agency, at national, provincial or district level, is a distinct political entity in itself, complete with political actors who hold their own ideologies, goals, preferences, allies, and/or enemies. Agencies compete with one another, and their prizes often take the form of budgetary allocations, enlarged jurisdictions, and increased prestige. Of course this bureaucratic behaviour all occurs within the framework of 'official' policy as described above, and corresponding rules and procedures that are adhered to in different degrees. Were the Indonesian authorities serious in tackling the issue of breaking away from the complicated and rigid sectoral straitjackets, or were they just adhering to the latest fashions in development thinking and placating the donors in their quest for foreign assistance? Whereas one may doubt the sincerity of the then Indonesian power brokers advocating the involvement of local people and institutions in shaping development at regional level while simultaneously keeping them effectively out of influencing politics in a democratic manner, the establishment of BAPPEDAs showed the seriousness of the effort to improve the co-ordination of development initiatives. Changing the structure (cf. sub-sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4), however, does not automatically change the behaviour of the political actors in the agencies.

The LTA-77 project, as has been shown above, was a foreign-aided attempt to improve both the existing horizontal and the vertical co-ordination within the government administration. In the first phase the project had very much been directed by the BAPPEDA project manager at provincial level who had a direct link to the implementing sectoral agencies in the district. The BAPPEDA at district level only received relevant information and was involved in co-ordination agreed-upon activities. The strategic emphasis of this second phase, however, was on decentralisation of responsibilities. The BAPPEDA project manager at provincial level was to deal only with the project in general policy matters whereas the BAPPEDA TK II sub-project manager would, on behalf of his superior, the Bupati, assume the responsibility for supervising and co-ordinating the operational activities directed by the local sectoral agencies involved. At each level of activity consultants were made available to advise the responsible agencies. The general objectives of the project during this phase, derived from the PDP mandate, were to strengthen the management capacity of the government at district level and to bring about self-sustained growth...
of income of communities of poor farmers. More specifically the project was to continue promoting the exports of Gayo Mountain Coffee, to construct feeder roads, to increase the productivity of Arabica coffee farming by small holders, to diversify agricultural production of coffee farmers, and to create and stimulate mechanisms of co-ordination and cooperation among government organisations in Central Aceh. In doing so it should take into account the existing competencies of the government at various levels, including those of the Kecamatan and desa, and the potentials of private organisations. By then the coffee processing PD Genap Mupakat had acquired its own legal and budgetary status within the Indonesian administration. Further Netherlands assistance to it was limited to advisory services to the appointed director on matters pertaining to the (technical) management of the factory as well as promotion and marketing.

From the first phase it was clear that co-ordination and co-operation with the sectoral agencies (facilitating being the prime objective of the PDP programme) could not optimally be achieved when the project continued to operate from the premises of the factory, some 25 kilometres from the administrative capital, Takengon. It therefore had been decided to place the heart of the project in Takengon. To that end a Project Management Office (PMO) was established on the premises of the Bupati, which also housed BAPPEDA Tk II. The PMO was and did not to become a duplicate of BAPPEDA but rather a (physical) focal point for bringing together staff of various (sectoral) background. The programme was to be given shape by an intersectoral task force made up of representatives of the main agencies involved in rural development (BAPPEDA, Village Development, Estate Crops, Agriculture and Co-operatives) and which would work from the PMO. The members of the intersectoral task-force were to lend their technical expertise to the LTA-77 programme but also to facilitate the inclusion of the project’s results in the line agency’s agenda and budget’s, and vice versa. Thus they served two masters. To prevent those masters from pulling their staff in opposite directions, a co-ordinating committee was established that had as its main task to resolve the differences in priorities between the needs of the project on the one hand and the line agencies on the other. To further the objective of integrating project approaches in the line, it was decided that the expatriate advisor on extension issues and the members of the intersectoral task-force from the agencies of Estate Crops and Agriculture would have their operational basis in the office of the local Agency for Agriculture.

Whereas the first phase of the project (1983-1989) had mainly focused on the farmer households living in the vicinity of the coffee factory, the second phase was to concentrate on the whole district of Central Aceh. In that framework many activities have been undertaken by the project staff in the second phase. However, here we will limit our focus to two illustrative cases in which new technologies were tried out in a combination with an approach ‘from below’: the establishment of village coffee processing facilities, and the nursery development programme.

5.4.5 Establishing village processing facilities

In 1983/84 a number of transmigrants were moved from the ‘over-populated’ islands of Java and Madura to start a new life in Jagung Jeget, an area in Central Aceh’s remote

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76 For the danger of parallel structures, see Honadle and VanSant (1985, pp. 13-16). Yet, the PMO under LTA-77 was not intended to bypass the bureaucracy, but, on the contrary, to facilitate the integration and harmonisation of various bureaucratic (sectoral) inputs. The idea for establishing a new office was also borne out of the sheer lack of space in BAPPEDA which would have been the most logical place to work from. The chairman of BAPPEDA, the local project manager of LTA-77, also worked out of the new PMO building. In due time the PMO was not only the seat of the LTA-77 project but became for many bureaucrats and farmers alike also synonymous with bottom-up approaches as implemented by the project.

77 This sub-section is, unless otherwise indicated, compiled from the Final Report of the Rural Development Advisor/Team leader (1992, pp. 12-16, 24-25) and various Progress Reports 1990-1992.
Linge sub-district. Basically, the government had opened up a earthen foot path to a far away, isolated valley and allocated to each family a very Spartan, small wooden house, a parcel of 1 hectare of cleared jungle, some tools and seeds. For a limited period of time they received government supplied allowances of rice, cooking oil and other essentials.

At the start the transmigrant families lived in a severe predicament. They had been taken out of their socio-cultural context and tropical low-land climate and moved to an isolated valley at 1400 metres above sea level surrounded by dense jungle inhabited by bears, tigers and elephants. In their new environment they lacked access to basic social services and opportunities to earn a cash income to procure basic amenities. Many transmigrants could not stomach these harsh conditions and returned homesick to Java. Those who continued to fight for a living in Jagung Jeget, however, managed to gradually improve their living conditions. They planted coffee, grew vegetables and became, step by step, functionally integrated in the local economy, be it that living standards in Jagung Jeget continued to be far below the average in Central Aceh.

Soon after the start of the second phase of the LTA-77 project in 1989 the expatriate staff was contacted by inhabitants from Jagung Jeget. They requested assistance in marketing their coffee. Due to its fairly remote location and inadequate infrastructure traders visited the transmigration area infrequently. The resulting limited competition had an adverse impact on the local coffee prices. These sometimes only reached 50% of what was paid for the same quality in the district capital of Takengon. Moreover, these traders usually did not pay in cash. As a result Jagung Jeget was virtually a barter economy where the local people were indebted to traders and vice versa. They had very limited options to spend their meagre income on issues which they considered essential. After some discussion it was decided that in order to obtain better terms in transactions through challenging the traditional power relationships that regulated those transactions, the project would serve as a bridge between the Jagung Jeget population and the Perusahaan Daerah Genap Mupakat (P.D. Genap Mupakat) and provide facilities to transport the coffee to its factory in Pondok Gajah. The population shared the burden of the rental of the truck by paying a small fee per kilo coffee transported. In preparation of buying the coffee, an extension programme focusing on quality control was implemented and local staff trained. Representatives of the villages were invited to visit the premises of the P.D. Genap Mupakat to convince them of the high quality standards that had to be met by them as coffee sellers. The management of the local procurement, payment and transport of coffee was, conform the decision of the villagers meeting, placed in the hands of the village authorities who simultaneously ran the formal co-operative (KUD).

Although a beneficial impact on pricing of the coffee was realised, at least on the days that the project facilitated the purchase and transport to Pondok Gajah, the management of the intervention was seriously flawed. Tampering with the quality of the coffee, embezzlement of advance payments and surcharging the farmers for the intermediary role played by the management quickly led to dissatisfaction on both the supply and reception side of the chain. Thereupon the procurement was suspended.

In the meantime the support by the project staff to the farmers in the transmigration area had not been limited to the purchase of coffee. In addition, self-help schemes focusing on water supply and small infrastructure development had started. Moreover, the extension unit had initiated an intensive programme to inform the Javanese new-

78 Actually the transmigration settlement comprised (at that time) three villages, i.e. Jagung Jeget, Gegarang and Batu Lintang. However, to avoid unnecessary name dropping we will from hereon refer to the whole transmigration settlement as Jagung Jeget.

comers, who in contrast to the traditional inhabitants of Central Aceh had no experience in coffee growing whatsoever but were very eager to learn, about the 'ins' and 'outs' of coffee cultivation practices. Upon arrival, the farmers had started to establish coffee gardens with whatever seedlings they could lay their hands on. Therefore the project provided the most recent newcomers with some seedlings and started a training programme to introduce all of them to practical knowledge on seed selection, and proper building and managing of nurseries with high yielding, leaf rust resistant varieties.

Some time after the coffee buying had been suspended, a small group of relatively young people who were the driving forces behind the farmer group that had been involved in the Village Nursery Development Programme, took the initiative to establish an 'Usaha Bersama' (joint effort- UB, legally, a pre-co-operative). Their objective was to purchase consumption articles in bulk, sell them at affordable prices to the villagers, and to become engaged in the marketing of agricultural produce. Deliberately they did not establish a formal KUD for that would force them to place themselves under the tutelage of the Ministry of Co-operatives which they considered to be a guarantee for failure. The board of the UB was trained in book keeping and administration by project staff and together a new programme for the daily purchase of coffee was formulated. Due to this intervention coffee prices in the transmigration villages went up 25-35%. From October 1991 until April 1992 for more than 150,000,000 Rupiah (+/-75,000 US$) worth of coffee was bought.

Already in 1990, when the project started to be active in the transmigration area, the first of a series of lengthy discussions were held with the local population about the future development of the area, in particular after the LTA-77 project would be terminated in 1992. Their anticipating conclusion was that they had little to expect from the government. They anticipated a return to the conditions prior to the intervention, i.e. back to a kind of barter economy with limited competition and low prices for their produce. However, a fixed relationship with the P.D. Genap Mupakat for marketing of their coffee would provide a way out, they argued. But the P.D. Genap Mupakat would never be able to pay the high transport costs involved. Moreover, it would be very inefficient to transport bulky coffee berries if parchment (about 20% of the weight of berries) could be transported as well. And last but not least, the P.D. Genap Mupakat's management expected to reach the limits of its production capacity soon anyway. Processing of Jagung Jeget berries at Pondok Gajah could therefore at best only offer a temporary solution. Hence, establishing a processing unit (PPKA- an acronym of Pabrik Prosessing Kopi Arabika- Arabica Coffee Processing Factory) in the transmigration area itself would be the second-best option, was the general opinion. But if a processing unit would be established by an outside party, the conditions would basically remain the same, i.e. dependency of the farmer community on one trader/entrepreneur. On the suggestion of the project staff the farmer population started discussing a more pro-active approach towards establishing their own processing facility and finally decided to strive such an enterprise and claim a 51% stake in the PPKA's ownership. They also indicated their preference for individual ownership of shares, instead of through a co-operative. On these conditions it was agreed that the farmer households of Jagung Jeget would make voluntary savings on a special bank account, jointly administered by the UB and LTA-77. The project would match all savings at the moment of realisation of the PPKA. Savings were made in cash and kind (e.g. goats to be sold in the market). In the construction phase labour was supposed to be supplied and the wages paid into the bank account.

Based on a design of a simple, semi-permanent construction, a pre-feasibility- and, later on, a feasibility study of a PPKA was written in co-operation with a local consultant. Starting point was the agreement that processing the berries and drying the parchment would be done at the location whereas milling and sorting the parchment would be done in Pondok Gajah. Exports were to be arranged for by and under the
name of the P.D. Genap Mupakat. The installed capacity would be 200 tons of berries at its peak after three years. The price of the parchment sold to the P.D. Genap Mupakat would be linked to the purchasing price of the paid berries plus a fixed amount per kilo to cover the production costs and yield a profit. Ownership was initially set 51% of the shares for the farmers, 20% for the P.D. Genap Mupakat and 29% for third parties. The total amount of investment capital required was estimated at some Rp. 200,000,000.\textsuperscript{80}

After some time it was clear that due to the 'free rider' attitude of many farmers and the resulting slow pace of (voluntary) savings, building a PPKA would not be possible. It became clear that although the local people might be aware of the advantages of owning their own coffee processing facility is one thing, but sharing the burden of the realisation of such an enterprise is quite another. At that time it was the board of the UB which proposed to make a case of the inertia. Internally it was agreed that if people would not come up with a satisfactory solution, purchasing coffee on behalf of the P.D. Genap Mupakat by the UB Arga Mulia with assistance from the PMO would again be suspended, at least temporarily. It was thought that such a measure would have sufficient impact as at that moment no other traders were prepared to buy coffee in the Jagung Jeget area, and certainly not to pay cash.

At a dramatic meeting in the village hall the accomplishments in terms of savings were (graphically) presented and the consequences of the current pace of saving indicated (PPKA ready for construction only after more than ten years). The meeting broke up in disarray but with the agreement that the village would convene again to discuss the follow-up, this time without the PMO staff attending. After a few days the conclusion of this second meeting was announced: from each kilo of coffee sold to the P.D. Genap Mupakat a small fee would be deducted, administered and paid into a bank account in the name of the seller. Due to the substantial quantity of coffee delivered by the UB to the P.D. Genap Mupakat during the 1991-1992 season the savings started to accumulate at quite a high pace. In was expected that at the end of the season at least 30% of the required savings would have been made.

The ownership of the PPKA was supposed to be shared by three parties: the farmers, the P.D. Genap Mupakat and the private sector. Whereas it was not the objective of the P.D. Genap Mupakat as such to participate in the ownership of new processing plants, it was thought plausible to take part in the PPKA to be able to exert a positive influence on the quality of the management practices, in particular where it concerned quality control, and to serve as a bridge between the farmers and the private sector. The latter party, mainly local coffee traders who until that time had performed as middle men for exporters in Medan and Jakarta and who might be interested in the PPKA to obtain experience in producing high quality Arabica coffee, to gain direct access to the international export market and to buy the lower grades. Some interesting contacts had been made. Construction of the processing plant was supposed to start in August/September 1992.

The establishments of a medium scale plant for the wet processing of high quality Arabica coffee with the majority of the shares to be purchased by small farmers was a challenging but ambitious concept. Challenging because it would present about 500-600 farmer households the opportunity to become co-owner of processing facilities of their main crop, to increase their income by sharing the profits and to become less dependent on outside parties. Ambitious because it was highly questionable whether poor and quite vulnerable farmers would be willing to risk an initial investment of about 50 million Rupiah in an enterprise that might enhance their livelihood strategy but which’ profitability only could be proven in the (distant) future. Moreover, nobody

\textsuperscript{80} about US $ 100,000 at the then exchange rate.
knew whether they would be able to defend themselves against economic and bureaucratic forces whose interests would be threatened by independent, pro-active farmer communities.

The process that took place in Jagung Jeget was a classic example of risk avoiding behaviour of poor people. The farmer households were primarily interested in solving their present problems (low, unstable prices, indebtedness) whereas making sacrifices for a better future were only reluctantly made. But when their present conditions were jeopardised, they became interested in investing in their future as was proven by their own decision to impose a Rp. 25 saving levy on each kilo of coffee. The same action had been proposed before by project staff but had at that time vehemently been rejected by the farmers as unnecessary, undesirable and even exceeding the abilities of the people. It proves also that such a development process at the basis has its own dynamics which do not always fit with the rationality that underlies project documents and policies (cf. Chambers, 1983, pp. 158/159). Farmer households will decide at the moment they think action is required as seen from their perspective.

Precondition for a successful application of a bottom up approach is that the environment is conducive for such a process. In this case the involvement of the project, personified by the expatriate advisor, in organising the process and more specifically in arranging the administrative and financial issues was one of the positive elements (see also chapter 3). During the preceding years the project had proven to be a reliable partner. The expatriate advisor was presumed not to have private (financial) interests in the whole undertaking and therefore thought to be a guarantee for the proper settlement of the farmer investments. Moreover, due to his links with the authorities potential strains in the relations with other parties (traders, Department of Cooperatives) would easily be solved. And last but not least, the project offered a (matching) financial premium on their investments.

Yet, it is thought that a bottom-up approach as the above cannot be applied without the devotion of highly committed and motivated local project staff. Numerous training and extension sessions, private as well as group discussions have been held, at day time but mostly in the evenings and at night. In short, a primary requirement of this kind of community-based practice is allocating huge amounts of time to 'hang-out' with the community and participate in the process when it evolves (Sandercock, 1998, p. 176-77). In the Jagung Jeget case this was all organised by a remarkable indigenous consultant working for a local Acehnese NGO. Relatively well paid, but strongly motivated, he lived for the better part of the time in the villages and co-operated with local male and female key persons. It is seriously doubted whether such a labour intensive but successful approach could be achieved by more or less occasional visits by good willing, but relatively underpaid government staff.

5.4.6 The nursery development programme

For many years coffee farmers in Central Aceh had been growing traditional Arabica varieties which had been introduced during the colonial times. The production system could be characterised as a 'low input-low output' system. But of late, the coffee had been increasingly affected by leaf rust (Hemileia Vastatrix). Moreover, the widely used Lamtoro shade trees had been under attack of jumping lice. As a result the coffee productivity, already relatively low, threatened to decrease even further.

With the above in mind, LTA-77's agro-research section started to collect coffee varieties from all over the world in order to ultimately select the most suitable one for further development and distribution in Central Aceh. High hopes had been placed on the Catimor variety, a crossing of Caturra and Hybrida de Timor. Some of the collected Catimor varieties were very promising: they were of a dwarf type, had a high productivity and a considerable resistance to leaf rust. Yet, as these Catimor lines had
only recently been introduced to Central Aceh, according to scientific rules (taken over and laid down in administrative regulations) they could not be released to the farmers as long as their origin and development could not be traced for seven 'generations'.

While the researchers had been experimenting and studying the development of the Catimor lines, the local Acehnese farmers embarked on their own course. At the end of the 1970's a farmer in the village of Jaluk discovered a coffee tree in his garden that differed strikingly from the traditional varieties. Although its origins are not known, it most probably had sprung from a batch of seed that had been brought into Central Aceh from outside. The tree had all the characteristics of a good Catimor: a remarkably high productivity, vigorous development and good taste. The news of this 'wonder tree' spread fast. Its owner started to sell seed and seedlings at high prices. Thus, it became the mother tree for thousands of other trees now commonly known as kopi Jaluk, after the place origin. Soon it was no exception anymore that farmers cleared part of their land to plant this Jaluk coffee. Seedlings found their way even to faraway places on Java and Sulawesi. These plants would without any doubt become the mother trees for many more coffee trees. The trend of conversion of traditional varieties into Jaluk looked irreversible.

Although the introduction of Jaluk coffee showed great promises for the productivity of the coffee gardens, the picture was not completely positive. Close monitoring of the development of Jaluk coffee revealed that in quite a number of cases the favourable characteristics tended to disappear: sometimes these 'off-types' trees were not any longer of the dwarf type anymore (with negative impact on planting density and the ease of picking the coffee berries) and quite a number had bronze coloured top leaves instead of green ones, indicating that there was ample spontaneous cross-breeding. But most disturbing was the observation that a considerable number of these segregated Jaluk trees had already been affected by coffee leave rust. In due time this might threaten, as was the case with the traditional varieties, the complete coffee stand with extinction as it had done with the coffee in West Java and Sri Lanka in the nineteenth century.

At that moment, the responsible technical authorities and the LTA-77 project staff faced the dilemma whether or not to intervene in this spontaneous rejuvenation process. Farmers in the whole district were planting coffee which in their eyes was superior to the traditional varieties but which simultaneously could develop into a serious threat to their own economic existence. They were not aware of this inherent danger of indiscriminately planting Jaluk coffee. Yet, even if the administration would have been willing to intervene in the then uncontrolled spread of the Jaluk coffee, it would have been very difficult to formulate a suitable policy. For no viable alternative could be offered to the farmers who would face the dilemma between quick, high returns and potential danger in the more distant future. Quite a fierce debate developed between the local and expatriate 'scientists' on the one hand, and the local and expatriate extension-workers on the other. The former group insisted, with the official regulations in their hand, on a ban of Jaluk, or, if that was not possible, at least a formal non-involvement of the LTA-77 research section and the Estate Crops Agency in spreading Jaluk coffee. The extension section, however, claimed that if one had to wait until the seventh generation of Catimor of the LTA-77 nurseries would be available and the seed finally certified, the farmers would already have planted tens of thousands Jaluk seedlings in an uncontrolled way and thus have contributed to the spread of plant material that was not resistant to coffee leave rust.

In the first phase of the project, when it operated from a fenced compound where the trials had been laid out in isolation from the farmers, the dispute might well have been solved in the favour of the researchers. They had not only the technical guidelines on their side, but also the bureaucracy as well foreign back-stoppers. For them the dilemma was foremost a technical and procedural problem which had to be solved according to the textbook and sanctioned by those higher in the hierarchy. However,
during the second phase, another part of the project staff spent most of its time with the farmers and analysed the situation from their perspective. They perceived the problem as a problem of 'here' and 'now' which did not have to fit in grand research designs but should be answered in the range of the farmers present day options. But within the Indonesian context, in which authority is more based on ranking in the hierarchy than on arguments, it is very unlikely that without expatriates anybody would ever have dared to openly object to the 'formalist' policies adhered to by the scientists. Yet, in due time the extension staff convinced both the local researchers, be it grudgingly, expatriate back-stoppers and the authorities of the formal Indonesian Coffee Research Institute that farmers in search of planting material will always opt for the product that in their eyes has the highest quality and is available to them at a reasonable cost, irrespective of the opinion of the authorities. Therefore, instead of banning it, the local market should on the contrary be glutted with high yielding, 'certified' and leaf rust resistant Jaluk seedlings. With cheap, high quality seedlings widely available, it was assumed, buying and planting potentially infected ones would become unappealing to farmers. Such a critical attitude on the part of the farmers with respect to their planting material, however, would only be attained if they were also aware of the inherent of the dangers of planting unscreened Jaluk. An intensive awareness campaign was therefore an integral part of the strategy.

To achieve the above objectives a central nursery was built which in the end produced hundreds of thousands seedlings. In addition to spreading the extension message through radio programmes, leaflets, slide shows and video tapes, more than 4,500 people (man and women) were trained to construct some 70 small nurseries (10-25,000 seedlings each) and produce under project guidance more than a million seedlings at village level. This training-by-doing process served simultaneously to increase their farming knowledge, make quality seedlings available and provide a forum for further development activities. Seed, procured from selected mother-trees in Jaluk, was sown in seedbeds with covers to protect them from intensive sun shine; after a few weeks the seedlings were planted over in polybags. To test their susceptibility to the feared coffee disease the seedlings were sprayed by the farmers with a solution containing leave rust spores. The affected seedlings were destroyed and the remaining 'healthy' ones distributed among the members of the farmer groups. The construction and management of the nurseries was laid in the hands of new farmer groups. All members, on average 25 men and 25 women, received training in group dynamics, group-management and modest project planning from the PMO staff and technical support from the extension staff and, finally, also the field workers of the Estate Crop Agency. The proposal to establish nurseries was very well received by the farmers and many villages applied for support. The nurseries were very simple makeshift structures. However, the mere concept of selecting seed and caring for the cultivation of quality seedlings was so far more or less unknown to farmers in Central Aceh as clearly had been indicated by the baseline surveys conducted in the area at the start of the second phase of the project. How well the concern about the quality of the seedlings caught on was proven by the fact that very soon thriving commercial nurseries were established by some entrepreneurs. To quality conscious farmers planting material had obtained a value where it used to have none. And six years after the

81 And later replaced by high quality, seventh generation Catimor coffee seed cultivated at the project's research station.
82 Quite a number of farmers did not plant the seedlings from traditional varieties which they received for free from government agencies because they considered them sub-standard. In the end also the Estate Crop agency started to use Catimor varieties, although occasionally they continued to use the argument of the 'non-scientific approach' of LTA-77 to discredit the project staff.
LTA-77 project had to be terminated, everywhere in the district the characteristic nursery structures filled the backyards of the farmers producing themselves the material for a continuous rejuvenation process.

5.4.7 The After Care phase

In 1992 the then administrative arrangement between the Indonesian and the Netherlands government in relation to the Central Aceh Smallholder Coffee Development Project PPW/LTA-77 was to come to an end. However, it was jointly decided that a limited 18 months extension of the project would be implemented during which a number of loose-ends of the second phase would be finalised and a further incorporation of the tested approaches in agricultural extension and integrated rural development facilitated. Long term technical support was limited to the Aceh Coffee Research Unit which had after years of negotiations stopped being a project and become a structural part of the research facilities of the Department of Agriculture\(^3\).

Based on the lessons learned, new management and co-ordination mechanisms had been proposed by the Indonesian partners to facilitate the identification of programme areas, target communities, intersectoral responsibilities and lead agencies. In the end, it was expected that the LTA-77 project would have resulted in an internationally recognised exporter of high quality Arabica coffee: the P.D. Genap Mupakat which operated under full Indonesian responsibility from 1986, actor oriented, integrated approaches towards rural development implemented without Dutch assistance as per mid 1993, and a competent Arabica research unit which had already become a line agency in 1992 and would continue to receive technical advice form an expatriate consultant until 1995. However, in March 1992, the Indonesian authorities concluded that it could not any longer accept the Dutch conditionalities on the provision of development assistance and decided to severe development co-operation ties with the Netherlands. Dozens of development projects were to be stopped within a month, and their expatriate staff had to leave the country (van den Ham, 1993). Among the projects closed down was the LTA-77 project which had barely started its after care phase.

5.4.8 A personal comment\(^4\)

When commencing my assignment in Central Aceh in 1989, I was warned by several persons not to be too optimistic about meeting the objectives outlined in the project document. Central Aceh lacked the required human resources, according to my informants. They pointed to the fact that many young people left the area in search of education and career and never returned to their peripheral, rural roots. And what stayed behind or did come back was, almost as a matter of nature, second class.

The human resources factor was a serious problem in Central Aceh which should not be underestimated. But on the other hand, the then lack of employment opportunities elsewhere forced many young people back to their parental house after finishing their studies in Banda Aceh or Medan. Practice proved that with the appropriate supervision they formed a pool of relatively well educated, innovative and dedicated development workers. And also the older generation, who usually had not finished their tertiary education, performed quite well in the project. These mid-level project staff had often been employed for ten or fifteen years by the local government in a

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\(^{4}\) This sub-section was taken from the Final Report that I wrote as Rural Development Advisor/Teamleader (Culemborg, 1992, pp. 24-25).
working climate that deprived them of every form of responsibility and thus killed every sense of initiative. In the project we have tried to arrange a decent payment for them and to create an open atmosphere. All staff has been given the opportunity to participate in the planning and to assume the responsibility for implementation of part of the programme. As a result, all of them found in due time a niche in the project, be it that office hours or working procedures were not always strictly followed.

It has to be acknowledged that the above approach takes time and cannot be applied if strict deadlines are to be met. But on the other hand, hiring outside expertise, whether expatriate or local, for all jobs is no solution in the long run either. Transfer of the responsibility of (part of) the activities to the counterpart staff, with all potential trouble, should therefore be pursued as soon as possible during the project. It will be a tremendous moral incentive for the staff, will optimise the use of their knowledge and expertise and free time of the expatriate consultant for other tasks. As such it will contribute to the sustainability of the project after the intervention has been terminated. For a successful application of such an approach a number of preconditions have to be met. First of all their should be a clear willingness to invest in human resource development, to transfer responsibilities to those who are most directly involved, i.e. the target group and the local as well as the expatriate development agents. Moreover, there should be a long term perspective on bilateral co-operation - seeking an appropriate role for each of the staff and a transfer of responsibilities takes a lot of time- and a certain flexibility towards the working approach and the interpretation of the objectives.

The PDP programme has as its main objectives to increase the capabilities of the local government to implement more or less complicated development projects and simultaneously contribute to poverty alleviation. As the main entry point for the local government the Regional Development Planning Board had been selected. Theoretically BAPPEDA is indeed the most appropriate agency to come to terms with regional development for its main tasks were the integration and co-ordination of (sectoral) development activities. However, practice learned that the (national) sectoral agencies often pass over the regional authorities, in casu BAPPEDA. This had to do with budget allocations, BAPPEDA’s position in the administrative structure and its implementation capabilities. Whereas the first two points were outside the competency of bi-lateral development co-operation, the third provided an opportunity to contribute to an improved management of regional development. The history of the PPWLTA-77 project in the Province of the Special Territory of Aceh has shown that the development activities co-ordinated by BAPPEDA but implemented by the sectoral agencies under the responsibility of the local authorities can thrive. I have no doubt that, in addition to skills and knowledge on the part of the Dutch advisors as well as their counterparts, the long standing relationship with a number of key persons in the Acehnese administration was one of the keys to the success of the project. Throughout the years strong and stable ties had developed between the Netherlands’ consultants and their Acehnese counterparts. They were based on mutual acquaintance, respect, trust and common goals. These are pre-conditions for creative and effective joint actions under constantly changing conditions. Only time and willingness on both sides can create them.

5.4.9 Looking back eight years after: reflection on action in Aceh

Basically, the identification of the LTA-77 project was the result of a rather orthodox, technocratic and top-down planning exercise firmly rooted in neo-positivist thinking and the modernisation paradigm (cf. Hulme, 1995). This, to a certain extent, resounded in the normative underpinnings of the first phase, albeit it was by no means a homogeneous positioning. From a strategic point of view, the approach implemented
during the first phase of the project (1983-1989), however, seemed to have been grounded in a blend of positions that have been borrowed from various stations along axis 2 of fig. 4.1 and which can best be characterised as 'inspired eclecticism'. Although the main propositions feature in various project documents, it is not completely clear whether they were shared to the same extent at all stages by all relevant (formal) stakeholders, although the influential Dutch team leader definitely subscribed to them and had a firm hand in defining the mixture.

First of all, there is the emphasis on technical innovations at individual farmer as well as at collective level, and the focus on the functionally 'rational' farmers supposedly reacting to price incentives. Moreover, it was based on the assumption that communities have common interests, common felt needs that could be solved collectively; it was just a matter of reaching out to rural people to get their support for the offered solution. These assumptions are well in line with a belief in science-based enlightenment which is so characteristic of modernisation thinking. The firm belief in the decisiveness of these factors seems to explain the lack of interest in the wider socio-cultural and economic context as a relevant constituting element in the design of the intervention.

Furthermore, there is the prominence of the concepts of redistribution (although there were differing opinions between the Indonesian and the Dutch stakeholders about the questions whether the assets should be redistributed among the beneficiaries or that they should be given the opportunity to acquire them) and participation. Within the LTA-77 context, these seem of particular relevance in explaining the normative disposition undergirding the whole project, that is to enhance the socio-economic emancipation (which automatically implies the freedom to pursue own goals and thus fosters pluralism) of the local population by making them (literally) co-owners of the development interventions that are supposed to support their economic well-being. On the other hand, participatory approaches seem to have hardly been applied in an operational sense, i.e. to increase the effectiveness of the interventions. When it came to the design and the functioning of the organisation the wider social and cultural meaning of the whole operation to the different participants seemed to be considered less relevant.

Finally there is the conscious (political) sub-ordination of the project to the local (administrative) structure and focus on process approaches, organisational learning and good governance (see sub-section 4.3.1).

The 'why' of each of these 'points of departure' can be argued separately. Their blend within the then Indonesian context, the 'LTA-77 flavour' one might say, seemed to be a combination of value based and practical considerations, of substantive, procedural and politico-institutional theories-in-use (see fig. 4.1). The modernisation component of the approach was based on rather fixed assumptions on the need for technical innovations to further development and monetary rewards as the main objective of the farmer households. In this particular context these hypotheses had hardly been tested at farmer household level, let alone that it emerged independently from interaction with the target group. In retrospect, this lack of participation of the target group in identification and formulation of the development initiatives casts a strange light on the concurrent intention to include the farmers in the governance of the production facilities and to give them later on even the opportunity to acquire full ownership. Even so, the wish to include the farmers' ideas in the management of the project was simultaneously compromised by its subordination to the Indonesian political-bureaucratic system which prescribed the channelling of all relations between the factory and the farmers through politically sanctioned but malfunctioning co-operatives. One could also seriously wonder whether the government, given its prominent role in the development process and the very little active involvement of both the corporate sector and the civil society (see sub-section 5.2), was at all seriously interested...
in including farmers in decision-making processes, making itself superfluous and transfer assets (and a source of income and political patronage) to the corporate and/or popular sector. Yet, some (enlightened) individuals within the (Acehnese and national) administration might of course quite well have favoured such emancipatory options.

Based on the substantive results of the first phase (the factory got off the ground, exports had started, research had been initiated, physical infrastructure been prepared and the name of the project had firmly been put on the local socio-economic and political map), the second phase (1989-1992) started of what had from the onset been considered to become a long term initiative. The administrative responsibilities on the Indonesian side had been decentralised to district level but the substantive issues at stake basically remained identical. The strategies advocated, though, made the main difference. New expatriate experts joined the project. They had gained inspiration and experience elsewhere and were influenced by the literature of the 1970/80s (e.g. Scott (1976), Friedmann (1973, 1981, 1984), Rondinelli (1983), Chambers (1974, 1983), Uphoff and Esman (1973, 1974), Uphoff et al. (1979), and Korten (1980, 1984). Some of them did not subscribe to the assumption of farmers as 'rational deliberators' who based themselves on 'universal' and therefore predictable considerations when determining their behaviour, as had more or less been the case during the first project period. Instead of taking modernisation thinking as a point of departure they, supported by the team leader, favoured and implemented a more responsive, flexible, action-based, capacity building style of development. They tried to limit the difference between the function of researcher and the development practitioner/administrator. Instead they viewed the farmers as 'adaptive responders' who probe the continually changing reality of the external world and act according to the options available that meet their material, social and spiritual needs (cf. Röling, 1997, p. 254). Farmers in Central Aceh, it was claimed, should not to be considered as an essentially homogeneous undifferentiated 'mass' of coffee smallholders. Rather, they were socially, culturally and politically diverse and spatially sufficiently dispersed/versive. The majority of the population in the district is Gayo, an ethnically distinct people that value highly those who can speak their language of tradition and can sing the most refined poetry. Yet, the Gayo were and still are a minority in the regional ethnic, cultural and linguistic Acehnese context. Over the past centuries they have, for better or for worse, adopted new institutions and accommodated to new uniform values of the hierarchical, and territorial political system imposed by the colonial administration and, later, by the Indonesian state. Fed by a deeply rooted distrust of the fiercely Islamic Acehnese majority, most Gayo (and Javanese for that matter) aligned themselves since the 'New Order' came to power with the Central Governments ruling party, whereas 'Aceh', until the mid 1980's, consistently returned Islamic party majorities. The coffee trade, of eminent importance to the district, was mainly in the hands of Acehnese and Chinese. The Gayo found a sustained livelihood in growing and collecting coffee but showed little active interest in expanding their socio-economic horizon. Within that context Gayo sought their identity in their distinctive historical consciousness and particular cultural response to outside pressures. (Snouck Hurgronje, 1903; Bowen, 1984, 1988, 1991). The Javanese were a double minority in Gayo dominated Central Aceh. These descendants of the Javanese contract labourers that in the 1920s had been brought to Sumatra, had over the years dispersed themselves throughout the district and made a stable living from coffee growing and petty trade and hardly made any specific claims in the realm of culture, politics or economics. The recent transmigrants from Java, however, had come in the 1970s to Aceh to flee poverty. Living in an alien environment, but in culturally homogeneous village communities, they started with a clean slate and were eager to engage themselves in new ventures in order to build a prosperous future for their families. Thus, the old established farmer communities in 'traditional' Central Aceh had different needs and potentials and required a different
approach than the newcomers in the transmigration area of Jagung Jeget. This diversity in terms of needs, potentials and aspirations had to be recognised, acknowledged and respected. It required to allow for a number of diverse, localised, timely and flexible responses to the various demands and possibilities that were constantly changing themselves as well. Central to this value-based, actor oriented approach was an attempt to bridge the gap between the 'processed knowledge' of the development practitioners and the knowledge of the people which rests mainly on personal experience. Simultaneously it was acknowledged that the understanding one can acquire as (expatriate) development practitioner is at best partial (cf. Friedmann, 1973, pp. 171-193). It implied a shift from an emphasis on introduction of new (agricultural) techniques to development of existing human resources, from instruction to intensive dialogue with farmer households to increase their ability to analyse their own problems, make the most relevant decisions and act and respond accordingly. This planning involved primarily critical listening and how, through open and profound discourse, to "shape the attention of the people concerned" (Sandercock, 1998, p. 175). In terms of improved access to various 'assets', consecutive technical training and support, information, contacts and, where needed, financial inputs had to be negotiated to facilitate and follow up this development process. Within the LTA-77 project it became clear that opening up the debate and subsequently drawing on human capabilities and ideas is more important for developmental progress than either technology or capital investment, although those are often needed as well. Consequently, the project started slowly to move away from focusing on the local government as the main vehicle for accelerating development (as I had still assumed in the Aceh/IDAP and West Java LTA-47 projects) towards promoting the farmer communities as the movers of their own development path, as was the case with the small coffee processing factory, the nursery development programme, the saving and credit groups etc. Thus, the government, in cooperation with local NGO's and in dialogue with the corporate sector, shifted into a facilitating role.

Farmers and local government officials performed well above the level most people, including themselves, thought possible. When the strained political relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands forced the project to cease in early 1992, only a small portion of the required savings for establishing their own coffee processing facility had been collected in Jagung Jeget, and not a single spade of earth replaced. Yet, six years later a wholly farmer owned, modest factory for the wet processing of Arabica coffee had been completed without any extra foreign assistance. To the surprise of many involved, the farmer community had overcome the disappointment of the withdrawal of the foreign support, (re)analysed their new reality, lined out a strategy and surmounted a number of constraints to finally achieve their goal. Once activated by an external intervention by exponents of the state and the civil society, the corporate and political clout of a considerable stratum of small producers in Jagung Jeget, spearheaded by a small group of outward-looking, entrepreneurial young personalities, had increased sufficiently to be able to protect and manage their social and economic interests themselves and transform the 'shaped attention' into action. They had been able to build institutions to improve their collective bargaining position vis-à-vis other actors in both the power fields of the state and the corporate sector (see sub-section 1.4). Energised by a new generation of young local leaders who were more oriented

85 For a similar experience in the same period, see: Norman Uphoff and his Cornell colleagues in Gal Oya in Sri Lanka (1992).
86 Simultaneously the same group of young farmers had been instrumental in establishing a private secondary high school and were negotiating with the government about the provision of various public services. When visiting the site a few years later, this small band had become firmly entrenched in formal village administration as well.
toward public-serving than self-serving outcomes (although they would benefit themselves considerably as well!), the people concerned carved out a new role for themselves as entrepreneurs that would appropriate part of the added value of the produce. Long after the initial interaction between the farmer community and the project staff they had finally been able to solve a structural problem. A portfolio of interventions had developed through negotiation processes. Situations of shared learning had resulted in relatively consensual approaches towards the future (cf. Röling, 1997, p. 251). The same process happened with the production of high quality seedlings. In this case access to knowledge had induced some entrepreneurial farmers to take the step to become active in the commercial marketing of high yielding varieties and sustain their business also seven years after the project had stopped. Thus, interventions shifted from the domain of the state to the private domain; farmers transformed from beneficiaries who all but received, into claim-making actors who produced and purchased on equal footing.

The observation that the key to local development lies with the beneficiaries as actors themselves is not new but it is important to highlight the different role it implies for professional (local and expatriate) development administrators. It gives the latter the prime function to engage the various stakeholders in the debate, to give them the opportunity to break away from their traditional, constructed ‘cocoon’ (see sub-section 2.0.2), to spot potential ‘emphatic’ leadership and to facilitate a process of jointly (re) interpreting reality, of linking that new reality to goals and translating them into effective (support) policies and activities based on shared norms. In the LTA-77 project the expatriate advisors, most visibly in the person of the team-leader, had become the gateway to new sources of political, administrative and commercial (market) power that were previously unreachable. (Partly) due to the project ‘Jakarta’ started to recognise Central Aceh as a potentially important source of foreign currency, became information on price developments on the international market widely available at local level where it was hitherto limited to (limited number of) traders, started the international coffee sector to show interest in the area etc. In other words, the link between the micro and the macro had been established. Through engaging themselves in a relationship with the project, the various actors (including the local bureaucrats) not only gained access to new forms of natural, human and, occasionally, physical capital, but simultaneously expanded their social capital base by establishing new relationships in the domains of the state and the (international) corporate sector (cf. Bebbington, 1999, p. 2022-23, 2035). In the case of the transmigration site of Jagung Jeget the farmers were able to appropriate that increased mixture of capital to which they had gained access and exploited it skillfully (up to the national level) after the expatriate advisors had left. Their capabilities had clearly been enhanced in a for them potentially crucial area.

Such a view on the local population playing the leading part in local development with the government role limited primarily to that of negotiator/mediator, facilitator and supporter does usually not go hand in hand with a top-down, repressive political and administrative system which, on the contrary, tries to limit organised popular participation in decision-making to protect itself. Yet, there is simultaneously the need for each administration, also for autocratic ones like the Suharto regime in Indonesia, to legitimise itself in the eyes of its residents and the world community by enhancing stability and prosperity. However, achieving development in an efficient and sustainable way requires on its part again an active participation of the population. It is this paradox of needing to limit popular participation to safeguard the survival of the system in the short run with the simultaneous need to engage the population more actively in processes to achieve sustainable development in the long run, that provides space for new initiatives and approaches in the field of local development. However, for local administrators it is often extremely difficult to exploit this room for manoeuvre.
Either they lack the required knowledge or experience to start-up these participatory processes focusing on specific target communities, or miss the political clout to contravene conventional approaches, oppose vested interests and/or try to avoid open conflicts\textsuperscript{87}. Here expatriate experts that are external to the system can play a crucial role in inducing change. Without inalienable rights and on temporary assignments, expatriates are, in close collaboration with local counterparts, per definition well suited to explore the limits of the system. The same applies to civil society actors such as the Non-Governmental Organisations that usually have the mandate and the flexibility to probe alternative approaches without being constrained by restrictive procedural arrangements or the need to respect the status quo. Yet, without acting in a well established and recognised administrative framework, these voice-inclined local and expatriate development professionals run the risk to become ineffective whistle blowers acting outside the political reality as well (see chapter 3). It was precisely the firm strategic and administrative entrenchment of the LTA-77 project in the PDP programme, which could rely on broad support at all levels of the Indonesian administration, that provided the required legitimacy to the project and compelled the local stakeholders to take the initiatives of the expatriates seriously. Moreover, transferring power and responsibilities to mid- and lower level staff is not very common in the hierarchic Indonesian bureaucracy. To do so in a project which is merely an appendix to the project holder organisation would not be taken very seriously for obvious reasons. Yet, in case of a project that was placed in the line, as LTA-77 did, exemplary functioning such as in the devolution of responsibilities, is potentially powerful, certainly if it gets the opportunity to show its merits in the course of time\textsuperscript{88}. However, within a bureaucracy that is not used to deal with spread responsibilities and participatory approaches, project staff often seeks the support of firm policy guidance as a protection against what might seem irresponsible local initiatives (see also: Montgomery in Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983, pp. 104-107). In the case of the LTA-77 project, this guidance was provided by the expatriate advisors who derived their authority to a large extent from their personal experiences elsewhere, the PDP project context and their relations with bureaucrats at all levels. In the case of the nursery programme, it is for example very unlikely that, due to the concurrent administrative and social culture, without the explicit backing of the expatriate agricultural extension advisor even one local extension worker or farmer group would have dared to advocate against the formalistic adherence to scientific regulations and bureaucratic procedures. But it is equally questionable whether the expatriate advisors would have had a strong platform as well if he would not have been able to fall back on his position within the project that in its turn derived its power base from the conscious sub-ordination of the project to the local administration within the legalised format of the PDP programme. Thus it made Indonesian administrators at various levels equally responsible for its concerns and subsequent actions.

Due to its relatively high public profile the LTA-77 project was an interesting instrument for local politicians to further their political ambitions, for bureaucrats to supplement their experience and incomes and for the provincial administration to consider the project a money machine and beef up the meagre regional development

\textsuperscript{87} Although Acehnese (incl. Gayo and Acehnese Javanese) certainly are not as conflict avoiding as Javanese (see von Magnis-Suseno, 1985), differences of opinion of a business nature are not likely to be discussed openly, certainly not if it concerns a dispute with superiors.

\textsuperscript{88} Moreover, staff that has experienced the advantages of certain approaches will often try to continue to work in that way. Seven years after the severance of the project, I visited Central Aceh quite unexpectedly. When visiting one of the project villages, I met two of my former colleagues who, in different capacities, had found a way to continue the co-ordination between their agencies and work towards achievement of the erstwhile goals.
budgets. Yet, the expatriate advisors were in general instrumental in resisting these pressures from outside. Due to their good links to other parts of the bureaucracy and to the Dutch funding authorities but also to their affiliation to a well accepted and legitimate organisational framework they were quite well protected against retaliation of the rebuffed, greedy bureaucrats although in practice it sometimes resulted in less than perfect working relations. In other words, the consequent submission of the project and its staff to the local structures provided the space for advocacy ('Voice') on alternative options at strategic ('how') and operational ('what' and 'where') level. Thus the project was able to contribute to the accomplishment of one of the main (normative) development objectives, i.e. social equity, that, within the Indonesian context, was at that time mainly a token objective and not consequently pursued by the authorities.

However, excluding organisational bypass mechanisms and consciously subordinating the development project to the local (political/administrative) system with its own procedures and its specific mores was not without drawbacks as well. First of all there is always the immanent danger of co-optation and becoming a pawn in the arena of local power struggles. It also implied that decision-making with respect to the contents and ultimately also to the progress made in achieving the goals of the project - to which the Dutch consultant and his team had committed themselves - were highly subject to external factors. As the positioning of the project under the administrative umbrella of the planning agency (which was not supposed to be involved in implementation) may seriously be questioned, it is not surprising that other participating Indonesian agencies, each with its own organisational (and sometimes personal) interests, sometimes took quite antagonistic positions in the project arena. This not only required a considerable flexibility and self-restraint (and on the other hand an 'objective and critical' frankness) of the expatriate consultant but also of the agencies that commissioned the project, i.e. the Dutch and to a certain extent of the Indonesian government. And whereas enough money should be available to implement the envisaged activities, it should not lead to pre-planned programmes in pursuit of short-term results but instead facilitate a flexible, sustained capacity-building style of development initiative. In terms of the PDP objectives, these should not only be measured by goods and services delivered. Attention should also be focused on building the capacities of the responsible institutions to deliver these goods and services in ways that are responsive to local needs and build the local problem-solving capacity on which sustained development depends (Korten, 1986, p. 177; Fowler, 1997).

Moreover, a sub-ordination to the local administrative structure, procedures and culture can contribute significantly to the administrative sustainability (if such a project has to stay 'within' the administration anyway). Yet, it may simultaneously hamper the technical or economic sustainability of the programme and the quality of public services delivered as well. More efficient (or less inefficient) and effective ways may exist to achieve the stated emancipatory goals. Although designing and implementing a base-line survey for the second phase of the LTA-77 project definitely gave a boost to the self confidence of local development administrators, facilitated a common understanding of the challenges faced by the farmer population and provided the basis for the action programme, it was, due to the lack of experience of the group, also very labour intensive and had a (negative) impact on the quality of the end results too. In another case, the coffee factory was forced to apply each year for a budget and to transfer the proceeds from the coffee trade annually to the provincial coffers. The allocation of funds to the factory was therefore dependent on the very slow and cumbersome Indonesian bureaucratic procedures concerning the annual budget cycle. This posed a

89 In fact, in the early nineties, the then chairman of the BAPPEDA used the project as one of the main assets in his successful bid for the post of governor.
serious constraint to the adequate management of a (semi-) commercial enterprise that had to operate in a volatile market where opportunities have to be seized and obligations fulfilled both in the short and in the long run. The inclusion of the P.D. Genap Mupakat as a para-statal in the local bureaucracy also implied that it preferably had to be staffed by government (BAPPEDA) administrators who did not (necessarily) have the required abilities to run a (semi-) commercial enterprise with a 'development' objective. And even if they had wanted to employ people from outside the civil service, they would not have been able to offer market-conform salaries to the right candidates. Other examples of non-responsiveness to the market include the long time it took to formally appoint persons to crucial posts and the insistence of the Indonesian counterpart to channel the relations with the farmers through an officially recognised cooperative (KUD). Yet, there was wide contextual and experiential knowledge of those in the front-line of action, -project staff as well as the communities involved-, to the issue that these co-operatives were inefficient and, quite often, corrupt organisations that could not rely on support of its (token) members. Most distressing, however, was that in any of these cases there was hardly any learning through experience and adapting to the prevailing conditions.

There remains also the serious question whether the government, common as it might have been in Indonesia (see: 5.2), after all was technically and economically speaking the best party to take the lead in a (semi-) commercial enterprise as the P.D. Genap Mupakat. The ease with which (Acehnese) bureaucrats assumed the role of entrepreneur in an internationally operating business basically rested on a blend of superiority feelings and (historical) disdain for commerce, practical knowledge and first hand experience. As the self-proclaimed custodians of the people's will, the administrators could enforce developments by implementing the canonised rules whereas entrepreneurs always have to bow, bargain and compromise. As many bureaucrats consider administering the country a far more complex issue than running a business, they often regard themselves implicitly good businessmen. Moreover, many bureaucrats directly involved in economic activities regarded themselves as the protectors of the poor against entrepreneurs who (tacitly) were depicted as exploiters of the marginalised people. An extra complicating factor was the normative point of view, springing from the strong religio-cultural identity in Aceh, that it should be an ethnic Acehnese that should manage one of the flagships of the province. Yet, most Acehnese with the required business acumen (if available at all) would never consider settling down in remote Gayo dominated Central Aceh at all, and certainly not on the basis of a civil servant remuneration. As a result, trusted Acehnese bureaucrats who needed exposure but had hardly any rapport with the local Gayo and Javanese com-

90 When it came to problems as described above, the position of the team-leader was clear, though: "...The absence of tangible progress in these matters has seriously hampered the functioning of the project and its staff during the reporting period. It must be underlined once again, that the factory will definitely enter into a crisis situation at one time in the near future if these matters cannot be settled... The irony of the situation is that Aceh Tengah's potential in terms of Coffee development is (thought to be) such, that even the economic set-back of the above described situation is not relevant in the long run. This potential is (thought to be) such, that it can be afforded to let things drag on until a real crisis occurs. But that is the kind of reasoning, which only takes economic factors into consideration. But there is also such realities as the work motivation of the Project staff and labourers and the relationship with the farmers. A crisis situation would put tremendous stress upon these persons. Hence such situation should be avoided, if possible. But this would call for appropriate and effective action. The hope is expressed that such action will now be forthcoming without further delays (Progress Report, July-December 1986, p.4)."

91 For the relation between commerce and politics in Southeast-Asia in a historical perspective, see: Wang Gungwu (1999).

92 This strained relation with commerce and entrepreneurs had to a certain extent also an ethnic component as most (bigger) business activities were in the hands of the Chinese minority. However, the contempt displayed contrasts sharply with the booming joint commercial activities that many high level indigenous bureaucrats and Chinese entrepreneurs are involved in private life.
munity, usually from the hosting provincial BAPPEDA, have been appointed by the board in management positions. They had hardly any commercial experience and hence fully relied on traditional bureaucratic behaviour and text-book knowledge. Such a claim on a function that essentially belongs to the domain of the corporate sector and its appropriation by (in this case) an in-experienced and incompetent state and the dominant ethnic group is not uncommon. However, it is deeply rooted in normative dispositions which, in spite of all good intentions, cannot be solved by initiatives of expatriate advisors at a strategic or operational level\(^\text{93}\).

When reflecting upon our research questions as formulated in 1.7.1, we can, in the case of the Central Aceh Smallholders Coffee Development Project LTA-77, conclude that the propagated and implemented strategies were very much rooted in previous, practical project experiences of a number of (expatriate) key-figures. Although geared towards functioning in the day-to-day reality of the project, these strategies were clearly grafted onto distinctive blends of normative dispositions and (academic) knowledge bases. Due to the strong personal element in the formulation of strategies, changes in the staffing of the project team resulted over the years in remarkably different approaches and styles of operation. Thus, from more or less neo-positivist, modernist at the start of the project the approach developed into a more phenomenological, actor oriented direction which offered space to different institutional-cultural perspectives and perceptions of reality, and accommodated various socio-economic interests.

Although the (constant) underlying empowerment motive of the project, focusing on widening the access of the project beneficiaries to new ‘assets’, could be called radical within the wider context, the project approach was not dogmatic in its argumentation but rather pragmatic in selecting the options available for furthering the objectives. The mere fact that the project did not encounter serious, sustained resistance from vested political and/or economic Indonesian interests at a higher level, is most probably caused by the ‘limited’ scope of the project. As its nature was mainly operational, and its spatial scope local, the project had not the formal strategic objective to adapt the overall system (although it strived for the position of a role model in the development process). Thus, although propagating (applying the social rhetorics then in-use in the local administrative-political domain) redistribution of assets it did not threaten general normative dispositions and interests of the (national) powerbrokers but at most the stakes of a limited number of local bureaucrats and traders. Within that ‘harmless’ setting the project was sufficiently backed-up by an appropriate administrative environment and actively supported by local and national bureaucrats.

The project started completely within the government realm and continued to function within it. Although there certainly was attention for the corporate sector, it was mainly taken into consideration in its role of customer, not as independent actor in the development process. Where organised civil society came into picture, it was in the first instance in an instrumental way, such as the government related co-operatives which acted as a vehicle for transfer of assets under the guidance and supervision of the relevant sectoral agency or the NGOs that could accomplish certain tasks that could not easily be performed by the government. Only in the last years, independent, organised citizen groups started to play an important role in the project. However, the project did not involve civil society in the development process as a result of a well-defined and thought-out strategy based on (new) academic insights, changing power relations and related potential roles for actors from various domains. Rather, civil society came into the picture after government related institutions had time and again proven their incompetence in the field of trade and industry and the (local) cor-

\(^{93}\) The good intentions were a.o. clearly expressed in a letter of the team leader to the Embassy dd. 22-6-1987.
porate sector was considered not to serve the interests of the local farmer households, at least not when it came to empowering them. The mere fact that these deviating positions and views in terms of strategies and actor groups could be taken, was greatly facilitated by the foreign-funded character of the projects and the deployment of expatriate staff. On the one hand was the project largely integrated in the local administrative system and benefitted from being 'inside'. However, on the other hand did the lack of institutional interest of its expatriate staff facilitate an independent, critical voice-like position that is difficult to be taken by local staff who have limited freedom in their behaviour due to cultural and social restrictions and more mundane interests related to income security and career.
Chapter 6:
Some Conclusions on Planning and Management of Local Area Development at the Start of the New Millennium

6.1 Looking back

Over the years different approaches with regard to socio-spatial development planning and management have been advocated and implemented. This study intends to shed some light upon the processes that influence at field level the dynamic change in the aims and practices of local area development planning and management of the resulting policies within international development assistance projects. More specifically, we have reflected upon the way a hypothetical interplay of personal dispositions, professional knowledge bases and functional considerations impact upon the practical propositions for poverty alleviation in the normative, strategic and operational domains and the room for manoeuvre that is offered by the (changing) power relations between the state, the corporate sector and civil society.

In the case of the foreign-aided West Java Regional Development Planning Project LTA-47 (sub-sections 5.3.1-17), both the personal dispositions of the expatriate consultants as well as their accumulated professional knowledge bases suggested decentralisation, popular participation and redistribution in the strategic domain ("how?") as important ingredients for achieving appropriate and sustainable development as well as, more specifically, the normative ("what for and for whom?") national development objective of social equity. Yet, it should have been clear from the onset that to seriously contribute from a regional planning perspective to changes in normative positioning and related policies and governance practices the poverty issue should be structurally addressed and that this entailed consequences that would not be acceptable to the then ruling elite for reasons of political, bureaucratic and economic interests. As a tacit compromise the 'project' settled for including as much popular participation in the strategic ("how") and operational domain ("what, where") as possible. Of course the potential for such a change was as well limited by the political space available and by the existing capacities and culture of the local administration.

From the political side there was very little room for the local people to organise themselves in independent associations to defend and further their socio-economic interests. The development process was dominated by a bureaucracy that manifested itself as the leading actor but that was, qualitatively, hardly prepared for that self-proclaimed role. The military considered itself the guardian of stability and simultaneously a legitimate player in the societal and economic development process. Next to these two dominant players one would come across a rather weak corporate sector and an insubstantial civil society. In this context radical perspectives or complex approaches were not possible, not even at the level of proposals or ideas. As a result, and based on previous personal experiences in Aceh and an analysis of both the capacities of the local/regional administration as well as the (political) prospects for popular participation, 'the consultants' opted for a modified Strategic Development Framework approach as a 'second best' exemplary training-cum-planning method focusing on selective spatial, social and sectoral development. In other words, without any specific assignment from and structural access to and influence on the top decision-makers.

1 By van den Ham.
the expatriate planning practitioner active at regional/local level (and this would, ceteris paribus, probably also apply to local planning experts) makes little chance of feeding his/her outward looking, professional nor his/her inward looking, personal perspectives into the normative domain, as long as this deviates from the officially sanctioned standpoint. At the strategic and operational level, however, there seems to be more room to feed a specific outlook into the practical design of development objectives (if only in the absence of their local 'translations'), this in spite of the 'limitations' put up by choices made at normative level. The case of the Central and North Aceh Regional Development project shows clearly that during a long project period with the same persons in charge on the part of the local bureaucracy, different expatriate consultants could propagate (and implement) different approaches that were not only grounded in different previous experiences but even more in a different portrayal of the position and role of the population in development processes.

Both projects basically subscribed to the vision of the state as the foremost actor in the development process. Although in the West Java project an important role was assigned to the corporate sector, the latter was mainly expected to react to investments of the state. This applied to civil society as well. In sum, it was the state, and in a depoliticised society like Indonesia more specifically the bureaucracy, which, quite arbitrarily and without much transparency, defined the development agenda instead of adapting its interventions to the needs and potentials of other actors. In the case of the Central and North Aceh Rural Development Project the state did not limit its task to guaranteeing the farmers access to the necessary (human, social, natural or produced) capital but even assumed through a para-statal the task of organising the production of coffee as well as marketing of the produce. Under the assumption that it was an experiment in fair socio-economic development policy the consultants defended and supported the heavy handed state involvement. For the local bureaucrats the coffee factory and related programmes was an opportunity to increase their standing in the hierarchy, a tool for patronage and a potential source of government income. Only in the last phase of the project there was some acknowledgement of the legitimate and potentially productive role of the non-state sectors in sustainable economic development by stimulating the involvement of the population and local entrepreneurs in the development and ownership of the small-scale coffee production units, seed nurseries etc. The dominant role of the state carved out by the bureaucrats is explainable by the various levels of self-interest. It is believed, however, that the support for the state-led development propagated by the consultants had very much to do with the then dominant development paradigm amongst (western) practitioners. It assigned an pivotal role to the state as the defender of the interests of the people (in contrast to the corporate sector which was assumed to focus only on self interest and to contribute to exploitation of the people) and hardly provided room for investing public resources in private sector development, irrespective of its potential contribution to achievement of the overall development objectives. This line of thinking was strengthened by the theories mostly in-use at that time and that did hardly consider any role for the corporate sector in structural poverty alleviation. As a consequence, most expatriate development practitioners had, if at all, only a very limited practical experience with and attention for the corporate sector. This combined well with the fact that the above projects were part of a larger bi-lateral programme of international co-operation that, next to its focus on poverty alleviation, centred on strengthening the (local) government itself and thus for reasons of both ideology and self interest (see also chapter 3) provided limited scope for direct involvement of the private sector except through creating dependency mechanisms on the government. Yet, both projects provided somewhat more latitude for co-operating with civil-society groups as independent actors. The level of involvement of citizens in shaping (and thus in owning) the development intervention, proved to a large extent to be influenced by the way expatriate practi-
tioners perceived the way the people engaged themselves in life: as a more or less homogeneous group of rational deliberators reacting in a predictable way to external stimuli, or as a culturally, socially and economically heterogeneous group of adaptive responders who constantly probe their changing reality and act according to the options that arise. The attitude towards the target groups throughout the project history was very much influenced by the respective consultant's view on life and on the responsibilities of the various actors in the development process, by their previous practical experiences and by the scientific theories in-use to which they had been exposed. This was facilitated by the fact that, in contrast with the above case of the corporate sector, in the available knowledge-bases one had started to pay ample attention to the involvement of citizens as deliberate actors in development.

6.2 Concluding remarks

After reviewing the cases in chapter 5 and referring to our research topic and related research questions (see sub-section 1.7.1), we can in retrospect distinguish a considerable change in advocated policies related to local area development planning and management. These changes in the approaches can occur, over a period of time, both within the framework of one and the same (foreign-funded) local area development project as well between two or more of those initiatives that could benefit from the experiences of some key practitioners in subsequent projects. The first phenomenon can largely be attributed to a gradual change of personal opinions, due to new experiences and growing insights. The latter can be explained by the digestion of various experiences by one practitioner when faced with different room for manoeuvre offered by the particular political-administrative framework of the respective projects. As an example, while confronted with (Indonesian) reality on a day-to-day basis, my own view on the appropriate role of the local government in the development process quite definitely changed over the years. At the start, I still favoured a rather pro-active role of the administration in implementing social and economic programmes but gradually shifted towards a pre-dominantly facilitating and regulating role for the state, checked and balanced by emancipated citizens who further their interests through appropriate, decentralised mechanisms. However, the extent to which such a view or, for that matter, other views can be 'translated' into new approaches towards local area development that effectively make a difference, is only to a small extent influenced by either the normative/inward-looking or the academic/outward-looking perspective of the concerned development practitioners. Political room for manoeuvre turns out to be the determining factor.

In practice the access to the normative domain turns out to be heavily shielded by a small elite of (national) decision-makers that determines the room for manoeuvre. This elite usually favours this domain to remain an "appreciated" environment for everybody outside their privileged limited circle. As a consequence, there is little possibility that strategic approaches that will break new ground and touch on issues from the normative domain will ever be accepted. However, if interventions still do (slightly) affect or are expected to influence this normative domain, there has to be a thorough common understanding and agreement between the highest responsible authorities of the recipient country, the host organisation, the foreign donor and the (expatriate) implementing partner about the real objectives of the project as well as the potential implications of adopting the newly advocated policies. Thus, the scope for practitioners in (foreign-aided) projects to feed their views into the decision-making realm on the normative issues to ultimately solve the dragging problem of poverty, is for various reasons very limited. This has consequences for (mutual expectations of the) the staffing of foreign-funded projects as expatriates are often 'voice-inclined' and
thus easily at odds with their more loyal, status quo oriented local development practitioner colleagues.

Thus the acceptance of the normative implications (and hence the feasibility) of the advocated strategic approaches is mainly defined by political and administrative considerations. This space is to a large extent determined during the identification of the project by the donor and the recipient country, a process in which both domestic and the expatriate practitioners are usually not involved. However, there is often some (limited) room for manoeuvre available at the strategic and operational levels which are more likely to be "influenceable" or "controllable". The appreciation and exploitation of this room proves to a large extent to be determined by one or a few practitioners in the project team. It appears that the ultimate design and implementation of the advocated strategies (and therefore the potential outcome of the project) is mainly guided by the (normative) disposition of these key players towards the essence of development, their perception of the (strategic) role of the various actors in the development process.

It is fed by a compatible cognitive outlook on reality, previous practical experiences, and a lot of trial and error. Again, substantive knowledge bases received from scientific quarters appear to play only a rather limited role in the actual formulation of policies and practices. Yet, they certainly have an impact on the determination of the general direction of the advocated project policies and the selection of appropriate tools. Taking into account that the outcome of the development assistance projects to a large extent depend on the views of the expatriate individual practitioners involved, it is surprising that in the selection process their normative and/or strategic views are hardly probed; hiring almost exclusively takes place on the basis of verifiable facts (number of years working experience, country experience, prepared to stay in peripheral area's etc.) or assumed abilities to do the job and hardly on the basis of their normative and strategic notions.

Within the framework of the studied development co-operation projects the provincial and district governments acted as the counterparts. In spite of many negative experiences over the years, these actors continued to play the central role in the development process. In the analytical framework of both the expatriate and the local development practitioners the corporate sector did hardly feature as a potential positive and independent force in the efforts to structurally combat poverty. This position was not really challenged by the then available literature on socio-spatial development as well. Looking back one cannot but conclude that the project's close links with the administration acted as a cocoon, more or less shielding the project and blurring the perspective on the options available for the responsible teams to co-operate with and transfer assets and responsibilities to other actors in society. However, honesty compels us also to admit that hardly any systematic thinking on this issue, in particular in relation to the corporate sector, took place within the projects as well. In that sense it was slightly different with the involvement of civil society as an independent actor itself. A growing body of literature had already indicated that active and responsible participation of organised citizens had a positive impact on the effectiveness and the sustainability of poverty alleviation efforts. Simultaneously, involving citizen groups was alluring as well as it appealed to moral sentiments of (at least) many of the expatriate development practitioners: it suggested a real option for furthering the economic, social and political emancipation of those who had been affected most by poverty. Yet, none of the expatriates had any previous practical experience with organising participatory development at a larger scale. However, effectuating 'real' participatory devel-

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2 Although at that time the Indonesian government pushed, at least in name, the "Bapak Angkat" construction in which a larger company was supposed to nurture small ones. However, this policy never got beyond the status of a government support scheme imposed upon the corporate sector.
opment, implying redistribution of resources and (decision-making) power, within the context of 'foreign' projects would most likely have run up against the resistance of vested interests that would suffer from claim-making by those living in poverty, although institutionalised participation of course also offers the opportunity to local elites to formalise their informal power positions. Finally, real participation simultaneously required real representation, which was threatening the very power base of the regime, and hence not to be tolerated. Thus advocacy for structural political changes was self-censored and effectively banned from the project's strategic vocabulary.

Hence, the foreign-funded socio-spatial development projects 'ploughed through' with limited, isolated and above all 'accidental' (because very much depending on the individual practitioner involved and very specific local conditions capacitating or constraining the potential actors) experiments, in spite of the moral sentiments of the development practitioners and the universal visions and solutions offered by science.

However, the above reflections on action all pertain to past experiences. Since then, conditions have changed dramatically and there is all reason to believe that they will continue to change fast. This will pose new challenges to everybody involved in structural poverty alleviation. Based on the above conclusions, in sub-sections 6.4 and 6.5 some suggestions are made for equipping development practitioners at local level emotionally, intellectually and practically to face the new challenges in the 21st century.

### 6.3 An emancipatory three-pronged approach towards capacity improvement in local area planning and its implementation

In re-digesting food for LADPM-thought and -practices the research construct of figure 1.1 and 2.1 was to take orderly stock and to stream-line lessons learned, as presented in section 4.6 and following from a lifelong sequence of synoptic prisms a → d pictured by figure 4.1. A widening range of human capabilities thus emerged 'onto the horizon' as required for practical consciousness in conformity to propositions and test-questions of our reader's guide in section 2.0: early and briefly put forward for generalisation purposes. By looking back now at the -partly contingent- public choice structures employed, 'constructed' interventions undertaken and inherently restricted roles of socio-spatial planners acted out at various territorial levels of government, the eclectic theories-in-use discussed in the preceding sub-sections 2.2.1→3 plus 2.1.3 conjure up an increasingly broad range of socio-spatial, administrative and politico-institutional policy criteria plus moral imperatives for evaluating plan performances. Clearly, stakeholder groupings in various Third World peripheries at different times and locations make different combinations and trade-offs between multiple and conflicting 'sustainability' criteria, -partly induced by western 'fads and fashions' dominating sometimes the 'planistrator' arena in a don-quinotixic posture. Foreign expert advice indeed abounds on how, why, when and for whom to construct area-specific, problem- and goal-directed policy indicators. This material is not reviewed but meta-ordered here, as shown below in figure 6.1: neither in a technocratic 'top-down', nor radical 'bottom-up' perspective. A reconciliatory, long-run 'transformist' route is adhered to below. This is in line with cumulative lessons learned from multi-annual working and training procedures for improving in sequential rounds rural development planning-cum-implementation capacities at lower governmental levels in Asia and Africa. From these North-South, long-winding information exchanges on 'trials and a lot of errors' in area development thought and practice, the following final proposition now emerges

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3 By Veenstra.
regarding three overlapping managerial domains III → I with opposing forces, to be sequentially dealt with in learning rounds, and from the viewpoint of lower-tier administrations.

III During an operational and executive action-project phase attention is initially restricted to the short run (what, where, when, for whom?):
- for solving in a first round urgent and visible problems on a small scale, by trying out priority-area-project packages;
- guided by such target-indicators as economic efficiency, income and employment creation in (agro-) industrial production, including fair distribution of social and physical infrastructure; and
- using/improving central bureaucratic leadership 'from within' including (trained) town and countryplanners, public utility engineers and administrators versed in standardised cycles of project-feasibility planning, implementation control, performance monitoring and impact evaluation, - for instance, through rigid logical-framework procedures.

II During the strategically diversifying programme phase emphasis is subsequently laid in the medium run (how, for and with whom?):
- on second-round, re-defined selection of inter-sectoral, albeit area-specific problem approaches district or province-wide;
- on working towards a full-fledged area development profile, or pre-feasible framework including large-scale infrastructural investments, thus explicitly incorporating multiple policy-test criteria for ecological, financial and local administrative sustainability, accountability, operation and maintenance; and
- on stimulating the outward- and future-directed, facilitating or mediating role of local government, - for instance, through (training in) strategic-choice procedures including inter-connected decision areas and management of uncertainty.

I. During a policy formulation phase attention is yet to be focused in the long run (what for?):
- on a limited number of controversial and complex policy issues like land/water over-exploitation, c.q. degradation and pollution; like unequal access to land/shelter and inadequate provision of public services, credit, etc.; like the over-centralised public sector, bureaucratic red-tape; like community participation and self-reliance, c.q. local resource mobilisation, etc.
- on building local consensus and professional integrity in interpreting and counter-acting central (sectoral) policy objectives through (empathetic training for) action-oriented policy evaluation responsive to multiple, rural and urban stakeholder expectations, values and needs; and
- on stimulating the divergent role, both in public and private spheres, of the local statesman/general manager assisted by mediating and advocacy planners, but while confronted with ever changing exterior, and interior (psycho-)milieux of (counter-) planners as well.

Note, in conclusion, that along this route III → I shared meanings and grounded knowledge continue to besought, - rather than that a single universal truth and definitively ordered sustainability criteria are aimed at. For, men's knowledge bases and socio-cultural values on 'good and bad' are world-wide in ceaseless interaction with their changing environments. This leads to staggered processes of information exchange and transformation creeping upward, i.e. from operational towards strategic and normative policy options and inherent resource control criteria, or 'trapped universals'. From man's interior mental spaces the latter are altogether being triggered.
Time-Phasing of Planning Outputs according to Different Domains i.e. Areas of Public and Private Concern felt and addressed by Lower-Tier Administrations:

Main Questions ...

Usual Time Perspectives:

Widely Agreed, Inter-related Problem Areas, i-e. Points of Entry:
- Local Administrative Capabilities
- Urban and Rural Productivity,
- Employment and Poverty
- Land and Housing Markets
- in Built-Up and Peripheral Locations
- Water and Electricity
- Supply incl. Sanitation and Air Pollution
- Public and Private Transport incl. Air Pollution
- Social Development, i.e.
  - Health and Education
  - Services, Public Security and Human/Gender Rights
  - Environmental Management incl. ground/waster, waste disposal, forest and household energy supply from biomass fuels
- Political + Institutional, Multi-level + Multi-Functional, Revenue + Expenditure Responsibilities

III. Controllable Domain of Public Interventions + Operational Action Projects, being evaluated by Economic + Managerial Criteria like Efficient (non-)renewable Resource Use, Responsiveness and Accountability downwards to local communities and private enterprises. What, where, when for whom to be produced, distributed and consumed? 3-4 years' planning horizon

II. Influencable Domain of Strategic programs evaluated by Social + Environmental Criteria like Social Equity, Ecological Sustainability and Biological Diversity

How inter-organisational cooperation with whom? 4-5 years' planning horizon

I. Appreciatable Domain of Normative Policy Options evaluated by Political + Institutional criteria like Legitimacy + Accountability upwards to Central Authorities

Public consensus building and professional integrity for what? 7-10 years' planning horizon

Figure 6.1 Sequential learning rounds/loops III → I for introducing policy indicators into rural district and medium-sized city administrations: Think big, but start small.
At the end of the twentieth century the scene for regional development policies appears to have changed drastically. Regions have always been viewed as, to a more or lesser extent, integrated in national and international systems (Hilhorst 1971, 1990). Yet, they simultaneously continued to have a distinct physical, socio-cultural and economic identity. The past decades, however, are characterised by information and communication revolutions. They lead towards rapidly declining transport costs, vastly improved (electronic) communications, more flexible forms of economic organisation, and the growing importance of mobile assets (like finance and knowledge). These developments have established, instead of a diversified, an increasingly uniform horizon of production possibilities and financial markets. Economic systems and information exchanges are leaping across borders and frontiers. This trend towards increasingly similar conditions for production and, hence, further integration, is again facilitated by growing economic and political, international decision-making and enforcement of international agreements. This type of globalisation, however, undermines the national sovereignty and strengthens the hand of international inter-governmental agencies and of the internationally operating corporate sector. It takes place without corresponding evolvement of accountable democratic structures and severely limits the ability of (national) governments to implement their own economic strategies and maintain desired 'local' arrangements and commitments (Leys, 1996, pp. 19-25; UNESCO, 1998, pp. 15-20; Edwards, Hulme and Wallace, 1999, pp. 4-9; Edwards, 1999; Rao, pp. 42-43 in UNESCO, 1998; UNDP, 1999). Under the banner of an increasingly accepted (neo-) liberal ideology this intensifying political and economic co-operation, either in intergovernmental blocks or through the international corporate sector, will have an enormous socio-economic impact at 'local' levels. In due time, the breaking down of national borders, not only for trade, capital and information but also for ideas, norms and values, may as well create standardisation. It may lead towards greater homogeneity of cultures in the sense of people's shared beliefs and attitudes, lifestyles and values through which a group collectively perpetuates itself (Rao, p. 25, in UNESCO, 1998; UNDP, 1999, pp. 29-31, 33-34). Common attitudes and standards may evolve, either through common experience or through imitation, and thus have a negative impact on the diversity of local cultural identities and value bases of the regions under study.

However, globalising influences are unifying as well as fracturing (Giddens, 1994, p. 81). Strikingly in contrast with the above transformation into greater economic, cultural and social unity, is the simultaneous attempt in many places to sustain original, traditional cultural identities (van der Staay, p. 254, in UNESCO, 1998). This new awareness and affirmation of pluralist, ethnic, social and cultural identities is very much initiated in the growing international cultural interchange facilitated by new communication technologies. The 'new', dominant cultures are by many local people perceived as implanted and 'foreign' and denying the uniqueness of the way of life and the underlying systems of beliefs, values and norms of local peoples. The assertion of cultural divergence, often backed-up by economic and (geo-) political interests of the local elites, has in a number of instances led towards securing considerable space for local political interests in exchange for support to the (weakened) nation state, as for example was the case in parts of India (Khilnani, 1997). Moreover, during the cold war...
there were geo-political reasons for the two main contesting power blocks to keep
nation-states intact. After the fall of the Berlin wall the spatial spheres of influence
and interests changed completely. As a result, in some situations, regions got the
opportunity to contest the supremacy of the dominant cultures and sought peoples' 
security in their own traditional 'cocoons' by trying to break away from the nation
state such as the provinces of Aceh, Irian and of East Timor in the case of Indonesia. In
other instances they sought (and succeeded) to completely dismantle the unitary or
federalist states and breaking them up in small entities, such as was the case in diverse
countries like Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Ethiopia or Somalia. In other
countries no definite steps have been set, but centrifugal forces are at work and ten­
sions are rising. Not only the integrity of the existing nation state is in many cases
under severe pressure, but some question whether the concept of the traditional
nation-state, with its claim on unqualified sovereignty, still is the most appropriate,
self-sustaining political unit in an era that needs institutions of a new and more func­
tional kind: for sub-national, transnational, or multinational institutions and proce­
dures to serve the various social and economic needs (Toulmin, 1990, pp. 7,193). In gen­
eral we can say that the global trend towards more autonomy for the regions to pursue
their own aims and objectives is paramount. Although it is by no means suggested that
this growing 'localism', and accentuation of local identities is simply a response to the
increasing economic integration and cultural homogeneity, globalisation might in the
future indeed give birth to new and even stronger assertion of local social and cultur­

Of course, in addition to the people who may seek security in their local culture as
a protective cocoon, there are many others who feel challenged by the opportunities
offered by globalisation to go forward, change and adapt for the better. This is not the
place to discuss to what extent the various theories with respect to the nature of the
ultimate impact of globalisation and fragmentation, are validated and what ought to
be done to stimulate or stem the tide: to close off, de-link or become constructively
engaged. Definite or universal answers are not at hand anyway. This chapter is about
the intellectual armoury and tool-kit of development practitioners to respond to the
new realities including the emerging contradictions, and to make use of the imminent
opportunities and counteract negative trends.

Not only in the face of globalisation and increasing regionalism but also as an actor
in its own right, the nation-state, once by many considered to have a far sighted and
comprehensive vision of the public good, has lost strength. Rapidly expanding knowl­
dge of social and material processes have not led to spectacular human mastery of
reality. Decades of controlled, state-led interventions have not produced the popularly
desired outcomes. In the pursuit of poverty eradication it has, in spite of the occasional
successes posted, not resulted in lifting the overall restrictions on the realisation of
the human potential to qualitatively change the conditions of life and livelihood in
the long run. The failure of the public authorities to, by and large, 'sustainably' inter­
vene in all those spheres of life has in the end led to a receding state. It started to con­
centrate more and more on its core functions which are often defined as providing the
preconditions for development and facilitating others to take over (some of the) func­
tions previously implemented by the state. The void created by the state rolling back
appears to be, if at all, filled up by actors from the two other domains, the corporate
sector and civil society. These are not only increasingly engaged with providing func­
tions that hitherto have been associated with the responsibilities of the (nation) state
but they also (try to) continue to expand their influence on decision-making and
behaviour of the other actors in the triangle (see sub-section 1.4). Whether this trend
is something to be appreciated and encouraged within the context of sustainable
poverty alleviation is an issue of eminent importance, but, again, not to be discussed
within the framework of this study. Yet, it is considered important to discuss the role

and function of the local development practitioners in Third World countries within
the newly emerging socio-economic and political landscape that is here taken into
view as if the centralised state is in retreat, a successful market economy is driven by
global competition, and civil society is blossoming.

Some might argue that in the changing constellation thus viewed, there is anyway
no meaningful role for planners, who represent par excellence the 'old', failing, instru­
mental, rational and statist approach to development. In sub-section 1.1, however, it
has been argued that it is debatable whether the state has altogether failed in its devel­
opment mission (although, again, nobody will deny that overall results have been
poor) and whether there is a real alternative for the state. For it can simultaneously be
questioned how the masses living in poverty that have not organised themselves (see
sub-section 4.2.3) will benefit from a new constellation that is dominated by an
increasingly powerful corporate sector—predominantly focusing on growth and profits
and viewing people merely as consumers and workers, complemented by an array of
civil society organisations that each focuses on its own particular interests. We there­
fore still consider an active state crucial for representation of the interests of all its cit­
zens, for facilitation and providing legitimacy to access to the social bases of power,
for stimulating and supporting its citizens in expanding their range of options to
decide what kind of life to lead and the capabilities to define, pursue and achieve
objectives they have reasons to value (sub-section 2.2.1). As a bottom line, the state as
a collective should guarantee all its citizens a secure, minimum standard of living. In
the organisation of this development process we see an important role for local area
development practitioners, in particular for inducing the various actors of all three
domains of the state, the corporate sector and civil society to step out of their own
cocoons with their direct interests and forge coalitions where interlocking overlaps

Culture in the sense of collective beliefs and attitudes, norms and values very much
determines the aspired shape of development (cf. sub-section 1.6.). Yet, the aspirations
are always strongly affected by people's own perception of the nature of, and their
(potential) access to the various sources of social, human, cultural, natural and pro­
duced capital. Yet, if the culture of all those families, communities, clans, states or
other forms of collective organisation indeed varies according to social position in the
respective societies, and over time and space, then their concept of aspired develop­
ment will vary as well (cf. Rao, p. 28, in: UNESCO, 1998). The context of the two dia­
metrically opposing trends of growing international integration and national frag­
mentation, of the changing relationships between the state, civil society and the
corporate sector, and of the above attention for diversity thus poses regional/local
development administrators with new challenging issues that should be addressed
when preparing themselves for their role in the development process.

The first issue at stake is related to the fact that, as we have seen in the preceding
chapters, the tasks of local development practitioners have virtually always been lim­
lited to the strategic ('how, with whom') and operational ('what, where, when') aspects of
development, whereas the normative ('what for') aspects were usually dealt with by the
political elite in the faraway capital. Within the framework of greater autonomy of the
regions, local development administrators should therefore in the future be better pre­
pared and equipped to become themselves more involved in the normative under­
girding of development policies. This becomes only more urgent if, in the slipstream
of international processes, the global and the local become intertwined to the point
that they are nearly indistinguishable (Giddens in Boynton, 1997, p.73), and (region­
al/local) actors have increasingly the option to by-pass the national bureaucracy and to
directly addresses development issues in an international context. If a region wants to
capture global opportunities in trade and investment, borrow from and contribute to
surrounding cultures, participate in efforts to stem trans-boundary environmental
degradation etc., it should not only take into account the interests and potentials of
the relevant international actors and to analyse and prepare for facing the (volatile)
outcomes of a more opaque exposure to the outside world, but also take stock of its
own potential contribution and define its own needs, potentials, aims and correspond-
ing development scenarios. As regional/local authorities become less dependent on
the national capital for the normative aspects of development, they will not only
increasingly have the freedom but also have the responsibility to articulate the per-
ceived needs and preferences of the local population, culminating in their own vision
on how society should be constituted. These processes will not take place any longer
exclusively in the faraway capital where compromises have to be made with other,
equally legitimate claims. Now they will increasingly take place in the regional/local
capitals amongst people who are related by ethnic, religious and/or cultural ties but
 stil have their own interests to defend.

Secondly, the decreasing power base of the (central) state offers more scope for par-
ticipation of local actors from civil society and the corporate sector than is the case
under centralised state systems. Local development practitioners cannot any longer
exclusively refer to the normative underpinnings of development policies as formulat-
ed by higher level scientific, political and bureaucratic authorities, which they 'only'
have to translate into strategic and operational approaches, in programmes and pro-
jects. Their mental playing decks (etic) are very likely to change in the near future: their
influenceable environment is advancing at the expense of their appreciated environ-
ment. Under these new conditions it is required that local development practitioners,
more than they were ever used to, stop focusing exclusively on their traditional influ-
enceable and controllable environments. Instead, they should also start taking individ-
ual and collective responsibility for contributing to the articulation of common values,
norms and derived development objectives, all of course to be sanctioned by proper and
accountable decision-making procedures. They should shift their full attention from
adaptive planning, with decision-making heavily contingent on external actors, to a
more emancipating and self determining type of planning with a higher degree of
autonomy and authenticity with respect to the setting of aims and objectives, and the
choice of means. In other words, local development practitioners should become more
aware of their own individual vision on the intended road to development (emic), and
practically shift away from their sole involvement in programming, to policy making

6.5 Challenges facing development practitioners in the twenty-first
century

For a long time local area development planning, and hence the role of its practitio-
ers, has mainly been related to developing visions of the future, and to making relat-
ed public decisions more rational by working from a more or less comprehensive, pos-
ativist and value-free perspective (Friedmann and Kuester, 1994, p. 55). Planners were
considered neutral technocrats working in the public interest, technically absorbed in
devising (grand) designs of the future and in analysing the consequences of alternative
courses of action (sub-sections 2.1.2-3). Locked into a strict procedural environment
and backed-up by modernist planning theories that were rooted in the faith in ration-
ality in public decision-making, development practitioners were foremost supposed to
loyally dis-aggregate national, normative objectives in regional ones that could be
achieved through rather exclusive governmental interventions (see e.g. Conyers,1985,

6 By van den Ham.
However, over time the general assessment of the potentials of development planning has dramatically changed. The firm and optimistic belief in man's (read: the state's) ability (or even willingness!) to understand how development in reality occurs, to control all relevant factors and thus create a world which suits the needs of all, has rapidly faded away. Yes, even defining what is desirable proved to be very hard beyond the level of particular interest groups! Instead, value pluralism as a basis for ontological perspectives has gained increasing recognition in the development debate (see chapter 1). Positivist attitudes towards realities have gradually been displaced by the understanding that realities are multiple, socially constructed, personal, local and dynamic. This gives more space to (conflicting) value-based individual epistemologies (see Figures 2.1.2-4). Thus, diversity and difference in terms of needs of target groups as well as their capabilities found their way into the development arena. Yet, surprisingly enough, at the planning desks, in both the (international) co-ordinating agencies and the sectoral departments as well as at the responsible training institutes in Third World Countries, not very much changed over the years. In practice, the above new pluralist insights seem to have hardly been fallen into day-to-day procedural and operational place. As a result, there continues to be a considerable distance between the theoretical discourse on the substantive theory of local area development, on the one hand, and the profession of regional development administration practitioner proper, on the other. Hence, the various and new perceptions on the discipline of local area development are hardly noticed in the daily life of practitioners in remote areas. They largely remain to be trained and to function in the tradition of the modernisation paradigm and top-down approaches. In their work-environment the state very often is still the dedicated, omnipotent and omniscient problem solver and enlightened, selfless protagonist of poverty alleviation (cf. Shivakumar, 1998).

In this thesis we have set ourselves to answer the question how to turn received academic and practical knowledge into improved practices, which is itself a normative concept and thus open for debate. To improve the capabilities of development practitioners themselves to function effectively within the above new realities and contribute to the alleviation of the dragging problem of poverty, their profile, and consequently the type of training that they ought to receive, has to be adapted. Preparing new batches of local area development practitioners as well as strengthening the capabilities of the current generations, through formal education and on-the-job training, should start with offering them a wide overview of the domain that they are supposed to cover. It is suggested here that development practitioners should not only be technically trained in a number of skills that have traditionally been linked to the function of regional development officer (see e.g. van Staveren and van Dusseldorp, 1980; van Raay et al., 1989; Bendavid-Val, 1983, 1989) but rather start with acquiring a thorough understanding of the dynamic way normative, strategic and operational dispositions are achieved in an effective and legitimate way, and of the

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7 This does not only apply to developing countries. After studying the curricula of a number of planning courses offered at American Universities, John Friedmann (1996, p. 90) observes that in spite of the theoretical changes that have marked the discourse of planning since the mid-1950s as well as the profound and rapidly changing patterns of needs in real life, also in the United States "the practice of planning education continues to reproduce itself from decade to decade". Twenty years ago Om Prakash Mathur (1980, p. 41) already remarked that: ...it is somewhat perplexing that not many authors have attempted to capture the realities of the regional planning profession as it exists today in the Third World Countries. There is very little discussion or documentation on what the regional planners actually do, what their main concerns are, and what the profession looks like." As it seems, not much has changed over the past twenty years.
role they themselves as well as other stakeholders can play in that complicated process. Empathy towards other stakeholder's dispositions and potential contributions as actors in their own right, as well as self-critically reflecting on their own positioning, should development practitioners make more conscious of the link between personal or inner change (emic), and social or outer change (etic), and thus of the various conscious roles they (can) play in the various development arena's (cf. Edwards and Sen, 1999, p. 2).

As shown in the chapters 2, 4 and 5, visualised by our figures 1.1, 2.1, 4.1 and 6.1, and exemplified by our own practical experiences and positioning, the collected body of implemented planning and development approaches is not static at all; it constantly evolves over time. At the level of individual planners the inward-looking knowledge that is evolving within different contexts, in our cases induced by 'hopping' from project to project, constantly transforms received academic and practical learning in a fresh understanding of development processes. Then the experience of implementation and (un-) conscious reflection on that implementation contributes again to reshaping the perspectives on intended societal advancement and results in new approaches to deal with the outstanding issues. Thus development practitioners should be aware that neither their own understanding of reality and their way to deal with it, nor the other stakeholder's positioning and his/her use of the results are fixed nor value-neutral. These are all very much dialectically influenced by personal and professional life history, inner guiding normative lines of individual beliefs as well as values, economic interests, gender, class - all very much time-, space- and context bound - possibilities and constraints.

As has been shown, it is to a large extent the individual disposition of one or more key personalities, the way they process and apply received knowledge, and the inherent constraints of (foreign-aided) projects in terms of responsibilities, organisational positioning, staffing, outreach etc. (see chapters 3 and 5), rather than generally professed and sanctioned scientific insights per sé, that determine (changing) strategic approaches in rural development. In the development of these strategic dispositions, there is some dynamic link between (1) evolving inward looking perspectives self-reflectively acquired, (2) a growing body of academic insights becoming available, and (3) their own, constantly developing, 'learning-by-doing' practical experiences on what works in reality. The interplay between these three, but in particular between 1 and 3, make individual practitioners, constrained by the political, procedural and operational room-to-maneuuvre, meander into the future. Then, the main issue is how to equip the development practitioner best and prevent that meandering too much becomes drifting away into the void. Yet, as this depends on the intended development destination, 'drifting away' is very much a relative concept as well. Therefore, it is for development practitioners highly important that they are able to open up space for public dialogue on the directions of development and can analyse the various options as expressed by the participants. They should be able to explore, un-pack, make explicit and communicate the ideological-normative basis of the proposed development objectives and the potential conflict of interest that will occur among the various stakeholders, before getting it accepted as "appreciated" and translating it into (normatively) disputable strategies, projects and programmes. This requires on the part of the development practitioner, more than is currently usual, a deep, 'best as possible' insight and grounding in the social, cultural, ethical and institutional arrangements (i.e. social and cultural capital) that guide the various dispositions of stakeholders. It also calls for communicative, analytical skills as well as abilities in the field of conflict resolution, - in addition to the 'traditional' technical skills in economics, regional science, physical geography, public administration, data management etc. which are needed to (help) translating the people's normative disposition in strategic and operational terms. Thus equipped, development practitioners should become more
'engagers' than 'do-ers'. They should stimulate the advancement of human capabilities within the communities to analyse their own realities and to relate them to their own perception of well-being and poverty, to get better access to various interlocking (social, cultural, human, produced and natural) assets, to combine these and to engage themselves with economic and political actors at the appropriate levels in order to change structures and processes that constrain them in realising their potentials and achieving their aspirations (cf. Sen, 1993, Scoones, 1998, Carney, 1998-a, -b, Bebbington, 1999, Neefjes, forthcoming). In terms of roles, it is proposed that rather than displaying 'voice'-like behaviour themselves, although this even might contribute to greater welfare in the short run, but in the end is hardly empowering, development practitioners should wholeheartedly encourage particular interest groups or their representatives to become active in the political arena. It is highly important to get the groups to engage themselves in the public discourse, to support them in translating their value propositions into arrangements and concrete action to realise them, and to maximise their capacity for negotiation with and between other spheres and/or decision-making levels in order to manipulate the agenda for public action. Such a role model - involving interest groups in the debates, identifying and making intelligible the different normative origins of and explanatory foundations to various positions and events in order to make them inter-subjective and negotiable effectively excludes an "exit" position for development practitioners. Such an outsider position would prevent them from playing the role of bridgehead for other relevant actors and thus from increasing the social capital of the target group. However, "exit" development practitioners may of course well contribute to the empowerment of disadvantaged groups through strengthening their human capital. Even "whistle blowing" (Hume, 1995, p. 223) may have a positive impact although it is likely to affect the potential for a constructive role in the longer run in a negative way. It also rules out the position of the "loyal" bureaucrat as that does not square with the idea that development practitioners are to engage (potentially antagonistic) actors on politically sensitive issues (structural poverty eradication!) in the political arena without beforehand positioning themselves (cf. Hirschman, 1970; Hulme, 1995; Friedmann, 1973, Friedmann and Kuester, 1994; see also sub-section 3.4.1).

It goes without saying that when focusing on poverty reduction, development practitioners should be loyal to the interests of people living in poverty, although this, paradoxically, might sometimes warrant closer co-operation with other socio-economic actors as well. As such, they should focus on difference and diversity rather than on consensual or collective interests which, in most cases, seem quite difficult if not impossible to be defined anyway. However, local development practitioners have not only a role to play in engaging actor groups of people living in poverty in development processes. They should also be able to facilitate reconciliation of the claims of people living in poverty with those of other contesting actor groups (which might at the surface be equally legitimate), to integrate them in the framework of (central) state policies and so transcend the limitations posed by post-modernists (see sub-section 2.2). Thus, the development practitioner becomes part of the actor groups' social capital (most clearly illustrated by the key personality of the team-leader of the LTA-77 project, see sub-section 5.4.8) and s/he can play a mediating role in providing better access to a combination of other (human, social, cultural, produced and/or natural) capitals. It is the prac-

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8 However, as the main domain of our concern is the reduction of rural poverty in all its facets, you might expect the development practitioners to act within their own arenas in defence of the interests of those (organised or not) constituencies that due to their identity and limited access to sources of power have traditionally mostly been excluded from defining and deciding on development policies that concern their own lives.
titioner's role to focus on interactive social processes, on facilitating encounters of people living in poverty with those actors from civil society, the corporate sector and agencies of the state that could enhance their access to resources and increase their capabilities to participate in a meaningful way in the development process. Each of these actors involved has its own value/normative background, substantive interests and (in)formal procedural arrangements which have to be reconciled before being able to engage all concerned in specific development efforts. To facilitate this development, practitioners do not only need the required negotiation skills, but foremost the trust of the parties involved and the capability to gain and sustain that trust.

To perform their role in this 'facilitatory' type of planning and management of local area development and deal with the issues at the operational, strategic and normative levels, practitioner teams should ideally (see also Schönh, 1987; Argyris and Schönh, 1978; Friedmann, 1981, 1987, 1996; Bebbington, 1999; Edwards and Sen, 1999; Mintzberg, 2000):

- be able to explore and analyse their own and other stakeholder's (un)conscious axiomatic basis of ethics and values, facilitate their translation in normative dispositions, relate them to 'outward theoretical and practical knowledge' and establish links with required and/or functioning formal and informal institutional processes;

- have the capacity to identify and interpret formal and informal institutional arrangements as well as related behaviour and policies that promote or restrict further development of people's capabilities to achieve a sustainable livelihood;

- be able to identify and engage the relevant actors from the corporate sector, the civil society and the various state agencies in the discourse about designing and formulating strategies towards and, finally, building a society that strives for decreasing the restrictions - both material and socio-cultural - on the full realisation of human capabilities to qualitatively change the conditions of life and livelihood;

- be able to create an open discourse by removing distortions, and negotiate and broker between different contestations and trade-offs involved in constructing a just and sustainable livelihood;

- link the conceptual to the practical and concrete, the micro to the macro issues and related policies and practices, and (inductively) piecemeal knowledge to action, and;

- have a basic multi-disciplinary knowledge about the substantive, multi-faceted socio-spatial processes that, in interaction with each other, are responsible for the emergence and maintenance of the structures and produce the rural habitat, incl. the most prominent sectoral issues and policies at stake;

- be able to use his/her intuition and previous impressions and experiences as a starting point for exploratory and creative communicative action for change with the main actor groups concerned and identify potentially effective development interventions;

- constantly reflect on the impact of their own actions as well as changes in the environment and to accommodate intended policy lines with the experiential knowledge acquired in the course of action, and adapt them to new realities and insights in flux.

The above indicated need for flexibility, responsiveness and adaptation to specific and changing conditions and active engagement of the direct stakeholders in the development process means also that the best angle from which to intervene is usually at the local or the regional level. Of course, this does not exclude the frequent involvement of supra local/regional actors to guarantee that the local initiatives fit with concurrent developments at higher levels in the spatial hierarchy, or, simply, to allocate the required resources from collective budgets. Yet, when it comes to poverty alleviation for local people, the legitimacy of policies is mainly vested in local need, local knowledge, local trust and local support.
Selective, local interventions are also required as financial and, in particular, skilled human resources as well as reliable data are scarce in (remote) rural areas. Simultaneously, the need for concerted efforts to combat poverty is great and in many places problems grow rapidly more serious due to population growth and encroachment whereas environmental damage becomes increasingly irreparable. Morally, it cannot be justified as well to keep people living in poverty longer than absolutely necessary. It is therefore not defensible to continue to follow the strategy of first instilling a greater capacity for planning, implementation and monitoring, and design the required structures and systems before, pragmatically, tackling severe poverty step-by-step. Identification of most ("strategic") pressing problems or biggest potential to serve as many people living in poverty as possible (and, as a consequence leaving out 'less' pressing issues for the time being) before formulating strategies and deciding and embarking on a course of action, is therefore not only badly needed but also appropriate within the above indicated limitations.

The predominant role of the state in implementing development processes should be discarded, not only to solve the capacity problem of the government but more to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of the interventions. This is a difficult and often painful process as bureaucrats derive their status and legitimacy from their active role in development processes. Giving more space to civil society or the corporate sector can threaten the very basis of their existence. However, all over the world voluntary organisations have demonstrated that they can play an essential role as interlocutors between their members and government, participating actively in government policy formulation, decision-making and policy implementation. The corporate sector has over the years proven to be an effective engine for generating economic growth and employment. Moreover, the intensity of deployment of skilled human as well as financial resources in foreign-aided projects cannot be sustained under 'normal' conditions. The state should concentrate more on protecting the common interests, and more particular of those who are not able to defend their own interests, on allocative functions, regulating potential conflicts, providing co-ordination and ensuring access to basic public goods etc. Meanwhile, actors from the other domains can, each according to their own mandate and core competencies, bring specific local and technical knowledge to bear on problems, tap latent managerial abilities and provide the necessary checks and balances to avoid any lop-sided development. In sum, together they can activate the energies of rural people, afford them entry into the relevant systems and gain for them a measure of individual or collective influence over their own destinies.

Yet, it has to be realised that exogenous conditions, events and decisions will often have a very significant impact on local development as well offer opportunities for structural change. In the end sustainable development will only be achieved if interventions lead to a structural transformation of normative dispositions, strategic policies and practices and related socio-economic (power) relations in that external environment. From a local perspective this can only be accomplished by simultaneously and selectively resisting and adapting to these exogenous forces, by taking advantage of them and attempting to create at multiple levels proper responses to various pressures. The development practitioner has an important role to play as a catalyst by providing strategic information and in supporting people in articulating that information into common goals. Thus, s/he should facilitate that micro-level needs, aspirations and potentials meet response at the influenceable/strategic and appreciated/normative levels with the ultimate aim of creating an effectively enabling environment that continuously facilitates and supports people to build sustainably upon their own strengths. Moreover, mutual confidence, trust and relations between all actors involved, including the practitioners, lies at the basis of a public consensus around development solutions. It is therefore believed that interventions aiming at poverty reduction in peripheral areas should start selectively at local level through a number
of deliberation and decision-making rounds from the bottom-upwards while, as nobody exists in a spatial, socio-cultural, economic and political vacuum, taking very well the external influences into account and end up structurally anchored in appropriate systems and structures (see sub-sections 2.2.2, 4.2.3, 5.3.17 and 5.4.18). Taking the local as the starting point is not so much because small is per definition beautiful, or because small, experimental, pilot projects generate credibility and legitimacy for claims at macro level once their viability and potential for expansion has been proven - although that might be the case as well. Rather, at regional level the locus is addressed of the multi-faceted interplay of various sets of socio-economic, cultural and physical forces that originate from different spatial levels and result in specific manifestations of development and change. Locally rooted development, within a certain administrative framework and building upon 'something underneath', is considered to be the most suitable way to facilitate and support particular groups of people living in poverty to define democratically their own meanings and objectives, analyse ever evolving institutional and political arrangements, assess technical and economic opportunities, identify options and choices and ultimately decide what to do. Only then they can themselves come to grips with their socio-economic and natural environment and transform their own (in) tangible resources in positive livelihood outcomes. For it is their reality that counts in defining strategies for a better future.
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In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift reageert van den Ham op het toenemende vrije markt denken en houdt in hoofdstuk 1 een pleidooi voor handhaving van de inspanningen op het gebied van actief, sociaal-ruimtelijk overheidsbeleid gericht op duurzame armoedebestrijding in afgelegen gebieden. Doel daarvan zou de opheffing moeten zijn van zowel de materiële als de socio-culturele barrières die mensen belemmeren om op duurzame wijze hun eigen levensomstandigheden te verbeteren. Aangegeven wordt waarom, vanuit het perspectief van de ontwikkelingsdeskundige, het belangrijk is de dynamiek te doorgronden van zowel de theorie als de praktijk met betrekking tot ontwikkelingsprocessen. Er wordt een ontwerp geïntroduceerd voor het onderzoek naar de wijze waarop ontwikkelingsparadigma's, ontwikkelingsbeleid en ontwikkelingspraktijk op normatief ("waartoe" en "voor wie"?), strategisch ("hoe"?) en operationeel ("wat, waar, wanneer, door en samen met wie"?) niveau in de tijd veranderen. Gesuggereerd wordt dat deze veranderingen sterk beïnvloed worden door individuele opvattingen van sleutelfiguren ontwikkelingsprocessen, hun waarden en normen, verworven academische inzichten en praktische ervaringen opgedaan in het veld. In werkelijkheid lijkt het beleid veelal gestimuleerd te worden door een buitenwereld die vanuit het perspectief van de ontwikkelingsdeskundige als respectievelijk te aanvaarden, beïnvloedbaar of beheersbaar gecategoriseerd kan worden. De ruimte tot verandering zou ook afhankelijk zijn van veranderde machtsrelaties tussen de overheid, de marktsector en het maatschappelijk middenveld.

In hoofdstuk 2 werkt Veenstra het boven aangegeven onderzoeksontwerp verder uit door een aantal hoofdcomponenten te onderkennen en te duiden langs de drie lijnen van een assenstelsel.Zo worden langs de eerste 'naar binnen' gekeerde as de persoonlijke werkelijkheidsovatting, de beroepsinstelling en het praktisch rolpatroon van zowel buiten- als binnenlandse ontwikkelingsdeskundigen belicht; langs de tweede 'naar buiten' gerichte as komt de beroepsmatige kennis aan bod, uitwaaierend in de tijd van sociale-ruimtelijke en procedurele naartotekstuurlijke aspecten; en langs de derde centrale als worden accentverschuivingen binnen de op problemen en actie gerichte ontwikkelingspraktijk in tijdsperspectief geplaatst vanaf de zestiener jaren tot op heden.

In hoofdstuk 3 neemt van den Ham in vogelvlucht de praktijkontwikkeling van internationale ontwikkelingsaanpak, en meer in het bijzonder van de technische assistentie, onder de loep. Aandacht gaat daarbij uit naar de verschillende factoren die van invloed zijn op de uitkomst van met buitenlandse fondsen gefinancierde en met buitenlandse deskundigen gesteunde ontwikkelingsprojecten. Aan de orde komen onder meer de invloed van de project identificatie, de organisatorische inbedding van een project, de rol van buitenlandse deskundigen, hun samenwerking met lokale collega's, de factor tijd, de rol modellen in de overdracht van kennis en de positionering van deskundigen binnen een project - loyal aan het systeem, kritisch binnen het systeem of radicaal afwijzend van buitenaf.

In het tweede deel van de studie worden zeven case studies uit Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Jemen, Kameroen en Indonesië, allen uitgevoerd binnen het kader van internationale
ontwikkelingssamenwerking, gepresenteerd en gerelateerd aan het raamwerk dat in de eerste drie hoofdstukken geïntroduceerd en toegelicht is.

Betreffende (on)mogelijken van duurzame bestaansopbouw trekt Veenstra met name in secties 4.6 en 6.3 zijn conclusies uit wat hij ‘van binnenuit en van buitenaf’ leerde in vijf op elkaar volgende exercities in plattelandsontwikkeling. In het bijzondere geval van de typisch agrarische stammen samenleving onder patrimoniale grondbezitsverhoudingen in het binnenland van Sierra Leone/West Afrika uit de zestiger jaren, deden zich onverenigbare beleidszeden voor, -zowel in strategisch als uitvoerend opzicht-, wanneer nu teruggekeken wordt naar ingrepen daar-en-toen in de vorm van ‘harde’ infrastructuur werken en landbouw technologische verbeteringen. Want nadat ontwikkelingen hun onafwendbare loop reeds hadden genomen traden tekortkomingen op de voorgrond, zowel binnen als tussen gebruikte bronnen van kennis; alsook van hiermee overeenkomende beleidsinstrumenten die al of niet werden ingezet; van al of niet toegekende bestuurlijke bevoegdheden; en van al of niet beschikbare, goed opgeleide bestuurskaders, te besteden gelden en hulpmiddelen. Bovenal onverenigbaar tussen betrokkenen bleken dominante normen en waarden waarmee op uiteenlopende bestuurniveaus partijen hun eigen voorrang opeisten bij de inzet van publieke middelen. Zo kon het gebeuren dat ondanks goede bedoelingen, -in het openbaar meeslepend beleden-, buitensporige levenswijzen van kleine elitaire clans, in aanwezigheid van een tandeloos staatsapparaat, vol wantrouwen in stad en platteland door de goegemeente duurzaam moeten worden doorstaan.


Deze neutraal-technocratische beroepsinstelling ontwikkelde zich vanaf het begin van de tachtiger jaren, -afhankelijk van politiek-bestuurlijke situaties-, tot die van een bemiddelende makelaarsrol, ja zelfs soms tot pleitbezorger ten behoeve van ‘nood-
druftige' doelgroepen. In het geval van het Rada-district in Noord-Jemen, 1981/82, werd het blikveld weliswaar verruimd naar op de lange duur sociaal-culturele ontplooiing en navenant veranderende eigenschappen van leiderschap; maar de dominante (buitenlandse hulp-) thematiek centreerde zich op de overgang van een operationeel-uitvoerende naar een strategische wijze van omgang met beschikbare middelen en maatschappelijke krachten. Betreffende duurzame bestaansvormen ontdekten praktijkmensen 'van oversee' te moeten manoeuvreren tussen de Scylla en Charybdis van conflictlicerende beleidsopties:

- aan de ene kant, beantwoordend aan de belangen van een centrale overheid en particulier bedrijfsleven, inclusief 'vooruitstrevende' boeren, ten gunste van politiek-bestuurlijke stabiliteit en vrije economische groei geled 'van bovenaf'; en
- aan de andere kant, beantwoordend aan gemeenschappelijke lokale belangen van 'behoefte' boeren en veetelers ten gunste van gelijkberechtiging, bevolkingsparticipatie en samenballing van middelen 'van onderop', in wankel evenwicht met behoud van natuurlijke hulpbronnen en een historisch gegroeide, cultureel erfgoed.

Na tien jaren van buitenlandse ontwikkelingsplanning in Rada moest rond 1985 worden geconcludeerd dat ondanks (of vanwege) kleinschalig ontworpen en selectief geconcentreerde gebiedsaanpakken het lokale dorpsleven intact was gebleven; dat op districtsniveau met name uitvoeringscapaciteiten van de overheid waren verbeterd dankzij de, soms weinig gerichte, technische bijstand 'van overzee'; maar dat op het hoogste sub-nationale bestuursniveau van de provincie strategische beleidsvorming en -uitvoering géén coördinerende positie van betekenis, noch het bijbehorend leiderschap hadden gekregen.

Daarom, in de twee volgende studies van Aceh in Indonesië, 1977-86, en van het Tikar stroomgebied rond 1990 in Kameroen, West Afrika, werd aanvankelijk afgezien van middellange strategische planvorming. Dit mag blijken uit prototypen van werkschema's ten behoeve van plattelandsontwikkeling, van betreffende trainings- en uitvoeringsprocedures inclusief inzet van produktieve, verzorgende en bestuurlijke verbeteringsmaatregelen. In plaats van een rechtstreeks-redirect, allesomvattende planningsmethode 'van bovenaf' werd een slingerend pad (ter aanbeveling) gevolgd van ongeveer zeven jaar waarin politieke toezeggingen, verbintenissen tussen overheidssectoren, teamgeest en vertrouwen plus technische plancapaciteiten worden opgebouwd 'van onderop'. Zo óók, wanneer verreikende problemen van strategische aard in ongewisse besluitvormings situaties om aanpak en training vragen, komen onvermijdelijk conflictlicerende beleidsopties openlijk op tafel die verschillend geïnterpreteerd en gewaardeerd worden door betrokken doelgroepen en sociaal-politieke machthebbers.

Een flexibele benadering is met name in perifere Derde Wereld gebieden van belang nu lokale werkomstandigheden een onrustbarend splijtzwam karakter gaan vertonen. Nu, immers, centrale staatsoverheden zich steeds meer verzorgende en produktieve taken laten ontvallen, staat de gewone boer en burger niet veel meer ter beschikking dan vanouds vertrouwde sociale netwerken van wederzijdse hulpverlening: een cultureel, zij 't religieus, clan- en standgevoelig, soms stam-bepaald erfgoed dat nog steeds in haar doorwerking al te zeer over het hoofd wordt gezien. Lokale planners doen er goed aan in hun beleidsvoorstellen 'van onderop' hiervoor open te staan, -of zij nu vanouds sterk technocratisch bezig zijn 'van bovenaf', bemiddelend of als pleitbezorger, of, gering in aanzien, als katalyserende lilliputters aan de basis werkzaam zijn. Langs al deze ingangen tot operationele, strategische en normatieve beleidsterreinen blijft het zaak gezamenlijke waarden, normen en know-how te blijven zoeken en uitproberen, -in plaats van één laatste waarheid en definitief gerangschikte criteria op het schild te tillen ten behoeve van duurzame bestaansopbouw.

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In hoofdstuk 5 zet van den Ham aan de hand van een tweetal case-studies uit West Java en Aceh uiteen hoe de verschillende standpunten en strategieën die in de loop der jaren gepropageerd en uitgevoerd werden vooral tot stand kwamen onder druk van de omstandigheden waaronder deze bilaterale ontwikkelingsprojecten moesten opereren. Persoonlijke standpunten van enkele buitenlandse deskundigen speelden daarbij zeker een rol, maar de invloed van algemeen erkende wetenschappelijke inzichten of veranderende machtsverhoudingen tussen de drie onderscheiden domeinen van overheid, markt en maatschappelijk middenveld was bescheiden.

In de paragrafen 6.1 en 6.2 concludeert van den Ham dat de normatieve, strategische en operationele gezichtspunten van de sleutelfiguren binnen ontwikkelingsprojecten sterk beïnvloed zijn door hun vorige ervaringen. De mate waarin deze opvattingen in de praktijk kunnen worden 'verteald' in vernieuwende benaderingen van lokale ontwikkeling hangt echter slechts in beperkte mate samen met de inhoudelijke kracht van deze normatieve/innerlijke of academische/naar buiten gerichte perspectieven van de betrokken ontwikkelingsdeskundigen. Zo zou het streven naar ontwikkeling op basis van 'echte' participatie, die onherroepelijk hervordering van (toegang tot) hulpbronnen en (besluitvormings) macht met zich meebrengt, onmiddellijk oplopen tegen een muur van gevestigde belangen; een dergelijke benadering kan derhalve, hoe wenselijk misschien dan ook, binnen het raamwerk van 'buitenlandse' projecten de facto niet worden nagestreefd. De politieke speelruimte blijkt dan uiteindelijk de bepalende factor te zijn in het normatieve domein. Binnen het strategische en operationele domein is echter gewoonlijk wel enige (beperkte) speelruimte. Op die niveaus lijkt de formulering en de verwezenlijking van strategieën en uitvoeringspraktijken wel sterk beïnvloed te worden door de stellingname van de sleutelpersonen ten opzichte van de essentie van ontwikkeling, hun opvatting over de (strategische) rol van de verschillende actoren in het ontwikkelingsproces, hun kijk op de werkelijkheid en eerdere praktische ervaringen. Wederom lijkt 'objectieve', inhoudelijke kennis slechts een beperkte rol te spelen in de formulering en uitvoering van beleid. Aldus kunnen door het buitenland gefinancierde ruimtelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten 'voortploegen' met beperkte, geïsoleerde en vooral toevallige (want sterk afhankelijk van de individuele deskundige en de bijzondere omstandigheden die potentiële actoren in staat stellen of verhinderen een rol te spelen) experimenten.

Met het oog op de toekomst schetst van den Ham in paragraaf 6.4 de veranderende context voor deskundigen op het terrein van lokale ontwikkeling. In paragraaf 6.5 zet hij uiteen hoe deze veranderende context nieuwe uitdagingen biedt en in de toekomst een nieuwe rol van (teams van) ontwikkelingsdeskundigen vraagt. Gesuggereerd wordt dat andere, specifieke vaardigheden nodig zijn om op meer structurele wijze de ruimtelijke en sociale ongelijkheden aan te pakken. Om succesvol een ontwikkelingsproces van onderaf te kunnen begeleiden is het niet voldoende om ontwikkelingsdeskundigen alleen op te leiden en te trainen in een aantal technische vaardigheden die traditioneel gekoppeld worden aan het beroep van regionaal ontwikkelingsdeskundige. Van centraal belang daarbij is het verkrijgen van een gedegen kennis van de wijze waarop normatieve, strategische en operationele stellingnames in de praktijk tot stand komen, de verschillende rollen die de diverse belanghebbenden (kunnen) spelen en de wijze waarop dat complexe proces op een effectieve en legitieme wijze beïnvloed kan worden. Invoerend vermogen ten aanzien van de belangen van de verschillende belanghebbenden en hun potentieuë bijdrage aan de formulering van strategieën alsook een zelfkritische reflectie op hun eigen positionering, zouden deze ontwikkelingsdeskundigen meer bewust moeten maken van de relatie tussen persoonlijke of innerlijke, en sociale of maatschappelijke verandering. Deze (on)bewuste reflectie op de uitvoeringspraktijk zal vervolgens weer bijdragen aan nieuwe perspec-
tieven op de gewenste maatschappelijke ontwikkeling en resulteren in nieuwe benaderingen van de problemen. Ontwikkelingsdeskundigen zouden zich er echter wel van bewust moeten zijn dat noch hun eigen interpretatie van de werkelijkheid en de daaruit resulterende wijze waarop men zich manifesteert, noch de standpunten van de andere belanghebbenden en hun positionering waardevrij zijn. Bovendien, standpunten veranderen in de tijd. Zij worden in hoge mate beïnvloed door persoonlijke en professionele levensloop, context gebonden normatieve opvattingen, waarden, economische, gender en klasse belangen, kansen en bedreigingen. Juist vanwege de diversiteit van de belangen en de veranderingen in de context waarmee eenieder voortdurend wordt geconfronteerd, is het van het grootste belang dat ontwikkelingsdeskundigen in staat zijn om ruimte te scheppen voor openbaar debat en dialoog over de richting van de ontwikkeling. Ze dienen de diverse opties van de deelnemers in kaart te kunnen brengen, deze tegen elkaar af te kunnen wegen, de potentiele belangstellingen en conflicten te kunnen identificeren, alvorens standpunten algemeen geaccepteerd te krijgen en ze (helpen) te vertalen in strategieën, projecten en programma’s. Wat de ontwikkelingsdeskundigen betreft vraagt dit, in aanvulling op de traditionele technische vaardigheden op het gebied van economie, regionale analyse, fysische geografie, openbaar bestuur, data management etc., ook om sterk ontwikkelde communicatieve en analytische vaardigheden op het gebied van communicatie, sociale analyse, conflict preventie en oplossing. Daarmee gewapend zouden ontwikkelingsdeskundigen in staat moeten zijn om de gerechtvaardigde claims van mensen die in armoede situaties leven te verenigen met aanspraken van andere sociale groepen en ze een passende plaats te geven in het geheel van (centraal) overheidsbeleid. Aldus dienen de ontwikkelingsdeskundigen te bevorderen dat de behoeften, ambities en potenties op het laagst ruimtelijke niveau weerklank vinden op de ‘hogere’ beïnvloedbare/strategische en te aanvaarden/normatieve niveaus met als uiteindelijk doel een omgeving te creëren die mensen effectief ondersteunt om op duurzame wijze aan hun toekomst te bouwen.
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Allert Pieter van den Ham was born in 1955 in Tiel, The Netherlands. In 1975 he completed his secondary education at the Rijksscholengemeenschap in Tiel and enrolled as a student in Catholic University in Nijmegen. In 1982 he graduated in Human Geography of Developing Countries with development economics, sociological aspects of development planning and Bahasa Indonesia as secondary subjects. From 1984 till 1986 he was employed by the Dutch Ministry of Development Co-operation as regional planner/budget analyst in the Institutional Development Assistance Project in Aceh/Indonesia; from 1986 till 1988 as urban/regional planner in the LTA-47 West Java Regional Development Planning Project in West Java, Indonesia; and from 1989 till 1992 he worked for BEPLAT B.V. as rural development advisor/teamleader in the Smallholder Coffee Development Project in Central Aceh PPW/LTA-77 in Indonesia. In 1992 he joined the Netherlands Organisation for International Development Co-operation, Novib, and his current position is head of the Bureau for the Middle East, Central- and South Asia, and Novib's Financial Services Unit.

Jan Veentra was born in Alphen aan de Rijn, The Netherlands in 1937. He completed secondary school at the Stedelijk Gymnasium in Tiel. He earned B.Sc. and M.Sc. degrees in resp. Rural and Urban Land Development Planning in (sub) tropical areas, Agricultural University, Wageningen, and followed Post-graduate Courses in regional development planning at the Institute of Social Studies (ISS). From 1961 till 1962 he worked as a research worker at the Institute for Land Improvement and Reclamation (ILRI), on development potentials of (sub) tropical brackish river delta soils in the Far East. In 1963 he joined the N.V. Grontmij as Land Surveyor and socio-economic Research Worker in Irrigation projects in the Tadla plain of Morocco. From 1966-1968 he worked in Sierra Leone for the FAO/UN as Land-Use Planning Expert on the introduction of new cropping patterns and farm management systems. From 1969-1971 he was employed by Raadgevend Bureau Ir. B.W. Berenschot, N.V. Management Consultants in its Section Programme Planning and Management related to financial and manpower resources of local and regional government authorities in The Netherlands. Between 1971 and 1972 he worked for the Netherlands Economic Institute as Economic Research Fellow and was involved in studies on tourism, forestry development and port development. From 1973-1978 he worked as regional/urban planner for DHV, Consulting Engineers. In the academic sphere he was senior Lecturer in Multi-Level Area Development, e.g. Regional Development Planning for Third World Countries at the department of Rural Sociology of the Tropics and Subtropics at the Agricultural University Wageningen (1978-79) and from 1977 till 1982 he was professor in Urban and Regional Planning at University of Technology, in Eindhoven, The Netherlands. From 1980 to date he is lecturer and consultant at the Department of Land Resources and Urban Development/Survey Integration of the International Institute for Aerospace Survey and Earth Sciences (ITC), Enschede, The Netherlands.