WAR VETERANS IN ZIMBABWE'S LAND OCCUPATIONS:

COMPLEXITIES OF A LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN AN AFRICAN POST-COLONIAL SETTLER SOCIETY

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Dedication

To my two daughters

Tamirirana and Agnes Tapurai:

That as mothers remember, will you,

The spirit of struggle passed over, ever;

That your fecund powers of shall beget,

Resistance of Africa's marginal poor,

Yearning still, seeking but in vain,

The content of their liberation,

Shuttered, destroyed by;

top heavy-weights

the filthy,

rich,

few.

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In Manyika customs, as in many other African groups of the region, thanks-giving is a double edged spiritual ritual directed through the ancestors of the thanked person, signifying that the mortal being is encouraged, in the godly act of generosity, by her own ancestors to please ancestors of the thanks-giver. Both spirits are invoked and ultimately praises go to *Musikavanhu* (the Creator of humans). It is in this spirit that I make these acknowledgements, knowing that: words will fail me and for limited space and time I will inevitably omit some who participated in this work. I therefore begin by collectively and humbly thanking *Musikavanhu* through my own ancestors to the ancestors of all those (the living and the dead) who contributed in various ways for the successful outcome of this work that this thesis only symbolises.

I thank the Manyika people, my extended family, and particularly my mother who nurtured me into a freedom fighter that I became; the ancestors of those I fought with in the liberation struggle, the living and the dead comrades-in-arms, *vabereki, vakoma ne hanzvadzi*. I thank the communities of Chimanimani where I first fought the war and the people of former Chaminuka and Takawira sectors who looked after me as I traversed the two provinces of Mashonaland Central and East. This story (and others yet to be written), is about your own struggles inspired by *Musikavanhu* through your ancestors, and I am only here attempting to be a mouth piece. I say to you: *Kutenda kwakitsi kuri mumwoyo*[1].

For me to pursue a successful academic career (for 28 years) after the armed struggle, without assistance from the government, it would have been a futile exercise if I had not been supported by different institutions, individuals and the extended family in this venture. In the sojourn I came across people like Sir Geoffrey Bindman, Willem van Harderwijk, Dr. Daniel Mausezahl, Professors: late Timothy Nyapadi, Allen Isaacman and Terence Ranger. These people were just there at the most opportune moment during my long struggle for education, giving me material and moral support. Outstanding was Professor Niels Roling who spotted my academic potential through my publications and writings and he facilitated me to undertake a MSc without a BSc degree at Wageningen University, which was almost taboo.

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[1] Manyika proverb: 'The gratitude of a cat is hidden deep in the secret silence of its heart'.

[2] Manyika proverb: 'Being many, is cherishable, otherwise only witches hate numbers'.

scholarship (2001) and CERES Graduate School awarded me a scholarship (2002) when funds had to be augmented. I heartily thank the dedicated staff of the National Archives of Zimbabwe whom I regard to be symbolic in the work ethics of our nation. I say to them, do not tire.

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This work could hardly have reached its level of quality without the personal commitment and incisive comments of Professors: Sam Moyo, Paul Richards, Michael Bourdillon (at the beginning of this work) and Dr Kees Jansen who supervised me. As an organic intellectual in the liberation war and the land occupation movement of Zimbabwe, it was obviously normal to have my own biases but the critical supervision, and able navigation of the supervisory team is evident in this final thesis as a piece of scientific work. I particularly appreciate their patience and note that the maturity of the work is proportionate to the time and energy they invested.
Lastly but not least, I finished the study under very difficult problems. I thank sincerely thank, my sister and midwife, Grace Hatiziwani Makanga.

[3] Portuguese slogan: 'The struggle continues!'.

ABSTRACT

In 2000, Zimbabwe's century old land movement took a swift turn, rupturing into nationwide occupation of mainly White owned commercial farms. The speed with which occupations spread, their organisation, the political and economic context, the historical origins and interaction of the forces, shaped an unprecedented and complex land movement impacting on the region, the continent and beyond. Zimbabwe's land occupations were unique in two ways. First, the leading role of War Veterans of the 1970s anti-colonial guerrilla war in the land occupations was exceptional. Second, the simultaneous challenge to racial, settler economic dominance and neo-colonialism by marginalised peasants, farm workers, war veterans, urban youth and the unemployed, was a new experience in post-colonial history of Africa's liberation movements. Zimbabwe's land occupations were a long continuum of land struggles to resolve the colonial legacy of racial resource distribution but as they occurred, the role played by the state, the contested terrain of the civil society, formidable political opposition and imperialist interventions of western powers clouded the identity of the land movement thereby making it difficult to distinguish the moving current and the identity of forces from the wider political conflicts swirling around it. Who exactly initiated the occupations and for what reasons? This thesis attempts to unpack these intricately locked forces in a bid to understand their origins, interests, strategies, tactics and above all, the alliances between and amongst them, for clearer understanding of the core of the movement. This thesis traces the history of Zimbabwe's liberation movement as foundation to understanding political reconfigurations that shaped post independence social movements and assesses agrarian technology responses to such a dramatic social change of Africa's post-colonial settler society. The thesis provokes prognostic thoughts about the role played by social capital of liberation struggles in future economic and cultural emancipation from shackles of neo-colonialism and racial, settler capitalism.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
ANP	African Nationalistic Paradigm
APs	Assembly Points
AREX	Agricultural Research and Extension
ARP	Accelerated Resettlement Program
ASPEF	Agricultural Sector Productivity Enhancement Facility
AZTREC	Association of Zimbabwe Traditional Ecologists
BSAC	British South Africa Company
CA	Communal Agriculture
CFU	Commercial Farmers Union
CICSA	Centre for Indigenous Cultures in Southern Africa
CIO	Central Intelligence Organisation
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DA	District Administrator
DDF	District Development Fund
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Program
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
FROLIZI	Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Program
HC	High Court
HRTSA	Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MOTSRUD	Management Outreach Training for Rural and Urban Development
MWART	Mashonaland West Mining, Agricultural, Residential and Tourism Association
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NDP	National Democratic Party
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OCCZIM	Organisation of Collective Cooperatives of Zimbabwe
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PTSD	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
RDC	Rural District Council
RSF	Rhodesian Security Forces
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SC	Supreme Court
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UN	United Nations
WFD	Westminster Foundation for Democracy
WVA	War Veterans Association
ZANLA	Zimbabwe National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZIPA	Zimbabwe People's Army
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

ZIRCIK	Zimbabwe Resource Centre for Indigenous Knowledge
ZLP	Zimbabwe Liberators Platform
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army
ZNLWVA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police
ZUD	Zimbabwe Union of Democrats
ZUM	Zimbabwe Unity Movement

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

In February 2000, Zimbabwe's land movement took a dramatic twist, sparked by a referendum to decide on a new constitution for the country. A 'no' vote prevailed against the government-sponsored draft constitution. A few days after the vote, War Veterans of the 1970s guerrilla war that led to Zimbabwe's independence from Britain in 1980, occupied a derelict White-owned farm just outside the south-eastern capital of, Masvingo located in Masvingo Province, in protest. The War Veterans claimed that the referendum, an event in which the country's White population had participated more actively than any other election since independence, was in essence an organised 'no' vote against the land clause included in the draft constitution. The clause stated that land for resettlement would be taken compulsorily, and only land improvements would be compensated. Compensation, the draft constitution stated, would have to be paid by the British government, as the power standing behind by the colonial authority that had originally appropriated the land.[4]

The occupation received wide coverage in local media, triggering a contagious mass movement through which occupations spread like a veldt fire across the country. The actors included peasants, urban workers, professionals, farm workers and political activists. Occupiers played different roles at different times, intermittently facing stiff resistance from the opposition and commercial farmers, and in some cases the situation degenerated into bloody violence ending in loss of life.

The occupations of 2000 occurred when Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the ruling party, and President Mugabe were all under the most formidable political challenge to their authority since independence. Since 1990, when an Economic Structural Adjustment Policy was adopted by the government, there had been progressive deterioration of the economy with widespread retrenchments, industrial decline, negative economic growth, huge balance of payments deficit, rising inflation and countless micro economic problems. Chronic poverty began to spread, increasing the gap between rich and poor. Gradual reorganisation from below, rupturing explosively in 2000, seemingly signalled the advent of a new political era in the country.

The Zimbabwe land occupations were very controversial among Zimbabweans and abroad. They drew the attention of the international community and resulted in intense diplomatic pressure on the country from Europe and the USA. The land occupations were carried out amid major activity by the political opposition organised as the Movement for Democratic Change posing a serious challenge to the post colonial state. Occupations were also intermingled with violent political

[4] The British government had promised to provide funds for resettlement to the new Zimbabwe government at the Lancaster House Conference (Selby 2006).

campaigns by various groups, making it difficult to distinguish land occupations sustained by land hunger dating from the colonial period of peasants and agricultural workers from spoiling operations linked to the political survival tactics of ZANU-PF, state functionaries and President Robert Mugabe.

Moreover, state organs like the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), the police, the army and service departments, and parastatals like the District Development Fund, actively participated in the 'invasions' (as some term them) in various ways at different times. This added to the suspicions of many, including foreign observers, that the land movement was not (this time) initiated from below, but was driven by forces external to the agrarian community, and was top-down.

This thesis seeks to contribute analytically to the debate about the correct characterisation of land occupations, including a focus on the critical issue of government intervention and its influence over the process of occupation. But looking at government actions alone will not shed sufficient light on the subject, because the incumbent government was born out of a broader liberation movement, spearheaded by but representing a wider spread of interests than subsequently absorbed within the political mainstream represented by ZANU-PF (itself a united front of the former PF ZAPU and ZANU-PF).[5] Deeper understanding of the history of the liberation movement is called for, in order to explain the evolving tactics and actions of the ZANU-PF government and its shifting positions regarding the land movement.

1.2 Land and race dichotomies

Land occupations in Zimbabwe did not start in 2000, after the referendum, but have a history continuous with the anti-colonial struggle triggered by British colonisation in 1890 (Ranger 1967; 1970, Davidson 1988) and the subsequent distribution of land on racial lines, with Africans moved to areas of poor agricultural potential (Moyana 1987, Moyo 2001, Sadomba 2007). The African struggle for fairer land redistribution became the main form of conflict between a settler community of European descent and indigenous people, and this extends into the post independence period, since the Lancaster House agreements through which independence from Britain was finally agreed, allowed a redistribution of land only through the principle of 'willing buyer,

[5] The country's first nationalist movement was the Southern Rhodesian African National Youth League that was formed in August 1955 under the leadership of James Chikerema, George Nyandoro and Dunduzu Chisiza. The Youth League joined the Bulawayo branch of the old African Nationalist Congress (ANC) and formed a revitalised ANC in 1957 led by Joshua Nkomo. The ANC was banned in 1959 leading to the formation of the National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1960 led by Joshua Nkomo. The NDP was banned the following year in 1961. The Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) was formed on December 18, 1961 again under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo and was banned in 1962 after its leadership was arrested. The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was formed (by mostly Shona people) on 8 August 1963 as a splinter of ZAPU and was banned in 1964. The banning of the two nationalist parties resulted into the re-organisation of the parties in exile, operating in neighbouring Zambia, Botswana, and other countries like Tanzania, Ghana and Egypt. ZAPU formed an armed wing, Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPRA) and ZANU formed Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA). The two waged the war of liberation from the 1960s that brought about independence in 1980.

willing seller'. The violent appropriation of land from the indigenous population was never matched by a comprehensive de-appropriation.

The land issue undoubtedly changed form and intensity during the colonial period, but it remained the central focus for the nationalist movement, and later fuelled the guerrilla war that precipitated the need for the Lancaster House negotiations, resulting in Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. In effect, that negotiation was a peace process, and like many such peace processes, led to a cessation of hostilities without removing or fully resolving the tensions underlying war. In this respect Zimbabwe was different from other decolonisation processes in British Africa, and it can now be seen that a generation later true peace has yet to be found. As such, the explosion centring on the 2000 land occupations evidences a complex matrix of unresolved historical and agrarian issues central to understanding the social tensions at the heart of Zimbabwe's current economic and political predicament today. The international community sees Zimbabwe's current problems as centring on a time-expired president. The data and analysis presented in this thesis support a finer-grained and more sociological and historical perspective. In this thesis it will be argued that what is needed is a full resolution of Zimbabwe's agrarian question. The purpose of the thesis, therefore, is to look at the causal factors underpinning the agrarian rupture of 2000.

1.2.1 The land problem as a race problem

Racial land distribution started in 1894 after the defeat of Chief Lobengula, when the Matebele people were moved to the Gwaai and Shangaan Reserves (Davidson 1988). Other native reserves were created around the country. In 1930, the Land Apportionment Act was promulgated, effectively dividing the country into exclusively White and Black farming areas, in terms of ownership. The White areas were the richer, better watered highlands, and the African areas were generally the lower lying, drier areas with poor potential for agriculture and infested with tsetse flies and mosquitoes that cause malaria. In 1950, the Land Husbandry Act was passed. This was a comprehensive attempt to bring African agriculture into line with the requirements of commodity-oriented (i.e. capitalist) production. But the act (and associated policies) also sought to change the mentality and institutions of the indigenous people. The linked policies aimed to change notions of tenure and land use, gender relations, and agronomic techniques, and to limit African livestock production, thereby affecting household reproduction. The Land Tenure Act of 1969 intensified efforts to effect the changes envisaged in the two earlier pieces of legislation, and the more pressure for change was intensified, the more the resentment and resistance of the Black population grew (Quinton 1960, Moyana 1987, Page and Page 1991, Sadomba, F. 1999).

By the time of independence in 1980 the skewed racial land distribution encapsulated the inherited problem of colonial legacy. Moyo and Yeros (2005) summarise the situation thus:

> *For its own part, the White agrarian bourgeoisie, some 6,000 farmers at independence, retained 39 percent of the land, amounting to 15.5 million hectares of prime agro-ecological farmland, while one million black households remained consigned to 41.4 percent of the land, or 16.4 million hectares of marginal land. In all, the White minority, at below 3 percent of the population, commanded nearly two-thirds of national income;*

> *while the black majority, at 97 percent, took the remaining one-third. (Moyo and Yeros 2005)*

In other words the land problem was a problem of racial distribution, and it was not resolved in the post independence period. The government policy of peace-making with a White landed elite (i.e. reconciliation) was interpreted to mean 'a one-off process whereby Whites were forgiven for their past oppression of Blacks, and whereby unequal national resources allocations, including the fixed heritage of land were to remain largely as they were before 1980' (Moyo 1995). The status quo was maintained. The policy of reconciliation, operating under the Lancaster House Constitution, not only preserved White supremacy politically and economically, but it also made the racial dimension of the land problem in Zimbabwe a taboo which the nation had yet to squarely face (Moyo 1995). However, the issue of race was not the only problem that the government had to deal with in the post independence period. Other agrarian problems of equal importance had to be dealt with. Some are outlined in the next section.

1.3 Resulting agricultural dualism

At independence the government was faced with a dual system of agriculture. This inherited system survived under a very complex political dispensation. On one hand the new regime was confronted by the poorer classes of society, tempered in a liberation struggle, and having high expectations for land distribution. On the other hand, it faced an established White settler community with long term experience in dealing with state formations and skilled in influencing political directions that would place them in a vantage position to control land ownership. Government strategy was to forge a practical alliance with White agrarian capital, while sustaining its populist rhetoric in the face of mass expectations (Moore 1990, Moyo 1995, McCandless 2005, Selby 2006). Moyo and Yeros (2005: 171), citing Mandaza and Sibanda, succinctly sum up this alliance as follows:

> *The 'post-white- settler colonial state' was a particular variety of the neo-colonial state, for formal power had not been ceded to a black petty bourgeoisie alone; instead, the aspiring black bourgeoisie would share power with the established white-settler capital (Mandaza 1986a, 1986b). Ideologically, this political dispensation was cast in the form of 'reconciliation' and echo of post war 'partnership' consisting of effectively in a reconciliation* ***not*** *'between races' but 'with capital' (Sibanda 1988).*

Another detailed study of the alliance between White commercial farmers and government was undertaken by Selby (2006), who devotes his PhD thesis[6] to analysis of the complex alliance between the settler commercial farmers and the state during the colonial period through to the post independence era. Selby (2006: 145) notes that 'The alliance was remarkable given the history of settler farming and the legacy of

[6] Selby's thesis will be extensively referenced in this introduction for two reasons. First, it is the first detailed study of the nature of the internal organisation, strategies and tactics of the White farmer community, and how its grip on land was sustained from colonial to post independence times. Secondly, Selby exposes White farmer tactics of political manipulation and alliance with key state officials in order to maintain control over the pace and scale of land redistribution. As a son of a former White farmer Selby offers important 'participant' insights into a key process largely inaccessible to the present researcher.

the war, but more intricate autopsy reveals the complexity of the arrangement.' Selby (2006) illustrates that an organised, though varied, White farmer community led by the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU)[7] produced political strategists with outstanding abilities to manipulate the state and sustain the alliance. They organised 'regular meetings and social interaction with targeted ministers, at which the President, Vice President and Director [of CFU] would build up personal trust in key individuals' in government and ZANU-PF. 'When [John] Laurie[8] took office', writes Selby, 'he had 30 ministerial meetings in the first two months, including three with Mugabe[!].' However Selby's thesis fails to capture the internal dynamics of the liberation movement especially in the post war period, in order to offer a comprehensive explanation to the breakdown of the alliance. This thesis argues that the breakdown of this alliance was mainly due to the internal opposition within the liberation movement. The internal conflicts, epitomised by a war veteran led opposition, challenged the ruling elite for negating liberation objectives of which the alliance with White capital was seen as the causal factor.

However, although these meetings were under the banner of reconciliation (even if hidden from popular view) it became clear to many rank-and-file onlookers that the ruling elite of ZANU-PF and the President, Robert Mugabe himself, were in effect betraying the liberation agenda and 'sleeping with the enemy' (Selby 2006). Policy at the top caused disquiet among some of the ruling party members, who 'were averse to the high profile relationship with commercial farmers, and felt that the ideals of the liberation struggle had been betrayed' according to Kumbirai Kangai, former member of Revolutionary Council (Dare reChimurenga) and Minister of Labour at the time (Selby 2006). This sense of betrayal was especially strong among the War Veterans who had not only born the brunt of the struggle but who now found themselves relegated to the margins of policy formation in the immediate post independence period.

Under this politics of racial reconciliation the new government decided to maintain the status quo with regards to land ownership, engaging in only a limited resettlement program (1980-4) under the Lancaster House provisions. Government acquired a total of 1,172 farms totalling 2,587,735 ha, under the 'willing buyer, willing seller' proviso (Rugube *et al.* 2003) and settled 35,000 families by 1985. 'The 1981/82 and 1982/83 financial years accounted for 70 percent of all land purchases up to 1989' (Alexander 2006: 115). The surging momentum of the liberation struggle demanded some action on land, but the steps taken met only a small proportion of the demand. The program was mostly a process of regularising land occupied by peasants, War Veterans and farm workers, beginning in the zones liberated during the guerrilla war. The program was thus termed an 'accelerated' resettlement

[7] The union of White commercial farmers (CFU) started soon after the colony of Rhodesia was established in 1890 (Lee 1974). The organisations developed from strength to strength in different forms and became the organisational structure for White settlers. The CFU continues to exist even today.

[8] 'John Laurie, Sinclair's vice-president and successor, was widely considered the most effective CFU President since Independence, even in government circles.' *David Hasluck [CFU President] described Laurie as 'the straightest of the Presidents … the honest broker of the alliance.'* (Selby 2006: 148).

program, with provision of minimum infrastructure to allow rapid settler placement. One might say it went fast, but not far.[9]

The amount allocated from 1980 for resettlement, as a proportion of national budget was very little. For example, land reform was allocated less than one percent of the national budget in contrast to defence that had in access of 15 percent, which (i.e. 5 percent of the gross domestic product) in the 1980s (Selby 2006). This allocation was less than government's 'annual maize subsidies to private grain millers and consumers, which stood at over one billion Zimbabwe Dollars per annum until 1993' (Moyo 1995). Government reaction to popular demands for land from the mid 1980s will be discussed in Chapter 4 and 5. When landless peasants and War Veterans attempted self provisioning of land they were evicted in many cases. Moyo (2001: 21) presents the government's response as follows:

> *The brutality with which ... evictions were carried out, both by police and farmers, were reminiscent of colonial era evictions ... in the decades prior to Independence. This was coupled with increasing violence by property owners, particularly white farmers, against illegal occupants [termed 'squatters'], often with implicit or explicit state approval. … However, 'squatting' as a concept … gains meaning within a particular moral framework that is codified as 'law' by the state [-] Rhodesian law defined a squatter as 'an African whose house happens to be situated in an area which has been declared European or is set apart for some other reason*.'

Thus doubts are raised whether nationalist leaders were sufficiently committed to land redistribution in particular and to transforming the nature of life of marginalised Africans in general, in view of their propagation of Rhodesian legal concepts and violent eviction of the land hungry. The government did not remove the settler capitalist system and left the economic systems largely intact.

1.4 Resettlement and changing objectives

The original objectives of the resettlement program are outlined in a document, *Resettlement Policies and Procedures* (Harare Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development 1980). These can be summarised as (Gunning *et al*. 2000)

1. To alleviate population pressure in the communal areas
2. To extend and improve the base of the largest and poorest sector of the population
3. To improve the level of living standards of the largest and poorest sector of the population
4. To provide, at the lower end of the scale, opportunities for people who have no land and who are without employment and may therefore be classed as destitute

[9] In principle, the Fast Track Resettlement Programme of 2000 was similar to the accelerated resettlement programme. Both were preceded by extensive land occupations which the government had to regularise by officially allocating land. Both programmes disregarded the set standards of infrastructural provision, although the former provided more than the latter. Both were low cost operations. For example, Selby (2006: 133) says this about the ARP, '*ZANU-PF initiated an Accelerated Resettlement Programme (ARP), whereby 'squatters' were permitted to remain on land they had occupied. This legitimised the self-provisioning of land*'. On the fast track land reform, Sachikonye (2005: 33) wrote: '*From July 2000 onwards, the government defined the parameters of the land distribution process (also termed jambanja) more clearly. It was to be implemented at an accelerated pace through a fast-track programme*'.

5. To bring abandoned or underutilised land into full production as one facet of implementing an equitable program of land redistribution
6. To expand or improve the infrastructure of economic production
7. To achieve national stability and progress in a country that has only recently emerged from the turmoil of war.

The accelerated resettlement program (ARP) was implemented 1980-5. Its initial target population was to resettle 18,000 families on 1.1 million ha. This was quickly revised upwards, and by 1983 the target was 162,000 families. However this change in targets was not based on serious evaluation of the land demand but on political decision by President Mugabe.[10] The increase in the official target differed from a much lower real number of settlements as Moyo (1995: 123) argues:

> *The pace of resettlement was fast in the first four years of the 1980s, with around 10,000 families settled per annum, only to slow down to less than 5,000 families settled per annum during the late 1980s. This reflected massive political pressure for access to land in the first few years, during a period when hegemony over leftist intellectuals, ex-combatants and party leaders, as well as peasant communities was still uncertain. (Moyo 1995: 123)*

From 1986, criteria for beneficiary selection drastically changed, thereby throwing the original objectives of the program into doubt. Emphasis shifted from poverty alleviation, decongestion of communal lands, reduction of unemployment and benefitting those affected by the war,[11] to productivity. The Master Farmer Certificate[12] was then used as a basic qualification and proof of farming ability (Moyo 1995, Kinsey 1999a, Selby 2006). This was amidst tremendous pressure from Commercial farmers who argued that resettlement was unproductive and caused environmental degradation (Selby 2006) and what had already been done 'was more than adequate' (Moyo 1995). The productivity debate became more prominent as the accelerated resettlement program was implemented and eventually it became a dominant concern.[13]

From the late 1980s and subsequently the government approach was dominated by efficiency concerns, influenced by the neo-liberal market-oriented land reform policies of the donors agencies (the so-called Washington Consensus). Under these policies a Black middle class was earmarked for settlement (Moyo 1995) since only

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[10] '*According to Dr Mupawose (Secretary of Agriculture 1980-7) this figure emanated from the 1982 ZANU-PF party conference, where Mugabe stated that he wanted the program to be magnified threefold*' from 54,000 target of 1981 (Selby 2006: 130).

[11] '*It is estimated that over 80 per cent of [of beneficiaries of the early 1980s resettlement] fell into the categories of the most needy; refugees and the war-affected, the landless, and those with insufficient land to maintain themselves*' (Kinsey 1999a: 181).

[12] The Master Farmer programme was started by a colonial missionary-extensionist, Emory Alvord, as a combined strategy for religious conversion and transformation of African agriculture through 'modern' techniques. The certificate was awarded to those who had demonstrated satisfactorily that they had abandoned African agricultural practices (and ways of thinking). Recent research has argued that the African agronomic methods Alvord was fighting against were more environmentally sustainable and better for food security than he supposed (Sadomba, F. 1999).

[13] According to Kinsey (1999a: 176) policy was '*side-tracked unwittingly into the vacuous debate on agricultural productivity and the alleged superiority of large-scale farming provoked by the Commercial Farmers' Union's attacks on misuse of land in resettlement areas*.' See also Moyo (1995) and Selby (2006).

the 'middle peasant' would have the size of holding and market orientation to provide an efficient replacement for White farmers. Consolidation of a Black middle class in the agricultural sector continued, such that 'in late 1997 the state identified ... 1,772 farms (4.6 million ha) for acquisition for resettlement. Forty percent of these farms (30 percent of the area) were apparently to be used to resettle "indigenous commercial farmers".' (Kinsey 1999a: 178). According to Kinsey (1999a), many of these were civil servants, members of the security services and ruling party apparatchiks, some of whom 'had benefitted in the past' (Kinsey 1999a) although Moyo argues that this fact is exaggerated (Personal communication with Sam Moyo 2007). Nevertheless, earlier commitment to redistributive justice had been abandoned by the ZANU-PF government. [14]

The logic and justice of this policy trend has been questioned by some academic commentators, and in political circles also (Moyo 1995, Moyo and Yeros 2005). First, it seems illogical to give large land allocations to Black farmers, who often had to go through a steep learning curve to manage those big pieces of land, and as yet lacked other key factors of production, when already the inefficiencies of large-scale farms were being exposed (Moyo *et al.* 1991). Another argument was that land acquired for resettlement had first to be allocated to many landless people who needed it badly for livelihood. Thirdly the new form of redistribution favoured capitalist accumulation at the expense of the mass of the poor (Moyo 1995). With the recent experience of the former Soviet block in mind history teaches that the first generation of beneficiaries in any ill-considered redistribution of former state resources tend to be 'asset strippers' rather than 'production minded'.

This policy continues to shape newer developments. The Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) in 2000 reserved land for 'A2 farmers' (i.e. those presumed able to farm on a large scale) and remains one of the most criticised aspects of government land policy up until the time of writing. The rationale to remove a White farmer and replace with a Black farmer on the same piece of land has been under attack from many quarters on the grounds that these large farms are mainly given to elites of the ruling party (Kinsey 1999a). Although the matter raises a huge emotional storm, leading to exaggerated claims at times, the class bias of the program has not been disputed by scholars and analysts[15], and challenges to it from below are one of the central issues examined in this thesis and strengthens Moyo and Yero's (2005) argument.

The issue, it should be noted, is one of justice (in land reallocation) versus productivity. This opposition is a smoke screen raised (for their own purposes) by the White farmers, but now used as a pretext by government. Lack of faith in the peasant levels productivity and fears that significant resettlement might cause

[14] This view about small-scale farming, once entrenched, did not subsequently change, and it was the basis for preferring to lease government-acquired land, under the guise of indigenisation and Black empowerment, to senior civil servants (representatives of a rising Black bourgeoisie) and associates of the ruling oligarchy, 'to cement corroding political loyalty' (Kinsey 1999a: 174, Moyo 1995). For example, '*Bartha Farm in Wedza, which was acquired in April 1993 for the resettlement of 33 families, had instead been allocated to ex-Agriculture Minister Mangwende*' (Selby 2006: 222).

[15] For example, Moyo (1995: 20) states that '*Government's political balancing ... tends to favour elites to the detriment of the rural poor' a point which has been presented in a variety of ways by critics of the land reform*' (Kinsey 1999a, Hammar and Raftopolous 2003, Alexander 2006, Selby 2006).

hunger belongs to the mythic charter of the settler class, but is based on little hard evidence. Kinsey (1999a: 174) observes:

> *Despite evidence that small-scale farming can be a powerful source of growth in Zimbabwe, support to the sub-sector dwindled in the late 1980s and throughout the late 1990s. Over this same period, a myth grew in political thinking, promoted by vigorous lobbying, that the beneficiaries of the land reform program were the least productive farmers in the country and thus undeserving of the land they had been 'given'. Concrete, unbiased evidence to sustain this myth is almost non-existent.*[16]*(Kinsey 1999a: 174)*

Mythic charters assist rulers to assert hegemony. The independent government of Zimbabwe soon realised that the land issue, as conceptualised in the productivity debate by the settler class, could be adapted to its own hegemonic needs. Land grants could be used to reward desired elements associated with the regime. Henceforth, land became an important tool of patrimonial governance. It is therefore not surprising that government quickly abandoned any proactive role in land redistribution and only engaged in it to suit its own purposes, or when (from time to time) forced to acknowledge facts established on the ground by determined occupiers. This establishes a point to which this thesis regularly returns – that land redistribution was a tool of governance, while land occupation was a tool of a certain kind of political force within the post independence liberation movement opposed to the ruling oligarchy. When the government appears from time to time (in the story unfolded below) to side with land occupiers, it is doing so in an attempt to retain control over its own preferred instrument of political control.

A few data help support the point just made. Figures on land distribution show that government was not proactive, but only reacted to the momentum of occupiers, once resettlement of peasants stalled from the mid 1980s, despite clear continued land demand by these people. Government acquired land for resettlement, but it did not distribute it to the land hungry, as a comparison of Tables 1.1 and 1.2 shows. Government commitment to serious agrarian transformation is also questionable when fiscal allocations are considered from the year 2000 as shown in Table 1.3. The figures show that, 'despite the fact that GoZ is a signatory of the Maputo Declaration of 2003 which mandates African governments to allocate at least 10 percent of national budgetary resources to agriculture', this ration was never achieved, the best attempt being in 2006 and 2007 in the fluctuation graph to allocation.

[16] Kinsey (1999a) argues that the judgement against resettled Africans in the 1980s was faulty in that '*considerable body of region-specific and international received wisdom advises that the benefits – or otherwise – of programmes which involve large-scale human resettlement are unlikely to become apparent in less than a generation [yet] sweeping judgements on the programme nevertheless began to appear within just a few years of its (resettlement programme) inception*.' Kinsey (1999a) also cites a document of the British aid ministry (Overseas Development Administration 1988) which characterises Zimbabwe's resettlement programme as 'impressive' in achieving its objectives and contributing to post war reconstruction and stability, with a quoted rate of return on investment of (a satisfactory) 21 percent . See also Selby (2006: 221) who notes that in 1992 Dr. Ndimande, Secretary for Agriculture, mentioned to the CFU that he did not simply want reproduction of resettlement areas ... or a continuation of the dualist farming structure. He wanted the 'integration of competent Black farmers'.

Table 1.1 Land purchased for resettlement (1980-1990)

Financial year	Land purchased in ha	Amount paid in ZW $
1979-1980	87,415	1,699,750
1980-1981	223,196	3,517,198
1981-1982	900,196	18,803,158
1983-1984	75,058	2,966,849
1985-1986	86,187	4,444,610
1986-1987	133,518	3,898,335
1987-1988	20,319	874,200
1988-1989	63,917	2,807,335
1989-1990	91,266	10,508,100
Total	2,780,863	76,164,890

Source: Auditor General's report 1993, as cited in Moyo (1995: 122)

Table 1.2 Land acquired for resettlement but not yet occupied (1993)

Province	Area in ha	Cost in ZW $
Manicaland	2,137	496,600
Mashonaland East	9,234	1,970,500
Mashonaland Central	9,987	1 644,714
Mashonaland West	11,162	280,000
Midlands	15,202	812,400
Masvingo	1,954	79,300
Matabeleland North	9,444	449,500
Matabeleland South	176,868	3,308,455
Total	235,988	9,041,469

Source: Auditor General's report 1993, as cited in Moyo (1995: 122)

Table 1.3 Government fiscal support to agriculture since 2000

Year	National budget (ZW $ in millions)	Allocation to agriculture	Percentage share (%)
2000	109,197.2	2,173.2	2.0
2001	276,450.0	5,520.4	2.0
2002	421,926.3	16,943.1	4.0
2003	783,934.0	40,549.1	5.0
2004	7,747,638.5	497,615.3	6.0
2005	28,363,608.4	1,000,155.3	4.0
2006	430,836,273.0	32,198,830.0	7.47
2007[17]	41,725,656.0	3,053,734.0	7.32
2008	7,905,314,086.0	366,858,058.0	4.64

Source: Pazvakavambwa, cited in Moyo (2008); data from GoZ estimates of revenue and expenditure

[17] Three zero's had been slashed from the local currency in July 2006 by the RBZ.

The Lancaster House negotiation of 1979 yielded positive results for White commercial farmers and settlers in general, since it provided a focus on agrarian issues (e.g. the maintenance of an agricultural export economy) through which the settlers managed to manipulate, and to an extent co-opt, nationalist leaders, and thus to forge an alliance through which their position in independent Zimbabwe could be safeguarded. As with many peace processes, key issues were bargained among the main politically influential parties, and then presented to a war weary populace, euphoric that the fighting has ended, as a 'policy' of reconciliation. What this did, in fact, was not to resolve an old injustice, but to embed the issue over which the parties had been fighting within a new power-sharing scenario. Land was henceforth an issue over which Black and White political class fractions now to some extent had a common interest.

This alliance between commercial farmers and the state was, of course, no new thing in the politics of the country. Settler farmers had for a long time managed to influence the state, both directly and indirectly, throughout the colonial period (Lee 1974, Selby 2006). The settler farmer movement started to grow soon after colonial conquest in 1890, and by 1904 Southern Rhodesia had twelve farming associations formed 'for the protection of farming interests'. Selby (2006) insists that White farmers grew from strength to strength and argues, contrary to other researchers, that, 'whilst the RF and the Rhodesian state weakened [during Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)], the relative power of farmers within the White electorate actually strengthened.' This 'powerful farmer group' was able to influence the course of political direction during UDI, shifting power from civilian administration to a military bureaucracy spreading to the farms and businesses. By the time of the Lancaster House negotiations and subsequent Independence, settler White farmers were politically mature and highly experienced in dealing with the state and manipulating it to their advantage. However the politics of post independence was qualitatively different from the colonial period in that the new state was now a product of a liberation struggle whose internal forces and contradictions introduced a completely new political scenario, a point which White commercial farmers did not appreciate. As a result they continued to act as if they possessed both the land and political power as manifest in their arrogant challenges to government land acquisition program, which government was under pressure from below (Moyo 1994).[18]

There was latent but escalating polarisation between protagonists for land redistribution and those who had reservations about it. The debate for land redistribution shifted from the moral argument over redress of injustices and land demands by the poor to the economics of resettlement and evaluation of the added value and productivity associated with settler agriculture (linked to potential claims for compensation, should matters deteriorate politically). Those who opposed resettlement like commercial farmers thought that settler productivity was low, while environmental degradation was high in the resettlement areas of the early 1980s. Productivity as criterion for accessing land as a resource endowment was an

[18] Selby (2006: 218) has underplayed this stance by the White commercial farmers which is highlighted by Moyo (1994) yet it is critical in two ways. First, the arrogance and inflexibility of the farmers put the government that was under pressure from the masses, in a corner. Second, by pointing out that Ministers farms had to be designated first, resorting to the private media, the courts and advocacy with western powers undermined the negotiation route and introduced direct conflict leading to inevitable breakdown of the alliance.

old-age debate. It is rooted in John Locke's theories of enclosure – Locke was a pioneer of the labour theory of value, and thought that land had no value until improved (Wood 1984) and became a major argument for land dispossession of the Black peasants in the first 50 years of colonial rule. In an argument spearheaded by Emory Alvord, founder of the Native Agriculture Department in Rhodesia, African agriculture was considered wasteful, inefficient and of low productivity, thereby justifying dispossession of its owners, and reallocation of land to White settlers (Page and Page 1991, Alvord undated a; 1928a; 1928b; 1929; 1948; Bolding 2004, McGregor 1995, Moyo 2001). However, this convenient sentiment contradicted facts on the ground. Longitudinal surveys by Bill Kinsey from early 1982, studying farmers settled from 1980 and spanning more than two decades are very revealing and demand attention, considering the lengthy period of time required for valid conclusions to be drawn on any attempted agrarian transformation. Comparing production between farmers in communal agriculture (CA) areas (i.e. farmers cultivating under customary rights) and farmers, originating in these but now resettled on reassigned land, Kinsey (1999a: 194) concludes that:

> *Zimbabwe's resettlement program [such as it is!] has ... resulted in both higher incomes and more equally distributed income ... Resettled households crop twice the amount of land and earn more than three times the unit revenues of CA families. Values of livestock, crop production, food and non food expenditure, and holdings of cereal stocks are all higher and more equitably distributed in RAs than in the neighbouring CAs. Further, the average RA household relies far less on cash remittances and spends much less on staple cereals than its CA counterpart. (Gunning et al. 2000: 13)*

Benefitting from Kinsey's longitudinal surveys over 17 years then compare social and economic wellbeing of resettled farmers and the communal farmers left behind. The authors conclude that:

> *(i) there has been an impressive accumulation of assets by these households; (ii) while this accumulation has played a role in increases in crop income, it appears that increases in returns to these assets have been especially important in generating the dramatic increase in crop incomes ... (iii) differences in initial conditions ... such as previous farming experience, have few persistent effects ... their impact is virtually non-existent by 1995/96.*

These studies dispel the Alvordian myth about small-scale farming in Zimbabwe. They also reveal that changing criteria for resettlement to Master Farmer qualifications was a groundless requirement, with no bearing on the alleged under-productivity of resettled farmers. Within three years of production, as Gunning *et al*. (2000) observed, previous training, including Master Farmer programs, had no significant effect.[19] These data argue that the official policy of preferring 'qualified' farmers simply encapsulates an old colonial myth. The myth was nurtured from the 1920s as a fundamental plank of policy of colonial agriculture in Rhodesia (Sadomba, F. 1999). Its persistence in policy circles rests on no valid empirical data, and served only to reinforce abandonment of the original objectives of the resettlement program in favour of the hegemony of the ruling party elite.

[19] The Master Farmer programme was formal training and extension given to selected few peasants who established demonstration plots. Agricultural extension workers trained the farmers in mono-cropping, use of fertilisers and the plough, and conservation. Master Farmers were awarded certificates for successful abandonment of African agriculture (Sadomba 1999).

The Alvordian perspective, revived and adopted for its own purposes by the government after Independence, did not have it all its own way. A counter-argument in the productivity debate was developed by pointing out the inefficiency of large-scale farming in Zimbabwe. Large-scale commercial farmers underutilised the land that they owned. Moyo *et al.* (1991: 61) make a critical observation regarding underutilisation of land by commercial farmers:

> *There was considerable under-utilisation of land on commercial farms. In the 1981/82 season, in Mashonaland, only 10 percent of the land that is potentially arable was actually cropped and this represented 75 percent of the total area cropped by the commercial sector in the whole country ... Overall, 34 percent of the large scale commercial farmers land is cultivated and 66 percent is fallow ... as much as 1.45 million ha out of 4.3 million ha of land found in the high potential land of Mashonaland remained uncultivated in the 1983/84 season.*

The distribution of land, as a major means of production, also entails access to public resources. Financing agriculture through subsidies, concessionary interest rates, inputs, infrastructure (for irrigation, transport, communication and power), and access to export processing zones with many exemptions, all tended to favour the established commercial farmers at the expense of the communal small-scale farmers. Policies, especially after adoption of an Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) in 1990, were designed to cushion large-scale farmers and to promote exports. This became an incentive to farmers to divert from supplying food to the local market to export crops like tobacco, even during times of drought,[20] with disastrous food security consequences. Such policies widened the gap between the rich and the poor:

> *... more [commercial] farmers indulged in (imported) luxury goods - power-boats, luxury vehicles and larger farmhouses ... Many senior farming respondents lamented these ostentatious displays of wealth, and identified them as key drivers of class and race resentment ... so displays of wealth by some farmers shaped the direction and tone of public debate. (Selby 2006: 196)*

A widening agrarian income gap that might be reduced through resettlement had potential for social unrest and racial conflict, as Kinsey warned:

> *... genuine poverty reduction through resettlement is possible. Yet there appears little recognition at the policy level that, through land reform Zimbabwe has the potential [for] ... national development ... Declines in inequality are likely to reinforce political stability ...When incomes of a political or economic elite are high or increasing rapidly, while the income of rural non elites stagnate, there is risk that large segments of the population will become politically alienated. Declining inequality implies, in contrast, that non-elites are sharing in the benefits of economic growth ... These are considerations ZANU-PF would do well to weigh carefully in the years ahead. (Kinsey 1999a: 195)*

Unfortunately, the ZANU-PF government did not seem committed to broad based resettlement as a progressive principle for poverty alleviation, but only used it as

[20] For example, during the 1992 drought, the worst in Zimbabwe's living memory, commercial farmers were offered parallel market prices of ZW $1,000/tonne (itself almost 181 percent of the official price of ZW $550.00/tonne) to induce them to sell their maize to the state Grain Marketing Board for distribution to the population on the brink of starvation, but the farmers still refused, demanding instead ZW $1,500/ton, i.e. 50 percent more than the parallel market price. They argued that they needed the maize for their livestock.

rhetoric from time to time, mainly during electoral campaigns. Anger and despondency grew among poor peasants, farm workers and neglected War Veterans, feeding the militant land occupation movement led by former fighters, long dissatisfied with the 'reconciliation' negotiated under the Lancaster House agreement. Land occupation (as argued above) developed as an expression of political dissent, even while government was (nominally) committed to the idea of land redistribution. As Kinsey (1999a) perceptively sensed a social movement was coalescing around the notion of direct action to reclaim land. In the momentous year of 2000 this movement erupted in a simultaneous rising against the White settler agrarian property owning group and its allies of convenience, the neo-colonial regime.

1.5 Land distribution as political tool

That land would be the centre of political struggle in Zimbabwe can be sensed from the proceeding of the Lancaster House talks. The commercial farmers influenced this agreement to protect their interests. In the Bill of Rights, enshrined in the Lancaster House Constitution there is a key land clause prohibiting compulsory acquisition of property, and guaranteeing fair compensation on a 'willing buyer, willing seller' basis. The nationalist leaders resisted this element, but yielded after being promised money (from Britain) to buy land for resettlement.[21] Selby (2006: 112) argues that this was:

> *Effective and shrewd diplomacy, conducted in the well-organised manner in which the CFU had lobbied for decades and would continue to do for years to come. [A]n updated version of the willing-buyer, willing-seller paper, which the final constitution was based on [had] The Bill of Rights clause [that] protected the interests of the white farming community and restricted the ability of the inheriting powers to deliver much of the land-based expectation immediately, whilst the funding guarantees will remain one of the great unanswered controversies in Zimbabwean history.*

With benefit of hindsight the position of the Patriotic Front at Lancaster House seems difficult to understand, and may indicate that the Front was already divided about how to proceed. On one hand, in agreeing to the British funding package, the nationalists seemed determined to ensure that land would be taken from the White commercial farmers for widespread and speedy resettlement of the landless. On the other hand, their rather rapid abandonment of the landless classes, as soon as Zimbabwe became independent, seems to cast doubt as to whether they were serious about their stance in the negotiations. Immediately after independence, Robert Mugabe announced the policy of reconciliation which, according to Selby:

> *... favoured the whites. This may have provided a cornerstone of stability, but enduring land and race inequities remained unresolved. 'Political neutrality' had been a guiding principle of CFU policy since the early 1970s, even though their proximity to the RF and the Rhodesian government amounted to an alliance. Their guiding principle to 'work with the government of the day' provided a slogan on which to justify their repositioning to an alliance with the Patriotic Front, which was the most visible symbol of settlement for both sides. (Selby 2006: 113)*

[21] *'Josiah Chinamano [prominent ZAPU politician] reassured delegates that if there were sufficient financial guarantees then ZAPU's land policy was directly in line with the CFU's. Both groups could agree, provided there was money'* (Selby 2006: 117).

How genuine were Patriotic Front leaders about the importance of the land issue, therefore, at Lancaster House? If they were, why did Mugabe announce the policy of reconciliation, and not long thereafter openly act against the landless whom he purported to stand for in the negotiations? Was land being used to garner support from the electorate only for the imminent elections? How would the landless and marginalised War Veterans react if finally land was not delivered as per their expectations? These are unavoidable questions when one considers the policy of reconciliation, subsequent stalling of the land resettlement program and alliance of the ruling party elites with White capital.

It can be noted that each time elections loom ZANU-PF made noises about the land issue, but did little or nothing to adequately address popular sentiment once the vote was secured (Moyo 2001). Nothing changed until it was faced with a formidable opposition from within (by War Veterans) and from outside, by Movement for Democratic Change. As we shall see in Chapter 6, a more activist stance on the land issue seemed a possible way of foiling vital leadership changes within the ruling party and heading off mass defection from the ruling party to the opposition. The regime now sought to make the land issue its trump card. President Mugabe, put himself in the forefront by becoming the de facto spokesman of the land movement, his earlier alliance with the White commercial farmers in the 1980s to 1990s notwithstanding.

In trying to make sense of these developments it is helpful to delve into the history of the liberation movement, post independence. A fundamental reconfiguration of forces within the liberation movement occurred soon after independence, resulting in the relegation of the ex-fighters (known in Zimbabwe as 'War Veterans') to the sidelines. This relegation took place under very complex circumstances. Soon after Independence the alliance of political parties that had waged the armed struggle sundered, after Robert Mugabe announced that he would not stand in the first general elections as a leader of the united Patriotic Front but as presidential candidate for ZANU-PF. This division increased long-standing lines of fissure between the two guerrilla armies,[22] and tensions degenerated into heavy fighting threatening civil war. The risk of escalation led to ex-combatants (i.e. those with weapons of fighting techniques) being treated with suspicion, and subjected to the constant risk of being labelled 'dissidents'. One consequence was that they were not allowed to participate in active party leadership, thereby curtailing the representation of their interests and concerns in the political process. Exclusion from active formal politics drove the War Veterans towards other modes of political expression, including interest in traditional religion.

[22] The main nationalist political parties, ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army) and ZANLA (Zimbabwe National Liberation Army), were arch rivals, following the outbreaks of violence and animosity between ZANU and ZAPU. This animosity resulted in an ethnically inflected uprising of dissidents, which the state used force to subdue, at the same time as punishing the population in scorched earth campaigns during which many civilians were killed. Some argued the killings were consciously intended to deter ZAPU political rivalry with ZANU.

Figure 1.1 So-called protected villages in 1980
The Smith regime had changed the rural landscape by putting people in 'keeps' where they were densely populated in order to isolate guerrillas. Peasants desperately needed land to change this situation.

Source: Photos by author, Chiweshe 1980

1.6 Land and religion

Use of African religious ideas was a long-established factor in mobilising mass support for the guerrilla struggle, so it made sense for veterans to continue to develop this modality as a way of projecting the land struggle into the public arena, even when the government wished to sweep it towards the sidelines in the interests of 'reconciliation' among rival (Black and White) elites. During the colonial period,

spirit mediums and chiefs were at the centre of social mobilisation around territorial claims.[23] For example, in the Eastern Highlands, the Tangwena land movement (1963-75) dragged the government to court in what became the most widely known case of resistance to the Land Apportionment (1930) and Land Tenure Acts (1969) during the colonial period (Moyana 1987, Moore 2005). Led by Chief Rekayi Tangwena and the Hwesa spirit mediums, the Tangwena people steadfastly refused to be moved from what had been designated European land. In the Matopo Hills, south of the country, the Sofasonke and Sofasihamba land movements were also led by chiefs, supported by the Mwali cult as the dominating religious influence (Ranger 1999).[24]

One of the most influential studies of religion as factor in the guerrilla struggle is a book by Lan (1985) entitled, *Guns and Rains: guerrillas and spirit mediums in Zimbabwe*. His work illustrates how Shona-speaking guerrillas used religion to mobilise support for the armed struggle. After analyzing the role of spirit mediums in traditional Shona social organisation and the management of ancestral territory, Lan traces the critical part played by spirit mediums in the mobilisation of peasants on the north-eastern front during the 1970s liberation war. Religion has a material base, and the activities of spirit mediums and ancestral spirits only fully makes sense when integrated with ideas about the indigenous agricultural system.

The indigenous agricultural system of the Shona people of Zimbabwe belongs to an agro-ecological religious complex prevailing over much of the farming zone in Africa (Mbiti 1969, Wiredu 1996, Eze 1998, Ramose 1999). Shona religion is composed of a spirit world with various levels: *midzimu* (ancestral spirits), *mashave* (professional spirits), animal spirits (*shave remhuka* e.g. *shave regudo)*, *ngozi* (avenging spirits) and the highest spirit of all, generally called *Mwari* (creator) (Ranger 1999, Sadomba, F 1999). The spirit world is understood to have its own internal dynamics, levels of seniority and different effect on human beings. It is also a world of both friendly and evil spirits. However, the spirit world always finds its way into the human society by expressing its wishes, interests or disappointments through mortal beings, or at times through nature, animals, caves and other phenomena (cf. Ranger 1999).

Shona cosmology also recognises the seniority of nature over humans, and the close association of nature with the spirit world. Nature is known to possess powers no human being can fully comprehend. As in many African systems of thought, nature, according to the Shona, is too vast and complex to conquer. Far from being dead and lifeless, nature can also be a medium of the spirit world, just as human beings can serve as mediums.

According to Shona belief, the creator (*Musikavanhu/Mwari)* created the first humans. These ancient ancestors are the ones who founded the many different clans and ethnic groups, which have then expanded by division and subdivision (Hodza and Fortune 1979, Hodza 1982, Chigwedere 1985). Memories or relics of the founders of each clan are kept and passed from one generation the next, especially through praise poems, and the reciting of oral traditions. These progenitors reside in the

[23] A spirit medium is a person through whom ancestral spirit(s) talk. The medium is said to be possessed by the spirit and is usually in a trance induced by song and dance specific for this purpose. The medium might not know what the spirit says and an aide keeps the record.
[24] See also (Sadomba 2004: 5).

nyikadzimu (spirit world) and influence their current descendants by possessing the spirit medium (*svikiro)* whenever they need to speak (Lan 1985, Ranger 1999)

The role of the spirit medium is to pass messages from the spirit world to mortals, and vice versa. Among others, some messages particularly concern agro-ecological management. They include preserving certain species of flora and fauna, prohibiting whole areas from human activity as *marambatemwa* (literally to be translated as 'places that refuse/cutting'; could be called ecological reserves in present-day idiom), or the declaration of certain points as sacred shrines, pools and caves (Hodza and Fortune 1979). The *svikiro* also performs the important social function of anointing the chief or headwoman of the clan, who then serves as the de facto administrator of the territory under her jurisdiction. Each headwoman or chief receives guidance on how to rule their subjects and to sustaining the environment from inputs from the spirit world through the *svikiro.* This is how the mortal is connected to the world of spirits. The ruler administers territory on behalf of and according to the wishes of the spirits of the land. This notion of territorial management provides the base of the system of land tenure values and customs. Thus, in crowning a chief (Hodza and Fortune 1979: 9) the Rozvi[25] King or his emissary recites:

> *Finally I say, here is a handful of soil, hold it in both hands.*
> *That shows you will rule the land and eat its fruit.*
> *Go pasture and guard every creature, big and small, in the land in which you are. (Hodza and Fortuen 1979: 9)*
> *'The ideology of the Shona stressed this: the ruler was given clods of earth at his (her) installation'. (Beach 1980: 21)*

War Veterans were keen to engage this institution in the land occupations, knowing the significance this had on claims to territory. As this thesis will show, spirit mediums led occupations before the rupture of 2000 and War Veteran-led occupations of 1998. Spirit mediums were (and remain) at the heart of agrarian community organisation, despite the alignment of many rural Zimbabwean with mission religion. As will be shown later, the occupation of Gomba (the study area) is a case in point.

1.7 Land ideology and War Veterans

This thesis is about the role played by Zimbabwe's War Veterans in the land occupations movement. The core of the land occupation movement is composed of people who participated in the liberation struggle. Through their exposure, association and training veterans developed certain distinct sets of (neo-traditional) values, rituals and ideologies affecting their actions in combat, and which have retained normative force in their activities in the post independence period. It will be argued that combat itself constituted a kind of ritual induction generating solidarities among veterans which have remained an active social force in the period of post independence peace (cf. Peters 2006).

The liberation war went through three main phases, namely Chitepo, Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA)[26] and Mugabe periods, each of which will be more fully

[25] The Rozvi are considered to have built the Great Mutapa Kingdom (See Beach 1984; 1994, Chigwedere 1980; 1985; 1992; 1998a; 1998b).

analysed in subsequent chapters. These phases each had its own distinctive types of recruits, leadership styles, levels of military engagement and ideological thrust, producing rather different sets of guerrilla fighters, in terms of their ideological persuasions and visions of emancipation. The Chitepo phase (1963-75) was the earliest period, followed by ZIPA (1975-7), the shortest of the three, and the Mugabe period (1977-2000+), the longest. The Chitepo phase, as will be analysed in the following chapter, was dominated by uneducated recruits of peasant background, many of whom were press-ganged in Zambia, with some later recruited from the hinterland of the north-eastern front (Mphoko undated). At this time, there was greater focus on military strategies and tactics, and little attention was placed on political education. This resulted in a highly militarised cadre of the guerrilla movement with limited political understanding.

The ZIPA period was a more developed phase, politically and militarily. Recruiting mostly from Manicaland, the war incorporated a large number of literate cadres, many of whom were secondary school leavers, with a sprinkling of undergraduates from the University. Workers from towns and mining areas also flocked into the movement during this period. In addition the leadership of the war changed hands from an 'old guard' to younger, more intellectually inclined, cadres shaped by a mixture of Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) ideologues. A more ideologically advanced cadre was fashioned during this period, and the pattern of military offensive changed, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Guerrillas from this period were exposed to political education that went beyond the more limited objectives of the older nationalists who wanted to replace the settler colonial government by a Black government without changing the economic structure of the country.

The Mugabe phase was the antithesis of the ZIPA period, in that this phase actively reversed the ideological education initiatives started under ZIPA. Advanced political education, climaxing the establishment of the Wampoa Political Academy in Mozambique in 1976, was immediately stopped when Mugabe took control over the movement. The focus on recruitment also changed. Selective recruitment (Tungamirai 1995), which is tantamount to handpicking of nationalists from abroad, without experience of participating in the armed struggle - was driven by the top hierarchy of the nationalist leaders, sensing their imminent arrival in power and anxious to head off rivalry from among the guerrilla ranks.

This new pattern of recruitment tended to displace actual fighters from leadership roles, in order to open a way for the nationalists to control the guerrilla cadres. In essence, these politicians with extensive external links, pushed the guerrillas to the back of the queue, knowing that they could later use them to advantage.

The post independence period then saw an intensification of this process of marginalising and suppressing the ex-fighters, in order to consolidate a new civilian ruling class intent on forging class alliances with settler capitalists and farmers. Throughout the 1980s several attempts by War Veterans to re-organise were thwarted by divide-and-rule tactics, and it was only in the 1990s (with the war long

[26] ZIPA was a united guerrilla army formed out of ZIPRA formed by Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) formed by Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).

over) that sufficient organisational cohesion was finally achieved to challenge the regime and its alliance with settler capital.

These challenges climaxed from mid 1997 to November that year when the War Veterans besieged State House, the official residency of President Mugabe, demanding welfare benefits and a return to the liberation agenda. War Veterans had started to pressure government for land redistribution in the early 1990s leading to the enactment of the Land Acquisition Act in 1992, i.e. after the Chinhoyi meeting between Mugabe and the War Veterans. However, government still was not keen to use the instrument to acquire land from White settlers and the piece of legislation remained lip service. War Veterans continued to mount pressure which escalated in 1996 forcing government to designate 1,471 farms for compulsory acquisition in November 1997, when the truce with the President was entered. The land issue was once more drawn to the centre stage. However, the White farmers went to the courts to resist the designations and many of the farms were delisted. When the nationalist leaders failed to distribute land War Veterans forged an alliance with the land movement and provided key leadership for a militant land occupation movement from 1998. White commercial farmers, failed to read this political climate and the pressure from below against the alliance they had forged with the ruling elite. As a result, instead of compromise, White farmers exhibited racial arrogance by refusal to accept government supremacy in land adjudication (Moyo 1994). The government was in a tight corner.

As already noted, this land occupation movement ruptured into nation-wide occupations in 2000 after the government sponsored draft constitution referendum was rejected by the electorate in a referendum. The President and ZANU-PF, under pressure from the powerful land movement and also from the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), then opportunistically sought an alliance with the former. The land movement judged that it had less to gain from the MDC, a movement mainly reflecting a coalition of urban workers, settler farmers, business interests and support from international capital. The government's adroit move succeeded, and once more War Veterans, farm workers and peasants accepted the nationalists, President Mugabe and the regime as part of the land movement.

1.8 An exposition of the argument of the thesis

This study is based on the theory of social movements. Social movement theory is used to attempt a better characterisation of Zimbabwe's land occupations. This topic is yet to be settled in academic debate, and has generated more heat than light. To some the land occupations are little more than a political ploy by a moribund ruling oligarchy trying to cling to political power. One school of thought argues that the land occupations lack the credentials of a social movement (Cousins 2003, Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003, Feltoe 2004, Harrold-Barry 2004, Moore 2004, Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 2004, Alexander 2006, Selby 2006). This argument places emphasis on the role played by the state and the apparent high levels of anarchic violence associated with the occupations.

Another school of thought argues that there is a long history of land occupations in Zimbabwe, varying mainly in form but hardly in content (Moyo 2001; 2002, Marongwe 2003, Moyo and Yeros 2005, Sadomba 2007, Andrew and Sadomba 2006).

The argument of this school of thought is grounded in the theory of social movements (Jamison 1991, Layman 1995). Blumer defines social movements as:

> *Collective enterprises to establish a new order of life. They [social movements] have their inception in a condition of unrest, and derive their motive power on one hand from dissatisfaction with the current form of life, and or system of living. The career of a social movement depicts emergence of a new order of life. (Blumer 1995)*

Literature and case studies on the theory of social movements tries to find a secure analytical base from which to characterise this social phenomenon. Eyerman outlines conditions giving rise to the emergence and development of social movements as:

> *Peculiarities and avenues for protest: actual underlying **causes** of complaint; **generalised beliefs,** the role of ideologies and ideologists in shaping the way protest and complaint is understood by actors; **precipitating factors,** the specific sparks that ignite protest, **leadership and communication**, to direct and coordinate; and, finally, **the operation of social control**, the way established authorities react.[27] (Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 17)*

The nature and character of social movements differ significantly from one part of the world to the other, reflecting (it is argued) an '*increasing separation of the sites of theoretical production and collective action*' (Foweraker 1995). There is thus a challenge to see the general in the particular. Social movement theory will benefit, it is generally agreed, from carefully contextualised case study material. This is the ambition of the present thesis. Zimbabwe's land occupations were characterised by specific features that need to be subjected to rigorous analysis, against a background of local history and ethnography.

Moyo (2002), in his landmark introduction to the topic of the contemporary significance of land-focused social movements has developed a framework for land movements in Africa pointing out their specific features, useful for understanding Zimbabwe's land occupations. He observes that African land movements are '*dispersed*' and '*varied*' reactions to decaying post colonial African nation states. These struggles – although apparently highly specific when taken in isolation - together constitute an aggregate pattern assignable to the category of social movement,[28] albeit different in nature from such movements in Europe and Latin America, which tend to presume the existence of functional centralised national organisations. Seemingly '*isolated*' peasant organisations and actions have induced major policy shifts in Africa, and this calls for profound studies on the nature of rural society and '*how the evolution of peasant organisations influence the processes of democratisation and economic change*' (Moyo 2002). Moyo goes on to argue that land occupations should be seen as a historical process rather than as isolated events:

> *Land occupations [were] an ongoing social phenomenon in both urban and rural areas of Zimbabwe, before and after the country's independence … The 2000-1 occupations mark the climax of a longer, less public and dispersed struggle over land shortages and land demand in the post independence period. (Moyo 2001: 3)*

Moyo focuses his analysis on the post independence land occupations without going deeply into the history of occupations prior to 1980. As a result his argument

[27] Emphasis in the original.

[28] See three West African examples of social struggles related to land issues Chauveau and Richards (2008).

regarding historicity could be strengthened. Lacking enough time depth, the argument has been vulnerable to criticism (Sachikonye 1994, Alexander 2003, Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003, Raftopoulos 2003, Selby 2006) for failure to explain the sudden rupture of 2000, the associated violence, the active participation of the state in the occupations, the precipitating economic meltdown and the threat of imminent elections. In the eyes of critics, the state, ZANU-PF and President Mugabe were perceived to be using the land issue as a scapegoat, with the real motive being their continued determination to cling to power. These critical academic voices have drawn 'qualitative distinctions between the 2000 invasions and the occupations occurring in 1998 or in previous periods since independence' (Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003: 19).

Closer characterisation of Zimbabwe's land occupations is thus a vital task, in the hope of shedding light on the elements that constitute the occupations and how they have functioned. This will be helpful especially in assessing the role and functions of the regime and how it has influenced the land occupations. The Zimbabwean regime has been the centre of analysis in the studies of land occupations because of its shifting positions and particularly its violent participation at a time when the ruling party was under threat from the opposition forces within it and outside. Some researchers (Hammar and Raftopolous 2003, Alexander 2006, Selby 2006) have however underplayed the force of internal dynamics within the liberation movement which others have tended to highlight (Sithole 1979, Moyo 1995, Moyo 2001, Moyo and Yeros 2005, Sadomba 2008) thereby failing to comprehend the agency of marginalised War Veterans, peasants and farm workers in the land conflict. After the Unity Accord (1987) and formation of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), there were cumulative achievements by the War Veterans' movement including legislative (amendment of the War Victims Compensation Act 1992, Enactment (1992) and amendment of the War Veterans Act 1996, Compulsory Land Acquisition Act 1992 to mention but the critical ones) and forcing government to designate White farms. This thesis will therefore analyze the development of the post independence state by looking at political tactics of those who control it in order to understand behaviour of some state organs during the land occupations and the agency of the marginalised peasants, War Veterans and farm workers.

1.9 The research questions

1.9.1 The main research question

The main research question is: are the land occupations in Zimbabwe between 1998 and 2004 primarily a result of elite-driven restructuring of access to land and political manoeuvring, or a result of bottom-up action from social movements informed by historical claims of popular demand for land?

1.9.2 The sub-research questions

- How and for what reasons have land conflicts in Zimbabwe developed from the colonial period until the present?
- What social groupings emerged around the land issue, and how did they link to each other at different times?

- What continuities and discontinuities can be traced in the land movement over time?
- What was the specific role of the War Veterans in these processes?

1.9.3 Methodology

The thesis combines two main research approaches, namely historiography and ethnography. It has been necessary to employ historiography to study critically the development of the liberation movement, particularly the guerrilla movement of the 1970s, because this was the immediate prelude to Independence, the period in which the land occupations occurred. Participant observation covers both the emergence of the War Veterans' movement and the more recent land occupations, since I was a participant in both. The work has been undertaken as a 'movement intellectual'. This provides privileged access to data, but makes considerable demands in terms of seeking a standpoint from which to view the data objectively. I have paid attention to the methodological advice of other 'movement intellectuals' in seeking a degree of historiographical and ethnographic and objectivity, though recognise that this is never perfectly attainable (Laville 1998, Mafeje 1998, Moore 1998, Nkwi 1998, Mudege 2005).

One (historiographical) move was to attempt a thorough reconstruction of the phases of the liberation war, as a necessary framework to address the research questions relating to the evolution and development of the War Veterans' Movement. To do this I used both primary data (mainly in depth interviews with participants in the war) in addition to secondary data, in order to develop a synthesis open to inspection and criticism by other scholars and by veterans themselves. At times I have had to be cautious in identifying informants, but have checked my own memories of involvement in the armed struggle carefully against the multiple accounts I was able to assemble. To address possible bias, I sought out other studies, and other sources of material, to cross-check my interview materials and observations. Additionally, I consulted photographic and audio visual materials concerning the liberation war,[29] from both the Rhodesian side and the guerrilla perspective. My analysis of materials had an extra advantage in that having been a participant I had a certain amount of practical knowledge of e.g. training, terrain and fighting techniques, useful in testing the reliability of both informants and diverse secondary accounts.[30]

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[29] Especially material held in The National Archives of Zimbabwe.

[30] For example, I was able to distinguish different categories of War Veterans according to their war time positions and dispositions, which helped contextualise their accounts. Did they belong to the notorious Security and Intelligence Department, were they graduates of Wampoa College, or did they belong to the first phase of the war? In some cases I was also able to supplement interview materials with my own reflections on the mobilisation process at the front, the political education in the rear, or in relation to knowledge of the strategies in the war zones. I reflected upon unpublished cartoons and poems written by 'Nikita', for example, relating to visions of an independent Zimbabwe. With this background, during the land occupations I made an effort to interview the different categories of people I could identify, probing on their past as well as their interpretation of the present in which they were participating, and their vision about the future. In addition I also subjected some of my own earlier writings, including a document (War Strategy for Chaminuka Sector) that I had drafted (1979), and some short stories, poems, notes and lecture materials that I had prepared to teach political lessons. My collection of war time photographs was also a subject of

In studying land occupations, the ethnographic method of participant observation was my main tool. With its emphasis on fieldwork I chose the approach for 'uncovering the masked, the latent, the unconscious … to clarify the opaque … [and] to give meaning to the meaningless' (Crapanzano 1986: 51) issues pertaining to the complex social phenomenon of land occupations. As a result I made a conscious decision (as opposed to my war involvement) to follow my veteran activist informants and become a participant observer in the land occupations when they exploded in the year 2000.

As a veteran myself, it could be said that my earlier war front experiences were a kind of participant observation, but the difference between the two situations was that in the latter case I was a student of anthropology in the Technology and Agrarian Development Group of the Social Sciences Department, in Wageningen University, following in the footsteps of other anthropologists working on African war (cf. Richards 1996, Peters 2006).[31] Even so, the problem of identity still haunted me. The subject of my study was not foreign to me - I was part of them – simultaneously a researcher and a subject. There was no '*traditional society doing its traditional thing, oblivious to the alien observing presence*' (Pratt 1986: 43). This challenged assumptions[32] in anthropology about separation of observer and observed, and raises new methodological questions, like to what extent is one's accumulated knowledge through socialisation, gained by virtue of being part of the society, group or process under study, to be accepted as scientific data for purposes of an anthropological research? Ethnography is a more flexible craft than it once was, and now welcomes research by members of the societies that are the subject of study, though debate is ongoing as to how the specific biases of the insider are to be accommodated within the field (Mafeje 1998).

I am aware that there is a danger of losing perspective from being too intimate with the topic, but the dangers of insider bias seem to be no worse (even if of a different kind) than the dangers of being an outsider (having too much contextual information and not enough inside detail). Indeed, usefully different dynamics emanate from the interactions between the two kinds of researcher and their subjects. Even more so, it is compelling to consider for the 'local' anthropologist how best to '*decode and recode*' (Clifford 1986, see also Clifford 1996, Clifford and Marcus 1986, Marcus and Fisher 1986), to tell a story in which he/she is a participant. I find this a

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reflection. I also received materials from individuals interested in my work, including collections of pictures. Some of these materials are otherwise confined in the ZANU-PF archives and have not, almost a generation after the war, been released to the public. I also had assembled a collection of interview materials, including cassettes of interviews, undertaken by myself and other researchers, prior to envisaging the present study. Where appropriate, I sought and received permission from the researcher in question to use the materials.

[31] I started researching on land occupations in 2000, as they happened, and while waiting to enrol for a PhD programme. My studies of land occupations were therefore more by default than by design.

[32] Anthropology is in its origins a social science for studying foreign cultures, and has perhaps not entirely given up that orientation. For example, Marcus and Fischer (1986: 24) argue that, '*the main motif that ethnography as a science developed was that of salvaging cultural diversity, threatened with global Westernisation especially during the age of colonialism*'.

particularly important challenge for African students of African anthropology, and readily accept the challenge in the present study.[33]

1.10 Research methods

1.10.1 Participant observation

Anthropologists use both non-participant and participant forms of direct observation as research tools. In this thesis I analyse data gathered from the specific participant perspective of the "movement intellectual". This means that I seek to analyse data gathered from within a movement in which I was (and remain) an activist. I myself am a veteran of the armed struggle for independence in Zimbabwe, and have remained active with groups of veterans seeking to bring about land reform. I took part in land occupations, and made observations and collected data as I did so. This means that I might describe myself as an observant-participator, as distinct from a participant-observer. I was part of that activity from the outset.

In the pages that follow I do not seek to disguise my role, but I do strive for as objective an analytical standpoint as can be obtained. For this reason (after discussion with my supervisors) I rejected an autobiographical standpoint. I followed the advice of Richards (2005) that anthropologists analysing conflict situations should aim for "thin" rather than "thick" description, and offer transparency rather than complexity. I took part in many events associated with land occupation. For example, I took part in mobilisation of urban and rural people, worked out logistics, attended meetings, confronted White commercial farmers, occupied land, and followed through administrative procedures to be allocated land, up to the point of getting inputs and making occupied farms work. I sought to get involved in key situations in the occupation progressed.[34] For example, I was a founder member of civil society organisations formed by War Veterans for purposes of sustaining the movement or diversifying it. During these various activities I also experienced land dispossession by ZANU-PF elites and civil servants in 2006.[35]

I did not undertake these activities as a research strategy, but I knew that one day I wanted to make an accurate analysis of the events unfolding round me. I was in this

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[33] Sally Falk Moore (1986: 3) contends that, '*To say that African studies have played a central role in these theoretical and methodological transformations (of social anthropology) may understate the case. The large body of data that has already been accumulated on African society is bound to make Africa a continuing locale for anthropological research of major importance*.' It is in view of this that I suggest that African (and any other) anthropologists studying their own societies need to contribute more to methodological writings, especially regarding their positions as simultaneous researchers and subjects. (See also Clifford 1986; 1996, Crapanzano 1986, Pratt 1986.)

[34] For example when I was informed that War Veterans were organising to chase away another ('elite') War Veteran, backed by prominent ZANU-PF politicians, and return the White farmer because he was liked by the community for his support to Concession District Hospital, clinics and local schools, I decided to take part as a participant observer. I also decided to accompany the demonstrations against one farmer who had ploughed in a field on which occupiers had planted green maize before it had tussled.

[35] See Appendix 1 'Land dispossession: forced abandonment of an agricultural research centre in Mazowe District'.

sense an "embedded" intellectual, and at each stage I took field notes and records, and interviewed key activists. My analytical skills, such as they were at that stage, contributed to the land occupiers' own assessments of their situation, as much as these assessments also fed my notebooks. In making a "thin" descriptive account I do not seek to disguise my role, but do not unduly privilege it either. I try and present a picture of an ongoing discourse among land activists, and at times I "disappear" into that picture as but one voice among several. I cannot (for security reasons) identify my informants. Instead they become initials, and (on occasion) I become an initial among them, not to disguise the part I played but to make it clear that I was acting in a group.

Whether that group was as significant as I claim will be for others to judge. But my two basic aims are to show that such a group existed (I was there) and that it was far from being a tool of state power, as several analysts have claimed. I claim for my account in this thesis no more, but no less, objectivity than can be claimed for any other ethnographic account. I can report only the conversations that happened around me. I interviewed White farmers to gain some insight into their perspective. But it will fall to others (using other techniques) to assess the positions of (for example) government civil servants and members of the Mugabe regime in regard to land reform. Conflict (by its very nature) divides the parties, and every account is written from one side or the other. What is important is to have some kind of parity of accounts. It is essential to avoid the situation of the war in Sierra Leone in which all accounts (whether by academics or journalists) were written from one side alone (Peters 2006). I offer an account from within a segment of the land occupation movement in Zimbabwe, fully confident that others will answer it from the other side of the fence.

As a veteran I was well known to activists in the land occupation movement, and had ready access to their deliberations and actions. I encountered state officials and community leaders and used every opportunity to obtain their views, even though at times they saw me in oppositional terms. To ensure that I was compiling evidence regularly (and not just when the going was easy) I made use of check lists and observation guides. I also made use of camera and recording equipment to ensure that as much as possible I had back-up records, to support my note taking and interviews. The fluid circumstances of a conflicted situation do impose severe limitations on what can and cannot be observed, but I believe my own work is not out of line with what is accepted as a feasible standard for conflict analysis in the heat of struggle (Richards 2005, Peters 2006).

1.10.2 Interviews

I also used a variety other methods, including interviews (Bernard 1988), focus group discussions, content analysis and techniques of participatory rural appraisal (PRA). The interview method was particularly useful. I used it to collect case histories of War Veterans, farm workers, peasant farmers and White commercial farmers, some of whom agreed to be interviewed as key informants. The interview method was helpful to bridge gaps left by the participant observation method. The history of the liberation struggle, for example, was mainly collected through interviews from groups of participants. I also used the method to follow up on events that I could not be present at myself. Interviews were generally unstructured (though based, of course, on my own mental check list of topics about which I wished to enquire) and

followed the flow of conversation, thus yielding mainly qualitative data. As such I probed my informants especially to get information on sensitive areas such as violent occupations or repulsion. I recorded the interviews on cassettes or on a digital recorder and this gave me the opportunity to concentrate on the interview without much disruption to jot down notes. In most cases I had repeat interviews with informants, often visiting them several times, and I would study the cassettes between the visits to prepare questions where further probing was necessary or where gaps were discovered. Some of the interviews were transcribed by a research assistant but I transcribed most of them myself and this enabled me to have an in-depth understanding of the materials before analysing them. The interview method was one of the most widely used in this research. The interviewees were informed about my research aims and agreed to be interviewed on that basis. They were offered anonymity in view of the sensitive nature of the subject.

1.10.3 Focus group discussions

Focus groups are group meetings held to probe a topic on a panel basis. They tend to elicit consensual views rather than facts, but I used them effectively for bringing out contradictory views about occupation processes between groups of landless farm workers and peasant beneficiaries, for example. Ten focus group discussions were held in Nyabira and Mazowe areas. These mainly focused on the occupations of 2000. The method was useful in gathering data especially where conflicts had occurred. I asked representatives of the conflicting groups to discuss on various selected topics in order to get representations and reactions from both sides on the nature of occupations, the approaches, grievances and current relationships.[36] This method was very effective in opening windows of understanding on the nature of conflict and the development of relationships between occupiers and farm workers. Through the method a dialogue was started even where the two groups remained antagonistic to each other.[37] Focus group discussions were also held with homogenous groups such as occupiers, members of the same clan, or War Veterans. At times I chose to hold focus group discussions with only women, in case where I had discovered through other means that gender sensitive issues were prominent.[38]

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[36] One such focus group discussion held at Obvious Farm (2006) had a group comprised of a farmer, a War Veteran, a peasant occupier and two farm workers.

[37] For example at Witchens Farm, farm workers and occupiers had reached a stage where they would not attend each others' funerals although they were next door to each other. The focus group discussion revealed that the problem lay in the occupation process, after which the farm workers got nothing. When I probed during the focus group discussion I discovered that farm workers were bitter because they claimed their participation had been so crucial that it would not have been possible to occupy the farm without their help. Counter accusations from occupiers were that at first generally the farm workers resisted occupations but farm workers argued that the reason was they were not informed about what was going on and from the moment they did, they took part even more than the peasant occupiers themselves. I then began to understand that the position of farm workers in occupations was not as static as other people have tried to present.

[38] For example, I discovered that occupations around Nyabira business centre had a high participation of commercial sex workers. I therefore felt that the women would participate more freely in the absence of men. I made followed up the individuals to conduct in-depth interviews where need arose.

1.10.4 Content analysis

I used this method to analyse various materials including photographs, war time political lectures and popular occupation period songs. I analysed some of the songs that were written and sung for the occupations.[39] I analysed films made by both liberation movements and the Rhodesian government in compiling the history of the liberation struggle. Content analysis was also used to analyse various texts, including minutes of meetings, emails, letters and newspaper articles.

1.10.5 Naturally occurring talk

Land occupations were the most topical issue in Zimbabwe while they were taking place. People discussed them with emotion and attachment at any time. This became a very rich vein of research data. I listened out for people's views in public transport, at weddings and funerals, in pubs and any gatherings. At times I provoked the discussion and let the debate take a natural course. This was especially so at funerals and weddings, where a mixture of people usually congregate, including War Veterans, peasants, professionals, political party activists, old men, women and youths. At times I would play the devil's advocate and take an extreme position only to provoke reaction or to support the side that seemed overpowered. At other times I just listened humbly to the methodical discussions of old men. I would record notes of the discussions afterwards and or follow-up by interviewing people who had fascinating arguments about the issue. Such discussions in natural settings were very informative because they were not preset, and informants felt free to express opinions without fear or suspicion of the interview process.

I also made use of business trips with farmers and War Veterans to discuss land occupations. This was effective indeed as I used business issues to break the ice and introduce topics for discussion. I tried by all means to let the discussion flow, and I often succeeded, and even found myself accepted for follow up discussions.[40]

1.10.6 Participatory methods

At times where I found the subject to be sensitive, I used participatory (PRA) techniques to lead into a focus group discussion, without triggering these sensitivities. One technique that proved very useful was 'Retrospective Community Mapping' (Nelson and Wright 1995, Sadomba 1996) a method which assists people to

[39] An example of one popular song that was sung during the occupation period was this. 'If you see a War Vet take the land (*Ukaona War Veteran richitora minda*) (x2)/ This is the resolution we made (*Ndicho chibvumirano chatakaita*) We the War Vets (*Isu maWar Vet*)/ If you see parents (i.e. peasants/farm workers) take the farms/ This was the resolution we made' The song had one voice leading and a sudden resounding repetition of the refrain from the crowd. It was simple to sing, since it required only repetition of the first voice, but the repetition hammered out a message that a decision to occupy land was based on a popular resolution. People sung it over and over again during occupations. Some of the songs sung were from the war time period but these were carefully selected to fit the occasion of occupation (see p. 97).

[40] I had one such trip with a dispossessed farmer who had established a beef consortium with others. I had recently been dispossessed of a farm that I had bought and I was selling the cattle to downsize operations. We both had a common grievance about the land reform, and interest in beef production, so the discussion flowed naturally. However, this discussion also enabled both of us to examine weaknesses of the land reform from our own experiences.

revisit historical events through a mapping exercise.[41] I used this extensively in Nyabira, to augment a quantitative survey data collected through the African Institute for Agrarian Studies. In many cases I would have failed to get any information if this method had not been used.

1.11 The study area

To study the early (1998-9) and later (2000-4) occupations I was influenced by a number of factors. There was a need to choose a manageable case study area. I wanted an area I was familiar with, and where I could become actively involved in land for resettlement. This turned out to be Mazowe and Matepatepa areas. I first knew Mazowe and its surrounding areas in early 1978 when it was my area of operational deployment. Mazowe Detachment covered a much bigger area than Mazowe administrative district. That remained my official area of operation before I was attached to the whole sector of Chaminuka and later the Province of Tete.[42] After the end of the war I was again deployed in Mazowe to carry out party political work, involving forming structures at local levels. When I was working in the Ministry of Local Government, leading the provincial Promotion and Training section, I was deployed in Mashonaland Province, and Mazowe was one of the districts under my supervision. With this background I chose Mazowe for my study area. See Figure 2.1.

The study area for examining the occupations of 2000-4 covers three administrative districts (Bindura, Mazowe and Zvimba districts) falling in two provinces (Mashonaland West and Central). The study particularly focuses on

[41] I invented this method, working in a Water and Sanitation project under UNICEF. The method goes through the following steps: Step 1. Establish a baseline date and intervals of maps: maps were easily developed for each decade with 1920 being the base year. Step 2. Divide the community into mapping age groups: relevant groups are formed for each mapping period. Step 3. Drawing of maps Step 4. Presentation of maps: each group present their map. Step 5. Description of socio-economic and cultural conditions: discuss demographic changes and associated impacts, various institutions for health, education, bringing up children, family, marriage; their cardinal philosophy of life and belief patterns including religion, social cohesion; economic activities, access to means of production during their period such as land and finished commodities. Step 6. Presentation of life patterns for the period: community describes different patterns of life for each mapping period. Step 7. Focus group discussions: Community members ask questions, debate and discuss freely (Sadomba 1996). At Machirori where it was rumoured that occupiers were people who had not been accommodated in the villagisation programme of President Mugabe's Kutama village because (so the rumour went) they were not close relatives I used retrospective community mapping to gather information on how these people moved to Machirori in 1999. Settlers presented maps to illustrate changes that caused them to go and occupy adjacent farms in 1999. Through mapping they recounted how they were mobilised by War Veterans from Murombedzi. The rumour was neither refuted nor confirmed and I did not probe because of the sensitivity of the issue, but the story of their occupation from Kutama came out; they had initially refused to talk to me at all.

[42] The lowest operational area was a detachment that covered about three administrative districts. A sector was comprised of five or more detachments and was the size of present administrative provinces. Chaminuka sector covered Mashonaland Central Province. There were only three provinces to cover the whole country according to ZANLA strategy. These were Tete, Manica and Gaza Provinces.

Mazowe District and the adjacent areas of Matepatepa in Bindura (east of Mazowe) and Nyabira in Zvimba (west of Mazowe). War Veterans criss-crossed districts and provinces as they led occupations of farms. Harare is also included as a study area, although urban occupations are not a subject of this study. However, War Veterans from Harare played a vital role in the land occupations from 1998, which became a model for the 2000 occupations in parts of the study area.

The study area is agriculturally prominent, lying in natural region IIa. Close to Harare, the national capital, it is considered part of the bread basket of the country. It contains four peri-urban areas: Mvurwi, Concession, Nyabira and Glendale and the provincial town of Bindura. The one area of communal land, Chiweshe, is surrounded by former White owned commercial farms. With proximity to the capital and urban centres, the area is readily accessible to politicians, urbanised War Veterans, urban working class and professionals. This enriches the study, by bringing into the picture a full range of competing interests over land occupation.

The case for Goromonzi and Svosve was different. I chose the two by default. When I started interviewing War Veterans on the occupations of Nyabira they told me that they had started occupying land in 1998 at Goromonzi. Upon probing I realised that a full study had to be done of these early occupations, but they had occurred elsewhere, in Goromonzi and Svosve in Mashonaland East Province. I decided to select these two areas for study. The intensity of this second study was not comparable to work I undertook on the 2000 occupations but was enough to understand continuities and discontinuities between the earlier and later occupations.

1.12 Structure of the thesis

I will conclude this introduction to the thesis with a short outline of the contents. As apparent, Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to and short exposition of the argument of the thesis, highlighting the main issues of the research. Chapter 2 deals with the history of land and evolution of the War Veterans' movement, via a reconstruction the liberation war. Chapter 3 analyses the political turning point for the land issue in Zimbabwe and discusses how and when contradictions in the liberation movement sharpened, leading to the alliance of War Veterans with a broader social movement for land redistribution. Chapter 4 offers an account of early occupations led by War Veterans in Svosve and Goromonzi in 1998. Chapter 5 provides a participant observation based account and analysis of the later occupations in Mazowe, Matepatepa and Nyabira (2000). Chapter 6 critically assesses directions of agrarian technology in the dynamic changes. Chapter 7 considers the institutional and political arrangements of the land movement, and draws some general conclusions.



Figure 1.2 The study area: Matepatepa, Mazowe and Nyabira in relation to Zimbabwe

CHAPTER 2

THE ROOTS OF THE WAR VETERANS' MOVEMENT: A HISTORY OF THE GUERRILLA STRUGGLE

2.1 Introduction

This thesis identifies four distinct currents within the guerrilla movement that brought about Zimbabwean independence. The interests, ideologies, strategies and tactics associated with these four currents help explain some of the intricacies associated with the land movement, when it finally burst forth in the late 1990s. In other words, the broad liberation movement had imbedded within it sets of conflicting interests, and alliances of forces that help explain not only the actions of the movement, but also some of the threats with which it struggled.

In the present chapter I will examine the origins of the War Veterans' movement and how the land issue was articulated in the history of that movement. The War Veterans' movement is but one part of the broader liberation movement, as explained in more detail elsewhere:

> *… the social movement that dislodged colonial rule in Zimbabwe (liberation movement) was an aggregate of a number of organised struggles, being smaller social movements. As such the liberation movement [was] not a homogeneous entity but [it] comprised of multifarious movements, viz. peasant land movement, nationalist movement, guerrilla movement and farm worker movement. Within the broad liberation movement [were] pushing and pulling movements and this explains the forces in Zimbabwe's land movement [today]. (Sadomba 2007: 3)*

To understand the influences at work in the land movement, therefore, a detailed analysis of the evolution of the guerrilla movement is suggested. This is critical in two ways. Firstly the guerrilla movement dominated the other movements identified in the above quotation, and became synonymous with the liberation movement itself during the struggle for independence. Because of this dominance, any analysis of its development will reflect considerable light on the emergence of the land movement itself. Secondly, an examination of the evolution and development of the guerrilla movement will help us to understand the War Veterans' movement, which is a direct post independence outcome. Without historical analysis of the origins of the War Veterans' movement it is difficult to comprehend its later internal conflicts and relationships with the nationalist movement, the peasant land movement, and the farm workers, as well as linkages with opposition parties and civil society.

This chapter, in illustrating important developments in the liberation struggle, fills a void that has caused difficulties or incomprehension in explaining the behaviour of War Veterans in the post independence period, particularly during the occupations. Although Moyo (2001; 2005) alludes to the relationship between the land issue, the liberation movement and the War Veterans he does not offer detailed analysis to illustrate the development of these relationships. The chapter is also important in understanding the limitations of nationalist politics. These limitations have proven to

be major influence over the outcome of the land occupations, as in the general politics of the liberation movement hitherto.

Often War Veterans are considered homogenous, yet they comprise different elements, from various social backgrounds, and above all, different war time exposure and experiences. One of the most important differentiating factors among War Veterans is the different environments through which they passed at various stages in the armed struggle. The following section focuses on the three main phases of the liberation struggle and analyses influential factors that shaped War Veterans differentially.

The origins of the War Veterans' movement are located in the early 1960s, as the culmination point of the civil nationalist struggle. When both Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) were banned in 1962 and 1964, respectively, they formed underground organisations and recruited for the war youth exiled in Zambia. Armies were formed to mount armed struggle to dislodge the colonial government. The cadres recruited into these armies became the veterans of the liberation war at Independence in 1980.

The War Veterans' movement went through three major phases, periodised as follows: 1963-75 (Chitepo period, the first phase), coined after veteran nationalist politician and leader of ZANU's revolutionary council operating in exile, 1975-7 (Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) period) and from 1977 to date (the Mugabe era).[43] Each phase is distinguished by the nature and characteristics of leadership, methods of recruitment, quality of recruits, politico-ideological thrust and level of military offensive. A fully elaborated phase model, to explain the complex patterns of the liberation war, has not so far been developed. The model below is intended to stimulate debate towards a systematic analysis of the development of the war, to help sustain comparisons, analyses and syntheses. In the following sections three factors will be examined in order to understand the phases through which the cadres later forming War Veterans' movement passed.

2.2 The Chitepo phase

Here, I term the initial phase of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle the Chitepo phase, because of the central leadership role of Herbert Tapfumaneyi Chitepo from 1963 to 1975. He was the first Black advocate in Zimbabwe, who spent most of his time defending nationalists in the courts and fighting racial discrimination before passing into self-exile in 1962. He left his profession (as Tanganyika's first African Director of Public Prosecutions) to lead the war and take over the external administration of ZANU, in 1966. He then became the first and only Chairman of the *Dare reChimurenga* (the highest political organ, Revolutionary Council, which stirred the

[43] It is important to note that the Mugabe phase extended from the war period into the post independence era and continues today (2007). This means that the period spans an entire generation in Zimbabwe's politics, making it the longest phase since nationalist politics began in the late 1950s. There is little doubt that the Mugabe era has had a major if not the greatest impact on the War Veterans' movement, and therefore it is important to understand how this period helped shape the context within which the War Veterans rose to leadership in the land movement.

liberation war on the part of ZANU) from 1969 until his death in 1975. There were also notable people in ZAPU who made similar sacrifices, showing the same level of commitment. James Chikerema and J.Z. Moyo are two names very well identified with this period, for example. However, Chitepo's contribution in developing the liberation struggle was particularly notable.[44]

It was under Chitepo's leadership that a military alliance was forged with the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) to allow guerrilla infiltration of Zimbabwe through Mozambique's Tete Province - an offer first made to ZAPU/ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army), but at the time rejected.[45] The contacts between ZANU and FRELIMO had started in 1968, and in 1970 *FRELIMO:*

> *agreed to allow Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) guerrillas and armaments … to pass through Tete into north-eastern Rhodesia … then ZIPRA and not ZANLA would have had Mozambique as its vital rear base and the nature and outcome of the struggle for Zimbabwe might have been very different. (Flower 1987: 115-19)*[46]

Chitepo decisively transformed the struggle into a guerrilla war based on rural mobilisation from 1971, and this strategy determined the success of the liberation struggle: 'Military confrontation was to become a thing of the past and in its place came a much more difficult problem – the new ZANLA tactic of mobilising the masses.'(Flower 1987: 121)

This element became decisive military strategy, and formed the basis of the war until the ceasefire in 1979. This mobilisation of the masses had wide implications, in that the guerrilla war enabled deep and widespread contact between peasants, farm workers and fighters. Related to this, it also allowed long and wide coverage in interactions between the guerrillas and peasants, owing to the war's protracted nature. Mobilisation, propaganda or intimidation (whatever may have been the case) lasted longer than the war itself, hardening into community memory and history. As will be seen in Chapters three and four, this constituted a body of cultural capital into which the War Veterans were able to tap during the subsequent mobilisation for land occupations.

The early phase of the war was characterised by the dominance exercised by a number of progressive nationalists (some of whom might be considered true

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[44] Of particular importance was Chitepo's shift to a guerrilla war after a reassessment of the period between 1969 and 1972. In 1970 James Chikerema had already announced a change in ZIPRA's tactics and that both conventional and guerrilla methods of warfare should be considered (Flower 1987: 110, Martin and Johnson 1981: 13).

[45] ZAPU was one of the seven 'authentics' – Soviet supported African liberation Movements determined by invitation and participation in the 1969 Khartoum conference – and was therefore a naturally of Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). This was the basis for giving it first offer (Martin and Johnson 1981: 14). This also explains the Soviet influence in ZAPU and ZIPRA, both militarily and ideologically. Military strategy, training and hardware were based on Soviet conventional warfare. Ideologically had a high dosage of Marxism-Leninism with abundant literature. Most of the books in Wampoa library were obtained from ZIPRA. ZANU and ZANLA were inclined to the Chinese and were also influenced more by Mao-tse Tung thought. ZANLA military strategy of guerrilla warfare was a result of this influence as was less emphasis on Marxism-Leninism, ideologically.

[46] See also Martin and Johnson 1987: 14-20.

revolutionaries, in terms of commitment to socialist modernisation who took control of the liberation struggle. They recruited youths, organised them for military training, and formulated military strategies and tactics, despite lack of formal military training themselves. The period began with poor organisation and defective strategies. Being the initial phase in building a war machine, it can be considered immature, lacking in focus, and vulnerable to major setbacks (Martin and Johnson 1981).[47]

Transformation of the war into a guerrilla movement had two key consequences. Social mobilisation by the guerrillas led to the development of new relationships between cadres and peasants. This relationship especially involved a mutual engagement in the African spiritual world, an area that White Rhodesians could neither fully comprehend nor emulate, as Flower, Head of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation, admitted:

> *ZANLA had moved ahead of us in the spirit world by invoking the national spirit of 'Chaminuka' (the greatest Shona prophet at the time of the First Chimurenga [anti-colonial war] in the 1890s) and by taking the spirit medium of Nehanda … [Rhodesian Forces] called [it] 'mumbo jumbo of witchcraft'… [failing] to appreciate the significance of the simple fact that the war had now taken us into the heart of the former Munhumutapa empire, the spiritual home of the Shona peoples and their allies across the border in Mozambique. (Flower 1987: 115-16)*

Flower's analysis is insightful. Lan (1985) devotes a full anthropological study to the role of Shona religion in the guerrilla war, entitled *Guns and Rain: guerrillas and spirit mediums in Zimbabwe*. Invoking spirits was the beginning of a long-term relationship between the rural masses and the fighters. African agro-ecological religion played a pivotal role from this time onwards among Shona-speaking fighters and farmers. The guerrilla movement drew on this belief system and its practices to develop an effective link between themselves and rural civilian populations capable of winning the war: 'From a winning position between 1964 and 1972, Rhodesian Forces were entering the stage of the 'no win' war, which lasted from December 1972 to 1976; after that, they were fighting a losing war.'(Flower 1987: 119)

The Chitepo phase also witnessed structural changes redefining the relationship between the fighters and the nationalists. In ZANU, there was separation of powers and roles in 1973, when Tongogara was elected to the Dare, and chaired the High Command, a group containing no civilians. Different from ZAPU, this was important for military development, even if military training remained deficient during this stage.[48]

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[47] At times there were signs of adventurism and disregard for human life by the nationalists (Martin and Johnson 1981: 71). A fighter, S. (Interviews 2004), trained in Ghana, claimed that they were sent to the front without weapons, despite the fact they were sure that one of the trainees in their group had defected and sold them out to the Rhodesians. They were all caught crossing the Zambezi without the slightest of resistance and jailed. Other incidents of this kind occurred in the Chinhoyi battle of 1966, and the Wankie battle, involving ANC and ZIPRA cadres at a later date.

[48] The High Command, ZANLA's highest military organ, did not know *'… the difference between military strategies and tactics … [or] the relationship between something of operational significance, tactical significance or tactical-strategic significance … There was no co-ordination: it was fighting, defeating enemy tactics, destroying …'* (Machingura's interview, in Moore 1995: 79).

Political education of the fighters during the Chitepo period was short, shallow and unfocused (and this was even more so for rural civilians) despite the fact that, through his leadership, Chitepo introduced a more fundamental ideological slant, seeking to transform ZANU's ideology (such as it was) by adopting Marxism-Leninism, e.g. through the document known as Mwenje 2[49] (in 1973), the second edition of Mwenje 1 (in 1973).[50]

Earlier, the Dare had specifically prohibited the learning of Marxism by the mass of the guerrillas. According to Moore:

> *In November 1971 a group of six was allowed to hold their first 'seminar' on Lenin's - State and Revolution. Until February 1972, the group studied Marx, Engels and Lenin every day. They made constant requests to include the rest of the camp members in their lessons, but were told that the time was not right and to 'keep to Mwenje 1'.[51] At that time ZANU's chief of operations visited the camp and ordered the lessons to be stopped: the fear of intellectuals had spread to ZANU as well as ZAPU.[52] (Moore 1990: 266)*

Political education during the Chitepo phase was in fact limited to shallow nationalist debate, and only a select few guerrillas were exposed to deeper ideological training in Marxism-Leninism. Political education for the rank-and-file cadres was limited to the very basics – memorising some of Mao's thoughts (Moore 1990: 318). Both some nationalists in the Dare reChimurenga, and some guerrilla fighters themselves, particularly the illiterate, were uncomfortable learning the revolutionary ideology of Marxism-Leninism, as observed by Fay Chung:

> *The end result was that a dominant and homogeneous group of guerrilla fighters emerged, later to be known as the 'veterans'. Poorly educated and drawn mainly from the Karanga people, who had settled in Mumbwa[53], they developed a pride in their military vocation with a marked disdain for education and a distrust of the educated.[54](Bhebhe and Ranger 1995: 9-10)*

This means that within the ranks of guerrillas and nationalist leaders there were two camps with differing ideological visions at this early stage. Amongst nationalists forming the Dare reChimurenga there were those who subscribed to Marxist-Leninist ideology like Herbert Chitepo himself, Matuku Hamadziripi and others. Although these were jailed in Zambia they are the ones who attempted to overthrow the Mugabe faction in 1977 but they, like ZIPA failed and were also jailed by FRELIMO. Within the guerrillas there also two opposing forces mainly distinguished by differential educational levels, and background. Uneducated peasant recruits who numerically dominated the liberation struggle this time formed one camp and the educated recruits formed another. The later struggled to acquire knowledge of

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[49] *Mwenje* is Shona word meaning 'torch lighting flame'.

[50] ZANU Political Programme, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), 27 November 1973.

[51] Mwenje 1 was based on the speech by Ndabaningi Sithole at the first congress of ZANU, in Gweru in 1963.

[52] This reflects ideological conflicts, considering that Chitepo wrote Mwenje 2 to transform the movement into a Marxist organisation and the Chief of Operations stopped the study of Marxism.

[53] Mumbwa is in Zambia's capital, Lusaka.

[54] Quoted in Bhebhe and Ranger (eds) 1995: 9-10. The full was not published.

Marxism-Leninism by forming a study group. Boosted by a platoon of defectors from ZIPRA, the ZANLA group of cadres later became the leaders of ZIPA when the High Command was incarcerated in Zambia. At that time they consolidated their ideological position by establishing Wampoa Political Academy to spread the views of Marxism-Leninism. These two strands continued throughout the armed struggle, resulting in deep fissures manifest in conflicts culminating in attempted purgation and negation of one force by the other (Bhebhe and Ranger 1995)

The main recruitment method of fighters during the Chitepo phase was conscription (enforced induction). Zambian residents of Zimbabwean nationality supplied the war with some of its manpower: 'The Zimbabwean peasant families in Mumbwa formed the natural and easily available source of conscripts. Peasant youths, many of them poorly educated or even illiterate, were among the first to train as guerrillas.' (Bhebhe and Ranger 1995: 9-10)

The uneducated peasant recruits, joining at these early periods, had a great impact on the war as it unfolded. Intellectual capacity shrank[55] relative to the overall size of a growing guerrilla force (Moore 1990). Nor was effective use made of the educated recruits; the manner of deploying them (in ideological instruction) then and throughout the liberation war was ineffective. As a result political education was limited to basic explanations of some nationalist grievances that caused the war and the political history of the party. There was no focus on what systems might replace colonial institutions and ideology. At times 'education' was little more than a recital of Mao's red book of quotations. Low levels of basic education and general resistance to intellectual engagement were negative conditions to of complex political lectures concerning the methods and values of scientific socialism.

Later recruits were inducted into the force from the north-eastern front, a region that had suffered high levels of governmental neglect under the White regime, and therefore had a particularly high level of illiteracy. Recruits from Mt. Darwin, Centenary, Rushinga, Muzarabani, Mutoko and Guruve were of a distinctly lower level of educational attainment than those who came (later) from Manicaland, Masvingo and Matebeleland - areas which were generally favoured by colonial government and the missionaries, who established many schools. The few educated guerrillas recruited in the Chitepo phase were often from other parts of Zimbabwe than the north-east although press ganging of St. Albert's Mission school students in 1973 boosted the numbers of north-eastern front recruits who were educated. This pattern of recruitment had a powerful bearing on ethnic related tensions throughout the liberation war. To some extent it still plays a role in current politics, and explains some of the intricacies of the land movement and the government fast track land reform program. These tensions manifest themselves in the current War Veterans' movement by the formation of a splinter organisation, the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (ZLP), by former ZIPA commanders. The ZLP has recruited mostly elite War Veterans with high social standing and has condemned the land occupations of

[55] The informants of David Moore give accounts of how some of the recruits ran away after witnessing their counterparts tortured. One of them went and narrated his ordeal and that of others to Herbert Chitepo in Lusaka. During the ZIPA period many recruits ran away or attempted to run away from the torture by the illiterate Chitepo phase recruits (Personal observation, Nyadzonya 1975). Some of these recruits never came back and those that remained went into hibernation, pretending to be undedicated.

2000 and dissociated itself from them claiming that the rank and file are being used by Mugabe and Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).

In sum, the Chitepo phase, geographically limited to recruitment of illiterate peasants, involved only shallow ideological training, owing to the lack of basic education of the recruited combatants. Although among the nationalists there were intellectuals with considerable potential for the kind of ideological education that might have served as a check on unbridled violence, these figures remained outside the harsh realities of guerrilla life. They continued living in urban environments (whether in the country or as exiles), apparently neither eager to become combatants nor prepared to make a paradigm shift in their somewhat narrow nationalist outlook. There was thus no scope to balance the rustic populism of the combatants or to keep the incipient elitism of the nationalists in check, through mutual exposure to the realities of the venture on which they had engaged. Richards (1996) and Peters (2006) make similar points about the diaspora student intellectuals who stirred the pot of rural rebellion in Sierra Leone, and then left the rough-and-ready cadres of the Revolutionary United Front to their fate.

In the Zimbabwe case, however, lessons were learnt from experiences associated with the transformation of the war to a guerrilla movement from the early 1970s, coinciding with FRELIMO's offer of Tete Province. Developments within this period had a bearing on the subsequent political thinking of some nationalists, who began to reflect on a perceived need to remove the system of capitalism, once decolonisation of the country had taken place (Interview with Dzinashe Machingura October 2007).[56]

The structure of the liberation movement during this period is distinct, in that both ZAPU's National Executive and ZANU's *Dare reChimurenga* were *ad hoc* arrangements to execute the armed struggle, rather than permanent political structures replacing those that had been formed at the inception of the two parties in the early 1960s. The two political parties still had structures inside Zimbabwe superior to those among the exiles entering the country as an armed movement. The roles played by the exiled nationalists in the armed struggle and their reluctance to undergo military training, resulted in a noticeable political and ideological gap between themselves and the fighters. Because they were not 'in the bush' the nationalists failed to keep up with ideological developments in the movement shaped by the contingencies of war. Political education had never been deep, and the nationalists feared to allow the fighters to deepen their political exposure. However, the Chitepo phase laid the foundation for a successful guerrilla war, built in part, as we have seen, from the absorption by (or activation within) the fighters of religious notions widespread among the local population. On to this underlay of local ideas the guerrilla leadership then successfully grafted a variant of Marxism-Leninism.

It was within this space that a potent mix of ideas about ancestral land and modernist collectivisation emerged and that the land movement and the guerrilla movement began to take mutual shape. Peasant guerrillas dominating the struggle

[56] Machingura suggested that nationalists who had undergone this ideological shift, such as Chitepo himself, and JJZ Moyo in ZAPU, became the targets of imperialists, and this accounted for their elimination even before Zimbabwe's independence. Machingura believes these external elements consciously sought a set of more moderate leaders than the war-hardened nationalists-turned-socialists.

had as their main political education course an analysis of key national grievances, of which the appropriation of the land by Whites made most sense to the different parties. War (as Richards 2007 has argued, drawing on Durkheim) is a kind of ritual engagement that heightens the emotions and fixes new collective representations. Land was now forged as a durable collective representation of what it was that the cadres were fighting for; the mentality of the land movement, as led and revived by War Veterans was beginning to take shape in the crucible of guerrilla struggle.

Transition of the Chitepo phase to ZIPA was marked by a series of rapid military and political events that affected particularly ZANLA but had a bearing on its relationship with ZIPRA. First in 1974 ZANLA cadres who were in the war zone led by Badza and Nhari mutinied against the High Command, accusing them of pursuing luxurious life at the expense of the war. This resulted into deaths of more than 40 people who sympathised with the High Command members. The rebellion was however foiled by forces loyal to Tongogara led by Dzinashe Machingura. Dzinashe Machingura a ZIPA leader[57] (1978, quoted in Moore 1995), captures the weaknesses of this organisational relationship. The rebels were court marshalled and executed, introducing a mode of punishment that would later affect the liberation movement (Martin and Johnson 1981). However, in the eyes of analysts, the crushing of the Nhari/Badza rebellion took an ethnic turn to settle leadership scores between the Manyika and Karanga groups.[58]

Second, was a car bomb assassination of Chitepo himself. Third was the arrest of the High Command members of ZANLA by the Zambian government sparking diplomatic tension and grinding ZANLA military offensive to a halt (Mgagao Declaration 1975). Fourth, and seemingly unrelated, Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in June 1975, opening floodgates to the eastern front recruits. Fifth, political talks were held between nationalists and the Smith Regime at Victoria Falls. This resulted in the release of some of the detained nationalist leaders who were languishing in Rhodesian detention camps.

Sixth, was the crossing into Mozambique of Robert Mugabe and Edgar Tekere, senior ZANU nationalists. Seventh, was the drafting and presentation of Mgagao Declaration by ZANLA fighters, pushing nationalist politicians asunder and kick-starting the war under the command of ZIPRA and ZANLA. The new united force that officially had no political allegiance to either ZANU or ZAPU was called Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). The following section discusses the details of this period.

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[57] A central figure in the formation and development of ZIPA in 1975, becoming ZIPA's *de facto* Political Commissar.

[58] Although this could be considered false ethnic consciousness, in that the cadres the ethnic grouping was based on colonial construction, there were internal conflicts based Rhodesian government and missionary ethnic classification. During the Chitepo phase the ZANLA/ZANU (in exile) leadership was dominated by cadres from Manicaland who included Herbert Chitepo himself, Noel Mukono (who played a key role in forging the alliance between FRELIMO and ZANLA), William Ndangana, Enerst Kadungure, John Mataure etc. Another rival 'ethnic' group was the Karanga that was comprised of General Tongogara and others. The Nhari Badza rebellion provided an opportunity to ensnare the Manyika leadership who were not part of the rebellion. These were the likes of senior commanders like Noel Mukono. Chitepo's death in March 1975 is seen as continuation of this purging of the Manyika leaders by the Karanga.

2.3 The ZIPA period

The Zimbabwe People's Army was comprised of military cadres from both ZAPU and ZANU. Internal developments within the forces, coupled with external force from frontline states for unity of the two guerrilla armies in order to avoid the rivalry like the one then experienced in Angola, caused the two armies to unite. ZIPA High Command was comprised of 16 commanders equally divided between ZANLA and ZIPRA. The ZIPA period, from April 1975 to January 1977, was the shortest phase of the liberation struggle, although its impact was far-reaching, and continues to influence Zimbabwean politics even today (Moore 1990). The ZIPA phase had a specific organisational character, in that, different from the other two phases, combatants had an opportunity to lead on both the political and the military fronts. Nationalists – remote from operations - had limited control over the guerrilla forces, and at times there was little more than indirect consultation of ZAPU leaders by ZIPRA on some decisions.[59] Otherwise, they were relegated to the margins.

The ZIPA phase followed the détente exercise and the death of Chitepo on 18 March 1975. Leaders of ZANU and ZANLA (Dare and High Command) were incarcerated by the Zambian state, allegedly for killing Chitepo in an ethnic feud according to findings of a Commission of Enquiry into Chitepo's death that was formed by the Zambian government. The war, more active on the ZANLA/ZANU flank than on the ZAPU/ZIPRA side, ground to a halt. There was no further training of recruits and therefore no reinforcement to the support those in the front. Supply of ammunition and other materiel halted. Only a few ZANLA commanders escaped the Zambian incarceration so reorganisation was required and new command structures were necessary, before the war could be started again.

The death of Hebert Chitepo, and Independence of Mozambique from Portugal three months later in June 1975, were a double political and geographical coincidence that encouraged mass exodus of students from secondary schools, colleges, university and even primary schools, especially in the eastern Province of Manicaland, adjacent to Mozambique. Some of these young recruits were angered by the death of Chitepo and FRELIMO welcomed those who crossed the border resulting in the closure of many schools because they fell below minimum enrolment levels. The nature of recruitment during the ZIPA phase was captured by Fay Chung who described them as:

> *… a new breed of leaders, young men and women in their teens and twenties who had joined the liberation struggle straight from secondary schools and universities. This younger group of military leaders had been influenced by the ideas of Marx and Lenin, and sincerely believed themselves to be participating in a revolution that would overthrow not only colonialism, but also the bourgeois capitalist form of government. This was quite a different objective from that of the old nationalists of the 1950s and 1960s who had wanted African representation, but without major changes in the form of government. The young leaders were also a different breed from the militarists, the*

[59] Although it is claimed (Moore 1995) that the ZIPRA component of ZIPA reserved any decisions until they consulted their political superiors, in *de facto* terms the military committee was the decision making body. Military decisions were not *per se* subjected to scrutiny by politicians, and none was reversed by them.

> *'veterans', who believed in the supremacy of military might, but had little idea about the type of government they wanted after independence. (Chung 2006: 148)*

This changed statistical composition of the guerrillas with the educated being more numerous. The many thousands of more highly educated recruits flocking to Mozambique had no one to receive them, give them direction and inform them of any program. FRELIMO tried to help by giving these new cadres some sense of direction, but the new Mozambique regime had its own urgent priorities and was also pretty much in the dark about the now fragmented leadership of the war and its direction. Recruits formed their own command structure in order to have some sort of administration. Food was inadequate, as were medicines and clothing. Camps almost degenerated into chaos, with some recruits going back to Rhodesia and others attempting to walk to Tanzania in search of training. A few trained ZANLA combatants from Tanzania came to try and administer these (so-called) refugee camps. These trained guerrillas were necessarily Chitepo phase recruits, and many of them were illiterate. Tensions soon surfaced between the Chitepo and ZIPA phase recruits, manifest in a generation gap and educational differences. Bhebhe and Ranger conclude that:

> *This dichotomy was to be reproduced on a much more massive scale within ZANLA from 1973 onwards with a 'flood of willing recruits' into Mozambique, many of them secondary-school students, others 'peasants', youths and illiterate refugees. Later still, university students joined the recruits. These disparities added to the generational tensions[60] within both guerrilla armies. (Bhebhe and Ranger 1995: 9)*

At this stage the leadership of the war was composed of nationalists, lacking military training, and thus the situation was different from FRELIMO, where leaders like Samora Machel were themselves experienced combatants. The functional distinction between 'nationalists' and 'fighters' was further underpinned by differential status, divergent experiences, and mental orientation as a result of war-

[60] To illustrate these tensions AG (Interview October 2007), a War Veteran who joined the war as a child soldier in 1975 and became a municipal security officer after the war, before going into the private sector, explained the generational and ethnic problems at Nyadzonya Camp (Mozambique) which held the largest number- and, according to him, the most educated and enlightened - recruits of the ZIPA period. Many of the recruits at Nyadzonya were abused, tortured and ill-treated, particularly the young girl school leavers. The Chitepo period recruits, most of whom came from the north-eastern front, accused the new recruits of joining the war for sex because the later arrivals were preferred (by those who abused them!) over the former. The tension developed to such high levels that the camp commanders - including Gutura, Morrison Nyathi and Saudi-, were imprisoned and then demoted after an open 'review meeting' where one of the girls is reported to have said, '*These people (Chitepo period recruits) have a habit of saying to us, "Why did you come to war? Even if you had not come we were capable of liberating the country without you." Do they think that Zimbabwe is their own country exclusively?*' The meeting led to a change of administration, and Chitepo period recruits were replaced by better educated cadres, who helped introduce a new quality and set of values into ZIPA. For this punishment Nyathi later defected to the join the RSFs, and returned to attack the camp, thereby being responsible for the deaths of about 1800 unarmed recruits. Gutura was at the forefront in dealing with ZIPA cadres at the beginning of Mugabe phase in 1976, and was reinstated as a member of the General Staff in reward for his later performance.

time experiences. Dzinashe Machingura (1978), a ZIPA leader[61], captures the weaknesses of this organisational relationship:

> *… though the fighting forces are under the political leadership and influence of the nationalist leadership, ideologically the fighting forces pursue a line opposed to that of the leadership. In the course of time, this ideological outlook develops to the point of influencing the organisation and political views of the fighting forces. This sets the fighting forces in a collision course with the petty bourgeois nationalist leadership … eventually develop[ing] to become the hotbed of tension within the nationalist organisation. (Moore 1995: 84-5)*

Dzinashe Machingura is here underlining some of the fundamental contradictions within the liberation movement, in that (as in so much of sub-Saharan Africa) the nationalist leaders were mercantilist or professional in orientation, and unexposed to the kinds of military conditions or political training that might have narrowed the gap between them and the combatants. As we shall see later in the thesis these contradictions figure strongly in the root causes of the tensions inhabiting the broad liberation movement, later inherited by the land occupation movement. They help explain an important plane of cleavage between War Veterans and the nationalists, evident in the failure of political factions within the ruling ZANU-PF party to unite around issues of peasant justice or agrarian development in the post independence period.

The Mgagao cadres[62] wrote a Declaration that they submitted to Hashim Mbita, Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Liberation[63] committee and then to others, including the group of supportive African countries known as the front line states. The Mgagao Declaration proposed unity between ZIPRA and ZANLA. Out of thus suggestion a military committee was formed comprising eight ZIPRA and eight ZANLA commanders. The rapprochement of ZIPRA and ZANLA boosted military aid in he form of supplies from foreign allies, especially to the near-starving, Chinese backed, ZANLA forces.

The Mgagao Declaration has not yet been thoroughly analysed in terms of its contribution to the debate about nation building and national ethos. In its first paragraph it talks about 'unswerving and unequivocal commitment to the liberation of Zimbabwe through arduous armed struggle… condemn[ing] any moves to continue talks with the Smith regime in whatever form'. The second paragraph is an evaluation of various ways in which unity can be categorised, namely: Revolutionary Unity, Counter Revolutionary Unity and Reactionary Unity. The fighters stood for revolutionary unity, defined as the unity of committed revolutionaries that enriches and drives forward the revolution. This became the basis for the formation of ZIPA, representing the unity of the two guerrilla armies, ZIPRA and ZANLA. It is important to note that only at this point did ZANLA and ZIPRA formally unite, a

[61] A central figure in the formation and development of ZIPA in 1975, becoming ZIPA's *de facto* Political Commissar.

[62] Mgagao was a training Camp in Tanzania where many liberation movement of Southern Africa were accommodated. Drafters of the declaration were the intellectual group of cadres some of whom then became members of the ZIPA High Command (Interview with Dzinashe Machingura 2007).

[63] Dzinashe Machingura (2 February 2006), critiquing Fay Chung's publication *Reliving the Second Chimurenga* as discussant at the book launch at Book Café, Harare.

move that could – had it lasted - have pre-empted the post independence conflicts between the two armies, and prevented the Gukurahundi (the ethnic eliminations of the post independence period).

With these principles in mind, these combatant 'organic intellectuals' then evaluated individuals and political organisations (e.g. the Zimbabwe Liberation Council),[64] condemning three nationalist leaders (Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, James Chikerema). It also went on to 'condemn and completely dissociate ourselves from the Nkomo faction of the African National Congress (ANC) [because] holding his congress in Salisbury is clearly a reactionary move…'. Alongside this condemnation (paragraph 4) the fighters expressed sympathy for Robert Mugabe 'for defying the rigours of guerrilla life' and chose him to be the 'middle man'[65] (i.e. power broker) when dealing with the nationalists. This provided for Mugabe's ascent to power, offering him a strategic position from which to control the levers of armed struggle. Paragraph six covered diplomatic conflict with Zambia, with the fighters alleging that the Zambian state killed ZANLA combatants, and going on to claim that 'the Zambian action has generated hostilities between itself and the Zimbabwe Freedom Fighters.' The document concludes in paragraph seven with a bold and resolute stance. The fighters state that 'If the OAU, the Tanzania and Mozambique governments cannot do anything to support the Armed Struggle in Zimbabwe, we shall start with throwing stones … If we cannot live as free men, we rather choose to die as FREE MEN'.[66]

The Mgagao Declaration is important in providing documentary evidence of a key, shaping moment in the independence struggle, defining the basic tenets for inclusion or exclusion of actors in the liberation movement. The Mgagao fighters asserted who, among Zimbabwe's Black populace qualified to be part of the liberation movement. Nationalist commitment to the revolution was openly put into question, with the implication that nationalists had to transform into revolutionaries according to the standards and values of the Mgagao Declaration. Never before had such standards been proposed, and at least up to that point, no one had been excluded from the liberation movement. The Mgagao Declaration attempted to separate sheep from goats, as it were. As we shall see later, standing in the liberation movement (according to Mgagao standards) is still an issue of concern up to today, and remains a basis for determining alliances between the liberation movement factions and other forces. In keeping with the declaration's sectarian tone, some War Veterans continue to judge that the ethos, standards and values of Mgagao were negated by the Mugabe period, and as we shall see this continues to act as a touchstone for conflicting values and ideologies. The layering and partitioning of experience in the guerrilla war underpins persistent strife between the cadres and nationalists to the present.

Another important aspect of the Mgagao document was that it helped to challenge the myth of the omnipotence of the (civil) leaders of the liberation movement in

[64] It had been formed by Ndabaningi Sithole.

[65] However, Mugabe did not end up a 'middleman' and he used this phrase in the Mgagao Declaration as his pretext to seek control over the leadership of the guerrilla war.

[66] Such statements have been important in carving out cultural capital for the liberation movement, and we find it echoed in statements like '*Zimbabwe will never be a colony again*', a cliché of the post 2000 land occupations.

Zimbabwe.[67] These leaders now had to prove their commitment to the struggle by deeds over mere words. A precedent was set that fighters should not hesitate to denounce leaders who failed to meet 'defined' standards. Leaders had to be accountable to the group, and free from corruption. The Mgagao Declaration denounced leaders who were jumping from 'capital to capital, raising funds which have never been put to the service of the revolution'. From this action onwards, nationalist leaders became much more vigilant about the mood of the fighters, and the need to control them, as we shall see. This became the basis for mistrust of the combatants, which in turn led (in the independence period) to 'selective' recruitment into the armed struggle of diaspora scholars and nationalist (Chung 1995, Tungamirai 1995), 'economic disempowerment' (Tapfumaneyi 1996), 'social isolation', 'relegation' and victimisation (Chitiyo 2000, Sadomba, F. 1999; 2004, Sadomba, F. and Dzinetsa 2004) of War Veterans.

The Mgagao manifesto (like the Revolutionary United Front's (RUF) document *Footpaths to democracy* (Richards 1996)) captures foundation of a sectarian moment. The value of the freedom fighter and her/his commitment to the colonised people of Zimbabwe was raised high by the Mgagao document only to be dashed to the ground when the civilian nationalists regained the upper hand and during the post independence peace times. The War Veterans continue to be influenced by the views and spirit of the Mgagao Declaration as a foundational sacred text, much as demoralised and marginalised RUF ex-combatants continued to copy out, furtively, select passages from their Footpaths manifesto to restore morale several years after the end of their struggle (Richards, Personal communication 2005). The wheeling and dealing of the factionalised Mugabe era was the antithesis of ZIPA solidarity. The ZIPA phase can thus be considered 'sectarian' or 'egalitarian' based in organisation and ideas, by analogy with Richards' (1996) analysis of the 'sectarian' turn in the Sierra Leonean RUF, when a guerrilla movement became isolated from (and abandoned) by its wider intellectual leadership, and it was necessary (for survival and self protection) for the bush-enclaved cadres to rally around a boisterous egalitarianism and self-taught ideology. The reorganisation of the War Veterans in the 1990s reflects this, as we shall see in the next chapter.

The Mgagao document was also important, however, in that it set aspirational expectations among a younger generation of committed Zimbabweans, suspicious of nationalist deal-making. It expressed important values within the liberation movement that would set parameters for an alternative vision of how to go about building a new post colonial Zimbabwean nation. It also had results, in the sense that it gave birth to unity between ZIPRA and ZANLA, resulted in the revival of the armed struggle, and deepened political and ideological education within the liberation movement, as we shall shortly see. Guerrilla war changed qualitatively and quantitatively. Militarily, ZIPA mounted an offensive that was based on the

[67] During ZIPA it was forbidden to shout a slogan praising an individual, unless that person had died fighting for the liberation of Zimbabwe. This changed during the Mugabe era, when the first out of the only ten permitted slogans was 'Forward with Comrade President Robert Mugabe!' The slogan was so ubiquitous that Nhongo-Simbanegavi (2000: 102) noted, '*Almost all the official documents prepared after 1977 bore the slogan … [but] earlier documents made no such reference to the Party President.*' This is because such a slogan was abolished by ZIPA only to be brought back during the Mugabe era.

strategy of engulfing the enemy by cutting communication and transport links employing guerrilla tactics:

> *Whereas at the end of 1975 there were barely a hundred guerrillas in the north-east, within six months many of hundreds of them had infiltrated along most of Rhodesia's borders with black Africa. This quantitative change was also reflected in the volume and nature of guerrilla war.*[68] *(Moore 1995: 78)*

In addition to the Tete Province operation covering the north-eastern since 1972, Manica and Gaza Provinces, adjacent to Mozambique, were now opened. On the political front ZIPA also managed to change the whole complexion of the war. One senior ZIPA commanders observed that 'because political parties were dead, ZIPA commanders had to continue the struggle on their own while politicians reorganised the parties (Dabengwa 1995). These are not negligible results, and thus the generation of liberation fighters inspired by the Mgagao manifesto has real achievements to which its aspirational sentiments relate.

It is worth looking at some of these achievements a little closer, paying particular attention to their educational and ideological significance. This parallels the account given by Peters (2006) of a hidden 'intellectual' layer in the RUF, whose existence is fervently denied by the political classes threatened by its emergent calls to deep reform. In the ZIPA phase a new breed of political instructors of sound academic background were selected and posted to the holding camps of Nyadzonya, Chibavava and Tembwe, where large numbers of recruits were located. Others were deployed in the training camps. The political education program was transformed, with the core syllabus covering the following lectures:

- Pouring out of national grievances
- People's war
- People's army
- History of ZANU and nationalism in Zimbabwe
- Classes and class struggle
- Serving the people
- Neo-colonialism
- Mgagao declaration

In addition to the common courses covered by everybody, ZIPA took the initiative to establish a Political Science College teaching Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-Tung thought. This was called Wampoa Political Academy, established at Chimoio and later called Chitepo College. The first group of candidates, highly educated[69] by the standards of a guerrilla movement, comprised a total of 100 guerrillas, about 15 of whom were women. The courses covered included the following topics:[70]

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[68] David Moore 1995: 78, quoting Marmakin 1990, *The Making of Zimbabwe: Decolonisation in Regional and International Politics*.

[69] In the first group of 100 there were at least six undergraduates, some of whom had been dismissed from the University of Rhodesia following the 1973 student's demonstration. At least 80 were 'O' and 'A' Level candidates when they left for the liberation struggle and about ten were professionals, including trained teachers (Personal observation, Wampoa 1976). The second and last group before abolition of the academy Wampoa was of a similar composition. Again, the comparison with the RUF (and the role of Bunumbu Teachers College) is uncanny (cf. Richards 2001, Peters 2006).

[70] Personal observation, Wampoa political academy, Chimoio 1976-7.

- Political and economic history of Zimbabwe
- Economic geography of Zimbabwe
- The history of philosophy
- Dialectical materialism
- Marxist political economy
- Historical materialism
- Scientific socialism
- The two line struggle and national democratic revolution
- Introduction to theories of adult education

The first set of Wampoa graduates developed a new syllabus for further recruits to give a basic understanding of principles of socialist revolution. Lecture notes were developed and distributed to all camps.[71] A second (and last) group was recruited but only finished the course under politically strenuous conditions, as the college was in a process of being banned by the incoming Mugabe leadership Wampoa graduates were deployed into the camps and to the front, yet by and large it was other, non-Wampoa cadres, who were sent to missions abroad for further training in aviation, intelligence and other professions (Interview with AGR October 2007).

The demise of ZIPA started when the young commanders of the ZIPA Military Committee failed to sustain unity between ZIPRA and ZANLA. Partisan loyalty was fostered by the nationalists, and the revolutionary cadres failed to establish an effective organisation transcending ZANU and ZAPU. ZIPA then began to disintegrate. '[C]onflicts between ZANLA and ZIPRA soon began in the training camps in Tanzania, resulting in some deaths, and consequently the fighters proposed that there should be political leadership over the fighting forces' (Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 2004). ZIPRA pulled out of the Mozambican camps (Bhebhe and Ranger 1995) amid accusations and counter accusations of murder. The proposal of surrendering power to the nationalist 'elders' was seen as essential to restore order and was accepted (Interview with Dzinashe Machungura October 2007). Indeed the political leadership then took over. This time the nationalists were led by Robert Mugabe for ZANU and Joshua Nkomo for ZAPU. This changed the course of the struggle once more.

When the Geneva Conference of 1976 was called ZANU leaders were released from Zambian prisons. ZANU nationalists forged an alliance with members of the former High Command and as a group convinced Samora Machel to arrest ZIPA commanders. Frelimo arrested the ZIPA leadership group, and they were jailed until 1980.[72] In the camps, resistance was immediately thwarted[73] by Frelimo and an

[71] The new syllabus then included, for example the following courses: 'Socio-economic formations' to widen understanding of 'People's war'; 'Capitalism' to widen the scope of 'national grievances' and 'classes and class struggle in Zimbabwe'; 'Imperialism the highest stage of capitalism' to widen the scope of 'Neo-colonialism' and 'State and revolution' to widen the scope of 'People's army'. More time was allocated to cover the new syllabus.

[72] In a similar move, the international community stood back in Sierra Leone while the civilian government arrested and detained without charge almost the entire strength of the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP) (the political party formed from the Sierra Leone rebel movement after the Lome Treaty of 1999) in May 2000. Most were not released (still without charge) until 2006 (Richards and Vincent 2008).

alliance between Chitepo phase recruits and the released High Command and Dare members. Josiah Tongogara and Rex Nhongo (who betrayed ZIPA colleagues) were instrumental in this development. Robert Mugabe was then declared President of ZANU and leader of the guerrilla movement at a 'Central Committee' meeting held in March 1977. The meeting, however, was dominated by the most recent (Mugabe phase) recruits, who were mostly guerrillas co-opted into the structure, and hand-picked nationalist recruited mostly from oversees where they had been engaged in various activities including education and employment. Some, like Nathan Shamuyarira who had defected from ZANU and formed the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) with James Chikerema, were recruited from neighbouring states.

Wampoa was disbanded forthwith. The syllabus compiled for the new political education program was banned and replaced by one that emphasised the history of ZANU and the new structure of the central committee. The whole political program changed and focused on the personality of the leader. For example, the slogan, 'Pamberi na Cde Robert Mugabe' (i.e. Forward with Comrade Robert Mugabe!) was first introduced in specific challenge to ZIPA's position that no one would be considered a hero unless already dead, and a revolutionary to the end. The ZIPA position reflected a deep awareness that human beings change. Under the new dispensation, political lectures were replaced mainly by lessons that demanded memorising the new structure of ZANU and the names of the incumbents of the Politburo, Central Committee and High Command. This became the thrust of political education characteristic of the Mugabe phase. Names mattered more than ideas. Recruits of radical intellectual background were once more persecuted, as had happened during the Chitepo phase. The Mugabe period was based on forging a unity between the Chitepo phase recruits and the Mugabe phase recruits, some of whom were hand-picked from the cohort of ZIPA period guerrillas (Sadomba 2007). A cult, building the personality of ZANU's President Robert Mugabe, developed rapidly from that time, lasting into the independence era, and thereby reversing (in the eyes of the egalitarian cadres) all ZIPAs achievements on the ideological front (Moore 1990).

2.3.1 ZIPA – a balance sheet

A combination of recruitment, political and ideological focus, military developments and leadership made the ZIPA period a distinctive phase in the armed struggle. The ZIPA period was introduced by defining the liberation movement, and raising the quality of its actors and its ethos through a process of self education. ZIPA differed from the preceding Chitepo phase in important ways. First, the nature of recruits drastically changed, and student, urbanite, and worker-peasant groups began

[73] An assertion (made Dzinashe Machingura 2006 at the launch of Fay Chung's book in 2006 at the Book Café) that there was no resistance in the camps is not true. At Chimoio Wampoa cadres were arrested for mobilising resistance, and the tension between the Old Guard and the ZIPA recruits was clear. At Doeroi, under the leadership of the late Moses Mvenge, High Command members (Old Guard) faced resistance to get into the camps, and at Tembwe, it is alleged that ambushes were laid, but foiled. If FRELIMO had not moved in, the situation could have degenerated into an armed conflict, and it was not likely that the Old Guard and the nationalist would then have triumphed, considering the number of cadres sympathetic to ZIPA. ZIPA recruits, who knew little or nothing about the Old Guard and therefore naturally supported ZIPA, numerically surpassed Chitepo phase recruits by far.

numerically to dominate. These were relatively younger, and recruited mainly through ideological and political propaganda (i.e. they were brought to the liberation movement by ideas), rather than through direct physical contact with the guerrillas.[74]

ZIPA was full of ideas. But as with many such idealistic 'youth' movements its zeal at times outweighed its practical sense. One of the major deficiencies of ZIPA was a failure to achieve unanimity in terms of judging the 'Old Guard'. Some ZIPA leaders were loyal to the jailed High Command to a point of adoration. ZIPA then was divided internally when it came face to face with the problem of handling the released High Command. This problem was coupled with the failure of its diplomatic offensive. It is difficult to understand why ZIPA did not seize the opportunity to have Samora Machel (President of Mozambique and ex-guerrilla and President of Front for the Liberation of Mozambique - FRELIMO) on their side, having worked with him for a whole year. They also failed to use Nyerere's influence to convince Machel that they were the authentic heirs of the liberation mantle. In their defence, ZIPA commanders argue that shortage of time was a major hindrance for them, but some inexperience, or lack of far-sightedness and diplomatic skill, seems also to be involved.

Perhaps the worst failure of ZIPA lay in its inability to sustain its most significant achievement – uniting ZIPRA and ZANLA forces (and overcoming the centrifugal tendencies of 'tribalism'). Partisan loyalties seem in some case to have been based on individual patrimonial commitments. In effect, some key ZIPA cadres failed to imagine a revolutionary society beyond ZANU and ZANLA or beyond ZAPU and ZIPRA. They were trapped by 'nationalist' (for which read sectional) politics 'hook, line and sinker'. The golden opportunity to unite the forces slipped out of their hands in a bloody conflict. The pull out by ZIPRA weakened the movement ideologically, militarily and organisationally. In addition ZIPA leadership was not fully aware of the key structural changes required to transform a war machine into a revolutionary vanguard. For example, the notorious security and intelligence department was left virtually intact, in the hands of Chitepo phase recruits such as the notorious (late) Tsuro, who persecuted many cadres on ethnic grounds. His methods, and the fear he instilled, can be glimpsed in the account of one interviewee, who claimed that the (late) Sheba Tavarwisa's husband Edgar died under torture and interrogation by Tsoro (Interview with A. November 2007, former member of Security and Intelligence Department, and eyewitness to Edgar's death). The failures of ZIPA to deal with these challenges affected the entire liberation movement, and this failure is still felt today. ZIPA phase ex-combatants are still terror stricken by these experiences.[75]

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[74] Revealingly, Chitepo phase recruits referred to the new ZIPA recruits in derogatory terms as 'those who joined the war by train' or 'those recruited by radio'.

[75] Besides the murder of Edgar there was torture that resulted in post traumatic stress disorders (PTSDs) and physical problems of the victims. For example, some well known cases of mental breakdown of Wampoa College graduates include Geos, Quinine, late Farai (female) and Zuka to mention but just a few. One typical example of torture involved Mhondoro (not real name) who was tied to a tree in Ruya Game Reserve by Chitepo phase section commander, Nhau Dzehondo (not real name) and left for dead (Personal observation 1977-85).

2.4 The Mugabe era

Robert Mugabe became President of ZANU in 1977, after the imprisonment of ZIPA commanders by FRELIMO. That year was announced as the 'Year of the Party', focusing on reorganisation of ZANU. A new Central Committee was established comprising former members of the Dare now released from prison, and one or two ZIPA characters who allied with the new dispensation (Martin and Johnson 1981)

During this period the Mozambican so-called 'refugee' camps were overflowing with recruits:[76]

> *By 1977 there were three major refugee camps in Mozambique. They were: Doeroi with 17,000 refugees, Toronga with 12,000 and Mavudzi with 6,000 – making a total of 35,000 refugees. It was from among these refugees[77] that ZANLA recruited cadres for military training. (Tungamirai 1995: 42)*

Any further recruitment from the front was stopped. However recruitment continued in a different way, typical of this phase of the war. Tungamirai (1995) describes recruitment at this period as 'selective'.[78] The recruits were hand-picked

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[76] Martin and Johnson (1981: 276) give higher figures for so-called refugees by the end of the war. '*In 1977 there were 29,000 refugees – excluding recruits, who numbered about 10,000 trained and in training – in three camps … Doeroi, which eventually became a virtual city mud-and-wattle huts hous[ed] the bulk of the estimated 150,000 refugees in Mozambique at the end of the war.*'

[77] Camps like Nyadzonya, Doeroi and Chibavava which are generally termed refugees camps were actually holding camps where recruits received basic political education and went through training in basic military tactics, although without guns. The Mgagao Declaration, with no need to misrepresent this position to the frontline states and the OAU Liberation Committee (who knew the true position), did not refer to the camps as refugee camps. Instead the document is explicit in defining the people as recruits. '*Another of our problems is the training of our thousands of recruits currently in Mozambique. We shall be grateful if you make the necessary arrangements for the training of our fighters*' (ZANLA 1975: section 7). During the war these settlement s were termed refugee camps so that they could be used to solicit international support from humanitarian organisations. However their continued designation of the camps and the cadres from there as refugees is today opportunistic and part of a tactic of downgrading the status of War Veterans (Interview with MSH, a War Veteran and senior civil servant when driving from Bulawayo to Harare in 2006). MSH (Interview with SS 2004, narrated a story where some former 'refugees' came to his office and queried why after independence they were considered refugees, which was never their designation during the war. They then asked why others like Dr. S. who had not received military training were taken as War Veterans, and they were 'refugees'. They put it to SS that they were considered refugees not because it was their true status but they were former fighters of non-elite social and economic background. Also in a speech by Jabulani Sibanda (Chairman of Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association, ZNLWVA, on 30 January 2008) addressing Harare Province war veterans. Sibanda emphasised that there people who crossed the border in pursuit of the struggle were not refugees whether they were finally trained or not.

[78] Fay Chung (2006: 188) writes about this recruitment as follows: '*Robert Mugabe embarked on this new task (building up a new leadership) with alacrity. He brought in a new group of university educated leaders such as Sydney Sekeramayi … Witness Mangwende … Ibo Mandaza … Ignatius Chigwendere …Davison Mugabe … Hebert Ushewokunze and Eddison Zvobgo (both of whom had integrated themselves to the ANC) … Military leaders like including Josiah Tongogara, Robson Manyika, William Ndangana, Meyor Hurimbo, Solomon Mujuru, and Vitalis Zvinavashe were integrated into the political leadership … Josiah Tungamirai … Perence Shiri … and Dominic Chiwenga [also became part of the new leadership].*' Recruits like Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze, Dr. Sydney Sekeramayi and Nathan Shamuyarira had specialised skills, and most of them were

from the diaspora to join, mostly, the political leadership of the war. These became key players and formed the core of ZANU 'group' and later the new government of 1980, causing tensions and conflict in the liberation movement from this period, centred on leadership struggle, as Matuku Hamadziripi (1975: 23) wrote, in a note smuggled out of Zambian jail: [79]

> *The leadership issue cannot be solved mechanically, that is, by imposing or importing a leader from without, one who has not been tried and tested and has not been closely following the ups and downs of the struggle. Leadership has to be produced and developed by the revolutionary movement itself. … [coming] from the leading cadres in the movement, leaders who have been part and parcel of the development of the revolution.*

Mugabe's success in isolating ZIPA (by incarceration) and taking over command of the guerrilla movement in its final stages can be attributed to a number of factors, including his forging an opportunistic alliance with the peasant recruits of Chitepo phase, support from Frelimo[80] at a critical juncture, and winning the support of the 'Old Guard', including Rex Nhongo (later General of the Zimbabwe National Army). He was then quick and adept at entrenching his power by embarking on 'structural consolidation' (Mugabe 1977) soon after purging the liberation movement of ZIPA radicals.

At the second Central Committee Meeting held in September 1977 President Mugabe delivered the 'historic' Chimoio speech defining the Party Line. This speech laid out the fundamental philosophical underpinnings and general ethos of Mugabe era. He defined enemies of the liberation struggle as:

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nationalist allies or nationalists themselves. However Tungamirai's (1995) assertion that those with special skills included teachers, nurses and even drivers is not true because these belonged to the ordinary recruitment base of the ZIPA period. He also misses the point when he claims that in 1974 and 1975 detente exercise disturbed recruitment. On the contrary recruitment rose abruptly during this period, when Mozambique became independent and soon after the death of Chitepo. Tungamirai, as an ally of Mugabe, underplays the contribution of ZIPA. This is clear when he argues that, '*Between 1976 and 1979 ZANU embarked on a major recruitment drive in order to build up a large fighting force to carry out the objective which was outlined by its President R.G. Mugabe in his 1979 (Gore reGukurahundi- Year of the People's Storm) new year message*' (Tungamirai 1995: 41). Mugabe was under house arrest in Quilimane in Mozambique during 1976, and surely the 1979 objectives could not have influenced the recruitment of three years earlier. From 1975, recruits crossed the Rhodesian-Mozambique border daily to join the war, a major characteristic of the ZIPA period. Tungamirai also argues that recruits came from 'all parts of Rhodesia' which contradicts other indication to show the concentration of recruits were from Manicaland during this period. It has been suggested that Manicaland contributed at least 75 percent of liberation war fighters (Chidawanyika 2000). A statement by War Veterans of Manicaland claimed even a higher figure of 80 percent (Manicaland dialogue conference 2004). This ethnic distribution is important to note, because in ZANU it was as critical factor as it is now. Arguably, it is a hidden factor behind the ethnicity-conscious ZANU-PF leadership's relegation of War Veterans to refugee status.

Internal evidence suggests the article was written sometime at the end of 1975. The document acknowledges '*participants in producing the book: Matuku Hamadziripi (Dare member - Leader), Meya Urimbo (ZANLA PC), Alec Dovi, Enos Musarapasi, Johnson Ndoda, Stan Mutandiro, sadat Kufa Mazuva, Dennis Madzingira, Justin Mazivanhanga and Kanyuchi*.'

[80] Frelimo sent two heavily armed companies of soldiers to quell resistance at Chimoio and provide safe take over of the camps from ZIPA (Personal observation, Chimoio 1976).

> *… destructive forces [who] strive in any direction that militates against the Party line or … seek, like the rebels of 1974[81] and 1975/6, to bring about change in the leadership or structure of the party … their actions are a negation of the struggle. We must negate them in turn [-] negation of the negation. (Mugabe 1977: 37)*

Party line here is defined relative to 'the leadership or structure of the party'. Seeking a change in leadership became tantamount to straying away from 'the' line. This was a new era in ZANU politics, where overt personality cult building was central to the propaganda theme of the liberation struggle. Values had indeed changed. Coercion, punishment and purgation were hovering threats, and often applied through purgation as with the Muparuri/Hamadziripi group that was again thrown into FRELIMO gaols in 1977-8 (Mugabe 1977). Freedom of expression, plurality of ideas and 'dissension' were considered rebellion. According to Machingura (Discussant at Book Café booked launch of Fay Chung's book, 2 February 2006), ZANU became a despotic organisation.[82] The psychological foundation of the Mugabe era was propounded philosophically in the President's address as advancing the concept of discipline:

> *…discipline [has] two dimensions – the external and the internal … the internal kind of discipline [being] the more important of the two. Internal discipline is a state of order within a person that propels him constantly to do right things. It is a stage of individual development that resolves the contradictions within an individual. (Mugabe 1977: 37)*

Internal and external discipline was emphasised to enforce unequivocal loyalty to nationalist authority at the expense of commitment to organisational objectives and ideology although such discipline was important in keeping the guerrilla movement cohesive. Members of the organisation had to internalise the leadership's characteristics to reach a 'stage' where they become unquestioning followers, thereby 'resolving' any 'contradictions within an individual' that might stem from negative judgements concerning the leadership qualities of incumbent characters.

The party, ZANU, was redefined exclusively to mean a 'group' of individual leaders, with the rank-and-file as coerced followers. The democratic base shrank and power became centralised and concentrated (Nhongo-Simbanegavi 2000).

> *Our group is the party called ZANU. ZANU has an order, rules and regulations which make its system – the ZANU system of behaviour. When an individual cannot subject himself to discipline, then external discipline must apply. The Party must* ***compel***[83] *him to conform. This is where punishment comes in. (Mugabe 1977)*

Compulsion was displacing education and intellectual development. Wampoa's programs and political education (or propaganda) for the fighters became irrelevant.

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[81] This is a reference to the Badza-Nhari revolt that marked the beginning of the end of Chitepo period. Badza and Nhari were commanders at the front who were critical of corrupt commanders and intent on setting up a new command structure. They accused commanders such as Josiah Tongogara of living in luxury in Lusaka, womanising and neglecting the needs of the guerrillas. The Nhari/Badza group was overpowered by ZANLA reinforcements from Tanzania. Badza is said to have been buried alive in a standing posture despite the verdict of Herbert Chitepo (who presided the court marshal) that the group had to be surrendered to FRELIMO and await the independence of Zimbabwe for judgement.

[82] Three years of Mugabe's leadership during the armed struggle witnessed purgation of two groups – the Vashandi and Hamadziripi/Gumbo group.

[83] Emphasis mine.

The 'ZANU system of behaviour' was based on 'compulsion', 'punishment' and intolerance of anything beyond the 'order, rules and regulations which make its system'.[84] The change of approach was accompanied by structural changes: '**We**, who are members of the Central Committee, have to demonstrate by our own actions that we are **entitled** to demand of others compliance to rules of discipline.' (Mugabe 1977)[85]

Emphasis on discipline enforced by a powerful Security Department filled with illiterate cadres of peasant background resulted in a reign of terror. Freedom of speech and expression were curtailed. Intellectual contributions to the progress of the liberation movement were held in suspicion, and any form of criticism was labelled rebellious. The promised punishment was to be severe. Mugabe continues: 'This exercise [quelling the ZIPA revolt] was followed by a politicisation program in the camps. We warned any person with a tendency to revolt that the ZANU axe would fall on their necks.' (Mugabe 1977: 13)[86]

This speech is multi-layered in its overall effects. First, the 'politicisation program' evoking fear of the axe a 'fall[ing] on the neck' yielded its positive results: 'Robert Mugabe conceded that there was very little ideological awareness, even amongst the leaders themselves. He spoke of plans to reconsider opening Chitepo Ideological College to start giving cadres proper orientation to avoid problems in the future.' (Nhongo-Simbanegavi 2000: 40)[87]

This is an important observation. If lack of 'ideological awareness' was cited during the Mugabe phase, despite previous ZIPA intervention, it shows that the different phases exposed the guerrillas to different qualities of political education. The Mugabe phase reversed the ideological gains of the liberation struggle, as Mugabe himself lamented. The psychological effects of this can be traced in the fear of and reluctance to carry out political education. Nhongo-Simbanegavi assesses the outcome:

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[84] Dzinashe Machingura as discussant on the book launch of Fay Chung's 'Reliving Second Chimurenga', Book Café, Harare 2 February 2006.

[85] Emphasis mine.

[86] Indeed that became the main objective of political education, coated with promises to re-open Chitepo College. Mugabe's proposal was rhetoric, according to Nhongo-Simbanegavi (2000: 39) '*Faced with limited challenge in this regard, ZANLA's ideological orientation remained within the confining limits of nationalism. The obsession with articulating a universal nationalist position within the organisation stifled debate on other political views. Any issues not immediately identifiable with the conventional struggle (as defined by the nationalist leadership) were viewed as divisive in the camps and were met with repression. When a few better educated fighters made attempts to raise rank-and-file issues, carrying their analyses beyond nationalist parochialism by addressing class differences, ZANU's leadership panicked and acted to convey a clear message to the rest of the fighters: anyone who took the concept of revolutionary war too seriously risked official ostracism and, consequently, their political demise*.' This was stated at the meeting of the Party Ideology Development Committee that met in Chimoio, Mozambique, on 12 March 1979. Nhongo-Simbabnegavi's sources were the ZANU (PF) Archives, File: Political Commisariat, Doc: Circular to the High Command and General Staff Members' undated but estimated to be from 1979.

[87] This was at the meeting of the Party Ideology Development Committee that met in Chimoio, Mozambique, on 12 March 1979 (Nhongo-Simbanegavi 2000: fn. 37).

> *… respondants voiced concerns like: 'deep political education will cause me to revolt. Intimidation by the security personnel had almost paralysed ZANLA's operational system … They also said they had not yet heard from the Party (leaders) if they could resume political education since the 1976-7 Vashandi[88] Revolt. (Nhongo-Simbanegavi 2000: 40)*

Second, as illustrated, the speech defined new patterns of structural authority in ZANU. There was now a new Central Committee that controlled ZANLA. Whereas the Chitepo phase had the 'Dare reChimurenga' as an adhoc supreme body, but according to ZANU's permanent structures which were in Rhodesia. Dare was subordinate to the internal Central Committee of ZANU, and the ZIPA period was headed by a military committee, the Mugabe phase introduced for the first time a Central Committee and Politburo in exile. This changed the power structure in that the transient nature of the Dare and the military committee was replaced by the final authority of the Central Committee and Politburo in exile, the first steps towards building the absolute power now enjoyed by Robert Mugabe. The Politburo, the new structure, was created for the purpose of concentrating and centralising power.

Third, it defined a new kind of relationship between the guerrilla army and the party structure. The new Central Committee of ZANU was different from the Dare in that the former had only loose control of the fighters, who were more independent, with only Josiah Magama Tongogara being a member of that body.

Fourth, it set new boundaries on the individual party member, who was reduced to the status of blind follower, especially under the new command of authoritarian Josiah Tongogara (Moore 1990). Although in the 1977 Central Committee, the 'most important new element was a strong representation from the military, which now comprised almost half of the governing body [with only] one or two ZIPA leaders ...' (Martin and Johnson 1981: 275).[89] Although ZIPA denounced nationalist leaders and had no space for nationalists in its structures Mugabe period had a strong representation of the military. This was hardly for purposes of power sharing between the guerrillas and nationalists but strategy of the nationalists to provide a mechanism for controlling guerrillas through their commanders.

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[88] *Vashandi* is a Shona word which means 'workers'. The ZIPA group coined this term in reference to the Marxist working class ideology that they advanced. At the first Chimoio rally after the arrest of ZIPA leaders in Beira, Mugabe said, after explaining that the ZIPA group had been arrested, 'Down with these workers', referring to ZIPA (Personal observation, Chimoio 1976). It was also at that rally that Josiah Magama Tongogara first shouted the slogan, 'Pamberi na Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe!' (i.e. Forward with Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe!).

[89] Active participation of guerrillas in the top leadership of the war differed. In the Chitepo period, the DARE, the supreme organ, was dominated by nationalists with Tongogara representing the forces from 1972. During the ZIPA period nationalists played a very insignificant role because of the Mgagao Declaration. Even Mugabe and Tekere who had not been denounced by Mgagao cadres were during this time, under house arrest in Quilimane, Mozambique. During Mugabe phase there were many guerrillas as well as many selectively recruited nationalists in the Politburo and Central Committees. However, guerrilla dominance should be understood in terms of selective co-optation by the nationalists, in view of the need to instil discipline and loyalty among the rank and file of the guerrillas. Power balance was clearly in favour of the nationalists.

The heavy representation of the military was to ensure that the requirement 'to demand of others compliance to the rules of discipline' would be enforced by the guerrilla leaders. A special alliance of forces made this possible. Chitepo phase guerrillas, particularly the peasants loyal to the 'Old Guard', were instrumental in the new dispensation. Some had become adept at torture during the Chitepo phase,[90] and now used these 'skills' to suppress the ZIPA generation guerrillas, thereby helping entrench the power of the new ZANU group led by President Mugabe.

Fifth, it spelt out the action to be taken against the individual who failed to comply – they would be severely punished. Two years later Dzinashe Machingura[91] (1978) was to reflect, while in FRELIMO gaols, that:

> *Consequently, the broad masses of the fighters are in reality not politically interred into nationalist organisations; they are only members of the army … never consulted and are regarded as military instruments. In a revolutionary situation, such political relations between the army and political organisation, can only be counter-productive; the denial of democracy to the fighting forces … give[s] rise to political instability. (Quoted in Moore 1995: 84)*

Machingura's analysis is important in understanding the contradictions now apparent in ZANU-PF today, and sheds some light on the source of internal conflicts within the liberation movement as a whole. The success of the liberation struggle depended a great deal on the initiative and political understanding of the guerrilla cadres, especially in the ZIPA period, but this very political awaking spelt potential trouble to a class of nationalist politicians determined to control the fruits of independence. Their tactic was to marginalise the guerrillas by whatever means. Marginalisation and disempowerment of these fighters meant they were never truly demobilised. Mentally, many resented the new regime as they clung to their war-induced sense of solidarity and comradeship. This sowed seeds of longer-term political instability in the post independence period, rising to a climax in the land occupation movement led by War Veterans. The post war power distribution and ideological mix of the liberation movement then laid the basis for a post independence reconfiguration of forces with a high likelihood for the nationalists to forge a class alliance with settler capital, and commercial farmers in particular (Moyo and Yeros 2005). The President could bide his time. If the White capital ever rose against him he could always play the land card, and court instant popularity by booting the White Farmers out of the country. The commercial farmers enjoyed a longer tenure than many imagined, but they were always sitting on a ticking time bomb. As for disinherited War Veterans, he used a combination of wartime tactics of Mugabe phase and the new state machine to deal with them (Scholtz 2004).

2.4.1 Analysis of the Mugabe phase

The Mugabe phase of the war left a complex legacy. Nationalists, like the cunning wounded buffalo, had bounced back to take control of the liberation movement. ZIPA provided many lessons about the vulnerability of the nationalists, and sharpened generational contradictions, raising at least the possibility of a shift from ethnic to class-based politics in the new Zimbabwe. Above all, by marginalisation of

[90] Personal communication with late War Veterans, Marko Muchineripi Mabhunu (in Matopos prison 1976-7) and Bassopo Mpangara, (1976 at Chimoio Headquarters).
[91] Quoted in Moore (1995: 84).

the nationalists, and leaving them wallow in 'prison' houses, far removed from the leadership or any active participation in the armed struggle they had initiated, a new political strategy was introduced – the politics of 'negation', in place of the politics of accommodation. The enthusiasm of youth (especially when it takes a sectarian turn) can be dogmatic and divisive. And if ZIPA fighters had successfully overthrown their own ZANU leader, Ndabaningi Sithole, Abel Muzorewa (African National Congress), the FROLIZI leaders Nathan Shamuyarira and James Chikerema, and even challenged Joshua Nkomo, the question was, could they fail but to do it to everyone else? This threat and fear destroyed trust between the nationalists and the guerrillas, and replaced a true alliance, with a marriage of convenience.

With benefit of hindsight, ZIPA's failure (and Mugabe's success) was partly rooted in poor timing (on ZIPA's part) and partly in the immature or inappropriate application of Marxist theory to the realities of a liberation war in a peasant society. The critical (and perhaps insoluble) puzzle that ZIPA attempted to address was how to transform a national democratic revolution, based on a loose conglomeration of petty bourgeois, intellectual, peasant and semi-proletarian interests into a socialist revolution guided by Marxist ideology. Their strategy for this was to transform the guerrilla movement by deepening the socialist content of the war effort, a process which sharpened class and generational tensions, and threatened the mercantile elements and opportunists with no role in the Marxist revolutionary scheme of things, but essential as allies if the White settlers were to be beaten. Attaining success would always be a delicate balancing act and ZIPA would have first to co-opt remaining progressive nationalists, which they failed to do. When nationalists and the 'Old Guard' forged an alliance, ZIPA was all too easily isolated, and with the help of FRELIMO, as easily ousted.

What does this mean to Zimbabwe's politics and understanding of the land issue in particular? First, Mugabe's selective recruitment brought clever nationalists into the leadership of the armed struggle. Second, a powerful alliance was forged between the nationalists and selected guerrilla leaders mainly of the Chitepo phase. Third, the ideological thrust changed and the idea of socialist transformation remained, but only on a rhetorical level (Moore 1990).[92] Fourth, emphasis on levels of discipline that was backed by threats of purgation shrank democratic space and fear within the guerrilla army. The stage was set for the emergence of a typical neo-colonial regime under settler economic domination.

In essence this was a political dispensation that focused on acquiring political power from the Smith regime, only to work in cahoots with settler capital and commercial farmers against the interests of a marginalised African peasantry and rural (farm worker) proletarians. However, during the Mugabe phase, the ruling elite could not easily rid itself of the younger generation of guerrillas of ZIPA orientation. Mugabe chose to work with the rhetoric of socialist revolution that had gathered so much momentum during ZIPA, but this may have been a mistake since it only resonated with (and thus kept alive memories of) the 'more authentic' radicalism these cadres had experience under conditions of heightened consciousness and mutual dependence in a bush war. Under such circumstances the land issue, debated

[92] As Moore (1990) neatly puts it ZANU-PF '*went on to escalate their Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, while simultaneously arriving at a delicate* ***modus vivendi*** *with the international actors who would deliver them from Ian Smith's rule to that of international capital*.'

within the neo-colonial setting, was particularly tricky. Continued ownership of land by White settlers was entrenched in the Lancaster House Constitution and the nationalists accepted it, pleading pressure from the frontline states and the British. The ingenious Mr. Mugabe held the land card close to his chest. Eventually, faced with economic downturn, mutinous War Veterans, surging land movement, growing opposition and international pressure, he abandoned his alliance with White capital forging a 'new' alliance with the land movement now led by War Veterans. He needed the land to reward the loyal members of his regime, at which point the commercial farmers were shown the door. But it took time for ex-guerrillas, peasants and farm workers to discover that this was not the beginning of their emancipation. The ancestral spirits with which they had bonded in the bush would not come to their rescue without struggle. A Third Chimurenga was now required, almost two decades after independence.

CHAPTER 3

THE POST WAR DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR VETERANS' MOVEMENT

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter described how the guerrilla forces evolved during the phases of the war, and how the political awareness of cadres (or lack of it) reflected these developments, leaving a legacy for the post war period. The present chapter seeks to trace the story from the signing of the Lancaster House agreements through the first two decades of political independence in Zimbabwe. The focus is on explaining the part played by a distinct War Veterans' movement in the explosion of land activism at the end of the 1990s. The dynamics of demobilisation and reintegration into civilian life is explained from the perspective of the ex-fighters themselves. In significant respects this both enriches and contradicts other analytic perspectives on the demobilisation process (Rupiah 1995, Tapfumaneyi 1996, Sadomba, F. 1999; 2004, Chitiyo 2000, Kriger 2003, Sadomva and Dzinesa 2004, McCandless 2005, Sadomba 2008).

Robert Mugabe's ascendancy to leadership of his movement was followed within two years by the Lancaster House talks in London, to negotiate cessation of hostilities and a post war settlement for independent Zimbabwe. The talks, involving the participation of Bishop Muzorewa's African National Congress (ANC), the Patriotic Front comprising Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and a Rhodesian delegation headed by Ian Douglas Smith, were chaired by Lord Carrington, a senior member of the Thatcher government in Britain. Agreement was finally reached, after a number of deadlocks, on a ceasefire, and the Lancaster House Constitution for independent Zimbabwe was drafted. This marked the end of the war between the Smith regime and the liberation fighters, and ushered in a new political climate, and new relationships formed.

The Lancaster House talks marked the beginning of a new era in Zimbabwe's political life.[93] Throughout the guerrilla movement there was palpable sense of a new state being formed, and this can be deemed the point at which regime change began in earnest. The nationalist movement, being in control of the liberation movement as a whole, directed the path towards hand-over of power. As will be shown below, this resulted in guerrilla interests and the aspirations of the land movement being denied.

In effect, different visions of independence began to surface in a movement that had remained reasonably cohesive while there was a war to be won. The present

[93] The three-month long conference almost failed to reach an accord due to disagreements on land reform. Mugabe was pressured to sign and land was the key stumbling block. Both the British and American governments offered to buy land from willing White settlers who could not accept reconciliation (the 'willing buyer, willing seller' principle) and a fund was established, to operate from 1980 to 1990 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lancaster_House_Agreement).

chapter will look at the consequences of these differences, and how they impacted on the development of a civilian War Veterans' movement, with a multi-stakeholder land occupation movement taking shape in the background. The chapter discusses the transition from guerrilla war to independence and beyond, and seeks to highlight the major roles played by the state, Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the commercial farmer lobby on the land movement. The focus is on the agency of both land hungry peasants and an emergent War Veterans' movement.

3.2 The Lancaster House Agreement of 1979: a background

Cease-fire was negotiated through the Lancaster House agreement. It was thus the means through which the war was ended. But the actual locale (a stately home in London) was remote from the world and interests of the fighters. Perhaps unsurprisingly (not least, given the venue) the fighters felt their interests were not well represented. Sibanda, a key informant for F. Sadomba stated that:

> *When the politicians went to Lancaster we hoped that they would … recognise our role, but this was not the case at all. We felt as if the politicians were 'men on a mission'. (Sadomba, F. 1999: 11)*

Grasp of detail in the negotiations was so poor the Patriotic Front delegation comprising of ZANU and ZAPU delegations actually had any plans about the future of those guerrillas who decided not to join the army. Tapfumaneyi (1996: 50) contests 'the assertion … made in one World Bank study, that in the case of Zimbabwe, the [demobilisation] decisions became part of the peace negotiation'. In fact, the only allusion to the future of guerrillas was made by Lord Carrington in concluding remarks after the agreement had already been signed. He reminded the delegates that many of the guerrillas would wish to return to civilian life and post war military planning was a matter for the new government after independence. The issue was completely forgotten by the Patriotic Front, the name assumed by the alliance of ZAPU and ZANU during the negotiations.

White commercial farmers, by this time had taken a proactive decision to influence the transition to majority rule. According to Selby:

> *Direct exposure to the mounting pressures of the war, combined with the growing realisation that The Rhodesia Front [the political party of the settlers] was increasingly directionless, encouraged farmers towards compromise. They were … willing to encourage transition so long as they were guaranteed continued access to their land … The wealthier more progressive sectors of white Rhodesia could handle political reform, with conditions. (Selby 2006: 90-2)*

This is important, in that indeed the White farmers managed to influence the transition to majority rule using all the mental and material resources at their disposal. In the event, they were successful in negating the land objectives of most fighters in the liberation war. Informants in the land movement remain deeply suspicious that the activities of the commercial farmers amounted to a ruse. Some go so far as to opine that the proactive approach of the commercial farmers included a number of events during the war itself. The killings of Hebert Chitepo, J.Z. Moyo and Josiah Tongogara – leaders tempered by the armed struggle - and the timely release from Rhodesian jails of civilian nationalists less enthused by the land issue than those who were close to the fighters in the bush, is seen by some in the land

movement as a carefully planned anticipatory machination by White farmers to defuse the land issue during peace negotiations (Interview with D 2007).

A Commonwealth peace-keeping force was organised to monitor the short transition period from December 1979 to April 1980, and the Conservative peer, Lord Soames was appointed by Britain (still the internationally recognised colonial power, given that the RF coup, Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), in 1965 was never recognised internationally) as Governor. Guerrillas were moved first to rendezvous positions, from where they were transported to Assembly Points (AP) monitored by the Commonwealth peace keeping force according to the agreement. In the Assembly Points the guerrillas were made to fill in forms to indicate whether they wished to join the army, seek employment, or resume education (I offer here eyewitness observations from Echo AP, 1980). This raised hopes that nationalist leaders might be after all willing to accommodate guerrilla interests. The forms seemed to signify that plans had at last been made for the positive integration of the ex-combatants into post colonial society. This was far from being the case, as will be discussed.

There were four main priorities facing Zimbabwe after the Lancaster House Agreement. One was to comply with the cease-fire conditions, i.e. to get guerrillas to the APs scattered over the operational zones. The second was to hold elections and form a government. The third was to form a single army out of three fighting forces, namely Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA), Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF). This was a daunting task without any colonial African precedents ((Campbell, 2003 #194), and the task required meticulous planning. The fourth was, of course, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (Tapfumaneyi 1996).

The situation of the guerrillas during the ceasefire period and immediately afterwards needs to be explained. Many came from peasant backgrounds (Kriger 1995). In most cases, they came from the poorest peasant strata (families typically on the edge of subsistence crisis at the best of times) and their families could ill afford to support the returning ex-combatants. Very often villages and homesteads of the fighters had been destroyed by the RSF during the war, or their kinsfolk had been forced into 'protected villages'. Former fighters were by no means sure they had homes to go to. Typically, ex-combatants faced a situation in which parents had died, or were living in abject poverty. These families in fact looked up to the returning ex-combatant for help.[94] The volunteers, especially the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) and Mugabe phase recruits, had abandoned their education, careers or jobs in order to join the war. They now required school fees and a subsistence grant to cover their own basic needs and the needs of their dependants (including both parents and children!). The situation was very stressful.

[94] For example, my own situation was that when I returned home to Honde Valley I was faced with the responsibility of looking after my mother and two brothers who were attending school. I had to pay for their secondary school fees, clothing and everything else. I decided that even if I were to get a sponsor for my education, I could not go back to school full time unless the sponsor also covered these expenses as well, since they were my responsibility. I then had to look for employment and pursued my education plans part-time as the government offered no help.

Unlike their Rhodesian counterparts, who were salaried, the guerrillas had nothing. They had been unpaid in the bush, and lacked savings, pension plan, health schemes or any other benefits of employment. They possessed nothing in terms of shelter and source of food. They even lacked clothes, and had to rely on what ended up being called 'Thatcher's clothes'. Tapfumaneyi describes what was on offer:

> *… two barrack-type blankets, a shirt, a pair of trousers, two face towels, a tube of toothpaste and a toothbrush. There was no underwear and no shoes. The same clothes were given to everybody regardless of gender.* (*Tapfumaneyi 1996: 58)*

Figure 3.1 Guerrilla Training at Tembwe military base in Mozambique (date unknown)

At the conclusion of the Lancaster House Agreement many guerrillas were in such conditions. At independence they did not receive demobilisation funds, they were not rehabilitated and there were no programs to reintegrate them back into society. Destitution followed.

Source: Photo, author's collection, also deposited with the NAZ

Nationalist political leaders (with little experience of the bush campaign, and its privations) had little sense of what was needed for a successful demobilisation of guerrillas, and they failed to raise this issue as part of the negotiation package. Tapfumaneyi emphasises this point, saying:

> *… the 1980-5 demobilisation was not planned … [t]hus, post war demobilisation as a subject, is conspicuous by its absence from the position papers presented by the parties at the [Lancaster House] Conference … [B]oth ZANU (PF) and ZAPU, had not made such considerations by election day [and] the only planning of significance, from a military point of view came from the British … working out coherent plans from 5 November 1979. … 'Operation Agila' … covered only the separation of forces, containment within cantons, the development of cooperation/dialogue, the development of reconciliation and integration into a national force. Demobilisation was not covered. (Tapfumaneyi 1996: 49-51)*

A book chapter by a splinter War veterans' group is clear that the reason for absence of demobilisation planning was that the revolution had been hijacked and the position of guerrillas compromised:

> *After the struggle, the freedom fighters were relegated to a secondary role … The revolution was hijacked partly during the struggle, partly during the Lancaster House negotiations, and partly during the post independence era. (Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 2004: 37)*

These claims have wider implications. If failure to plan for guerrillas was not just an oversight, but the consequences of a hijacked revolution, then it may be reasonable to conclude that the nationalists saw it in their sectional interests to agree to the protection of White owned land and White supremacy in general by the Lancaster House Constitution. So was the revolution hijacked?

Although nationalists on many occasions threatened to abandon the talks because they disagreed with the proposal on land redistribution after independence, they finally conceded to clauses inhibiting the smooth and speedy redistribution of land. The Lancaster House Constitution stipulated that for ten years land would be acquired for resettlement by government only on a 'willing seller, willing buyer' basis. Moreover the negotiations produced, as Moyo shows:

> *… [a] constitution which secured, for the whites, unhindered citizenship rights; a bill of rights which precluded the expropriation of private property, secured freedom of expression, movement and dual citizenship; a restricted executive power, disproportionate white parliamentary representation and protection of white civil servants' employment and pensions. It provided a ten year grace period during which the constitution could not be amended, while the independence of the judiciary was entrenched to guarantee white rights. (Moyo* 1995: 106)

A clear answer cannot yet be given. The Thatcher government was a campaigning neo-liberal regime, and its instinct will have been to encourage a modern market-oriented property regime, irrespective of the murky means through which the property was originally acquired. It is not hard to imagine that the nationalists were counselled on the side to accept the deal, as a means of getting Britain off the colonial hook, and ending a damaging armed conflict. Leaders will have been enticed, perhaps, with promises that Zimbabwe would be favoured with international development aid for fast-track modernisation, and told the usual (but untrue) story that wealth would soon trickle down to benefit the poor. Whatever the case, the

nationalists wavered on the land issue, and the agreement was signed. Undoubtedly, the effect of the new constitution was to end, at a blow, the aspirations of guerrillas and peasant farmers to acquire land as part the post war settlement. They would have to wait in line, and yet were aware enough to know that if money sometimes is redistributed property never 'trickles down'.

Warring peasants, farm workers and guerrillas however were approaching the land issue very differently from what was going on at Lancaster. Guerrillas were mobilising peasants to occupy abandoned farms left by fleeing Rhodesians. In Manicaland the mobilisation was so strong that soon after the war in Honde Valley for example, there was mass movement of peasants to occupy the forest areas in the highlands to reclaim the land they had been removed from during the 1950s and 1960s. They occupied land where their original homesteads were trying to follow the land use patterns practiced before colonial dispossession (Personal observation, Honde Valley 1980s; Interview with Mbuya Nyanzunda 1998). These occupations were regularised by the accelerated resettlement scheme of the early 1980s after the peasants War Veterans had vowed not to be removed.

In Chaminuka Sector, which covers most of Mashonaland Administrative Province, I wrote the war strategy for the sector that was adopted by the High Command of the Tete Province during the first quarter of 1979. The strategy had three main components, the unique one of which was agricultural production. This had become a necessity because the war was no longer sustainable given that peasants had no longer food reserves and they could not replenish them owing to the activities of the war and the cyclical droughts in the liberated zones.[95]

I trained a special unit of guerrillas at Tete to spearhead the strategy between March and May 1979. The agricultural development component of the strategy involved driving White farmers off the land adjacent to Tribal Trust Lands (as Communal Lands were then called) for peasant and farm worker occupation thereby expanding the liberated zones. Groups of trained youth were tasked to accompany the combatants into the not yet liberated areas which were dominated by White farmers, to take inputs and equipment and transport them to the liberated zones where 'war farms' were established. These farms were located along the Mazowe River from Mazowe River Bridge in Rushinga and they served three purposes. First they were designed to provide food self sufficiency to the peasants and combatants. Second they were designed to prepare for the final translocation of Tete Province Administration from Mozambique to Zimbabwe. Third they were to become centres of government in liberated zones, where different services including primary schools,[96] clinics and other public services would be rendered. Military training and coordination of counter intelligence operations were organised from there. Peasants and youth from both Takawira and Chaminuka sectors in Rushinga and Pfungwe areas were mobilised to implement this strategy which did not realise its full implementation because of the ceasefire concluded at Lancaster House.

[95] The liberated zones, adjacent to the Mozambican border, were in the Zambezi Valley area lies in Natural Region IV and V. Food was scarce and communities could no longer provide for the war which they had been engaged in since 1972.
[96] Primary schools had already been opened in Nehanda Sector, part of Tete Province.

There were other similar initiatives carried in other liberated zones (Personal communication, Gonese, 1992). The land ideologies curved from these guerrilla war strategies had lasting impact on views of the land which were to be at tangent with the Lancaster House Agreement negotiated by the nationalists. The agreement was therefore viewed by peasants, farm workers and War Veterans, as a betrayal. As we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, this grievance was at the base of the rupture of 2000.

This sense of betrayal – that the main objective of the war had been squandered to allow the nationalists to come to power - was later to become the main basis for alliance between the War Veterans, peasants and farm workers in the land occupations. In a way the explanatory problem is not to account for why the land issue remained an issue, but why it took so long to re-emerge.

The claim made by the informant above summarises the perceptions of many guerrillas on the period from the Lancaster House Agreement to the assumption of power by the Mugabe government. As we shall see, the core of the War Veterans' movement rotates around grievances emanating from these developments. First, we need to resume the story of the War Veteran constituency at the point of independence.

3.3 The deficiencies of the demobilisation process

The main demobilisation exercise was long delayed. It started two years after independence, in 1982. Until then the only amount given to a demobilised was ZW $400.00 as severance pay:

> *… when given … a $185 per month allowance for two years, it seemed to offer the ex-combatant a short-term advantage over the poverty datum line [PDL] of $125. Unfortunately, the PDL was pegged on the assumption that the individual had shelter, food and a disposable income (savings capacity), which the guerrillas lacked. … Poverty and destitution would follow. (Tapfumaneyi 1996: 91)*

Numbers entering demobilisation are, even today, disputed. According to Tungamirai (1995: 42), ZANU's Department of Personnel records revealed that '66,367 people were registered as recruits undergoing military training or trained combatants in 1979'. This suggests that the government figure of 21,500 fighters under arms and a total (including trainees) of 35,000 is a considerable under-estimate. Tapfumaneyi (1996: 53) in fact suggests that '65,000 seems to be a more realistic working figure' for the total number of trained guerrillas. Judith Todd's figures (*Daily News* 15 December 2000) imply that at independence there were at least 80,000 ex-combatants, in the broad sense (of including trainees). Kriger (2003: 70), suggests that 'Altogether, some 25,000 Africans, roughly equivalent to the numbers of assembled guerrillas immediately after the independence election, were disbanded without benefits'. Tungamirai (1995) had access to ZANU-PF archives, which up till now have not been opened to other researchers, so his figures should be taken seriously. Furthermore, these relate only to ZANLA. If ZIPRA is considered as well then Todd's figure of more than 80,000 guerrillas is quite believable.

It is also important to realise that the pool of mobilised persons from which the War Veterans' movement draws encompasses a wider group than the ex-combatants

bearing arms. Many of the so-called 'refugees' were in fact recruits awaiting training. These recruits had undergone political education, and in Mozambique they also trained in individual tactics, theories of guerrilla warfare, ambush, surprise attack, marching and encampment, etc. Their camps were designated 'refugee' settlements only for tactical reasons (to do with supplies and security).

Table 3.1 Estimated strength of the guerrilla armies as at 31 December 1979

Army	No. in APs	Other elements	Total
ZANLA	16,000	5,500	21,500
ZIPRA	5,000	6,000- 8,000	11,500-13,500
Total	21,500	11,500-13,500	33,000-35,000

Source: Tapfumaneyi 1996. Judith Todd estimates that ZANLA only had 66,367 guerrillas

In contrast to the predicament of the ex-guerrillas the new Zimbabwe government continued to respect demobilisation obligations to the army originally legislated in 1945-7 to deal with veterans of the Second World War. This became a focus of controversy for the guerrilla ex-combatants (Tapfumaneyi 1996: 36).[97] In the case of former RSF soldiers from the 1970s war 'they [were] still receiving their pensions, partly in foreign currency' up to the year 2000 (Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 2004: 39).[98] This conformed to the Lancaster House agreement, but it also fulfilled Robert Mugabe's reconciliation policy which, as Moyo and Yeros (2005: 171) put it, was 'not between races but with White capital'.

War Veterans also tend to feel that of the three armies integrated into the Zimbabwe Defence Forces the two guerrilla armies were targeted more for demobilisation than the former Rhodesian army, thereby disproportionately suffering from a badly planned and inadequately funded scheme (Interview with DTM, former ZIPA High Command member and leader of land occupations, 2000).[99]

> *Our problem is … I think we should get back to the 1980s when after independence we are the only country that waged a liberation war and after the war was won the fighters were demobilised. Almost en masse they were demobilised and only a few were incorporated into the national force, in the police, the army and the air force. It's a bit disturbing to know that while the War Veterans were demobilised the Rhodesian Force that we were fighting … remained intact. Those [former Rhodesian forces] that left the army … the police [and] Air force, left on their own accord because they would not stand a … Black government. They fled to South Africa [and] other places but they were not demobilised … So one would ask - why was it done that way?*

[97] Tapfumaneyi (1996: 36), writing during the time of ex-combatant demonstrations against the government and President Mugabe observed that *'…the post independence government is still having to meet the obligations of that exercise to surviving White ex-servicemen, [and this] has actually become one of the major political issues in the current debate regarding the manner in which the veterans of the Second Chimurenga War were demobilised between 1980 and 1985'.*

[98] It is not clear whether the government has abandoned this obligation, or whether former Rhodesian soldiers, who fought against the guerrillas, continue to benefit.

[99] Tapfumaneyi, (1996: 36) notes '*… the disparity between the demobilisation conditions for Whites and Africans in the 1945-7 exercise, and the fact that the post independence government still has to meet the obligations of that exercise to surviving White ex-servicemen.'*

It is therefore not difficult to imagine why the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (2004: 37-8) concludes that, 'There was a convergence of interests between the nationalists and the Western powers.' These are the authentic sentiments; it is claimed, of a large number of ex-combatants, who felt that their struggle had been undermined, and that nationalists were serving the interests of the Western powers. Lack of planning, commitment and corruption in the demobilisation exercise (Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 2004) were seen by the War Veterans not merely as a failure or oversight on the part of the new government but an intentional neo-colonial coup on the part of nationalist politicians and imperialist forces.

The demobilised ex-combatants then dispersed. Some of them were employed by state organisations, parastatals and local authorities. Neither the public sector nor private companies were particularly sympathetic to ex-combatants (Kriger 2003). A few War Veterans went into trade and small-scale business. A number formed producer and service cooperatives, mainly in agriculture. Some ex-combatants benefitted from the resettlement program of 1980-4. Of the beneficiaries many were given conditions to form agricultural cooperatives in order to receive their demobilisation money in bulk. As a result economic coercion was the basis for formation of many of the agricultural cooperatives that were considered as model B resettlement according to government policy. Others got into the transport and hospitality industries. With lack of training, lack commercial knowledge and business administration, most of these cooperatives failed (Rupiah 1995, Kriger 2003).

But much more remained unemployed. Table 3.2 presents some figures on occupational status of ex-combatants in mid 1984.

Table 3.2 State of demobilisation of former freedom fighters as at 26 July 1984

Serial	Category	Total
1	Opted for various scholarships	4,700
2	Engaged in commercial programs	2,900
3	In self-reliance projects	4,333
4	Self-employed	1,579
5	In formal employment	3,041
6	Unemployed	19,160
Total		35,713

Source: Sadomba Demilitarisation, demobilisation, control of trafficking and proliferation of small arms and peace-building, 2004[100]

There was no compensation for injuries sustained during the war. Rehabilitation programs for the war wounded and handicapped were non-existent. Many of the War Veterans did not get even the small assistance packages to which they were entitled.[101] Their marginalisation at a moment of victory and general optimism

[100] Sadomba's source was Tapfumaneyi (1996). From the data available it is difficult to judge demobilisation opportunities according to different factions.

[101] Treatment given to Zimbabwe's anti-colonial War Veterans is comparable none except perhaps the Mau Mau guerrillas of Kenya. Rebels from the Sierra Leonean war, for example, 'took part in a DDR programme and were based in so-called "reorientation camps". As part

opened up a gulf between the veterans and the wider society, and is important in explaining their enduring sense of occupying an embattled position. Ostracised, and in many cases verging on destitution many became alienated and depressed. Young has shown how the diagnosis of 'post traumatic stress disorder' came out of the US veteran's administration, to deal with ungenerous funding for rehabilitation and reintegration, in an America trying to turn its back on a disastrous war (Young 1991). The sense of alienation may have been even harder to bear for the Zimbabwean veterans, since they were indeed the victors in their own war, and yet lack of proper demobilisation and reintegration sent a strong signal that they were now to be forgotten. War Veterans felt they were being mocked for their pains. The following quotation captures some of the strength of feeling among the War Veterans:

> *And the War Veterans became a laughing stock of the country. People would ask you: 'In the first place why did you join the war?', because very often your child can't go to school and you have to talk to your aunt, brother or whoever, to be given school fees so that your child goes to school. 'You are suffering like this … you have no money to buy beer, the child cannot attend school, why did you go to that war? Why …?' And some would be even more cynical and say, 'If you went to liberate the country who had asked you to? Go and tie it back where it was',*[102] *[and other] such things. (Interview with Qq, former ZANLA commander and leader of occupations in Concession, 2001)*[103]

In some cases War Veterans did not agree fully to demobilisation. They were intent on continuing with the war to remove the Whites from the land. For example, in 1980 some former ZANLA War Veterans in Masvingo, perceiving that the nationalist leaders had abandoned the objectives of the armed struggle by not taking land from the colonialists, and leaving sacred places under the control of foreign settlers, organised to continue the war by attacks on White farmers. They determined to embark on this campaign after a series of meetings with the spirit mediums headed by one who claimed to be the medium of Nehanda. They were pursued by the new security services, arrested and given long prison sentences, averaging 15 years.[104]

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of their pre-discharge orientation they received classes in civic education, basic adult literacy, reconciliation and psychological counselling. Upon discharge they were given the local equivalent of US $300 … ' (Peters 2006). In addition, former rebels were trained in different skills and were equipped with tool kits to prepare them for economic integration. This was not the case for the Zimbabwean freedom fighters.

[102] This is a pun on *sunga*. In Shona the word 'liberation' is *kusunungura* which literally means untie. So *Kusunungura* is an infinitive verb or noun meaning 'to liberate' but also it can be used to mean 'undoing a knot or untie'. So people, especially the so-called 'born frees' (i.e. the post war generation), played on this double meaning. They were saying '*If we were tied and you are the people who untied the knot why don't you tie us back so that we untie the knot ourselves without your help*.' In effect these youngsters were deriding the concept of liberation that the War Veterans and others boasted about as a noble achievement.

[103] This cliché was repeated by many War Veterans that I interviewed, e.g. interviewee P (2000) said, '*… we [were] a laughing stock of the public, especially the so called born-frees [who say] "You say you liberated us (kutisunungura) you rather would take us back to the point where we were unliberated (tisungirirei patanga takasungirirwa pacho) and it would have been best if you perished.*' (See also McCandless 2005).

[104] Personal communication with Cosmas Gonese (1992), leader of the attackers of a White farmer in Masvingo.

Another way the ex-combatants reacted to the situation was where War Veterans were employed in a group (e.g. as Local Government Promotion Officers) it was common for them to use the opportunity to organise themselves and discuss issues relating to their welfare and the political situation. Outside work they met and discussed informally with fellow ex-combatants in recreational centres such as beer gardens, and at funerals and similar meetings. Ex-combatants everywhere meet to relive their experiences. But in the case of these guerrilla fighters this meant – inevitably -rehearsing why they felt the objectives of their struggle were yet to be achieved, or to lament that under the new government these objectives seemed as far away as ever.[105]

Those who remained in the army were also faced with problems of integration. The absorption exercise was filled with uncertainties and frustrations, and it was often slow going for guerrillas, who found themselves re-learning basic skills when they had expected a bush to office transition.[106] Poor demobilisation benefits and total lack of attention to rehabilitation needs of the wounded caused one ex-combatant to say to Barnes that:

> *… as liberators of the people I expected us (ex-combatants) to acquire a moderate kind of life, not like we are today. We were made to believe that after liberating the country we would be the … defence forces of the people. And also I expected some of our disabled combatants to be taken care of in institutions, to be taken care of by the state. (Barnes 1995: 125-6)*

At independence there was no program for the guerrillas dumped in APs, and only a few at a time were taken for integration into the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). The disabled and those who did not qualify for the new army for various reasons did not have any clear route forward, and they were only given a ZW $400.00 (see Figure 3.2) severance package[107] (Tapfumaneyi 1996) prior to the launching of a belated main demobilisation program started in 1982. By then many had already left the Assembly Points (APs) and many of them could not return because they had no information about the developments in APs and others lacked

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[105] Participant observation Ministry of Local Government 1980-9. For example in 1988 the Local Government Promotion Officers held a meeting at Kadoma Ranch Motel and Gweru's Midlands Hotel both of which ended up discussing their general conditions of service as an exclusive section of ex-combatants in the Ministry of Local Government. Both the meetings were stopped by then Permanent Secretary Mariyawanda Nzuwa. Also interviews with DM 2000 and Pf 2000.

[106] The Rhodesian army was considered the superior force in technical and tactical competence (despite the fact it had lost the war), and Rhodesians officers retrained the guerrillas, something the latter did not expect. An additional bone of contention was that the ex-combatants did not receive salaries, unlike their Rhodesian counterparts. This is a reason so many decided to quit military life, because they felt the system was unfair to the ex-combatants (Barnes 1995: 122-6). The issue of unfulfilled promises and sustained expectations was also presented by B, a White commercial farmer, who said '*… basically what [War Veterans] were doing (in the 2000 land occupations) was actually a national expression of an unfulfilled promise … land was a principal party of the whole struggle … And much of the motive behind the ex-combatants to fight was to secure land … and then 20 years after independence there was no land. So inevitably it was that unfulfilled objective which manifests itself in a desire to fulfil the objectives and if no one is going to do it they would do it for themselves …'.*

[107] Tapfumaneyi (1996: 58) '*An initial financial package, in the form of a $400 severance gratuity, was available to the first few voluntary demobees. This remained in effect until early 1982 when the main demobilisation exercise may be said to have begun …'.*

the logistics to return (Tapfumaneyi 1996). The demobilisation exercise from 1982 was also marred by corruption, poor planning and poor records. Resources were looted by senior commanders in the army (Kriger 2003) with much intended assistance going not to ex-combatant beneficiaries but to relatives of the officers in question.[108] As a result, many War Veterans found themselves financially crippled at a time when they badly needed financial support (Sadomba, F. 1999).



Figure 3.2 Annual mean exchange rate, Zimbabwe 1991-2001

Notes:
The Zimbabwe dollar continued to fall steeply with official estimated year on year inflation rate rising to more than 100,000 percent in the first quarter of 2008.
The parallel market rate was US $1=ZW $36,000,000.

Source: adapted from Chambati W (2007), (Personal notes)

The sharp rise in 1997 is associated with awarding of War Veterans compensation in 1997 after Mugabe was forced to pay unbudgeted funds as part of the truce conditions.

In general, the War Veterans left the war feeling they were not given due recognition by the state and society in general. They sensed no one felt sympathetic for their plight. Q (Interview with Q, a War Veteran holding a degree in social sciences and leading occupations in Mvurwi, 2000) put it this way:

> *And having been demobilised, [War Veterans] got next to nothing … in terms of remuneration. They were given $185 a month for two years. That was it. A total of $4,400 was given as demobilising money where you would be expected to rehabilitate yourself back into society. And for many as soon as it was finished, that was it … And also for the War Veterans to get that so-called gratuity and pension of $2,000 a month [in 1997] it was not out of the goodwill of the Party and government. It was after a struggle. War Vets actually struggling … making demands, demonstrating against government. And government was not willing to part with anything but it later*

[108] Sadomba (1999: 5) writes, '*The state policies designed to permanently reintegrate thousands of the demobilised soldiers soon fell far short of the basic demands. Corruption, negligence and mismanagement by officials that were charged with supervising the process were also partly to blame.*'

succumbed to pressure from the War Veterans.[109] *So you see the government or some government and party officials, have some dislike of War Veterans; they have some fear of War Veterans. They have some uneasiness about War Veterans. They would want them to keep a distance.*

The issue of being neglected long remained topical among the War Veterans, and at every opportunity they would question why this had to be. At the first occupied farm in Beatrice by War Veterans from Chitungwiza, one of the former commanders, Gutura was interrogated over this issue, and he answered as follows (Interview with P, a War Veteran participating in the 2000 occupation of Beatrice employed in Harare Municipality, 2000):

Boys, even we ourselves did not get anything as soon as people were told to go in Assembly Points. And when we went to the Assembly Points things drastically changed. People were being taken to the army, the whole system was torn apart and there was totally nothing left. There was nothing we could do.

This sense of abandonment is at the core of War Veteran grievances fuelling land occupations from the late 1990s. They were simply not part of any process. It was apparently expected that they would fade away, or resume some long forgotten trade or activity without any account being taken of the asset loss they had suffered as fighters. War Veterans were thus bitter about the social and political exclusion that they suffered at the hands of government and the ruling party. The rise of the War Veterans' movement is associated with political exclusion from as far back as 1980, as another War Veteran, who worked for a parastatal as a security officer, F indicates:

I was immediately suspended [from ZANU-PF provincial leadership]. This was on the grounds that ex-combatants are not allowed to participate in politics. … You see, this is where it all started. These people who were in the party structures didn't want War Veterans amongst them because they knew that their [opportunism] would be exposed. (Interview with F 2000) [110]

Conditions that prevailed soon after independence were inimical to the re-organisation of the ex-guerrillas. The two parties that had fought for the liberation of the country and united during the peace negotiations at Lancaster House did not unite as the Patriotic Front during elections in 1980, which were seen by many War Veterans as a lost opportunity to end the hostilities between the two elements and their armies, ZANLA and ZIPRA (Barnes 1995). Not surprisingly, as an informant of Barnes (1995: 125) anticipated, 'there were signs that at some point there would be a lot of fighting between the two parties.' Fighting between ZANLA and ZIPRA broke out at Entumbane, Connemara and other barracks. One ex-combatant blamed Enos Nkala, a ZANU-PF veteran politician, for having instigated the fighting, at a rally in

[109] Note that Mugabe had refused to give an assent to the bill passed by Parliament and he only changed his mind under pressure as discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis.

[110] The Directive to prohibit ex-combatants to occupy any position in ZANU-PF was given by the then President of the party Robert Mugabe in 1980 at 88 Manica Road, (ZANU-PF HQ). It is said this was after a complaint by Didymus Mutasa (Secretary for Administration) that War Veterans were getting all the posts in the party because the electorate obviously preferred them (Personal communication with Chimota, then Political Commissar at 88 Manica Road - Mutasa passed the Directive through the Commissariate Department). Then became popular the ZANU-PF cliché that youth are the leaders of tomorrow and War Veterans were classified as youth and could only get into the leadership of main wing of the party through to represent the youth wing.

Bulawayo (Barnes 1995). It was in the interest of nationalists for former guerrillas to be fighting among themselves, and disunited, as will be argued later in this chapter.

Animosity between ZANLA and ZIPRA continued in the post independence period, as it had been during the war, thereby reducing chances of the liberation forces assuming a single voice. When the fighting just mentioned first broke out many members of the former ZIPRA combatant group fled the camps and took up arms against the government, using weapons they had cached before and during the ceasefire period. The situation deteriorated to a point where it threatened a civil war in Matebeleland and part of the Midlands Province. Mugabe used former Rhodesian Security Forces to quell the 'dissident' disturbances.[111] However, this violence continued to escalate along ethnic lines, and a special Fifth Brigade was then created as a force to clamp down. The Brigade, exclusively comprising former ZANLA guerrillas, and specially trained by the (North) Koreans, has lately been shown to have carried out ethnic targeting of Ndebele-speaking people in the region (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace). In their defence, pro-state forces argue that the dissidents were ethnically motivated and targeting Shona-speaking people, especially those in the civil service.

This trouble had repercussions on the re-organisation of former ZANLA fighters as well. During this time, any criticism levelled against the government, the state or the ruling class was labelled dissident. Former ZIPRA combatants thought they suffered more (Kriger 2003). With Soviet influence, ZIPRA guerrillas organised agricultural cooperatives and the Mafela Trust (Brickhill 1995), an organisation formed to rebury its fallen heroes scattered in the battle torn rural areas. These cooperatives were disbanded and the land and equipment confiscated by the state during the period of hostilities. The distinction between dissidents and former ZIPRA fighters became blurred. Former ZANLA War Veterans who tried to join any other party including ZAPU, as some of the released ZIPA commanders did, were labelled dissident. Previous experiences with purges during the ZIPA period reminded former ZANLA ex-combatants about the hovering axe of ZANU-PF, always too ready to fall on anyone's neck. Early attempts to organise the War Veterans to demand reforms and a better deal encountered these obstacles, as we shall see below.

Discovering that doors were closed in the party structures, War Veterans (particularly former ZANLA) initiated moves to re-organise a War Veterans' Association. Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (2004: 38)reports that:

> *In the early 1980s, War Veterans from ZANLA and ZIPRA made efforts to form an organisation that would unite them, look after their interests and ensure that the gains, objectives and values of the liberation struggle were defended and consolidated. The government and ZANU-PF leadership frustrated these efforts. (Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 2004: 38)*[112]

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[111] Many War Veterans felt the animosity between the two guerrilla armies was fanned by politicians. Teresa Barnes (1995: 122) quotes her informant as saying, '*the whole thing (fighting between ZANLA and ZIPRA at Entumbane) was provoked by politicians. I wouldn't say it was provoked by the comrades themselves ... there was a rally organised by Enos Nkala [then senior ZANU-PF politician] at White City Stadium, where he actually made some very bad remarks about ZAPU and ZIPRA.*'

[112] Another War Veteran (Interview with Pf, employed by Harare City Council and leading occupations in Mazowe, 2000) expressed his viewpoint as follows, *'We finally reached the*

Margaret Dongo,[113] a former ZANLA combatant and Parliamentarian in the mid-1990s, who ended up forming an opposition party, the Zimbabwe Union of Democrats (ZUD), shared the same sentiments in Parliament, when she was quoted by *The Herald* newspaper saying:

> *I honestly do not know why there is this mistrust, suspicion and resistance from some politicians to this Association. We started the War Veteran Association in 1982 but it failed. We tried to resuscitate it in 1985 and again, it was a flop. Finally in 1989 the association was born but I tell you it was after a struggle. It was very difficult to form the association. The government seems not to trust us, why, I do not know. (The Herald 30 September 1991)*[114]

Initial regrouping in the early 1980s by former ZANLA combatants was initiated by former political commissars from the ZIPA period who thought they could influence or assist the party and government to implement socialism. The group was composed of a number of former Wampoa College graduates and other ex-combatants who had received political education in former Eastern Block countries such as Romania and Yugoslavia. The Minister of Health, Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze,[115] also participated in the meetings, held at Mount Hampden, a few kilometres outside Harare. The group was soon stopped by leaders of ZANU-PF and dissolved.[116]

The failed Mount Hampden initiative was soon followed by discussions to form an association of War Veterans. However, the discussion centred very much on sharing power with the politicians, in that War Veterans advocated for a quarter of

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conclusion that… the objectives of the revolution were totally alien to [the opportunists occupying party positions] because they had no idea of where the revolution came from and how it came about. In addition they did not want to hear about it …' See also Selby (2006).

[113] Margaret Dongo joined the liberation struggle as a child soldier at the age of 15 in 1975, a typical ZIPA period recruit. She received military training and after independence she worked in the Central Intelligence Organisation before getting into full time politics. Her challenge of the 'Old Guard' in Parliament is reminiscent of the internal struggle between War Veterans and ZANU-PF ruling elite and the political thinking of many ZIPA period recruits.

[114] Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (2004: 39) believes that *'The only logical explanation (to deliberate frustration of War Veteran efforts to form an organisation) for the leadership … [was]: a) their fear that a strong War veterans' organisation would pose a threat to their own position of power and control over decision-making; and b) their awareness that such an organisation would question the leadership's agenda.'*

[115] Dr Ushewokunze, a trained medical doctor and Mugabe phase recruit was different from other Mugabe phase recruits in that Ushewokinze sought to integrate in the guerrilla movement. He insisted to acquire military training like Tekere and worked in the war 'hospitals', training many combatants as nurses and field medics. After independence Ushewokunze is one of the few Ministers (and Edson Zvobgo), from the bush who worked a programme of integrating ex-combatants into the civil service, in this case into the health sector. He introduced a programme at Harare Polytechnic specifically to upgrade nursing skills of ex-combatants so that they would fit into the health delivery system (Personal communication, Lenneiye 2007). Zvobgo absorbed former political commissars (mostly ZIPA phase recruits) into Local Government and later did the same for a Magistrate programme when he was Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs.

[116] Personal communication with MT, who participated in the Mt Hampden initiative (1981-5).

parliamentary seats and they wanted to be allowed to be elected into party positions and addressing the specific needs of the War Veterans, such as war victim's compensation. However, like the Mt Hampden initiative, this also failed in its objectives and the group folded. Nevertheless, informal debate and discussions about the position of the War Veterans in society and their role in leading post independence Zimbabwe continued among the veterans themselves. What seemed to be the major stumbling block was the relationship between the two guerrilla armies, ZIPRA and ZANLA. Seminars were organised to discuss these issues and the need for unity between the two parties and their former guerrilla armies.[117] These debates tended to centre on the weaknesses caused by the division between the former liberation parties and their armies. However the debates remained elitist and scholarly thereby failing to permeate into the rest of the War Veterans.

Unemployed War Veterans also attempted to solve their problems and meet their ambitions in a more specific or localised norm, e.g. through forming Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and agricultural cooperatives for purposes of self-rehabilitation. For example, War Veterans, chiefs and spirit mediums in Masvingo formed the Association of Zimbabwe Traditional Ecologists (AZTREC) in 1985.[118] The founder members of AZTREC were War Veterans who had continued with the agenda of taking land from the White settlers after independence but ended up in jail for having attempted to remove the White farmers by military force in 1980.[119] Gonese[120] and Sub were ZIPA period recruits who had fought in the Gutu area during the war. They mooted the idea of forming conservation during their incarceration at Chikurubi Maximum Prison where they were serving 15 year jail sentences but were released after five years by Presidential Decree.

The association's goal was to unite War Veterans, spirit mediums and traditional chiefs in leading the peasants to rehabilitate sacred sites that had been degraded after

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[117] Some of these seminars were organised in collaboration with Grassroots Books, a leading purveyor of socialist literature with a heavy tilt towards literature from the Communist block during the Cold War (Personal observation mid-1980s).

[118] It was later renamed Association of Zimbabwe Traditional Environmental Conservationist.

[119] The decision was reached at Great Zimbabwe when the senior spirit medium who was conducting rituals at that ceremony told War Veterans that the spirits were not happy with continued ownership of land by Whites and she called for courageous War Veterans who would take up the command of the ancestors. Gonese and Sub, offered themselves and started on a mission to remove the White farmers, using guns they had smuggled from Entumbane Camps. Gonese then was a captain in the new Zimbabwe National Army (Personal communication with Gonese 1992-5). Using military force to remove White farmers from by War Veterans was not isolated to this case. Adgar Tekere, in 1980 also carried a similar operation with his aides on White farmer and killed Gerald William Adams of Stamford farm, near Harare. He and his accomplices were acquitted on a legal technicality – the Rhodesian Law that protected actions of Ministers in fighting against terrorism was used. Tekere's action was supported by War Veterans at various levels including some Assembly Camp commanders like late Chihombe Madhala. Madhala drove to Harare and told Tekere that if the state would have him jailed they (Madhala, commanders and War Veterans) in the Assembly points had resolved to go out and resume fighting (Interview with AG, a War Veteran who was a member of the close security of CIO 2007). Ex-combatants supported Tekere because he was seen to be acting in conformity with the agenda of the liberation movement.

[120] Gonese is said to have been trained by guerrillas inside the country (Musikavanhu Sector) sometime between 1976 and 1977.

the war. It started operating in Masvingo Province but had clear national and regional objectives. In 1998, the association mobilised spirit mediums from as far as Guruve to preside over ceremonies in Masvingo (Participant observation, Masvingo, 1998). AZTREC also hosted a continental training course on indigenous knowledge and development organised by Comparing and Supporting Endogenous Development that year.[121]

AZTREC's approach was to articulate African religion and conservation philosophy and practices for environmental rehabilitation and protection. For example the organisation introduced a program of rehabilitating *mapa* (burial places of chiefs), which according to Shona tradition, are sacred places as they are associated to the regional spirits of the land. These places had been degraded in the euphoric period at independence when the civil service inherited from the Smith Regime was at its weakest and could not enforce conservation laws. AZTREC succeeded in initiating conservation these sites including the artesian wells and springs (*zvitubu*) and *marambatemwa*. The organisation promoted African agronomic techniques, encouraging farmers to desist from using pesticides and chemical fertilisers.

The activities of the association included planting of woodlots with indigenous species in direct contrast to the eucalyptus that was promoted by the Forestry Commission, a parastatal that spearheaded government forestry policy. Different indigenous tree species were associated with different sacred places and AZTREC was keen to restore vegetation that had significance to these places.[122] AZTREC sought to revive these practices by re-educating the youth and holding traditional ceremonies where spirit mediums, chiefs and elders embarked in community education (Personal observation 1993-5). [123]

The association attracted attention from all over the world and became a member of the COMPAS Network in addition to its participation in various regional and international conservation programs. The organisation got funding from the European Union Micro-projects, Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV), Hivos and Nordic NGOs. AZTREC still operates today.

There were other NGOs formed by War Veterans for land and natural resources management based on African philosophy and practices. One such organisation was

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[121] The course was attended by African countries including Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa.

[122] For example, the *muchakata* tree is associated with traditional religion in that communion with ancestors is done under it and its leaves are used for placing the snuff offered to the ancestors. Mermaid pools (*dziva renjuzu*) and artesian wells have to be surrounded by certain water related species like the *muonde* and the *mikute* trees. The *marambatemwa* concept and practices were revived. These are places that are considered sacred, identified as such by the regional spirits a long time ago. There flora and fauna are kept intact to the extent that if the hunted enters such a place the hunters cannot pursue the animal anymore. If one has to eat fruits or harvest vegetables from there, special rituals have to be performed including clapping hands and reciting praise poems of the territorial spirits as if one is receiving the items from someone. Destruction of any flora and fauna is strictly prohibited and is understood to cause regional punishment as droughts and disease (Sadomba W. 1996).

[123] I was a member of AZTREC and Deputy Director (1993-5) during which time I coauthored the organisation's literature with Cosmas Gonese, the Director. Two major works were *The History of AZTREC* (Gonese and Sadomba 1992) and *Operational Strategy of AZTREC* (1993).

Zimbabwe Resource Centre for Indigenous Knowledge (ZIRCIK), a national NGO whose membership comprised organisations that had interest in promoting African knowledge in resource management and utilisation. The organisation, formed in 1996 encompassed such a big NGO as Zimbabwe National Traditional Healers Association founded by Professor Gordon Chavhunduka and many others that focused on indigenous food processing, cultural and spirit medium groups. ZIRCIK had strict principles of self reliance and rarely accepted donor funding. It had projects with the World Bank and it contributed in the research on indigenous knowledge in education methods. It also worked with The Netherlands Organisation for International Cooperation in Higher Education / Indigenous Knowledge (NUFFIC/IK-Unit).

In 1997 the organisation focused on formation of a regional organisation Centre for Indigenous Cultures in Southern Africa (CICSA), covering 14 members in the region. The centre quickly transformed into an international organisation after African Americans got interested in it and wanted something wider to include all African peoples. This led to the formation African Nationalist Paradigm (ANP) in 2000. This organisation focuses on promoting African cultures and promoting equal relations with other peoples. Owing to its principles of self reliance it bought land and established a research centre which also became its headquarters. The centre focused on African technologies. ANP started researching on indigenous cattle breeds in order to replenish the depleted national herd by selling improved breeding stock to new farmers. The organisation became the largest seller of breeding beef cattle in Mazowe area if not in the whole of Mashonaland Central province (Mazowe Institute of Veterinary Science and Zimbabwe Republic Police records 2007). However, as we shall see in the following chapters, organisations formed by War Veterans became targets during the Fast Track Land Reform Program by government. The farm was taken by the government and subdivided. Operations of ANP on the farm were wound in mid-2007.[124]

Wampoa College graduates formed some NGOs focusing on a variety of activities. One such organisation was Management Outreach Training Services for Rural and Urban Development (MOTSRUD) founded by a female ex-combatant, graduate of Wampoa, in 1987 to provide 'on the site business management, organisation skills training, tillage and transport services to people involved in self-help[125] projects ... associations, cooperatives, youth groups, women's clubs and individuals engaged in subsistence, community services or income generating projects' (MOTSRUD undated flier). The organisation worked on providing services to rural peasants in form of transport for hire, marketing services, supplying food aid to school children during drought periods to mention but just a few activities. MOTSRUD's objective was to support rural people to be self sufficient and self reliant. Its training and education programs covered election education.[126] MOTSRUD's programs are gender sensitive and capture indigenous knowledge in

[124] Participant observer. I was one of the founder members of ZIRCIK, CICSA and African Nationalistic Paradigm (ANP) and became the Director of ANP (2000-6). War Veterans who were founder members of these organisations were ZIPA phase recruits and many of them were Wampoa College graduates.
[125] MOTSRUD's motto is "Helping those who can help themselves".
[126] Personal communication with MOTSRUD Director 2005.

various degrees. The organisation was funded by Nordic, Australian, Dutch and US donors. MOTSRUD still operates even today.

Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa (HRTSA) was formed by a Wampoa graduate who pursued studies in law after the war and acquired a Master of Arts degree. The regional organisation is currently one of the most prominent in the region and is funded by governments and donor organisations. It carries various activities related to human rights including election education and monitoring. By its very nature HRTSA is an NGO engaged in governance and politics and therefore relates closely to the state and other civil society organisations.

Studies by Moyo reveal that during the 1980s when government was pursuing its socialist ideology, Organisation of Collective Cooperatives of Zimbabwe (OCCZIM) was formed in 1983 with support from the Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development. Many of these cooperatives were led by ex-combatants, because of their assumed exposure to socialism and general group cohesion among them. This was conspicuous in the agricultural sector. Former ZIPRA War Veterans also initiated the Zimbabwe Project which carried a number of activities including agriculture (Kriger 2003).

War Veterans sought ways of advancing their political and land ideologies through these organisations and as individuals in their various professions whenever possible, after being denied opportunities in the ruling party (See box 3.1). Through the civil society organisations that they formed they mobilised masses of people and sought to influence national policies and internal politics of the liberation movement. For example, Gonese took advantage of his AZTREC mobilisation to stage political offensive against the ruling elite in ZANU-PF, in Gutu North Parliamentary constituency, as we shall see later in this chapter. Similarly, CICSA and ZIRCIK were used as platform to mobilise people for land occupation in 2000. CICSA opened an electronic forum targeting professionals and academics to discuss the rupture of 2000 with an objective of mobilising the elite to support land occupations.

These organisations had varying degrees of success at both local and national levels. With the change of donor environment from 2000 those organisations that relied too heavily on donor support were significantly affected as many became financially crippled. Others which did not depend on donor support like ANP grew from strength to strength but were later attacked by ZANU-PF elites partly because of their War Veteran foundation and partly because of the internal politics within the liberation movement.

Organisation of War Veterans at this time was very much scattered and isolated.[127] There was no national structure for War Veterans and there was division

[127] During this time individual and group efforts to resist nationalist alignment and discourses were the main tactics of the War Veterans. War Veterans who were employed en masse as in particularly ministries and local authorities used their work places and meetings to discuss the liberation agenda and mobilise people for land reclamation. For example when amalgamation of Rural and District Council was started War Veterans grabbed the opportunity to educate Black District Councillors to highlight clauses of the Rural District Council's bill that inhibited resource sharing within the council area, focusing on land (Personal observation,Mashonaland Central Provincial Local Government Promotion and Training Officer 1986-9, See also Sadomba 1996). Other individual initiatives by War Veterans

between ZIPRA and ZANLA War Veterans owing to the animosity between ZAPU and ZANU, as highlighted above. The rift reached its climax when Joshua Nkomo, the President of ZAPU escaped to United Kingdom in disguise and ZIPRA senior commanders (Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuko) were arrested and jailed. Negotiations for unity were brokered by the then President Canaan Banana which eventually led to a Unity Accord between ZAPU and ZANU was signed on 22 December 1987 and a new united ZANU-PF was formed.

Box 3.1 Retrospective mapping in Malala Village

The retrospective map made by the Malala Village Community in Beitbridge showed the settlement pattern of the indigenous people in the 1920s, how it changed and the effect on the environment, leading to the present water and sanitation problems. The people were concentrated at the confluence of the Mzingwane and Vembe (Limpopo) rivers. This choice of the area reveals deep analysis of land use planning. The soil in these places is rich alluvium gaining its fertility from the millennia of organic matter deposited from upstream. As three old people explained, it was the most suitable land for cropping. Shifting cultivation was the method of farming. Croplands were not stamped. They did not practise monoculture and there was no cash cropping during that time. There were a lot of bumper harvests. The catchment areas of the rivers were intact and the rivers were perennial. The rest of the hinterland which comprised marshlands, forests and grasslands, were left for wildlife and grazing. This included the drier parts, not suitable for cultivation. This life did not continue for long, as shown by subsequent maps. One year the people were just given orders to leave the land because it had been bought. Convoys of trucks came to ferry the villagers. The old people narrated the story in graphic detail and outlined how the area was made a commercial farming area. The people were then driven into the hinterland where they live today. More people came from other parts of the province to join them and within a few years the land started to fill up. When they arrived in that area (Mtetengwe) there were only three homesteads. From the subsequent maps one could see how the communities were enmeshed by the cash economy, how the environmental problems started to unfold and with that the progressive deterioration of living conditions. They were no longer masters of their destiny. From this passionate narration the community started to gain a deeper appreciation of its history and the origins of their present life. They noticed that the causes of their poverty and misery were common, starting with the loss of their economic base; their fertile croplands. This developed a great sense of identity, belonging and mutual interdependence amongst members. (Sadomba 1996)

include their participation in Parliamentary debates. War Veterans like Lazrus Nzarayebani MP for Mutare Urban, and Malunga from Bulawayo who had was elected for at least two terms was critical of policies that compromised the liberation agenda with a lot of impact. Later contributions by Magaret Dongo and others were very much influenced by these debates. Some War Veterans began to contribute to the national newspapers writin both letters and contributing to special columns. For example Malachai Madimutsa, a Chitepo period recruit, a widely travelled intellectual with ZAPU before joining ZANU during Mugabe period, had to be reprimanded by Nathan Shamuyarira for what was termed embarrassing articles (Personal communication with Madimutsa, Highfield 1985-6).

The year 1987 marked a peace agreement between competing factions in ZANU-PF. This was a point of accommodation between the civilian politicians dominating post independence politics (notably Mugabe and Nkomo) but War Veteran issues and political ambitions for the country remained as marginal as before. F. Sadomba (1999) sums up the experience of War Veterans before and during the first period after independence in the following graphic terms:

> *In summary, the manner of the prosecution of the war between 1972 and 1979; the ushering in of independence and its challenge of some ZAPU cadres between 1980 and 1987; and the post independence conduct of demobilisation and civil re-integration by politicians and officials has left many minds in anguish. The psychological traumatic effect of the above cuts across many sectors of Zimbabwe's society including Whites, Blacks, civilians and soldiers from former three sides. However, while the other sectors have sought to alleviate their suffering from both formal and informal sources … only the ex-combatants have taken up a crusade that has implications on the future political stability of the nation. (Sadomba, F. 1999: 4)*

Lack of planning on the part of the liberation movement (ZAPU and ZANU), a set of restrictive impositions by the Lancaster House Agreement inhibiting flexibility to mobilise financial resources from the economy or donors (Rupiah 1995, Kriger 2003), and looting of meagre available resources, rendered Zimbabwean demobilisation difficult and unsuccessful. The weaknesses of demobilisation affected the guerrillas, but not the RSF. Many guerrillas did not pass through APs,[128] and there was no proper registration of names or payroll. Guerrilla ranks were not recognised (Personal observation, Goromonzi, 1980) [129]and this meant that commanders could not be used, were unwilling, to establish order. Thus the central point of the above account is that demobilisation failed (Kriger 1995, Rupiah 1995, Tapfumaneyi 1996, Tapfumaneyi 2001, Kingma 2000; 2002, Kriger 2003) the War Veterans drifted onwards with their mindset still dominated by the issues of war, rather than being positively reoriented towards an era of peace.

The land and cults of the land activated in the minds of the fighters during the war thus became an anchoring theme, while their needs remained unmet. It is during this period that the influence of the nationalist leaders, and subsequently of the government, over the land movement can first be discerned. During the Lancaster House negotiations nationalists conceded the 'willing buyer, willing seller' condition. Moreover, they agreed to leave this clause in the constitution unchanged for ten years after independence. These two conditions inhibited land redistribution. There was, as discussed earlier, a fast track scheme, but it was too modest in scope to meet the needs of all War Veterans. Moreover settler selection during this period did not specifically target War Veterans as a category. Registration was through traditional structures so this disadvantaged War Veterans who were coming from the bush.

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[128] Both ZIPRA and ZANLA, suspicious of the ceasefire arrangement, had reserved armies outside assembly points, in case the RSF mounted a surprise attack. In the case of ZANLA those who arrived in the APs were inexperienced youths while the hardened guerrillas stayed outside. ZIPRA had a double problem – fear of RSF surprise attack, and fear of ZANLA political domination in independent Zimbabwe, so reserved some detachments of guerrillas for possible future military operations.

[129] For example, there was no equivalent of Detachment Political Commissar (my own rank) in the conventional system of army ranks, and I was therefore ranked as a private on demobilisation.

They had no local connections and did not appear in the local registers of the village heads and the headmen for them to be considered for resettlement. [130]

In 1981, the government's target for resettlement was a mere 18,000 households, though this was scaled, so that by 1983 the aim was '165,000 households on five million hectares … [Even so, T]he government's Riddell Commission of 1981 had estimated landlessness and land shortages five times greater than the largest official targets' (Moyo 1995: 118). This shows that, true to the spirit of its Lancaster House agreements, the new government underplayed the land issue. It is perhaps surprising that the 'over 235,000 hectares of land acquired for resettlement nationwide were not resettled by 1990, in spite of the land demand evident in provincial resettlement "waiting lists"' (Moyo 1995: 122) thereby raising doubts of government's seriousness about land redistribution. Further, this suggests that the underplaying of the government hand was a deliberate strategy to create an artificial shortage and a politically useful tool of patronage.

During the 1980s peasants in the communal lands increased production of food and cash crops. For example, in relation to maize communal land farmers surpassed commercial farmers in the 1984 season and maintained this position up to and beyond 2000 rupture (Ministry of Lands Agriculture and Rural Resettlement 2001). Total output of sorghum and sunflower by communal area farmers were higher during this and the previous decade (MOLARR 2001). As the early resettlement program of 1980-4 did not specifically target War Veterans this increased production by the communal land farmers effectively caused War Veterans to feel more neglected and disadvantaged in comparison to the communal farmers.

In addition President Mugabe announced his policy of reconciliation, which as we saw, meant reconciliation with settler capital rather than between the races. Under this policy any land occupations were cracked down upon with the utmost brutality, using the police to nip any land movement activism in the bud (Moyo 2001). Such top-down crackdown by government on the land movement formed a striking contrast to government's later behaviour of siding with the activists during the 2000 occupations, thereby raising questions in both academic and political circles about the double standards now apparent.

3.4 The War Veterans' movement from the 1987 Unity Accord to the land occupations in 1997

The decade 1988 to 1999 marked a distinct phase in the history of the veterans' liberation project, with ripples felt throughout the general social, political and economic fabric of society. From the Lancaster House Agreement (1979), where the interests of the fighters were not represented in the negotiations, to the 1987 accord, nationalist politicians were wary of the veterans, and feared potential political challenges from a potentially nascent veterans movement seeking to carry on some of

[130] My own experiences could shed light here. When I went to join the guerrilla movement I was a minor but when I returned I was a major but I did not appear in the village registers and could therefore not get benefits that were processed through the system. I therefore had to buy a piece of land within the village which was later taken away by the village head and given to someone else who was in the village register (Personal observation 1983-90).

the ambitions of the liberation war. In part this was a symptom of the Mugabe government not yet feeling fully in charge of the political agenda. It feared the War Veterans much like it feared challenges from other contenders for power. But by the late 1980s ZANU-PF felt itself firmly in the saddle, enjoying dominance of near one-party rule, and facing only a negligible challenge from the ZANU Ndonga of Ndabaningi Sithole. Before the Unity Accord of 1987, the two parties inheriting the political legacy of association with the liberation struggle (ZANU-PF and ZAPU-PF) vied for power. The government (as we have seen) neglected ex-combatants as the opposite side of the coin of its alliance with White capital. The signing of the Unity Accord should have increased the grip of the merged ZANU/ZAPU-PF even further. But one unanticipated consequence was of the accord was that the War Veterans were now able to form a united front, and henceforth for some years the focus of opposition shifted to the internal politics of the (enlarged) ruling party.

The Unity Accord was signed on 22 December 1987. Internal political struggles were not long in surfacing within the ruling party.

With lively participation by the likes of Nzarayebani and Malunga, criticising opportunists in ZANU-PF for neglecting the liberation agenda many now saw a chance to become active in national politics. In Masvingo War Veterans mobilised peasants to vote against the ZANU-PF Politburo choice of candidate in primaries leading to the 1990 general elections. In a nationally publicised showdown between Shuvai Mahofa and Cosmas Gonese (a War Veteran) the Politburo candidate lost the primaries, humiliating the ruling party in what was seen as a head-on conflict between a War Veteran-peasant alliance and the ruling clique. After succeeding out-voting Mahofa in a crucial election and allies 'broke into a song entitled *Hatichada kunyengerera* which literally means 'we are fed up' (*The Herald* 31 October 1988). War Veteran leader, Cosmas Gonese, spoke out against the imposition of leaders by the Politburo saying:

> *Cde. Nyagumbo [ZANU-PF Politburo member and Secretary for Administration] must not tell us what to do here, ZANU-PF must not be run like a company, it's for the people and Cde Nyagumbo must not talk as if he is a company director. We never voted for Cde Mahofa, who was imposed on us and we do not want her. (The Herald 8 January 1989)*

This marked the beginning of a new era in the politics of Zimbabwe, with the periphery (in this peasants and War Veterans) directly challenging power at the centre. War Veterans now became much more active in national politics than before. After their electoral success at Masvingo, the War Veterans continued with their tactic of organising peasants as their power base to challenge the ruling oligarchy, a tactic applied until the land occupation period from 1998. With this tactic the War Veterans' movement expanded beyond ex-combatants, drawing in peasants, youths and other political interests. They also organised demonstrations against ZANU-PF ruling elite.[131] This open defiance increasingly encouraged a number of independent candidates to contest elections from 1990 onwards.

[131] *The Herald* (15 October 1988) in an item '*Police step in to stop demo at Gutu'*, reported that *'More than 200 people gathered in Gutu yesterday to demonstrate against the 8 ZANU-PF Gutu representatives who met President Mugabe on Tuesday in support of the area's MP – Mahofa.'* The demonstrators included youths and peasants (see also *The Herald* 10 August 1988).

Edgar Tekere, deposed former ZANU-PF Secretary General and Minister of Labour in Mugabe's first government, opposed the drift of the nationalists towards a one-party state, and formed a new political party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) - in April 1989.[132] Although Tekere had the courage to contest, he was unsuccessful in the presidential and parliamentary elections, gaining only three seats, and protested that the votes were rigged. Many War Veterans supported Tekere, since he offered a clear critique of the policy of sidelining the liberation struggle, and complained about the way the independence movement had been high-jacked by new-comers (*anamafikezolo*).[133] Tekere's concerns were closely in line with those of the War Veterans more generally. This was the first major challenge to the united ZANU-PF party arising from within the liberation movement. It drew support not only from the War Veterans, but also from a national cross-section of peasants, workers, intelligentsia and the Black bourgeoisie, in contrast to the ZANU Ndonga Party of Ndabaningi Sithole.[134] However, ZUM was thwarted allegedly through ZANU-PF's use of state power. Its peak was in the 1990 general and presidential elections, and subsequently it faded from view.

This was the first internal break away from the liberation movement. Tekere's courage in forming an opposition party and daring to criticise ZANU-PF and President Mugabe for neglecting the agenda of the liberation struggle had a dynamising impact on the War Veterans.

These developments should be viewed in a wider context. The steady emergence of the War Veterans as a political force offered a challenge to Mugabe's basic power building blocks. Through carefully selective recruitment he had encircled himself with acquaintances, relatives, and a range of loyal but often incompetent leaders, and now he was for the first time challenged from within in a key area of political management - resistance to imposition of functionaries of Mugabe's choice by War Veterans and mobilised peasants. At the same time was coming from without, as new opposition parties, following in the wake of ZUM, began to test their chances.

This spelt the beginning of the end of ZANU-PF undisputed political hegemony and *de facto* one party state rule. Secondly, this development also made clear a major split in the liberation movement, revealing to all and sundry the gap and antagonism between the levels. A new form of conflict, different from the former ZAPU/ZANU and ZIPRA/ZANLA split, had become apparent. This time the division was no longer along ethnic lines, but one which began to reveal opposed class alignments within the liberation movement. Nationalist elites and a rising Black bourgeoisie were now increasingly opposed in interest to class of peasants, workers and marginalised ex-combatants, as they continued to abuse state and political power in order to amass wealth. Thirdly, the challenge from below was increasingly well-

[132] Edgar Tekere was one of the few nationalists who insisted on getting guerrilla training and received it. He is therefore a War Veteran over and above his nationalist status and his position was always viewed positively by combatants.

[133] In essence Tekere was attacking the selective recruitment policy of Mugabe. The new-comers (*amafikezolo*) he referred to were the hand-picked politicians, usually comprising relatives, friends acquaintances and loyalists with no liberation credentials.

[134] Ndabaningi Sithole was the first President of ZANU, who was deposed through the Mgagao Declaration in 1975. He then formed ZANU Ndonga which appealed only to the three parliamentary constituencies of Chipinga, where it consistently won seats in the post independence period, signifying its ethnic cleavage.

organised. War Veterans, by now keenly aware of the political character and tactics of the ruling oligarchy, started to organise the peasantry to challenge elite power. A new political era of oppositional politics had begun, just as the Unity Agreement (and the de facto one-party state it heralded) was being celebrated.

The Unity Accord was almost immediately followed by raging debate about corruption[135] and the plight of ex-combatants, gaining momentum when the issue was tabled in Parliament in March 1988. Kriger (Kriger 1995: 156) writes:

> *With preparations under way for ZANU (PF) to dissolve their separate constitutions and unite, parliamentarians turned to the plight of the nation's living heroes, the ex-combatants, in March 1988. The motion on ex-combatants, introduced in parliament by a White non-constituency member … Sean Handermark, ended the virtual silence on the grim situation of an estimated 25,000 – 35,000 unemployed ex-combatants. Parliamentarians who spoke in support of the motion portrayed ex-combatants as poor, desperate, disgraced, jobless and roaming the streets, despite their contribution to the liberation of Zimbabwe. (Kriger 1995: 156)*

The print media now became full of stories of neglected ex-combatants, sometimes with pictures like the one below, taken by *The Herald* (13 December 1990).[136]

[135] ZANU-PF leaders including government ministers and parliamentarians had been involved in a major scandal in 1986/87 involving corrupt accessing of manufactured vehicles from the only country's assembly plant, Willowvale Motor Industry. One of the Ministers, Frederick Shava who had been convicted and sentenced to a jail term was pardoned by President Mugabe who invoked his presidential powers. Corruption had caused internal divisions within ZANU-PF, calling for a debate on a leadership code. War Veterans were incensed by this corruption, especially considering the neglect.

[136] The story of this picture by Charles Kabera, a *Herald* correspondent, was entitled, *'Sheer determination: dollars roll despite disability'. 'Magureyi (31), wounded in a battle and amputated found himself unemployed and his "demob" money in sufficient to cater for his family. He resorted to selling roasted mealies … However, the money he made from these sales was insufficient, hence his decision to enter the firewood business. "Firewood splitting is not easy for a one-armed man. At times if the blow is too powerful the axe springs from my hand, or worse still if the wood is too hard I get a lot of blisters, but I have to make money somehow", he said.'*

Figure 3.3 A War Veteran

Lameck Magureyi, a War Veteran amputated after injury in a battle, found himself jobless and penniless after the war and resorted to cutting firewood for sale with his one good arm. He had received no rehabilitation support from the government. Magurei was a ZIPA period recruit from Honde Valley, Manicaland who joined the war in 1975.

Source: courtesy of The Herald 1990

With the Unity Accord signed, a new public debate about the neglect of ex-combatants starting, and the environment was set for a united War Veterans association. It was finally formed in 1989 as the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA). This was an important development in the organisation of the War Veterans' movement because energies were no longer spent fighting each other. The change also sharpened contradictions between the War Veterans and the 'Old Guard' nationalists in the ruling party, as ex-combatants began to question their position *vis a vis* the nationalists and newcomers in the liberation movement. However, because of teething problems and resistance from the politicians the official inauguration of association only took place later, in 1992.

The first National Executive of the ZNLWVA was weak and ineffective. Incumbents included Chris Pasipamire,[137] Hebert Matanga and other former ZIPRA cadres. However the executive failed to convene a national congress and to hold elections for more than four years, despite the provisions of the ZNLWVA constitution. They were heavily criticised for poor performance, financial mismanagement and failure to fight for the interests of the War Veterans. It was

[137] Pasipamire was a Mugabe phase recruit who did not undergo military training (Personal communication with MT December 2007) but Matanga was ZIPA phase recruit and former political commissar during the Mugabe period.

expected the ZNLWVA would operate along lines similar to a trade union in protecting its employed members. The leadership was accused of doing nothing when War Veterans were targeted for retrenchment, for example, and for failing to fight for benefits for War Veterans, including demobilisation funds, reintegration training programs, pensions and gratuities. They were ousted at a meeting held in the Parliament Buildings in 1992 by a meeting of the provincial leadership convened against the will of the national executive.[138] A national executive committee led by Charles Hungwe[139] succeeded the first leadership. The new executive was not much more active. It made an effort to meet provincial members and to develop structures, but that was about all. A handful of utterances apart, the Hungwe executive failed to confront ZANU-PF and the government to demand answers to the problems of the War Veterans. The Hungwe Executive was widely seen by the rank-and-file as conniving with ZANU-PF. Instead of confronting the party and its president the executive argued that War Veterans had to draw the sympathy of the party to attract attention to their plight. This committee was then unseated in favour of a new executive led by Dr. Hunzvi,[140] voted in at a congress held in Umzingwane, Matebeleland South Province in 1995.

It is important to recognise that despite this faltering start, War Veterans had begun to build a national organisation. The structure of ZNLWVA cut across the ZIPRA and ZANLA divide and for the first time there were active structures down to the district levels. These became instrumental in organising and mobilising for the land occupations, albeit without getting command from the centre, as we shall see later in the thesis. The national executive headed a hierarchy of provincial and district committees. These became official communication channels through which the War Veterans started to pressurise government to look into the plight of the many destitute ex-combatants. The immediate reaction of government was to pre-empt ZNLWVA by forming a board under the Social Welfare Act. A War Veterans Board was set up with a mandate to address the problems of War Veterans on behalf of government, chaired by Rtd. General Solomon Mujuru (Rex Nhongo), the former commander of ZIPA Military Committee who betrayed his ZIPA colleagues and aligned with the Mugabe leadership in 1976. Mujuru was the first Black Army Commander of ZNA. Due to inactivity it remained a white elephant, because War Veterans went about their business as if the Board did not exist and it was little known or respected by ordinary War Veterans.[141]

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[138] Personal observation (1993) Parliament buildings, Harare. I attended the meeting as part of Masvingo delegation and was instrumental to the changing of the old leadership.

[139] A lawyer, and later a Regional Magistrate and a High Court Judge at the time of writing.

[140] Polish trained, the doctor gained popularity when he assessed the injuries of War Veterans and awarded them percentages for compensation purposes. Hunzvi also argued in the press and in public addresses that War Veterans of Zimbabwe had been short-changed and he urged government to compensate ex-combatants for both physical and mental disabilities caused by the war. With his exposure of World War II claims during his medical training in Poland, he was well equipped to argue the position of War Veterans. War Veterans liked him for his courage and articulation of their position.

[141] Mugabe has tried several times to put the War Veterans under the command of retired former guerrilla commanders, without success. He still attempts to co-opt their support. For example in 2006, in serious in-party fighting, with his continued rule under threat from internal contenders, he appealed to War Veterans to back him. But doubting their loyalty after badly treating them in the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, he then tried to insist on War Veterans being led by former ZIPRA Intelligence supremo, Dumiso Dabengwa, retired

An Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) was adopted in 1990 (barely a year after the formation of ZNLWVA) and introduced major changes in government expenditure, chief among which was the demand to downsize the civil service (Kanyenze 2004). When ESAP was full throttle, in 1992, ex-combatants were retrenched en masse from many government ministries.[142] This coincided with extensive lay-offs, as a result of the economic downturn the ESAP was intended to address. This double blow made many more War Veterans unemployed, a development which strengthened the War Veteran organisation.

In April 1992, ZNLWVA held its inaugural meeting in Chinhoyi, and it invited its patron, the incumbent State President, Robert Mugabe. This was a landmark meeting. Representatives of War Veterans from all over the country, and from both ZIPRA and ZANLA, came and put forward their case in no uncertain terms. War Veterans argued that the party had been hijacked, and had degenerated because 'it had been taken over by wolves in sheep clothing', a reference to the opportunists and loyalists filling party and government posts: 'This is not the same Zanu (PF) that we built. This is not the same party we brought home in 1980 upon attainment of victory. The party is dead …' one ex-fighter said *(The Herald* 25 April 1992).

Army Commander, Solomon Mujuru, retired Army Commander Zvinavashe and former dissident leader Andrew Ndhlovu. As these leaders went round the Provinces attempting to reorganise War Veterans they came under attack from the ex-combatants themselves, rendering the whole effort futile. They had also started to campaign against Mugabe's continued rule causing Mugabe to work against them. Mugabe dropped them and sought the support of Jabulani Simbanda who was the properly elected War Veteran Chairman at a Congress in Mutare in 2005 but had been booted out of ZANU-PF (by Mugabe leadership) for participating in the Tsholotsho saga led by Johnathan Moyo (deposed Minister of Information). Sibanda successfully campaigned for Mugabe's ZANU-PF candidature to stand for the country's Presidency amid internal opposition from. His campaign reached climax when he organised a million men and women march in Harare in November 2007.

[142] The most conspicuous targeting of ex-combatants for retrenchment from the civil service involved disbanding departments that had recruited mainly ex-combatants in the early 1980s. For example the Ministry of Local Government's Promotion and Training Section employing more than 300 ex-combatants, the Department of Youth in the Ministry of Youth Sport and Culture, and the Department of Community Development in the Ministry of Community Development in the Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs, all of which recruited mainly from among former Political Commissars, and particularly from Chitepo College, were disbanded in 1990/91. As a transition, the units were systematically moved to the newly formed Ministry of Political Affairs before being abolished. Across the whole civil service very few, if any departments, were abolished like that. Ex-combatants believed that the movement of Mariyawanda Nzuwa from post of Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development to chair the Public Service Commission, was intended to purge ex-combatants in the public service. Rumour has it that Nzuwa was posted a bullet in an envelope by the War Veterans, during the War Veteran demonstrations in 1997. Nzuwa had previously successfully silenced and then purged Local Government Promotion Officers, a group of ex-combatants in his Ministry. Local Government Promotion Officers wrote a grievance document according to Public Service procedures declaring that they intended to meet Mugabe to explain if the Commission failed to address their grievances. Nzuwah foiled the move (Personal observation and co-author to the grievance document, '*The Grievances of Local Government Promotion and Training Section*', Harare 1989). See also Hammar 2003.

War Veterans demanded recognition and one, pointing to the delegates, angrily reminded the President and senior politicians that: 'Everybody in the position of leadership is there because we fired guns. None of you could attain positions of leadership within the Smith regime. You are where you are because of these people here' (*The Herald* 25 April 1992).

They demanded Mugabe 'throw out the rest of the leadership of the country' (*The Herald* 25 April 1992). At the meeting, the War Veterans threatened the government that if it was developing cold feet they would get the land from the White farmers themselves, demanding speedy resettlement of peasants, farm workers and ex-combatants. For the first time in Zimbabwe, the War Veterans were speaking with one voice, attacking nationalist politicians and criticising opportunists within the liberation movement. A new tone had been introduced that finally addressed the complex contradictions within the liberation movement in a settler dominated economy.

Economic strife exacerbated by retrenchments, hardships caused by ESAP, adding to general neglect, now drove the War Veterans to demand what they believed the state and society owed them. They demanded to be compensated for the injuries they suffered during the war. They demanded the demobilisation packages they never received. They demanded pensions and gratuities. Above all they demanded land for resettlement. Their argument for resettlement was based on the precedent of compensation previously offered to soldiers recruited to fight the World War I and World War II, a topic which they had by now carefully researched.[143]

The 1990 election saw a number of War Veterans enter Parliament, following pressure on the ruling party to allow War Veterans to participate in parliamentary elections without hindrance. Some of these new parliamentarians were women, such as Margaret Dongo, who became vocal about the plight of War Veterans, and challenged nationalists (particularly Nathan Shamuyarira)[144], in parliamentary debate. The ZANU-PF Politburo decided to drop Dongo from the Party ticket in the

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[143] Rhodesians who had taken part in World War II were demobilised with resettlement packages and education options. The package was heavily funded by the government. '*Based on 1944 budgetary estimates, £44,000 pounds, of which £13,793 was specifically dedicated to the "Soldier Land Resettlement Scheme" in the 1945-6 budget.*' (Tapfumaneyi 1996: 24). It also involved major policy decisions, such as alienating Black owned land particularly in Nyanga and Gokwe, in order to resettle World War II veterans (NAZ S237/1, Suspension of Land Alienation during WWII 1940-7). Ex-combatants undertook their own research to inform the War Veterans. For example, then Major Tapfumaneyi himself was himself an ex-combatant (ZIPA period recruit), and his research was of general interest to War Veterans.

[144] Shamuyarira was former FROLIZI leader who had defected from ZANU after failing to oust Herbert Chitepo as leader of the Dare in 1972. He was then recruited by Robert Mugabe during the selective recruitment drive of 1976. It is widely believed that Mugabe recruited Shamuyarira to strengthen his ethnic group of the Zezuru. Shamuyarira became the Secretary for Information and held several Ministerial positions in Mugabe's government including that of Minister of Information. When he resigned from government he was full time in ZANU-PF where hitherto he holds is the spokesman of the party and is responsible for safeguarding ZANU-PF archival materials which have not yet been released to the public since independence. War Veterans view him as a person who hates them and as a sell-out for his role in creating FROLIZI.

1995 general elections in favour of Vivian Mwashita[145], another woman ex-combatant. However Dongo protested and registered as an independent candidate with the support of War Veterans and her constituency. Vivian Mwashita was declared a winning candidate but Dongo complained that the votes were rigged and took the matter to the courts and won. In a re-run of the elections Dongo won the Parliamentary seat, setting a new challenge to the ruling ZANU-PF and giving confidence to the electorate that some democratic progress could be made against the Mugabe regime, as Masunungure (2004: 166) subsequently analysed:

> *This development was significant politically in that even individuals now had the self-confidence to challenge the ruling party. It demonstrated that though ZANU-PF remained omnipresent, it was no longer omnipotent. More importantly, it was a harbinger of an incipient opposition movement, which started under the organisational name of the Movement of Independent Electoral Candidates (MIEC), under Dongo's chair[womanship].*

Participation of War Veterans in national politics, challenging the ZANU-PF ruling elite from within, and using a wide variety of tactics, contributed to the build-up of a formidable opposition politics in the country over the next few years. From internal challenges and struggles, first War Veteran organised grassroots resistance like the Gutu North constituency, then Tekere yet again Dongo (both War Veterans), political opposition field was widened. Dongo's strategy to organise independent candidates, was clear maturation of opposition politics in Zimbabwe.[146]

Margaret Dongo is an interesting example of this kind of development. She transformed the MIEC into a political party ZUD in 1998. It could be claimed that the War Veterans' movement, with its militant street marches, support for independent candidates, and stimulus to the formation of breakaway political parties, also paved the way for the mass protests, demonstrations, and riots that finally led to the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). But this is to get ahead of the story.

Meanwhile, the ZNLWVA elected Dr Chenjerai Hunzvi's Committee at a congress held at Umzingwane in 1995. The Chairmanship of Hunzvi transformed the Association into an active and militant force. Hunzvi was a medical doctor trained in Poland, and aware of issues of war victim compensation, having learnt from his trainers how they dealt with compensation issues for World War II victims. Under his leadership the medical problems of ex-combatants were first exposed. *The Herald* (1 July 1995) reported:

> *For [War Veterans], a special help is needed. The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veteran's Association believes there are several hundred men and women still suffering from traumatic mental stress, people who were mentally broken by war, and what they saw and what they felt. Besides these people, there are those who faced great stress on demobilisation; with families dead or uncaring, friends gone and homes destroyed they cannot piece the bits back together, and go over the edge themselves.*

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[145] Both Mwashita and Dongo were ZIPA period recruits from Manicaland. Here again was used a divide and rule tactic.

[146] A number of independent candidates had succeeded in parliamentary and local government elections, notably Councillor Mudehwe in Mutare Urban.

The association mobilised support from various institutions, until eventually 'the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, the veteran's association and the University of Zimbabwe's faculty of medicine … launched a rehabilitation program for the broken men and women for whom the war still has to end.' (*The Herald* 1 July 1995). Humanitarian NGOs also supported War Veterans and sympathised with them,[147] which also added to the pressure on the government and ruling party to pay attention.[148]

The following year, 1996, the association was instrumental in getting the government to enact or amend a number of pieces of legislation which War Veterans felt hindered their progress. Sixteen years after Independence, Parliament finally enacted a War Veterans Act (1996).[149] This provided for the establishment of a War Veterans Board, heavily controlled by the Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare. War Veterans viewed the Act as an attempt by the government to co-opt loyalists in order to regain control over an increasingly militant movement. Under Hunzvi's leadership, the War Veterans disregarded the Act, continuing to build the pressure politically, as if it did not exist.[150] In addition, the War Victims Compensation Act was amended (1996). In the event, pressure caused government to release money to compensate War Veterans for injuries. The distribution was badly handled, and many non-War Veterans benefited, and relatives of the ruling oligarchy in particular.[151] After 16 years it was difficult to establish who exactly was qualified to benefit from the scheme. Other demobilisation schemes typically supply ex-combatants with entitlement cards in return for handing over a weapon, and punch holes in the entitlement pass when specific benefits are handed over. Even such schemes, in the immediate aftermath of wars, where it is more obvious who is to be treated, are subject to abuse, so how much more likely was it that compensation would be incorrectly directed in the Zimbabwe case? The looting of the War Victims Compensation fund angered War Veterans and was one of the factors leading to War Veterans street marches and demonstrations in 1996 and 1997.

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[147] For example, in an article entitled *Bringing them home from war* (*The Herald* 11 May 1995: 4) it was recorded that '*A P Reeler from the Amani Trust backs the article of 1 July 1995 in The Herald. Through research, Amani trust established that over the past 20 years few people have recovered from effects of the war physically and psychologically. " …We therefore strongly agree with your statement: As a matter of honour, we should do what is required to bring home all those who went to war."*'

[148] The outcome of the tripartite effort is unclear. But it is clear it was too little too late, because this should have been planned for prior to independence, as part of the peace negotiations. As Sadomba F.C. (1999: 19) notes, '*there have been no anticipatory programmes to train staff, identify extreme cases of PTSD and begin the much-needed rehabilitation of this marginalised community. Because of this the ZNLWVA has announced plans to establish a section specialising in PTSD within the hospital project that is envisaged. But this will not provide the panacea for what was required. National awareness and recognition of the existence of PTSD amongst ex-combatants as well as very visible efforts to address the problem through both the formal and informal system … would constitute the most effective way of lowering social tensions*'.

[149] It defined a War Veteran as '*any person who underwent military training and participated, consistently and persistently in the liberation struggle which occurred in Zimbabwe and in neighbouring countries between the 1st January 1962, and the 29th of February 1980, in connection with the bringing about of independence on the 18th of April 1980.*'

[150] The Chairman of the Board, who was appointed by the Minister, according to the Act, was retired General Mujuru (Rex Nhongo).

[151] For example, one of the most widely published incidents involved a Marufu, brother to the First Lady, Grace Mugabe. The corruption also ensnared Dr. Hunzvi (McCandless 2005).

Under Hunzvi's leadership, ex-combatants took to the streets of Harare and elsewhere. Such demonstrations against the ruling party, ZANU-PF, had not been witnessed before. Ex-combatants were defiant and threatened violence against anyone who tried to stop their peaceful demonstrations. They demanded to talk to Robert Mugabe in person for two reasons. One was that he was the Head of State. The War Veterans had fought for the state. The other was that according to ZNLWVA constitution the President of the country automatically becomes the patron of the Association.

President Mugabe refused to talk to the War Veterans and he turned a cold shoulder to their welfare and other demands. The War Veterans only piled on the pressure. When talk was unavoidable Mugabe preferred to send his Ministers of Social Welfare, Defence and/or Security for meetings with ex-combatants, held at ZANU-PF Head Quarters. On one occasion ministers were held hostage for several hours while the women in the meeting presented them with crawling and crying babies, a rather effective non-violent means of protest. Politicians seeking election are said to be good at kissing babies, but this was beyond a joke. The War Veterans were protesting they had no means to feed the children. The ministers were expected to find the milk!

Ex-combatants also started to disrupt high level government activities. In August 1997 they staged demonstrations and disrupted a conference being held at the Harare Conference Centre between government and a group of African Americans intending to invest in the country. There was a strong rumour that President Mugabe had ordered the army to shoot the demonstrators, but that the army (and other uniformed forces) refused to carry out the order. Many were War Veterans themselves. The uniformed forces in fact informed the War Veterans about the order, and their refusal to obey it. They assured the War Veterans of their support (Information from G, a Provincial and National Executive member of ZNLWVA, who claimed to have been present at the meeting at Police General Headquarters, Harare, 1999). The climax of the conflict was the siege of the State House, the official residence of the President. At this point President Mugabe, now seriously alarmed that his grip on power was slipping, yielded not only to talks but to the demand to compensate the War Veterans. This was at the end of 1997.

3.5 War Veteran grievances and the truce of 1997

The picture painted so far shows that the War Veterans did not disperse and integrate with civilian society after the war of Independence, but that circumstances kept many of them in a condition where they came to rely, for their sense of identity and coherence, on an explicit vision shaped during the war (that the struggle was a struggle for land) and on a set of coherent grievances around which they were increasingly willing to base political action, eventually challenging Robert Mugabe's regime. Summing up the grievances of the War Veterans, it is clear that they reflect on a sense that a war-time political vision was being squandered, but also on the marginal nature of the life many of them lived in independent Zimbabwe. Neglect by the state, poverty, social humiliation, aggressive neo-liberal (anti-liberation) policies, settler supremacy and racism helped feed War Veterans grievances. Tapera (Knox) Chitiyo's paper, 'Land Violence and Compensation: Reconceptualising Zimbabwe's

Land and War Veterans' Debate' is ground-breaking in showing 'the link … between the land crisis and the War Veterans' situation in Zimbabwe' (Chitiyo 2000: 1).

The blame to most people lay with the attitudes of an increasingly unsympathetic political leadership. This comes out clearly in the testimony of one veteran, Simbanda, interviewed by F. Sadomba:

> *All [the nationalists] needed were the reigns of power … I still remember in 1984, we sent our representative to go and see Dr. Nkomo. The situation had seriously worsened … Nkomo actually said, 'I never moved from one homestead to another saying one, two three let's go to war'. We felt dejected, we felt lost. When we went to war we had given up everything. It was just like giving up everything to Christ just like the [Catholic] 'sisters and fathers' do. (Sadomba, F. 2004: 14)*

Nationalist leaders were not even diplomatic about the way they treated the former guerrillas. This bluntness and denial pained the ex-combatants. It stoked their sense of alienation and anger against the ruling nationalist elite. As one of the War Veteran leaders rhetorically asked:

> *… but when we liberated the country what, did the powers that be do? Those are the people we are interrogating and we … demand the promises we made to the people to be fulfilled. If we liberated the country why are we not fulfilling our promises? This is our major question. We are not in the farms just for farming. (Interview with MDT 2001)*

It is ironical that even the opposition to Mugabe tended to marginalise the War Veterans. Anti-War Veteran discourse and propaganda intensified,[152] as different social movements (constitutional, human rights, student, workers etc.) jostled for space in confronting the state. When the War Veterans forced the government to pay the $50,000 back pay from demobilisation funds to its members, there was an outcry that the War Veterans had brought the economy to its knees. Feared by the government, they became scapegoats for the opposition movement for democratic change.

'The controversy surrounding gratuities has refused to go away. War Veterans are still haunted by it to this day, as if it was not justified. Incidentally, former Rhodesian soldiers are still receiving their pensions, partly in foreign currency' (Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 2004: 39, see also McCandless 2005: 300).[153] This put social

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[152] The so-called 'born frees' – i.e. youth born after independence - challenged the War Veterans saying that War Veterans were too old to stand up to them (the youth). They confronted War Veterans during their marches, resulting in several clashes that left many on both sides injured (Personal observation, Harare central business district 1999-2000).

[153] World War II ex-servicemen were given land for resettlement leading to the expulsion of more than 100,000 Africans from absentee landlord properties in European areas. McCandless (2005) quotes Rtd. Maj. Gava, ZNLWVA Director in 2003 saying, *'The [former] Rhodesian Security Forces were still getting pensions and this became known to the War Veterans who began to see that there were different pay scales for Europeans … While one person [War Veteran] was fighting for liberation and another was going to school, the liberation fighter missed the appropriate time that he should have gone to school. While that critic bought goods and a [residential] stand in Rhodesia that fighter who went to war for years had no opportunity to do that. That critic has led a normal healthy life, and has not experienced the pain and hard conditions of the bush – disease, rain downpours – that liberation fighters went through. It is only people who are short-sighted and short-minded who think that reinstating War Veterans in civilian life is equated to a prize. We are saying somebody has lost time and that social justice must prevail.'*

pressure on the War Veterans, who were increasingly becoming social outcasts in the eyes of independent media and the opposition movement.

It is worth noting a couple of specific components of this social exclusion. When War Veterans demonstrated in the streets for payment of War Victims compensation, gratuities and demobilisation funds, the Zimbabwe Council of Trade Unions issued no statement of support, contrary to what it had done in other previous strikes by doctors, nurses and civil servants. A second example is the wave of literature celebrating the exploits and daring of the former Rhodesian forces, contrasting with a paucity of material on the exploits and heroism of the War Veterans. This sense of social isolation became so extreme that some War Veterans began (ironically) to express the fear that one day they would be declared war criminals for having participated in a liberation war. As P (working in the City of Harare) states:

> *… whenever you met a Comrade that you knew or one you once worked with or an acquaintance who was a Comrade you would ask, 'But Comrade, how do you see these political developments?' And the Comrades would tell you 'If we are not strong then we are gone. At the end we will be declared criminals. We all will be declared undesirable elements'. That we concluded … all of us … But is fighting a liberation war a criminal activity …?. (Interview with P 2000)*

War Veterans felt threatened and they found it imperative to reorganise themselves for personal survival. D (Personal communication October 2007) argued that if the War Veterans do not do something to distance themselves from the actions of ZANU-PF ruling oligarchy they will be painted with the same brush, and when time comes they will be attacked by the people, as if they – the War Veterans – were part of the oligarchy. This intensified sense of social isolation, it is argued here (cf. Richards 1996), has forced the War Veterans to rely more and more for their self worth on acting as a group, and this has in turn rekindled the visions that once kept them alive in the bush. Their alliance with the spirit guardians of the land has not been forgotten. Eventually land occupation has served as a safety valve for pent up feelings of social exclusion. Occupation of farms is, thus, a way of restoring lost pride and lost dignity for the War Veterans. They want to reclaim their social status as liberators and so decide that leading the occupation of 'settler White farmers', and giving land to Black people, would do exactly that.

However Robert Mugabe will be judged in the long run, there is no doubting he is an astute politician. He realised at the end of the 1990s that the War Veterans were in a dangerous and deeply alienated mood. If he opposed the War Veterans and the MDC he would be fighting a battle on two fronts. The survival of the ZANU-PF oligarchy required a deal to be struck with one or other party. He chose to try and do a deal with the War Veterans, but later.

The truce he made with the War Veterans included a number of issues. Ex-combatants argued they were due demobilisation money at $4,000 a year backdated for 17 years. They also presented the issue of hospital fees for themselves and school fees for their children. But the land issue – the one that engaged the ideological gear – was not far behind. Ex-combatants thus demanded 'that the 5 million hectares targeted by the government of Zimbabwe, be acquired at once' (Moyo 2001: 6) and

threatened to move on to the farms if government did not resettle them alongside the landless peasants for whom they had been fighting. *The Chronicle* reported that:

> *Ex-fighters threaten (ed) to occupy White farms … War Veterans were stating that 17 years after the liberation struggle they had still not been resettled and they vowed they would move onto White-owned commercial farms if the government did not resettle them by July 1998. (The Chronicle 22 August 1997)*[154]

This is how, according to Moyo:

> *… War Veterans took center stage, [and] … brought back … the land redistribution initiative … to the centre of the development debate, now couched in the more popular arena of liberation and nationalist discourses. (Moyo 2001: 2)*

Mugabe ordered lump sum payment of ZW $50,000 and subsequent monthly pension of ZW $2,000 to each War Veteran out of government coffers and the amount, unbudgeted, was paid without even parliamentary approval. A gesture of pure populism, the money was 'found' by taxing workers. Mugabe also agreed to award free medical services to the ex-combatants and to cover children's school fees. On the issue of land Mugabe agreed that 20 percent of all land for resettlement and residential purposes would be given to ex-combatants as a matter of policy. The street demonstrations by ex-combatants ended as the agreement was executed. However this triggered anger and mass demonstrations by the workers who footed the bill through their increased taxes, an action widening the gap between the workers (led by Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)) and society in general on the one hand and ex-combatants on the other. As Sadomba wrote later:

> *Since the grants had not been budgeted for, funding the demobees became problematic and in order to raise funds, the Minister of Finance had to introduce special taxation by the end of 1997. However, the attempts by the Minster were met with stiff resistance by the workers and public who went on demonstrations and strikes to express their displeasure. The displeasure by the workers and public clearly showed that there was an underlying feud between the demobees and the society at large [who] saw the ex-combatants as a separate and 'exclusive class': a class that could not be effectively reintegrated into them. On the contrary, the demobees saw themselves as the 'liberators' who had been marginalised economically, politically and socially but whose efforts in the struggle had brought about independence [and had] to be recognised. (Sadomba 2004: 17)*

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has offered an historical sketch of the emergence of War Veterans' movement from the Lancaster House negotiations in 1979 to the point of occupations in 1997, when a truce with the government was negotiated. The position of guerrillas was not represented during cease fire and peace negotiations, and (perhaps as a result) no proper planning was done for the future reintegration of the combatants. This lack of preparation was the first indication to the War Veterans that their struggle was largely in vain; the liberation struggle had been hijacked by nationalists more intent on gaining the benefits of the post conflict peace than in addressing the objectives of the liberation struggle. The chapter has also discussed various setbacks to the early emergence of the War Veterans as a coherent force in Zimbabwean

[154] *The Chronicle* 22 August 1997. See also *The Herald* 20 August 1997 and *The Chronicle* 21 August 1997.

politics. These included the failure of ZANU-PF and PF ZAPU to unite soon after independence. War Veterans continued to fight each other after independence along partisan lines, conveying a picture to the country that fighters spelt trouble.

A Demobilisation Directorate was eventually formed in 1982, but many War Veterans had become frustrated with the wait, and left the army, thereby losing their benefits. What they took with them was a mentality formed in the fighting in the bush. It is easier to disarm a fighter than to 'demobilise' the combatant's mind and emotions. When the Directorate was finally formed and demobilisation started, much of the money was corruptly administered, or simply stolen, leaving entitled ex-combatants with nothing. Many became destitute.

The 1980s was a difficult period for the War Veterans in that former ZIPRA and ZANLA only united after the Unity Accord was signed in 1987. This period was dominated by ZIPRA and ZANLA trying to settle war time scores. This in-fighting expanded into incidents of dissidence, to which the state reacted by forming the Fifth Brigade, composed exclusively of former ZANLA combatants, and reportedly responsible for many atrocities against civilians apparently along ethnic lines. During this time War Veterans pursued the liberation agenda in a disjointed fashion as individuals, groups of civil servants or local authority staff, leaders of NGOs, contributing to press and as parliamentarians. Their focus was to find a platform for tabling their grievances, with the land issue ranking high on the agenda. They used some of these organisations to mobilise peasants to rebel against the elites within the united ZANU-PF, for example in Gutu North. This led to more organised internal rebellion by the grassroots against ZANU-PF elites leading to the formation of ZUM and finally ZUD.

However, War Veterans eventually united and formed ZNLWVA, (after the Unity accord of 1987), when destitution of many War Veterans was put on spotlight by a White MP, Hundermark. ZNLWVA had a faltering start, but which gained momentum after further retrenchment of War Veterans during the 1990-2 period, when ESAP was adopted. The Hunzvi Committee from 1995 transformed the War Veterans into a militant organisation and started to demand recognition, pensions, compensation and gratuities. ZNLWVA demanded land for resettlement. The stage was set for an alliance between the War Veterans and the land movement. War Veterans, through their internal struggles with the ZANU-PF oligarchs, developed enough confidence and awareness of political tactics to cultivate a front with other political actors and confront the authorities. Street demonstration was the main tactic. The War Veterans mobilised peasants, urban and farm-workers and the unemployed. When a truce was reached with President Mugabe, War Veterans immediately started to lead peasants and farm workers to occupy mainly White owned commercial farmland, after a series of threats to government that if government would not honour pledges on land reform the War Veterans would take matters into their own hands. The period 1988 to 1998, was therefore a period in which the War Veterans regrouped and gained political power, forcing President Mugabe to concede to their demands.

But the land issue was more a practical concern. The veterans suffered from social ostracism. Neither government nor civil society understood how the experience of fighting in the bush had shaped their mentality. Social disdain forced the War Veterans back to basics. They had fought in the hope of liberating the land of

Zimbabwe from White settlers, and safely leading a Black peasantry back on to that land. Marginalised in post war society, they would once again rally, and march to glory, by seizing the land. They chose their moment well. The alliance between ZANU-PF elites, nationalists and White commercial farmers had finally broken down (Selby 2006).[155] What then happened, and the further development of the tangled relationship between the War Veterans and the Mugabe regime, is the subject of the following chapter.

[155] Selby puts it thus, '*Communications between White farmers and the state deteriorated significantly and any trust that had developed during the 1980s was lost. Decreasing consultation with the CFU during the drafting of the Land Acquisition Act [1992], political interference in land identification and controversial land allocations fuelled doubts across the farming community. Among government officials, CFU strategies were seen as confrontational. … Illusions of indispensability, scepticism over government's ability to proceed with reform, and a focus on the opportunities of ESAP all contributed to a collective myopia.*'

CHAPTER 4

THE ROLE OF THE WAR VETERANS IN THE EARLY LAND OCCUPATIONS (1998-2000)

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed how groups of War Veterans articulated, in the late 1990s, a claim for access to land as part of a compensation package for their contribution to the liberation war. This chapter discusses how this claim at the political level worked out on the ground in concrete land occupations. The chapter describes two crucial, early occupations, in Svosve (Marondera District) and Chikwaka (Goromonzi District), and the mobilisation of people and cultural resources by groups of war veterans. These occupations heralded a new era of agrarian struggle in the country. We shall examine these occupations in detail to trace the actors, mobilisation techniques, strategies and tactics and interaction with various institutions including the state. Most data were obtained through interviews with participants of the land occupations, particularly key informants with a war veteran background, and by using filed court documents. This chapter contributes to the debate among scholars about the continuities and discontinuities in Zimbabwe's land occupations and the extent to which the land movement was driven by exogenous forces, i.e. the political regime, or was rooted, during specific historical periods, in locally-grounded, economic, political, and historical claims.

4.2 The occupations in Svosve and Chikwaka (1998)

Both Svosve and Chikwaka areas occupy communal lands in the Province of Mashonaland East. The communal lands in both these districts experienced land pressure with high population density, poor soils and poor infrastructure (Moyo 1995). They lie adjacent to prime agricultural land with fertile soils, abundant rainfall, highly developed infrastructure with a good network of roads, a railway line, telecommunications and wide distribution of electricity. Land conflicts between White commercial farmers controlling the prime agricultural land and the African population living on the adjacent communal lands persisted throughout the colonial period, spilling over into the post independence period.[156] Land was a hotly contested resource and Africans continued to claim land that the commercial farmers possessed in a variety of ways including 'poaching' firewood and thatching grass, and through claiming space to erect monuments to their heroes (Interview with DM 2000).

[156] One of the major campaigns by peasants of Chikwaka during the war was to reclaim land from the surrounding farms. They harassed the farmers, destroying their properties and taking away livestock. For example in 1978 peasants invaded and drove away about three hundred cattle and distributed them amongst the villages (Personal observation 1978-9). At one time when farmers resisted to leave the farms peasant youth captured the farmer's wife, Y.

In early 1998 some War Veterans from Harare went round the country to agitate Chiefs and Headmen to reclaim land that was held by White commercial farmers. When going round the country they covered several chiefs in Midlands, Matebeleland South, Masvingo and Manicaland Provinces, and ended up in Marondera, in Chief Svosve's area. These Harare War Veterans were led by K, a former Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) High Command member (Personal observation 1975-80, Mozambique) who had left the army in 1997 (at the time of interview K was an unemployed War Veteran cashiered from the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA)). They took four days to convince a handful of local War Veterans of the Svosve area about the need to occupy White commercial farms in order to force government to distribute land. With the cooperation of these few local War Veterans, K and the other Harare War Veterans approached the peasant leaders in the area, including Chief Svosve himself (Interview with K 2004). 'Land hungry villagers from rocky Svosve communal area … continued to pour onto nearby Marondera commercial farms that they say were once occupied by their ancestors, despite government attempts to stem the tide.' (*The Herald* 23 June 1998)

The group of local and Harare-based War Veterans talked to Chief Svosve, his headmen, village heads and the spirit mediums, who welcomed the idea. The latter performed traditional ceremonies to gain support of the spirit world according to Shona religious beliefs (Interview with K 2004). Through traditional leaders, with Chief Svosve in the forefront, about 20 villages were mobilised (including, according to *The Herald* newspaper of 23 June 1998, the villages falling under headmen Gonye, Hwenjere, Zinatsa, Chibanda, Badza, Toto, Masangomayi, Gambiza, Chikosha, Chapendama, Jera, Choto, N'andu, Mupazviro, Mumvuma, Chihwehwete, Muchemwa and Mareverwa).[157] The grievance of the peasants was mainly that the farms they were occupying were homes of their ancestors and they were moved by the White farmers when they took the land during colonial invasions. A key person in the Svosve occupations, Ben Mudzingwa, narrated the history of their movement to *The Herald* newspaper reporter in an article entitled 'Land Hunger Unleashes mass exodus', saying, 'they were forced off their land by White minority regime and moved to Rushesha rea. From there they were further moved over Whinimbe to Muswatimire until they were dumped on Mafuramhepo Mountain, their present home.'

The villagers organised different modes of transportation including lorries and ox-drawn carts to carry out the occupations. The first group '... moved on to Igava Farm' and four days later 'others followed on to Ruwari, Daskop and Homepark farms' (*The Herald* 23 June 1998, Interview with S 2004). The main base that functioned as a springboard and command centre for the occupation of other farms was at Igava Farm (Interview with K 2004). The villagers brought adequate food supplies and as soon as they occupied they mapped the area, excavating archaeological evidence like remains of mud huts, grinding stones and grave sites in order to construct evidence for their claim that they were the autochthons.

> *Families [were] moving onto the farms which they claim[ed] were previously occupied by their ancestors before being forced out by White settlers. An elderly woman at Daskorp Farm showed an old grinding stone which her mother used when they lived there. Some*

[157] The role of traditional leaders was also recognised by other sources, for example: '*The Chief … sabhukus and the sub-chiefs set a date and announced that everyone who is able bodied should get into the surrounding farms where they were moved from*' (Interview with S, a War Veteran running a beer outlet in Harare, 2004).

of the villagers indicated their forefathers' graves to the reporter. They all clearly remember where their former homes stood. (The Herald 23 June 1998)

They then erected huts, dug pit latrines and wells, vowing not to return to the 'barren' communal lands. The first reaction of the government was to use force and warn the villagers that they would face the wrath of the law. However occupiers were defiant and vowed to stay. The government responded by sending a high-powered delegation headed by one of the state's Vice-Presidents, Simon Vengesai Muzenda, who was also Vice President of the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party. The delegation went to persuade the occupiers to vacate the farms. The occupiers, nevertheless, continued to be defiant until police were sent to disperse them, targeting War Veterans who were the ring leaders (Interview with K 2004, Interview with M, a female War Veteran and trader, 2006). The War Veterans were threatened with arrest and imprisonment and to escape this they fled the area.

Our second case is an early occupation that took place in Goromonzi, about 30 km from Harare (see Figure 4.1). There, peasants, War Veterans and farm workers occupied farms of the Enterprise community of White settlers. This occupation was different from the Svosve occupations on the Marondera farms in that local peasants and local War Veterans initiated the occupations jointly, while War Veterans and youth from Harare only joined by 'invitation'. This is because the local War Veterans and traditional leaders were very active in relation to land struggles.



Figure 4.1 Goromonzi District

The planning for occupations of Goromonzi Farms had begun in July 1998. Chief Chikwaka and his followers were believed to have visited Neptune Farm, on reconnaissance (Letter from Lombard to Husluck, Director of Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), 5 November 1998).[158] Planning included arranging dates and venues, writing posters, placards and banners. Registration took place of all community members who were going to take part in the occupation (Interview with M, a female War Veteran, was self employed in Harare as an informal trader in hardware, 2005) as well as of the participating War Veterans. Organisational structures were formed for the occupations. The local War Veteran committee was led by three powerful women, the late Ester Chimboza (Chairwoman), her Secretary, KK and another committee member MM. Although there were also men in the committee, some of whom were high ranking district civil servants; women leaders were more active and senior.

War Veterans from Harare joined the local organisation. According to K (Interview 2004) he was '*approached by the girls [female War Veterans] from Goromonzi*' to take part in the land occupation after the Svosve occupations had been successfully suppressed by the state. It is most likely that K was approached by Chimboza and her colleagues because they knew about K's involvement in the occupation of Marondera farms with the people of Svosve. Other War Veterans from Harare gave different stories of how they were recruited into the movement by the local people and local War Veterans. A common thread in these stories is that War Veterans from Harare frequented Juru (Bhora) Growth Point, a rural centre at the border of the area of commercial farms and Chikwaka communal lands. Female War Veterans emphasise that they went there to buy cheap farm produce, including beef. Male War Veterans say they mainly went there for casual drinking. It follows from the interviews that Juru Growth Point became an informal convergence place for War Veterans.

Through these gatherings the local peasants from Chikwaka communal lands incited the War Veterans against the owner of Oribi Farm nicknamed 'Shiro'.[159] The peasants taunted[160] Harare War Veterans by narrating how Shiro brutally tortured

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[158] Letter from Lombard PMJ to Hasluck D, Esq. Dated 3 November 1998. This letter and several other documents referred to in this section pertain to evidence given in the High Court, case HC 14192/98. The documents were attachments to the plaintiffs' affidavits. There was communication between the farmers and their Security Company (Lombard being the Director) and there was also communications with the Director, Commercial Farmers Union (a Mr Husluck). All these letters and documents provide details of how the farmers handled the occupations of 1998 in Goromonzi.

[159] In Shona traditions it is common to incite a fight between two people teasing and challenging one (usually the stronger) individual to fight. For boys, two small earth mounds the size of a fist, are made on the ground and allocated to the two potential fighters to symbolise respective breasts of the two's mothers. One of the fighters is challenged to flatten the other's mother's 'breast' after which a fight ensues. The presentation of the stories of 'Shiro' resembles this Shona tactic of incitement. There is of course often exaggeration by those fanning the fight.

[160] In Shona traditions it is common to incite a fight between two people teasing and challenging one (usually the stronger) individual to fight. For boys, two small earth mounds the size of a fist, are made on the ground and end allocated to the two potential fighters to symbolise respective breasts of the two's mothers. One of the fighters challenged to flatten the other's mother's 'breast' after which a fight ensues. The presentation of the stories of 'Shiro'

and threw guerrillas and war collaborators into a disused mine shaft during the war (Interview with D 2000, K 2003, FGD 2005). [161] War Veterans took up the challenge and started to organise the occupation of Oribi Farm. The organisation was at two levels. Firstly, they organised the war veteran movement that included War Veterans, youth and other collaborators by 'spreading word around in Harare' (Interview with DM 2000). Secondly, they 'organised the Village Heads of Chief Chikwaka' (Interview with DM, Harare War Veteran leader self employed as a building contractor and former Resettlement Officer, 2000) and mobilised as well Chief Chikwaka, the local councillor, and the villagers. Estimated figures of between 200 and 300 people at the peak of the occupation of Shiro were given by both farmers and occupiers (Interview with S 2000, Letter from Lombard to Hasluck 2000). An alliance between the peasant land movement and the War Veterans movement was apparent.

Oribi Farm was targeted for occupation because of the alleged poor war history and racist attitude of the farmer, named Connor ('Shiro'). The farm employed 60 male and 45 female employees (and produced) seed and commercial maize, soya seed and commercial soya, seed wheat and commercial wheat and potatoes (Connor Affidavit 1998).

Occupation of Oribi Farm took place on 2 November 1998. That morning the War Veterans sent an advance party to inform the farmer about their intentions:

> *(a) to occupy the farm, and to mark out fields for occupation by their landless followers; (b) to remain on the farms until government paid attention to their demands and to regard these lands as belonging to 'people' and that they [occupiers] would not be moved (High Court of Zimbabwe 14210/98).*

Previous occupations led by peasants were usually clandestine, without any prior warning. The occupation of Oribi Farm marked a new approach, consisting of warning the farmer before the occupation. War Veterans-led occupiers were introducing new tactics and were prepared openly to confront both the state and the White farmers.

One description of the occupation was given in the files of a court case:

> *…a procession of some 30 to 40 people, men and women, proceeded from Juru Heroes' Acre [the Heroes Acre for Juru Growth Point] … carrying placards saying 'SHIRO we want our land', 'SHIRO, we want our farm.' (High Court of Zimbabwe 14120/98)*

The use of placards and the direct confrontation with the farmer in this manner was unusual. The approach was more militant than previous land occupation approaches, and the occupiers openly alleged war time atrocities by the farmer. In a few days the occupations spread to other farms in the areas, owned by the Enterprise Community, and the number of occupiers swelled (Interviews with DM 2000, K 2004, M 2006).

When the procession arrived at the farm of Connor they established a base at the local Heroes Acre. In the evening some occupiers went to see Connor at his homestead, situated a few hundreds of metres away, but he refused to come out in

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resembles this Shona tactic of incitement. There is often exaggeration by those fanning the fight.

[161] The story alleging Shiro threw people down a disused shaft was widely known during the war (Personal observation, Mangwende Detachment February to May 1979).

the darkness. The occupiers then left and retired to the Heroes Acre where they continued singing revolutionary songs and dancing. The following day, the occupiers began to cause work stoppages (Connor, High Court of Zimbabwe 14210: 6), prohibiting dipping of cattle and stopping women from packing silage bags.

A well planned program was followed for each day of the occupations. The next day they planted the *Zunde raMambo* (Connor, High Court of Zimbabwe 141210/98). The *Zunde raMambo* ritual will be discussed in detail below. The next step focused on the Heroes Acre program and involved fencing and construction of a tomb of the unknown soldier with materials demanded from and supplied by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The occupiers had demanded these materials at a meeting where they clashed with the ministerial delegation. The final step was 'to get into all the neighbouring farms of the Boers around here to awaken them about our struggle (*Chimurenga chacho chatokura*)' (Interview with D 2001). Connor himself also described what happened:

> *[A] large crowd of people [who] left the Heroes Acre and started moving along the main road towards my homestead' …. [One of the War Veteran leaders]… beckoned his followers to come up to the lands. A group of approximately 200 people started to spread out over the lands and began to mark out fields in all unplanted lands (Connor, High Court of Zimbabwe 14120/98).*

The rest of the farm was subdivided and parcelled to the occupiers, and other farms within the locality were occupied.

By 12 November the occupiers were in full control of all areas of the farm. They also spread into the neighbourhood and their influence went far beyond, to Chinamora Communal lands where the people planned to occupy Munenga Farm. The occupation of another farm, owned by a Mr. Forsyth, took place in a different way. Forsyth expressed it as follows:

> *They erected a temporary shelter with poles and canvas just outside the gate … [a spokesman of the occupiers] ordered me to continue farming operations as normal and for all my employees to continue working in their usual manner' (Forsyth 14192: 7).*

One possible reason why the occupiers did not harass, intimidate or stop work at this farm was that the farmer had no history of racism or poor relations with the workers.

Figure 4.2 Chikwaka people (Goromonzi) ploughing the *Zunde raMambo field*

War Veterans provided the seeds. Ploughing the *zunde* was a symbolic act to indicate that the land was returning to traditional authority and management.

Source: Photo, courtesy of The Herald

The occupations in Goromonzi were a serious signal to the authorities, who then responded very quickly to this new aspect of the Land Occupation Movement of Zimbabwe and activism by the War Veteran Movement. The government and ruling ZANU-PF worked out strategies to respond. They decided to send a delegation of senior nationalist politicians to evict the occupiers. Minister Joseph Msika led the delegation to Goromonzi on 6 November 1998 and held a meeting with the occupiers lasting several hours (Connor, High Court of Zimbabwe 14210: 9). The meeting ended in a confrontational atmosphere with the occupiers in a defiant mood. The message of War Veterans presented in the meeting was a mixture of references to the liberation war and to the current situation of social injustice relating to access to land. DM (Interview 2000), the spokesperson of the occupiers, ended his address to the White farmer by saying, 'We are here to tell you that this farm is no longer yours. … Please can you get off our land'? The occupation of Oribi inspired a wave of occupations on surrounding farms, as Table 4.1 shows.

Table 4.1 Summary of 1998 occupations by Svosve and Chikwaka people

Date	Farm	Incident	Leaders
19/06/98	Igava	Svosve villagers inform farmer of their intention to occupy	Harare War Veterans; local War Veterans, Chief Svosve and other traditional leaders
20/06/98 - 23/06/98	Daskop and Homepark	Villagers trickling in, carrying their belongings	Same as above
02/11/98	Oribi (Shiro) and Stockholm	Information 'that the War Veterans would move on to the Heroes Acre/Oribi Farm on … 2 November 1998' had arrived a week earlier. A Nissan sedan dropped people from Harare at Heroes Acre. Chief Chikwaka addressed people at Juru Growth Point. 30 to 40 men and women demonstrated with placards saying, 'SHIRO we want our land'. Provincial Administrator's office announced a meeting to be held on 6 November 1998.	Chief Chikwaka and Councillor Chigora; local district committee of War Veterans supported by Harare War Veterans: Mutingwende, Rtd. Col. Muzhambe,
03/11/98	Oribi and Stockholm	Mr Connor empties a drum of water that one of the invaders was fetching for the rest of the group. The occupier reports this to the police who start an investigation.	Local War Veterans, Chief Chikwaka
05/11/98	Oribi	The Officer in Charge Juru ZRP approaches the group at Heroes Acre and tells them they are not disciplined and should stop their activities. Occupiers' leader tells this officer that they were to plant maize for 'Zunde raMambo'. Connor told the planting was to commence and 150-200 people proceeded to plant 1.5 ha of certified seed. The occupiers' leaders announced that the next day the rest of the people would plant on fields parcelled out to them.	Harare War Veterans, David Mutingwende Rtd. Col. Muzhambe
10/11/98	Chinyika	Ridged and fumigated lands prepared for tobacco by the commercial farmer is parcelled out in 70 m^2 for individual use. A part of Oribi farm is also pegged for individual plots.	- Prince Derere - Ester Chimbodza - War Vet. (Mwanza ward, Chinamhora
10/11/98	Strathlone	Claim made at Strathlone Farm that all farms in the area were now being controlled by occupiers.	9 males
10/11/98	Colga	The owner was warned that there would be demonstrations at Colga Farm store.	Prince Derere Rtd Col. Muzhambe
11/11/98	Melrose	White farmer argued that the 'country was governed by laws … to be complied with'. Ordered them off the farm. Phoned legal practitioner.	Unspecified War Veterans
11/11/98	Devonia	War Veterans told the farmer that they would plant maize on 12/11/98	Unspecified War Veterans
No date given	Mashona [korp] vlei	Calm occupation	Unspecified
No dates	Ivordale	Calm occupation	Unspecified
4/11/98	Ivanhoe	A farm worker calling himself Charles Hunzvi directs occupation operations	Unspecified
7/11/98	Frascati	Member in charge warned that on 9/11/98 occupation would take place	Unspecified
10/11/98	Munenga	Information that people from Denda area of Chinamora intend to move on to Munenga Farm (i.e. 20 km from Oribi/Shiro) on 23/11/98	Unspecified

Note: The farms shown in this table were occupied in Marondera and Goromonzi in 1998. Gromonzi occupied 10 farms in total but the total number of farms occupied in Marondera could not be determined in this research.

Source: High Court Affidavits: High Court of Zimbabwe 14192/98, High Court of Zimbabwe 14210/98, Interview with Mutingwende, 2000-4

The series of occupations at Oribi and other farms was stopped after White commercial farmers O.P. Connor (Pvt. Ltd) and J.G. Forsyth (of Forsyth Trust) applied, on 13 November 1998, for High Court orders to evict the occupiers. The orders were addressed to Harare-based War Veterans leaders David Mutingwende and Colonel Khumalo among other respondents. The orders were granted, instructing the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) to evict the occupiers and restrain the War Veteran leaders. Armed with these High Court orders the Zimbabwe Republic Police raided the occupiers and their shelters were torched. Most of the occupiers fled into the mountains while some of them were arrested including Esther Chimboza (Interview with K 2004). Other War Veteran leaders like Khumalo and Mutingwende were prohibited immigrants in Goromonzi Farms by order of the High Court.

The action of the police force to evict the land occupiers led, in turn, to a response from the occupiers. 'Goromonzi villagers [went to Harare] to demonstrate outside Ngungunyana Building, [the Head Office of the Ministry of Lands] on 19 November 1998' (*The Herald* 20 November 1998, see Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3 Goromonzi villagers demonstrate outside Ngungunyana Building (Head office of Ministry of Lands and Agriculture) in Harare against eviction orders

The villagers were ordered to vacate farms they had invaded recently. One of the banners reads '*Ivhu kuvaridzi varo'* which means 'Land to its rightful owners!' The first line of the other banner partly says '*Pasi nevapambi vemapurazi'* which means 'Down with thieves of farms!'

Source: courtesy of The Herald 20 November 1998

4.3 The mobilisation of people for the early occupations

According to the resource mobilisation theory (Foweraker 1995) a social movement cannot succeed if it fails to mobilise resources to sustain itself. These resources are both material and non material.[162] This section describes the involvement of different kinds of people in the occupations. It will be argued that the involvement of war veterans led to modes of operation, mobilisation, and organisation that have their roots in the experiences of the liberation war. War veterans mobilised existing traditional structures of organisation, local government councillors, and so on. The next section will describe the role of cultural resources intimately linked to the mobilisation of the people as described in this section.

The first notable element is the use of zoning and organisational structure on the occupied farms. When occupiers spread to other Enterprise Farms of Goromonzi, they 'divided the whole area into small operational units … [and] decided who was going to take which farms' with a structure to coordinate the occupations (Interview with SS, a War Veteran working in a parastatal, 2004). The zoning and organisational structure of the occupations were based on guerrilla war experiences. War Veterans divided themselves up into sections and assigned each other operational areas during the guerrilla war of the 1970s. They assumed war time command structures and military style bases with command posts that acted as springboards for occupation of surrounding farms.

A second notable element is the effort to unite different groups of peasants as well farm workers. Mobilisation of various social groups included the use of traditional forms of governance to put pressure on people, as well as intimidation. The peasants of Goromonzi and Svosve, who formed the largest part of the occupiers, had different economic status. The poor peasants generally came from the communal lands. They owned small pieces of land, often about an acre, and had no children working in town to supplement their incomes. Some of them augmented their food by picking crumbs after harvest (Letter from Lombard to Husluck 6 November 1998, Forsyth High Court of Zimbabwe, 14192/98) '[W]omen from Mwanza Ward in Chikwaka … were permitted by the farmer, R. Brown, to glean wheat dropped in the land by the combine harvester …'. Rich peasants were mainly from Juru Growth Point, the business centre that bordered with Shiro's farm. These were people with bigger holdings than the poor peasants and they supplemented their income from commercial activities with established commercial shops. Some of the rich peasants moved around in 'pick-up truck (s)' and 'double cab vehicles' when they participated in the occupations.

Other participants in the occupations were petty traders who sold fruits, vegetables and second hand clothes to locals and travellers, and poor seasonal farm workers who complemented their livelihoods from small plots with work on the adjacent farms like Melrose Farm (High Court of Zimbabwe affidavit 14192/98:7). There were youths too, mainly teenagers, young men and women from Chikwaka

[162] Many of the material resources were mobilised by the War Veterans. Many of the vehicles used were from local War Veterans and War Veterans from Harare. Vehicles of local leaders like the Rural District Councilor and the participating civil servants were also used in the occupation process (Interview with DMT 2000). The seeds for the planting of the *Zunde raMambo* were bought in Harare by the War Veterans.

Communal Lands who joined the occupations. Some were unemployed school leavers and others were farming on their small family plots, sharing with the rest of the family. These youths were active in the occupations and instrumental in the process of mobilisation since they gathered the villagers and were sent out on specific operations such as frustrating the farmer (Letter from Lombard to Husluck 5 November 1998). Youth maintained the general security of the area, intimidated farm workers (threatening to throw them out of their houses) and forced work stoppages at the farms (Letter from Lombard to Husluck undated).[163]

The reaction of farm workers to the mobilisation of people for the occupations varied. Farm workers in both the Svosve and Goromonzi comprised both farm workers commuting from communal lands and farm workers living permanently on the farms. Both groups of farm workers had varying participation in the occupations. Some farm workers took part and at times actually led the occupations. Others were neutral and undecided on how to act. Yet others openly resisted the occupations and refused to join the occupiers. There were conflicts between some farm workers who appeared to be on the side of the farmer and the occupiers, resulting in assaults, work stoppages and intimidation. An illustrative case is the occupation of Shiro's farm in Goromonzi. The 60 male and 45 female employees *on* this farm fell into two broad categories of resident and non resident workers. There were also skilled workers, such as clerks and machinery operators and general workers. In addition the category farm workers also included hired security guards of private companies. All these played different roles in the occupation of Shiro. The decision to occupy this farm was partly based on information provided by farm workers about the brutal habits of this particular farmer (Interview with Muchaneta, female War Veteran, 2005) and farm workers' stories of ill-treatment.

Those who lived on the farm were in a significantly different position from seasonal workers and non-resident but permanent workers residing in Chikwaka. Residence would determine the nature of organisation of the farm workers. For fear of risking their jobs or persecution by the farmer the resident farm workers, whatever their employment position, did not want to appear to be supporting the occupiers.. Their choice was either to hide their feelings or to carry out only covert operations as individuals. The non-resident workers had a different position. Farm workers who were also part-time peasants from Chikwaka Communal Lands were subjected to the village government besides the government of the commercial farmers. In his founding affidavit (High Court of Zimbabwe 14210), Connor said he received a report from his manager that female farm workers from Chikwaka Reserve were 'intimidated by the Kraal Heads to occupy commercial farms and to support the cause of the liberation struggle or they would be evicted from the Communal Lands that they lived on'.[164] Collective social pressure – in this case on worker-peasants – to conform to the group will is a common feature of governance based on traditional or

[163] This letter was probably written on 5 November 1998, judging from the contents.

[164] This was written by the farmer for purposes of High Court proceedings and therefore demands a closer look. It is possible that the mobilisation approach and methods used by the 'Kraal' (Village) Heads were not particularly tailored to the commercial farm workers but were general to all inhabitants. In this case the action or inaction of the commercial farm workers should not be distinguished from the rest of the peasants who occupied Shiro. Chiefs and 'Kraal' heads often use these kinds of threats to secure conformity from their inhabitants in a variety of cases.

customary rules. Eviction from the area is in fact a common punishment for deviants, in the administrative procedures of customary governance. Chiefs and Headmen gain their power from administering such punishments.

Both the occupiers and farmers battled for the hearts and minds of the farm workers because they constituted a critical group in the conflict. Both occupiers and farmers at times used coercion to solicit support from peasants and the farm workers. Tactics could be physical, mental or economic. Connor claimed that farm workers, 'did not in fact obey [the occupiers]… [and] have been supportive of me and resentful of the illegal occupation and behaviour of these illegal occupants…' (Connor, High Court of Zimbabwe affidavit 14210). War Veterans remember that at times they intimidated farm workers. At Shiro War Veterans intimidated the Clerk and Secretary of the farm in order to get confidential documents circulating in the White farmer community to prepare for economic sabotage in the country. The two farm workers cooperated but clearly 'shaking with fear; so they accepted under duress.' (Interview with SS, War Veteran, 2001).[165] The War veterans felt the need to have the farm workers on their side, but it turned out to be difficult to mobilise those that lived on the farm. First, farm workers could not easily be mobilised from within. With state of the art communication equipment and good transport, the security company, Bateleur Ventures was very efficient. Any attempt to enter the farm compounds to mobilise the workers was intercepted. There was tight security of armed guards and dog handlers who patrolled the farms, using techniques developed from the military Agric-Alert of the war times (Letter from Lombard to Husluck 5 November 1998). Because farm workers had no wider idea of what was going on, they tended to base their action on the reaction of the farmer to the occupations. 'I sense that they are now looking to me to do something to end this siege of the farms' (Connor, High Court of Zimbabwe 14210). The settler farmers had enjoyed power over 17 years of independence and seemed invincible. Farm workers must have felt that occupations would threaten their jobs. Yet it is relevant to note that farm workers did not actively resist the occupations when they began.

Sources from both sides confirm that War Veterans intimidated, harassed and assaulted individual farm workers with specific knowledge or skills that occupiers could benefit from. Farm workers were 'interfered with' and 'ordered not to dip' cattle and 'female workers … were approached … and told to report to Heroes Acre (Connor, High Court of Zimbabwe C14210/98: 6). '[F]arm labourers have been intimidated by what has already happened on Oribi and the neighbouring farms and are petrified of similar incidents taking place on Melrose and Devonia North Farms' (Forsyth, High Court of Zimbabwe 14192: 10). Evidence from the interviews with War Veterans also suggests that the War Veterans did not sit down to 'conscientise' the farm workers. 'We need this secretary so that we can continue to have these faxes' (Interview with DM 2000). When they had to get the services of the clerk, War Veterans said to him, 'You know, if you don't give us information, you have destroyed your future and that of your children. There is information that we want you and the secretary to give us' (Interview with DD 2001). Another War Veteran recalls what was said to a farm worker: '[W]e want all the information that is being faxed from UK. So your career would end if you hide the information' (Interview

[165] The clerk and the secretary at the farm were 'forced' to carry out espionage by the War Veterans. They supplied the War Veterans with vital information relating to strategies of economic sabotage which the latter then used in targeting farms for occupation.

with CC 2000). These cases suggest that the War Veterans themselves considered farm workers would not automatically collaborate with the occupations out of conviction or 'loyalty' to the cause.

There were also farm workers who supported the occupations openly and, in some cases, led groups of occupiers. One such recorded case (Letter from Lombard to Husluck 5 November 1998) was of one farm worker who joined the occupiers in a leadership position at Shiro's farm. He operated under a pseudonym and was believed to have participated in assaults on some of the other farm workers at Shiro.

A third notable element in the mobilisation process was the role of women. Women from Chikwaka who worked at Oribi farm were warned by the *sabhuku* (appointed village head) not to sell out the movement (High Court of Zimbabwe 14192/98, High Court of Zimbabwe 14210/98) and they ended up participating in the movement. Women played key roles in the occupations. Some peasant women were leaders, and made decisions on various issues including 'punishing' male farm workers whom they considered obstacles by assaulting them (Fax from Lombard to Husluck 3 November 1998):

> *Information has been received from the assaulted cattle guards that a woman is the key figure in the assault that took place. This was the same in the assault case of Tuesday 3rd November.*

The assaults involved beatings, forced singing of revolutionary songs and crawling in dirt. Women were also in the forefront in taking pieces of land when this was parcelled out to the occupiers. They participated in the planting of maize on the *Zunde raMambo*. They took the lead in singing and dancing at Heroes Acre and were also deployed in the bases at occupied farms.

The Goromonzi occupations reveal a number of features characteristic of the mobilisations for the occupations in 1998. There was significant mobilisation of peasant populations from the communal lands. War Veterans (e.g. Colonels (retd.) Muzhambe and Mutingwende) took the lead in some cases and introduced or allowed the use of liberation war style forms of organisation and means of putting pressure on people. At the same time community figures (e.g. local councillors) and traditional leaders (e.g. Chief Chikwaka and various the village heads) played significant roles in agitating the peasants and seasonal farm workers. Local War Veterans, especially women (as mentioned, e.g. late Esther Chimboza) led occupations alongside War Veterans from Harare. The next section will discuss how use was made in this mobilisation process of various cultural resources.

4.4 The mobilisation of cultural resources

The movement that arose during the early occupations period built upon, re-used, re-interpreted, and melded different cultural resources and symbols. These included:

1) Political narratives concerning war credentials which included or excluded certain persons from the liberation war history
2) The re-interpretation of heroism and the symbolism of the Heroes Acre
3) The performance of the *Zinde raMambo* ritual that rooted land occupation in past collective forms of land use

4) The use of body movements in dance and music to stir specific emotions and reshape form and content of war history

4.4.1 Reclaiming history: war credentials

As Norma Kriger (1995) argues, the government of Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF elites have relied on 'war credentials for legitimacy' and draw on the history and symbols of the liberation struggle to construct their power base. In the post colonial history of Zimbabwe this appropriation and monopolisation of war credentials is a continuing political battlefield (Kriger 1995; 2003). When War Veterans started to lead the land movement in 1998 it was imperative for them to break the political hegemony of the government and to present their own interpretation of war credentials by appropriating symbols and performing rituals rooted in the liberation war. War veterans represented themselves 'as the conscience of the nation and the embodiment of the ideals of the liberation struggle'. They argued that the revolution had been betrayed by the ruling Nationalists, saying that the elites had abandoned the poor who fought the liberation war (McCandless 2005). The spokesman of the Goromonzi occupiers, a self employed former Resettlement Officer and graduate of Wampoa Political Academy during the liberation war, expressed the issue as follows:[166]

> *We want you [the ruling elites] to know our resolve today and we want you to get this to Mugabe. … When we took over the country you took the ZANU-PF that fought the war and put it aside and you formed another one for yourselves that is full of the bourgeoisie, opportunists who got in through corruption, tribalism, regionalism and nepotism. … The ZANU-PF that fought the war is the one that you see of these parents [peasants and farm workers] and us [freedom fighters], who are absolutely poor and at the bottom of the social ladder. But the people who used to tease us when we were fighting the war of liberation are the very people you now wine and dine with today. We want to tell you that if you so wish to send the army and the police … call them, then the war starts right here and now, in your presence. You are here as rebels aren't you? (Interview with DM 2001)*

This was how DM remembered (during the interview) his response to the address made by Minister Joseph Msika to the occupiers when he visited Goromonzi. Joseph Miska had intended to use the history of the war to persuade the occupiers that they had to listen to government orders to vacate the farms. The spokesman of the occupiers objected, arguing that he (the Minister) was not qualified to lecture the occupiers on liberation war history as they (the occupiers) and not the elites had fought that war and knew its history better. Interpretations of the history of the war and its objectives differed between the elites and occupiers. Occupiers articulated their own history to de-legitimise the ruling class of ZANU-PF, while at the same time justifying their occupations. The excerpt above illustrates the extent of the divisions and tensions between the 'poor' at the 'bottom of the social ladder' and the elites within the liberation movement.

[166] This information is corroborated by the findings of Erin McCandless (2005). MacCandless did her research from 2001. Her study is based on interviews with War Veterans - mainly the leadership of ZNLWVA, among other sources.

4.4.2 The symbolism of Heroes Acre

The symbol of a Heroes Acre originates from local notions about burial rites and sites associated with dead guerrillas and recruits (so-called refugees). How burial in the battlefield took place depended on circumstances. At times the bodies were buried in shallow graves or caves, or the remains were simply hidden in thickets. War time burial ceremonies combined traditional rites and military customs. A burial generally consisted of traditional prayer, with snuff (*bute*) used for supplication (the spirits). After that a ZANLA anthem (*Moyo wangu watsidza kufira Zimbabwe – My heart has vowed to die for Zimbabwe*[167]) was sung while the clenched right fist or gun was raised in the air. The political Commissar then said words to give strength to the other guerrillas, emphasising that death is a common occurrence, but differs in its significance – this was the death of a hero, a freedom fighter. The place of the burial then became sacred to the combatants, and memories of such sites served to configure histories of the struggle at variance with those of the elite.[168]

In Shona religion death involves rituals and rites of passage (Bourdillon 1990) concerned with connecting the dead to the spirit world. The burial place is considered sacred and libations are usually undertaken there for a variety of purposes. For example, if there are problems in the family caused by the spirit of the dead, supplication is made at the grave of the deceased. It is therefore important for the living to know where their family members are buried.[169] However, during periods of crisis – such as a guerrilla war - unknown or unidentified people may die and are buried in mass graves such as the mine shaft at Shiro. An area like this becomes sacred and the Shona treat it with both fear and respect. The symbol of Heroes Acre was therefore deeply rooted in both Shona traditions as well as the guerrilla war practices.

The symbolic value of the Heroes Acre at Shiro's farm was important in the occupation. In the early 1980s, soon after independence, Chikwaka people succeeded in forcing the government and the White commercial farmer to cede one and then two acres of Oribi Farm, to fence it off and preserve it as a sacred place in honour of the fallen heroes of the liberation struggle. They named this place the Heroes Acre, as if it were a national shrine where heroes are buried. Demand to establish the Heroes Acre by the people of Chikwaka in the early 1980s was based on the argument that it was cultural affront and unjust to allow the perpetrator of murder to continue 'owning' the sacred place where the remains of war victims were mass buried.

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[167] The lyrics were: *My heart has vowed/ To die for the liberation of Zimbabwe/ Until my spear has resurrected Zimbabwe/ In mountains and rivers shall I sleep/ I grief perishing of my people*

[168] Personal observation, Chaminuka and Takawira Sectors, 1978. I participated in the burial of Felix Chitepo (real name, Sigauke) at Dengu Village in Bindura, where this ritual was followed. This ritual was not followed when a burial of deceased guerrillas took place under pressure of a battle. At the rear a gun salute was fired. This was avoided in the battlefront.

[169] It is also believed that if the relatives of the deceased do not know where the remains of the deceased are buried the deceased's spirit makes visitations to the family members or gives problems to the local community where the remains lie. In 2005 traditional religious ceremonies presided over by chiefs and spirit mediums were held countrywide to cleanse the whole country, in the belief that national problems were associated with failure to cleanse the spirits of those who died during the war of liberation. It is even claimed that the abundant rainfall of that year was a sign that the ceremonies were received by the ancestors. This is a token of the strength of local beliefs concerning the land and the importance of correct burial.

Despite the policy of reconciliation, the people of Chikwaka considered that the farmer had to be dispossessed of the piece of land surrounding the Heroes Acre, at very least. They involved the government, which appeared to understand the cultural argument of villagers, and the owner of the farm did not '*object*' to the proposition (Connor affidavit).

4.4.3 The *Zunde raMambo* ritual

The *Zunde raMambo* is a long established tradition in Zimbabwe which was engaged by the war veterans as cultural capital. Zunde can loosely be translated as a collective field. Mambo means Chief. Zunde is also applied at household level to ensure food security for the extended family and in polygamous marriages. Subjects of the Chief work in the *zunde* field in work teams. The system involved organisation of inputs and labour and centralised storage and distribution. *Zunde* was a means of securing social security that guaranteed relief to needy community members during times of extreme hardship or calamity.[170] The *Zunde* is generally practised as a powerful ritual in rural community organisations, arousing cohesive emotions.

The *Zunde* is also performed at the family level, especially in large joint and polygamous households.[171] Food reserves are stored in times of crises so that the various household members rely on these reserves when their own food stocks run out. The *Zunde,* as a ritual with wide social and economic appeal to the community, was considered an important mobilisation tool in the occupations.

The work of the *Zunde*, like other agricultural collective performances, was an important social undertaking. The production process was designed along similar lines as the work-feast (*nhimbe*). Beer drinking, singing and eating provided the setting of *zunde* for planting, weeding and harvesting. The occasion was also used for 'casual' interaction between the ruler and his/her counsellors. For example, the *zunde* provided an opportunity for group voices to be raised in criticising the deviant social behaviour of individuals or poor leadership of the chief. This would be done through typical songs whose themes carried such messages (*kurova bembera*). During the process every citizen assumed immunity and could not be punished by the ruler for such criticism. Using the *zunde* in the occupation process was both a way of 'going back to the roots' by defying modern organisation, and also a way of providing freedom of expression through song and dance to the occupiers. Performing the

[170] During the war political education with recruits very much centred on building egalitarian social structures to advance socialist practices (*Gutsaruzhinji*) and the Zunde raMambo was a typical example widely referred to as an indigenous institution based on egalitarian ethics. Peters (2006) reports that RUF rebels in Sierra Leone exited from their own war firmly fixed on collective farming as a way of redeeming their communities.

[171] In this case the head of the extended family, normally a man, manages the Zunde (as opposed to the household granary, in which case the production process is managed and the produce controlled by the individual senior wives of the household heads). Men do not control the *dura* (granary), over which the woman exercises authority and responsibility (whether in a polygynous union or not). In Manyika custom, at the death of a woman the *dura* was demanded by the wife's agnatic relatives as a symbol and expression of control over her produce. Failure to deliver it would be punishable by paying a 'beast on hoof', as this would be interpreted as having used the woman as a slave during her life time (Sadomba, W. 1999a).

Zunde raised the position of the chief and emphasised traditional models of local governance.

War Veterans used the *Zunde* in order to gain the support of the chief, by adopting the traditional custom that elevated him. Chief Chikwaka came in his regalia to preside over the *Zunde* ritual and he struck the first blow with his hoe to officiate the occasion. This was greeted with much ululation, singing and whistling. At the same time the *Zunde* united the land occupiers in action reducing the police to 'mere by-standers' (*The Herald* 16 November 1998). Collectively, 14 ha of land was planted with maize seed. The planting of the *Zunde* signified that the occupation enjoyed the blessing of the chief, and War Veterans seized on this to galvanise his subjects for mobilisation. Subsequently, individual plots were then marked for household production. After completion of the *Zunde* ritual the movement was prepared for the occupation of Goromonzi. The participation of the chief in the *Zunde* planting excited the occupiers to such an extent that they broke into frenzy and advanced on the homestead of Connor, the farmer. They were stopped by the War Veterans who, at that moment, feared the situation might get out of hand. 'Effervescence', to use the term assigned to the phenomenon of ritually-induced excitement by Durkheim, was induced by the performance of the *Zunde*.

The performance of *Zunde raMambo* was a turning point in the occupations led by War Veterans. It marked a new level of alliance of the War Veteran Movement and the Peasant Land Occupation Movement. The farmer, Connor, in his evidence, remarked that the occupiers 'erected a banner across the access road to my homestead. This banner consisted of a white cloth approximately 2 m long and 1 m wide on which was written 'Zunde raMambo Chivake' (HC affidavit). The banner suggests that the *Zunde* was not an impromptu performance but something for which the occupiers had planned.

In the later occupations (to be discussed in Chapter 5) the *Zunde* has been adopted as government and ZANU-PF, in a bid to mobilise the grassroots through the traditional leadership of chiefs and headmen. As we shall see in the coming chapters, the Fast Track Land Reform aimed to co-opt or neutralise the land movement and diffuse the powers of War Veterans, and to develop the chiefs as a powerful rural tool of governance allied with government capable of controlling peasants and war veterans. What began as local protest from below involving War Veterans and peasants has become a tool of 'indirect' rule for the government.

4.4.4 War time *pungwes*, song and dance

War Veterans conducted '*pungwes*', which were all-night-long gatherings for political mobilisation and education punctuated by singing and dancing similar to those held during the armed struggle. War Veterans resuscitated the war spirit to invoke militancy in the followers through singing revolutionary songs, politicisation and shouting of war time shouting slogans, as the farmer Connor remarked, 'They [occupiers] were … singing revolutionary songs and beating drums' throughout the night (High Court of Zimbabwe 14210/98: 10 affidavit). Occupiers also made gestures and noises arousing war spirits. In the songs they threatened O'Connor with a mixture of 'shouting,'[172] 'whistling' and 'ululating' (Interview with DM 2000).[173]

[172] High Court of Zimbabwe 14210/98:6 (Founding affidavit).

The occupiers selected particularly those songs whose themes were land and courage, and connected the occupation to the liberation struggle (Interview with Muchaneta, female War Veteran, 2005). For example, the following songs were sung and occupiers danced and drummed:

We Black people, owners of the land[174]
We Blacks, owners of the land
Of Zimbabwe ...
Are pushed into mountainous terrains

Children of Zimbabweans, the Black power
We ought to unite
To liberate our country

The fords that we crossed
Oh the fords through which we crossed
Were full of tears and blood[175]

Fire your gun Chaminuka
Fire your gun Chaminuka[176]
Your time is ripe
To liberate your country
Fire your gun.
We meet in battle
And immerse in Takawira's[177] *blood*
That was spilt for our land
Our blood will mix

Get your planes and ship
Go back to your lands of origin
We are tired of you Boers[178]

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[173] Interview with DM 2000 – 2004 (some of the songs which were sung were: *Bereka sabhu tiende pasi neDzakutsaku and Tinoda nyika yedu Smith/ iyeiye hee ahee/ Iyeiye toda nyika yedu. Vanamukoma vauya vanamukoma vauya.*

[174] Its Shona version is *Vanhu vatema varidzi venyika, veZimbabwe/ Tosundidzirwa mumakomo X2 Vana veZimbabwe, hondo yevatema/ Tinosungirwa kubatana.* This song's theme is land dispossession and land hunger suffered by the Africans moved from fertile low-lying flat land into rocky and marginal mountain lands.

[175] This is a refrain. In Shona the lyrics are: *Mazambuko ayo takabva nawo / Azere misodzi neropa.* The song describes the nature of hardships suffered during the liberation struggle, thereby arousing the spirits of the occupiers by invoking those memories. It was particularly relevant to the situation at the farm of O'Connor considering the stories of brutality during the war attaching to this particular farmer ('Shiro').

[176] Chaminuka is considered, by Shona people, to be the greatest national spirit of the Southern African region. The lyrics (in Shona) of 'Fire Your Gun Chaminuka' are: *Ridza gidi rako Chaminuka/ Yave nguva yako/Yekusungura nyika/ Ridza gidi rako/Tichasangana mukurwa/Neropa raTakawira/ Rakapararira nyika/ Tichasanganiswa/ Tora ndege nengarava/Udzokere kwako/Taneta nezvenyu mabhunu/ Muno muZimbabwe*

[177] Takawira was the veteran nationalist killed by the Rhodesian government and now a national hero buried at the Heroes Acre.

[178] The derogatory term 'Boer' means White coloniser or land grabber (derived from the Dutch word for farmer).

Here in Zimbabwe[179]

Fatherland was colonised
Fatherland was colonised
Let's go and fight
To take it back (x 2)

Chorus

This land, this soil
Of the Black people
Of Zimbabwe[180]

Fatherland was usurped
Lets go and fight
To take it back (x 2)

It would be fair to summarise by saying that these songs were strongly anti-colonial and anti-settler in tone, and in many cases highlighted the theme of land dispossession and land hunger, the suffering of the indigenous people as a result of landlessness, and the agenda of liberation. Songs of the liberation war, at times modified to suit the current land occupations, were a common approach both in the early War Veterans-led occupations and in the later (2000) occupations, as will be discussed further in the following chapter.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated how the early occupations were organised. War Veterans mobilised peasants, local traditional leaders, local politicians, local youths and themselves during the early land occupations. It has also showed that although there was a national structure of War Veterans in the form of Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), the land occupations at this early stage were not initiated by this organisation, but had the character of local and isolated initiatives, linked horizontally rather than vertically, as seen in the case of the Svosve and Goromonzi occupations. Thus at local level the War Veteran district committee members collaborated with individual War Veterans from Harare without going through the provincial and national channels. Individuals were approached depending on their skills and motivation. The early occupations can be considered

[179] Another song of a similar nature had these lyrics: *The Whitemen came* (*Vachena vakauyawo)/ Clad in sheep's skins (Vakapfeka nguo dzehwai)/ Pretending to be holy (Voita sevakanakisa)/ But evil at the core (Asi mumoyo vasina)/ Toiling then started (Nhamo zvino yazotanga)/ Oppressing Zimbabweans (Kudzvanyirira mhuri yeZimbabwe/ We are like slaves (Kuita sevatapwa isu)/ And who enjoys our wealth? (Hupfumi hwedu hwodyiwa nani?/ [It is enjoyed] By other countries far away (Nedzimwe nyika dzekunze)…*

[180] The song, 'Fatherland was colonised' in Shona was, '*Nyika yababa yakapambiwa'* and had the following lyrics: *Nyika yababa, yakapambiwa/ Handei torwisa tiitore x2 Nyika iyo, nyika iyo nyika iyo nyika iyo/ Nyika yavatema veZimbabwe/ Ivhu rababa, rakapambiwa handei torwosa/ Tiritore. Ivhu iro, ivhu iro, ivhu ir,o ivhu iro,/I vhu ravatema veZimbabwe.*

initiatives undertaken by local agents drawing on local structures rather than something planned and executed from outside drawing on hierarchical organisation. Land occupations, it is here argued, began from below and then became subject to control from higher levels, including eventually the state. This local element – as catalyst to the current process of land reform in Zimbabwe - has not been given proper weight in the often bitter and polemical debates about responsibility for these changes.

It was in these early occupations that we see for the first time War Veterans articulating their reasons for occupying farms and for approaching White farm owners directly. It is important to note at this period that violence was only an incidental element in farm occupations, mainly involving minor assaults and threats of violence. There was a correspondingly strong emphasis on negotiation. But although War Veterans claimed that their objective was to attract government attention through occupation, in reality they actually occupied and distributed land for use. This was thus more than a demonstration, and as such it attracted the intervention of the courts, seeking to defend state-sanctioned property regimes of as great an interest to Black elites as to White farmers, which is one reason the negotiations could not be allowed to bear fruit.

War Veterans framed the problem of lack of access to land and the right to claim the land in terms of anti-colonialism and liberation war. They employed war-time forms of organisation (including intimidation and pungwes) and sentiments and ideologies through songs and dance and references to the Heroes Acre in order to agitate potential occupiers. They also mobilised local forms of social organisation by involving chiefs and ritual modes of engagement such as the Zunde raMambo. This is perhaps more than a point about means; the struggle to control the legacy of the war is as crucial an aspect of events as actual control of land. It is in this regard that we see the incomplete demobilisation of War Veterans as an important part of the story.

Finally, there is the important issue of the response of the state. We have seen that the state and ZANU-PF ruling elite were, at this stage, openly against land occupations, for the reason that they judged it in their interest to continue an alliance with White farmers. The placatory delegations sent to occupiers had (in reality) one mission, to chase the occupiers from the farms to await lawful resettlement. This caused confrontation between the occupiers and the government organs. Eventually, as we shall see, a governing elite sacrificed its allies, the White farmers, in defending its own claims to control both land and state. The details of this development, and the interactions it involved between the land movement and the government, will be discussed in Chapter 7 when we look at the land movement in terms of political and institutional arrangements. In Chapter 5 we will discuss the War Veteran-led occupations of 2000. The chapter will analyse how occupations were organised, and draw attention to both continuities and discontinuities between early and later occupations. As we shall see, the 2000 occupations caused the position of the state to shift, thus also causing the land occupations to be different.

CHAPTER 5

THE ROLE OF THE WAR VETERANS IN THE LATER LAND OCCUPATIONS (2000–2004)

5.1 Introduction

A day after the announcement of the February 2000 referendum results (resulting in a majority 'No' vote), War Veterans occupied a derelict farm in Masvingo belonging to a White farmer.[181] This triggered a wave of occupations at a moment when land reform had become a central issue in national politics. Several authors (Hammer and Raftopolous 2003, Feltoe 2004, Selby 2006, Alexander 2006) have concluded that these occupations were instigated by the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
(ZANU-PF) as a political move, in order to, among other reasons, weaken or break the coalition behind the 'No' vote in the referendum. This coalition represented a real political threat to an otherwise firmly entrenched regime. In this chapter we will explore to what extent the wave of occupations can be considered solely or mainly the product of a top-down political strategy. It will assemble evidence to suggest that a more nuanced view would need to include the political orientation, organisation and definition of objectives of those actually engaged in the land occupations. This more nuanced view questions the picture of the fast track land reform as a homogeneous process, and of ZANU-PF as an actor with a single political aim. The case material aims to bring out some of the key internal contradictions and differences associated with the land occupations of 2000.

The chapter focuses mainly on material relating to the occupation process in Nyabira, Mazowe and Matepatepa (See Figure 5.1 and 5.2), to highlight some of the diverse factors that have played a role in land occupations. Mazowe is an area north of the capital city of Harare. The administrative district of Mazowe includes the eastern parts of the capital, where it shares the borders with Zvimba District. In the east of Mazowe, lies a strip of land called Matepatepa which falls partly in Bindura District. Nyabira is an area in the west of both Mazowe and Harare. It lies in Zvimba District of Mashonaland Central Province. All three areas are located in agro-ecological region IIa (Vincent and Thomas 1962) which is endowed with high rainfall (average of more 750 mm/annum) and rich soils, making them suitable for mixed farming. Tobacco, maize, wheat, flowers, and citrus are some of the major crops grown. In addition, there is floriculture, beef production and dairying activity. The proximity to Harare, the capital city, especially of Mazowe and Nyabira, allows us to discuss the urban influence on the land movement. Second, communal lands (areas reserved for Africans since colonialism), peri-urban areas (semi-urban centres within commercial farming) and rural commercial farms are all present in the region.

[181] The early occupations described in Chapter 4 were followed up by others throughout 1999 but these were not as widely publicised as the 1998 ones (Retrospective community mapping and focus group discussion with Machirori occupiers, 2005; Focus group discussion with Goredema group 2001 (Sadomba 2004).

Thirdly, the presence of military barracks, like Inkomo, makes it possible to ask questions about influence of the military on the land occupations.

Nyabira, being a peri-urban area about 30 km from Harare, was totally surrounded by commercial farms. The population of the area was mainly engaged in petty trading (including commercial sex work), agriculture, processing of agricultural products such as tobacco, and transportation (especially working for Zimbabwe Railways and at Prince Charles Airport). Inkomo Barracks and a police station are also situated in Nyabira. The Nyabira case shows diverse backgrounds among key participants in the land occupations: external War Veterans from Harare, War Veterans from Inkomo Barracks, Nyabira police, railway workers, community leaders (including the local councillor and ZANU-PF leaders), and farm workers. [182]

Mazowe is an administrative district north of Harare. It has three semi-urban centres: Mvurwi, Concession and Glendale. Government district offices are located in Concession which has a high and low density suburb, primary and secondary schools, a police camp, a district hospital, railway station and Grain Marketing Board silos. The district has a highland and a valley – Mazowe Valley with the conspicuous Mazowe citrus plantation and processing plant for an orange drink that exports to international markets. In the eastern side of the district is Chiweshe, a communal land dominated by the African population. Lying in natural region II, Chiweshe has good potential for agriculture only for the overpopulation resulting in high pressure for land.

Matepatepa lies in Bindura district but is adjacent to Chiweshe Communal Lands. It is a rich agricultural area in natural region IIa with good soils and high rainfall. Proximity to Chiweshe Communal Lands makes the area an easy target for occupation by the people of Chiweshe Communal Lands. Tobacco, flowers and other horticultural crops were grown in Matepatepa. Many farm workers of the area had permanent homes in the communal land of Chiweshe.

As in the early occupations (see Chapter 4), the occupations of Mazowe, Matepatepa and Nyabira brought together activists from different social strata with different strategic and political interests of groups. War veterans were involved, but also sections of the peasantry, and some coalition-shifting farm workers. Below, we will first discuss the political and organisational role of the war veterans, in mobilising political and material resources for the occupations, for which they interacted with forces within ZANU-PF. Then we look at how peasant modes of organisation and belief systems contributed to the land occupations. Finally, we discuss the mobilisation of farm workers, and the conflict of interest this implied.

[182] A baseline survey carried out by the African Institute for Agrarian Studies revealed this diverse background of Nyabira population.



Figure 5.1 Mashonaland West Province



Figure 5.2 Mazowe and Matepatepa

5.2 Organisation and mobilisation by War Veterans

5.2.1 Distribution of personnel, district coordination and zoning

Although War Veterans were quite widespread, as discussed earlier in this thesis, they were not evenly distributed. Harare, being the capital city, had a high concentration of War Veterans, while in rural areas they were generally few in number in any given locale. In this section we examine how the War Veterans managed to distribute their numbers as a strategy to provide leadership to the scattered occupations of Mazowe, Nyabira and Matepatepa areas. We shall begin by tracing how War Veterans got into Mazowe and Nyabira from elsewhere. Central Matepatepa had one war veteran leading the occupations. There were also some war veterans from Mt. Darwin, in the north of Matepatepa (Participant observation, Matepatepa, 2000; Interview with War Veteran C, leader of Matepatepa occupations, 2000). P (Interview with P 2000)[183] came to Mazowe via the Harare Provincial office of War Veterans, where a meeting was held to assess deployment, after Mazowe had requested reinforcement for occupations already initiated. Ch said: 'P, we want people to go to Mazowe where we have a request that Mazowe needs reinforcement because ex-combatants are too few to carry out farm occupations.' (Interview with P 2000) This is how P and many others ended up in Mazowe.

War Veterans were few in number[184] and could not have managed to take over the farms without the participation of peasants, farm workers and sections of the urban unemployed.[185] Numbers were too small; in fact, even to staff the leadership of a movement engaging in national activism. In Mazowe and Nyabira, the War Veterans had to recruit reinforcements from outside, in order to adequately supply leaders of teams and groups (Interview with D 2001): 'this is why we decided to get reinforcement from Harare. So I would phone, especially every weekend …'.

Ironically, Mvurwi turned to Mazowe for reinforcement,[186] making the matter even more complex, as Tt, a War Veteran in Concession (Interview with Tt 2000) described:

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[183] The first invasion coordinated by P was on a government property known as Imbwa Farm, leased to a Black farmer. This was in Beatrice, south of the city of Harare. While at Imbwa Farm, P was sent to get more information about other occupations elsewhere. There he was asked by Chino to join a group that was going to invade Mazowe because that district had requested for reinforcement. P went back to Imbwa farm to inform his colleagues of the developments and later joined the Mazowe group. Their first invasion was on Somerset Farm in Concession.

[184] To illustrate the numbers, when occupations started in 2000 only ten War Veterans were present (six women and four men) (Interview with Mk, woman War Veteran, 2000). *We were just ten. Some were from Mazowe. Other War Vets in Mazowe go to work, so the few of us who are unemployed and people from Chiweshe went to the farms …When we started male War Veterans were only six out of the ten of us. So at M Farm we were six female War Veterans…*

[185] When groups of War Veterans met in the operational zone, occupying farms (Interview with Ss 2001*) 'We told them that we were aware that they (Comrades from Harare) were coming at this place that time and we had actually come to join them. We also told them that we were the War Veterans in Concession. … We worked well with the Comrades from Harare.'*

[186] Mvurwi, in the northern part of Mazowe District, obtained War Veteran reinforcements from Mzarabani for specific days during the Easter period of 2000, and made a push southwards, occupying farms with the aid of farm workers (Interview with DT 2000): '*The WVs from Mzarabani were forthcoming. We agreed at Easter that we would team up together. We*

> *Comrades from Mvurwi appealed to me saying 'Please do something … we are overpowered in our area…Can you assist us in whatever way possible'. This is why therefore I turned to Centenary [the district next to Mazowe]. I went there several times. We had to negotiate with the War Veteran leaders in that area for them to give us reinforcement. And they agreed to reinforce us. I also went to Mount Darwin … in my old Mercedes Benz[187] to ask for reinforcement because everybody knows as well as I do that there are more WVs in Mzarabani [and] more WVs in Mt Darwin, unlike this area. This is why I turned to these two areas for reinforcement.*

This appeal for additional personnel introduced a change in the organisational tactics of the movement in Mazowe, from a loose, locally based organisation to a more centralised structure. The situation demanded a centralised approach to coordinate reinforcement to weak areas where occupiers faced resistance. At one of the meetings where both Harare and Mazowe War Veterans were present, Chiro[188], a War Veteran who was also member of Central Committee of ZANU-PF, declared that D was the coordinator for Mazowe area. From then on the occupations were coordinated at the District (Interview with Tt 2000).

Later, coordination became more ramified. Six zones were established in the Mazowe area to coordinate activities. Two zone commanders were selected in a meeting of War Veterans held at Glendale (Participant observation, Glendale, 2000). The zones were as follows: Mvurwi area, Concession, Mazowe South, Nyabira, Glendale and Matepatepa. In some cases the zone commanders were from both Harare and Mazowe. In Matepatepa there was only one zone commander, who requested for reinforcement at that meeting, and I ended up joining him with three other War Veterans. This is how I ended up in Matepatepa, which was originally outside my research area. The zone commanders were responsible for solving problems faced by occupiers in the different farm bases of the area. They also kept a register of occupiers at each base and were responsible for maintaining discipline in their areas. Reports for each zone were presented at the Saturday meetings of War Veterans (Interview with zone coordinator Pf 2000, Participant observation 2000):

> *The War Veterans meetings started when DTM [the War Veterans' leaders] … called for a meeting of the district War Veterans and said it was not good that we operated differently, without a common approach [and] without meeting and discussing. He called for meetings to be held every Saturday or every Sunday. The purpose of the meetings was to share problems faced and to determine the way forward. That is when the issue of the zones came up. I was then partnered with Mk for zone 5. So I would come with others from Harare and Mk organised people locally and we teamed up and went to [occupy] farms.*

It is important to note that this particular hierarchical structure emerged in response to organisational needs, and was not predetermined by external forces. In addition, the organisational structure was not elaborated beyond the express need for it. In particular there was no attempt to link to the existing structures of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA).

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would spend the whole Easter together, which is exactly what we did. We ransacked all the farms: Forester Estates, as far down as near Tsatse, very close here. We went also to farms around Mvurwi. We were now winning the battle.'

[187] This was an old car probably more than 20 years and did not depict the War Veterans' status.

[188] This is not his real name.

5.2.2 Meetings

Meetings were important in the organisation of the occupiers. Before the eruption of the 2000 occupations, War Veterans used to meet almost every month to discuss various issues relating to their interests. These meetings were the basis for organising land occupations in Mazowe, as Mk (Interview with Mk 2000), a woman coordinator of the occupations in Glendale, Mvurwi and Concession, said:

> *We used to hold meetings every Saturday. If not we would make sure that we had our monthly meetings every 8th when we got paid our pensions and everyone got money at Glendale, so we then held our meetings on that day. This was far before the NO vote. The meetings were called by the Chairwoman. In most cases the meetings were about our welfare. We discussed that the money we were getting was too little and we tried to discuss what we could do about it. We also talked about problems of school fees for our children. So we agreed that the meetings were important, in that they would make us share our problems. The meetings were also helpful in that whatever was decided from the top we would get it there.*

At Concession, a meeting with youth, peri-urban workers and the unemployed was held to advise how to get into the farms, convened by the War Veterans at Dandamera (Interview with Dd, the convener, who was also a member of the ZNLWVA provincial executive, 2000):

> *And we called for a meeting at Dandamera[189] … where we told our people and advised them what others were doing and that we could do the same in this area, and everybody agreed that, 'it is good … let's go and take our land.' And off we went.*

Meetings were also held in Harare for recruitment and mapping out of strategy. Covering mostly Nyabira area and part of Mazowe, War Veterans formed an organisation, Nyabira Mazowe Association, by recruiting people from Harare; its purpose was to occupy farms (Interview with DD, District Secretary for ZNLWVA who led occupations in Nyabira, 2000):

> *So I organised Comrades in my district in which I held the post of secretary [of ZNLWVA]. We agreed as a committee to call for a meeting with the agenda of going to occupy farms by force (jambanja[190]). We went to join the others who were in those places already.*

5.2.3 Committees and task groups

Farm committees represented the occupiers and farm workers at each of the occupied farms. At a higher level there was a coordinating committee. War Veteran Ff explains the structure in the following words (Interview with Ff 2002):

> *The structures of our association are as follows. We began at first by establishing the main committee that oversees all the activities of the farms invaded by comrades ... So there was the understanding that never mind that we were taking land from the Whiteman, we needed to reflect to the government that we were also organised in mind and in practice as we undertake the invasions. So when we established the main committee, we noticed that we had to be very clear of who was at which farm. That's the main committee to which I was elected chairman.*

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[189] High density area of Concession, an urban centre of Mazowe.

[190] 'Jambanja' was the word used to describe the occupations (meaning 'use of force').

At times these committees within the land occupations movement were linked 'with the lower tier level of the ruling ZANU-PF. Minutes of the Coordinating Committee of Nyabira Mazowe dated 4 April 2000 hints at links with ZANU-PF:

> *The committee further recommended that planning department, War Veterans' Association (WVA) district Committee and ZANU-PF district be part of implementing agents and overseers to this program.*[191]

Some groups in the land movement were assigned specific tasks. When War Veteran Pf started occupations in Harare South, reconnaissance teams negotiated with the farmers ahead of a bigger group that followed to occupy. This team also furnished the bigger group with information about the area and the nature of response of each farmer. This is said to have avoided bloody conflicts (Interview with Pf 2001). Likewise, the Nyabira Mazowe Association had standing committees (Interview with War Veteran leader D, 2000-4): 'We have got another [Committee] on administration that [does] … registration and allocation. The committee structure has the Chairman's department (administration), secretariat, treasury, planning, transport and security departments.'

The Planning Department of the Nyabira Mazowe Association was responsible for surveying and producing layout and land use plans for occupied farms. The security department handled security issues related to occupations.

Although in most cases the War Veterans follow operational modes derived from their experiences during the liberation war, in some cases they built on experience of civil society organisation, as distinct from political and military organisation. In Mazowe south, for example, the types of bases established reflected ways of operating within civil society, as will be indicated in the next section.

5.2.4 Establishing bases

Derived from guerrilla war experiences, the concept and function of the 'base' was crucial for the land movement. Bases became focal points for operations in the occupied farms. A base was a place where the commander of the group leading the occupations in the area would be located (in most cases the commander was a War Veteran, but occasionally was a male youth appointed by the War Veterans). From the base, smaller camps would be established at the occupied farms, and these were mainly commanded by youths. The function of the base was to monitor and supervise the farms under the jurisdiction of the group. The commander received reports from each of the farms and attended to the problems faced. Orders or instructions were issued from the base, and where a need arose the base would also communicate other groups or other areas in the larger landscape of farm occupation. The use of bases was a guerrilla strategy which divides a group into small operational units (sections of 12 guerrillas on average) and makes it self-sufficient and independent. Likewise, it was thought that the farm occupations should be largely independent, as is illustrated in the following quotation (Interview with BP 2000):

> *…we went there to establish our base. We said we don't want to operate from Chitungwiza - we want to fight our war from the farms themselves. All Comrades should*

[191] Minutes of the Coordinating Committee held at ZANU (PF) Provincial offices on 4 September 2000.

> *know that the issues of farms should be sort[ed] out from within the farms themselves, not elsewhere. … Then we stayed there.*

At times the bases were located in farm buildings, but in most cases a more distant defensible position was chosen, in case of counterattack.

There were variations in the bases, influenced by dominant characters in the group. For example where youth and peasants dominated and there were no War Veterans, usually party structures were assumed, but where War Veterans were present they formed a military structure. For the military type of base there was a commander, a political commissar, and security, logistics and medical officers. Where civilian structure was adopted there was a chairman, political commissar, secretary, treasurer, etc. In some bases created by peasants, a pattern reflecting 'traditional' village governance was assumed, with the village head at the top. However, these bases were found in the minority of cases where peasants predominated among occupation activists. Peasant bases were mainly centres for coordinating clan occupiers or occupiers from the same village. In contrast, War Veterans bases acted as focal points for coordination of occupation activities across several farms in the area.

5.2.5 Communication

War Veterans used various modes of communication. Communication was important to avoid clashes, to ask for reinforcement, and to inform the main bases about developments. The channels of communication were both formal and informal. War Veterans communicated effectively, via a variety of means: 'Even nationwide … such that what we do here can be known in a few hours by people in Bikita or Chiredzi or Bulawayo, if we want that to be done at a national level.' (Interview with DM, self employed War Veteran, 2000) The occupiers made effective use of technology such as cell phones. At a meeting of Nyabira Mazowe Association held on 10 July 2000, the minutes read:

> *…that most members have cell phones and the telephone bills of Administration members' accounts are so high. [money] has to be put aside for communication [purposes]; i.e. letters to members, telephones, fuel, etc.; but some members are requested to exercise due care in the use of public funds and make sure accountability and transparency prevails all the times.*

Communication between the War Veterans in Harare and Concession was by both land line and cell phones (Interview with F 2001): 'We exchanged notes on what we had achieved that day. And we also exchanged our telephone numbers. And so from that time on I would contact them.'

Informal communication also took place in many situations. Whenever War Veterans met, at funerals, at drinking places, at work places and so forth, they discussed their plight and what to do about it. The land issue would always come up during such discussions. As P said (Interview with P 2000): 'There was no meeting held to analyse and strategise operations.' In other words, the established networking of War Veterans provided ample opportunities for informal exchange of information and analysis, without need for special meetings.

5.2.6 Social mobilisation and political education

War Veterans had learnt about the importance of mobilisation in the guerrilla war and some of this knowledge was apparent in mobilisation for land occupation. Expanding the movement became an important issue, since farms were extensive and occupation demanded a growing number of committed activists. War Veterans recruited peasants, farm workers and urban residents using different forms of mobilisation in order to widen the appeal of the land movement. One of the methods of mobilisation was to hold all-night political education campaigns (*pungwes*) and day time rallies. Both reflected war-time techniques for mobilisation. Pungwes had a number of effects on both potential participants in the land movement and on the White farmers. On the one hand it inspired the occupiers by rekindling the emotions of liberation, especially through singing songs from the war. On the other hand these events showed that something was 'brewing', and thus tended to weaken the farmers' resolve to resist.

Mobilisation was not necessarily by persuasion, during the war or in the occupation movement. In certain cases occupiers were coercive, and education followed later or never at all. For example at one farm, if occupiers met a suspected Movement of Democratic Change (MDC) supporter preparing for a rally for their movement president, Morgan Tsvangirai, they abducted the person there and then, and confiscated any food that had been brought for the rally. This was also used as a tactic of mobilising people, as Mk (Interview with woman, War Veteran leader, 2000) said:

> *After 12 midnight we forced [the MDC supporter] to pick the kapenta fish. This challenge was very encouraging to the masses from Chiweshe around Bell Rock area, who became more resolute. They followed us and we gave them the kapenta fish and a lot of other food stuffs. The rest we gave to the youth in the bases. That is [one of the] reason[s] that converted the farm workers of that area.*

Political education was an instrument the War Veterans used to recruit different classes of people to the occupation movement. War Veterans ran classes for male and female farm workers, peasants, and youths about the occupations. One War Veteran (Interview with Q, a former political commissar during the war and leader of occupations, 2001) explained that their group prepared political education messages that aimed to transform people they encountered into conscious supporters of the land movement:

> *When we address the ex-combatants at the farms, we do not just address them aimlessly in a disorderly fashion. We conscientise [i.e. offer political education to raise awareness] every single Comrade so that he/she understands our aims and objectives. What is the cause of us being in that farm by way of 'invasion'? … People had to understand that what we were doing was… to redress the imbalance of land distribution. We were repossessing our land and the reason for us to go into those farms through force or confrontation is because of resistance of the Boers. They were given enough time by the government of the day, 20 years to establish equitable distribution of land but they resisted.*

The intensity of education and messages differed from one group to the other. War Veterans were given groups to lead, or coordinated activities based on their experience and ability to mobilise people. Selection for leadership: *'…was generally based on the fact that these people were going to be instrumental in mobilising people as*

Commissars. This is why people like myself were elected. It was like these people have the capacity to mobilise, organise people.' (Interview with DT 2001)

Political education was also seen as a prerequisite for forming structures, as stated by DM (2000): '*… we conducted the elections to establish committees after addressing [the people]. After the address both occupiers and farm workers, understood what was expected of them, the farm workers who had been at the farm also understood what their future was*.'

Perhaps this implies a naïve faith in the power of propaganda. The class interest of farm workers did not necessarily coincide with the interests of those who hoped to become the new owners, but one of the long-lasting legacies of the guerrilla war, to which this focus on education points, was belief in the value of asserting a common discourse as a means of bonding a group for the struggle ahead. The point we wish to make here is not that the faith of the land occupiers in this kind of 'class education' was well placed, but that it is evidence that the occupations of 2000 were still in some sense an enactment of modalities of struggle associated with the guerrilla war, suggesting that events were more complex than the party-inspired opportunism some have supposed.

5.2.7 Resource mobilisation[192]

Transport

There are several contrasting views presented about transportation of occupiers. Some analysts argue that there was a high government participation in the land occupations based on organisation of transport. Feltoe (2004: 199), for instance, argues that: 'The rapid expansion of the process required considerable pre-planning and logistical support and it was clear that there was substantial government involvement. The farm occupiers were transported in an assortment of government vehicles.'

In what the present researcher observed, however, the mobilisation of transport seemed to be a much more chaotic process, with a high level of active involvement of local people. Even if the means of transport originated elsewhere, its requisitioning was primarily the work of local organisers. For example, at least some occupiers across all three case study areas (Mazowe, Nyabira and Matepatepa) organised their own transport. War Veterans emphasise this in their accounts. DD (Interview with DD 2000), who mobilised resources from the elites in Harare, said: 'This is when we

[192] Resource mobilisation theory argues that the success of a social movement is based primarily on '*mobilising of sufficient resources to maintain and expand the movement*' (Foweraker, 1995: 16). As a result a movement has to acquire resources and has to competitively position itself in a vantage position to gain resources required for its sustenance including '*advantageous exchange relationships with other groups*' (Foweraker, 1995: 16). This theory has received a lot of criticism mainly based on the fact that it *'employs narrowly instrumental rationality which bridges a rigid means/end model [and thereby] falls far short of universal or complete account of collective action …'* (Foweraker, 1995: 17). Another criticism of the resource mobilisation theory is (understandably) that the actor is stripped of the '*social context*' when emphasis is laid on the '*rational*' and focused interest in material advantages associated with movement membership. This makes it difficult to explain the behaviour of actors not apparently based on such '*rationality*' at all (Foweraker 1995: 17). This does not mean, however, that practical 'resource management' is unimportant in rendering social movements operational.

started to organise for transport from the people who had money and vehicles, our own people who understood our cause, and we told them that we wanted to get to particular farms.'

But it is also clear that multiple factors were at play in determining specific outcomes. Mk, a woman War Veteran (Interview with Mk 2000) working in Mazowe central, said;

> *We were given our own Datsun 120Y by another mupositori [member of a certain African Apostolic Faith sect] who offered us the vehicle so that we had means of transport. We promised to reward him with land when the program succeeded. The Mupositori was [also] a member of ZANU-PF so he gave us the 120Y.*[193]

Occupiers also used their own personal vehicles, and organised transport in a variety of ways. Some doubtless felt it was to their advantage to use their own assets in this way, but for others they were making a conscious sacrifice to the cause: 'That's where I had my Land Rover completely destroyed. I drove it everywhere carrying people.' (Interview with F, a self employed War Veteran from Harare, 2001)

Peasants also did the same. Some of those with cars donated them for use by occupiers. One group used its own transport to go and occupy Gomba.[194] Farm workers involved in occupations sometimes commandeered vehicles from commercial farmers. This diversity of means of moving around contradicts Feltoe's picture of top-down pre-planning. The picture painted above suggests more a social movement grasping at whatever means came to hand, even if partly aligned with ZANU-PF. It does not confirm the notion of the party 'bussing' its supporters to an event executed according to a centrally-devised plan.

Food

The provision of food also reflects a similar combination of local and higher level resource mobilisation initiatives. Food was essential in the process of occupations. War Veterans could prove their leadership if they succeeded in getting food to the occupiers. They used various means, including paying for it, or requesting it from the occupied White farmers as donation, as well as by applying pressure or using outright force:

> *People complained that they were hungry and the farmer gave us one carcass from the cold room and he also gave us eight 25kg bags of maize meal [corn flour] for us to cook sadza [thick porridge commonly made from corn flour]. We even took some of it to Dun and Sun, the other bases because we could not consume everything there. (Interview with K, a youth from Dandamera, 2000)*

The methods of requesting or pressuring the farmers varied according to circumstances (Interview with M, woman occupier from Mvurwi, 2000):

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[193] At local levels many ZANU-PF members, as actors of the liberation movement, took part in the occupations and at times used their resources for this purpose as in the quotation above.

[194] Gomba is about seven kilometres north of Harare. The place is significant in that that it is where Charwe, the spirit medium of Nehanda lived when the First Chimurenga war of resistance was fought in 1896-7. Nehanda spirit medium together with Kaguvi, were captured and hanged in Salisbury. Gomba is a Shona name depicting a valley as the place is, lying between a range of mountains.

> *At J, and at K's farm we ate beef. We ate whatever we could get at the farm; if there were cattle we ate beef if there were chickens we fed on that. Also when the elections were announced I contributed more than $700 to buy food for [occupiers]. We went to the councillor and demanded fire wood. The youth started to celebrate. We went to the team leader of the central committee to celebrate at his business premises and he contributed crates of soft drinks. We went to the hospital to see M and we celebrated and the nurses threw money at us. We also came to the shops here and the shop owners threw money at us. We were singing Chimurenga songs.*

This last quotation suggests links of mobilisation of food from different sources and its sharing, with the expression of emotions associated with victory among members of the movement. The acquisition and provision of food was thus more than a utilitarian matter. Sharing of food during occupation became a recurrent celebration of popular power.

Money

It would have been almost impossible to carry out the occupations without money to buy food, fuel, and other necessities. Money was also needed by the occupiers to support the teams established at the bases. These were both youth and War Veterans guarding occupied farms from small makeshift but secure or defensible shelters. Money was collected from War Veterans, well wishers and those who wanted to participate but could not manage to attend the actual occupations. For example, employed workers and professionals paid money for the sustenance of the occupiers in the farms, and in this way sought to acquire a stake in the ongoing events. The money was collected at meetings, and in some cases a register of contributors was kept. In other situations membership fees were charged, as in the case of the Nyabira Mazowe Association.[195]

Some analysts (e.g Feltoe 2004, Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 2004) suggest that the government supplied resources to occupiers, and see in this proof that the occupations were simply a government project. The above data on money and food seemingly contradict this interpretation. The land occupiers were in quite important respect self-financed, or at least financed by well-wishers. They coerced food in many cases, but again this was often or largely on their own initiative. The War Veterans also make it clear in their testimony that it was not government money that made the occupations possible:

> *Those days what happened is that you (any ex-combatant who wanted to be involved in the land issue), would wake up in the morning and just go to at the gathering point where contributions were made there. If this exercise had been funded by the government it would have paid a lot of money, ex-combatants are the ones who actually sponsored it themselves. (Interview with P, a War Veteran from Chitungwiza, 2000)*

War Veterans were well organised in the capital city and had better means of communication and a relatively well-funded community from which to mobilise

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[195] The Nyabira Mazowe Association members paid monthly subscriptions to sustain their organisation's farm occupations. *When they realised that people were organised through the formation of Nyabira Mazowe Farmers Association, they started making all sorts of unsubstantiated claims that we were selling land. It was proved that members of the Association pay their monthly subscriptions and [this is] not selling land. (Interview with M 2003)*

resources. This community included sympathetic intellectuals and professionals, members of the petty bourgeoisie and workers. The War Veterans from Harare were also relatively better off, in terms of economic status, than their rural counterparts. Some of them were employed in the private sector, many working in parastatals, and others were self employed, being mainly engaged in petty trading at Mbare Musika. The bulk of the War Veterans from elsewhere were unemployed and these were cushioned by those with income when money was required for land occupation purposes (Participant observation 2000-2).[196]

Written documents confirm that much money came from the War Veterans' individual contributions. For example, the minutes of the coordinating committee representatives held on 7 August 2000 at Muti Builders Offices state:

> *Members had to be conscientised that there are subscriptions needed from all farms wishing to be represented … in self-contained plots $300 per head. Everyone pays $50 monthly towards administration … Each farm must have its Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer who will be responsible with the running of the day to day activities on their farms including ensuring payments of subscriptions by individual members. The treasurer has to have a receipt book for each farm and in turn receives a receipt from the Association's Treasurer upon surrendering funds from members.*

This does not mean that there was no money from politicians and the government to support the land movement. In fact, such contribution was actively sought. For example, F (Interview with F 2003) sought money from sympathisers and politicians:

> *I personally went to ask for money from Cde Msika[197] but he did not give us the money. … When we failed to get money from the party we went to Mackay farm and congregated all the Comrades from the farms: Spar, Mackay, Barrier, Pama, Nochikabar, Walley, Greenheights, Bramfield , Penrose, Ballinety, Bellilie, Nognov, Little England, Muvururu, Lilifordia, Landscape, etc … They all came and we addressed them.*

The sources of funds had run dry and the War Veterans pressed the ruling party for funds to sustain the occupations (Letter, addressed to ZNLWVA and ZANU-PF 12 April 2000).[198] War Veterans mobilised money wherever they could, and from anyone possible, to ensure that occupiers did not abandon farms because of hunger:

> *We are now approaching the last crucial phase in farms where it is highly important to constantly visit and boost the moral of farm labourers [occupiers] and our comrades camped in these farms... We have exhausted our pockets now … there is need for back-up before it is too late.*

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[196] War Veterans collected money for (food and other necessities) from those War Veterans and others who could not live in the occupied farms owing to various conditions including employment (Participant observation 2000–2).

[197] ZANU-PF and State Vice-President.

[198] Another document illustrating the continuous search for money within political circles is a letter dated 12 June 2000 addressed to Chairman of ZNLWVA, Chenjerai Hunzvi, ZANU-PF Mashonaland West Provincial Chairman, Mashonaland West Governor, ZANU-PF Secretary for Finance, Emmerson Munangagwa, Mashonaland West Member of Parliament S. Mugabe and Chief Gava. In this letter, entitled, '*Complaint to non-equitable distribution of funds*', the association states: *We have written to express our greatest concern regarding our failure to get any cent since we occupied the farms in Nyabira. Through our coordinating committee, we have exhausted all channels, but to no avail since February, 2000. The wording seems to suggest that the occupiers acted without prior support from the government and party, but in the clear expectation that such support ought to be forthcoming.*

The collected money was used for a variety of purposes, including paying hired professionals to produce cadastral maps for demarcated farms and recommend land use plans for settlers, travelling and subsistence allowances (Interview with DM 2000):

> *We were subscribing $250 per week and then $250 per month per person … By July we had spent $442,000 we actually wrote to the government and the ruling party that we have contributed so much on our own despite the fact that you are not giving us any financial help. This is just the amount we used on the farms alone, excluding fuel, subsistence etc.*

War Veterans, operating in central Mazowe, lobbied ZANU-PF politicians for financial contributions. They targeted candidates contesting for the 2000 elections. They also sought to pressurise ZANU-PF politicians sympathetic to their cause (Interview with Mk 2000) to finance some of their operations:[199]

> *At that point we were called back to get some money. Chi [a senior ZANU-PF politician] used to leave money at Gweshe shops for us. So when he noticed that the $500 per day that he was leaving there was not being collected, he started to trace and got the information that we had been arrested. He asked the Governor to intervene. … We were fined $500 each for common assault which Chi reimbursed.*

These data suggest that indeed that there was at least some government involvement in financing land occupations as Feltoe (2004: 199) claims. But it may be wrong to jump from this evidence, which needs to be more fully assessed, to the conclusion that the government was funding the land occupation movement. Some officials linked to the regime co-funded the occupations, although their contribution may turn out to be small in relation to a pattern of nationwide occupations. In other cases state resources were used by individual officials without authority or approval. For example, in a Provincial Stakeholder Dialogue meeting of Mashonaland East, one District Administrator, a War Veteran complained that his job was on the line because of using government vehicles for occupation of farms. During the occupations I met many War Veterans using government, army, air-force and parastatal resources without explicit permission. For example, Chinotamba, a War Veteran was subsequently grilled by the Harare City Council for leaving work to take part in the land occupations without permission from his employer. But in other cases the resources of private companies were also used without permission, and it is unlikely that these employers were supporting or sanctioning the occupation movement, far less explicitly funding it.[200] The picture presented here is of a movement driven from below, with all kinds of opportunistic adaptations by superior authorities. But the evidence of a centrally-organised campaign planned and funded by the regime is largely lacking.

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[199] For example, KK (Interview with KK 2000) said: '*Kr [local MP candidate] gave us $3,500 for petrol and food. Then we left.*'

[200] Focus group discussion in Nyabira, 2005. In that focus group there was one company employee with a field, but coming from another province (not Mashonaland West). He narrated how he got a field by using his company's resources during the occupations and this is how he was identified as one deserving land, despite his origin. In the Nyabira Mazowe Association many members are professional WORKING in banks, industry and parastatals, and during the occupations they used their employers' resources (participant observation 2000-6).

5.3 Peasant organisation; the role of spirit mediums

For peasants, occupations were less a spontaneous act and more a further step in a protracted inter-generational struggle with the White farmers to regain traditional, ancestral lands. Occupations had a long history before and after independence in 1980. For example, efforts of the Hwata people (who claim to be autochthons) to return to Shavarunzwi Hill in Gomba date back to before the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953) (Focus group discussions, 2002):

> *Even the Smith regime knew it. They discussed the issue even when Smith was still in power. It has actually passed but it failed because of the [liberation] war. Mr Mashonganyika [who was part of the delegation] said that in 1954 there is a committee from the government of the Whites that actually had agreed that 10 families had to come and settle back in their area.*

In some cases peasants also negotiated with farmers independently to gain access to their shrines and to be allowed to perform religious ceremonies on land controlled by White farmers. In Gomba one White farmer whose family had owned the land from 1902 (ownership passing from his grandparents) complied with peasant requests and even assisted them during the ceremonies. The original owner donated cattle when the Hwata people came annually to perform religious ceremonies. This was continued by two generations of his heirs (now jointly owning the farm with their father) up to the occupation period in 1999. Throughout the 1980s the farmer (Mr. T, the second generation owner) accommodated the spirit medium (Nehanda I) so that she could take care of the shrine of Shavarunzwi Hill[201] was accommodated (Interview with RN, former farm manager, 2004; Focus group discussions, Goredema, 2004):

> *…he [White farmer] was saying that …Ambuya [Nehanda, who came from Chiweshe with Hwata people in 1998] should stay in Shavarunzwi. And the White commercial farmer gave the entourage of this Mbuya Nehanda cattle. I witnessed their coming [in the post independence period] so many times during the past years. They started coming here in 1985 when I had just arrived. He used to give them cattle …*

Below we will discuss two levels of mobilisation involving aspects of Shona religion. The first level is through what might be termed spiritual 'direct action', i.e. a spirit medium intends to occupy land for her own social group. The second level is through the use of a system of shared religious beliefs in the process of recruitment and education of potential participants.

In Gomba, Nehanda Spirit Mediums did not move to occupy Gomba as individuals but as groups. This is understandable from the Shona religious perspective. A medium is always surrounded by people who have various duties

[201] The spirit of Nehanda originated from Nyamhita, a daughter to the founder of the Mutapa kingdom, Mutota. Nyamhita became the great female ancestral spirit after having participated in an incestuous ritual with Matope, her brother, according to custom to consolidate the emerging Mutapa kingdom. '*Matope gave the district of Handa… to his sister-wife Nyamhita, who for that reason became known as Nehanda i.e. the ruler/owner of Handa*' (Mudenge 1988: 41) There are now many spirit mediums who claim to be possessed by Nehanda. In Gomba 3 mediums occupied Lowdale and adjacent farms. from the 1980s, but at different times and with different organisational backing. Nehanda I was from Musana Communal Lands, Nehanda II came from Chiweshe and Nehanda III came from Guruve.

and functions. Some act as intermediaries when the medium is possessed by the spirit and is in a trance. The assistant to the medium is the one who explains this possession and what it portends to the people consulting the spirit and who also keeps a record (usually based on memorising what the spirit said).[202] There are also groups of people who stay with the spirit medium to perform such functions as brewing beer, an important ingredient on occasions when people gather round the oracle. Only old women and/or young girls – i.e. females beyond or not yet capable of conceiving - are allowed to brew beer associated with the spirit world. Evoking the spirit, including singing and playing the *mbira*, is performed by a musical group known as *vaimbiri* (Interview with Z 2005).[203] Another functionary keeps the 'accessories' or instruments used by the spirit medium. These include a Black and white cloth, and a small axe called *gano* or the *tsvimbo* (knobkerrie). In addition there are also men and women in the medium's entourage who perform basic chores such as cooking for the medium, slaughtering sacrificial beasts and farming. Furthermore, due to the seniority of the spirit of Nehanda the medium demands always to be flanked by lesser regional spirits.[204] In addition, the medium's family group, the children, husband some nephews and nieces are also part of the entourage. National or regional duties do not break the ties with the domestic group.

The spirit medium therefore operates with a number of families in attendance, depending on the seniority of the spirit and the circumstances of deployment. The support to Nehanda I (who came from Musana Communal Lands) by the commercial farmer mentioned above involved '*setting up a [whole] village*', and proved to be an '*expensive*' venture for the farmer concerned (Interview with farmer BT 2004). The medium's extensive social base is important to understanding the mobilisation of the various Nehanda Mediums involved in occupying Gomba. The farmer did not fully understand the social implications of inviting the medium back on the site. 'Then they ended up becoming too many - that is when T [a White commercial farmer] said that he only wanted the spirit medium to live in her mountain.' He then consulted the ZANU-PF offices to try and establish which was the *authentic* Nehanda, in the hope of driving off those he considered fakes (Interview with RN 2003).

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[202] This function is quite widespread in Shona spirit possession and is most conspicuous where the medium is also a healer. A person called *makumbi* assists the healer by interpreting and explaining instructions given by the possessed healer. The *makumbi* also performs the functions of receiving and psychologically preparing the client or caregivers for the healing process (Sadomba 2000b).

[203] Z was one such singer and dancer for the spirit of Nehanda during the 1970s. The medium was taken to Zambia by the Guerrillas in 1972 and Z, then a young girl who had not yet reached puberty, remained one of the singers until the death of the medium in Zambia. In some of the African Christian churches with a strong syncretist element, such as the Johanne Masowe Chishanu, there is also a group of *vaimbiri veMweya* (in this case they are singers for the Holy Spirit). They specialise in singing to help the prophet to become inspired (i.e. possessed) by the Holy Spirit. I have participated in and researched upon Johanne Masowe since 1998.

[204] The Nehanda Spirit of the 1970s was flanked by Chidyamauyu Spirit, whose medium is the one who carried the Nehanda medium out of battle in Mozambique before crossing into Zambia (Interview with Z 2005; Interview with K 2004) *Chidyamauyu, the youngest of the three (mediums), was charged with the care of the old Nehanda[the] feeble and weak* (David Lan 1985: 5).

However, the support offered to the spirit medium by this large social group is not unconditional. For example, Nehanda Medium II was living in Chiweshe with the Hwata people when she was first possessed by the spirit in 1997 (Focus group discussion, 2002). The spirit through its medium masterminded a new wave of occupations of Gomba during the early occupation period (1998). Events took a new turn (Focus group discussion, 2002) in 1999: 'when she said "Carry me I want to go to my land where I was beheaded". But people did not pay attention and they refused because they could not understand how they were going to settle on the Whitemen's farms.'[205]

This was not the first time Nehanda had demanded to return to Gomba. Nehanda's medium had tried to pressurise her people to go to Gomba but they had developed cold feet. On this day she protested against her followers and decided to walk from Chiweshe to Gomba, more than 60 km away (Interview with B 2001, Focus group discussion 2002): '… [so she] just bade farewell and told people that she was going to her land. When she was a distance away, we [the entourage] then decided to follow her.'

Nehanda's actions here should be put in a correct perspective. In Shona custom, the behaviour of Nehanda is known as *kuramwa*. This can be translated as 'to become impatient'. The Nehanda medium was fed up with the response of her followers when they refused to go and occupy Gomba. When a spirit medium reacts in this manner it could signal punishment from the spirit world for disobeying orders. This punishment is usually experienced in the form of natural disasters such as famine, epidemic or environmental catastrophe. When Nehanda's entourage did eventually decide to follow her, these concerns will have been in their mind. They then persuaded her to board a vehicle to travel to Gomba, which she only reluctantly accepted. But 'before Ambuya [the Nehanda medium] went into the car, people who were [just] six metres apart were drenched in rain.' (Focus group discussion, Hwatas, 2003) Needless to add, perhaps, this was seen as supernatural intervention.

[205] Refusal of the Hwata was based on considering the legal issues and government policies on land. They knew that the commercial farmers had freehold title to their farm land. They therefore did not see the logic of the spirit in deciding to settle. In effect, the medium gad envisaged or anticipated the coming period of farm occupations. This 'far sightedness' is a good illustration the kind of role played by mediums in triggering, motivating and mobilising occupations.

Figure 5.3 Author with some of the aides of Nehanda 2

From left to right; author, two aides of Nehanda and two relatives of Chief Hwata

Source: Photo by Tsuneo Yoshikuni, 2002

Figure 5.4 Nehanda aides brewing ceremonial beer

This was to mark return of Chief Hwata**.** Hwata Chiripanyanga, the last chief to rule Gomba, was captured and hanged together with Charwe, the medium of Nehanda spirit in 1897. Since then the territory was owned by settler farmers. The white, blue and black dress materials are typical for Shona spiritual regalia.

Source: Photos by Tsuneo Yoshikuni, 2002

But the claims to land by spirit mediums were not enough, by themselves, to spark off a large land movement. It was the new political and economic circumstances in the late 1990s and early 2000s, interacting with the established religious context that made a large land movement possible. The second level of mobilisation through Shona religion involved the mobilisation of youth, men and women outside the circles of religious adepts. This had the character of a religious revival, in which latent ideas and knowledge were brought back to life in highly charged emotional circumstances. For example, Hwata traditional leaders and spirit mediums recruited their sons and daughters in professional and high level government service. The newly enthused included the Registrar General, a Chemistry Professor working in the University of Zimbabwe, and many others (Focus group discussion, Goredema, 2004). Representatives of six clans descended from the sons of Shayachimwe[206] occupied Gomba. The process of mobilisation was through rituals and ceremonies performed at Chiweshe, before the occupation commenced in 1999 (Focus group discussion, Chief and Mediums, 2002):

> *The boys (War Veterans) who took land came afterwards. We had already spent quite some time on reclaiming our land when the Whites were still in power. Mbuya[207] [Nehanda] was demanding the return to her place. The War Veterans came when we were already settled at the current homestead. Beer was finally brewed and a ceremony which called all [the] people and [some] Ministers, was performed to demonstrate that Mbuya had returned to Gomba.*

Another instance of this kind of religious activism is the lead offered by a spirit medium, Sekuru Mushore, in the occupations in Nyabira area. Mushore occupied Nharira Hills, starting as far back as the 1960s, as explained below. One could classify this as a typical occupation tactic by peasants, (Munyaradzi 2003: 3):

> *…the conflict dates back to the 1960's, when Sekuru Mushore came to the hills to maintain his ancestors' graves and to appease his ancestors. Through a gentlemen's arrangement, the farmer allowed Sekuru Mushore, together with some of his aides, to temporarily stay at the hills to conduct their rituals. However, attempts by Sekuru Mushore and his aides to establish permanent homes resulted in their swift removal by the then-farm owner, Mr. Hinde. Mushore is said to have continued to visit the Hills on a regular basis with his aides to conduct rainmaking ceremonies at the site. However, in 1993 he moved to the hills permanently to stay there with his family.*

Shona religious rituals were particularly important in rallying villagers to the occupations. Chiefs and spirit mediums organised meetings to prepare the people. I managed to attend some of these all-night ceremonies (*biras)*[208] in this part of the Chiweshe Communal Lands, and so have some idea of what this aspect of mobilisation involved. At one occasion the local Chief and the spirit medium had jointly convened the *bira*. First, lengthy spiritual communion, supplication and

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[206] Shayachimwe, Gutsa and Nyamhangambiri were three brothers who fled from their father Nyashanu of the Shava totem living in Buhera in the east. They sought refuge in Seke and later conquered the Mbari (living at present day capital of Harare area) and Zumba people (living in Gomba). According to Beach they migrated about the 17th Century (Beach 1980); additional information from focus group discussions with Hwata group (2002) and Zumba group (2002), and interview with a Zumba spirit medium (2003).

[207] Mbuya literally means grandmother but is used as an honorific prefix to the spirit's name, irrespective of the age of the medium.

[208] A *bira* is a religious ceremony where spirits are invoked and then appeased. The bira involves singing, dancing (particularly to the *mbira)* and all-night beer drinking.

offerings were performed. The Chief and other old men and women then explained to the possessed medium that the community was sending people to go and '*reclaim the land from the usurpers*'. The spirit, through its medium, set rules for doing this and gave instructions on what ceremonies and actions had to be performed before occupying. There was much clapping of hands, singing, drumming and dancing, including ululations. Even school children participated in these all night long ceremonies. The volunteers and selected candidates were given snuff by the spirit medium and words of encouragement. The snuff was to receive the blessings of the spirit and to weaken the White farmers. Prohibitions included abstinence from sex in the occupied areas.

Such meetings were attended by adult men, women and male and female youth. This was a cross-section of the composition of the occupiers. It was able bodied men, women and youths who were selected to carry out the occupations. The remaining members of community (mainly children and older people) collected food and other necessities for the occupiers. These would be brought to the occupiers by people given that duty by the community.

5.4 Involvement of farm workers

In Matepatepa there was significant mobilisation of farm workers by peasant occupiers. Some of the farm workers were from the same communal lands as the peasants (Chiweshe Communal Lands) and they commuted from these peasant villages to work in the commercial farms. Others were part-time peasants, having been given land by the local authorities in adjacent communal areas. These people were strategically useful, since they could give useful information about the farms, the farmers, and activities in the area. These farm workers were sometimes given tasks by the communities in which they lived. These included working under cover for the occupiers, providing food and other necessities and communicating with the village leaders when occupiers encountered problems that required attention of the peasant coordinators.

In Mazowe, farm workers living on the urban fringe, alongside unemployed youths, accepted mobilisation by War Veterans, thus constituting an element in the initial manpower moving on to farms to engage in further mobilisation and engage in planning further occupations. War Veterans in fact relied on mobilising these amenable 'local' farm workers to occupy farms in the surrounding areas.[209] But in other cases War Veterans saw farm workers as a threat (seeking to protect their jobs by defending the land or property of their employer) and were thus anxious to immobilise them, where they could, to prevent counter-attacks, something that happened often, indicating that the farm workers had their own competing views about the land occupation movement, perhaps tending to be negative where they lacked local connections (Sadomba and Helliker, forthcoming). War Veterans report

[209] This group of farm workers from commercial centres like Concession was so important to the movement that they were given land for housing, with at least an acre for tillage, in Dandamera. Not only were they significant as an occupation force but also in continuing to provide skilled and unskilled farm labour for the new settlers. They organised themselves into skill-based (weeding groups with experienced foremen) work teams to provide services to new and inexperienced settlers

how important they viewed it to mobilise farm workers, because weight of numbers mattered in the actual occupation process (Interview with Tt, leader of the Mvurwi occupations, 2000):

> *So it would be massive … You can imagine five hundred people approaching a homestead, the dogs can't stand. Not only five hundred, we were much more than that.*[210] *You would initially start when there was a hundred or so, initially - but as you attack this farm, mobilise the farm workers there. When you go to the next farm, you go with them and to the next, you take them [with you].*

Farm workers were certainly decisive in the outcome of the occupations as small units of occupiers were easily repelled between February and April especially in Mazowe, before mobilising farm workers and reinforcements from neighbouring districts. The strategic significance of farm workers in the occupation process has been neglected. Their contribution has often been ignored, or worse, deliberately misinterpreted, as if they were in all cases, and without further evidence, victims without agency (Raftopoulos 2003, Selby 2006, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2007). Empirical data suggest, however, that the position of farm workers was complex, and fluctuated throughout the occupations. Some were coerced, or came under enormous pressure to conform with the plans of the War Veterans, but others continued to weigh the balance of forces, considering their own interests at each point in time, and made strategic and tactical manoeuvres to position themselves advantageously in the struggle for land (Sadomba and Helliker, forthcoming).

Some farm workers, for example, were (as noted above) only partially landless, retaining a toehold in the peasant economy, and seized opportunities to align themselves with the occupations in the hope of gaining more land. Further fieldwork and a more differentiated analysis is now needed, to replace some of the snap judgments made at the time, in which it was assumed that farm workers were all but universally supporters of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change. Here it is suggested that enough evidence already exists to conclude that many were (at least) strategically calculating in intent, and intentionally aligned themselves with the occupation movement where it suited their requirements.

In many cases when War Veterans went into the farms, they did not prioritise mobilisation of farm workers, who were thus frequently left without any clear understanding of the objectives of the occupiers. Only later, when War Veterans realised the cost of neglecting farm workers, were attempts made to apply war time techniques and to mobilise farm workers through ideological instruction.[211] Some of this education was effective, since some farm workers later became active participants. This active agency can be demonstrated through some of the (negative)

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[210] White farmers report smaller groups of occupiers. At another farm the White Farmer (Interview with Uu 2004) said *'I think we have to make [the number] between 70 and 100 people. That's my estimation'.*

[211] In Matepatepa seasonal farm workers from Chiweshe Communal Lands were mobilised during peasant mobilisation but permanent farm workers, not residing in Chiweshe, were not subject to this mobilisation and experienced friction with occupiers when occupations started (Personal observation Benridge Farm, 2000). This was the same with the farm workers in Mazowe but different from the Nyabira area. War Veterans in Nyabira targeted farm workers for mobilisation from the onset and promised to share the land with them. Farm workers here became willing participants in the movement from the outset (Interview with occupation leader DM, a War Veteran, 2000).

data provided by critics of the land movement. For example, a published human rights violation report on commercial farms launches into the familiar line that farm workers lacked agency, asserting first that 'widespread human rights violations were inflicted upon … Black farm workers by agents of Zimbabwean President Mugabe's government during the seizures of White-owned farms from 2000 to 2005.' (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and Justice for Agriculture Trust, 2007: 2). But the report's empirical data then goes on to show that farm workers ranked third after War Veterans and ZANU-PF supporters, and thus ahead of any state agency, including the police, army and the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), in the perpetration of violations on both commercial farmers and (other) farm workers themselves. This might suggest that farm workers had divided interests and that a substantial number had forged an alliance with peasants and War Veterans of the liberation movement. The report's authors, however, fail to consider this possibility, and simply re-assert the view that farm workers were passive victims as a group.[212] To consider farm workers, en masse, as opposed to the land reform via occupation is to ignore the data presented above. Not unlike Marx's view of the peasantry, there is a tendency for opponents of occupations to treat the farm workers as an inert 'sack of potatoes', rather than as a complex social formation, affected internally by many of the contradictions of property, wealth and political alignment affecting the wider Zimbabwean agrarian formation. In imposing unthinking victimhood on this group rights activists sometimes say more about their own 'class sympathies' than about the complex and rapidly shifting alliances 'on the ground' during the occupations.

In several cases farm workers occupied farms on their own initiative (Rutherford 2003). Workers' committee and sometimes ZANU-PF structures were used to organise such occupations. In Concession farm workers held meetings and decided to occupy one of the four farms of the White commercial farmer. They used structures of the workers' committee to mobilise people for the occupation. However they were stopped by the District Administrator, when they went to register as occupiers of the farm (Interview with D, former foreman, 2001). In some cases there was clearly a clash of interests between farm workers and other occupiers. For example, in Gomba the occupation was spontaneous and the whole community of farm workers took part. Farm workers had not been allocated land by government, which had divided the farm between peasants, War Veterans and the former White farmer. Farm workers decided to occupy land that had been allocated to both the White farmer and the new settlers. When they were not given land they used all the tactics of occupation, including stealing produce from the new settlers. When peasant settlers tried to stop them the farm workers resisted and repelled the settlers, as NR, a former farm manager, (2004) recounts: 'So this year they tried to stop us and we said we will all die here fighting (pano apa tichafira pano nhasi). We ploughed 20 hectares.'

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[212] The preliminary report is based on questionnaire responses of 184 (97 percent success rate) former commercial farmers, covering key areas such as '*violations against farmers [and] farm workers, use of the justice system to protect farmers and their rights, damages and losses incurred and loss of support services to commercial farm workers*' (Ibid: 5). The effect of the questionnaire is to operationalise the notion of 'violation of human rights' so that it encompasses almost any activity associated with the occupation process. For example, it included violation of the 'rights' of cats, dogs and baboons (both pets and wild) in the assessment. Even so, the data indicate that farm workers ranked third in terms of active participation in occupation, thus clearly revealing that not all farm workers were passive victims.

Farm workers had grown militant and, drawing upon their work team structures, were well organised.

Clearly, in many situations the organising War Veterans did not view farm workers as their first allies. War Veterans considered that farm workers lacked information on what was happening, and that this limited their participation in occupations and rendered them easily recruited by farmers and the opposition MDC to resist occupations. However, the role of farm workers in the land occupations has been judged solely on the basis of this initial response, ignoring their role afterwards, once they were more thoroughly mobilised into the movement.

War Veterans developed activities to educate farm workers in many locations. Coercion was often the initial step to induct farm workers into the occupations. But this was later followed by attempts at educating them about the land movement (Interview with DM 2001). 'Initially we would force them then when they come to us we educated them. Then they understand.' DT coordinating occupations in Mazowe District (Interview with DT 2000) said:

> *So we established our base there and we addressed the farm workers. We addressed the teachers from the school and we told them what the whole thing was about. The nature of my address was to remind them about our [Zimbabwean] history, the taking of our land by the colonialists and that now we wanted to take the land back. And that the draft constitution which was rejected by the people actually had a provision by which we would have peacefully acquired land through the normal legal channel. But given that the draft constitution was rejected there was no other channel through which that could be done other than to force our way through.*

Another example of how pressure was applied comes from Centenary. [213] One War Veteran who came from this area as reinforcement to Mvurwi described the situation as follows: (Interview with Mz 2003)

> *We would commandeer the tractors and the lorries that belonged to the farmers and take with us even the farm workers. First of all we would gather them by force, then politicise them, and they would go with us. So it would be massive. Like when we left Forrester A, the HQ for Forrester Estates … we spent the night there politicising the people, then the following morning we took the farm workers, [in] lorries and the tractors. We took everybody to … other farms. Now it was more massive, because there were 37 War Veterans who came from Mzarabani alone.*

In sum, mobilisation was not through education and persuasion. As in most guerrilla movements, education was combined with pressure. However, it would be incorrect to assume that whenever and wherever pressure was used the subjects were brought in line solely by force and fear. The process of education and involvement in the struggle were still viewed (under the influence of War Veterans) as transformative opportunities in regards to the land movement. Occupations (as education through doing) themselves had an impact on the thinking of the actors.[214] But one of the most effective mobilisation technique used by the War Veterans on the

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[213] District adjacent to Mazowe Administrative District.

[214] Foweraker (1995: 49) makes a similar comment when he writes that: '*… individual participation is a "potentially transformative experience" which can create loyalty to the movement and commitment to the cause. The transformation does not happen naturally but through mobilisation, struggle and face-to-face encounters.*'

farm workers was to assure the workers that they would continue in their jobs and have more bosses to employ them. This was generally quite effective although it also depended on the degree of confidence the workers might have in the capacity of inexperienced War Veterans to continue with commercial production. War Veterans said to the farm workers (Interview D, War Veteran leader from Harare, 2000):

> *farm workers who are willing to stay behind with the comrades and landless masses here at the farm, will be accommodated when the farmer goes … So when they go, you (farm workers), would not be out of employment because these people who are getting in as new settlers need employees. For that matter they are many more than this one Whiteman.*

In the propaganda of the land movement, farm workers were promised land and work, but their position would generally remain different from the other occupiers, as clearly illustrated by what DM said (Interview with DM 2000):

> *… we told (farm workers) about our coming into the farm. We promised them that they would not lose employment because they were now going to be having a lot more bosses than the one they had. There were now 44 bosses… And the Whiteman would never for one day give a piece of land to the workers even if one had worked for a whole life there with children and grand children. …but for those of you who will be working on this farm for comrades, they will have their own plots here. We would employ them and secondly we would reserve an area for them when we do the pegging. 'We will reserve land that we will honour our obligations that we will give you a piece of land, but we will not give you the same 40 hectares. Can you manage that?'*[215]

In a number of cases of which we are aware the promise of access to land made to farm workers was then not fulfilled. This was not always the fault of the occupation leadership, but due to the intervention of higher authority. In focus group discussions at Witchens (2005) and Lilifordia Farms (2006) farm workers confirmed that War Veterans pegged land for them but that the District Administrator took it away from them and either settled other people, or the land remained vacant. According to some farm workers (Focus group discussion, Lilifordia Farm, 2005), occupiers feared that if farm workers became part of the movement the good pieces of land that were available would be taken by the farm workers because of their proximity to the site and knowledge of the ground.

It follows from what has been presented above that the position of farm workers was therefore far from uniform or static, as several researchers and analysts have so far presented (cf. Moyo and Yeros 2005).[216] The relationship between farm workers and occupiers varied from place to place, and changed as the occupations developed.

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[215] It is worthwhile to note that the group of War Veterans that organised occupations for Nyabira was led by War Veterans who had taken part in the early War Veteran-led occupations in Svosve and Goromonzi, and therefore had acquired experience of how to handle farm workers. They had seen the need to mobilise and work together with farm workers from the beginning. One of the most influential of this group of War Veterans leaders had graduated from Wampoa (Chitepo) college in 1977. He explained that he was taking land occupations as a way of advancing his socialist ideas by giving land to the tillers, especially the workers.

[216] Moyo and Yeros (2005: 191) argue that '*War Veterans had an ambiguous, even arrogant posture towards farm workers, viewing them as incapable of nationalist political consciousness'.*

5.5 Reaction of the White commercial farmers

Nor was the reaction of the White farmers to the occupations fixed and immutable. It also developed over time. At first some farmers snubbed the occupations, dismissing them as an over-reaction to the failure of the government-sponsored draft constitution. Later, they were forced to address a serious challenge to their business and way of life.[217] In the section below an attempt is made to capture some of the dynamic of these changing positions.

War Veterans did not have the idea to chase away commercial farmers violently from the outset, as suggested by some researchers (Feltoe 2004: 197). Initially, they were interested to try and negotiate with the White farmers, and even to get agreements to share land with the White farmers. Often, they first saw their task as enforcing government policies of 'one person, one farm' (and thus to acquire properties from those who broke the rules) and to ensure compliance with limits on maximum farm sizes.[218] Accordingly, the approach was to debate and negotiate with the White farmers, in the hope of arriving at a mutually agreeable decision, around government stated policies. This spirit of compromise was abandoned, however, in cases where a farmer was known for his or her racist attitudes or for disregard for community welfare.[219] DMT (Interview with DMT, a War Veteran from Concession and former government health officer, 2000) summarised the approach of the occupations as follows:

> *I have a number of … documents signed, to say can we share. My farm is about 800 hectares arable. You take 400 and may I remain with 400, please. They [the documents] are all over the place. Even the maps, he would draw the maps showing which land would revert to the War Veterans and which land would remain with the farmer.*[220]

[217] I draw this conclusion from reaction of farmers in a phone-in radio programme on Radio 3. Many farmers phoned and they snubbed the occupiers.

[218] **Table 1.2 Government proposed farm sizes for resettlement models**

Agro-ecological zone/Natural Region	A1 (ha)	A2			
		Small-scale (ha)	Medium-scale (ha)	Large-scale (ha)	Peri-urban (ha)
I	12	20	100	250	
IIa	15	30	200	350	
IIb	20	40	250	400	2 to 50
III	30	60	300	500	
IV	50	120	700	1500	
V	70	240	1000	2000	

Source: Government of Zimbabwe (2001)

[219] In Concession for example, the first farm to be occupied was AKW: '*Because he is socially an unacceptable element. He is very racist. The farm workers… who work for him [and] the local people here talk about him and naturally he was the first target of this area'* (Interview with DTM 2000). Next to this farmer was his son who was growing roses in green houses (among other activities). Farm workers and the surrounding community pleaded that the son be spared because he was good to the community and his workers. He was left intact by the War Veteran-led occupiers. The farm was later taken during the 'fast track land reform' (Interview with Mk 2000; Interview with farm worker D 2002; Participant observation 2000-2).

[220] This view was corroborated by many War Veterans interviewed in the study area. For example Pf (Interview with Pf 2000) said, '*The process was that we first negotiated with the farmers and entered into written agreements before even occupying*.'

The period during which War Veterans remained open to negotiation lasted from February up to the election period in June 2000. According to several informants, the White commercial farmers reacted opportunistically to the whole process:

> *But when we then returned to implement the agreements, the elections were on. Then the farmers changed and they were now saying they signed under duress. We then realised that these people were dishonest and they were not serious. We were just wasting our time. (Interview with PF 2000)*[221]

The War Veterans accused the White farmers of mobilising farm workers and MDC supporters to fight off War Veterans and other occupiers.[222] They also disliked the legal measures taken by the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU). The CFU managed to get High Court judgments in their favour from March 2000.[223] Dumiso Dabengwa, former Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) intelligence supremo, and Minister of Home Affairs during the occupation period, sent police to evict occupiers in March and April 2000. Joseph Musika, who was acting President while Mugabe was out of the country, did the same. In August, Minister of Lands, John Nkomo, announced that occupations had to stop. At Balineety Farm in Nyabira the White farmers jointly wrote a strongly-worded letter to the War Veterans after Minister John Nkomo had ordered occupations to stop. The War Veterans replied with equal vehemence (See Appendix 3). These developments gave the impression to the White farmers that the state was going to evict the occupiers, and so many farmers then felt they could renege on earlier agreements with land occupiers. Many War Veterans then began to see negotiation and dialogue as a waste of time, and attitudes became more openly confrontational.

Reading the two letters, it seems clear that for the preceding six months (i.e. from February 2000) the occupations were mostly '*peaceful and non-confrontational*' and War Veterans had made '*numerous visits … with requests to see…*' (Townsend's letter to Nyabira Mazowe association, 16 August, 2000). The White farmers did not respond to a reply by War Veterans dated 18 August 2000 defending their position. Any further attempts by the land movement to open dialogue proved fruitless. Instead, the commercial farmers reported to the police and informed their organisation, the CFU, and Minister John Nkomo. This infuriated the War Veterans, something that can be noted from their response. The War Veterans then typically asserted that 'It is

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[221] War veteran DMT (Interview with DMT 2000) described it in similar words: *This is why after elections farmers would take us to court and say, I signed this under duress. … Quite a number of farmers were now saying they signed under duress. [inaudible] He even appealed to the High Court. Some of our Comrades were served with summons to appear before the law courts.*

[222] For example, DTM (Interview with DTM 2000) said, '*…each time they [the occupiers] would go to invade farms … a day or two later … the MDC would team up with farm workers, with everybody, from two [or] three farms, to come and attack our bases. So naturally they [the occupiers] would run away. Many … sustained very serious injuries through the attacks of the MDC … [M]uch later … it became very evident to the White farmers that… war veterans, and their support of ZANU-PF, began to appear as invincible. And they began to realise that they would not win in terms of continued support for the MDC [i.e.] openly supporting by sending farm workers to the MDC meetings. It became evident that you just can't do that because people would be beaten up. Beat up the farmer [inaudible] beat up some of these strong supporters of MDC. And it spread all over and when actually it spread then it became clear that offering assistance would not work.*'

[223] High Court judgements against occupations were made on 17 March 2000, 13 April 2000, 19 April 2000 and orders issued for occupiers to vacate farms and/or for the police to evict them.

our birth right to demand to share one farm while you remain with [the other].' (Nyabira Mazowe War Veterans' letter, 18 August 2000) Despite the vehemence running through the letter, the main point comes out clearly in paragraph 12, in which the war veterans repeat again that farms should be shared, and that they should not be accused of starting violence. It seems important to emphasise that the War Veterans still saw the issue in terms of taking 'spare' land, and not as an attempt to end White commercial farming.

In the run up to the 2000 general elections were (held in June), many White commercial farmers continued to believe that the occupations would be reversed, either because the MDC was going to win, or because they believed the government and ZANU-PF only supported the occupations as an election stunt. Given the actions of Cabinet Ministers and other members of the ZANU-PF elite this was not an illogical expectation. The War Veterans, in fact, made an equivalent analysis of the regime's position on land, and pushed for more radical moves (Interview with DM 2000):

> *… we told them [member of parliament candidates] that if government was saying 'land to the people' as a political gimmick we were, on our part, serious. So we asked them to forward people from their constituencies through their district structures to us for land allocation in order to demonstrate to everybody that opposed the land reform that we were serious.*

The White farmers interpreted the position of the government and judiciary as supportive of their position. Signals from government Ministers, decisions by the courts, and the belief that the opposition was in fact gaining an upper hand caused White farmers not to retreat from or not to enter into deals with War Veterans. However, a revision of the regime's position towards the land movement was in the making. Already at a meeting of the ZANU-PF Politburo held on 18 February 2000 President Mugabe, a wily political realist quick to realise that the land movement had become a force to be reckoned with, took his first open steps to make an alliance with the War Veterans.[224] Mugabe now shifted his position from merely condoning the occupations (Feltoe 2004: 200) to one of unwavering support. His sense that War Veteran radicalism now had teeth drew him into a much stronger anti-White stance than before.

But as time went on the anti-White rhetoric intensified so that, in ZANU-PF propaganda, the White farmers became the 'enemy of the people'. The numbers of expropriations of White commercial farmers was drastically increased, as the government implemented its fast-track resettlement program. By the time of ZANU-PF congress in December 2001, the president was clearly fighting the White farmers.

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[224] Interview late Washington Chipfunde (2000-5) personal adviser of Dr. Hunzvi and Consultant to ZEXCOM, a company of ZNLWVA. Chipfunde said that Hunzvi was invited to the meeting as a special guest and at the end of the meeting President Mugabe asked Hunzvi to lead the elections campaign and gave him a special position in the Central Committee for that purpose. Jabulani Sibanda, the current (2008) ZNLWVA chairman, was co-opted back into ZANU-PF after suspension, to play a similar campaign role to endorse Mugabe as ZANU-PF candidate for the presidential elections of 2008. Mugabe won the candidature at a ZANU-PF congress held in November 2007 suppressing internal descent from the former ZAPU and Mujuru factions.

In September 2001 the matter of land occupations was brought to the Supreme Court, where the CFU was challenging the legality of the fast track land resettlement program. The court ordered the government to comply with the earlier High Court (HC) and Supreme Court (SC) decisions, but the executive refused. At this point the judiciary was now fully sucked into the land conflict. President Mugabe said on 14 December 2001: 'The courts can do what they want. They are not courts for our people and we should not even be defending ourselves in these courts.' (Feltoe 2004: 205)

In the end, the land occupations escalated without options of dialogue. The opportunism of the White commercial farmers must be held to be at least partly responsible for the closing down of more peaceful opportunities for resolution of the land conflict. New efforts to start dialogue through initiatives by organisations like Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiatives came too late, since the occupations had by now built a political momentum of their own, and no results were forthcoming. One White commercial farmer summed up what in his opinion was the root cause of the White farmers' rejection of dialogue about sharing the control over land (Interview with BT 2004):

> *Some of the people I worked with were … living in a land … (inaudible) their style of life continued forever without any attachment. They thought that they were immune to any form of interference in their life…The life they spent … They had allowed themselves to fall into some form of complacency which said, 'We are who we are. There can be nothing without us therefore we cannot be touched.'… That's how people might be perceiving their life, their role in the country and I might maintain is that certainly a lot of farmers that I know would explain that … 'Well, no one can touch us, now we are too important we contribute too much to the economy, without us the country will collapse.' I think I stand by that assessment that I have about them.*

If BT is correct in his assessment, plausible in regard to the other evidence here cited, then the reaction of White farmers is perhaps not unexpected. Their identity, social and economic privileges, and entrenched ideas about their social and economic position in Zimbabwe held them back from strategic interracial dialogue with people who demanded access to land at a key moment in the country's history.

In the new context the government quickly put up a structure and a program to control and co-opt the land movement: the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP). The FTLRP was spearheaded by civil servants who took over the leadership role of War Veterans. The contradictions and struggles that emanated are discussed further in Chapter 7, where the thesis will pay attention to linkages of the land occupation movement. We shall discuss how War Veterans were systematically pushed out as leaders of the occupation movement and ZANU-PF stalwarts and opportunist young Turks gained control. Mugabe managed to co-opt the leaders of War Veterans, using all sorts of tactics, including harassment of unyielding ZNLWVA executive members.[225] Where the War Veterans' approach had been to negotiate and share the land, the new occupiers, led by civil servants, had a different approach, i.e. to totally displace the White farmer and to take entire farms for

[225] For example the hardliner, Andrew Ndhlovu, former dissident leader and national executive member of ZNLWVA, was imprisoned and then released about two days before the Mutare congress of ZNLWVA in 2005 (Personal observation 2005).

themselves, and not for redistribution to the land hungry.[226] In short, the radicalism of the War Veterans – a survival from the war of liberation - was pushed aside as the politics of the elite assumed control of the land movement.

5.6 Spontaneity, horizontality and localisation

The material presented above allows us to prepare some conclusions about the particular role of the War Veterans in the later occupations. First of all it has to be stated that War Veterans build the movement jointly with peasant activism. Peasant occupations, led by traditional leaders and spirit mediums with minimal or no participation by War Veterans, were clearly a recurrent, long-term phenomenon, as can be noted from both the Gomba occupation by Nehanda-led groups and the Nharira occupation by the Mushore group. The claim over Gomba, peasants argued, was on-going, from the time the land was taken after the defeat of the Hwata in the late 1890s (Interview with Nehanda Spirit medium 2002, Interview with Bungu Spirit medium, 2002, Focus group discussion, Goredema, 2002-3). This supports the idea advanced by this thesis that peasant land activism is a kind of continuous background to the more highly visible eruptions as described in this chapter. But then, in the context of a rebellious program built by the War Veterans, these longer term claims for land by peasants themselves became more aggressive and resolute.

Peasant dominated occupations led by War Veterans assumed a slightly different approach from those led exclusively by local peasant leaders. One common characteristic shared by the early War Veterans-led occupations and the 2000 occupations was that they both were *spontaneous, localised* and had a horizontal rather than a hierarchical structure. Each isolated local group proceeded with its own set of rules vision and command structure, and only occasionally communicated with others in times of need. Having been ignited by the rejection of the draft constitution the 2000 occupations unfolded in a dramatic fashion, but had clear linkages with the early 1998 occupations. Some analysts have argued that the 2000 land occupations were 'spontaneous' (Feltoe 2004, Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003, Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 2004) Spontaneity connotes '*suddenness*' and severally rising actions from below, following the 'No' vote in the February referendum. Many War Veterans interviewed agree with this picture, claiming that 'no one can say I am the one who sent people there' (Interview with War Veteran Pf, who later became one of the zone commanders in mid 2000). MT (Interview with MT 2001), a War Veteran who coordinated occupation in Mazowe and Matepatepa, was clear that:

> *The whole thing was* ***spontaneous.***[227] *There was no central point that gave any direction, not even the party, not the government, not the leadership of the War Veterans*

[226] I put it to one dispossessed White farmer that they were myopic in failing to accept the approach of War Veterans to share land in the first place and he argued that in Shamva they went into similar agreements but that these could not be implemented because ZANU-PF chiefs disrupted the whole thing when they eyed those farms (discussion with Gl, travelling to Concession and back, 2006).

[227] Emphasis mine. Spontaneity can here be perceived as a pun with double meaning. The nationwide occupations of February 2000 were sudden and not vertically organised and therefore can be termed spontaneous. However this spontaneity is based on a long term development of the land movement from colonial times and in this case this was not spontaneous.

> *– it was **spontaneou**s … no central directing, organising platform … It is not Dr. Hunzvi who is the Chairman of the War Veterans' Association, who gave direction. It is not the President, Cde Mugabe - the President of the party and government. It is not anybody … For example, here in Mazowe, nobody told us to do anything. … We decided it on our own. … We simply organised the local people here and a few War Veterans and then we went to demand land from Akwoods.*[228]

The land occupations can thus be characterised as relatively isolated and disconnected, with variation reflecting the nature and characters of the occupying group and its linkages with surrounding institutions. Boundaries of groups and their overlaps were determined by mutual negotiation between and amongst the War Veterans groups. The boundaries kept shifting as the groups adjusted in order to achieve effectiveness, considering terrain, manpower and level of resistance to the occupations. To the extent that one can speak of a central coordination it was rather ad-hoc and oriented towards local situations. DMT, (Interview with DMT, a War Veteran with a degree in political science and administration, 2000) who coordinated land occupations, said:

> *Initially I had told [Harare War Veteran]) that they should not encroach on farms in this area, that Mazowe Citrus would become the boundary with the people from Harare, that they would operate in that area in Mazowe South and the people near Concession, and Glendale, would operate in the other farms. But when it became apparent later on that there was not sufficient force for this area, I then changed and would ask them to come as far as Concession. So every weekend I would ask them to come. 'And as you come let us join hands, our next target this time is A,' then we would go there. 'The next is B, and we go together. Just like that, this is how we were doing it.'*

It is possible to read too much into evidence that ZANU-PF people and infrastructure were used. For example, occupations were organised by War Veterans in Harare at the ZANU-PF provincial office located along Harare's 4th Street. This is where occupiers assembled, organised resources and launched occupations from with War Veteran leaders directing operations. However, as soon as each group left Harare, they operated independently and as local conditions dictated (Participant observation, Harare, 2000). The plot theory of history is always tempting, but the evidence reviewed in this chapter confirms that although land occupation draws upon the cultural and experiential background of both War Veterans and peasants, it initially bubbled up in spontaneous ways 'from below'. The idea of a carefully organised 'stunt' by the ruling party is not consistent with the evidence here assessed. It was only when the occupation movement had begun to assume an unstoppable momentum of its own that an alarmed political class moved in to control it. By an irony, those who eventually acquired land through seeking to control this spontaneous land occupation movement, are members of a political class that earlier did little to redistribute it. This is not a recipe for agrarian peace.

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[228] Dr. Hunzvi's statement is very clear about the role played by ZNLWVA (*The Standard* 15-19 March 2000), *'I must categorically state that I am not and was not responsible for the occupation of farms.'* Many researchers have erroneously dressed the ZNLWVA in borrowed robes giving them credit for organising land occupations. For example, Moyo and Yeros (2005: 189) claim that '*The land occupation movement was organised by the War Veterans' Association*.' This needs correction, as the association, in its official capacity did not organise occupations but they were organised at local level outside the structure of the association.

5.7 Conclusion

The way the occupations started and spread after the government sponsored referendum was rejected illustrates the widespread demand for land by the marginalised, and confirms that government had little or no control over occupations. In fact at the time occupations began, the War Veterans were still fighting ZANU-PF, the state and President Mugabe. Attempts to co-opt the land movement came soon afterwards, but this was not easy to achieve, considering the horizontal, emergent, unsupervised structure of the occupation movement.

This chapter has offered key evidence to address the research question about continuities and discontinuities in the land movement at different periods. The occupations of 2000 were not immediately premeditated, and surprised even some of the participants in the way events took off, as they did in February of that year. They were, in Durkheimian terms (cf. Durkheim 1995 [1912]), 'effervescent', and carried along many in the emotion of the moment, even where their interests were perhaps not best served by joining in (e.g. some farm workers). As with the 1998-9 occupations, the events of 2000 drew upon local structures and ad hoc initiatives by War Veterans and community leaders. The War Veterans' Association did not initiate the occupations, nor did the central structure of ZANU-PF or organs of the state. In Nyabira, Mazowe and Matepatepa occupations were organised horizontally rather than vertically, with each local group employing its own tactics, determining its own boundaries of operation, and mobilising its own manpower and resources. As a result, the occupations took very varied forms, depending on the group composition and War Veteran leadership. However, common to all the occupations were basic approaches, such as establishing a local command structure and central administrative bases, and mobilising peasants and farm workers. In this sense, occupations of the year 2000 were similar to the early occupations of 1998-9. The pool of ideas came from the war years. We can say that the institutional capital, like the War Veterans themselves, remained only partially demobilised!

The main difference between early and later occupations is the manner in which government and the ruling ZANU-PF influenced them, as we shall see in the next chapter. The shifting relations between ZANU-PF, the state and President Mugabe impacted upon the land occupations in a variety of ways. In 2000 the state position shifted in three major ways. Some state officials and organs opposed the movement and tried to reverse, it but in vain. Later, with the unwavering support of the movement by President Mugabe, the state participated in the land occupations, and mobilised its own groups, carrying allegedly violent campaigns. After this, the state worked against the land occupiers, and instead supported a new group of 'Young Turks', i.e. ZANU-PF politicians and relatives of the powerful elite. This argument is developed more fully in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 6

TECHNOCRACY AND AFRICAN LAND USE: TECHNOLOGICAL CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES IN ZIMBABWE'S AGRARIAN TRANSFORMATION

6.1 Introduction

Zimbabwe's land occupation movement challenged the legacy of settler colonisation in other ways than just ownership of the land (Sadomba 1999a; 1999b). The occupiers challenged the legitimacy of the settlers in all respects, and this meant raising the question of technology[229]. At least from the time of White agricultural ideologues such as Alvord, (an agricultural missionary who promoted 'scientific techniques' and condemned African beliefs and agricultural practices) the way the land was managed had been a contentious issue between Whites and nationalists. The settlers justified their ownership through their (supposedly) advanced techniques. The land movement proclaimed an African sense of custodianship. Technological consequences were implied. This chapter examines what this has meant, at least in the short term (i.e. the last decade or so). Land redistribution and occupation introduced new contradictory elements into the government policy framework for agriculture, and technology choices were now imbued with all the contradictions and competing interests apparent in the land struggle. Indigenous and received agricultural philosophy and techniques openly clashed as arguments swayed back and forth between small and large scale commercial production, household food security and sovereignty and national economic demands, and old and the new perceptions of the agrarian technological agenda. In this chapter we discuss land redistribution in the context of policy, technocracy and technology, in order to review continuities and discontinuities within Zimbabwe's agrarian transformation, as apparent in the set of occupation case studies upon which this thesis has drawn.

The land occupation movement was a challenge to the status quo in several different ways. It directly challenged the settler property regimes and indirectly it challenged the legacy of colonial, capitalist production relations and modernist agriculture, as we shall see in this chapter. The land movement sought to change the structure of ownership of land by redistributing it to the landless and marginalised peasants, farm workers and War Veterans. In general, it aimed to establish small-holder farming communities as opposed to large scale commercial enterprises, the latter having been a characteristic feature of the settler era. This change entailed a different technological thrust. The resurgence of the War Veterans' land movement, and its success in forcing a reluctant state to break up and redistribute large scale commercial farms, increased the intensity of debate as to the merits of elite and

[229] Among the literature on recent land reform in Zimbabwe, a paper by Chaumba, Scoones and Wolmer (2003) is noteworthy for having raised debate about technological issues on newly occupied African farms, and in pointing out the danger of re-appplying established land use planning methodologies. The present chapter rises to the challenge issued by these authors in focusing upon radical technological alternatives for Zimbabwean small-holder land use.

grassroots perceptions and practices, and between competing technical notions based in Western scientific and indigenous African agricultural practices.

This chapter on the technological consequences of the land movement describes a struggle mounted by the land movement to challenge an entrenched technocratic order, and inappropriate government technology policy towards small-holder farmers. As discussed earlier, Alvord continued to rule Zimbabwe's small-holder agricultural policy from the grave. Agricultural policies focused on the master farmer, and the demonstrator remained largely intact after independence and a myth of racial technological superiority was transmuted into a doctrine that a scientific elite knew best, despite lack of empirical evidence in many areas to support the assumptions of Alvordism.

6.2 Contextualising technology shifts

Agro-technology is never a truly independent variable. It interacts with its context. The natural resource base (soils, rainfall and so forth) are obviously important. But technology also interacts with its social and institutional environment. Techniques that might work on similar land in other parts of the world may unexpectedly fail if labour lacks the skill, or peasant farmers have other aims in life than meeting the needs of a highly unstable international market for commodities. The land movement justified its actions in terms of social justice, with the implication that Zimbabwe would have to modify its policy of reliance on large-scale commercial farms. The technology system had been configured to meet the needs of these larger farmers; now it would have to shift its focus towards the needs of a much larger base of smaller-scale semi-commercial farmers. The upheaval in land ownership regimes in Zimbabwe has been too recent to attempt a full-scale interpretation of consequences in terms of technology and technology-support services (i.e. research and extension). What the present chapter attempts is to trace some of the moves of the major actors, e.g. the kinds of technology strategy pursued (or envisaged) by major players, notably land occupiers and government. Conditions allowed only for impressions rather than sustained fieldwork based analysis, but a major resource for this study is my own experience. I was involved in trying to run an occupied farm, and so am able to act as my own 'informant' to some extent. The big picture may change as others study the transformation process over time, but the experience and testimony stemming from the initiative with which I was associated is offered here as a resource for future further analysis and debate. The first task attempted, however, is a framing of technological issues as they presented themselves during different phases of the recent land transformation. One way of understanding this transformation is to pay attention to the changes that took place during three phases - the occupations, and the fast track and Murambatsvina phases of the land reform process. These phases are linked to distinct policy frameworks and technology thrusts that continue variously to impact on farm management and farming systems in Zimbabwe.

6.2.1 Periodising technology changes

In Chapter 5, we saw that the period between 1998 and 2001 was the occupation phase, followed by the Fast Track period from 2001 to 2005 and the Murambatsvina period, still ongoing (2008).[230]

6.2.2 Social context of technology of the occupation period

The occupation phase was marked by rapid shifting and cyclical changes in alliance of forces with conflicts between the White farmers and occupiers. A timeline analysis reveals that in the nationwide occupations of 2000, the first wave of occupiers was organised mainly from outside the farms by War Veterans. This ignited peasant mobilisation (with or without War Veterans) to occupy farms bordering communal lands or interior farms. During this initial phase leading peasant and War Veteran activists failed (in a number of cases) to target farm workers for mobilisation, and White farmers took advantage of this strategic lapse to begin to mobilise farm workers instead. This explains the initial conflict between farm workers and occupiers. However, in other areas, farm workers initiated occupations, or were direct targets of mobilisation by outside occupiers.[231] The later period of the occupation phase was different, and more emphasis was placed on mobilising farm workers for occupations.

It is important to understand the variation in composition of the main occupation groups because this determined the nature of the conflicts between occupiers and White commercial farmers, and had consequences for the immediate aftermath of occupations. A number of tactics were used by occupiers to establish authority over occupied land, and these tactics were resisted by White farmers in a variety of ways, including ploughing in the fields that occupiers had cropped and chasing organising Movement of Democratic Changes (MDC) supporters and farm workers to chase occupiers away. The most widespread action of occupiers was to negotiate with the White farmer to share the land. At times the negotiation might involve claiming a whole farm in cases of multiple farm ownership. In other cases the negotiation involved subdividing a single farm, if it was larger than government regulated maximum size.[232] These negotiations were followed up with written agreements

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[230] I periodise War Veteran-led occupations of Zimbabwe in these three phases. The occupation period (1998-2001) is the time when the land movement was in control of its own destiny to some extent, albeit with varying degrees of conflict with the state. During this period the main conflict was between movement and the White commercial farmers. The second phase, the fast track, was marked by a clear strategy by ZANU-PF elites in government to control the land movement. The Murambatsvina phase was a crackdown on the land movement, using state force to intimidate War Veterans. It was characterised in particular by demolition of houses built on occupied lands in the outskirts of urban areas.

[231] For example in Gomba, the Hwata and Zumba people who occupied land on grounds that they were autochthons, then excluded farm workers and War Veterans. In Matepatepa, peasants from bordering Chiweshe communal lands mobilised seasonal farm workers who had homesteads in the communal lands. In peripheral Nyabira area War Veterans from Harare mobilised farm workers from the onset, having learnt lessons about the role of farm workers from their participation in the 1998 occupations. In central Nyabira agro-industrial area, seasonal and commercial sex workers, with a few War Veterans working at the railways complex, occupied surrounding farms. (for further examples of farm worker occupations see also Rutherford 2003).

[232] It is important to note that during the occupation period occupiers tried to adhere to government policy on farm acquisition which was based on one household per farm and fixed (maximum)|farm sizes for each agro-ecological region. However occupiers also

where farmers ceded their rights of ownership of certain pieces of land or whole farms (Personal observations 2000, Interview with P, War Veteran leaders of occupations, 2000, Interview with DTM 2000, Interview with Mrs. Kaurudza 2000). These negotiations were followed by specific actions to establish the authority of the newcomers. New farmers started to crop the areas reserved for them and build to build shacks for accommodation.

6.2.3 Social context of technology change during Fast Track

The Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) (2001-4) following on from the War Veterans' led occupations (1998-2001) culminated in redistribution of large scale commercial farms, to the predominant benefit of small farmers. An analysis of the outcome of land redistribution can shed some light on the variety of interests and perceptions of agrarian transformation and the struggles among interest groups within the land movement. Table 6.1 shows the nature of distribution by 2004.

included in their criteria the relations of the farmer with the surrounding community and with his or her farm workers.

Table 6.1 The new land ownership structure

Farm class	Land tenure	Farms/Households numbers	% of total	Area Hectares (million ha)	% of total	Farm size (ha)
Smallholder	Communal	1,100 000		16.400		15
	old resettlement	72,000		3.700		51
	A1	140,866		4.236		32
	Sub-total	*1,312,866*	*98*	*24.336*	*72.8*	*19*
Small to medium Scale commercial	Old SSCF	8,000		1.400		175
	Small A2	13,000		1.429		110
	Sub-total	*21,000*	*1.6*	*2.829*	*8.5*	*135*
Large scale Commercial	Medium-LargeA2	1,500		0.900		600
	Black LSCF	1,440		0.900		625
	White LSCF	1,377		1.200		871
	Sub-total	*4,317*	*0.3*	*3.000*	*9*	*695*
Corporate estates	Company	743		1.400		1,884
	Church	64		0.041		641
	Parastatal	153		0.600		3,922
	Sub-total	*960*	*0.1*	*2.041*	*6.1*	*2,126*
Transitional	Unallocated			1.239	3.6	
Total		1,339,143	100	33.445	100	N/A

Source: Moyo 2005: 21

Notes

Peasants: land sizes range between 1 and 30 ha, depending on natural region, with family arable land ranging from 0.2 to 5.0 ha, plus common grazing land. 'Communal' land and A1 are of the same tenure type; the former refers to pre-existing lands, the latter to resettlement lands.

Small and middle capitalists: comprise 'old' farmers from the colonial period and 'new' Black farmers, including those with post independence allocations on 'small-scale commercial farms' and the fast-track beneficiaries. 'Small capitalist' farms range between 30-100 ha, depending on natural region, while 'middle capitalist' farms range between 40-150 ha, again depending on natural region.

Large capitalists: farms range between 150 and 400 ha in NR I/II to 1,500 ha in NR IV.

Corporate farms: range from 1,000 to 1,500 ha, but few are near the lower hectarage mark.

A closer examination of this table reveals that about 98 percent of the land was allocated to the groups categorised as peasants. The land movement largely drew its membership from this category of people. This category was the biggest in terms of population size resettled, but looking at the land area occupied received the smallest per capita share. The smallest farmers are 98 percent of land holders, but settled on only 72 percent of the land, whereas 7 percent of small to medium holders owns 9 percent of the land, and large scale farmers (only 0.3 percent of all farm enterprises) own as much as 9 percent of the land, with corporate estates, comprising only 0.1 percent of all farm enterprises, owning 6 percent of the land. This skewed land distribution represents the outcome of a century of colonial history, with government efforts at agro-technical support biased towards the larger land owners. When the land movement began, forcibly to change the facts of land concentration on the ground there was a spiralling fall in production. According to the World Bank (2006: 38) the fast track 'transitional period, when new farmers took up plots, saw a drastic reduction in total area under crops, such that in the 2002-3 season the total area under commercial cropping decreased.'

During the fast track period there was rapid distribution of land, but largely or entirely on technocratic grounds. A planning section was set up in the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture during the occupation phase, and during the fast track period it was active in demarcating and allocating land via district lands committees, chaired by the District Administrator, the most senior civil servant in the district. The committees, and the ministry, failed to consider a number of pertinent issues when planning this settlement exercise. For example, when determining which farms would be demarcated into small holder (A1) schemes or large scale (A2) farms there were no set criteria to consider the actual properties of each farm. A blanket zone of farms was reserved for each of the land holding categories.[233] This undermined the interests of land movement activists, who chose specific farms for their settlement based both on social needs (e.g. proximity to their communities) and on often quite detailed agricultural plans for the future. For example some land movement actors chose farms to occupy with future plans for dairy or beef production in mind, but technocrats subdivided farms and allocated them with complete disregard for the infrastructure or suitability of the soils and other resources for the agricultural production ventures settlers had in mind. One technocrat later reflected that this approach was a mistake, since it failed to pay attention to farm infrastructure, and the potential and suitability of soils for any desirable future development (Zawe 2006). In effect, it was a 'carve up' without regard for agro-ecology or agro-technology.

Government agricultural policy continued to repeat its established focus on large-scale commercial farming. Finance, technology choices, research and extension all made effort to resuscitate a wounded commercial agricultural sector. Again

[233] Meeting held between some members of the District Lands Committee, the Provincial Governor and the National Task Force in August 2000. When the then Governor, Eliot Manyika, was asked by the Minister chairing the National Task Force, Ignatius Chombo, at the first meeting since the beginning of 2000 occupations, held in the District Administrator's office, and committee members indicated a boundary to separate area reserved for A1 from A2 farms. This was a general boundary determined only by proximity to communal lands. (Personal observation, in attendance – District Lands Committee and National Task Force meeting held at Concession, April 2000).

according to the World Bank (2006), a number of public financing schemes have been implemented since the start of the FTLRP to jump-start production on old and new farm settlements, including the Grain Marketing Board crop input scheme, ARDA irrigation fund, ARDA and Livestock Development Trust livestock support schemes and more recently, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe's Agricultural Sector Productivity Enhancement Facility (ASPEF).

What needs to be noted is that this attempt to resuscitate the commercial farming sector was not matched by urgent new efforts to provide equivalent support to small-holder settlers. Whereas before the government had under-invested in peasant agriculture, it now failed to invest in the rank-and-file of the land occupation movement. An elite bias, apparent even in the independence struggle - as argued in earlier chapters - endures today in government circles, even when faced with the facts of mass action in relation to land occupation.

Government policy during this period continued to focus on the export market, thereby effectively continuing its Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) practices of encouraging and supporting farmers through institutions like the Export Processing Zone which gave concessions to export producers including and especially in agriculture. Floriculture for example, benefitted a lot from this arrangement:

> *Between 2000 and 2005, farmers and agricultural firms could access, through the RBZ revolving fund, [investment capital from] a general incentive scheme targeted at the productive and export sectors of the economy. Under the scheme, producers could access funds at concessionary interest rates (set at 15 percent and 5 percent for the productive and export sectors respectively), with loans being channeled through agro-processors or through commercial banks … In August 2002, the RBZ provided a US $178,000 … Facility through Agribank for tobacco seedling production for all farming sub-sectors at an interest rate of 25 percent. (World Bank 2006: 57)*

Intended crop input support up to the end of this period continued to enhance a trend towards large scale commercial export agriculture, at the expense of food security and sovereignty. For example input support for maize was 35 percent of total support costs whereas tobacco had an average of 92 percent input support costs over the five year period to 2006 (World Bank 2006).

6.2.4 Social context of technology during Murambatsvina

The Murambatsvina period (2005 to date) has been characterised by use of state physical force to thwart the land movement. State agents, in a swift and surprising move, started to destroy houses built by land movement activists led by War Veterans who had taken over farms in the outskirts of towns and cities and distributed plots to the urban homeless. This was in 2005. The armed police and army moved in and destroyed these shelters for the urban poor with bulldozers, while in the agriculture sector the government was financing large scale commercial farmers in the hope of increasing the area of export crops above average. For the 2005-6 season, however, the cropped area in resettlement areas was expected to increase to more than the historical cropped area as the government adopted a target oriented model dubbed Command Agriculture, to meet minimum production requirements (World Bank 2006: 38). The sector was militarised and the Zimbabwe

National Army 'commanded' distribution of inputs, tillage and other agricultural activities in a scheme dubbed 'Operation Maguta'.[234]

However, even with this determined thrust, the stark bias towards large scale commercial farming sector remained. Reserve Bank financing was inversely related to farm size. A1 farmers, occupying 98 percent of the resettled land, got at most one eighth of the funds, with the balance going to commercial farmers on A2 farms[235]:

> *… in the 2006 budget the Government indicated that about ZW $1 trillion will be allocated for 2005-6 season crop input finance to support A1 and communal farmers whilst A2 farmers will be supported by ASPEF which the RBZ allocated ZW $7 trillion and other private financing schemes (World Bank 2006: 59)*

About 20 percent of the current tractors and 28 percent of combine harvesters have been imported since 2000. Table 6.2 shows the number of tractors and combine harvesters imported from 2000 to January 2008. Table 6.3 shows cumulative machinery acquired from phase one to three of the Farm Mechanisation Program (Gono 2007, 2008). Although the actual cost of machinery was difficult to obtain, it is clear that the value is highly skewed in favour of the A2 farmers, in all the three phases of the Farm Mechanisation Program. With high inflationary pressures generated on the national economy by such a project (estimated at more than 100,000 percent) which is accompanied by heavily subsidised fuels, seed, chemicals and fertilisers, the poor are subsidising the rich.

Table 6.2 Tractor and combine harvester imports 2000–2008

Organisation	Tractors	Combine harvesters
ARDA (2004)	432	24
ZIADA (2004)	268	-
RBZ/MAEMI and ZFDC	2,125	85
Total	2,829	109

Source: Ministry of Agricultural Engineering, Mechanisation and Irrigation Strategy Framework (forthcoming)

[234] *Maguta* is a Shona word literally meaning '*you(second person plural) are well fed*'.
[235] N.B. there were other private financing schemes in addition to the ASPEF scheme.

Table 6.3 Agricultural implements and equipment bought under the Farm Mechanization Programme. Progress up to 10 March 2008

Sub-programme	Target group	Machinery, equipment or implement	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Total
Farm mechanisation	A2 farmers, large scale commercial farmers, agricultural Institutions	Tractors	925	1,200	500	**2,625**
		Combine harvesters	35	50	20	**105**
		Ploughs	586	800	460	**1,846**
		Disc harrows	463	800	470	**1,733**
		Planters	71	300	95	**466**
		Boom sprayers	241	300	205	**746**
		Vicon fertiliser Spreaders	78	300	230	**608**
		Hay balers			10	**10 0**
	Smallholder farmers	Scotch carts		45,000	33,000	**78,000**
		Cultivators		20,000	26,200	**46,200**
		Planters		1,000	1,000	**2,000**
		Ploughs		50,000	50,000	**100,000**
		Harrows		70,000	60,000	**130,000**
		Knapsack sprayers		70,000	47,000	**117,000**
		Chains		200,000		**200,000**
SME[1] development	SMEs	Grinding mills			3,000	**3,000**
Electric generator	Farmers and small towns	Generators			5,000	**5,000**
Motor cycle supply	Extension workers	Motor cycles			680	**680**
Borehole Drilling	Not clear	Borehole drilling rigs			10	**10**
National Transport Enhancement	Health institutions and the public	Buses			300	**300**
National herd Restocking	All farmers	Heifers			3,000	**3,000**
		Bulls			120	**120**
National bio-diesel	FMP[2] beneficiaries	Diesel (liters)			100,000	**100,000**

Source: African Institute of Agrarian Studies data base (2008)

[1] Small to medium enterprises. This is a different category from the A1, A2 and Communal farmer. This category is more of agro-industry although grinding meals can also be used at the farm level for different purposes. National transport and health institutions also do not strictly fall under farm mechanisation.
[2] Farm Mechanisation Programme

6.3 Agricultural technology during the occupation period[236]

In many farms occupiers stopped all farming activities by the White farmer in areas which had been agreed to be reserved for occupiers. Some of these areas had been prepared by the White farmer for various activities. Some farmers resisted this attempt to halt activities on land claimed by occupiers, and conflict inevitably resulted, taking different courses according to the composition of each group of occupiers at the farm. In most cases, occupiers took over land and started to prepare for planting, mostly the staple maize, if land was not prepared already. This was the predominant situation in 2000. Threatened degeneration towards bloody violence tended to result from the mixed signals from government (Presidency, Police and Judiciary), and when the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) went back on agreements, to reclaim severed land. Some commercial farmers even went to the extent of ploughing over areas planted by land occupiers, burying green crops in a bid to reclaim ownership (Personal observation, Duncombe Farm, 2000).[237] At times commercial farmers sought to destroy occupiers' crops by spraying herbicides. There were also severe retaliation measures by occupiers involving the destruction of commercial crops and threatening White farmers with violence. Conflict resolution usually involved mediation by the Zimbabwe Republic Police.

These were the main challenges that occupiers faced in the initial period covering the year 2000. Farming operations in the 2000-1 season were generally constrained by the issues just outlined. This was the beginning of the wider breakdown of White commercial farming, and with it, the breakdown of established agricultural service institutions including marketing, insurance, credit, input supplies and extension services. Where occupiers planted prepared land they often did not have inputs and unless they could acquire these from the former commercial farmer – sometimes they did - yields were very low; only a few managed to buy adequate fertilisers, pesticides and seeds. Those who had land which was not prepared did not have equipment and draught power to work the land, and subsequently it lay fallow. In some cases the occupiers used hoes and the area worked was only sufficient for subsistence cropping. During this period occupiers introduced crops that were not traditional for the commercial farming sector, such as small grains, pumpkins, cane and a variety of vegetables. There were also several ways of organising operations. Some operated on a cooperative basis and combined their resources to achieve economies of scale. Others brought in kinsfolk to supplement their own efforts with cheap labour (Personal observation 2000).[238] With all these challenges, coupled with tenure insecurity, and escalating costs of production, agricultural production generally began to fall.

The challenges of 2000 provided good lessons to the occupiers about what was required to sustain agriculture, and in the following year occupiers started to prepare

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[236] This section draws on personal experiences and observations. I participated in the occupation of Mvuradona Farm which was one of the 4 farms owned by the commercial farmer. The farm was 297 ha, with only about 20 ha of arable land, the rest being a range of mountains. Only two of us were finally settled after another two, who had been allocated plots there, rejected the offer for reasons of inadequate arable land.

[237] The Duncombe issue was later solved with ZRP mediation when occupiers had retaliated with destroying the farmer's tobacco. An agreement was entered into whereby the farmer gave part of his maize crop to the occupiers in compensation.

[238] At Umvuradona, three War Veterans combined resources and worked as a cooperative.

for the season early. Many started to negotiate with commercial farmers so that they would get assistance. Some commercial farmers were supportive and helped with land preparation and inputs. The Gs, at Concession, for example, worked with the occupiers and prepared their lands, a continuation from pre-occupation of their desire to help the Black communities (Personal observation 2003). Cooperation between commercial farmers and occupiers was quite common as both farmers and occupiers believed the future of agricultural development lied in cooperation between the big and the small. Cooperation was also seen as beneficial by the White farmers in order for them to continue operations like mechanised tillage (Zawe 2006)

Some occupiers went further in establishing good relations with White farmers.[239] At one farm in Concession where the commercial farmer was a renowned seed producer of hybrid maize[240] and soya beans, he agreed to assist the new farmers by training them in seed production. The idea came about because in the previous year (2000) occupiers and the commercial farmer established good relations, and the two sides agreed on a farm plan that would not interfere with seed production. New farmers agreed not to crop commercial maize because it would contaminate the seed. In addition they gave up part of the land that the White farmer and occupiers had both resolved would be for occupiers. The farmer facilitated registration with SEEDCO, a seed company that he had been working with for many years.

He also agreed to train and assist with resources where need arose until the new farmers graduated as seed producers. This was important because normally it took about four years probation for a farmer's seed to be accepted and certified. With the new arrangement, where operations of the new farmer were directly under the supervision of a qualified seed producer, the seed company was persuaded to accept the seed without waiting for four years. For the project to be viable the commercial farmer offered to sell irrigation equipment, including aluminium pipes, sprinklers and an 80 horse power diesel engine and pump, to the new farmers on terms through a legal agreement entered into with the assistance of the farmer's lawyers. This project was to start in the 2002-3 season but was nipped in the bud when the commercial farmer abandoned his business after being violently dispossessed of the third farm during the fast track period (Personal experience 2000-2).[241]

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[239] The cooperation between farmers and settlers was quite widespread although in some cases it was out of fear on the part of White commercial farmers that their land would be taken if they did not show compliance. In some cases there is evidence of good will, but in others farmers were clearly uncooperative. Examples of good cooperation were noted on the Collingwood, John Saul, Ramahori and Lowdale farms. These farmers assisted new farmers with land preparation, and sometimes inputs, and especially with agricultural advice. Examples of poor cooperation were noted on the Wood and Duncombe farms. This category of farmers was antagonistic to the new farmers and at times they destroyed crops and engaged in various forms of sabotage (Personal observation 2000-5, interviews with farmers and new farmers at Rocky Mountain 2001, Lowdale 2002 and Dorking 2003).

[240] In 1983 the farmer won an international award for seed production in Canada (Personal communication with H, 2000).

[241] The violent dispossession involved organisation of thugs from Chiweshe who came at night in a two ton open truck and harassed the farmer, although he was waiting to vacate after the expiry of a 90 days notice to stop farming. The farmer was ordered to take nothing but his personal belongings (clothes and utensils). All farm equipment was left behind, including the irrigation equipment that been transferred by legal agreement to the new

This case suggests that there was some scope, as the occupations matured, to address the historical lack of government technological support for small and medium-scale farmers, as mentioned above, by some kind of informal mentorship approach. As we shall now see, the opportunity was foreclosed by the government's intervention during the fast-track settlement period. During the 2000-1 season new farmers from the land occupation movement concentrated on food production for household consumption. Government had not allocated land to the new farmers, and farmers had neither inputs nor equipment. Food crops grown by the new farmers were more diverse than those of the commercial farmers. For example, during the 2000-1 season we cropped about 6.5 ha with about 5 ha of maize and 1.5 ha of millet and groundnuts. The commercial farmer had never before grown millet. We grew the crop for long term food security purposes. Millet is easier and cheaper to store for long periods. It does not require pesticides, as weevils and other pests do not destroy millet grains. In addition millet does not easily deteriorate in quality. We harvested about a tonne. In 2002, when maize began to be in short supply, the millet was our main source of food.

6.4 Agricultural technology during the fast track

The fast track created both opportunities and problems for the new farmers. This period, characterised mainly by the final exit of commercial farmers and state allocation of farms to new settlers, disrupted the emerging relationships and activities of the occupation period (Interview with DM 2003). With government and ruling party agents in control, there were new waves of occupations on occupied farms, termed '*jambanja on jambanja*' by Nyabira Mazowe Association, which started to remove land movement activists from the farms (see Chapter 7). This affected farming patterns, disrupting both emergent social relations of production and farming operations. However, some new farmers seized the opportunities created by the fast track process. There was pressure on these new farmers to produce under conditions of scarce and expensive inputs, and in an environment of harassment by the bureaucracy and party officials. Where relations had been established with former White farmers, the new farmers were condemned as 'sell outs', and were forced to cease their cooperation with commercial farmers.

Owing to this pressure, the new farmers had little chance to acquire new skills from commercial mentors, or to disengage from previous activities and turn to farming in a phased transition They now found themselves torn between demands immediately to meet expected production levels and the contingencies associated with winding up their previous engagements. In question was the issue of moving from one occupation to the other, considering the difference in earnings especially where people had established jobs or professions to attend to and were breadwinners. New farmers found it difficult to access household labour in these cases. No attention was paid by government bureaucracy and policy makers to the reorganisation of household labour, and government production expectations were highly optimistic as a result. Coupled with the yet uncertain tenure security situation, the opportunity cost of moving labour from other sectors seemed daunting

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farmer but was still physically in the commercial farmer's possession (Personal experience, 2000-2).

to many new farmers, unable to calculate what they might lose or gain, and overall production fell more sharply than the government had anticipated.

When the land movement occupied farms, there was no official allocation of land to the occupiers, who agreed among themselves to share the pieces of land they acquired from the White commercial farmers. Land allocation to new farmers was sometimes quite orderly. Under Nyabira Mazowe Self-Contained Farmers Association, for example, the association raised money from its members and engaged professional surveyors and former planners from the Ministry of Agriculture. A cadastral survey was undertaken and layout plans were produced, with appropriate land-use recommendations made to farmers through the Planning Committee. Plots had uniform sizes and specific plots were reserved for farm workers. This heightened tenure security as opposed to areas where allocation was more haphazard. However when the fast track reform started the planning by Nyabira Mazowe Association was disregarded by the government planners. Spontaneous local organisation was undermined by a rush to assert state control of the land occupation process.

Government policy on agricultural technology remained little changed despite a nationwide transformation of land ownership. Emphasis remained on sustaining commercial agriculture geared for the export market at the expense of domestic food needs and needs of local agro industry. This policy orientation dates back to the 1920s and the era of Alvordism. The decades of Alvordism (1920-50) attempted to link African as well as White agriculture to international commodity production and markets, and this demanded a heavy handed bureaucracy to instruct African farmers to abandon established (subsistence-oriented) productions systems and replace them with 'western scientific agriculture', the principle advantage of which was that it was a technological system geared to earning export revenues (an income stream readily tapped by the regime).

One instance of the kinds of changes thus induced was that Africans were required to grow maize at the expense of small grain staples, a transition more or less fully accomplished in many areas by the 1950s. Tastes accommodated the change, as did the technology. Agronomic techniques, tools, storage facilities, food processing, preparation and consumption patterns rapidly evolved to suit the new economic order and Rhodesian culture. Food diversity shrank, as did bio-diversity, owing to mono-cropping, and increased reliance on pesticides and chemical fertilisers. The 'doctrine of the plough' became a 'gospel' and a means to spread not only agricultural technology but also and especially Christian ideals (Alvord undated, The Gospel of the Plow). Livestock production was similarly affected, and inclined to exotic breeds of cattle, pigs, chicken and goats. Indigenous breeds were disregarded, and little attempt was made to improve them not withstanding arguments that they might prove better adapted to the rigours of an African environment and more resistant to disease. Alvord died in 1959 but continued to rule technology policy for small-scale farmers in Zimbabwe from the grave (Sadomba 1999). Even now, government has failed to think through the consequences of the ongoing shift in land ownership, and stays firmly within the thought patterns established during this era. In other words, there has been little if any thought given to what kinds of agro-technological changes might be more appropriate to the new land occupation scenario, and rather unsurprisingly agricultural production levels have plummeted. This is more (it is here suggested) a product of ill-designed support policy than an

inevitable consequence of the actual occupations themselves, as suggested by the fact that rapid adaptation was ongoing, fostered by mentorship by White farmers and experimentation by the land occupiers themselves, until this was halted by the 'fast track' process. The skill formation process was disrupted, and government had no contingency plan. The regime continues to cling to the ghost of Alvord.

Government continued to promote cash crops like tobacco, wheat, cotton, and soya beans, and livestock breeds, but at a time when the settler established food chain was collapsing. The centralised boards of the Agricultural Marketing Authority began to run into many problems and they could not function effectively. Yet the fast track program measured farm production in the narrow terms of producing food to appeal to European tastes, targeted for sale to the marketing boards. Failure to supply to the marketing boards was considered as failure on the part of the settled farmer, and this then became a criterion to weed out disfavoured activists of the land movement, as will be discussed in the concluding chapter. Because of adverse economic conditions and flawed policies, agriculture, measured by these market oriented crops, continued to decline:

> *Tobacco, wheat and oilseed production declined due to a reduction in the areas planted on the transferred land, limited financing of new farmers and their skills in the immediate production of specialised commodities. Loss and withdrawal of farm machinery and irrigation equipment affected plantings for most crops (Moyo 2007).*

However there is also a largely untold story about the struggles that new farmers addressed in the agrarian transformation. Many sought to sustain commercial farming activities as recommended by the government even under drought conditions in 2001-2. This drove settlers to jostle for government supplies of seed, fertilisers, fuel, irrigation equipment and pesticides. But beset by corruption, manipulation of systems by politicians and general scarcity, the distribution was inefficient and the inputs often went to regime favourites. In the farms labour migration, especially of skilled and semi-skilled manpower, was high.[242]

All these factors adversely affected agricultural production and were challenges faced by the new farmers. In this section we look at how some occupiers grappled with the challenges. I shall here draw extensively on personal experiences in discussing the determination of courses of action, the process of decision making and outcomes.

6.4.1 Case studies on changing farming systems

Facing the challenges just sketched some the land occupation movement began to adapt to the new demands. First they wanted to be represented in the governmental structures of fast track land redistribution, in order to influence decision making in land allocations. Second they sought to protect the interests of the movement by ensuring that the productive capacity of its members was raised through input

[242] For example when H, the commercial farmer, was leaving, he recommended 16 of his hard working skilled farm workers who were trained in seed production, irrigation, cattle ranching, land preparation and so on. He talked to the farm workers on this issue but when he left only I managed to retain only two ranchers and recruited another four. Some left for the rural areas; others were not permitted to work for me by the new farmer TM, who had not taken over the residential compound of the farm workers.

distribution targeted to land occupiers. Related to this, there was interest to address food supply in a situation of collapsing White commercial farming agriculture.

Although the horizontal (non-hierarchical) structure of the land movement was a successful tactic during the occupations,[243] it proved disadvantageous during the fast track redistribution, in that it was inadequate to confront the heavyweight government bureaucratic institutions administering the fast track reform. The movement seemingly required organisational weight to match the fast track structures. Thus, where robust organisational structures were formed such as the Nyabira Mazowe War Veterans Farmers' Association (later the Nyabira Mazowe Self Contained Farmers Association) it was much easier to confront the governmental machinery and to sustain the movement. The association transformed from an occupation organisation into an agrarian association with wider objectives in terms of accessing inputs needed for farming. Mashonaland West Mining Agricultural, Residential and Tourism Syndicates (MwMART) succeeded the Nyabira Mazowe Association. MwMART became a national organisation, spreading into all provinces of the country (Participant observation[244] 2005-8, Personal communication with DM, leader of land occupations and MwMART, 2007).

The Centre for Indigenous Cultures in Southern Africa (CICSA), an organisation formed by War Veterans who founded the Zimbabwe Resource Centre for Indigenous Knowledge (ZIRCIK), advocated on behalf of land occupations, and introduced online debates targeting internet users. Members of CICSA formed a broader organisation that then began to assume an international character called African Nationalistic Paradigm (ANP). This organisation had an agrarian vision and program (described below) aimed at addressing the fast track problems and problems of Zimbabwean agrarian transformation more generally. ANP advocated for promotion of African technologies and agronomic techniques in the fast track. This called for a different farming system with a greater indigenous content, as described below.

A case study of Jambanja Farm[245]

One approach of the activist veterans was to lead by example. The movement tried to set up systems to transform technologies and techniques for other farmers to learn. It therefore encouraged long term planning of plots so that farmers would consciously engage in agrarian transformation in a besieged economy.[246] In this section a particular farm planning exercise, is offered as an illustration. The plan was executed at Jambanja Farm, an A1 establishment according to the fast track classification of plot sizes. I prepared the plan, based on extensive discussion with other occupiers and War Veterans and it reflects the views of the group. It was prepared with

[243] Horizontal organisation was appropriate for speed, effective administration of small and flexible units of occupiers and the state could not control the movement.

[244] I joined MwMART and became Chairman for the Legal and Training Committee from 2005.

[245] This section of the chapter refers to a twenty five year (2000-25) agricultural plan of Jambanja Farm, 'Twenty-five Year Development Plan for Jambanja Farm' (2005), which is a piece of former Mvuradonha Farm in Concession. Extracts from the plan are in italics.

[246] In 2001, I delivered a lecture delivered at a seminar organised by the University of Zimbabwe, Department of Agriculture entitled 'The role of indigenous knowledge in a besieged economy'.

intention of influencing the movement by demonstrating a specific vision of agrarian transformation.

The document entitled 'Land Dispossession: Forced abandonment of an agricultural research centre in Mazowe,' (Sadomba 2006, see Appendix 4), summarises problems that had to be solved by a new agrarian approach. All further quotations in this section come from this source. The basic argument is as follows:

Land redistribution benefited the Black majority and caused a backlash from both settlers and metropolitan governments thereby affecting the agriculture established under the colonial systems. Institutions of agriculture developed to this point cannot serve current agrarian transformation because the socio-economic and political environment during which they were nurtured has changed. New systems, technologies, techniques, institutions and extension approaches need to be developed to support this new dispensation. This calls for mayor efforts in research.

Mission statement and objectives

The mission statement of Jambanja Farm was: '*to provide geographic space for creation of a home that will be capable of fulfilling the material and spiritual requirements (based on Zimbabwean culture) of the present family and the generations to follow and to make positive contribution to the national development of Zimbabwe and Africa in general, through maximum utilisation of the land resource' with the objectives outlined as follows:*

- *To provide security of a home with housing and recreational facilities in order to fulfil social needs of the family members, recognising that Zimbabwe is the country where family members have unhindered citizenship*
- *to undertake agricultural production to provide adequate, healthy food at all times to the members in particular and the nation at large, in general.*
- *to preserve the environment by carrying out tested methods of agronomic techniques and using appropriate technologies*
- *to focus on production of African food stuffs in order to manage balanced diet for the family's health and the nation in general and to contribute to national food security and sovereignty*
- *to provide the economic requirements of the family by producing surplus for market, adding value through agro-industrial processing and agricultural research in various areas where the family has interest*

The document assumes the activists were concerned more for the welfare and social reproduction of their households than abstract national interests and international trade. In fact, the preoccupation of the land movement was to address immediate food security requirements and economic and social security needs of the kin group. This localisation of ambition does not necessarily mean however that national objectives were to be ignored; in effect, the argument is that by strengthening the family level the nation is also strengthened. By decentralising food security and food sovereignty to the household level, the burden of top heavy bureaucratic governmental institutions would be done away with. This is an implied criticism of institutions such as the Grain Marketing Board, Dairy Board, Tobacco Marketing Board and Cold Storage Commission, all formerly part of the Agricultural Marketing Authority created in the 1930s. These organisations were highly centralised, with only a handful ofdepots scattered around the country for domestic storage and distribution of produce or international marketing. Not only was the system inefficient and expensive but it was infested with corruption. The mission

statement claims that decentralisation of food security through household food planning would have positive national impact food security and sovereignty. With hindsight it can be stated that what it does not explore is how those without access to land were to benefit from this re-emergence of agrarian family structure as an alternative to commercial centralisation.

The layout and land use plan of Jambanja

In contrast to the blueprint farm planning by government officers, the plan for Jambanja was more localised in orientation, and considered detailed variation of land potential, taking into account water, soil and natural forests. The plan states that '*the land use of Jambanja is generally divided into three component parts following the relief, soil types, the flora and fauna of the farm*'. In the following paragraphs we examine the proposed land use pattern of the farm.

The mountain

'*Covering about 75 ha … mountain … divided into … mountain proper (rocky and steeper) and the foothills (gentle). The mountain is ideally suited for preserving flora and fauna. In the mountain proper, wild fruit trees … tree species of medicinal value … (i)ndigenous [hardwood] timber … fuel wood [trees] will be grown in the mountain. Natural forest will be conserved … [and] a forest and wildlife preservation policy will be designed ... The mountain can also be used for pasture of big (cattle) and small ruminants like goats and sheep … Wild animal species will be preserved and others added for food and recreational purposes*.' (Jambanja Plan 2005)

Foothills

'*[I]ntensive conservation works (terracing) are required especially closer to the mountain where the gradient is steeper. [Exotic] fruit trees (such as avocado pear trees, peaches, mango and citrus) … [and] indigenous fruit trees (like mizhanje, mitohwe, misekesa, mitsubvu and mitamba) will be grown to satisfy dietary needs of the family and the Zimbabwean market at large. In addition, foothills will have jatropha plants … [for] fuel needs self-sufficiency*'. (Jambanja Plan 2005)

The mountain and foothills areas were not utilised by the farmers, and agricultural extension workers did not plan for these areas which were considered non-arable and excluded from farm utilisation. New farmers, however, used these areas in a variety of ways and harvested forest products. Based ultimately on Alvord's methods, agricultural extension prohibited use of these areas by new farmers, rather than providing assistance in how to manage them without destroying them. The areas were used by both farm workers and new farmers.

Potential arable dry land

'*The foothills of the mountain also constitute potential arable land measuring at least ten ha but requiring (terracing) conservation works. This virgin land will be used for cropping. Trees will be cut at the height of one and half metres … [without] stamping … so that the root system of the cut trees … prevents erosion …and renew[s] the soil. The fields will be used in rotation with the rest of the farm with at least four years of fallow after four years of continuous usage. Seasonal crop rotation … will be done*.' (Jambanja Plan 2005)

Again, potential (as opposed to actual) arable land (to allow for fallowing) was not considered by government planning officers. This effectively under-estimated the amount of land required by and thus allocated to new farmers. Jambanja farm plan, by contrast, gives details of how such areas were going to be utilised, recognising the

potential of these areas and envisaging how bio-diversity might be maintained. Arex officials advise farmers to stump cropping areas, and then to carry out mono-cropping, based on use of chemicals for fertiliser and pest control. Fallowing techniques not only improve soil and water conservation but can also have advantages for pest control (in reducing concentrations).

Current fields[247]

'*The current fields have been continuously ploughed for more that a decade now. They were completely stumped to allow European type of agriculture and were subjected to heavy doses of chemical fertilisers and pesticides. Some time is needed to cleanse these fields of the chemical residues. The general strategy is to start by growing legumes that will not demand any further chemicals but will improve the nitrogen in the soil. … A deliberate approach to reintroduce trees in the cleared field will be adopted.*' (Jambanja Plan 2005)

By 2007, trees in these fields had grown to an average height of one and half metres. These were mostly acacia species which are original indigenous trees of the area. In addition, about 200 avocado trees and 100 mango and 20 guava trees were planted along contour ridges of the currents fields in the 2007-8 planting season. Other trees planted include indigenous fruit trees and fruit species (e.g. *twisting fruit*) indigenous to the equatorial region, but introduced from Malaysia.

The vlei

'*The low-lying vlei areas are suitable for such crops as sugar cane, bananas and others that are not affected by excessive water. There are patches of miunga dominated bushes which will be preserved... African …techniques for vlei cultivation will be employed for soil and water conservation [in these fragile environments]… Flood irrigation will be developed for the area and will be used to ensure cropping throughout the year… [R]ice … wheat … yams (madumbe), tomatoes, tsenza, leaf vegetables, potatoes, sweet potatoes (mbambaira) etc will be grown in the vlei. Fodder for cattle will also be grown especially along the river system. The vlei will also be used for cropping early maize to be sold green. Orchard trees will be grown in open spaces.*' (Jambanja Plan 2005)

Government policy and extension has previously totally prohibited cropping in vleis, following on from the promulgation of the Natural Conservation Act (1941). However, there is evidence to suggest that African farmers had developed sustainable techniques of farming these fragile but potentially useful wetlands, and that colonial policy forced an abandonment of these local techniques (Sadomba 1999). The ban was extended by the post colonial government. According to the Department of Agriculture Research and Extension Services, vleis should not be cropped and they are not planned for. The Jambanja document, by contrast, proposes a carefully managed return to a local African pattern of usage.

The depressions

'*It is important that good designs of and mechanisms for harvesting water from the mountains are developed. Small dams and weirs will be constructed at strategic points along the depressions to harvest rain water and run off. This water will provide moisture for the crops in the depressions for the greater part of the year. Banana plantations, for income generating purposes, will be developed as they need minimum soil disturbance and they quickly colonise the area*'. (Jambanja Plan 2005)

[247] These are fields opened and cropped by the White commercial farmer.

Residential accommodation and agro-industrial complex

'… Houses, sheds and agro-industrial buildings will be constructed ... Residential houses will be developed to suit the requirements of the family. There will be workshops for the design and production of agricultural machinery. There will also be sheds and store houses for equipment and crops... in addition space for cattle pens, pigsty and aviary for birds will be reserved. Recreational facilities as swimming pool, tennis courts and other sporting facilities will also be located in residential premises.' (Jambanja Plan 2005)

Discussion on Jambanja

Current resettlement policy emphasises on traditional commercial agriculture and does not consider other social uses of land. The plan for Jambanja illustrates some of the wider aims of many land occupation movement activists, in seeking for a greater variety of use of land than for commercial agriculture alone. It illustrates the gap between the government's technocratic perceptions on land use (shaped by its long-time alliance with White farmers) and the perceptions of some of the new farmers. The gap will not be easily closed, however, because government continues to use Alvordian methods and criteria to determine the degree of land utilisation, disregarding other uses of space and resources. Production is therefore measured in terms of how much a farmer is delivering to the Grain Marketing Board at the end of each season without calculating any return to land in its role as a tool of social reproduction. The orientation towards mono-cropping has also limited government extension towards crops, and diverted attention away from the possibility of other land uses such as wild life conservation, indigenous forestry management, fruit growing, eco-tourism and agro-industrial development. The tendency of extension workers to view land purely as a space for cropping is limiting, and disqualifies farmers with diversified land use interests. A productivity discourse dominates the current debate about land use in Zimbabwe, advanced by both professionals and academics and tends to neglect more holistic African approaches to land use. In this regard, it can be stated that there is a conceptual conflict between Western scientific and indigenous African land use perspectives. This conflict becomes clear in government policy for allocation of A2 farms. Government demands submission of a cash flow statement to determine allocation, yet this will not capture these other uses of land aimed at social reproduction and cultural development in the Zimbabwean family group.

In commenting on government policy as an artefact of White farmer agriculture mainly oriented towards international markets at the expense of domestic food requirements, social reproduction and growth, Moyo (2005: 19) observes that:

> *…Large Scale Commercial Farmers in Zimbabwe produced over 80 percent of all predominantly exported crops (e.g. tobacco, beef, tea, etc), except cotton with 75 percent produced by peasants, and of the high value food and agri-industrial commodities (dairy, beef, oils, fruits, and vegetables), which met domestic markets (middle class urban 'demand'), while the peasants produce over 70 percent of the lower value staple foods, (comprising the consumption of peasant and working class wage –goods), such as maize , small grains and peanut products, and 'indigenous' fruits, herbs and vegetables.*

Land activists associated with ANP seek a break with the past 100 years of technically-focused thinking about land-use in Zimbabwe. Whether the land activists can sustainably implement their alternative vision remains to be seen.

6.4.2 Agrarian changes more generally

A major question arising from studying Zimbabwe's land occupations concerns the degree of success of the movement? What instruments can be used to measure success or failure of the movement? Was land transfer from White settlers to the Black indigenous population seen by the occupiers as an end in itself or a means to an end? If indeed the movement just aimed at transferring land from the Whites to Blacks then it might be judged successful and occupiers' objectives achieved. However, continued internal conflict within the liberation movement, and the land movement specifically, suggests that redistribution is better regarded as a means to an end, and this is often what the occupiers themselves believe. These beliefs embrace envisaged equitable access to land (see Chapter 6). Occupiers also widely hoped that land occupations would be a route to poverty alleviation, household food security, and effective reproduction of an African family-based way of life. These ambitions include social as well as economic criteria for success and failure. It would be imprudent to judge the outcome of the land occupations at this stage since long-term empirical studies will be required, stretching over at least several decades (cf. Kinsey 1999a; 1999b), observing developments in the agrarian transformation of Zimbabwe over the last eight years, as a participant, does appear to shed some light on some specific aspects.

So far, scholars and analysts have tended to judge the land occupations through data relating to agricultural production and productivity trends from 2000, i.e. according to narrow economic criteria (Raftopolous 2003, Sachikonye 2005, Selby 2006) and have concluded occupations proved largely futile. However the World Bank (2006) and Moyo and Yeros (2005), following the same economic model of evaluation, has argued that decline in production trends have to be viewed in a disaggregated way, since some sectors declined, others were constant and yet others show a general improvement.

When War Veterans took over leadership of the land movement for a period, a widespread motivation was to recapture and revive the liberation agenda abandoned during the period of alliance between settler capital and the nationalist ruling elite. Owing to different ideological perception within the War Veterans' movement, visions on land as a cause for and result of liberation, also differed. Many War Veterans subscribed to the idea of *Gutsaruzhinji,*[248] meaning to satisfy the aspirations of the majority. This doctrine, based on socialist theory, argues that majoritarian rights supercede individual rights and access to resources, especially land. In the Zimbabwean context this majoritarian doctrine (instead of supporting a move towards, e.g. State ownership) has merged with older African communitarian ideas, about family, homestead, kin group and the rights of the rural collectivity. With state assistance, removal of White commercial farmers and settlement of Africans

[248] This concept, articulated during the liberation struggle and emphasised during the ZIPA period, was discussed by one War Veteran who was one of the leaders of a movement for reclamation of diamond resources in Marange (Interview X, July, 2007). The War Veteran who was critical of ZANU-PF nationalists who were using state apparatus to deny the local population access to the diamond resources asked a rhetorical question, 'Is this the satisfaction of the majority (*gutsaruzhinji*) that we talked about as policy of ZANU?'

achieved wide distribution of land to the majority. However, in spite of this, War Veteran and land occupiers continued to fight against ZANU-PF stalwarts, some of whom continue to believe (apparently) in a kind of state socialism, but a majority of whom are convinced believers in the doctrine of private property and individual success, once they have been able to achieve this condition through use of state power.

Linked to the communitarian/majoritarian concept – a significant view among the War Veterans, and hence a reason for their continued opposition to the mainstream in ZANU-PF - is an emphasis on decentralisation linked to enthusiasm for an evolving African agriculture as opposed to Alvordian ideas of modernisation, centralisation of services, and demand for huge infrastructural investment. Food security would necessarily become (according to the communitarians) a household concern. This change contradicts the approach through which the food security of the nation is to be measured more or less by the amount of grain delivered to and stored at the national depots. Statistics based on reserves in such depots thus (according to communitarians) offer only a very partial and biased picture of success or failure in the agrarian sector. Land redistribution empowered households to control of their own food security and widened the variety of crops grown in the former commercial farms (AIAS survey 2006). Again, this broadening of diversity of food crops is not necessarily reflected in aggregate figures equating agricultural items considered important for export. After occupation, settled farmers shifted land use patterns in ways that offered enhanced food security according to the communitarian view of things.

For example, 32 percent of the respondents in a sample of 308 households in a baseline survey carried out by African Institute of Agrarian Studies, confirmed that maize was cropped at the relevant farms by the White commercial farmers before the FTLRP. However after the program, maize land use had increased to 44 percent of cropping. This can be compared to a major non-food cash crop, tobacco; 32 percent of respondents said tobacco was the preferred crop previously but this had fallen to 16 percent. Land used for cattle ranching, mainly embarked on for export to the EU, by commercial farmers, shifted from 10 percent before FTLRP to 1.7 percent. Again, it is significant that 50 percent of the shift of land from ranching went to maize (AIAS survey 2005). In addition a wider variety of food crops is being cropped in the newly resettled farms and this is in effect a sign of the return of the land to African agriculture more on the lines associated with the period before the full impact of settler colonialism (Sadomba 1999). Ironically, it was Emery Alvord who was one of the first to recognise the significance of this point 'Food for Natives comes from great many sources. They have a great many more varieties of foods than do Europeans.[249]' (Alvord 1929). Other food crops mainly used traditionally as sauces and relish, like

[249] Alvord, 1929, Agricultural Life of Rhodesian Natives. NADA 7:pages 9-16 He gives a list of some of the common crops grown that he knew but the list was not at all exhaustive. Currently there are food crops that were not grown by commercial farmers that have been introduced by the indigenous farmers, e.g. millet, rainfed sugar can, variety of pumkin and harvest of wild vegetables like black jack (*nhungunira)*, *derere,* wild spinash *(bowa sena*), and insects like termites (*ishwa*), White ants (*majuru*), larvae (*madora*) etc. (Personal observation, Mvuradonha Farm, Concession, 2000-8). This was not source of food in the commercial farming areas before the land reform and access of these foods goes to the Harare market.

sugar beans, groundnuts, cowpeas and round-nuts which grow and are consumed like ground nuts, also gained area, whereas non traditional crops such as sunflower, wheat, and paprika lost ground. This suggests that land redistribution may have enhanced food sovereignty, as people shifted land use towards food crops and away from export markets.

Many occupiers viewed land redistribution as only the beginning of a much longer process to reinstate the social and cultural position of the indigenous population. Land was seen by some as a vehicle to bring to centre stage African religion and land management institutions. In this regard, occupiers often started to involve institutions associated with the chief and the spirit medium in the administration of the reclaimed lands. During occupations, as has been illustrated (Section 5.3), spirit mediums sometimes played a critical role in organising traditional leaders and communities, and in spearheading occupations. The spirit which possesses the medium is considered to be that of the progenitor, and therefore ancestor of the chief. In that sense the medium is senior to the chief when it comes to governance.

The spirit, through the medium, commands the chief on how the land is to be administered. However, the spirit medium, because of his/her centrality in African religion, is an institution confronted both by Christian missionaries and colonial authorities. The spirit of opposition was (correctly) seen to lie with the spirit medium. As a result, the chief was co-opted into the colonial administration, but the spirit medium was not, and this situation continues today, the present Government's rise to power notwithstanding. The occupation movement, by contrast, has tended to reconfigure the position of the spirit medium, and it can be claimed that most newly settled farmers conform to the institution to varying degrees. This has resulted in performance of *biras* convened by spirit mediums, such as one observed in Gomba during fieldwork. It has also resulted in recognition and renovation of sacred sites that had lost their value during occupation by White commercial farmers. The specific mediums are now consulted about the administration of those areas (Personal communication, Sibao, 2006, Interview with Pt 2007). Increased recognition of the spirit medium is thus tending to change the religious landscape of the country. It is difficult to predict, at present, however whether the land movement will manage to persuade government to recognise the renewed strategic significance of spirit mediums and sacred sites as plans to rule the land from which the Whites have finally been excluded progress.

So far, it is the position of the chief that has been entrenched. The chief's role, traditionally, was to administer land on behalf of ancestors and to provide resources to the less privileged in society including those who suffer unforeseen calamities (Sadomba 1999a, 1999b, 2000a). Occupiers resuscitated the *zunde ramambo* concept, as described in Chapter 4, engaged the *svikiro* spirit mediums and revived the *bira* ceremonies. Learning from the role played by traditional leaders in occupations, the government has opportunistically elevated the social and economic position of chiefs. But this is very much in line with the co-option of the institution during colonialism, with chiefs increasingly widely viewed as agents of the ruling party to mobilise the electorate in their areas to vote for the party. It is possible to anticipate that the unresolved tensions between the ruling political elite and many in the land occupation movement might eventually play out in opposition between spirit mediums and government-backed chiefs, perhaps generating some of the anti-chief

violence seen in African war zones where conflict reflects unrecognised agrarian tensions (Chauveau and Richards 2008).

The single biggest weakness of the communitarian vision is what to do about those who have no realistic access to land in the immediate future before agrarian reform has impact on industrial development of the country. Focus on food production, security and sovereignty removes attention and investment in industrial development at least in the initial stages of agrarian transformation although horizontal and vertical linkages of agricultural production are likely to have multiplier effects on industrial growth.[250] 'Self reliance' and 'back to the land' messages may work for those with access to land, but Zimbabwe has a large population of workers and the unemployed with no direct land access who need jobs immediately. Many are migrants to the country. Communitarian visions can – when pursued to excess – either lead to schemes such as in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge to force urban and professional workers back into the villages to labour on the land, or (as in some African countries) fuel cries for (African) migrant 'foreign' workers to be repatriated (e.g. Cote d'Ivoire). As shown in previous chapters, the War Veteran-led land occupation movement has been conscious to some extent of this issue, in that it sought to mobilise workers as well as peasants in the land struggle. Some thereby became new farmers. But the issue of land access and land rights for farm and urban workers will continue to dog the Zimbabwean land activists if their vision of a just and sustainable communitarian vision of 'back to the land' is ever to be fully realised.

[250] The second and third phases of the 25 year plan of Jambanja has ideas of agro-industrial development mainly focused on food processing of produce at the farm and the surrounding areas. In a document to the District Lands Committee (see Appendix 3) a example forward linkages of industry and farming according to ANP vision is described as: "*I influenced some scholars to take MSc. research … [in] Food Science and Technology [for one] … and BSc. in food science and nutrition [for another] ... Professor C's (now with Fort Hare in SA) interest in studying local breeds was as a result of many discussions and his involvement with our research projects. We had started designing researches on indigenous food like different* ***mutakura*** *mixtures in order to develop precooked and canned* ***mutakura*** *for specific nutritional requirements for people like lactating mothers, AIDS patients, diabetic patients and so on. This project is current although it has had personnel disturbances.*" (Mutakura is a whole grain diet of different mixtures. Usually groundnuts, round nuts (*nyimo*), maize, are mixed in different proportions and cooked. Mutakura can also be cooked with beef, pork and any other meat to both flavor it and increase nutritional value).

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION: THE LAND MOVEMENT IN ITS WIDER POLITICAL CONTEXT

The main part of this thesis has looked at the 2000 land occupations, focusing on their organisation, mobilisation, strategies and tactics. These chapters also analysed different approaches to occupation, as led by peasants, farm workers and war veterans. It has been argued that land occupations were complex in organisation and tactics. This final chapter will attempt to position the land movement in relation to the Zimbabwean political context, and specifically the different political and institutional arrangements that have shaped and have in turn been shaped by the land movement. Particular emphasis will be placed on the role played by the ruling the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party and opposition Movement of Democratic Change (MDC), as well as by civil society organisations. As already noted in Chapter 4 the development of the War Veteran Movement has been affected by its interaction with the state, and ruling party (ZANU-PF). The War Veterans were often regime loyalists, in the sense that they had fought for the president's faction in the war, but relations soured later. By the time of the occupations conflicting interests had reached the level of open antagonism.

It would be wrong to imply the relationship between War Veterans, the state and President Mugabe was ever simple and unidirectional; it was in fact complex, with many twists and turns. It involved complicity as well as contradictions, alliances as well as antagonisms, authority as well as subordination, inclusion as well as exclusion. To round off this account of war veteran activism in regard to land we need to explore more of this complex interaction, by paying attention to the wider political and institutional environment of the land occupation movement.

Foweraker (1995: 63) postulates that 'social movements are shaped by their political and institutional context as well as shaping that context in some degree' (see also Benford and Hunt 1992). This statement links to the second research question of this thesis 'What forces evolved around the land issue and how did the land movement interact with these forces?' This chapter provides an opportunity to address this question.

7.1 Relations and interaction with ZANU-PF and the state

The relationship between ZANU-PF and the War Veterans has been a subject of debate among academics and political analysts. One school of thought argues that the War Veterans were 'bought out' by ZANU-PF in 1997 (a specific piece of evidence concerns the granting of $50,000) per each ex-combatant as unpaid pension since independence. This leads to the conclusion that War Veterans were co-opted as agents of ZANU-PF (Personal communication McGregor 2005). This chapter will suggest that the co-option thesis is too simple. During the early occupations (1998-February 2000) attempts may have been made to co-opt the War Veterans, but these

attempts had not yet succeeded. The turning point in the relationship between ZANU-PF and the War Veterans reflected a process of change in Zimbabwe's political, economic and social life as a whole. That change, as this thesis argues, took almost a decade to reach a climax, leading to the occupations at the turn of the Millennium. Only after the referendum, and specifically after the first ZANU-PF Politburo meeting held a week after the referendum, was there any reconsideration of trying once again to co-opt the War Veterans by ZANU-PF and President Mugabe.

Relationship between the state, ZANU-PF and the land movement can also be discerned from the interactions with the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA). In 1999, Dr. Hunzvi, the Chairman of ZNLWVA spent some time in custody and under restriction.[251] The allegations levelled against him included serious criminal offences (planning the murder of top ZANU-PF officials, and looting of War Victims' funds). Many War Veterans interpreted these trumped-up charges as a pretext by ZANU-PF elites to try and get rid of a militant chairman. When he was brought to court War Veterans demonstrated in High Court, disrupting the proceedings by singing revolutionary songs and standing on and banging table-tops (*The Herald* 19 February 1999). The state was reduced to making fatuous threats. '[S]ix of those on the hit list … warn[ed] Hunzvi … to watch out' (*Eastern Star* 5 March 1999). There were even allegations that Hunzvi was on the pay roll of an opposition party, ZANU-Ndonga, led by Reverand Ndabaningi Sithole (*The Financial Gazette* 25 February 1999). These allegations and actions against the Chairman of War Veterans illustrate are a sign of the bad blood between the ruling party elites and the War Veterans at that stage.

By July 1999 open conflict had broken out between the War Veterans and the government, ruling ZANU-PF and President Mugabe. Some War Veterans locked out a group of visitors including one senior ZANU-PF member, former Air Marshall Josiah Tungamirai, a member of ZANU-PF Politburo, accusing him '*of* being one of the top party officials and an oppressor', as reported by Zimbabwe inter Africa News Agency (Ziana 13 July 1999). The conflict escalated further to the point where the ZNLWVA contemplated disown Mugabe (*The Herald* 9 July 1999): 'Chenjerai Hunzvi stated that the association would disown President Mugabe as its patron if he refused to ... discuss their demands for $500,000, land issue and funeral grants… .'

Mugabe refused to meet the War Veterans. Moreover (*The Herald* 15 July 1999) he also refused: '…to give his assent on … [the] War Veterans Amendment Bill [that] would have allowed ex-combatants to claim $500,000 gratuities and $2,000 monthly pensions … .'

The level of conflict between the War Veterans and the ruling party had reached a climax. Meanwhile, however, power struggles also raged in the association and attempts were made to overthrow Hunzvi by a faction led by Cosmas Gonese and others (Personal observation, ZANU-PF Headquarters, 1999).[252]

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[251] Hunzvi was restricted by a court order and was not allowed to travel 40km outside Harare. According to *The Herald* (16 February 1999) *'Muzenda distance[d] himself from Hunzvi [after] Hunzvi had addressed a meeting which was a breach of one his bail conditions and claimed that he had [the] acting president (Muzenda)'s consent.'*

[252] I attended the meeting, which was poorly organised, and operated no screening of the delegates to ensure equal representation of the all provinces. For example, I only managed to

Power struggles were threatening the organisation with collapse as Hunzvi vs Gonese Cosmas. Hunzvi had been replaced as president by Moffat Maradhwa in an emergency meeting[253] of 10 provincial executives. (The Herald 14 March 1999)

The power struggles that rocked the association during this period were viewed by many War Veterans as infiltration of the organisation by the state's Central Intelligence Organisation. A number of times, Hunzvi's credentials were questioned and former commanders of Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) like Dumiso Dabengwa threatened to vet Hunzvi afresh, claiming to doubt his (Hunzvi's) war credentials (*The Financial Gazette* 25 February 1999). The issue of vetting Hunzvi and attempts to discredit him for not being a trained guerrilla is based on a difference of understanding among commentators about the nature of the (War Veteran) Movement, as opposed to holding the status of ex-guerrilla. War Veterans (i.e. trained ex-combatants making up the bulk of the movement) tended to bother less about whether one had received military training as by a potential member's orientation and class leanings within the liberation movement; in short it was an emergent quasi-political organisation seeking to continue the agenda for which many War Veterans felt they had fought the war. War Veterans were satisfied with Hunzvi as long as he represented their interests and had the courage to lead them against the government, state and President Mugabe for their presumed abandonment of the ideals of the liberation struggle. This factor needs to be taken into account in assessing these key actors in the land movement. The movement has been accused of insincerity on the grounds that many of its participants were too youthful to be War Veterans. Although this is undeniably the case, it should also be understood that as a political grouping in the making it sought to mobilise youths, professionals, workers and peasants for an ongoing struggle. Trained ex-combatants formed the nucleus of a movement with a larger agenda than veteran welfare issues alone.

Another attempt to control this rising force in the land was to try and enlist the ex-fighters as a reserve force; the tactic (and the threat it was meant to contain) are clearly spelt out in the following press report (*Daily News* 28 July 1999):

> *In a bid to contain the restive war veterans the Ministry of Defence … announced that more than 50 000 of the ex-fighters [would then] constitute a reserve army and [would] take orders from the defence forces commanders. [General] Zvinavashe [the army commander] said, 'Ex-combatants are people capable of controlling and using weapons and we cannot just leave them to do what they want on the streets. The security of the state would be at risk if nothing was done to control them'.*

Zvinavashe voiced an underlying fear of the government; the War Veterans had access to powerful 'cultural capital' and posed a potential threat to the state. The reply of the War Veterans to this was simple, *'pay us, if you want us as a reserve force'* (*The Standard* 22 August 1999).

Meanwhile War Veterans had already started to organise land occupations (since 1998) expressive of their oppositional relationship with the state and ZANU-PF, as illustrated by the cases of Svosve and Goromonzi (Chapter 4). In both cases

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get in because I was a personal friend to one of the executive members, but I did not represent anyone, and was not an office bearer of ZNLWVA.

[253] I attended the meeting at ZANU-PF Headquarters. It was not properly constituted, since it lacked representation of the Provincial Executive members.

delegations of senior ZANU-PF politburo members and government officials were sent to remove defiant occupiers[254] through deploying riot police and the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) (Interview with K, an unemployed War Veteran participating in both Svosve and Goromonzi occupations in 1998 and 2004). Details of the interaction between Goromonzi occupiers and government help illustrate the nature of relationship between the land movement and political institutions during this period.

At Heroes Acre on Shiro's farm (Chapter 4) government Ministers '... Sekeramayi, Murerwa and Msika, Governor Karimanzira and a Senior Police Officer [believed to be the Senior Assistant Police Commissioner for Mashonaland East Province]' (Connor, High Court of Zimbabwe 14210/98: 6) came from Harare escorted by a lorry of armed policemen and another truckload of police dog handlers with Alsatians. The CIO also came, but separately. The delegation addressed the occupiers and the meeting ended in a confrontational mood, because according to Muchaneta, a self employed female War Veteran from Harare (Interview with Muchaneta 2005), Ministers were 'being boastful and did not respect the occupiers', for example when Minister Joseph Msika:

> *… talked, his hands were in the pockets.*[255] *Then he started talking with that approach of using force to say that we ought to leave the place unconditionally and no one would disobey the order. Then the women Comrades who were there said, 'Iwe (You - without respect)! Take those hands out of those pockets!*[256] *… This is where it starts from, lack of respect for us. Do you fail to reciprocate our respect to you?'*

War Veterans were by now growing more aggressive, and one of them S, an unemployed War Veteran from Warren Park in Harare, angrily advanced towards the delegation (Interview with QQ 2000):

> *… like an arrow to where they [the Ministers] were sitting. Then he went in front of Murerwa, and he said 'Down with you, thieves!' (pasi nemi, makumbavha evanhu) … and when CIO elements tried to stop him, the crowd thundered 'Leave him alone! Leave him alone! Leave him alone!'*

This form of direct confrontation between the elements making up the occupation group, the state and ZANU-PF stalwarts, was unprecedented at the time. Such open challenge to state authority by poor, Shona-speaking rural people, it is submitted, was only conceivable in the context of a rekindling of the war induced mentality of the War Veterans.

At the time this incident was exceptional. In general the local police pursued their duty of maintaining law and order. Many Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) members were sympathetic to farmers and cooperated with them (Forsyth, High Court of Zimbabwe, 14192: 6). Further engagement between state organs and the land occupation movement involved the judiciary. Farmers took the matter to the High

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[254] Top ZANU-PF members are also top Government Ministers. Muzenda was both the Vice President of ZANU-PF and Vice President of the state. Msika was National Chairman as well as the powerful Minister of Lands and Resettlement. He is now the state and ZANU-PF Vice President succeeding veteran nationalist Joshua Nkomo.

[255] A sign of disrespect in Shona culture.

[256] It is considered rude and disrespectful to speak with hands in pockets.

Court.[257] The Lawyers for the Applicants, the law firms of Etherstone and Cook and Gill, Godlonton and Gerrans made urgent applications ordering War Veteran leaders and their followers to vacate the occupied farms in 24 hours. With the order granted, police then raided the occupiers, torching temporary shelter and scattering the occupants in the nearby mountains. Some of the leaders and youth were arrested. Amongst them was the Chair of the local War Veterans, the late Esther Chimbodza, a woman who had been very active in organising occupations. Occupations stopped when these people were arrested. Other leaders from Harare were given prohibition orders and never went back to the area. But the fire continued to smoulder.[258]

Since 1997, the Heroes Day and Heroes Acre were marked by demonstrations and bitter verbal exchanges between War Veterans and the ruling party. Just before the Heroes Day in 1999, three War Veterans were arrested at the 'national shrine in anticipation of a demonstration [and] police officers were also deployed … around the city … preparing to clash with the former fighters who had said they wanted to meet Mugabe' (*Ziana* 11 August 1999). In response to the War Veterans demands in his Heroes Day speech, Mugabe said that ex-combatants were 'no better than the rest of Zimbabweans' (*Daily News* 12 August 1999) and they had to 'realise that [there was] a population of twelve million whose interests … were equally important' (*Ziana* 11 August 1999). Hunzvi, the War Veterans leader answered back saying President Mugabe 'should not be so cheap a politician. As Head of state, we did not expect him to brush us aside. We do not want to be abused or treated like fools' (*Daily News* 12 August 1999). Acrimony between the ruling party and the land movement continued unabated throughout 1999 up to the referendum conjuncture in 2000.

However, in the last quarter of 1999 bitter exchanges subsided. This was also the period when the National Constitutional Assembly, a coalition of civil society organisations, gave birth to the MDC; a development which affected both the ruling party and the War Veteran creeping into the entire land movement and ZANU-PF was directly affected, as we shall clarify below. Events were rapidly moving towards a new constitution amid protests and demonstrations by the civil society movement and the new opposition political party against what they claimed to be a flawed process. Government finally decided to hold a referendum to decide the fate of the draft constitution and: '…with unprecedented speed, a referendum Bill was published in December 1999 and was passed into law within a matter of days and now exists as the Referendum Act (Chapter 2: 10).' (Madhuku 2000: 55)

The Chidyausiku Commission was meanwhile drafting the constitution but it was not clear what the next step would be as government was silent for long whether a referendum would be held to decide on it. When the draft constitution was finally out War Veterans staged a demonstration, which according to the association's Chairman of Harare Province, Douglas Mahiya[259] was for (*Daily News* 12 January 2000):

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[257] High Court of Zimbabwe 14210/98.

[258] Interview with J 2003.

[259] Chinotimba, another War Veteran leader (*The Herald* 12 January 2000): '*We are here because we want* ***to show our allegiance to the President*** *over the land issue. When we went to war the main reason was to reclaim our land and so to buy it back with money when we bought it with our blood already is unfair.*' Chinotimba's statement also shows the first public signs of cooptation

> *… demanding amendments in the draft constitution section dealing with land redistribution. The section [said] government [would] compensate farmers whose land [would] have been acquired but the war vets demanded that no compensation be paid. ZNLWVA Harare branch Chairman, Douglas Mahiya [said], 'We are saying the price of the land has been paid by the blood of the people who died during the war.*

At Corner House War Veterans petitioned both the British High Commissioner and the Minister of Justice, Emmerson Munangagwa expressing their sentiments against Section 57 (1) of the first draft constitution. When Munangagwa addressed the War Veterans they threatened to mobilise the electorate to vote against the draft constitution if the land clause was not changed. Munangagwa who claimed to have phoned President Mugabe promised that the clause would be changed that afternoon through Presidential powers. The section was then changed accordingly. [260]

This was another major victory for War Veterans where the President conceded to their demands. He made this shift because, as Hammar and Raftopolous (2003: 7) argue:

> *He was aware of the veterans' political capital in relation to their primacy in Zimbabwe's national liberation history, and reluctant to face losing their support of the prospect of an even more violent challenge from them as threatened, he yielded to their demands.*[261]

It is more prudent to view the change by the President to Section 57 of the first draft constitution in this light rather than as 'unilateral' or as effected by 'Zanu (PF) inner circle … not interested in the people's opinion and democratic process'. War Veterans should be viewed as a pressure group occupying democratic space during constitutional drafting; they were part of the civil society (Moyo and Yeros 2005).

The referendum was on 11 February 2000. Both War Veterans and the White settler community were interested in the outcome of the referendum because it would define the position of the land issue. The MDC, whose first congress was held on 30 January 2000 two weeks before the referendum, was eager to use it as an opinion poll as expressed by one prominent founder member of MDC (E-mail from H 11 February 2000) who wrote:

> *The first test of the amount of support of the MDC will be shown in the Referendum. Whilst ostensibly the referendum is only about a new Constitution in reality it may also be an opinion poll. I believe that we will know the result of the general election in the first hour of voting in the Referendum.*

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of the War Veterans. The demonstrations were not specifically in solidarity with the President but just against the land clause in the draft constitution (Participant observation, Corner House, Samora Machel avenue, Harare, 2000).

[260] Constitutional Commission,The Draft Constitution: with amendments and clarifications, dated 19 February 2000.

[261] The war of liberation is the one used by the ruling oligarchy to legitimate its power, as Kriger (1995: 139) observes; '*The governing elite might reasonably have expected that drawing on the recent war of independence for symbols of legitimacy and national identity might capture the popular imagination. The war had claimed an estimated 30 000 to 80 000 lives and had contributed to the liberation from colonial rule, thus making it an important emotional symbol and source of legitimacy for the governing elite.*'

The MDC, composed of the a broad and in some eyes opportunistic alliance of employers, civil society organisations, White commercial farmers, student activists and workers, started to organise for a 'No' vote against the draft constitution. In an email with layers of addressees[262] written on 14 January 2000, the organisers instructed youth to go 'round door to door DURING WORKING HOURS … [and] one of these people to be stationed at a local clinic or school at all times, including weekends … to ensure that domestic workers are registered' to vote (Email dated 14 January 2000 from Mr. N to commercial farmers and others).

The most critical question that faced the President and the state was whether the War Veterans, with their recent resurgence, were a political liability or asset. Could he manage to contain the MDC without the help of the War Veterans? How could he deal with the rebelling War Veterans? These were nagging questions as Mudenge (2004a) later confirmed.

The government was faced with a dilemma; whether to deploy the police and/or army to evict them and risk a bloody confrontation with former combatants, or negotiate. The army and police are headed by former combatants and many of their officers, men and women are former combatants.

There seemed to be two options for handling the war veterans. One was to deal with them ruthlessly by force thereby silencing them, a strategy which had proved unworkable since the 1997 climax because many War Veterans were employed by the state, especially the uniformed forces, and it was unlikely that they would support that option. The other was to co-opt them. Neither option was easy. Without powerful opposition, War Veterans would not be an asset to ZANU-PF and Mugabe. The problem however, was to determine level of support of the electorate and a referendum seemed the best answer.

When the referendum was finally held on 11 and 12 February 2000, the 'No' vote prevailed. For the two rival political parties, the referendum had completed its purpose. What was left was to draft steps forward. For War Veterans, the referendum was a dismal failure because the issue of land could not be resolved constitutionally as DTM (Interview with DTM, a former government health officer and leader of occupations in Mazowe, 2000) said[263]:

> *… after the [draft] constitution was rejected in the referendum … was highlighting how government wanted to solve the issue of land, that's the starting point where many people including myself picked up the issue of land. Then the situation had presented itself. Yes there were many issues which were featuring at the time but land was one of the major ones.*

Soon after the announcement of the referendum results War Veterans occupied White owned farms. The first group of War Veterans to get into the farms occupied a

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[262] The email was coming from one of the 39 addressees who in turn circulated it to ten others. This rather geometric progression in the distribution of emails disseminated information swiftly.

[263] That the 'No' vote in the draft constitution was an immediate cause to the occupations, was expressed by many War Veterans (Interview with Pf 2000; Interview with DM 2000; Interview with Nomatter 2005; Interview with Muchaneta 2006) '*For me to get into the land movement I was pained by when we were defeated in the referendum by the NO vote...*' (Mrs K, 2000, Concession) to mention a few.

derelict farm in Masvingo. The case was broadcast by the only television station in the country. It was only a matter of days before War Veterans occupations spread nationwide like veldt fire. Although government played a part in the occupations, as argued by many (Hammar and Roftopolous 2003, Harold-Barry 2004) it is dressing government in borrowed robs to say it (Feltoe 2004: 198-9) 'was quite clear that these farm invasions were planned and orchestrated by the leadership of ZANU-PF.' Government, ZANU-PF or ZNLWVA did not have any control during the occupation period from 1998 to late 2000.

However, both War Veterans and President Mugabe realised mutual benefit that would be gained from an alliance. War Veterans (Alexander 2003: 97):

> *… knew that they risked becoming targets of state violence … Sheltering under the umbrella of ZANU-PF was a sensible strategy … [resulting in] the interaction between the needs of politicians for a constituency, of people for land, and of the government for a means to pressure donors.*

Alexander captures an important point. DTM, a War Veteran intellectual who led occupations in Mazowe (Interview with DTM 2000) illustrated the point even more clearly saying:

> *Some people have been saying the land issue has been on the agenda because ZANU-PF wants to use it to gain some political mileage. But I, as well as my colleagues, War Veterans, we have a genuine desire to have the land issue resolved once and for all now. That [political mileage] would be a benefit rather than the main objective. It would be a downstream benefit. What we want to do is actually to give land to the people. If ZANU-PF as a party is going to benefit by that, well, there is nothing wrong with that. But it will be wrong for anybody to assume that we are doing this so as to bolster the position of ZANU-PF. That is not the case. We genuinely want to resettle people. And the poverty that is quite abundant among our people can only be ameliorated… rectified… corrected if people get land. There are no jobs in town, there are no jobs in industry and most of our people are on the land*

DTM supports and elucidates the view by Alexander above, that has been ignored by academics who reject the social movement theory. Indeed the land movement and ZANU-PF supported each other at various levels but they remain separate in identity.

The alliance between the land movement and ZANU-PF was conspicuous in the campaign for the 2000 general elections as DTM recalled (Interview with DTM 2000). 'We were campaigning for the party but it was both the party should win and also land to the people.' War Veterans were neither ambivalent of the duality of the outcome of land occupations (those occupations effectively put ZANU-PF as a party in a vantage election position) nor did they lose focus of objectives of the land movement. War Veterans saw downstream benefits to ZANU-PF precisely as the cause and basis for alliance or mutual support. War Veterans were also clear that before they spearheaded the land occupations in 1998, ZANU-PF (Interview with DM 2000) 'lacked that desire [and] dynamism … to resolve the [land] issue on a much broader case… there was no seriousness on the part of [ZANU-PF] …[despite] some constraints … principally, the Lancaster House constitution. But much more could have been done.' War Veterans knew that, without force, ZANU-PF was not willing to redistribute land but they also knew that the party could use the state against them which would make the occupations even more difficult.

In Nyabira the relationship between ZANU-PF ruling elite (*Chefs*) and occupiers was sour in February 2000. Faced with this situation War Veterans responded by becoming more militant and radical in dealing with the ZANU-PF '*Chefs*'. They besieged the ZANU-PF provincial offices in Harare around March 2000 (Interview with DM, self employed War Veteran leader in Nyabira, 2001):

> *… closed the ZANU-PF provincial offices [during] a Prolitburo meeting … to draw attention to our demands. After that we went to the ZANU-PF HQ and told the President [Mugabe] that if he did not send his representative we would … lock ZANU-PF offices … in Harare. [This] forced him to send to us Comrades Msika and Mutasa*[264] *[for negotiations].*

Such clashes with ZANU-PF elites were common especially at the beginning of the 2,000 occupations. The elites did not think the occupations would succeed and they were opposed to them. This put the two groups in direct confrontation and occupiers sealed off occupied farms from the politicians and declared that 'No senior politician was allowed into the seized farms as some of them were pro-Whites.' (Meeting on Penrose Farm 2000). The belief that elites were still in alliance with White farmers caused War Veterans to be even more militant.

As we can see, alliance between the land movement and ZANU-PF was not sudden, smooth and consensual. President Mugabe was the only top leader of ZANU-PF who unequivocally backed the occupations when they started after the February referendum; others either doubted or openly opposed them. Home Affairs Minister, Dumiso Dabengwa who was also a member of ZANU-PF Prolitburo, gave orders for War Veterans to stop occupations in early March and this was vehemently criticised by War Veterans and Mugabe. In April, Vice President Musika, acting as State President, instructed police to torch and destroy shelters of occupiers and evict them and this again was denounced by War Veterans and President Mugabe. As late as May, Dabengwa was insisting that the War Veterans had to be ordered out but once more Mugabe backed the War Veterans. ZANU-PF and the state definitely had their own vested interests in the land reform but it is erroneous to consider them as the initiators or even major players or the command centre of the land occupations (Alexander 2003).

7.2 Interaction with the opposition movement (1998-2006)

The land occupation movement also linked with the constitutional movement, labour movement (later developing into MDC) and civil society movement. This section explores these interactions and relationships and analyses in what way they contributed to the process of radicalisation[265] of the land movement. During this period there was heightened activity of different movements against the state including strikes by both industrial workers and civil servants, recording a total of 232 strikes in 16 sectors of the economy.

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[264] Interview with DM 23 February 2001. DM was talking to the author who was the interviewer but most of his information was in direct speech. At times this is translated in indirect speech to reduce confusion.

[265] The term radicalisation in this thesis is taken to mean revolutionary action that aims at empowering the poor and the marginalised permanently.

These strikes owed much to the climax of the War Veterans' movement. The manner in which the War Veterans staged the street demonstrations and their open challenge to the state, President and ZANU-PF elites was unique. Their success was even more astounding. 'The victory of the war veterans had its own contagious effect on other groups, notably the ZCTU' (Masunungure 2004: 169). It was during this period that the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) was set up in May 1997, at the height of War Veterans demonstrations led by Morgan Tsvangirai who later became the President of the MDC. Responding to awarding of money to War Veterans 'ZCTU confronted the state head-on with respect to its measures to fund war veterans' payments' (Masunungure 2004: 170). This action was contrary to the usual support that the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) gave to other movements that opposed government and the ruling ZANU-PF. 'The ZCTU called for a nation-wide strike for 9 December 1997' (Masunungure 2004) against government proposed levy to raise money for the fund. Under pressure, Mugabe withdrew the levy.

War Veterans were bitter about the action taken by ZCTU because the ZCTU had supported strikes by doctors, nurses, teachers and industrial workers, for more money. It also supported students' strikes for higher pay-outs which also burdened the fiscus although it differed in magnitude. War Veterans did not understand how ZCTU organised workers against them yet former Rhodesian soldiers had been enjoying the same benefits and the labour organisation did not complain about it before. The move of ZCTU was supported by independent media. The effect was that the War Veterans suffered social isolation and ridicule from the general public because they saw War Veterans to have been paid undeserved funds and they (public) considered them to be the cause of the economic strife that they suffered. War Veterans lost a lot of their dignity and respect as they were publicly ridiculed. This was the beginning of a rift between the labour movement which later transformed into a powerful opposition party, and the War Veterans' movement.

The ZCTU was the leading and strongest of the Civil Society Organisations (CSO) and therefore its political position was critical to the whole opposition movement so a study into how and why the ZCTU took the unusual position of allying with capital and White farmers is important. Analysts consider this alliance as an 'unholy alliance between ZCTU, employers and White commercial farmers, who have been angered by the government's designation of farms' (Masunungure 2004: 171). To War Veterans the alliance further widened the already existing gap between them and the emerging opposition.

When the MDC was finally formed at the end of 1999, the gap between War Veterans and the opposition the contradictions between the two were antagonistic. 'By this point, the White commercial farming and business sectors had allied with the NCA and an emerging opposition movement in campaigning for a 'No' vote in the referendum' (Hammar and Roftopolous 2003: 10). War Veterans considered MDC to be a party formed by the western governments and White settlers when both saw that ZANU-PF was advancing its liberation agenda through the compulsory land acquisition. It was claimed that (Mudenge 2004a: 10):

> *A month before the New Labour Party was voted into power in Britain … European Trade Unions had already selected Morgan Tsvangirai, then Secretary General of the … ZCTU, as their candidate for the President of Zimbabwe [and] the Danish Trade Union Council posted Georg Limke in late 1996 to … turn trade union movement in Zimbabwe*

into a political party. Therein lay the evolutionary roots of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

In two detailed documents entitled 'Western Socialists' view of ex-liberation movement governments' and 'Zimbabwe's land reform program (the reversal of colonial land occupation and domination): Its impact on the country's regional and international relations' Mudenge (2004a, 2004b), then Foreign Minister, presents detailed information of the formation of the MDC. He claims that the formation of the MDC involved the Rudolph Trauber-Merz Director of Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Harare and gives evidence of the party's external funding from Western sources, economic sabotage and planning for civil unrest in order to remove the ZANU-PF government.

Some of the intercepted documents proposed to create artificial shortages of basic necessities[266] to cause social unrest and referred to bloody coups and horrible executions of dictators around the world like an email entitled, '*The immediate future in Zimbabwe*' (written by a White MDC founder member, 29 January 2000), referring to ZANU-PF leaders as 'frightened old men' partly reads:

They no doubt have nightmares of Ceausescu, Hitler and Mussolini[267] and their unlamented ends … Sir Aboubakar Tafewa Balewa of Nigeria was put against the front door of his house and shot, with the main gun of a tank … The MDC is committed to the removal of Mugabe and Zanu-Pf by democratic means and through the ballot box. If they should fail, the anger of people is such that only the one alternative remains. I have lived through one civil war[268], and do not wish to see another. But a minority cannot loot a country, suppress the majority and expect this to be accepted forever …

A document like this frightened the War Veterans. The historical references clearly painted a powerful imagery of vengeance. The downfall of the leaders symbolises and epitomises the crumbling of a political edifice as opposed to defeat of just an individual. War Veterans, considering how Morgan Tsvangirai had organised a strike to protest the $50,000 demobilisation given them, believed the MDC identified War Veterans as part of the ruling clique and they would be killed indiscriminately as ZANU-PF criminals as PF said in the above excerpt. These sentiments were strengthened by the fact that the White members were at the centre of fomenting ideas of insurrection and vengeance which was interpreted as a reorganisation of the Rhodesians using the MDC as a front.

The email advised on the immediate course of action which was to organise people to vote 'no' in the referendum. The authors of the email echoed a strategy drafted in Europe and discussed at a meeting held on 24 January 1999 at the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatam House on the theme 'Zimbabwe – Time

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[266] According to DM (Interview with DM, self employed War Veteran from Harare who participated in the 1998 occupations, 2000) one of the documents in his possession was clear that '*White settlers decided to create artificial shortages far before the referendum. They thought if people started to feel the pinch of shortages of basic necessities …would cause social unrest.*'

[267] Ceausescu, and Mussolini were executed by a firing squad but it is the celebration of Sir Aboubakar that shows MDC was anticipating horror and naturally War Veterans were frightened by such threats.

[268] This extract shows that MDC was '**not** committed' to democratic means of gaining power and it was advocating for a 'civil war' if they failed to win through constitutional means of the ballot.

for Mugabe to Go?. It considered the following options for removing Mugabe: military coup … elections … upheavals in the streets and through manoeuvres within the ruling party, ZANU-PF.' The United States focused on using the Civil Society Organisations, in an initiative spearheaded by Dr Chester Crocker. MDC and the NGOs were funded from European and United States sources. British and American politicians and businessmen formed the Zimbabwe Democracy Trust (ZDT) and funding for the MDC came from the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD)[269] (Mudenge 2004a).

The MDC identified itself with the White farmers and publicly denounced land occupations.[270] A War Veteran leader in Mazowe explained the role of MDC (Interview with P, a peasant War Veteran, 2000): '…In April, at Easter our Comrades from Mvurwi, came under severe pressure from the opposition. They were outnumbered being only about seven or so in that area and … the MDC would team up with the farm workers, … to attack our bases.'

With this background, land occupiers led by War Veterans were against MDC supporters and they did not cooperate with them in getting land. At one farm near Harare leaders of the land movement in Nyabira, 'were told that there were MDC members who had come with Learnmore Jongwe[271] and they [were] asking to be given land by Comrades (War Veterans) for settlement' (Interview with M, an unemployed War Veteran, 2001). This shows that some MDC politicians also participated in land occupations, contrary to popular belief. War Veterans articulated their relationship with the MDC according to them (Interview with DM, a Wampoa graduate and leader of occupations in Nyabira, 2000):

> *We told our Comrades we were not opposed to the fact that MDC members and their supporters should get land … but we disagree with their mind that occupations will destroy the economy. If they say we are destroying the economy why do they come seeking land from us? …They should first go back and tell the public that they are now clear …what Comrades are doing is correct … the truth is an MDC member deserves to get land. The only bad thing is that MDC people have been given the wrong ideology and if the MDC member understands what we are doing and openly announces that he/she was lost there is no reason for denying that person land.*

Reinforcement was got from Muzarabani (a truck load of 37 War Veterans), Harare a group headed by Pf and from Mt Darwin who occupied north Matepatepa (Participant observation 2000). The position of farm workers changed when occupiers used all means to gain their support using tactics that included both violence, education and mob psychology, forming crowds of more than 'five

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[269] In 2001 the US government enacted the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (2001, PL 107-99) which was largely viewed by War Veterans as advocated for and even drafted by the MDC and this widened the gap between ex-combatants and the opposition. When the Act was seen to be, 'consistent with the International Donors' Conference on Land Reform and Resettlement in Zimbabwe held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in September 1998, or any subsequent agreement relating thereto' (ZIDERA, Section 4 (d) (3)) War Veterans interpreted this to mean a proposal to reverse the land situation in Zimbabwe to pre 1998 ownership structures and to buy land from White commercial farmers for resettlement which they did not accept.

[270] Morgan Tsvangirai, MDC President described occupiers as mushroom sprouting everywhere in a chaotic fashion.

[271] MDC spokesman and member of Parliament in 2000.

hundred (500) [farm workers]' to occupy a single farm (Interview with DTM, a War Veteran leader who was a civil servant working in Mazowe, 2001).

7.3 Effect of government FTLRP on the land movement

In 2000 the government introduced a new program for resettlement that aimed at regularising or legitimising the occupations. The effect however turned negative to the land movement as the FTLRP ended up highly controlling the movement as it aimed by establishing a centralised command, with state structures, acquiring land, planning for it, providing basic infrastructure and allocating it to beneficiaries. A National Task Force with Provincial and District Land Committees as lower organs was set up to manage the FTLRP.

7.3.1 The structure

The structures were chaired by the Ministry of Local government with the ministries of Lands Resettlement and Agriculture, Home Affairs (police) and Defense (army). At Provincial levels the committee was chaired by the Provincial Governor and at the district level it was chaired by the DA. At both the provincial and district levels the committee had War Veteran representation but not at the national level. Another addition to the local level structures was the inclusion of the Rural District Council and District Development Fund (DDF) in the district land committee.

The process of Fast Track Resettlement involved launching[272] of the program by the National Task Force in each district which entailed giving a go-ahead to the District Committee to identify farms for A1 and A2 settlement and recommend them to be listed for compulsory acquisition by the state. The National Task Force was responsible for gazetting the farms and publishing them in the local press. The process of land use planning for those farms would begin and the then Agritex Department would produce layout plans followed by the physical demarcation and allocation by the committees. The district committee only had jurisdiction over A1 settlement schemes. The A2 allocations were left for the provincial committee.

7.3.2 Devised tenure systems

There was a dual land tenure system and land use pattern devised for the settlement. First, was the A1 scheme that was and spatial extension of the colonial Tribal Trust Lands to decongest them. These were based on small arable plots for households and a common grazing area for the village (hence this was known as villagised scheme). Maximum farm sizes were set differing from one agro-ecological region to another.

Then there were A2 schemes that aimed at propagating commercial agriculture and leasehold tenure system. This settlement scheme was by qualification. People had to apply in English by writing a project proposal complete with cash flow projections and indicating the agro-ecological region for the area applied for. The

[272] This step was delayed in Mazowe causing War Veterans to be restless and apprehensive. They demanded to speak to Chombo (Minister of Local Government and Chairman of the National Task Force for Land Reform) who had come to attend a celebration party for Dr. Kruneri for being elected Member of Parliament.

proposal also had to show the nature of production at the proposed farm and the applicant had to declare his/her asserts (immovable and movable) including bank statements to prove one's financial strength. Selection of the beneficiary was supposed to be based on this 'academic' exercise and an insignificant number of the occupiers could ever satisfy these requirements.

A2 resettlement was earmarked for large scale commercial farming. To demonstrate government priority on this scheme, allocation for A2 was done by the Minister of Lands and Agriculture himself through an offer letter signed by the Minister's own hand to the beneficiary who had to accept or decline the offer. An offer letter specified the conditions of lease with a 99 year expiry period. However, a lot leaves to be desired for the fairness of the lease agreement considering that the new constitutional amendment that restraints individuals from litigation against the state decision to take away land. This effectively gave the state powers to take away the land despite the fact that the lease continues to fulfil all the requirements of the agreement.

Owing to the decentralisation of the A1 allocation model, access was easier to occupiers who could go and address the Lands Committee on matters of concern. This was not so with the A2 model which required one to travel to Bindura and Harare to solve an issue or present a case. When it came to the Harare level the whole country converged on the Minister's office with different matters to present ranging from designation anomalies, allocations, disputes, administrative complaints, proposals to give land to government by individual commercial farmers, and so forth.[273]

7.3.3 Experience of Mazowe, Nyabira and Matepatepa areas

The process was that War Veterans and councillors submitted names of farms that were occupied and recommended them to the District Committee for designation (Sadomba 2000a). However the criteria by occupiers to target farms were abandoned and a more wholesale approach was adopted sometimes imbued with corruption. This had some negative effects in some cases. For example, a farm owned by a couple in Concession, the Gs, had been spared for occupation because the couple served the community in many ways. The couple was Board members for the local District Hospital. They contributed a lot for the development of the hospital including sourcing funds for an administration block. They also donated computers to a local secondary school, linen and beds to clinics. During the occupations, the farm was spared by the occupiers for this reason.

During the FTLRP, the farm was demarcated to accommodate six settlers because it exceeded the maximum farm size for NRII – 350 ha. War Veterans advised the Gs to comply with government policy of sharing excess land and they cooperated. Six settlers were allocated land and the Gs lived well with the settlers, assisting them in production. However, when the farmer and the new settlers started to produce, all of

[273] I visited the Ministers office several times from 2000 and met all sorts of people with all sorts of problems. For example, a White farmer wanted to give the rest of her farm to government for resettlement purposes after determining what land she wanted to remain with and she was referred to the Minister for that. That same day, there was also a representative of a seed company who had come to see the Minister on proposal of supplying seed to the newly resettled farmers.

them were removed and the farm was allocated to one person, allegedly with close connections with the high offices of the land. War Veterans, youth, local community and farm workers staged a protest demonstration and forced the new incumbent out under police escort. As a counter, the demonstrators were dispersed a few days later by police from Harare Support Unit Depot in combat and riot gear and the settler was reinstated and he took everything there. A protest march to the city (60 km away) that had been planned by the land movement was only abandoned by the demonstrators because it coincided with an international conference and they thought journalists would take advantage and exaggerate the problems of the land reform. This is just one of many such examples.[274]

Occupiers of the farm were identified through a list from those who controlled the occupations. At this time the War Veterans had zoned the whole of Mazowe into six operational areas. The commanders of those zones were responsible for giving the names of the occupied farms and the list of occupiers (Interview with Pf 2000):

> *This is how land is allocated. We were selected as field officers and our job is to go to each farm and determine its size. Agritex goes to demarcate it. If say they conclude that 35 people will be allocated, then we compile the names of the people who will get the plots. We select names from the district and the list of names from Harare. If there are too many people for the farm to accommodate, we occupy another farm to accommodate the excess number.*

Other beneficiaries came through the DA from the Rural District Council (RDC) based on the waiting list for resettlement. Conflicts over allocations arose based on the two lists. War Veterans demanded their 20 percent of land for resettlement that they had forced the government to adopt as policy during the turning point at the truce with Mugabe. Peasants were listed through the DAs office and there was no specific policy for farm workers most of whom hoped to be allocated land at the farms that they had worked and that they had participated in the occupation (Interviews with farm workers Davison 2002 and Mwale 2005).

In Mazowe district the conflict over sharing occupied lands manifested itself in the Lands Committee. There were many conflicts between the occupiers and the government authorities, the ruling ZANU-PF and individuals with influence. The conflicts were based on manipulation of the FTLRP and attempts to evict the occupiers or exclude them from benefiting in the allocation process. Below, is a discussion of the different conflicts and their contexts.

When the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) was being implemented, the District Lands and Resettlement Committee[275] controlled land distribution and in the process started to sideline occupiers targeting War Veterans as the leaders (Sadomba 2000a). War Veterans were represented in the District Lands Committee by only one person out of about fifteen people. Land occupiers felt that the skewed representation of actors was a way of weakening the movement as they could not influence decision making. Moreover, the rest of the committee members were top

[274] Participant observation 2003.

[275] The District Lands Committee was comprised of Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), army, Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), District development Fund (DDF), Local Government, War Veteran Chair person, Council Chairman and a Chief (Interview with Gurure 25 April 2002).

ZANU-PF leaders and government officials perceived to be under instructions from other influential political leaders like the Governor and Ministers (Interview with K, self employed War Veteran, 2000). In July 2000, the District Administrator (DA) and a War Veterans representative had a confrontation over discrimination of leaders of occupiers (Interview with DMT, a War Veteran leader of occupations and former civil servant working at the district offices, 2001):

> *The first District Land and Resettlement Committee first met in July and … I was not allowed to attend meetings. I suspect some people feared that I would … predominate the meetings because most of the members … did not participate actively in the previous [land occupations] campaign. And so they knew very well that this was the guy who was spearheading the whole thing and if he should come to the meetings I [would] dominate the business of the committee and so the best thing was to leave [me] out.*

Ejecting candidates chosen by War Veterans weakened the land movement. Civil servants like the DA, who did not participate in the land occupations were given the 'prerogative to decide who to invite' to committee meetings and had powers to bar individual representatives from attending meetings (Interview with late Gurure, former civil servant in charge of the Fast Track Program 2000, Interview with DA 2000, Interview with DTM 2001). War Veterans encouraged their candidate to force his way into the meetings in a move that created antagonistic contradictions between the land movement and government organs and the DA would threaten to call off the meetings whenever the War Veteran insisted to attend.[276]

During the FTLRP, there was increased participation and control by ZANU-PF class of young capitalists. These were rich businessmen labelled 'Young Turks' who were rapidly accumulating wealth like Phillip Chiyangwa, (then ZANU-PF Chairman of Mashonaland West Province), Xavier Kasukuwere (now Minister of Youth) and Mutumwa Mawere (a business tycoon who later went into exile after falling out with the ZANU-PF nationalist ruling class). In many cases they employed 'unwarranted code of conduct' (Meeting of War Veterans 27 April 2002) in the FTLRP. The main strategy by the ZANU-PF stalwarts was to displace the War Veterans and hijack the land movement using all sorts of tactics including 'feet dragging', 'divide and rule', 'imposition of leadership', 'use of state power', 'sidelining', 'intimidation' and 'cooptation' (War Veterans' Association Corruption document 2004, Provincial Stake Holder dialogues, 2004, Interview with DM 2000-6, Interview with Muchaneta 2006).

On 18 December 2000, a landmark meeting was held between War Veterans leaders and Ministers. The aim was to consolidate state and ZANU-PF control over the occupation movement. This was done by removing any doubts that the new structures were in charge of land redistribution and the land movement had to relinquish power or face the wrath of the state. Conflicts that followed were about

[276] Representatives of Nyabira Mazowe Association were also sent out of District Lands and Resettlement Committee meetings (Mazowe District Resettlement Committee 5 December 2000). War Veterans, believed the new Governor (Manyika) was also part of the civil service ploy (Interview with MK, a female unemployed War Veteran leader who was also a ZANU-PF provincial committee member 2000). At another meeting War Veterans threatened to beat Manyika up, and the meeting became chaotic. The result was that controversial War Veterans, according to the implementers of the FTLRP, were weeded out and only the acceptable characters were allowed to be part of the decision making structures in the FTLRP.

the resistance of the land occupation movement to relinquish power or getting co-opted.

Committees of FTLRP, civil servants, Ministers and ZANU-PF stalwarts started to bring in new beneficiaries to take land that had been occupied by the land movement actors (Meeting, Royden and Muzururu farms, 15 August 2002):

> *They managed to do this by bringing new names on Farms taken through JAMBANJA leaving out those who participated in the actual repossession. He [Comrade M] stressed that government should allocate land to those on the land first and then those who did not participate in the land invasion [afterwards.*

There were new waves of occupations instigated by ZANU-PF stalwarts and civil servants. These transposed occupations were termed '*jambanja* on *jambanja*'[277] by the occupiers to distinguish them from land movement occupations. These subsequent waves of occupations also included co-opted members of ZNLWVA national executive (Meeting Governor Manyika and Nyabira Mazowe, 31 December 2001; Meeting and elections, Zvimba District War Veterans' Association, 27 April 2002). This shows that ZNLWVA, as a body, was not necessarily part of the land movement. The situation was much more complex and demands closer scrutiny of different actors to distinguish the identity of the movement.

War Veterans became more and more irritated by the greed, nepotism and selfishness of ZANU-PF ruling class (Meeting, Zvimba District War Veterans' Association, 27 April 2002):

> *The meeting noted with concern that there are big fishes involved and politics at play in these unplanned settlements. It is high time war vets show the authorities that selfishness and nepotism will never be given a chance. We fought hard to retain the party in government and we will guard jealously [against] those officials who … take war vets and the party for granted.*[278]

This shows that War Veterans were prepared to continue the fight against the politicians who were hijacking the land movement and they did.

By 2004, the problems had not yet been solved. War Veterans were still fighting against ZANU-PF nationalist politicians and civil servants who were under the influence of the politicians (War Veterans' Association Corruption document 2004):

> *There are unending problems caused by our ruling party high ranking officials working in cahoots with corrupt technocrats in the Lands Ministry's provincial and district offices… an organised clandestine grouping meant to derail this agrarian reform through … destabilisation of land occupiers…*

The corruption document was written and handed over to the Minister of Lands, the Governor of Mashonaland West, and the CIO. This suggests that War Veterans believed their allegations to be true and they were determined expose the corrupt state officials and ZANU-PF stalwarts.

[277] Meaning invasion of farms already occupied by land movement actors.
[278] Meeting, Zvimba District War Veterans Association 27 April 2002.

During the Fast track period War Veterans were worried that politicians were using the state machinery particularly the police to displace occupiers as argued in the corruption document (2004: 6):

> *Arrests of land occupiers have been orchestrated and well planned [by politicians] so much that strategies are made to create crimes where war veterans have been fast-tracked to cells, court and jail. It's a well organised syndicate of officials from the mass that is used (abused of course), police details who arrest, magistrate and his public prosecutor who make sure you have gone to jail.*

The police also used brutal force to evict peasants from the farms during the occupation period as RM (Interview with RM 2003) a former cross border trader who was the Secretary in a committee of peasant led occupiers of the Zumba clan said:

> *We pursued the issue further three more times but we discovered that he (District Administrator) was not interested to talk to us and he was hiding something from us … So when we came back to live in our shelters, we were pained that the Assistant DA whom we had told our story was the one who led the Police (Black Boots Unit) to burn down our shelters. They just said we had trespassed and illegally settled on the area. … We were given no time to respond and they told us long back that we were supposed to go out of that area long before. When we tried to answer them that we didn't know about that message Mrs D called out for the police to hurry up and burn the shelters. We were given 10 minutes to take out our belongings. And of course we only managed to take out a few items the rest were burnt inside including fertilisers, clothes, seeds, blankets, just a few things were not burnt.*

These people and others who occupied the Gomba area, were harassed by the ZRP, arrested, beaten up and verbally abused (FGD with Zumba women occupiers at Ingleborough Farm, 2003,[279] (Interview with Nehanda, spirit medium, 2001, Interview with Zumba, spirit medium, 2001, See also Fisiy 1992). Just like the War Veterans felt, peasant led occupiers were bitter that they were used to take over land and afterwards they were being chased away by ZANU-PF elites to accommodate their relatives. This feeling was well articulated by one cross border trader, a woman who led the Zumba clan to occupy their native land Gomba, about seven kilometres from Harare (Interview with RM 2002) who said:

> *What I want to say is that if we are saying the country is liberated I expect that we should be free people. There should not be any person who should oppress anyone because the oppressors should only have been the Whites who colonised us. Those are the people whom we fought against to liberate ourselves. After fighting them and driving them out it means we as the Black people should live in freedom all of us and we should enjoy the wealth of the country without oppression. There should not be anyone who takes the mind of the British and use it on another person like her/himself. I also plead that Father Mugabe gives us access to him to present our grievances. If this was possible we would always be at his feet presenting our grievances. Unfortunately he is surrounded by the powerful that deny us access lying to him. President Mugabe has a good heart but the people he surrounds himself with and those in the ruling circles are the corrupt ones like*

[279] One woman in that FGD (2002) said, '*They (Police) were… scolding us saying things that should not be said, the very things we wear clothes for. They had noticed that we were not going to be moved. One of us had … his fridge, sofas, display cabinets all of which were destroyed that he cannot buy anything like that again because of the price hikes. He gave-up and left. …Lorries were driven over bags of maize tearing them apart, destroying them. When I tried to scoop the maize, I was hit by a sjambok and left everything there.*'

> *some of these who are now being apprehended*[280]*… My heart burns with desire to get to President Mugabe and say to him… that we are suffering from oppression here but there is no access to him. That is what is in my heart.*

The peasant woman here expresses bitterness against President Mugabe's ruling clique but she is careful to exonerate President Mugabe himself. This could have been affected by President Mugabe's lone support for occupations against his ruling clique. Occupiers invariably felt President Mugabe was a person.

One of the major sources of confusion to academics and analysts is the position of the President in the land reform. He kept changing his position and was unwavering only after February 2000. The first shift was made by the President in June 1998. 'Mugabe defended (occupations) stressing that force should not be used to evict the land hungry.' But this was short lived as barely a month or so after he 'reversed his position in August warning of stern government action' (Alexander 2003: 97). And indeed occupiers were brutally evicted by the police, burning their (occupiers') shelters as we have seen of the Goromonzi case.

After the referendum President Mugabe hardened his stance against the White farmers progressively as Masunungure (2004: 176-7) and Feltoe (2004: 200) observe:

> *In early April 2000, the president said* ***no white commercial farmer would be chased away*** *from Zimbabwe …But as time went on the* ***anti-white rhetoric intensified*** *and … in December 2001, the president was really on a* ***warpath…***[281]

The shifts caused by a number of factors including agenda of the opposition and the civil society movement of regime change, heightening onslaught of Britain and the United States on the President, and continuous pressure from the land movement not to retreat on land redistribution. Strategic shift by the War Veterans and Mugabe constituted important survival strategies for both parties with obvious mutual gains. On one hand, War Veterans seemed to avoid 'state violence' against them as Alexander (2003) aptly argues. On the other, the President realising their political capital, did not want to antagonise the War Veterans. The actions of War Veterans and the President were 'based solely on cost-benefit calculation', contradicting assertions by the resource mobilisation theory (Foweraker 1995).

War Veterans at times thought that Mugabe uses them for his convenience and did not want to share political power with them as a civil servant, an intellectual who was a leader in the land occupations (Interview with DTM 2000) observed:

> *I thought following the pronouncement by the president that it was the War Veterans who had saved the party, to me it followed that he was going … even to promote and create a conducive environment where the War Veterans would be fitted into various government structures because it's not enough to acknowledge that 'These are the people who saved the party.' And so what are you doing about them…? If you are not doing anything you … are just paying lip-service. War Veterans are now saying: 'There's no way we can continue to be used as cannon fodder … enough is enough'. They would want to participate actively in decision making processes.*

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[280] Referring to the arrest of Dr. Kruneri (Minister of Finance) and James Makamba, a top ZANU-PF member.

[281] Emphasis mine.

This quotation shows that War Veterans feel they are used by President Mugabe and they are bitter about it. The question remains whether they think they can do anything about it. Many academics and analysts have not considered this ambivalence in the relationship between the War Veterans and the President which is a critical omission.

The Provincial Chairman of War Veterans summed up the relationship between the land occupiers that were led by War Veterans and the ruling party in a parable as follows (Provincial Dialogue for Mashonaland West Province 2004):

> *When Jesus was crucified, a blind man came and pleaded, 'Jesus, bless me with sight, please.' Jesus blessed the man who gained sight instantly. When the healed man, amazed by the first sight of the world, looked up at Jesus on the cross, he discovered what he thought had not yet been seen by those who had sight all along. He announced this discovery saying, 'That nail is not deep enough - he might escape!' pointing to the nail driven through Jesus' hands into the cross. This is how we, war veterans, are treated all the time.*

This 'parable' captures the feelings of actors of the land movement throughout the history of the liberation movement.[282] After independence the liberation movement, under the leadership of nationalist ZANU-PF elites, was abandoned and an alliance of ZANU-PF ruling class and settler capital was forged and War Veterans were relegated. In what to War Veterans seemed to be history repeating itself the land movement actors were sidelined by the ruling elite during the FTLRP. The Presidential Land Review Committee (Utete 2003: 35) observed that although War Veterans were happy that the government at last 'had heeded the call for land redistribution … [however] their members had not benefited as promised … [and] land was allocated on regional lines…'. On-the-ground perceptions of unfairness, regionalism, tribalism and nepotism were a source of conflict between, on the one hand, ZANU-PF stalwarts and a rising bourgeoisie, and on the other, land movement actors.

7.4 The Murambatsvina period 2005 to date

Operation Murambatsvina, carried out from May 2005, was largely seen by War Veterans as victimising land occupation movement actors. The operation destroyed 'illegal' structures that had mushroomed in urban areas including extra buildings located in private stands, home and backyard industries and houses build by land

[282] Farm workers also felt that the FTLRP had benefited the wrong groups, as RN, (Interview with RN, a former farm manager and occupier, 2004) explained, '*People who are really farming are those from Harare. People from the communal lands are not farming because they do not have the capital. The farm worker is not farming because he doesn't have capital also. But if we look at the beneficiaries of this programme they are not the people who should be getting the benefit because you see that one comes in his Pajero, with one tractor and this and that. But now a person like me from the reserves hoping to do something here finds myself without capital. I cannot farm. I am not getting what I expected… those who are benefiting are the well-to-do... People came from the communal lands hoping to get Government assistance. That person is land hungry. The farm worker is land hungry. I, as a manager, have the knowledge and skill of farming but don't have the land. I applied but did not get one.*'

occupiers on land ceased during the occupation period. Figures of the affected people have been controversial. Moyo and Yeros (2007: 115) argue as follows:

> *… they have magnified the tragedy, claiming, in a UN report, that some 700,000 persons were displaced (UNO 2005). A more rigorous analysis would have placed the number of displaced at a much lower number, possibly between one-half and one-third the UN estimate. For the UN team that conducted the inquiry employed a shoddy methodology, relying largely on the 'evidence' of unaccountable civil society organisations, rather than doing the more demanding research that was required.*

The report by the United Nations (UN) envoy, Annah Tabaijuka was also castigated for poor methodology because the mission relied on 'unaccountable civil society', 'simply doubled' up figures of an earlier UN estimate that was also questionable.

War Veterans who led occupations of farms surrounding urban areas had formed housing cooperatives and distributed the land to needy urban workers. These turned out to be the main target of the operation and the structures were erased to the ground by bulldozers.

Although Operation Murambatsvina was largely seen as an urban operation it did not end or start in the urban areas. Before, during and after the operation land movement actors had running battles with the police and government forces. For example in Gomba, both the Zumba and Hwata people were brutally attacked by the police in a bid to force them out (Interview R 2004, cross border woman trader who was one of the leaders of Zumba people):

> *So when we came back to live in our shelters, we were pained that the Assistant DA whom we had given our story is the one who led the Police (Black Boots Unit) to burn down our shelters. They just said we had tresspassed and illegally settled on the area. We were given 10 minutes to take out our belongings from the shelters. They were just scolding us saying things that should not be said, the very things we wear clothes for. They had noticed that we were not going to be moved. … They were throwing away things. Heavy vehicles … were rolled over [my] bags of maize and tearing them apart and destroying the contents. When I tried to scoop the maize, I was hit by a sjambok and left everything there running for safety.*

The Operation Murambatsvina of 2005 was seen by many War Veterans in the land occupation movement as ZANU-PF elites' consolidation of power – a process that had started with the fast track. As the land movement proved much stronger in the occupied farms the state turned to the easier urban settlements for political solving both political and local government problems of unplanned development. According to War Veterans (Interview with Mucha, a woman War Veteran who was self employed and was a member of Tongogara Housing Cooperative, 2006) the operation was aimed at demonstrating to the War Veterans and the public that ZANU-PF elites were still powerful and would not hesitate to use the state machinery against the War Veterans. One informant said that War Veterans in the occupied farms anticipated that the operation was going to be extended to them and the land movement was taking measures to defend occupied lands and this could have sparked an armed resistance.

Murambatsvina was a continuation of what had been started in FTLRP. The state and ZANU-PF elites decided to suppress the land movement by force after realising

that it (land movement) could not be co-opted. The War Veteran struggle had now reached a new development in terms of class alliance. This time it had reined in the urban working class in a move that would reconfigure the Zimbabwe's class politics and power with unpredictable consequences to the ruling elite and bourgeoisie. The alliance forged by peasants, urban working class, farm workers and War Veterans, based on land occupations, was highly threatening not only to ZANU-PF, President Mugabe and the state but also albeit less conspicuously, to local and international capital. It was therefore clear that this new alliance had to be ruthlessly destroyed and the state did not hesitate to take action.

Raging battles between War Veterans led occupiers and waves of occupiers that were sent by ZANU-PF elites were enough evidence that the War Veterans were eager to see land redistribution to the poor. This was contrary to the party stalwarts and Black bourgeoisie. Murambatsvina therefore marks a temporary triumph of the bourgeois class and elites over the poor peasants, farm and urban workers and War Veterans who would hit back in the 2008 general and presidential elections.

Murambatsvina signalled the breaking of the marriage of convenience between the forces of the liberation movement, which had brought the nationalists back into the fold. As one War Veteran said, 'we shall meet at the election period' (Interview Muchaneta 2000 a woman War Veteran trader at Mbare (Market) Musika). The weapons for the Murambatsvina victims were now the ballot papers.

The Mugabe regime, after Murambatsvina had to seek for other partners and forge yet a new alliance through which it would sustain its grip on power. They found this in the traditional authority, chiefs, headman and village heads. In their judgement these would substitute the war veterans in the alliance. From 2005 the state started to devolve power to the chiefs giving them more authority over judicial matters, making them commissioners of oaths accompanied by many fincancial and material benefits. Each chief was given a brand new twin-cab vehicle, a farm with elegant farm house, a computer and a state funded secretary and messenger. The mechanisation programme spearheaded by the Reserve Bank in 2007, the Agricultural Support Productivity Enhancement Facility (ASPEF) targeted traditional leaders as specific beneficiaries and distributors of inputs. Indeed war veterans were sidelined and substituted by traditional authority but this also increased inflationary pressure and more and more people plunged into abject poverty.

The new strategy for the state and ZANU-PF was to use the chiefs to regiment the rural electorate in preparation for the following general elections. Mugabe intended to contest for the presidency in a bid to continue as leader of the country for more than 30 years although he had ealier promised to hand over power to someone else. However, it was clear that opposition from within and from outside, was becoming more determined against him. Murambatsvia was also an inadvertant strategic error on the part of ZANU-PF, the state and Robert Mugabe, as the 2008 events later showed. The dispersal of urban land movement actors through Murambatsvina had a catalystic effect on the rural voting pattern. Murambatsvina victims, most of whom relocated in the rural areas (both resettled farms and communal lands), became a strong mobilising force against the elite, bourgeoisie, the ruling oligarchy and President Mugabe.

The land movement, now an alliance of urban workers, farm workers, peasants, and sidelined war veterans was decisive in the 2008 harmonised elections. War Veterans sought to to be more active in politics than ever before, during these elections. They elisted to participate in elections for urban and rural constituencies

but were weeded out by the ZANU-PF machinery during primaries and afterwards. Some war veterans resisted and went ahead to register on the party's ticket, thereby splitting the vote with disastrous consequences to ZANU-PF. The anti-elite struggle within the liberation movement seems to have given MDC and advantage as the vote then swayed to them. Aggregated votes for both MDC- Tsvangirai (99 seats) and MDC (10 seats) had a resounding success over ZANU-PF which got only 97 seats in the first electoral defeat in almost a generation. For the presidential election, Robert Mugabe got 43 percent of total votes cast against Morgan Tsvangirai's 47 percent. However, neither satified the constitutional requirement of obtaining more than 50 percent of total votes cast to be reistated as president. A run off has been set for 27 June 2008 in a violent post electoral atmosphere.

Even with this electoral victory for the MDC, a deeper analysis would reveal more complex activities under the surface. The victory for MDC does not necessarily mean an embrace of the political programme of that party and abandonment of the liberation agenda. To many the common enemy was the elite, whether in ZANU-PF or MDC but this political group could be dislodged by first removing Mugabe and his henchmen who had grown very powerful[283]. The vote expressed for the first time a new and developing alliance of workers and peasants. This view was analysed by a former ZIPA Commander and founder member of the MDC (Discussion with MDZ, 2008). He illustrated that even within MDC, the struggle between the elite on one hand and on the other, peasants and workers was heated. This was shown by the poor performance in Midlands by MDC-T, expressing discontent by the workers. The elections of 2008 can best be seen as of the lower classes against the elite although this view has not been accepted by some analysts. Murambatsvina had speeded the common alliance of progressive forces of the liberation movement but ironically under backing a party that is seen as serving the interests of capital than their own class interests. However in this equation inflation, hunger and other problems played an important part.

7.5 Post Murambatsvina: withering away of the land movement?

We have seen how the land movement evolved and developed throughout the colonial period and how it became the foundation of nationalism. We have also seen how the two were the most prominent forms of struggle against colonial rule and further how the liberation war was the ultimate outcome of those struggles which were then under the umbrella of the liberation movement. This movement, as we have seen had many more movements within it namely the peasant land movement,

[283] Some War Veterans who had been urged by the ZANU-PF politburo in the 2008 elections chose to be independent or to join Simba Makoni, a challenger of Robert Mugabe presidential candidature from within ZANU-PF. They saw this as a better alternative than the MDC which was western backed. So these War Veterans had a double task of fighting the ZANU-PF elitse and the MDC Hoping to have representation of the grassroots in the new political structure. The other motive of the War Veterans was to split the critical MDC vote so that by losing western countries would not use MDC as leverage. Without this strategy MDC would have got a clear victory over ZANU-PF which many of the War Veterans feared, as argued in this thesis.

the farm worker movement, the nationalist movement and the guerrilla movement. Conflicts and alliances before and after independence within the liberation movement were also discussed and how these led to the rupture of the 2000 land occupations.

The occupation period that covered a four year period from 1998 to 2002 had multiple alliances forged which ultimately resulted in a political united front of the liberation movement against a united front of the opposition and the civil society movement. But alliances within the liberation movement soon fractured as class contradictions sharpened in the struggle for land redistribution. The state, ZANU-PF and President Robert Mugabe again turned against the land movement and started to crush it through Operation Murambatsvina. The liberation movement was once more divided along class lines although the struggle remains latent owing to state repression. With all these shifting positions of the government, Mugabe and ZANU-PF in relation to the land movement and the liberation movement in general, the burning question is, what was the reaction of the land movement to all these influences by the state and ZANU-PF? One school of thought argues that: '…many observers' analyses [are] that the 'war vets' association was actually taken over by the Central Intelligence Organisation in preparation for the 2000 invasions: this is the state incarnate.'

Moyo and Yeros (2005) offer a different view. They argue that the land occupation movement survived beyond February 2000 and continued until:

> *… the war veterans' association … bec[a]me a source of weakness for the movement … [it] emerged as a 'single issue' movement, focusing exclusively on the immediate question of land repossession and not on longer-term political economic questions, particularly the post-fast-track phase. (Moyo and Yeros 2005: 190)*

The authors argue that because of the perceived 'single issue' weakness War Veterans, as leaders of the movement, consequently failed to build: '…self sustaining, democratic peasant worker organisational structures, with a view to preparing for longer-term class-based political education and ideological struggle.'[284] (Moyo and Yeros 2005: 190)

What logically followed was the 'withering away of the land occupation movement', according to Moyo and Yeros (2005). There are two issues that Moyo and Yeros (2005) raise here. One is the organisation of the land movement for sustainability purposes and the other is the current state of the movement.

Was the land movement co-opted or even negated by the state before the 2000 elections as David Moore (2004) argues? This question has sufficiently been dealt with in Chapter 5 and this chapter. The conclusion is that the land movement continued beyond 2000 elections and it was not co-opted nor was it then negated.

[284] Moyo and Yeros can be excused for having been writing at the heat of the moment, before some issues had fully evolved or before enough empirical data had been collected. Their position Moyo and Yeros (2007) recognises as in previous works that War Veterans managed to sustain 'unique organic links' in the countryside which enabled them to mobilise for occupations. However, the authors do not fully explain what happened to these links.

Has the land movement itself 'withered away' because of all these influences by the state? We shall examine this question as we conclude this book.

We shall begin by assessing organisational structures that developed during the land movement because this is a critical factor in sustaining the movement. In discussing the issue of organisation of sustainable structures for the land movement a number of issues have to be taken into account. One of the main propositions of this thesis is that there is a complex embryonic relationship between the War Veterans and ZANU-PF as a party. Another is that there are many ZANU-PFs within ZANU-PF with class, ethnic and generational cleavages. As a result even the embryonic connection between the War Veterans and ZANU-PF is not a single umbilical code but many. Therefore multiple patterns of alliances can be formed between the two.[285]

As we have seen in turning point section, when War Veterans came out of their cocoon from 1988 they fought with ZANU-PF elites for cultural capital accumulated through the liberation war. They claimed heroism and its redefinition; they claimed the metaphors and symbolic images of the war. However, as they did this they did not want to lose the gained cultural capital by forming another party or organisation. They would rather battle it out with politburo selected candidates like Mahofa in the Gutu saga, push Mugabe to throw away his Ministers like at the Chinhoyi meeting but they wanted to remain identified as ZANU-PF.[286] War Veterans feared losing something by moving out of ZANU-PF. As a result War Veterans used structures of ZANU-PF in competition with ZANU-PF elites and nationalists.[287]

It is this fluidity of the land movement as a component of the liberation movement, that allows War Veterans to access ZANU-PF structures in as much as ZANU-PF has access to War Veteran structures depending on the objectives, and tactics at given times. This is the complexity of the liberation movement that needs to be critically evaluated in order to appreciate certain strategies and tactics, continuities and discontinuities, of the land movement.

Moyo and Yeros (2005) recognise other grassroots organisations that War Veterans have access to like traditional structures. However there are also organisations which War Veterans have formed arising from the land movement, for example the Nyabira Mazowe Farmers association. This was formed by War Veterans in early 2000 to, *inter alia*:

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[285] As when War Veterans forged an alliance with peasants from 1997 to occupy land or when War Veterans, now leading the land movement, itself lower echelons of the liberation movement, forged an alliance with the ZANU-PF elites to campaign for 2000 general elections and 2002 presidential elections.

[286] For example notice how even Margaret Dongo was herself apprehensive, in one of the controversial parliamentary debates, of being anything else than ZANU-PF although she proceeded to form her own party shortly afterwards, '*At some stage we were labelled ZUM supporters and some even wanted to start forming a new party. Cde Dongo emphasised that the ex-combatant fought for the struggle under ZANU-PF and would remain ZANU-PF.' (Ziana 30 September 1991)*

[287] The land movement mobilised peasants across ZANU-PF structures. The ruling party's structures were used by the War Veterans in organising the movement on the ground although the same War Veterans were fighting with ZANU-PF elites at the top.

- To foster, encourage, promote and advance the establishment, maintenance, development of farming activities undertaken by the War Veterans and other landless masses of Zimbabwe, and in so doing, improve the economic and social status for the previously marginalised owners of the Zimbabwe ….
- To communicate, exchange information, or become associated or affiliated with other organisations, not at war with Zimbabwe; for the benefit of economically empowering the Association's members.
- To present the views of members to government, local authorities, institutions, associations and other bodies in and outside Zimbabwe on any matters directly or indirectly affecting members and the capacity to conduct business.
- To encourage and promote development of socio-economic and financial systems which appreciate the problems of the members in their endeavour to empower themselves through sustainable farming activities.
- To provide farming business counselling services through the Planning Department of the Association to its members.
- To communicate, improve and pass constructive comments when proposed changes to legislation are made known.
- To act when required, as arbitrator in any matters concerning members' enterprises and industry in general.
- To enter into and become a party to any contract or agreement (Constitution of Nyabira Mazowe Self-contained farms Farmers Association, undated).

In fact after the Fast Track this association transformed into a more powerful organisation, Mashonaland West Mining, Agricultural, Residential and Tourism Association (MWART) (see Mwart Agro syndicate constitution).[288] Mwart and Nyabira Mazowe Association have managed to defend their members against evictions by ZANU-PF elites and civil servants as discussed above. They continue to provide services to their members and other victims of corrupt officials according to their constitution.

War Veterans in Mazowe also formed another organisation, the African Nationalistic Paradigm (ANP). This NGO was registered as a public Trust with the following objective:

> *… to preserve, promote and develop spiritual and material cultures of the African people and to facilitate positive contribution… by articulating African thought, values, practices and technologies that can assist in solving problems faced by … humanity (Constitution of African Nationalistic Paradigm, 2001 as amended 2005)*

With this objective the organisation established a centre in Concession for research in African biotechnologies and agricultural machinery for support to the agrarian reform. The organisation bought a farm from a White farmer in 2001 and started a research project on the indigenous Tuli breeds because of its commercial and adaptation advantages. The organisation mobilised the University of Zimbabwe, Henderson Research Station and Mazowe Institute of Veterinary Science which participated in the researches. They also started researches on a breed that has features of a wildebeest found in Chiweshe Communal It sold about 400 cattle to

[288] Participant observation (2003-8) I was a member of Mwart heading the Legal and Training Committee. This is but one organisation amongst many.

new farmers for breeding. Above all the organisation members invented and patented two agricultural machines for furrowing and ridging in order to promote African agronomic techniques using modern equipment. However the farm was suddenly subdivided by the district and Provincial Committees when the project had just started to bear fruits.[289] This shows that War Veterans have continued to organise and they have insight into sustaining the land movement although the organisation takes different shapes depending on different sets of factors.

When the FTLRP started to have effects on the ground it met serious resistance from the occupiers as discussed in this thesis. At times there were physical clashes between the occupiers and state organs resulting into arrests and imprisonment of the War Veteran leaders (Interview with DM, self employed leader of occupations in Nyabira, 2004). Relations between the state, ZANU-PF and the land movement continued to sour because of divergent views about the direction and destiny of the land reform program. When the FTLRP was in the hands of civil servants and elites within the ruling party and private sector had access to the structures and processes, they worked hard to redirect the movement and steer it off its original course as defined by the occupiers. Here we look at the ultimate objectives of different occupiers and their evaluation of the outcome of the Fast Track.

Coming back to the issue War Veterans' vision beyond the land repossession, some War Veterans leaders ended at land repossession but others had ideas beyond that. For example some War Veterans had socialist ideas gained from the time of the guerrilla war and they were keen to apply them through the land movement. The actually saw themselves as the vanguard in what they considered a class struggle between the bourgeoisie and ruling oligarchy. In Mazowe and Nyabira alone there were seven War Veterans who were either graduates of Wampoa College or were the lecturers there. And out of the seven, three were leaders in the occupations one of them being a woman. These commanded vast areas and when the movement centralised its coordination they became coordinators thereby widening their influence in the land movement. Amongst themselves they also discussed intensely (Participant observation, Mazowe, 2000-6).

Probing one of them on his visions and interpretation of the situation DMT (Interview with DMT, intellectual War Veteran employed as civil servant and leading occupations in Mazowe, 2000) explained that:

> *… the national democratic revolution was not completed. We are now in the process may be of realising this stage. But in my case, I have ideals which go far beyond that. Like you are aware I have Communist ideals, I would want a society that is free of exploitation of man by man. I would love to have a situation, a society where classes within society are narrowed. The haves and the have nots, that distinction should be narrowed as much as possible if not completely done away with. The state should own the basic means of production on behalf of the majority of the people. These are the ideals that I think go far beyond what the ideals of a national democratic revolution would entail, because it ends here. People share the land, people have been given the means to go into industry and commerce and this revolution is complete. But there would still be differences in terms of wealth, in terms of stratification of society - we have those who have and those who don't have and so forth. I would want to go a step further.*

[289] Participant observation, founder member and Chairman of ANP (2001-6).

As a result, although Moyo and Yeros (2005) might be correct when they point out that War Veterans did not mould 'self-sustaining, democratic peasant-worker organisational structures with a view to preparing for a longer-term class-based political education and ideological struggle' they have understated the ideological clarity and objectives of some influential War Veterans. The better view is to look at this as a class struggle between the 'haves and have nots'. The intention of these ideologically motivated War Veterans and other occupiers was to not just take land from the White commercial farmers and end by giving it to the Blacks but they wanted the land to go to the landless and the needy and it was not a racial issue. Farm workers also expressed clearly what they felt was the objective of the land occupation movement and were critical about how this was derailed through government intervention. DN (Interview with DN 2001), a former foreman at a farm in Concession whom I quote at length had this to say:

> *Fear strikes us but we realise that we are the victims here because … to tell you the truth … we the [Black] people want our land but [also] we want all of us to survive. The land … is for all of us. …You know that when we are at meetings we say (inaudible) one cannot have land that stretches from here to that end …But there is this other program of section 8 [that] allow[s] one person to be like a White man … it is says, you have no land here, go away then only one person is left who shall just be like the White man. So this is where we notice that things are bad. It's now twisted at this point. … We here at the compound would share 8 acres, 5 acres, 6 acres that will be enough for us. We can survive our whole lives here. We were confident that we would get our own share of land while we work for a wage … to sustain my life. But P and others changed later. They said they were not going to give us any field. This program does not give the farm workers land. Then we asked, 'What about the houses?' Then they said we could keep that for some time and we left our properties and came here. Then they followed us up and took the keys from us … Even up to now we don't greet each other. I want my house… They [civil servants] are being paid by the government, aren't they? What about us who are being chased away from these houses? … This is where this program is wrong. It is causing a lot of suffering to farm workers … I end up saying that had I known I would not have supported the [land occupations] program. If we can be 6, 8 of us thinking the same thing like this, what will come into our minds here? … Land is now given to a person who is at the DA's, sitting in an office but I, who stumped, cannot get the land. I moulded the bricks for the sheds to be there, I constructed the dam and now what are you saying? This grievance! That's the major complain in the farms. It will not just die off like that. It is getting very bad in all these farms. There are a lot of people who are crying fowl about it.*

Another farm worker a former manager in Gomba, RN (Interview with RN 2004) evaluated the outcome of the Fast Track program as follows:

> *And if you actually look at it the people who are really farming they are those who are coming from Harare. People who really came from the communal lands are not farming. They do not have the capital. The farm worker is not farming because he doesn't have capital as well. But if we look at the beneficiaries of this program they are not the people who should be getting the benefit because you see that one comes in his Pajero, with one tractor and this and that. But now a person like me coming from the reserves hoping to do something here I find myself with no capital. I cannot farm. I am not getting what I expected …those who are benefiting are those who were well-to-do already …people came from the communal lands [because] that person is land hungry. The farm worker is land hungry.*

The aggregate effect of all these views by the land occupiers is that they certainly had ideas beyond the Fast Track and in fact Fast Track stopped them from implementing their vision of land reform. It seems clear to occupiers that their objectives went beyond repossession of land from the White farmers but to give it to the landless peasants, farm workers and War Veterans; people who wanted to make a living out of the land. It is also clear form the tone of the informants that there is still bitterness and dissatisfaction about the outcome of Fast Track.

This thesis argues that the land movement is still vibrant and is far from 'withering away' despite efforts by the state to thwart or to co-opt it. The prognosis that 'there would remain only a minimum of organised political structures among the peasantry to exercise influence over the post-redistribution phase of agrarian reform' (Moyo and Yeros 2005: 193) does not seem to be supported by facts on the ground. On the contrary as discussed in this chapter, there is formidable challenge from the land occupiers to the ruling oligarchy and petty bourgeois opportunists. Evidence for this ongoing struggle is corroborated by the new political tactic of war veterans to enrol as candidates for the March 2008 elections and how they were systematically weeded out by the ZANU-PF ruling elite (Personal observation 2008).[290] The alternative view suggested by this thesis is that the land occupation movement of Zimbabwe expresses a higher level of struggle against Africa's post-colonial settlerism and neo-colonialism.

[290] Many war veterans had registered to compete in the primary elections in order to become parliamentary candidates through the ZANU-PF ticket. However there was systematic elimination of war veterans by the ZANU-PF ruling oligarchy through various means. One was that the ruling elites demanded that for a candidate to qualify for primaries one had to be at least five years as a Provincial level office bearer. Considering the exclusionary directive given in the early 1980s prohibiting war veterans to be office bearers in the party, many failed to qualify. However, noting that some loyalists were also excluded by this qualification there was provision for a waiver, particularly for members of the diplomatic corps who had returned from services abroad, but not for war veterans. Although war veterans used their mobilisation skills and were preferred by the ZANU-PF electorate the leadership did not waive the condition. In a charged meeting in January 2008 held at ZANU-PF Harare Provincial offices chaired by ZNLWVA Chairman, Jabulani Sibanda, war veterans were bitter about this exclusion (Personal observation January 2008). I personally campaigned for 3 women war veterans (two were former Wampoa graduates, one having led land occupations in Chinhamora) and another war veteran man, during the primaries. Two of the candidates campaigned in my former war zone – Mazowe detachment. Three were disqualified despite their popularity in the constituencies. One of the women applied for an urgent chamber application to bar a Politburo-preferred candidate, and she enrolled as an independent when blocked by the ZANU-PF elite. In another case where another leader of (1998 and 2000) occupations had registered and was standing against Francisco Zhuwau, Deputy Minister of Science Technology and President Mugabe's nephew, the army was used to beat up people protesting the imposition of Zhuwau. Because of fear many did not become independent candidates. However another Wampoa female graduate became an independent and joined the Simba Makoni camp led by former Minister of Finance and ZANU-PF Politburo member who registered his presidential candidature against Mugabe. These internal conflicts illustrate that the War Veterans' movement is far from being co-opted and their struggle against the elite continues, if in changed form.

7.6 Conclusion

In arriving at a general conclusion to this thesis it is appropriate to attempt to form some judgments about the evolving relations between the land movement and the state, for the light thrown on the nature of the Zimbabwean agrarian crisis. This leads to a final summation, linking the tendencies described in this thesis to the wider African context of rural violence, as seen in countries as diverse, distant and agrarian as Cote d'Ivoire and (most recently) Kenya. The land issue is far from being uniquely Zimbabwean. The failure of mercantilist political elites in Africa to address agrarian tensions or to invest in agro-technical improvement relevant to the needs of the rural masses lies close to the heart of much of the social tension plaguing Africa's rural areas.

In the early occupation period (1998-9) the land movement came into conflict with both the state and the White commercial farmers. ZANU-PF elites and President Mugabe were against the occupations for reasons of their own (partly because the veterans were challenging elite grip on state power, but also because the government was anxious to defend a property regime from which its cronies benefited). The movement was at its strongest following the victory of some War Veterans in some of these early skirmishes (in 1997). From these early gains some War Veterans exercised a leverage to mobilise the existing land movement for land occupations, and this helped the ideologically-motivated Wampoa group to shape and pursue a (war-induced) alternative political vision for the future of Zimbabwe as a radically decentralised state based on 'back to the land' social (and technical) values.

The later occupation period (1998-2000) encompassed dramatic and critical shifts reconfiguring political factions and forces in the wake of the referendum on constitutional reform and afterwards. At this juncture, President Mugabe was adept enough to forge an alliance with the land movement to withstand a political surge from a wider opposition alliance. This allowed the presidency and its backers to regain political control, through using War Veterans and the land movement as campaigning asset during the 2000 general elections and 2002 presidential elections.

It has been made clear in this thesis that there were two levels of occupations within the process occurring in and around the year 2000 – one was led or inspired[291] by groups of War Veterans still in pursuit of liberation political visions and the other by ZANU-PF elites and the state. It has been argued that these two occupations had different objectives based on conflicting class orientations. The second kind of occupation process strengthened the emerging Black bourgeoisie and key political backers of ZANU-PF and the president. Occupations pushed by the ideologically-motivated veteran group were swiftly negated by the Fast Track approach, resulting in this group of occupiers receiving inadequate land (Utete 2003), and coming into conflict with new rich farmers supported by the state and the ZANU-PF ruling elite. Be that as it may, the case for reform made by the land movement could not be totally deflected, and consequently 72 percent of land went to small scale farmers. Many land movement actors benefited this way, even if ZANU-PF ruling elite and President Mugabe were careful to marginalise those most in favour of the strong alternative ideological programme described in this thesis.

[291] These include independent groups of occupiers of farm workers, peasants and peri-urban centres who were not directly led by War Veterans.

White farmers, once a key ally of the regime, were neatly replaced by a Black commercial farming class on the back of the social surge for land occupation. Political damage to the status quo was thus contained, even at the expense of some quite severe dislocations and decline in agricultural productivity. The gamble is that these inefficiencies will prove temporary – some White farmers may indeed stay on and supply consultancy services to the new group of large-scale owners. This would not have been a possibility had the War Veteran occupations succeeded, since (as we have seen in Chapter 6) the movement called for a radical shift towards localised food sovereignty around a different system of agro-technology.

Winning the 2005 elections by ZANU-PF signalled irreversible political gains by the ruling party, proving that an alliance with those in the liberation movement with a 'back-to-the-land' ethos, was no longer needed for the survival of ZANU-PF. As a result Murambatsvina (Operation Restore Order) could then be commenced, marking a victory for ZANU-PF elites, the state security apparatus and President Mugabe over those within the land movement that they had earlier failed to co-opt or completely silence. And yet the failure to alleviate agrarian poverty – it has continued to worsen, in fact – or to address contradictions in the relationship between rural citizens and ZANU-PF elites makes it unlikely that the land movement will simply 'wither away'. Cooption will then prove an expensive option, since it will require (in effect) deep economic reforms, based either on heavy investment in small-scale production systems or in provision of urban jobs. The 'archaism' of the land movement thrives on the fact that the majority of Zimbabweans live impoverished and highly insecure lives, and still retain a strong sense that health and safety are to be found in peasant options. The Mugabe regime can, at best, have won only a temporary stay of execution, for failing earlier to develop agrarian policies independent of the needs of a White farming elite. It is suggested that the Lancaster House compromises will continue to haunt the regime.

This thesis has attempted to characterise an Africanising land movement led by ideologically-motivated War Veterans, and to show that it was distinct from ZANU-PF, ZNLWVA and the state, though far from being completely independent within a broader liberation movement framework. As shown, the War Veteran land movement has interacted with different institutions and political organisations in its operational environment, forging a range of alliances, and resulting in complex outcomes, with varying significance and practical consequences for participants at the top and bottom of the movement structure. Also the situation is fluid, and relations between the land movement, state, presidency, ZANU-PF and the opposition movement have evolved over time. At present, the state has the upper hand, but the agrarian problems, to which the War Veterans' land movement is a political response, will not go away. The Wampoa veterans (or their successors) are likely to return.

The literature has recorded a number of hasty judgments about land occupations, failing to perceive the competing class interests involved. A complexity of outcomes and legacy is typical for social movements in general, but it is important for analysts to follow the twists and turns of development of the land issue in Zimbabwe, and to become aware of the details, if an important subterranean class conflict is not to be misrepresented. It is an overall conclusion of this thesis that blanket condemnation of the veteran-led land movement as stooges of the regime is premature and incorrect. This study has prepared the way for a fuller and more nuanced approach to the

topic, and challenges commentators and future analysts to grapple further with the details yet to be exposed.

A correct assessment of the land movement in Zimbabwe is important for Africa more generally, which faces a crisis of food production and agricultural under-productivity. This crisis is not (as often characterised) a technical problem alone. At root, it is a matter of social commitments and justice for the rural poor. The study supports recent work that has drawn links between land issues and the violence from which much of the continent suffers (Moyo and Yeros 2005, Richards 2004, Peters 2006, Chauveau and Richards 2008). Hunger for land is more than a desire for an economic asset; it is at root a deep desire for a more just, more equal and more communitarian way of life.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1

My Hero[292]

My hero is the wrinkled old woman
Who slowly uphill trudges
Balancing a bamboo-woven basket
Of hot *sadza* to the base
Where fighters wearily lie.

My hero is the teen-age girl
Of tender flesh and innocent virtues,
Trapping sharp acrid smell of billowing smoke
Blowing glowing embers of wet wood
For fighters at least to have a meal.

My hero is the toddler lonely left,
Humming nostalgic memories
Singing jolly old days of breast feeding,
When dear mother lullabies softly sang,
And no soldier drove her to the strong point
To answer puzzles of the dead and gone.

My hero is *mujibha*
Whose rolling piercing eye observes
From the summit of the hill,
Scanning battle-torn landscape below
Watching soldiers in single file
Marching silhouette to the camp.

My hero is the machine operator in overalls
Whose mind and muscle wane under bestial exploitation;
Sitting on a squeaking bench of plank and nail,
Splitting hairs of meager income earned,
Calculating with boney fingers,
What to spend and how much for combatants in the bushes.

My hero is the brave fighter

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[292] Poem written soon after the burial of late Minister Morris Nyagumbo, a veteran ZANU-PF nationalist who committed suicide after being implicated in the Willowvale Motor Industry (Willogate) scandal having succumbed to the questioning by Justice Sandura Commission of Inquiry. Nyagumbo was buried at the National Heroes Acre. His burial can be contrasted with that of Sheba Tavarwisa, a woman war veteran and the first female intellectual to join ZANLA and receive military training with the first group of female trainees in Tanzania. She rose through the ranks and became the first ZANLA Central Committee member and became the highest woman commander with virtues described by Fay Chung as follows: "*The only camp commander who to my knowledge refused to comply with this systematic abuse of some of the young women who had joined the struggle [by Tongogara and other top commanders] … was Shieba Tavarwisa, a top woman commander… a skilled and wise leader, who managed to maintain her integrity …* ". However Shieba got no more than a pauper's burial in her village and her credentials as a guerrilla leader are hardly known to the current generation.

Who never would backward retreat;
But now roams the streets unemployed
Stinking ages of sweat and dust,
Hunger pangs on dry cracking lips written,
Recalling gory memories but better days
When on his lap the gun lay.

My hero is not posthumously popular,
Nor is his heroism pruned and grafted
By eloquent eulogies at the graveside;
But candidly curved by courage and commitment
In the licking fires of the battle field
At road blocks, in keeps and the bases

My hero's life and her name are unknown;
They appear not in prepared speeches and The Herald
No one holds high her noble revolutionary banner,
Except the suffering workers, peasants and students
Whose wishes are no more than old man's dreams
Sweet suckling with toothless gums,
His mother's granite breast.

My hero is not passively beneath
The old ground levels of Heroes Acre,
Nor will he there ever lie;
But in the simple hearts and minds
Of the poor that toil and spoil,
The wet picture of heroism painted now.

My hero knows both night and day
Nor is she nightly guarded every hour
By ex-combatants of Warren Park;
His violet flame eternally glows
In the minds of workers and peasants
At work, in queues and in fields.

Wilbert Sadomba 1989

Appendix 2

Dear Land

For a decade this red earth I have tilled
The blunt of my hoe scratching sharp gravel
That cut the underside of my feet yester-years
As I covered distances like a mad man.
When bullets whizzed, earth you gapped
In your caves and dongas you swallowed me,
Like a bream shielding offspring from birds of prey
You've ta'en all dirt and scorn from me:
Smelly jet of blood, your soils have bathed
Spattering tears of grief from my cheek,
Down memory line of comrades dead and gone.
The foreskin of my toe peeled off by rock
You buried without word of complaint
When I suffer in the background, land
And my voice is muffled, my gun taken,
When I wobble up and down streets unemployed, land,
Engulfed by sweet fragrance of misery,
I will always come back to you for protection.
Land, take me back from deafening sirens of cities
And embrace me in the heart of your hinterlands
Where tormented souls droop in sympathy
At the unworthiness of my bitter struggle
When my heart sinks in the depths of the abyss
Under burdensome weight of relegation
I will always remember you land, my saviour.
I would, you swallow me forever
Should drought be too persistent for you to feed me.

Wilbert Z. Sadomba

April 1990

Appendix 3

Communication between War Veterans and White Commercial Farmers[293]

These are transcripts of letters between War Veterans and commercial farmers during the land occupations of Nyabira, throwing light on the nature of the conflict and how it was managed. They help evidence the claim that the land movement, led by war veterans, was a mass movement with well structured ideological arguments, thus countering arguments that War Veterans and occupiers were mere ZANU-PF tools.

Letter from the Towns, Directors of the Ball Farm, dated 16 August 2000. The letter was addressed to T, the Chairman and G and was copied to Vice president Msika and Minister of Home Affairs John Nkomo. It partly reads:

In response to numerous visits by yourselves over the last six months with requests to see ourselves personally we would like to make out our official response to your requests as follows:

1. Mr B and ourselves do appreciate that up to this stage your requests have been peaceful and non confrontational.
2. We understand that as War Vets you are carrying out your mandate to take over Ball Farm.
3. We have not received any formal documentation as to your credentials or authority as to the lawfulness of your demand.
4. To this date we have not received any notification or visitation from the relevant government authority concerned with land redistribution asto the intended acquisition of this farm.
5. It has come to our attention that T alleges to Mr. M that you have been informed that: (in your words) 'The labour on this farm has been mistreated and some of them have died'. By this we presume that you are accusing ourselves and others on the Ball in the past of physically assaulting the labour to the point that some of them have died. We question the authenticity of this information and believe it to be an accusation that has to be denied completely. If you have any official evidence to back your allegations up please feel free to furnish us with it and we will investigate to the best of our ability.
6. Yesterday there was a request for the farm to supply maize meal to your representatives. We would like to advise that maize meal would only be sold from the farm stock to your representatives at $7.50 per kilo.
7. In addition there was a request for firewood from your representatives. There are areas nearby where your representatives can collect their firewood. There is no need for any trees to [be] cut down for this purpose, as there is sufficient deadwood available.
8. *Any* actions undertaken by yourselves and/or your representatives, which are illegal under Zimbabwean law (which as citizens of Zimbabwe we acknowledge), will be reported immediately to the Zimbabwean Republic Police who have assured us of their willingness to take action should the law be broken.

[293] These letters between War Veterans and the commercial farmers are in the author's personal archives.

9. A full report of your demands made to Mr. B has been submitted to the Nyabira Police station (R.R.B. No. 310710) and faxed to the C.F.U.
10. We believe the latest directive from Minister John Nkomo (as of Friday 11 August) has made it cleat to the Commissioner of Police, and the CFU that there will be no more invasions, threats or lawlessness. As your visitation and continued presence thereafter falls after the date of the directive (11/08/00) it is perfectly obvious to us that you are in violation of this directive.
11. As concerned citizens of Zimbabwe we agree with the urgent need to redress the current land imbalance however we believe this should be conducted in an organised and transparent manner. We cannot condone the present wave of violence and intimidation being carried out under the banner of 'land reform for the landless', which is obviously your agenda. (The Commercial Farmers are being blamed for the inability of the present government to plan and carry an orderly land reform policy, which, as you are well aware, had the financial backing from most other countries in the world.)

Response of the Association, dated 18 August 2000, signed all the executive members of the Association and copied to the two Ministers, Chairman of ZNLWVA and the Commissioner of Police:

Your letter of the above dated 8/16/00 is acknowledged and herein refers:

1. We have always had and believed in peaceful and non-confrontational approach to our quest for our motherland as can be witnessed by our consultations with your Colleagues in the several farms our members occupied since February, 2000. As an Association, we went further to request your (Commercial Farmers in Nyabira and Mazoe) representation into our Association and some of your Colleagues reflected that they welcomed the idea, though they never came back from the time we discussed on the issue. May be they discussed with us in bad faith, clumsily defending their material comfort at the expense of the toiling poor masses and those who died for the same land to gain economic empowerment as their own liberators.
2. The mandate to take over Ball Farm comes from our historical background and the that twenty years after has passed when our Government had extended the hand of reconciliation, and request yourselves to consider land sharing equitably, but proved to have been resisted. We as freedom fighters and reserved forces o our motherland, have an obligation to put the record straight forthwith for the benefit of our land hungry Comrades in particular, and the landless masses at large. It is our birth right to demand to share one farm whilst you remain with one.
3. Any formal documentation in connection with acquisition and compensation is done by the Zimbabwe Government, or in consultation wit the British Government, depending on what is to be compensated on the farm. Our mission is to fulfill the wishes of our fallen Heroes and the toiling masses of Zimbabwe which is to justifiably break through the blockages or hindreances deliberately created by nature of imperialism, hence our stay put on Ball.
4. We forwarded to Government our interest in occupying Ball like any other farm we occupied and our remarks were that you have two farms; and we are to stay at Ball for ever as our home farm. Yours id Lil farm and the earl[ier] you shift from Ball the better. We are not going to let the farm idle, but to start land preparation since we are completing pegging within the course of his week. We are more concerned with land redistribution that the Government's pace. Better

you start the uphill struggle of energising your opposition and white supporters to realise the reality of Zimbabwean politics.

5. T is unkown to us and you should not associate us with any of what transpired between Mr B and himself. The moment I received your letter … I went to see Mr B to enquire about T. After talking to Mr B, I made it sure case that I got in touch with T and went with his to the Police. At the police it was clear that T and us (Coordinating Committee) are two different peoplewith vast gap to our approach regarding land occupation. This we refer to items 5 to 9. We therefore, as the sole representatives body to all Ex-combtants and the landless masses in the farms we ossupied, dissociate ourselves from Mr. T and all the actions he might be requested to respond to. This trend is not only unacceptable, but it is downright immoral for you to engage in that direction to parcel us with activities you very much know we did not do.
6. We checked with your report to Nyabira police station and the contents in your RRB No 31071; and advised the Member-in-charge … our position to your claims. It is naïve for yourselves to lay charges to police against us and T combined when you very much know that we are the association that created a peaceful [atmosphere] and establish the political environment which you enjoy from February to now through communication initiated by us to yourselves.
7. Do not twist the justifiable political demands for land by ourselves to suit directives from Government Ministers as if you are ignorant of our obvious claims and the climax to which our forecast and expectations are now at. We wish to let you know that we are aware of all your hide and seek games in effort to turn around our aims and objectives. Be very careful to explode the time bomb we had strenuously controlled in order to create an enabling environment to both of us. Once it explodes, there will be no more room for negotiations [and] for dialogue as the comrades attitude to your negative response is do or die situation and sacrificial. You should have told [Ian] Smith about lawlessness, invasions, threats or rule of law when he declared U.D.I. not us. The [amassing] of our wealth (natural heritage) whilst we die poor is no longer acceptable.
8. ["]As concerned citizens of Zimbabwe who agree with the urgent need to redress the current land imbalance["], you should have welcomed our soft and confident approach and conducted an organised and mutual understanding in response so that by now we could have been offered the farm from yourselves. Do not hide behind land reform program which you want to be implemented to other whites and not on you when you know very much that you can not own more than one farm whilst the majority have no land for a home twenty years after independence. Why do you want to reflect to Government that there is a wave of violence and intimidation carried out by us when you know very much our approach that has nothing to do with your charges but our motherland. Once again, we day be careful to explode the time bomb you are sitting on; instead you must be thankful to us for non-confrontational attitude.

The CFU, we are aware, is there to defend the settler minority like yourselves against the African majority through white advocates who left England to join the illegal regime's resistance to release our motherland to its rightful owners. They see nothing wrong with the brutal way our land was taken and start calling us all sorts of names. May we advise you that property law in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe was meant to make colonial theft as permanent so that it could survive any changes of

Government. We brought Zimbabwe, a majority Government can not allow this theft to go forever.

Remember we are aware that minorities like yourselves who have done well economically from our natural resources, and exploitation will never vote to a Government that advocate for such a land reform exercise like the one currently in place. This struggle demanding fast-track started with your inner-selves when you resisted the sharing of our land for the past twenty years.

21 August 2000, a meeting was held to "deliberate on Comrade T's fate" and the following was resolved and or observed[294]:

That Comrade T be incorporated into the Nyabira Mazowe Coordinating Committee.

His terms of reference entails to coordinate the activities of the Association (Nyabira/Mazowe) and those carried out by his group and Comrade Tk. This will avoid duplication of interest when occupying farms by comrades … when the main objective is commonly to resettle the landless comrades.

That Cde. T in fact worked hard to consolidate the aims and objectives o the acquisition o our motherland. The only disturbing development was communication breakdown mainly focused on the white farmers who wanted to divide us and let us clash to create disintegration amongst ourselves. Instead, the meeting resolved that there be more and constant communication between us inclusive of UNITY between us.

That Cde T write his report to defend the charges laid against him by the Towns family and present it together with that of the Association to Police.

That Government should realise that time for land preparation has come and we can not wait anymore when we are in Self contained farming model. Our initiation to pull resources together and pay for surveyors is clear testimony to Government that we are more than ready.

Mrs Towns and Towns are actually Directors, but one family. They have been left with Lil farm because they are trying to cheat Government as if the farm belongs to two different people as [recorded] in title deeds yet it is for one Owner. This observance and subsequent development makes the Ex-combatants more disappointed and wishing to start utilising Ball forthwith. Thanks [to] GOD their tactics have made us aware and united us further to fight for a just war [-] that of repossessing our motherland.

"To whom it may concern" Towns, as undersigned writes:
This letter serves to absolve entirely the management and staff of Ball (pvt) ltd. from any responsibility for any damage caused by whatever means to the property of any invaders, including any crops or machinery that are on the farm. Given that the farm is not designated at this juncture the staff and management are continuing with normal farming activities and cannot be held accountable for any wildlife tramping, or acts of God. Your understanding in this matter is appreciated.

[294] Extract of the meeting proceedings as copied in a letter addressed (to whom it may concern) and copied to the two Minister and Chairman of the War Veterans Association.

Appendix 4

Land dispossession: forced abandonment of an agricultural a research centre in Mazowe District

Introduction

This document was prompted by sudden land dispossession that was effected by the District Lands Committee of Mazowe of a farm that I and colleagues bought, occupied and established a research centre to support the agrarian revolution. We started negotiating with a Mr Hawskley to buy Subdivision A of the Rivers of Wengi River Estate sometime in 2001 after two of his four farms were designated and distributed among the landless. We sought the consent and support of Mazowe Rural District Council, District Lands Committee, Provincial Lands Committee and several Ministries to carry out activities of research to advance African agronomic techniques and biotechnologies. These Ministries include Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, President's Office, Policy Implementation and Coordination. We then commissioned a number of research projects involving the University of Zimbabwe, Mazowe Institute of Veterinary Medicine our organisation African Nationalistic Paradigm (ANP).

However, while we were in the middle of these researches without any warning, sometime in August 2006, we started to see people coming to claim the land arguing that they had been offered it by the Minister of Lands through the appropriate channels. This had started as a rumour which the Chairman of the District Lands Committee refused to confirm until the farm had been subdivided and people had already been allocated plots. Only one of us was offered a plot then. I was not offered any piece of the farm myself. We tried to seek audience with the District Lands Committee to present our case but in vain.

When we bought the farm it included a herd of 270 cattle and I had an additional individual herd of 54 cattle. It had all infrastructure for cattle ranching. At its peak the farm had more than 500 cattle. However with the change of status we were forced to sell all the cattle that we had. We tried to advertise so that we could sell the cattle to breeders in order at least advance our original objectives but in many cases those who had ready cash were abattoirs and we had no choice than to sell breeding stock for slaughter.

In the four years we had managed to transform the herd into mainly Tuli, an indigenous breed and we were now starting various projects to study the breed to improve it for purposes of restocking the depleted national herd as a contribution to the agrarian revolution. With my colleagues we had also managed to invent agricultural machinery which is appropriate for use by newly resettled farmers. We patented two agricultural implements. These programs had managed to attract serious students and researchers who had committed themselves but they immediately left the country when the projects suddenly stopped.

The objective of this document is not to resist the demarcation of The Rivers A and its allocation to other needy farmers. Rather it invites us to reflect on our vision of the agrarian reform. It questions the decisions that we as a country, as people in position

of authority and as a party, (ZANU-PF) which is spearheading the agrarian revolution, are making. It is an earnest appeal for inward evaluation and self criticism without which we cannot expect the development of our country.

As my personal details will show, I feel that the responsibility of raising such debate and criticism lies on people like me. Being a veteran of both the Second and the Third Chimurenga, I think the challenge we have now is to ensure the success of our agrarian transformation by addressing the more difficult issues beyond land allocation. With my history, academic standing and professional experience I feel I meet all requirements to raise these questions and criticism. Despite the land dispossession, I will continue to participate in shaping the agrarian transformation both in theory and practice.

Personal history

My name is Wilbert Zvakanyorwa Sadomba. In 1975, when doing Form Two, I left for Mozambique, to join the liberation struggle. I lived as an untrained recruit at Zhunda (where President Mugabe, Cde Edgar Tekere and Vice President Mujuru were) and Nyadzonya. I was trained at Chimoio, Mapinduzi Military Base with the first group under the command of Cde Tonderai Nyika (Brigadier Zimondi).

I became a political instructor after graduating with the first group at Wampoa Political Academy (Chitepo College). … At Wampoa one of the most influential literature that I read was an agricultural picture book entitled *Learning from Tachai* which illustrated developments in Chinese agriculture and grassroots efforts of food self sufficiency. This enkindled an interest in me to study agriculture and rural development which I pursued after independence… I taught politics at Chimoio and Chibabava, Toronga Camp up to the end of 1977 after which I went to Beira and then into the front.

I was deployed in Manica Province, Musikavanhu Sector, Mutambara Detachment during which time I operated with the current Army General, Cde. Constantine Chiwenga (Dominic Chinenge). I was wounded in a battle at Gwindingwi Estate and went back to Mozambique for treatment. When my wound healed I went to the north-eastern front, Tete Province and I operated in Mazowe Detachment, Chaminuka Sector. Mazowe Detachment covered Chinamora, Domboshawa, Masembura, part of Musana and Goromonzi, Mazowe Citrus, Concession, Mazowe farms, Nyabira, Mount Hampden and the city of Harare itself. I was engaged in many battles and I interacted with communities in both communal lands and commercial farms.

Owing to the advanced position of Mazowe Detachment one could hardly avoid traversing the whole sector going up and down to the rear detachments of Chesa and Nyahui (Rushinga). With this exposure, guerrilla war experience and profound political training I was in a good position to develop theories and formulate war strategies. In 1978 I wrote a war strategy for Chaminuka Sector which was later converted into a Provincial strategy for Tete Province in 1978. The writing of the strategy was commissioned, then Provincial Political Commissar for Tete Province. This was in the presence of Cde MH and the strategy was submitted through the channels … I went to Mozambique to train a special group to execute the strategy and ceasefire was announced when the first group had entered Tete Province to

implement it. Unique to this strategy was that it included agricultural development that was aimed to provide food to sustain the war. It outlined how farms would be established in the liberated zones with participation of military youth, combatants and adults. These were trained in agricultural production and protecting farms in the liberated zones. Equipment, and inputs were moved by a special unit from the white commercial farmers to the liberated zones of Rushinga and Pfungwe along the Mazowe River.

I went to Echo Assembly Point (Elim Mission) where I was responsible for political education – interpreting the Lancaster House Agreement to combatants and civilians. After independence I was assigned to Mazowe (Chiweshe Communal Land) to carry out political work and party building in 1980. I participated in the construction of party structures from branch to district levels. During this time I commissioned my own research project on the social and economic impact of *keeps* in Chiweshe.

At independence I was trained as a Local Government Promotion Officer and deployed at Gokwe District office. During my two years in Gokwe, four of my projects became national policy and evolved into several statutes and regulations. These projects include: conception and formation of lower tier structures of the District Council i.e. Village and Ward Development Committees (VIDCOs and WADCOs); formation and outlining the functions of the District Resettlement and Development Committee of the council; formation of the District Development Coordination structure that outlined division of functions between the technocrats and policy makers (councillors) and I developed the first District Development plan that culminated in a documentary film (*Gokwe People Speak*) produced by Ministry of Information. These projects resulted in the Prime Minister's Directive of 1984 and promulgation of several subordinate pieces of legislation.

I left the district to head the Mashonaland Central Provincial Promotions and Training Section with more than twenty four junior staff in the districts. During that period I led the amalgamation of former Rural councils which were mainly composed of white commercial farmers and the District Councils which were for Africans in the Communal Lands. After that I joined the Training and Promotion Unit of the Ministry in 1977 where I led teams of Ministry personnel and consultants from Swedish Association of Local Authorities (SALA) seconded by SIDA and co-authored the *Administrative Handbook* for Rural District Councils and I co-authored *Towards Council Decisions: Minute Handbook* for Rural District Councils.

I left Government employment in 1989 to join the Water and Sanitation Sector. As Community Participation Coordinator and was responsible for spearheading community participation, supervising a team of consultants located in the districts and provinces. I wrote a manual for grassroots practitioners in the sector which was accepted for publication by Intermediate Development Technology Group (ITDG-UK) in 1992.

I joined United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in 1992 to research and develop a policy for community based management of water and sanitation and my project was rated among the best of UNICEF community based initiatives in this sector worldwide. It was wholly adopted by the Zimbabwean Government and remains the operating policy to date. I also developed new methods and approaches

in community participation and education gaining international recognition in the field through publications with, for example, International Institute for Environment and Development (UK) and Medicus Mundi (Switzerland).

I left UNICEF and briefly worked as a freelance Rural Development Consultant during which time I met Professor Niels Roling from Wageningen Agricultural University who sported me through published works and facilitated my mature entry enrolment for a Masters Degree in Management of Agricultural Knowledge Systems which completed in 1999 with a distinction. My research topic was *The Impact of Settler Colonisation on Indigenous Knowledge in Agriculture: Fusion, Confusion or Negation?* The research gave me an insight of how agriculture was used as a cultural weapon to dominate the Africans. Sustainable (African) agronomic techniques and bio-technologies were systematically negated by western scientific agriculture as a process of colonisation.

I fully funded myself for the MSc from personal servings and this cost me over US $35,000. In 2001 I was awarded a scholarship to do a sandwich PhD program which was partly funded to cover expenses in the Netherlands and tuition. . I also wholly funded the rest of the study including data collection and write up. My topic was *War Veterans in the Land Occupations of Zimbabwe: Complexities of a liberation movement in Africa's postcolonial settlerism*. The research was motivated by the desire to ground the agrarian revolution in the momentum of the liberation movement by giving a voice to the war veterans who were vanguard to both revolutionary processes and it questions the postcolonial future of African liberation facing the complexities of neo-colonialism. My defense is due in 2007. During this time I also wrote and published book chapters, journal articles and presented seminar papers both here and abroad.

… When land occupations erupted in 2000, I immediately went to Mazowe District to participate. I chose Mazowe not because of its agricultural potentials first and foremost. I come from Honde Valley in the Eastern Highlands. Were it for the agricultural potential I would have gone to my home area and occupied Nyanga Highlands which fall under agro-ecological Region I whose potential is best in the country. I chose Mazowe as an area which encapsulates my historical experience and nobility of cause. I fought battles in places like Jumbo Mine, in mountains below Mazowe Dam, at Dengu village where Felix Chitepo died in my arms. I identify with the struggle of the people of Mazowe and surrounding areas to gain land and end poverty. Mazowe is vast therapeutic landscape to me.

I mobilised people in my neighbourhood and facilitated transport to go and occupy land, joining the only war veteran who was in Matepatepa area with people from Chiweshe. I later moved across Mazowe District getting as far as Nyabira. I took part in occupations in Mvuma although I had no intention of settling there. With other war veterans I finally occupied Umvuradona Farm in Concession owned by Mr Geoffrey Hawksley in early 2000. When the farmer decided to quit farming I proposed to buy the last of his four farms (Subdivision A of the Rivers) for the organisation that I had formed with others – ANP – whose objective was to advance African thought, technologies and practices. The farm provided ideal space and some facilities for research.

My agrarian reform vision

My ideological orientation, professional experiences and academic career have given me a basis for developing a land vision which became clearer as I took part in occupations. I argue that agrarian reform of this country can hardly address the key transformative issues if there is superficial understanding of the legacy of colonial history of agriculture. The decades 1920-1950 are critical in that therein lay the demise of African agriculture which had dominated since the coming of Europeans in the 15th Century. Other determining factors for the vision of agrarian reform are the micro and macro-economic environment. External markets, supply of machinery, chemicals, balance of payment support systems are vital aspects to the agrarian reform. With the sudden expansion of demand of machinery and inputs, dislocation of agricultural institutions like farmers' associations and boards, as well as breakdown of financial support services (insurance and banks), the nature of agrarian changes need to be profound and holistic.

There are other factors that need to be taken into consideration. In our people is a huge manpower resource with varied knowledge systems, skills and experiences. There is still wide knowledge of indigenous agronomic practices and biotechnology despite erosion through laws, extension packages, colonial land dispossession and forced relocations. Programs that changed food tastes, crop and animal varieties, bio-diversity and production patterns resulted into mono-culture agriculture that is heavily dependant on external inputs with negative environmental impact. It is imperative for our agricultural policy to address these problems.

As land redistribution benefited the Black majority it caused a backlash from both internal settlers and metropolitan Governments thereby affecting the pillars of agriculture that had been built by colonial systems. Institutions of agriculture that had been developed to this point cannot serve current agrarian transformation because the socio-economic and political environment during which they were nurtured is now different. New and innovative systems, techniques, institutions and extension approaches need to be developed to support this new dispensation. This calls for relentless efforts in research.

I therefore saw the need for research into areas that can free our people from depending on foreign technologies and inputs for success in agricultural production. With benefit of understanding both indigenous and western scientific production systems borrowing from both to advance the agrarian reform became the most logical approach. Plant and animal breeding by our ancestors resulted into crops and livestock that have stood the test of time. They are suited to the agro-ecological environments of our region and they provided rich nutritional diet for the household especially during the long cyclical droughts. However, colonial education and research did not have interest to study African agriculture let alone to advance it. Only in the past one and a half decades have scholars started to confirm that African agricultural techniques were appropriate for environmental sustainability and provision of healthy food than the pursued European scientific approaches.

My vision is therefore based on making African agronomic techniques, biotechnology and institutions the foundation of Zimbabwe's agrarian transformation. Instead of relying on outside countries for our agriculture we need to be more introverted and look at our potentials, our resources and our manpower. We

must focus our energies on addressing issues of food security for our people as a matter of urgent priority. Zimbabwe should come first in our approaches and strategies. We need to address the food needs of our children, our HIV/AIDS patients, our old and our pregnant or lactating women before we think of providing a cigarette for the smoking pleasure of someone in distance lands. The opportunity cost of focusing on international trade is sustainable, adequate, healthy food is a basic a prerequisite for primary health care. This will induce unimaginable import substitution through reduced or elimination of food imports, drugs and chemicals due to improved nutrition. Food processing and marketing of value added Zimbabwean food products will curve a niche in the international food industry which will eventually improve our foreign currency position, employment and will develop agricultural based industry.

When I participated in the land reform my vision was to practically build a model to demonstrate this direction of thought. I decided to develop a research institute and formed an NGO – African Nationalist Paradigm (ANP). Through this organisation with one of the members we bought "Subdivision A of the Rivers" farm inclusive of vast infrastructure for ranching, irrigation equipment for 30 hectares and a herd of 270 cattle. We funded it solely from our savings. The CIO Bindura investigated into the organisation and I believe they arrived at this truth.

My idea was to immediately start research programs in order to facilitate the agrarian reform by focusing on appropriate technology development to enhance productivity of newly resettled farmers. I wrote a concept paper and identified key contact persons at University of Zimbabwe (Animal Science/ Vet Departments), Mazowe Institute of Veterinary Science and Handerson Research Station.

The first project was to replace the exotic herd with Tuli cross breeds breed with the intention of replenishing the depleted national herd. Tuli is a product of our African bio-technology. The breed is adapted to local conditions but also compete highly for commercial purposes internationally. (A few years ago an Australian, through intellectual piracy stole Tuli genetic material and patented it and now Australia earns millions of US $ from indigenous knowledge of our people). At the point when our project had started to flourish, the farm was subdivided and allocated to other people. The Tuli herd presently at the farm bares testimony of this and I invite anyone interested to visit the farm to see for him/herself. In addition to the study of the Tuli, the Veterinary Institute of Mazowe identified a breed in Chiweshe with features of a wild beast which we had started to study by first collecting social data of the animal with intentions to commission MSc. and PhD. studies on it.

I influenced some scholars to take research in this direction. For example, my wife who had started on a medical degree dropped it to study Food Science and Technology and has just completed a Masters in Food Quality Management with Wageningen University. My daughter is also studying for a BSc. in food science and nutrition at the Midlands State University from my encouragement. Professor C's (now with Fort Hare in SA) interest in studying local breeds was as a result of many discussions and his involvement with our research projects. We had started designing researches on indigenous food like different *mutakura* mixtures in order to develop precooked and canned *mutakura* for specific nutritional requirements for people like lactating mothers, AIDS patients, diabetic patients and so on.

In addition I commissioned researched in agricultural implements that advance African agronomic techniques. With a colleague I invented and patented two machines for furrowing and ridging appropriate for small, medium and large scale farmers and drawn by drought or mechanised power. We had just begun negotiations with a private company in Bindura for the production of these implements. A third invention in progress is a plough that can be used on land that is not stumped.

My agrarian reform vision is to develop an agricultural system that makes Zimbabwe self sufficient and removes dependency on other countries by making maximum use of our material and human resources particularly indigenous knowledge systems. It is an agricultural system that should consider the broadening of the participants and aim at their empowerment. One way of doing so is to explore production techniques that encourage local systems than external ones.

Subdivision of the research centre

My vision was shuttered when in the last half of 2006 when I suddenly saw people coming to the farm holding offer letters and claiming that they had been resettled at the farm. It was shocking because the authorities had neither communicated about the subdivision nor warned us to prepare moving. We tried to seek audience with the District Lands Committee but we did not get sympathetic hearing. As we speak the land was divided into 7 plots and earmarked for cropping despite the huge infrastructure for beef farming, including boreholes, fenced paddocks, improved pastures, dip tank, handling facilities, weighing and loading infrastructure. I was not offered any land there so I had to rely on an A1 scheme nearby. However the future is also uncertain even there. I have not been given any offer letter and the boundary is in dispute.

The major problem is where to put the remaining herd of cattle that I have. I started downsizing operations since last year. This year alone I have sold over 100 cattle most of which have been breeding stock. It has been painful to sell breeding stock for slaughter because of the desperate situation. The last time (24 December 2006) I tried to sell the cattle for slaughter the potential buyer was so touched that he refused to buy them for slaughter urging me to present my case to the authorities so that I save the herd. This prompted me to write this document.

Numerous and intriguing questions come into mind after such experiences in our land reform. What really are we trying to achieve with our agrarian reform and how do we intend to achieve what we want? Do people in position of authority at all levels understand the nature of agrarian transformation that we are engaged in as a nation and do they understand the consequences of some of their actions?

We cannot afford at this juncture when we are under economic siege that is causing untold suffering to our people, to waste time and resources, cripple production that has already taken off the ground and is running or generally retard progress. … If corrupt tendencies result in derailing this noble cause it is difficult to see how our nation will come out of its predicament and this is worrisome. I hope this document will at least arouse debate but also constructive criticism which is a prerequisite for the success of our agrarian reform and national development. If a person like me fails to meet the requirements for resettlement I wonder who will.

How many more are getting dispossessed of land that they fought for and took away from colonialists but without recourse? How many, particularly war veterans?

I write this not because of desperation and the bitterness for loss. During the course of time I have managed to develop myself into an international professional and I can work anywhere in the world at any level but the question is why should I be forced to leave my country in search of livelihood? Why should I be denied the opportunity to serve my own people and contribute to the development of my own people whom I sacrificed so much for? Why?

Signed:

Distribution:

District Lands Committee (Mazowe District)
Mazowe Rural District Council
Provincial Lands Committee
Provincial Governor
Provincial Administrator
Chief Lands Officer (Mash. Central)
Principal - Mazowe Institute of Veterinary Science
Minister of policy Implementation and Coordination
Anti Corruption Commission
Minister of Agriculture
Minister of Lands
Reserve Bank Manager – Dr Gideon Gono
CIO Bindura
Director CIO
Minister Local Government
General Paradzai Zimondi (Cde. Tonderai Nyika)
General Constantine Chiwenga (Cde. Dominic Chinenge)
ZANU-PF Provincial Chairman for Mash. Central
Honourable Vice President (Comrade Joyce Mujuru)
Honourable Vice President (Comrade Joseph Msika)
His Excellency President Robert Mugabe

Appendix 5

Aspects of planning and implementation at Jambanja Farm Plan

Available resources to implement the plan

This plan is developed with the full realisation of the economic challenges that the country is facing and there is no hope that the situation will change in the near future. The plan is designed to be completely self-reliant. This means that the basic assumption is that there is no external financing that will be available to support the plan. As a result all the projects will be based on the fact that they will be financed from the household income. However should there be unconditional donations and loans the household will take advantage of it and use that efficiently. This however will just accelerate the speed but not determine the outcome of the plan. As this is a lifelong project and at that, an intergenerational program, resources that are readily available will only cater for the initial stages of the plan. A lot more resources are required in the long term and in the distant future. (Jambanja Plan 2005)

Cattle

There are cattle that I have acquired since the year 2002. The general plan is to allow the herd to increase to an optimum of 100 herd and then begin culling to finance the agricultural plan. If pastures continue to be available on the ANP Farm this figure can easily be realised. But if ANP ceases to provide grazing rights then the number of 100 will be too big to be maintained. In this case the mountain part of the farm will have to be fenced off and paddocked to provide for pasture. There are so far 40 cattle, six of which are steers and a Tuli bull. The livestock policy is to sell the steers, dry cows after the expiry of the mating season, aged cows and (some) trouble animals. These will be sold to sustain activities of the farm and to introduce projects wherever possible. (Jambanja Plan 2005)

Irrigation equipment

There is irrigation equipment which has been acquired over the years. I have an 80 horse-power Ford Major diesel engine fitted with an Ajax water pump. This equipment is capable of driving 60 sprinklers on average. The main line aluminum piping covers a length of 1,107 m. There are also other accessories including the sprinklers to complete a full set for irrigation. *(Jambanja Plan 2005)*

Inventions

Another (item of) property which is available for potential use are the two inventions of the Furrow plough and the Ridging plough. These will be produced commercially, to generate income to support agricultural activities at Jambanja. Besides being produced for the market they will also provide cheap affordable equipment for use on the farm to advance African agronomic techniques. (Jambanja Plan 2005)

Requirements

For the farm to operate securely and sustainably there are a number of measures that have to be taken. These include employment of skilled manpower, comprehensive security, fencing, and construction. (Jambanja Plan 2005)

Manpower recruitment

Recruitment of manpower to undertake relevant farming duties is important. A manager with knowledge in horticulture and other and growing of small grains is required. This manager will be responsible for planning and implementation of plans from season to season. She shall have at least six supporting members who will be unskilled labourers but with experience. All the six must have exposure of handling irrigation equipment. This will have to be done in phase 1. (Jambanja Plan 2005)

Development of draught power

There are eight steers reserved for providing draught power. These steers need to be broken-in and trained as draught power. Relevant implements will have to be acquired like ploughs if the furrow or ridger are not yet available. This will have to be done in phase 1. (Jambanja Plan 2005)

Fencing

Boundary fencing that will cover a total perimeter of about 5.5 km is required to fence the perimeter of Jambanja Farm. The western boundary is 2,555 km. About two-thirds of this is fenced but the wire needs rehabilitation. The eastern side is about 1.5 km. Being a new boundary, this length is not fenced. The distance from the apex to the eastern boundary is 675 km and is already fenced.

The farm will further be divided into three areas according to the land use patterns as outlined above. The mountain will be fenced off and developed into pasture, wildlife and natural forest area. This requires a length of about 0.6 km. The potentially arable land will form the second block. The third block will cover the area south of the road, with its fence along the road. This fence is already there. The second block demarcates the vlei from the fields north of the road. This fence just needs rehabilitation. The last fencing is along the river on the other side of Garamapudzi. This fencing is about 1,575 km. A total length of about 4 km is therefore immediately needed to fence the perimeter and the blocks of Jambanja Farm. Phase 1 of the plan will concentrate with fencing of the eastern boundary. This might even mean removing wire from elsewhere for this purpose. Money from cropping will be targeted for fencing the eastern boundary. (Jambanja Plan 2005)

Water Harvesting points

There is great potential for harvesting seasonal run-off from the mountains to augment irrigation. Suitable points will be surveyed for weirs and small dams to be constructed across the depressions and dongas. Pipes will deliver the water down to selected points including the central dam. Some of the dammed water will be allowed feed the bananas along the depressions. Harvesting technology will be developed so that there is perennial water to the orchards. (Jambanja Plan 2005)

Strategy and phases of Jambanja development

In the Jambanja plan the first phase covers a period of 10 years ending 2010. This is the transitional period during which the established European system of agriculture is to be phased out. This will also be a period of intense capital investment. Furthermore, it is the period of staff development aimed at instilling the production ideology and ethics of the farm into workers. Phase two covers five years from 2010 to 2015 and focuses on expansion of production, firm establishment of national and regional markets and agro-industrial development for value addition of farm products. Processing, branding and packing of Zimbabwean foods to compete on the

regional and international markets will be the main thrust of this phase. This will cover the period between 2015 and 2025. During this period fruit harvesting is expected to commence. The third phase focuses on horizontal integration by expanding production of invented agro-technological implements and marketing them nationally, regionally and internationally.

Phase one and activities for 2006

The plan for 2006 is determined mainly by the fact that Rivers A is being subdivided and allocated to other farmers. The following activities are imperative to shift from the ANP Farm:

- Build living quarters for servants and family temporary accommodation
- Construct sheds and storeroom
- Buy supplementary feed
- Move all equipment, bricks, poles etc.
- Fence off paddocks
- Plant stock feed
- Prepare winter plough
- Construct dip-tank (Jambanja Plan 2005)

Phase One Achievements of Jambanja Farm

To date this plan has been accomplished only in part. Five thousand metres of barbed wire was bought for demarcations as outlined in the plan. The herd of cattle was sold and converted into a piggery project. So far 30 sow units have been constructed. Stock feed for the piggery project is being cropped this 2007-8 season. Soya beans and maize was planted for this purpose. In addition, the two spans of oxen that were trained became the main source of draught power. However, contrary to the main objective of the plan, the plough remained the technology that formed the basis of production instead of the improved ridger and furrower ploughs as originally intended. This is because plans to have produce the ridger and the farrow plough were behind time owing to financial constrains. There was no equipment and materials to produce prototypes and test them for necessary modifications.[295] This account of Jambanja (a project in which I participated) is offered not as a success story, but as an illustration of the extent to which an alternative vision for Zimbabwean agriculture can be developed under the conditions of land occupation as described elsewhere in this thesis. It can serve as a rather concrete case around which debate can be engaged about the technological and economic feasibility of the kinds of alternatives envisaged by activists inspired by the ANP vision.

[295] The inventors approached Harare Polytechnique (a Government institution), the department of Agricultural Engineering (Hatcliff), Ministry of Science and Technology and Agricultural Rural Development (ARDA) for assistance to produce the inventions but all them refused. The department of Agricultural Engineering actually said that they preferred machines invented and produced in other countries because these are already tested and only need modifications. However there are plans to work with private companies which have been approached in Bindura and Concession but resources still inhibit (Personal participation).

Appendix 6
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BP, July 2000, War Veteran involved in Baeatrice occupations and later moved to Mazowe interviewed at his residential home in Harare

BT, April 2004, a White commercial farmer interviewed at Lowdale Farm offices

Bungu Spirit Medium, 2002, interview at Muguti Farm

C, June 2000, leader of Matepatepa occupations interviewed at Benridge Farm

Davison, 2000, a farm worker and foreman in Concession

D, 2000-2004, Committee member of Nyabira Mazowe Association (I held longitudinal interviews) interviewed in Harare and Nyabira

DD, December 2000, leader of War Veterans who participated in the 1998 Goromonzi occupations interviewed in Nyabira

Dd, December 2000, War Veteran and member of ZNLWVA provincial executive interviewed at Concession house

DM, August 2000-2007, interviews were held at different venues annually including his offices in Harare, residence, Nyabira and Mazowe

DMT, November 2000, interview at Mvuradonha (Jambanja) Farm

DT, August 2000, participant of group reinforced by Muzarabani War Veterans, interview at Ramahori Farm

E, August 2003, former farm worker trained in seed production, interview Mvurwi compound

F, January 2001, interview at Concession business centre

Ff, April 2002, interview at Harare, author's residence

G, November 2003, farm worker, irrigation specialist, interview at Nyabira business centre

GG, 2000-2006, interview at different venues including African Institute of Agrarian Studies

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K, September 2000, a youth from Dandamera, interview Dandamera

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Mk, October 2000, interview with woman, War Veteran leader at her residence in Concession

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RM, 2003, a woman leader of Zumba group, former cross border trader, interview at her new homestead, Ingleborough Farm

Sabao, 2002, farm worker, former security guard and irrigation worker, interview at his new residence Concession

Ss, October 2001, interview at Mazowe

Tt, October 2000, interview at Concession, District Administrator's office premises

Zep (Mr and Mrs), March 2006, War Veterans who participated in 1998 occupations, interview at their Hatfield residence, Harare

Zumba spirit medium, 2003, interview at Lowdale shops

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Chief Hwata; Bungu and other spirit mediums, 2002, held at the new residence of Chief Hwata

FGD with mixed group of farm workers, occupiers and A2 beneficiaries, 2005, at Lilifordia

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SAMENVATTING

Dit proefschrift gaat over een van de grootste landbezettingsbewegingen in de hedendaagse tijd. De landbezettingsbeweging in Zimbabwe vindt zijn oorsprong in het begin van het formele kolonialisme rond 1890. In 2000 explodeerde de beweging in een dramatische campagne, geleid bij de veteranen van de 1970-vrijdheid strijd. Het richtte zich op de Witte 'settler' landbezitters en de ondernemerschaps' ideologie met welke zij hun eigendomclaims op land beschermden.

Toen een door de regering gesteund voorstel voor een nieuwe grondwet was verworpen in een referendum in februari 2000 veranderde de landbezettingsbeweging dramatisch van richting, geleid bij de veteranen sinds 1998. Er was een snelle nationale, spontaan-ogende golf van bezettingen van boerderijen van Witte boeren door kleine boeren, landarbeiders, arbeiders uit de stad en werkelozen, professionele en oorlogsveteranen. De bezettingsperiode duurde in feite van 1998 tot 2002, en betekende een belangrijke uitdaging van de staat die het eigendomsregime ondersteunde en waarvan de Witte commerciële boeren profiteerden. De regering kreeg toen zijn grip op de macht terug door het uitvoeren van een politieke maatregel met de naam Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), ontworpen om de 'landhongerigen' tevreden te stellen. Dit programma bleek een effectieve opportunistische stap in de grotere agrarische revolutie die de actoren die al lang actief zijn in de landbezettingen op te zetten tegen de nieuwe landeigenaren uit de groep van nationale elite politici, staatsfunctionarissen en een opkomende Zwarte bourgeoisie.

Het referendum was een keerpunt in de ontwikkeling van deze confrontaties van klassenbelangen. Een oppositiebeweging kreeg vaart in de eerste jaren van de negentiger jaren nadat de regering de Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) had geaccepteerd die resulteerde in neerwaartse spiraal van de levenstandaard van de bevolking die het gevolg was van verminderde sociale dienstverlening. De kosten van levensonderhoud schoten omhoog, net zoals de werkeloosheid, met wijdverpreidde vermindering en krimp van de industrie. De afstand tussen rijk en arm nam toe. De Witte 'settler' gemeenschap, waar zich een nieuwe opkomende Zwarte middenklasse elite bij aansloot, werd steeds rijker en er werd veel geld uitgegeven aan opzichtige zaken. Voor de gewone kleine boer, arbeider en oorlogsveteraan was het tegelijkertijd steeds moeilijker om zich de elementaire levensbehoeften te kunnen voorzien. Dit resulteerde in spanningen tussen hoogte en rassen en klassen, en een boemerang effect dat voor een deel de conflicterende en complexe natuur van de landbezettingsbeweging in Zimbabwe verklaart.

Het proefschrift vertelt het verhaal over het landconflict dat resulteerde in de explosies in de periode 1998-2002. Het exploreert hoe

achtergrondconflicten en spanningen werden beïnvloed door de historische ervaringen en ideologische vorming gedurende de guerrilla oorlog in de zeventigerjaren die centraal waren in de sociale transformatie van Zimbabwe als natie (door verplaatsing van de Witte regulering). De aandacht is gericht op een incompleet proces van demobiliseren welke onvoldoende aandacht gaf aan de mentale en fysieke re-integratie van de vroegere strijders. Dit proefschrift zegt dat de bevrijdingsbeweging een samensmelting was van vier elementen – nationalisten, boeren, landarbeiders en guerrilla's – met intra- en inter- groepsconflicten later belangrijk in het vormgeven van de groei en uitkomst van de landbeweging van 2000. Als sleutelactivisten in de oorlog verloor het kader van de guerrilla s grond ten opzichte van andere sociale elementen in de naoorlogse periode van economische groei. De militairen en speciaal de ideologische training van deze guerrilla's was van een durend belang en ondersteunt een alternatieve, radicale visie van nationale ontwikkeling langs socialistisch-cooperatieve egalitaire lijnen, grotendeels gemarginaliseerd gedurende een periode van economisch succes, maar in toenemende mate betwist als de economische ramp die volgde op de 'structural adjustment'. Als gevolg van het 'settler' character van het Rhodesische colonialism werd land dat werd toebedeeld op basis van ras in de Land Apportionment Act (1930) en de Land Tenure Act (1969) een sleutelkwestie voor de in toenemende mate hoorbare voorvechters van deze alternatieve ontwikkelingsideologie.

Toen de bevrijdingsbeweging op zijn hoogtepunt was, door de guerrilla strijd, de vechters, speelden een centrale rol in de verbinding maken tussen de nationale 'exiles' (die leiderschap op zich namen in de oorlog) en de kleine boeren en landarbeiders (de sociale basis in het land). Het waren de vechters die zich op dagelijkse basis bezig hielden met de rurale bevolking en land en omgevingskwesties in de bevrijdde gebieden en gebieden waar gevochten werd. Strijders, beïnvloed door militaire trainers hoofdzakelijk uit het Oostbloklanden van tijdens de koude oorlog periode, namen emancipatie-ideologieën op die verschilden van die van de nationale ambities, en een belangrijke groep van ex-strijders begonnen zich te interesseren in het vestigen van meer egalitaire systemen in een onafhankelijk Zimbabwe, verschillend van de bezorgdheid van bourgeois over een nieuw Zwart leiderschap. Deze met elkaar strijdende ideologische trajecten veroorzaakten spanningen in de vrijheidsbeweging, resulterend in explosieve zuiveringen, met uiteindelijk de nationalisten in controle. De constitutionele onderhandelingen die gehouden werden in de Lancaster House voor de onafhankelijkheid van Zimbabwe slaagden er niet in een einde aan deze spanningen te maken en ze hebben zich gedurende de periode na de onafhankelijkheid gecontinueerd, en in toenemende mate toen verarming van de rurale gebieden een feit werden in de negentiger jaren. Het proefschrift gaat over deze latere ontwikkelingen die resulteerden in de landbezettingen.

In de Lancaster House overeenkomst hadden de nationalisten clausules geaccepteerd die de eigendomsregimes van de 'settlers' beschermden. In termen van verkrijging en verdeling van land, een constitutionele clausule vereiste dat land voor 'resettlement' alleen verkregen kon worden op basis van vrijwillige koop en verkoop. Er vond daarom maar beperkte landverdeling plaats in de periode onmiddellijk na de onafhankelijkheid. 'Resettlement', wat in feite een proces was van regulariseren van landbezetting, was intens in de eerste vier jaar van de onafhankelijkheid 1980, maar stopte daarna. De regering tolereerde verdere bezettingen door deelnemers in de landbeweging niet meer en noemde hen 'squatters' en gebruikte draconische maatregels om hen te onderdrukken.

Feitelijk was er een alliantie ontstaan tussen de Witte boeren en de nationale politieke elite, die beiden gebruik maakten van de neokoloniale staat om zich te verrijken, en daarmee de aspiraties van kleine boeren, landarbeiders en ex-guerrilla's (nu oorlogsveteranen) te negeren. De geringe representatie van de belangen van de guerrilla in Lancaster en de daaropvolgende alliantie tussen nationalisten en de 'settler' economie had directe effecten op de veteranen. De ontwapening was degelijk maar de demobilisatie was onvolkomen en corrupt. Er waren praktisch geen rehabilitatie en re—integratieprogramma's voor de ex-strijders. In het kort gezegd, zij raakten in vergetelheid, en zij die zich buiten het staatsbestel bevonden leden meer ontberingen dan zij die het geluk hadden daarbinnen een baan hadden. Maar zelfs de weinigen met werk binnen de verschillende overheidsinstellingen waren doelwit van inkrimping ten voordele van de ESAP. Het laten vallen van de bevrijdingsagenda, en de harde behandeling van de ex-strijders voedde de beweging van oorlogsveteranen die zich gemobiliseerde rond de grieven over hun welzijn, daarmee de bevrijdingsagenda van tijdens de oorlog oproepend om de alliantie tussen nationalisten en 'settlers' aan te vallen, welke resulteerde in de ESAP. The authenticiteit van deze politieke strijd werd in twijfel getrokken door vele commentatoren die in een post-ideologische periode leven en die aannemen dat de verouderde socialistische retoriek van de veteranen eenvoudigweg een rookgordijn is om hun activiteiten te kunnen presenteren als waren zij 'boeven' die opereerden op gezag van het regiem. De mislukking om de rol van het agrarisch radicalisme naar behoren te evalueren is een kenmerk van een de analyse van een aantal huidige Afrikaanse conflicten, en dit proefschrift beoogt een belangrijke correctie daarop te zijn voor de Zimbabwaanse situatie.

De beweging van oorlogsveteranen, onder toeziend oog van de neokoloniale staat, ondervond vele beletsels, special in het eerste decennium na de onafhankelijkheid. De mobilisering van oorlogsveteranen en hun agitatie werd door velen gezien als dissident en snel geassocieerd met de ZIPRA opstand en de Gukurahundi (de vervolging van dissidente elementen van de ex-ZIPRA vechters op beweerde gronden van een etnisch conflict in de

Matebeleland regio). Die gewelddadige onderdrukking blijft in de herinnering van de veteranen van de ZIPRA and ZANLA. ZANLA leed gedurende de oorlog onder intense generatie-, gender- en etniciteitconflicten welke ten volle werden uitgebuit door de nationalisten. Deze conflicten gingen gepaard met fysieke en psychologische marteling, stigmatisering, zuivering en isolaties en het terroriseren gebaseerd op angst voor extreme afstraffing. De oorlogsveteranen begonnen echter de kleine boeren en het electoraat in variërende mate te mobiliseren. Dit intensiveerde in het laatste gedeelte van de tachtigerjaren nadat het akkoord was getekend tussen de leidende nationalistische partijen van de bevrijdingsbeweging – Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) was gevormd in 1989, en verenigde daarin de ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-guerrillas. Het proefschrift beschouwt de rol van de ZNLWVA in de latere landbezettingen. Het laat zien dat de veteranenbeweging een belangrijke katalysator was van de landbezettingen maar dat activisme binnen de beweging van onderaf kwam. Het leiderschap worstelde vaak om de vrede te bewaren. Hetzelfde geld voor de president, Robert Mugabe die op verschillende momenten de acties van de landbezetters veroordeelde, maar als het uit kwam hun samenwerking zocht voor zijn eigen doeleinden. Dit proefschrift beschouwt de verschillende bezettingsgolven, en brengt de onafhankelijke ideologische agenda naar voren van vele van de activisten, gebaseerd op een communale 'terug-naar-het-land' notie van agrarische samenwerking. Sommige van de implicaties voor de landbouwtechnologie worden nagegaan, inclusief de pogingen die sommige landbezetters deden om nieuwe meer Afrikaanse en duurzame productiesystemen te ontwikkelen. Maar geen van deze bood voldoende revenu voor het regime of kon de bezitsaspiraties beantwoorden van de politieke elite die de kern vormen van de regerende politieke partij (ZANU-PF). Na slechts een gedeeltelijk succes om de landbezettingsbeweging, geleid door radicale activisten, tot samenwerking te brengen, nam de regering het besluit hun bondgenoten, de Witte boeren, te laten vallen, en haar eigen bourgeoisie toe te staan om hen te vervangen terwijl ze tegelijkertijd enig geconfisceerd land aan de kleine boeren en landarbeiders toekende. De radicale landactivisten werden zelf in dit proces verplaatst en technologische experimenten waaraan zij deelnamen werden in de knop gesmoord. Het proefschrift eindigt met te suggereren dat tenzij de rurale economische condities snel beginnen te verbeteren - en de tekenen zijn niet hoopvol – de radicalen hun aantrekkingskracht voor de massa blijven behouden. Zimbabwe's agrarische toekomst is verre van zeker.

SUMMARY

This thesis is about one of the most major land occupation movements in contemporary times, in terms of scale and intransigence. . The Zimbabwe land occupation movement dates back to the onset of formal colonialism in the 1890s. In 2000 the movement exploded in a dramatic nationwide campaign led by veterans of the 1970s liberation struggle. It targeted White settler land owners and the business ideology through which they protected their claims to the land.

When a government-sponsored draft constitution was rejected in a referendum in February 2000, a dramatic turn occurred in the land movement, led by war veterans since 1998. There was a sudden nationwide, seemingly spontaneous, wave of occupation of White owned farms by peasants, farm workers, urban workers and the unemployed, professionals and war veterans. The occupation period was, in fact, ongoing from 1998 to 2002, and represented a significant challenge to the authority of the state which backed the property regime from which the White commercial farmers benefited. Government then regained its grip on power through implementation of a policy dubbed the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), designed to appease significant numbers among the land hungry. This programme proved to be an effective opportunist step in a larger agrarian revolution pitting long-established land movement actors on one hand against new land owners from among the ranks of elite nationalist politicians, state functionaries and an emerging Black bourgeoisie.

The referendum was a turning point in the development of this confrontation of class interests. An opposition movement had started to gain momentum in the early 1990s after government adopted the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) resulting in a spiral fall in the living standards of the population owing to reduced social services. The cost of living escalated, as did unemployment, with widespread retrenchments and shrinkage of the industrial base. The gap between the rich and poor increased. The White settler community, joined by a new rising Black middle class elite, was becoming highly affluent and spending on ostentatious goods was conspicuous, whereas for the ordinary peasants, workers and war veterans it was increasingly difficult to afford basic food, shelter and clothing. This resulted in height and race and class tensions, and a boomerang effect that partly explains the conflicted nature and complexity of Zimbabwe's land movement.

The thesis tells the story of the conflict of land resulting in the explosions of the period 1998-2002. It explores how background conflicts and tensions were influenced by historical experiences and ideological formation during the 1970s guerrilla war, central to the social transformation of the Zimbabwean nation (through displacing White rule). Attention is focused on an incomplete

demobilization process, which paid insufficient attention to the mental as well as physical reintegration of former combatants. This thesis argues that the liberation movement was an amalgam of four major elements - nationalists, peasants, farm workers and guerrillas - with intra and inter-movement conflicts later important in shaping the growth and outcome of the land movement from 2000. As key activists in the war the guerrilla cadres lost ground relative to the other social elements in the post war period of economic boom. The military and especially ideological training of these guerrillas proved of lasting significance, it is argued, and fostered an alternative, radical vision of national development along socialist-cooperative-egalitarian lines, largely marginalised during a period of economic success, but increasingly called into contention as the economic disaster following 'structural adjustment'. Owing to the settler nature of Rhodesian colonialism, land, distributed according to race through the Land Apportionment Act (1930) and the Land Tenure Act (1969), was a key issue for the increasingly strident proponents of this alternative development ideology.

When the liberation movement peaked, through the guerrilla struggle, the fighters, played a pivotal role in providing linkage between nationalist exiles (who assumed leadership of the war) and peasants and farm workers (the in-country social base).. It was the fighters who dealt with the rural population and land and environmental issues on a day-to-day basis in liberated areas and zones of combat. Combatants influenced by military trainers mainly from the eastern block countries during the cold war era, imbibed ideologies of emancipation far different from those embraced by nationalist ambitions, and a significant group within the group of ex-combatants became interested in establishing more egalitarian systems in the post independence Zimbabwe, distinct from the bourgeois preoccupations of the new Black leadership. These competing ideological trajectories caused tensions in the liberation movement, resulting in explosive purges leaving the nationalists in control. The constitutional negotiations held at Lancaster House prior to Zimbabwean independence failed to address these tensions and they have continued to dog the post independence period, but increasingly so as mass impoverishment in rural areas became a fact of life during the 1990s. The thesis covers these later developments resulting in the land occupations.

In the Lancaster House settlement the nationalists had accepted clauses protecting settler property regimes. In terms of land acquisition and distribution a constitutional clause required that land for resettlement would be acquired only on a willing buyer and willing seller basis. Land distribution in the immediate post independence period, therefore, was limited. Resettlement, which was fundamentally a process of regularizing occupations, was intense in the first four years of independence in 1980 but thereafter stalled and halted. In fact government became intolerant of further

occupations by participants in the land movement, labelling them squatters and used draconian measures to suppress them.

In effect, an alliance had emerged between the White farmers and the nationalist political elite, with both sides using the neo-colonial state as a vehicle for accumulation, and in consequence negating the aspirations of the peasants, farm workers and ex-guerrillas (now war veterans). Poor representation of guerrilla interests at Lancaster and subsequent alliance between the nationalists and settler economy had direct effects on the veterans. Disarmament was thorough but demobilisation was flawed and corrupt. There were virtually neither rehabilitation nor re-integration programmes for ex-combatants. In a nutshell, they were relegated and cast into oblivion, with those outside state employment experiencing worse hardships than those who were lucky enough to be employed. However even the few in employment in various state institutions, were targeted for retrenchment at the advent of ESAP. Abandonment of the liberation agenda, and the harsh treatment of ex-combatants, fuelled a war veteran movement mobilized around grievances of welfare, but evoking the war-time liberation agenda in order to attack the alliance between nationalists and settlers resulting in ESAP. The authenticity of this political surge has been questioned by many commentators, who live in a post-ideological age, and presume the antiquated socialist rhetoric of the veterans is simply a smoke screen to disguise their activities as 'thugs' operating on behalf of the regime. The failure to evaluate properly the part played by agrarian radicalism is a feature of the analysis of a number of Africa's current conflicts, and this thesis seeks to serve as a major corrective in the case of Zimbabwe.

The war veteran movement, under close eye of the neo-colonial state, met many impediments especially during the first decade after independence. War veteran mobilization and agitation was viewed as dissident and quickly associated with the ZIPRA uprising and the Gukurahundi (pursuit of dissident elements of ex-ZIPRA fighters on the alleged grounds of ethnic conflict in the Matebeleland region). Memories of violent suppression of dissent lingered in the minds of war veterans from both ZIPRA and ZANLA. ZANLA had suffered intense generational, gender and ethnic conflicts during the war which were exploited to the full advantage of the nationalists. These conflicts had involved physical and psychological torture, stigmatised labelling, purgation and isolation and terrorization caused by fear of extreme punishment. War veterans however started to mobilize peasants and the electorate in varying degrees. This intensified in the late 1980s, after the unity accord between the leading nationalist parties of the liberation movement – Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) – was signed. The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) was formed in 1989, uniting former ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-guerrillas. The thesis examines the role of ZNLWVA in later land occupations. Basically, it is shown that the veterans movement was an

important catalyst in sparking land occupations, but that activism within the movement came from below. The leadership often struggled the keep pace. The same applies to the president, Robert Mugabe, who at various times repudiated the actions of the land occupiers, but when it was opportune, sought to co-opt them for his own purposes. The thesis examines the occupations in several waves, and brings out the independent ideological agenda of many of the activists, based on a back-to-the-land communalistic notion of agrarian cooperation. Some of the implications for agro-technology are explored, including the attempts that some of the land occupiers made to develop new, and more African and sustainable systems of production. But none of this offered a revenue base to the regime or met the property aspirations of the political elites making up the core of the ruling political party (ZANU-PF). After only partially successful attempts to co-opt the land occupation movement led by radical activists, the government decided to abandon its allies, the White farmers, and allow its own bourgeois supporters to replace them, while at the same time offering some confiscated land to peasants and farm workers. The radical land activists themselves were displaced in this process, and the technological experiments in which they were engaged were nipped in the bud. The thesis ends by suggesting that unless rural economic conditions begin to improve very quickly – and the signs are not hopeful – then the radicals will still hold out an appeal to the masses. Zimbabwe's agrarian future is far from secure.

PFUPSIO

Chinyorwa ichi chiri pamusoro pejambanja guru rekutora vhu munguva yatiri kurarama nhasi, tichitarisa kukura nekusendeka zvemirawo parutivi kwakaitika. MuZimbabwe, zvejambanja revhu, kutora minda nechisimba, zvine nhoroondo inobva pakandopambiwa nyika ino ngevarungu wakadzika mureza wavo muna 1890. Mugore ra2000 zvekutora vhu zvakaputika zvikaparariraa nyika yese zvichitungamirwa ngewarwi wakakana hondo yekuma 1970 (wanamukoma kana kuti maKomuredzi) yakasunungura nyika ino muna 1980. Jambanja iri rakanga rakanangana nehupfumi hwewapambevhu wechichena nemafungiro awo pakuumba nekugowiwa kweupfumi. Pfungwa dzawo idzi ndidzo dzaiita kuti warambire nevhu.

Pakarambwa bumbiro remitemo rakanga raitiswa ngehurumende (draf constitution) mureferendamu yemuna Kukadzi 2000, makakatanwa ezvevhu akabva andoita chamupidigori wanamukoma wabata matomu pakutungamira jambanja, chidanho icho wakanga wasotora kubva muna 1998. Zvino zvakabva zvandoti fararira nenyika yese, zvichiita sekunga katsuro kamukira mumakumbo pachiti warimi waduku wekumaruwa, washandi wemumapurazi nemadhorobha, marovha, naanamukoma waye, zvikati andova madirativhange kutora vhu. Jambanja raitungamirirwa naanamukoma rakanga rasototanga muna 1998 rikazvika muna 2002. Izvi zvakazungunutsa mbambo dzehutongi panguva iyoyo nekuti watongi ipapo waitsigira gowaniso yehupfumi yaisimbisa vapambevhu ruzhinji ruchitambura; warungu wakanga watotambarara hawo semunyemba. Hurumende yakazoti dzikiti papaya-paya ikabva kwaakuzoti futi dzvi masimba ekutonga anga aakupukunyuka. Yakazoita izvi yaakutoita zvekundundurudzwa kwaakuita chirongwa chekugowa vhu chakabva chatodaidzwa kuti 'Kugowa vhu zvaazvekukundundurudzwa' (Fast Track Land Reform Programme) chakanga chaachekutonhodza shungu dzemhomho yejambanja yaitambura ngepekugara munyika yechipikirwa. Chirongwa chehurumende ichi chakaunza wana mucheka dzafa, wakati tazvionera pano, pakati pekusanduka kwezvevhu zvakadzama zvakanga zvatanga. Nechirongwa ichi kwakachitanga zvino kukwikwidzanwa pakati pewatambi wejambanja nanamuchekadzafa waya. Asi wanamucheka dzafa awa waisawe wanhu nhando, waiti mashefu ezvematongerwo enyika, washandi wehurumende nekachikwata kezvigananda kakanga kari kusimuka zvine simba.

Pakukweshana kunoita wapfumi newarombo referendamu ndiyo yakaita nhandare. Kubva kuma 1990 kwakanga kwatotanga zvekukwikwidza hurumende nenyaya yekuti iyo hurumende yacho yakanga yatora gwara reupfumi rekuti "kakara kununa kudya kamwe" (muchirungu richinziEconomic Structural Adjustment Programme – ESAP). Hupfumi hwenyika hwakati hwatanga kuondomoka hurombo nenhamo zvikati huya tiende. Zvingoraramisa wanhu nezviwakwa zvehurumende zvakatanga kuondongeka, zvikati magariro chaiwo otanga kuita mutserendende kudonha iko kurarama kukati kwadhura, kushaikwa kwemabasa kuchibva kwaita mutungagore kukwira kwaane chigumura indasitiri irikusvinwa. Mutsauko wepakati pewarombo newapfumi wakatobva wanyanya kuwedzera. Warungu, wachibatana zvino nekachikwata kezvigananda kewatema kaya kaiwe pamusoro, wakanga woita kudya kwekupfatsura zviri pachena pasisina zvekuhwanda kana kunyara, asi uku ruzhinji warimi waduku wewatema, washandi wemapurazi nana mukoma, wari kudya nhoko dzezvironda. Zviro zvekurarama

ndizvo zvakanga zvaazvekutamburira kuti uzvione: chikafu, zvokupfeka kana pekuisa musoro chaipo. Izvi ndizvo zvakaedzera shungu muwanhu ngekuti zvakanga zvaapachena kuti Warungu ndiwo wakagukuchira upfumi watema wasina icho wanacho. Zvakazodzoka zvozvimbiraizvo zvigananda zviya zvakare ngekuti Jambanja apo rakatanga rakabva ranyandura zvese zvikabva zvaita kuti nyaya yevhu yeZimbabwe itotane-totane seshinda, kuita huswa hwasunga hwena.

Thisisi iyi ingotaura nezvemakakatanwa ezvevhu akaputika putika pakati pa1998 na 2002. Ingoongorora kwakatangira nechakazofuridzira kupesana. Ingoti iyo makakatanwa aya angotoonekwa munhoroondo nepfungwa dzakaumbwa kuma1970 muhondo yeChimurenga, inowa ndiyo yakaita bindurazviro muno munyika nekubvisa uko yakaita hutongi hwewarungu. Tingozodzamisa nyaya yekuti kutsvetwa kwezvombo pasi (disarmament) nekugurunura magariro emusango (demobilization) hakuna kufambiswa zvakanaka munyika. Wanamukoma hawana kupiwa rutsigiro rwekuti wagone kudzoka kumisha kootangazve upenyu hutsva hwakasiyana nehwemuhondo. Izvi zviro zvinotoitirwa zvirongwa zvakadzama ngenyika kuti wasununguri wagone kuwa neupenyu hungonzwisiswa ngeruzhinji rwevanhu uye kuti wagone kugara pakati pewamwe zvakanaka (rehabilitation). Thisisi ino ingoratidza kuti hondo yerusununguko yakanga iri mubatanidzwa wemaneshinarisiti (nationalists), varimi waduku (peasants), washandi wekumapurazi (farm workers), naanamukoma kana kuti warwi (freedom fighters). Zvikwata izvi ndizvo zvakasangana mukusunungura nyika asi pakanga patorine makakatanwa mukati nepakati pezvikwata izvizvi. Izvi zvakakosha kuti tizonzwisise mafambiro akazoita Jambanja remuna 2000. Wanamukoma wakarasirwa kwakadaro kwaakufuratirwa panguva yaibudirira upfumi hondo yapera asi wariwo wakanga wazvipira kuenda kuhondo koosunungura nyika. Asi tichitarisisa wana mukoma awa ndiwo wakawana mukana wekunyatsodzamisa pfungwa maererano nekuumba remangwana enyika. Kunyangwe wakakandiswa zvombo zvehondo pasi, chaisagona kuitwa newatongi kubvisa pfungwa dzewarwi idzi nekuti vakuru wakati chiri mumoyo chiri muninga. Saka pfungwa dzeremangwana enyika dzakaramba dzakasiyana. Warwi waida kuteedza zvebindura zviro munyika iri nyaya yekuda kuti muwe negutsaruzhinji munyika kwete humbimbindoga kana hushefu. Idzi pfungwa dzanga dzatorasirwa kure paikura upfumi kusvika wehutongi wotoita hawo gwara rekakara kununa kudya kamwe. Nerusarura ganda rwaiwe muno ichiri Rhodesia murawo waiteedzwa pakugowiwa kwevhu waiwe wekupatsanura marudzi nekwavangogara wainzi Land Apportionment Act (1930) neumwe wacho wainzi Land Tenure Act (1969). Iyi mitemo kunyngwe yakanga isingachashandi tasununguka kupatsanurwa kwemarudzi kwakaramba kuripo Warungu wakaramba wane vhu rawakapamba kubva kuwatema. Saka pfungwa dzegutsaruzhinji dzakabva dzatoramba dzichitonyon'onya warwi nemamiriro ezviro akaramba ariyo iwaya.

Pakati hondo yeChimurenga yati tibvu yasimuka, wanamukoma wakaita musimboti wekubatanidza maneshinarisiti waiwe kunze kwenyika (wakazotungamira hondo ikoko), warimi kumamisha, newashandi wemapurazi (hwaro hwehondo). Wanamukoma ndiwo wairwa zuwa nezuwa newabereki kumamisha nemapurazi wachitaurrirana neremangwana ezvevhu nezviwanikwa zvenyika kunyanya munzvimbo dzanga dzatosunungurwa kare moto wehondo uchiri kuririma (liberated zones). Wanamukoma waiwana mazano kubva kunewaiwafundisa zvekukana hondo wekunyika dzemabvazuwa paya pakanga pakamisidzana nyika dzemabvazuwa nedzemadokero (cold war). Zvidzidzo izvi zvaiwe zvepfungwa dzakatosiyana kure kure nezvaifungwa neshinarisiti asina

kuwana mukana wekudzidzira zvekurwa. Kudambura ngetani dzehudzvanyiriri neusvetasimba zvechokwadi pasina kunyengedza wanhu ipfungwa dzakatoramba dziri chinangwa chewarwi wehondo waitoti pasina kuita izvi rusununguko hapana. Idzi ndidzo pfungwa dzegutsaruzhinji dzanga dzakatosiyana nepfungwa dzekachikwata kezvigananda kewatema waitungamira hondo.

Maneshinarisiti akamirira hondo yerusununguko (Liberation movement) akabvumira kuti paiswe mirawo waizoti upfumi hurambe huri kuwapambevhu pakaitwa hurukuro nebumbiro remitemo kuRangasita Hausi. Nenyaya yekutora vhu nekuripa kuwanhu bumbiro remitemo iri raiti vhu raizotorwa richiitwa zvekutengwa kubva kuwapambevhu awa. Saka tichandotora nyika kugowiwa kwevhu kwakanga kwakaitwa zvishoma ngezvishoma sekudya kwendongwe. Kupa minda mirefu kwakanga kuri kundochinyatsa kugadzirisa wanhu wankanga watora ivhu ngejambanja kunyanya mumakore mana ekutanga kubva 1980 tichangowana kuzvitonga kuzere (independence) asi kuzongobva ipapo zvakambokamhinha zvikabva zvazomira zvachose. Kubva ipapa hurumende yakatotanga kuita utsinyi nekudzvanyirira zvikuru wanhu waipinda mumapurazi zvejambanja vachitumidzwa kuzi masikwata.

Asi zvakanga zvaitika chaizvo ngezvekuti pakanga pane kubatana pakati pewarungu wemapurazi nemaneshinarisiti aitonga nyika, waakudya wese wachishandisa simba rehutongi kutora upfumi hwenyika, zvaisakisa kuti zvinangwa zvewarimi waduku, washandi wemapurazi newakasunugnura nyika zvisatewedzwe. Kusamiriririrwa kwakakwana kwaanamukoma kuRangasita nekuzobatana kwewarungu nemaneshinarisiti kwakaitwa, kwakaisa warwi werusununguko panguwa yakaoma. Warwi wakatorerwa zvombo asi kudzokeswa kumusha (demobilization) hakuna kuitwa nemazvo ngekuti pakapinda huori. Hapana kana kugeza zvemusango, kuwaka ruziwo rutsva rwaienderana nehupenyu hwemumusha nekurapa nhengo dzakakuwara (rehabilitation) kwakaitwa kuwarwi werusununguko. Nechidimbu, warwi wakandokandwa kwakadaro kwaakusiiwa zvikawa dambudziko kunyanya kune wasina kuita mhanza yekuona mabasa muhurumende itsva iyi. Asi kana wakaona mabasa wacho ndiwo wakabva wanangwa pakaitwa gwara reupfumi rekakara kununa kudya kamwe (ESAP). Kusendekwa kwezvinangwa zvehondo yerusununguko neutsinyi hwakaitirwa warwi werusununguko (war veterans) zvakakwichidzira warwi kuti watange kuzviunganidza wachipengera hurumende kuti igadzirise zvayakaondonga maererano neupenyu hwawo. Mukupenga kwewarwi awa wakabva watangisa kusimudza zvibvumirano zvekuhondo zvekuti nyika yaizoitwa sei tatora kubva kuvarungu. Izvi zvakaita kuti warwi watange kurwisa mubatanidza wewarungu nemaneshinarisiti wakanga uripo. Wamwe wanhu warikupa pfungwa dzekuti manyepo kuti warwiri werusununguko wakamboita pfungwa dzawo pachavo wachiti kuda kueadza kuwiga ubhinya hwaiitwa ngewarwi awa wachitumwa ngewatungamiri wemusangano weZANU-PF. Kutadza kunyatsoongorora chidanho chanotorwa nevanopindura magoverwo nemashandisiro ezvevhu chiro chingopenengurwa mukurwisana kuri muAfrica saka chinyorwa chino chiri kuedza kugadzirisa zvingotaurwa pamusoro peZimbabwe panyaya iyoyi.

Warwi werusununguko, wachitarisiswa nehutongi hutsva hwaitsigirana newarungu uhu, wakasangana nezvimhingamupinyi zvakawanda mumakore gumi tichandotora nyika. Kuunganidzana nekudzidzisana kwaitorwa sekupanduka wanhu wonzi waakuita madhizidhendi sewaya warwi weZIPRA wakanga wapandukira hurumende wakazorwiswa ngemauto kusvika pazoita nyaya

yeGukurahundi kuMatebeleland. Simba rakashanda kurwisa madhizidhendi rakaramba rindori mumusoro mewarwi weZIPRA ne ZANLA. Warwi weZANLA wakanga wamboona kupesana pakati pawo kwaibva pakati pewabva zera newechiduku muhondo, rusarura rudzi nekubata wakadzi zvakasiyana newarume zvakashandiswa ngemaneshinarisiti. Besanwa iri rakasakisa kuti pawe nekurwadziswa kwenyama kushungurudzwa kwepfungwa, kutumidzwa mazita eupanduki, kubviswa mumusangano nekonyenyeredzwa pakati pewamwe zvakaunza kugedageda kwemeno kuri kutya kurangwa ukazi wapanduka. Asi hazvo warwi wakatanga kuunganidza wabereki nekutaura newanhu wanovhota nenzira dzakasiyana. Zvakazonyanya kudzama mukupera kwekuma 1980 paitwa mubatanidzwa we ZAPU ne ZANU-PF. Ndipo pakazobva pauumbwa Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA). Chinyorwa chino chinoongorora mabasa eZNLWVA mukufamba kwejambanja rakazotevera. Zvingopangidzwa kuti warwi ndiwo wakakwenya Jambanja asi Jambanja rakatobva muwanhu waiwa pasi. Watungamiri waito nzunzutira wachitevera kuti wasasare sure. Kana utungamiri hwenyika, hwaitomboshorawo zvejambanja izvi nguwa dzakawanda hukazosanduka hwaona kuti warwi, warimi waduku newashandi wemapurazi hawachadzoki sure. Utungamiri huya hwakabva hwatoenda pamberi sekunga ndihwo hwakaita zveJambanja riya asi hwakanga hutorinewo zvimwewo zvinangwa zvakatosiyana. Thisisi iyi ingotarisa masaisai ejambanja akawanda ichipangidza kuti warwi waitonga wakazvimiririra wane pfungwa dzawo dzakanga dziri dzekuti ngatidzoke kuvhu tironge upenyu hweumhuri nekushanda takabatana. Kuti izvi zvaizotaurei nenyaya yemarimiro nezvekushandisa pakurima nekuedza kwakaitwa newejambanja kuita zvekushandisa (technology) zvingoendesera mberi pfungwa nemarimiro epasichigare anepundutso, tingozvioongorora muno. Asi idzi pfungwa hadzina kutorwa nevari pamusoro zvimwe ngekuti zvanga zvisingaunzi mari kwawari kana kuti handizvo zvaitarisirwa newatongi wari muZANU-PF. Yandobudirira kukwezva kachikwata kewanhu wejambanja hurumende yakabva yasiyana nezveWarungu awo yanga yakabatana nawo ikabva yati zvigananda zvaiitewera zvitore nzvimbo yewarungu awa ukuwo ichigovera varimi vadiki vekumaruwa newamwewo washandi wemumapurazi mimwe minda yacho. Wejambanja waipisa musoro nezvevhu chaiwo wakabva wasudurutswa nekufamba kwenguwa zvichibva zvakanganisa mabasa ekushandura marimiro nekuwandudza zvombo zvekurimisa kwanga kuchiitwa ngewamwe wawo. Chinyorwa ichi chingopedzisira chaakupa pfungwa dzekuti kana zvekumira kweupfumi mumaruwa kukasachimbidza kusimuka watambi wejambanja wanogona kuramba wachitaura newanhu kuti zviro zvigadziriswe. Kuti zvino Zimbabwe inyika ingazi remangwana yayo yakagadzikana here nenyaya yezvevhu takatarisa mamiriro akaita zviro parizvino, mubvunzo ungoti netsei chaizvo.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Wilbert Zvakanyorwa Sadomba was born in Mutasa, Manicaland and grew up in Honde Valley where he undertook primary education at St. Peter's Mandeya and Gatsi Primary School. He went to St. Mary's (Hunyani) Secondary School where he left to join the liberation war in Mozambique before completing Form II in 1975. He joined ZANLA Forces and lived at Nyadzonya where he undertook basic political and military training (individual tactics). He completed military training at Chimoio Headquarters, Mapinduzi Base, and then attended Wampoa Political Academy with the first intake. He became a Political Instructor deployed at Chimoio and then Chibavava Holding Camp in 1977. He fought the war as a guerrilla, first in Chimanimani, Mutambara Detachment (Manica Province) then in Mazowe Detachment, (Chaminuka Sector, Tete Province). He wrote the war strategy for Chaminuka Sector in 1979, later adopted by the Province. At ceasefire he went to Echo Assembly Point.

After Independence Wilbert was trained as a Local Government Promotion Officer and worked in local government for nine years. First assigned to Gokwe, he initiated many programmes incorporated into government policy including lower tier structures of District Councils (Village and Ward Development Committees), the district development planning process and planning committees of District Councils. He was later involved with amalgamation of Rural and District Councils and co-authored several books and manuals.

Wilbert then joined a NORAD-funded Water and Sanitation programme, leading a consultant team responsible for community participation. He wrote a manuscript, *Step-by-step Implementation of Community Focused Water and Sanitation Programme: A manual for grassroots implementers in Zimbabwe*. He then joined UNICEF to initiate a community-based management programme for the country, which was adopted by government and is still the policy to this day. He also published several journal articles abroad in this field and developed his own methods of community education which are now used internationally.

He then became a rural development consultant working for different local and international NGOs, the UN and various Embassies, offering special skills in training, participatory planning, research, monitoring and evaluation, project design and implementation and gender articulation in rural development projects. He also formed three NGOs (at national, regional and international levels) focusing on African knowledge systems, technologies and spiritual cultures. On the basis of experience and publications he was admitted to a Masters degree programme and was later awarded a sandwich Ph.D scholarship by Wageningen University.

Wilbert remains a grassroots community worker and avid researcher at heart. Current research interests include impact of liberation struggles on current social and political movements in Africa, indigenous knowledge systems, and agrarian reform.