# Battle for Cattle or Praying for Power?

Constructing contemporary cattle and land conflicts in Koinadugu District, Sierra Leone

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Summary

The land in Koinadugu District, Sierra Leone, is used by different land users. Their different activities can sometimes help each other – for instance the manure of the livestock keepers' cows makes the soil more fertile for crop farmers. Yet also problems exist between different land users, especially between the two biggest groups: livestock keepers and crop farmers. The conflicts are mostly about crop damage by cattle, but also other problems like cow wounding, uncontrolled burning and illegitimately gained access to land exist.

This thesis sheds light on the conflicts over land and over cattle in Koinadugu District. It is written in a post-war context with the following research question:

How are conflicts over cattle and land in Koinadugu District constructed and how are these conflicts related to the historical context and changes in governance structures and socioeconomic conditions?

In academic literature, there are two major schools that go into natural resource conflicts. The oldest one, mostly referred to as the neo-Malthusian school, started by Malthus at the end of the 18th century and evolved via Hardin (1968) and Homer-Dixon (1994) and the environmental security school. This school states resource scarcity is the major explanation for conflicts; population increase leads to more pressure on resources, which leads to environmental degradation and conflict. Criticism on this theory is that it is too simplistic. The second major school, political ecology, states increasing scarcity is not the only explanatory factor for conflicts around natural resources; also other factors or developments can lead to conflict. Explanations should be sought in the whole context around the resource: access to resources and power, political voice, historical processes, governance et cetera. In this respect, they state abundance of resources could also lead to conflict.

As can be seen from the main research question, this thesis will follow the political ecology school, by analysing how the context is related to conflicts over land. Since land is the most valuable and debated natural resource in the district, this thesis will only focus on conflicts related to land. A distinction is made between land conflict, which is mostly about access to land or property rights, and cattle conflicts, about conflicts over crop damage or cattle wounding.

Together with a political ecology perspective, a constructivist approach has been chosen, to emphasise conflicts are not static, but change together with changing (discourses of) actors and factors that form part of the conflict.

The two months fieldwork for this thesis is preceded by a four months internship on the same topic – land tenure and conflict – for the non-governmental organisation (NGO) CARE International. Both have taken place in Sierra Leone. The desk top study to analyse (government and NGO) policies and academic literature on this topic, has taken place in The Netherlands, both before and after the stay in Sierra Leone. During the internship, interviews have been done in the four operational chiefdoms of the Conservation Agriculture Project (CAP) of CARE in Koinadugu District and in Kasunko Chiefdom, where problems were increasing. Throughout the fieldwork phase, four other chiefdoms have been visited to get a broader idea about the whole district and to compare chiefdoms where CARE is active in agricultural projects with chiefdoms where the NGO is not active. In the field semi-structured interviews are combined with other data collection techniques as informal conversations and observation. Furthermore, an attempt has been made to gather quantitative data.

The empirical analysis starts in chapter 4 with studying four settings in Koinadugu where conflicts arise. Also the persons concerned directly, the land users, are described: they are together with the disputes they have, the first analytical layer in this thesis (see figure 3.3). Furthermore, it is shown that in the chiefdoms where the cattle and population density are the highest, the conflicts over land are not the most severe. This means the resource scarcity theory can not be confirmed with regard to cattle conflicts in Koinadugu District, the most prevalent conflicts in the district. Like the political ecologists state, there are more factors that need to be studied to explain the conflicts.

This thesis has, based on the literature and on findings gathered during the internship, distinguished three other factors – governance, history and socioeconomic factors – that are part of the conflicts in this particular area. These factors are considered as analytical layers as well, starting with governance, which is broken down into three topics: actors, institutions and institutional change. In a society like Koinadugu where customary laws are fluid, the function of individuals and their interpretation of laws and rights turn out to be important. Therefore, the role of the paramount chiefs and court chairmen on the one hand and the friction between these traditional authorities and new actors like the council - due to decentralisation - and the international community – due to post-war reordering processes - on the other hand, influence the conflicts. In addition, another new actor - the foreign investors - is predicted to be involved in land and property rights issues in the nearby future. The third layer can be seen as the broader context of socioeconomic, historical and other developments that have influenced the conflict. Historical processes like the colonial legacy, but especially the war with its consequences like 'ethnic differentiation' of the possession of livestock, the destruction of cattle settlements, the increasing importance of education and income diversification influence land and cattle conflicts. Additionally, socioeconomic changes need to be kept in mind to get a complete picture of the contemporary conflicts. For instance, the differences between livestock keepers and crop farmers concerning diversification of activities, a profile change and decrease in the number of cowboys and the rise of education all have their impact on conflicts. Other developments which have influenced the conflict are mostly geopolitical changes: because of development processes and changing economical activities of especially livestock keepers, land users want to be more connected and live closer to cities. On the other hand, a countermovement of livestock keepers going to the outskirts of Koinadugu District can be remarked. These livestock keepers are increasingly sent away by crop farmers who emphasise their rights to the land.

Lastly, one layer is added that is not directly included in the political ecology school, but does seem to be of influence when studying these conflicts: the layer of discourse. Discursive constructions of the land users themselves, the other and the conflicts are part of cattle and land conflicts. For instance, while crop farmers often place themselves in a victim position by saying things as "now we are looking to God", livestock keepers have a discursive strategy of not talking about the problems or even denying them. Crop farmers show their weakness and powerlessness in comparison to the position of the livestock keepers. Solutions mentioned by respondents, are also part of this discursive construction. While livestock keepers have not many suggestions for solutions since they indicate no problems, crop farmers come up with direct solutions as fencing, but also with solutions aiming to have clearer processes of conflict management, what can – in their view – improve their powerless position.

Contemporary land and cattle conflicts in Koinadugu District cannot be understood as 'scarcity' conflicts. Rather, they need to be constructed by looking at the historical context, changes in governance structures and socioeconomic conditions and discourse and representations. All these different layers of conflict are connected and without having a complete picture of all these layers and their role in conflict, the cattle and land conflicts can not be properly understood nor managed.

Table of contents

List of Figures, Tables and Pictures

Figures

Tables

Pictures

List of abbreviations

APC	All People's Congress (political party)
CAP	Conservation Agriculture Project (CARE project)
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
ENCISS	Enhancing the Interaction and Interface between Civil Society and the State to Improve Poor People's Lives
EU	European Union
FFS	Farmer Field School
GO	Governmental Organisation
ILRI	International Livestock Research Institute
MADAM	Mankind's Activities for Development Accreditation Movement
MAFFS	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ONS	Office of National Security
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SLPP	Sierra Leone Peoples Party (political party)
VDC	Village Development Committee
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WUR	Wageningen University and Research centre

Acknowledgements

1. Introduction

"That was not my cow." (M, 16)[1]
Livestock keeper talking about crop destruction close to his cattle settlement.

"We farmers do not know anything but this [farming]. *When cattle people would control better, our farming would go better as well. The number of acres we farm has gone down, because we need to fence everything." (FD 8)*
Crop farmers complaining about livestock keepers.

"Accepting bribes is a midnight business." (FD, 4)
Crop farmers discussing the acceptance of bribes of authorities.

"When Sierra Leone manages its land properly, it can be among the richest of the world."(O,4)
Minister of mining during a meeting on land policy formulation.

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[1] This combination of letters and numbers refers to the interviews. In annex I a data collection overview is given.

Town chief: *"We want sink roofs for our houses; can you take care of that with your [agricultural] programme?"*
Local NGO worker: *"You are a big man, should I come and put sink on your house? What would you have done when there is no NGO to ask?"*
Town chief: *"We would have tried ourselves. But can't you provide a store* [meant for storing agricultural products] *then? I want to have a safe place to stall my bike, because in my own house I am scared for fire or that it will be stolen." (FD, 6)*
Conversation between a town chief and an NGO worker visiting one of the villages where his agricultural project takes place.

"Thieves will say to a cow: "follow me" and they will just follow him." (Kab, 17)
Veterinary officer talking about the presence of mystical powers during cattle raiding.

"They are good in talking, we are not so good in talking, so we listen to them." (Seng, 4)
Chiefdom speaker[2] talking about the arrival of NGOs.

"The land is too big for the subsistence farmers, so we accept all the conditions."(Sul, 13)
Councillor explaining how the chiefdom signed a contract with Chinese foreign investors.

What is groundnut soup without meat? What is cassava leaf without wood? What is a Sierra Leonean without rice? It is clear that this country has multiple uses for its land: livestock keeping, wood collection, crop farming and more. This thesis will focus on the problems of coexistence between the different types of land users in Sierra Leone.

The thesis will go into the findings of two months of fieldwork in Koinadugu District, Sierra Leone. Furthermore, relevant findings collected during a four months internship at the land tenure and conflict component of the Conservation Agriculture Project (CAP) of CARE International in Sierra Leone (hereafter called CARE) will be incorporated as well. This study is partly facilitated by CARE. Through the internship, many contacts have been acquired. In addition, colleagues at CARE have given a lot of valuable information during the internship, but also during the thesis period.

This chapter will first discuss the subject, aim and focus of the research, followed by its scientific and social relevance. It will finish with a general description of the contemporary rural situation in Sierra Leone.

1.1 Subject, focus and relevance of the research

"… no single topic has exercised so many students and men of affairs concerned with Africa as has that of land."
(Paul Bohannan, 1963, In: Peters P., 2002: 47)

Since most of the land users are either crop farmers or livestock keepers and because their activities are the most conflicting, the main conflicts in Koinadugu District are between these two groups. The most common problem between them is crop destruction as a result of cattle coming into the fields where the crops are growing. Also, cattle wounding, stealing and killing is mentioned, just as damage caused by uncontrolled burning of the soil. These issues will be elaborated upon later.

The conflicts between livestock farmers and crop farmers will all be covered by the terms 'cattle conflicts' or 'conflicts over cattle' in this thesis, even though they are maybe not all

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[2] Chiefdom speaker is the second person in command of the chieftaincy, after the paramount chief.

directly related to cattle. These cattle conflicts are the conflicts the most present and visible in the district (Nijenhuis, 2009a; CARE, 2008).

During the research also other issues around land came up, for example illegitimately gained access to land by livestock keepers and property rights issues because of the arrival of foreign investors. To give a complete image of the contemporary conflicts over land in Koinadugu, these issues will also be included in this thesis. Conflicts about property rights over land, but also conflicts between land owners and occupants will be called 'land conflicts' or 'conflicts over land', since they directly deal with land, even though other problems or issues might be at stake as well.

Needless to say, these two types of conflicts are interrelated. Furthermore, also other actors and factors that are thought to be a part of the conflicts are incorporated in this thesis. Even though all these actors and factors are intertwined, they have been separated into three categories: governance, historical and socioeconomic factors.

The aim of this thesis is threefold:
1. To understand and to provide insight into contemporary cattle and land conflicts in Koinadugu District;
2. To designate the importance of studying cattle and land conflicts not solely from a resource scarcity perspective;
3. To better understand the role of governance processes, historical factors and socioeconomic changes in conflicts over land and cattle.

Figure 1.1: map Sierra Leone (VSO, 2008)

As already mentioned, the focus will be on Koinadugu District in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone is a relatively small country in West-Africa, bordering the Atlantic Ocean, Guinea and Liberia, with almost six and a half million inhabitants (see figure 1.1). It became independent from the United Kingdom in 1961. The country is rich in natural resources, with diamonds, gold, bauxite, rutile, iron ore and chromite as most important ones. It consists of around eighteen ethnic groups, of which Temne and Mende (both 30%) are the biggest. Democracy is slowly being re-established after the civil war that lasted from 1991-2002 (CIA Factbook, 2009). Sierra Leone is still the lowest ranked country on the Human Development Index, a measuring device based on different criteria like poverty, education and life expectancy (Human Development Index, 2008). The country is composed of three provinces and one region: the Northern, Southern and Eastern provinces and the Western Area. The provinces are divided into twelve districts in total and

the districts are again subdivided into chiefdoms. Koinadugu is the largest district and most scarcely populated one. It is part of the Northern Province together with the districts Bombali, Port Loko, Tonkolili and Kambia. It is not part of the diamond rich areas of Sierra Leone.

In one chiefdom in Koinadugu District, Diang, gold mining takes place since the 1930s. Recent arrivals of international mining companies have resulted in an uplift of this mining industry (Kab 19).

Koinadugu District consists of plateaus and mountains and the climate is a Guinea Savannah climate: drier than the climate in the more southern parts of the country (Chakanda, 2009). This environment makes the area attractive for livestock keepers and therefore the cattle are centred in Koinadugu District. The geographical focus of this research will therefore be on this district in the North of Sierra Leone.

In academic literature, a lot has been written on conflicts over land in general and crop farmer-livestock keeper conflicts in particular. However, specific research on Sierra Leone has so far not been that elaborated. Therefore, research on cattle and land conflicts in Sierra Leone can contribute to the academic literature by investigation whether prevailing academic ideas about these conflicts can be confirmed for Sierra Leone. Moreover, while literature on resource conflicts may be rich, literature on post-war land and cattle conflicts is not. By investigating the influence of the war, but also developments after the war on these conflicts, the existing academic literature on these conflicts can be extended.

In addition, social relevance can be distinguished. As Moritz stated, "the key to prevention and resolution of these [farmer-livestock keeper] conflicts is greater understanding of its changing contexts and dynamics" (2006: 20). When knowing the contexts and dynamics of these conflicts, the region can solve these conflicts more easily.

1.2 Contemporary rural situation in West-Africa and Sierra Leone

To be able to position and contextualise the land and cattle conflicts in Koinadugu better, first a short sketch of the major changes concerning land and cattle conflicts in West-Africa will be given. In the next section, the focus will be on the rural situation in Sierra Leone.

1.2.1 Land and cattle conflicts in West-Africa

According to literature, the number of violent conflicts between farmers and livestock keepers seems to be increasing in West-Africa (Hussein *et al*, 1999). Multiple climate, agricultural and governance changes have been mentioned to explain the conflicts. These changes will be treated here.

Firstly, since the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, the already experienced shortage of space due to population growth and extension of agriculture has aggravated and caused a movement of West-African livestock keepers southwards (Valkenberg 1989; Hussein *et al*, 1999; de Bruijn, 2008). Being latecomers or strangers, livestock keepers experienced a fragile position in these areas (de Bruijn, 2008; Valkenberg 1989). Yet it is unclear how many livestock keepers have migrated to Sierra Leone due to these changes.

Second, pressure on natural resources has also increased because of the ongoing slash and burn system that is destructive and only marginally productive (Chakanda, 2009). The same counts for logging practices, especially the extensive ones for export use. Since 2010 the taxes for timber export have exponentially increased to discourage exportation though (Samba, 2010). This increasing pressure on natural resources can increase the likelihood of conflicts.

Furthermore, aside from population increase and depletion of natural resources, several other reasons have been put forward for this increasing competition for natural resources. Toulmin (2005) suggests a 'new tragedy of the commons' as a reason: land grabbing of government and elites. Oxby (1989) mentioned a similar phenomenon years earlier. She

assessed a diminishing of community-managed rangelands: traditional territorial boundaries of pastoralist communities or enclosures were freely trespassed by agricultural settlers, private entrepreneurs and for state projects.

Lastly, more recently, another development in rural areas that can be related to this is the commercialisation of agriculture. Foreign investors are not only interested in mining areas anymore, but they are increasingly aiming at leasing productive areas of agricultural land, for production of different crops for food security in their own country. This is on the one hand positive as this may - just like the arrival of the foreign mining industry - lead to an influx of money, employment opportunities and often an improvement of infrastructure and basic facilities as schools and hospitals. However, scholars warn for the risk of 'land grabbing', since the long term consequences are often overseen by people signing the contracts. Therefore, the local population risks losing access and control over land on which they depend. In addition, the length of the contracts is often vague, a large share of the money is taken by chiefs and a potential shift of local people to marginal soils with lower potential is also possible. Moreover, the more extensive (mechanical) use of the soil can lead to a deterioration of natural resources (Baxter, 2010; MADAM, 2010; Von Braun & Meinzen-Dick, 2009).

1.2.2 Rural situation in Sierra Leone

This section will first state something on the main agricultural practices, followed by the central land users and the land tenure system. The major agricultural practice for food production still is the rice-based system, which involves age-old practices that are conducted in both the upland and lowland ecosystems. These two ecosystems can be seen as the two major ones of Sierra Leone, the upland ecosystem being the largest. Upland farming involves slash-and-burn practices, by which forest cover is removed and plant remains are burnt to clear the land for cultivation (Chakanda, 2009).

Profile of land users

Different land users can be distinguished, crop farmers[3] and livestock keepers[4] being the most common ones in Koinadugu. Other users of land that can be distinguished in Koinadugu District are gold miners, fishermen, wood collectors, bee keepers, plantation holders, palm wine collectors, hunters and stone breakers[5]. These activities are mostly part-time activities executed by crop farmers and livestock keepers, especially by crop farmers. Men are mostly engaged in bee keeping and hunting, while women take on activities as fishing and wood collection aside from their farming activities (DS 7; D 6,10; M 13; Sul 3,8, 13; WWB 4,5,10). Livestock keepers are more engaged in (cattle) trading and crop farming (DS 5; WWY 5). Within the categories of farmers and livestock keepers, the most common land

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[3] Crop farmers can also be called farmers in this thesis.

[4] With a livestock keeper, all the people who are herding or owning cattle for a daily living are meant. It is the collective noun for cattle owners and herders. Other words for livestock keepers are transhumant pastoralists, pastoralists or cattle rearers. In Sierra Leone, the livestock keepers are mostly called cattle farmers. However, since this term implies they are farming intensively instead of extensively, this term will not be used in this thesis. The term livestock keeper is not tied to an ethnic identity: livestock keepers can have all ethnic identities present in Koinadugu District. However, most of the livestock keepers are Fula.

With cattle owners, all people who own cattle themselves are meant. With herders, all people who are hired to take care of cattle for a cattle owner are meant. They can also be called (cattle) caretakers or cowboys. These herders fall also under the term livestock keepers.

[5] Breaking stones is often an additional income activity of crop farmers. The activity implies collecting medium sized rocks and reducing their size by tapping on another stone. These stones are sold and used for the construction of the foundation of houses.

users in Sierra Leone, four different types can be distinguished according to Woldemichael (1995, in Hussein, 1998: 12):

1. *Nomadic pastoralists:* livestock keepers who depend largely on livestock keeping for their livelihoods, have no fixed residence due to a need for mobility to search for grazing and water resources, and practise crop production only as a supplement to livestock-raising;

2. *Transhumant pastoralists:* livestock keepers who practise both livestock rearing and crop cultivation, who follow a particular movement with their herds over fairly regular routes, but maintain a "home area" where they settle for part of the year;

3. *Agro-pastoralists:* farmers who gain their livelihoods from crop production and animal husbandry in about equal proportions, live in semi-permanent settlements, and supplement farming activities with other income earning activities as required;

4. *Sedentary farmers:* farmers living in permanent settlements earning their livelihood mainly from crop production, with domestic animals providing supplementary income.

Most livestock keepers and farmers in Sierra Leone fall under respectively the second and fourth category (Katta, 2009). The livestock keepers cultivate some crops for own consumption. They do not grow fodder for their cattle[6]. They have mostly two fixed residences: one for the rainy season and one for the dry season. Crop farmers generally reside at the centre of a settlement, while the livestock keepers are mostly resided at the outskirts of these settlements in their *werrehs*[7]. In the dry season they live closer to the crop farmers than in the rainy season, when they are moving upland.

Crop farmers work individually or on a family basis on a plot. For big activities as weeding, brushing and harvesting, they gather in groups, most often divided by age or gender: women, men and youth.

Who is crop farmer or livestock keeper, has been historically tied to ethnic and caste identities. Livestock keepers in West-Africa often belong to the Fula[8] ethnicity, whereas farmers have more different ethnicities (de Bruijn and van Dijk, 1997). Crop farmers in Koinadugu District can be distinguished into two categories: crop farmers who own land and those who do not. The first category contains crop farmers with a Limba, Kuranko and Yalunka ethnic identity, while the latter consists of Fula and Madingue.

Whereas in other African countries a blurring of livelihoods takes place between farmers and livestock keepers with both committed to farming as well as livestock (Toulmin, 1983 in Turner, 2004: 872; Beeler 2006; Oxby, 1989), this seems to happen less in Sierra Leone. A trend that is experienced in Sierra Leone though, is that livestock keepers are often no longer the owners of the cattle: the (urbanised) owner of the cattle hires a herder or caretaker (Hagberg, 2005; see also chapter 6).

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[6] The cows present in Koinadugu are originally from the N'dama breed. They originate from the cattle of Moroc Berber migrants who came to the Fouta Djallon region in Guinea. Spread to the surrounding areas, they have interbred with the Zebu cattle of the Sub-Saharan savannah and with the short horned cattle of the coastal areas, but they still belong to the N'Dama breed. N'Dama are dwarfs, their milking potential is low, but they are well adapted to Sierra Leonean conditions. They are tolerant to trypanosomiasis (a parasitic disease), thrifty in the dry season and able to endure the conditions of the rainy time. Besides, they can move over long distances (Touchberry 1967 in Valkenberg 1989; ILRI, year unknown). After the war, the World Food Programme imported cows of another breed from Mali. These cows did not survive since they could not adapt to the environment (WWB 2).

[7] A werreh means literally the paddock where the cows are kept at night. However, generally it refers to the place where livestock keepers live with their family and cows. It often consists of a few huts (for every wife one and often one for strangers) and a fenced area where the calves stay for protection, but also to be able to milk the suckling mothers.

[8] Also known as FulBe, Fulani or Peulh. Fula is singular as well as plural.

While economic ties exist between the two land user groups, social interaction is often limited. This is due to perceived differences in language, religion and eating habits. Tonah (2006) mentions that these differences are again more emphasised due to the spatial separation of residential areas. Economic relations are however cherished: ownership of livestock is not only a source of prestige, but is also a form of investment. Income earned from different activities by farmers, is preferably invested in livestock that are placed under the management of the Fula (Idem: 160).

Land tenure system
Sierra Leone has three systems of land tenure: family tenure, communal tenure and individual tenure, the first one being the most common. Land in the provinces is mainly under control of land-owning families or villages, towns or chiefdoms. No one has legal title to the land, although each member of a land-owning family is, in theory, entitled to a piece of the family land to farm.
This system of predominantly family tenure continues to be governed by elite land-owning families. These families have potential power to control land access and rights (together with chiefdom elders) as well as social, political and economic alliances (Hanson-Alp, 2005). The tenure system under customary law in Sierra Leone is patrilineal, meaning property rights are held and transferred through men, often the eldest son of a family (CARE, 2009). Women do thus not have any inheritance rights to land or property; most of them gain access to land through their family or husband (Andersson, 1999). As long as their marriage is stable, their access to land is too (Toulmin, 2005). "Non-natives" – generally everyone who is not a member of a landowning tribe - are not allowed to purchase land ownership. With approval of the paramount chief who is the custodian of the land, it is however allowed to lease provincial land to non-natives (Dale, 2008).

1.3 Outline
After the introductory chapter 1, chapter 2 will provide a theoretical overview; it explains the ruling academic views on land and cattle conflicts. Besides, it will explain the major concepts used in this thesis. In chapter 3 a methodological overview will be given; it explains the conceptual framework, data collection techniques and the research location and population. Besides, it presents the research questions and a methodological discussion. The fourth chapter is the first chapter where the empirical data will be presented. This chapter presents a general introduction to the conflicts in Koinadugu District and goes into the first analytical layer, presented in chapter 3. It is the layer of dispute and the land users directly concerned with this dispute. Four settings of conflict will be presented, which will serve as exemplary cases throughout the other empirical chapters. Chapter 5 elaborates on the second analytical layer, governance. It discusses the role changing governance structures play in cattle and land conflicts. The next chapter, chapter 6, will analyse the layer that is more indirectly related to the conflicts. It treats the historical context in which the conflicts should be seen, together with the changes in socioeconomic conditions. The seventh chapter, the last empirical one, focuses on representations and discourses and their contribution to the construction of conflicts. The last chapter offers a general conclusion together with a discussion, recommendations and ideas for further research.

2. Theoretical Framework

This chapter will first introduce the theoretical background and describe the prevailing thoughts about conflicts over land and cattle in the academic literature. Furthermore, the main theoretical approach, political ecology, will be introduced and it will be argued why is opted for the use of this theoretical approach in this thesis.

Next, the chapter will elaborate on academic literature about the actors and factors that are important when studying conflicts following a political ecology approach. In this section, at the same time a state of the art of these actors and factors influencing the conflicts in Koinadugu District will be given.

2.1 Conflict

This section will go into the definition of cattle and land conflict, the different theories around conflicts and will finish with a description of cattle conflicts.

2.1.1 Definition of land and cattle conflicts

Conflict is a broad term with different definitions constructed by various scholars. Adams and Bradbury (1995: 36) give a broad understanding of conflict: "[a] historical process that is mediated by socio-political and economic structures, at a micro and macro level". In this definition, it is difficult to distinguish the conflict situation from a non-conflict one. According to Lund (2002: 11) conflicts are "a range of issues over which political and legal struggles intertwine, where local powers and less localised power structures interact and where political and cultural symbols of power and authority are brought into play." Hussein (1998: 21) focuses on conflicts over cattle by understanding conflicts as "simple arguments between individuals or with the State, but also theft, raiding of livestock, killing of humans or livestock and large-scale violence between groups involving multiple killings".

The mentioned definitions are quite diverse, because conflicts can differ on various aspects: the type (between individuals, land-users or with involvement of the State), the level (arguments, theft, killing), the scale (local, regional, national), the visibility (for whom are the conflicts noticeable), the frequency (how often does it take place), the period (historical ties, only rainy season or dry season), the intensity (how severe are the conflicts) et cetera (Hussein, 1998). Furthermore, what Lund (2002) also mentions in his definition is that in land conflicts there is always more involved than solely conflict over land. It is never merely a struggle over the use of an economic resource, but more a political struggle over property or territory (Andersson, 1999; Turner, 2004). Nijenhuis (2009) endorses this by stating that conflicts should be seen in the broader context of deeply rooted struggles over power. In addition, conflicts should not be seen as static: it knows different stages and can evolve unexpectedly depending on circumstances.

Since there is not one definition and since different land users may define conflict differently, in this thesis conflict will be understood as such when one of the land users typifies an interaction with another land user as conflict. This can thus be conflicts over land (focused on direct land issues as property rights) or conflicts over cattle (between livestock keepers and crop farmers, mostly about crop destruction or cow wounding).

A last remark is that conflict often has a negative connotation. However, as Bradbury *et al* (1994) and Cramer (2006) state, violence in developing countries is not irrational or pointless, even though it does not fit in a model of rationality. Cramer (2006: 284) states that "violence makes sense to different people in different ways in varied contexts". Moreover, conflict has been a common experience of transition or change, so it does not need to be only negative or to be avoided at all costs.

In the academic field, when talking about conflicts over land, two main schools come to the fore. They will be discussed in the following part.

2.1.2 Neo-Malthusianists versus political ecologists

To explain conflicts over land and over cattle with a focus on (pressure on) natural resources, two streams are the most known: neo-Malthusianism and political ecology. At the end of the eighteenth century, Thomas Malthus wrote an essay on population increase and its consequences for resources. All things being equal, the exponential population increase would outpace available resources, which would lead in the end to 'misery and vice', for instance conflicts (Malthus in Gausset and Whyte, 2005: 7). Whereas Malthusianists focused on the direct consequences for people, the neo-Malthusianists in the late nineteenth and twentieth century concentrated more specifically on the consequences for the environment. They believed the imbalance between population and resources would lead to environmental degradation.

Garrett Hardin's article on the 'tragedy of the commons' is the best known example of neo-Malthusianism. Hardin states that people have the tendency to deplete natural resources in their search for income maximisation. Each livestock keeper for example is "locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world that is limited" (Hardin, 1968: 1244). Hardins solution to this tragedy is to relinquish the freedom to breed, to increase the role of the state and to privatise property (Idem).

The strength of the Malthusian theories is to reduce complex problems to simple equations, but this has also been their weakness (Gausset and Whyte, 2005). Boserup started with making a critical elaboration on the Malthusian position, still during the 'tragedy of the commons' discourse in the 1960s. Her general argument was that "although population growth lead to pressure on resources, this pressure may in its turn lead to innovation, in particular agricultural intensification" (Boserup, 1965 in Gausset and Whyte, 2005: 12). An addition to this argument is that more people does not necessarily mean more environmental degradation, but it can also mean more and better forests and soil conservation. In this sense, population growth can be seen as an opportunity (Gausset and Whyte, 2005).
Criticism came also from the common property resource school and was especially focused on the empirical analyses (Feeny *et al*, 1990). Comparable to Boserup, the approach of Hardin - and thus of Malthus as well - was judged as too model-minded; normal life can not be entirely model-based. Besides, people are not only greedy or selfish; they are able to organise, cooperate and to create institutions. Hardin was neither involving the state nor institutions, while they also play a role according to the critics. Moreover, Hardin equalised or overlooked the differences between 'common property' and 'open access' resources, while according to the common property resource school these different resources induce different types of regulations (Feeny *et al*, 1990). Open access means there is no regulation at all, while for common property access is restricted by inclusion and exclusion rights (Idem; Eggertson, 2003). According to the critics, resources may seem to be open for everyone (open access), but in reality regulations exist (common property). This means for instance that, after several years of declining yields, livestock keepers are likely to get together and seek ways to control access to the pasture and agree upon a set of rules of conduct. In short, Hardin overlooks the roles of institutional arrangements and cultural factors (Feeny *et al*, 1990).

Nowadays, neo-Malthusianism has been evolved into the environmental security school, wherein Homer-Dixon (1994; 1999) is the most known scholar. This school states that the problem is the increase of scarcity in renewable resources. However even though Homer-Dixon is still arguing for the existence of a causal relationship between scarcity and conflict, he also recognises the importance of political aspects (Homer-Dixon, 1999). At present, Toulmin (2005) argues a new tragedy of the commons is taking place. As privatisation and enclosure by governments and elite continue, the commons are less accessible for poorer people. She is not stating that rights should be privatised as Hardin did, but instead she pleads for formal registration of land ownership. This would reduce conflicts and would encourage more leasing, renting and selling of land.

Since the end of the 1980s the environmental security school has been subject to another wave of criticism. Especially the direct link between scarcity and conflict was criticised, by stating that conflict between different land users already existed before resource scarcity was recognised and was also prevalent during times of higher rainfall and lower human population densities (Turner, 2004; Gausset, 2005). In addition, according to Turner (2004), livestock do not enter cropped fields due to a scarcity of resources (fodder in this case), but due to poor management by livestock keepers or their herders. Moreover, conflicts are not

about every plot of land: it is not just land, but the fertility or productivity of land that is critical to understand livestock keeper-farmer competition (O'Bannon, 2006).

This criticism came from the political ecology school with scholars as Bassett (1988), Le Billon (2001), Peluso and Watts (2001) and Turner (2004). This school states that the causes of natural resources problems should not only be searched in scarcity of natural resources, but rather in the whole context around the resource: the character of the resource, the (unequal) access to wealth, different political voices, historical context, the behaviour of the government in the conflict etcetera. Therefore also an abundance of resources or a shift in state regulation can cause problems regarding resources.

With regard to Sierra Leone, the country's abundance of resources can cause poor economic performance, corruption of state institutions, but also greater socioeconomic inequalities (Le Billon, 2001). In the end this can also lead to an increase in the number of conflicts over land and cattle.

<u>Choice for political ecology in this thesis</u>
In the former section, the different theoretical approaches for land and cattle conflicts have been set out. This thesis will use the political ecology theory to approach the conflicts because of several reasons. Firstly, political ecology is at present the dominant discourse in the academic field to consider conflicts over land and cattle. The neo-Malthusianists are increasingly recognising the importance of other aspects than only scarcity, what makes their own theory weaker and the theory of, among others, political ecology more valuable.

Secondly, during the first months of stay in Koinadugu it was found out not only resource scarcity could be influencing the cattle and land conflicts, because in most parts of the district an abundance of resources could be remarked. Therefore, the scarcity theory was considered as not relevant, while political ecology, taking into account aspects around the natural resource as access, politics, history and governance, seemed to be a theory which did suit the situation.

However, it needs to be taken into account that in for example policy documents of NGOs and newspapers, the scarcity theory is still followed, even though it is often not the most relevant theory and does not lead to policies relevant for the specific situation (CARE, 2008; Katta, 2009; Van Raaij, 2009). Therefore, aims of this thesis are to first designate the importance of studying cattle and land conflicts not solely from a resource and scarcity perspective and next, to give an alternative to better understand the conflicts by constructing the roles of surrounding factors, processes and changes as part of these conflicts.

Yet, the choice for political ecology does not mean none of the (neo-)Malthusian ideas will be used. For instance, the modern 'tragedy of the commons' when considering the influx of foreign investors and land conflicts, will be taken into account.

A more detailed explanation of political ecology will be given in the next section.

2.1.3 Political ecology
The main focus of political ecology is the interconnectedness of politics and the environment. Political ecologists try to understand the dynamics and properties of a 'politicised environment' while approaching it from a range of disciplines (Bryant, 1998): it comprises geography, sociology, anthropology, biology and ecology.

According to Bassett (1988: 454), five common elements can be distinguished within political ecology. At first, the contextual analysis of human-environmental relationships at different scales of inquiry, second a historical approach emphasising the transformation of indigenous systems of resource management in the process of incorporation into the global economy. Third, a common element is the emphasis on the influence of state intervention in rural economies on land-use patterns. The fourth element is the focus at the local level on differential responses of decision-making units to changing social relations of production

and exchange, and the last is sensitivity to regional variability. Bryant (1998) emphasises that to develop a more detailed understanding of the politicised environment, it is necessary to analyse how unequal power relations are often linked to conflicts over access to, and the use of, diverse environmental resources. Furthermore, just like Bassett (1988), Bryant (1998) sees the importance to study the historical context since, especially in developing countries, the colonial legacy is still alive.

Robbins (2004) divides political ecology into four subjects[9]. This thesis will mostly go into the subject of environmental conflict, to explain who has access and why. Environmental conflicts are "struggles over ideas about nature, in which one group prevails not because they hold a better or more accurate account of a process – soil erosion, global warming, ozone depletion – but because they access and mobilise social power to create consensus on the truth" (Robbins, 2004: 114). Criticism on this approach is that it leaves no space for non-human actors and processes in explaining outcomes: it focuses more on the politically empowered environmental science (Robbins, 2004).

The conflicts studied under 'environmental conflict' are analysed according to three topics known to be important in the political ecology: social systems, property rights systems and historical experiences. Political ecologists state that "social systems are structured around divisions of labour and power that differentially distribute access and responsibility for natural goods and systems." Second, there is an understanding of "property systems as complex bundles of rights that are politically partial and historically contingent." Last, it is important to reflect on historical experience on class, race and gender of participants in the development process (Robbins, 2004: 173).

Political ecology, although a widely respected response to neo-Malthusian approaches, has not been without criticism either. According to Basset and Zimmerer (2004: 104), the field has become 'politics without ecology'. And if they do engage themselves in ecology, it is in a selective and ideological matter. Yet many political ecologists perceived this allegation to be exaggerated: maybe some political ecologists do not treat it directly, the tradition of careful examination of environmental change remains alive (Walker, 2005). Two years later, Walker (2007) was wondering where the political in political ecology is. According to him, political ecology is especially ignorant about the political dimensions of their own actions. Furthermore, there is concern among political ecologists that they are focused inwards and therefore facing the problems of the 'ivory tower': "no matter how brilliant, a light in a sealed box does not illuminate" (Walker, 2007: 365).

Operationalisation political ecology in this thesis

Despite the criticism on political ecology, it is still seen as the theory most suitable for this thesis, since it takes into account the different facets that seem to be important when analysing land and cattle conflicts in Koinadugu. Besides, the aim of this thesis is to construct the contemporary conflicts, so it depends on the construction of these conflicts whether the focus will be more on politics or ecology. Therefore, the debate on political ecology without politics or ecology is not that relevant here.

By choosing for political ecology, the conflicts need to be deconstructed in order to distinguish different factors and actors contributing to the conflict. This deconstruction does not aim to find 'the truth' since this does rarely exist in conflict situations, where different people have different versions of the truth. Additionally, constructivism does not consider

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[9] The four subjects of political ecology according to Robbins (2004) are: degradation and marginalisation, which explains environmental change; environmental conflict, which goes into environmental access; conservation and control what studies conservation failures and political and economic exclusion; environmental identity and social movement which explains social upheaval.

conflict solely as the product of competition between groups with fixed identities or interests, but rather as the interactive product of choices, culture and context that cause a change in social relations (Zartman, 2002).

The political ecology ideas mentioned by Bassett (1988), Bryant (1998) and Robbins (2004) will serve as a means to operationalise the thesis. What needs to be studied to get a better insight in the conflicts over land and cattle in Koinadugu District following the political ecology theories, is the context around the direct dispute. This context, like historical changes, the influence of the state, social changes and regional variability, are seen as part of the conflict: without this context, understanding a conflict is impossible. The perspective in this thesis is on three of these main elements which are thought to construct conflict in Koinadugu: the historical context, changes in socioeconomic conditions, changes in governance structures. These three are chosen, because during the desk research and first interviews the recent war and foremost the post-war consequences were often mentioned as a changing factor of the conflicts, but also the difference in socioeconomic position of land users – foremost crop farmers and livestock keepers - and the role of authorities, especially paramount chiefs, in conflict. However, also other reasons and relations were mentioned. These felt all more or less, just like the causes mentioned before, under the broader terms of history, socio economy and governance.

Besides these elements, one perspective is added which is not directly related to political ecology: because this thesis, as mentioned, focuses on the construction of conflicts and uses foremost interviews, it was found out that discourse and representations respondents have about themselves, others and the conflicts seem to influence the conflicts as well.

The next sections will go into what scholars say about these four main concepts used in the thesis, while it will at the same time also already give an insight, where possible, in the contemporary situation in Sierra Leone and Koinadugu District concerning these concepts.

2.2 Governance

This section will elaborate on governance: the concept itself, but also a historical overview of governance in Sierra Leone.

2.2.1 The concept of governance

Governance is currently a key concept in academic literature, but also a fashion and fuzzy one. It does not have a definite academic meaning and is often just seen as an appealing catchword (Nuijten, 2004). In this section, an attempt will be made to come to a relevant understanding of the concept.

Governance has been presented in the development debate since the early nineties of the last century. Recently, popular themes in this regard are accountability and the fight against corruption and globalisation. Regarding the latter, people are increasingly confronted with global patterns of (transnational) governance (Nuijten, 2004).

Different definitions of governance have been composed by a variety of institutions, the British Council using the following: "Governance involves interaction between the formal institutions and those in civil society. Governance refers to a process whereby elements in society wield power, authority and influence and enact policies and decisions concerning public life and social upliftment" (GDRC, 2010). The Institute on Governance has a more compact definition: "Governance comprises the institutions, processes and traditions that determine how power is exercised, how decisions are taken and how citizens have their say" (Johnson, 1997: 3). In both definitions, it is clear that governance is not solely the concern of the government, but also of civil society and other institutions.

Nuijten argues that it is almost impossible to arrive at a generally accepted definition. Therefore, she focuses on some general points of agreement regarding governance:
- It refers to processes of steering, ordering, ruling and control;
- It is often used in relation to processes of social transformation;
- It influences the distribution and reshuffling of people, means and resources;
- It is related to forms of domination and power relations: practices of governance are never neutral, they imply forms of domination, control, resistance and subversion.

Furthermore, she argues that the role of the state has not diminished by introducing the concept of governance. The state continues to be one of the central actors in governance, but "what has changed is that other actors and the configurations in the relationship between the state and these other actors have become more important" (Nuijten, 2004: 104). One last feature of governance is that governance and ordering are always at work, even in complete anarchy (Nuijten, 2004; Cramer, 2006).

To avoid falling back on 'fashion terms', an ultimate definition of governance will not be given in this thesis. The concept will be used in an analytical way[10] to understand the conflicts better. It will be operationalised by defining all the actors, institutions and processes of institutional change that might influence the conflicts over land and cattle in Koinadugu. Concerning these conflicts, the actors besides the land users will be the State, chiefs, council, other traditional authorities (besides chiefs and council), NGOs and foreign investors. With institutions the legal systems and property rights systems are meant. Institutional changes relevant to this thesis will be decentralisation, development processes and post-war reordering.

2.2.2 Historical overview of governance in Sierra Leone
Before, during and after colonisation, chiefs have always had their power, even though during the centralised political system under Siaka Stevens this was way less (Jackson, 2006). Chiefs abusing their chiefly powers, together with a highly centralised system of governance and even an abolishment of local governments, have been acknowledged as a major contributing factor to the war (Richards, 2004; Richards *et al*, 2004).

After the war, discussions rose among scholars on what to do with the chieftaincy system. Richards (2004) recommended stripping chiefs of their powers, while Fanthorpe (2006) pledged to make them more downwardly accountable. However, even though the social contract between chiefs and local population was growing weaker and large groups protested against the corrupt system and a lack of voice of the population, chieftaincy remained. Because of the protests, there is a need for chiefs to rebuild their own legitimacy. Chieftaincy as an institution is valued by many people, but the system is not. According to Jackson (2006), people do not want to abolish the chiefs, but reform is needed.

After the war, the idea of state changed in Sierra Leone. As Nuijten (2004) stated as well, it came to be considered as just another actor in an increasingly complex and interwoven global order (Oomen, 2002: 8). While Sierra Leone was first only governed by the state, governance was by then becoming more and more important because of two major changes. Firstly, since 2000, a process of decentralisation has been going on in Sierra Leone, which culminated in a new Local Government Act in May 2004. This resulted in three distinct political groups within local government: politicians, chiefs and district administrations. The

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[10] Governance can be used as an analytical or instrumentalist concept. An instrumentalist approach is used often in response to a crisis of manageability and it looks for practical relevance, whereas an analytical approach is used to study how things are and does not contribute directly to improve or change governance structures (Nuijten, 2004). Since this thesis is more focused on understanding conflict by studying among others the concept of governance, the analytical approach will be used.

three official groups have responsibility for a wide range of services and powers, like tax raising and planning (Jackson, 2006). Whether this decentralisation is the panacea will be discussed later.

Secondly, the upcoming of governmental organisations (GOs) like the UN (United Nations), EU (European Union) and powerful international NGOs were having increasing impact after the war. Many of these NGOs were far more influential in health care, education and disaster relief than the governments of the countries concerned. These processes of decentralisation, democratisation and donor policies led to a strengthening of the local sphere and an emphasis on grass-roots politics, thus on (local) governance (Oomen, 2002).

The next parts will go into the actors and institutions of governance in Koinadugu, followed by a section on the processes of institutional change.

2.3 Governance: actors

While at first sight land and cattle conflicts seem to be between land users, from literature it becomes clear that not only land users are involved. It is important to study actors, because they are believed to have their own agency (Giddens, 1984). With agency is meant that these actors have the ability to produce and reproduce social structures: they draw upon these social structures in order to act and, at the same time, they reproduce these same or slightly altered structures (Pérez, 2008). This means in this case that their role, function and power can influence the conflicts in Koinadugu. Since the actors and their agency can change, which can influence the social relations, but also the conflicts, it is interesting to study these governance processes and changes.

In this thesis the state, chiefs, the council, other local authorities, NGOs, and foreign investors are believed to be actors in conflicts. A short description of these actors will be incorporated here, focusing on their performances and tasks, especially post-war.

2.3.1 The State

The national government's post-war policy was threefold: decentralisation, the restoration of paramount chiefs and new local councils. Its programme was, according to President Kabbah, "to move away from the highly centralised system of administration that we inherited from previous governments and to restore democratic governance at the local levels" (Kabbah, 2003 in Thomson, 2007: 21). This is in contrast with what Cramer (2006: 277) advises for post-war economic development. According to him, not decentralisation, but a powerful central state is necessary for post-war economic development: "for economic development to achieve some progressive momentum in the wake of violent conflicts, and for the violence of war to peter out rather than mutate into pervasive post-war violence, a powerful central state is necessary, not the flimsy decentralising and enabling bureaucracy of the post-conflict reconstruction makeover fantasy".

According to Thomson (2007), the government's presence has been re-established throughout the country after the war. The government's strength was the progress in forming the armed forces and police and the effective management of the economy as a whole.

Unequal access to land and misappropriation of natural resources by land users continue to be among the most common concerns brought to the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Local Government and Community Development. Cattle and land conflicts are generally the most common form of provincial civil litigation (Dale, 2008).

While the government is represented at local level by the councillors, they also have a relation with traditional chiefs as Jackson (2006: 101) states: "Many MPs [Members of

Parliament] are reliant on chiefs for the mobilisation of political support, whereas chiefs rely on MPs for resources to maintain patronage networks".

2.3.2 Chiefs
In Sierra Leone, four types of chiefs can be distinguished: paramount, regent, section and town chiefs. Paramount chiefs are the traditional rulers over chiefdoms, seen as a key source of authority (Jackson, 2006). Regent chiefs are the chiefs who are replacing the paramount chiefs when they pass away until there is a new candidate, section chiefs are the traditional rulers over a section (around five per chiefdom in Koinadugu) and town chiefs over villages. Main activities of chiefs are the administration of customary rights, revenue collection and the maintenance of law and order (Thomson, 2007). During colonialism, the chiefs had a different role: they were put in place by the British to keep an eye on the inner areas. This made them dependent on the British but at the same time decentralised despots, since they did not care about the local population anymore (Mamdani, 1996).

Paramount chiefs, being the custodian of the land, represent the first-comers in a certain chiefdom. It is a lifelong hereditary position with elections: to become paramount chief, one should come from a so-called ruling-house. Among the candidates of the ruling families, one chief will be chosen by tax-payers of the chiefdom. Paramount chiefs are backed up by a kind of 'office' consisting of a chiefdom speaker (second in command), a mummy queen (female representative of the chiefdom) and a youth chairman. Especially after the war, scholars contested the role and function of paramount chiefs, as can be read in section 2.6. However, some scholars also see their advantages for rural people. This group values the chiefs as "a counterweight to a distrusted Freetown elite" (Jackson, 2006: 98).

In some districts women can be paramount chiefs, in Koinadugu this is not the case. Town and section chiefs are also appointed for life by the people living in the particular section or community. Section and town chiefs or members of the paramount chief's office do not need to have the same ethnical identity as the one of the ruling family. According to Sawyer (2008: 387), "section chiefs are seen as particularly important for settling small disputes, especially in the rural areas where contact between villagers and chiefs is most apparent".

2.3.3 Councillors
Since the Local Government Act 2004, councillors have been put in place as elected representatives from the central government who provide services to local people and raise local taxes to pay for them (Jackson, 2006; Thomson, 2007). They are unpaid and often have nursing or teaching jobs aside from their function as councillor. In Koinadugu 24 councillors are active in their wards[11], on average two per chiefdom. Every district has a district council in the capital of the district, with one elected person as district council chairman. The present councillors are the ones put in place after the second council elections. They do not have a fixed role in solving land and cattle conflicts or conflicts in general.

2.3.4 Other local authorities
Although often called 'grassroots institutions', in this thesis the other local authorities besides paramount chiefs and councillors, are categorised as actors. Other local authorities can be reverends, imams, Fula tribal heads, village elders, court chairmen and administrative staff. According to Swayer (2008), these authorities, together with donors, help to resolve conflicts and maintain stability and peace on a day-to-day level. An exception is mentioned

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[11] The country is subdivided in provinces and the western area. The provinces are subdivided in –
from the greatest to the smallest in size - districts, chiefdoms, wards, sections and towns.

for both magistrate and local courts [12] though: their performance in resolving conflict is relatively small (Idem).

2.3.5 International community

During the war, the international community in the form of GOs like the UN and EU and NGOs has been involved to put an end to the civil war (Thomson, 2007), but also after the war to (re)construct governance across the country, not least at local level (Jackson, 2006). According to Jackson (2006: 97-8), the international community "encouraged a rapid drive towards elected local government with the hope that chiefly authority would eventually wither away".

The role of the international community is a contested one. According to literature, aid interventions can influence conflicts both positively and negatively (Brown *et al*, 2009). Criticism is, among others, on the way they operate. According to Stoll (1997), the donors tend to make their own problem analysis and often think in dichotomies within their own paradigm, which is not always the right one: they have often already made their decision where and in what to involve based on filtered and simplified information due to long-distance reporting. An example of this wrong policy of aid organisations is mentioned by De Bruijn (2008). Regarding pastoralists and their ecological environment, she states the dominant idea is that they use the environment in a devastating manner. However, at present this idea is obsolete: herding leads to an increase instead of decrease of forest and the relation between pressure of grazing on pastures and degradation of these same pastures is not proven. Yet development policies have been based on these wrong assumptions. Therefore, no results have been booked in these projects.

Regarding the involvement in conflicts, two points are made in literature about the functioning of aid organisations in conflict situations. Firstly, NGOs do often not consider themselves as an actor in conflicts, while literature is proving both relief and development agencies do play a role: they lack conflict 'sensitivity' or conflict 'mindfulness' in their approaches (Brown *et al* 2009; Goodhand and Atkinson, 2001; Le Billon, 2001).

Furthermore, according to Cramer, in post-war countries all 'experts' think these countries can be considered as 'blank slates': economists project a fantasy of perfectly competitive markets, while political scientists and international financial institutions regularly project a fantasy of liberal states providing basic services and public goods. And when these states fall short, the fantasy of the latter is displaced on to decentralised, local government structures. However, Cramer (2006: 255) states, these fantasies show "a remarkable lack of historical memory and contemporary understanding". According to him, a country emerging from war is not destructed until the ground, it is no 'ground zero'. Furthermore, reconstruction never takes place in a political vacuum. When demobilisation is a success and the elections are relatively 'free and fair', it is not a successful post-conflict reconstruction yet.

This thesis will only focus on NGOs, since GOs were not directly active in the Koinadugu District[13].

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[12] Koinadugu has 28 local courts and 1 magistrate court (Kab 5). The local court is the only institution with lawful authority to "adjudicate cases governed by customary law as established by or under the Local Courts Act of 1963" (Koroma 2007: 8). The local courts fall under customary law of the chiefdom or the district, while the magistrate court falls under national law. Local courts mostly treat cases as divorce, debt, succession, minor public order offences, witchcraft and land disputes. Criminal offences under general law are mostly referred to magistrate courts (Koroma, 2007: 8).

The local court exists of a court chairman who is the ultimate judges, a court clerk to keep track of the records, a panel of elders known as members and the chiefdom police who provide security and act as process servers (Idem; Castillejo, 2009).

2.3.6 Foreign investors

Foreign investors are a relatively new actor in land conflicts in general and in a remote area as Koinadugu District in particular. Their influence on land conflicts lies, because of their recent arrival, more in the future. In Koinadugu District, their presence is increasing especially in the gold mining area in Diang chiefdom, but also in areas with vast amounts of arable land, interesting for commercial agriculture. Other investment opportunities for foreign investors are in timber and bio fuel (mostly through sugarcane plantations).

2.4 Governance: institutions

The institutions of governance can be subdivided into legal systems and property rights and access. These two themes will be mentioned here.

2.4.1 Legal systems

First a short historical sketch will be given, followed by the link between conflict and the influence of legal systems.

<u>Customary laws</u>

In Africa, many laws can be typified as customary. This type of law system is less static than authoritarian law and may vary from village to village. Therefore African land tenure is often seen as complex, variable and fluid (Peters P., 2002). In addition, it is tied to fluctuating social and political relations (Ubink, 2006).

Before colonisation, the African law system consisted solely of customary laws. Chiefs needed support of the local people to change laws (Hanson-Alp, 2005). During colonialism however, the colonial regime argued the need to manage land tenure systems on a national instead of local level out of economic efficiency and political reasons, but also to acquire land for public purposes and to protect local people from corruption of government officials. A less explicit reason was to "break the power of customary chiefs by removing their prerogatives regarding land allocation and the settlement of disputes" (Toulmin *et al*, 2002: 2-3).

Since colonialism, another layer of power was thus built on top of the customary law, overlaying the local tenure system by national legislation and obliging customary chiefs to give account to the British 'above them' and not any longer to the population 'beneath them'. This induced the already mentioned despotism by local chiefs. Only chiefs were seen as customary, no other institutions. Furthermore, the customary law was shaped by those in control of the customary institutions (Mamdani, 1996).

Until the late 1960s the variable and flexible characteristics of customary law provided arguments for seeing customary land tenure in Africa as inhibiting agricultural modernisation. Also in the 1970s people still assumed individual property rights were necessary, although criticism on national land tenure was already there. In the 1970s and 1980s, when land policy reforms and titling programmes failed to achieve their aims, researchers showed that these programmes based on faulty premises: customary tenure was not that bad after all. It did not inhibit investments, farmers could adapt easily to changing conditions and it did not exclude individual rights. Moreover, land titling (privatisation) even increased unequal access to land (Peters P., 2002 & 2004; Boos, 2004) and left open the possibility of "land grabbing by foreign investors, expatriate farmers and wealthy individuals" (Boos, 2004: VII). According to Berry (1993), the problems in Africa are

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[13] The GOs were not directly having projects in Koinadugu, but they did finance some projects of NGOs, which makes their influence indirect.

not the ambiguous or negotiable land rights, but the access of people to these land rights. This will be discussed further in the property rights and access section.

Anyhow, even though it was concluded that customary modes of landholding largely met the needs of especially small-scale farmers in Africa, criticism has still not disappeared since for example (gender) inequality is still there (Peters P., 2002).

Regarding conflict, in general rules to settle conflict depend somewhat on national laws, but primarily on local rules and customary law.

Bye-laws
Bye-laws are customary laws that vary per chiefdom and are put in place to give chiefdoms more legal power. They are often constructed by a committee made up of the chief and mostly male elders, which may result in laws that are not reflecting the needs of the whole community. The bye-laws are fluid and changeable as known for customary law. They are only treated in local courts. In Koinadugu, there are around two local courts per chiefdom. Most cases in court are debt, relational affairs and land use cases, with cattle damage of farmers' plantation and crops as the most frequently recorded cause of conflict in the district (Koroma, 2007).

Advantages of 'living' or customary laws are that the laws can respond to changing needs and they can be flexible in individual cases. Disadvantages are that citizens are often not up-to-date on the bye-laws that apply to them, which makes it easier for local courts to judge inconsistently or arbitrary (Castillejo, 2009).

In some chiefdoms in Koinadugu District, special bye-laws have been set up regarding land access and cattle conflict. Examples of bye-laws are that strangers should approach the town chief, landowner and section chief first before contacting the paramount chief to get access to a piece of land. Besides, dates have been arranged between the crop farmer and livestock keepers when the livestock keepers can come down from the uplands during the dry season to seek water and pasture for the cows.

2.4.2 Property rights and access

"Worbe mboolo	*"Men of the forest*
Be saare Aali Maalum	*People of the village of Ali Maloum*
Mboolo uddaa juuraa	*The forest is open to all*
Hattantaa yoogoobee"	*Except to women who draw water"*

(Part of Fulani poem. Sow, 1993)

In this section, different facets of land and property rights will be discussed to get an idea what the influence of these issues can be on conflicts in Koinadugu.

An exclusive definition of property does not exist; understanding of the concept is dependent on society, context, purposes, time et cetera. Lund (2002: 13) states that property can be seen as "sets of rules governing people's rights to access, use and control resources." These sets of rules are not solely legislatively; there is also a social aspect involved. Von Benda-Beckmann *et al* (2006: 14) set out that property is not only about things, but also "about relationships among social actors with regard to objects of value". In this sense, the state is not the only player in authorising property.

Property is always multifunctional: it is constructing identity of individuals and groups, but it has also religious connotations and it is an element in political organisation of societies. In addition, there is a relationship between property and inheritance: access to property in Africa is mostly by inheritance (von Benda-Beckmann *et al*, 2006).

Property can also be seen in a metaphorical way: a society is built up of different "bundles of rights". These bundles can be separated and reassembled, so property can be in the hands of

multiple parties. The persons, who have a stick in these bundles, have access to property (Meyer, 2009).

Access

Verdery (1999) does not see property as a bundle of rights, but as a bundle of powers. Not the rights themselves, but access to rights and property are at stake, because there is a highly unequal capacity for different categories of persons to put rights into effect.

Like Verdery, Ribot argues the focus should be on access rather than property, because access is a broader term: it is descriptive, while right is prescriptive. He states that access encompasses legal as well as extra-legal mechanisms. Extra-legal mechanisms governing resource-use include social identity, social relations, coercion and trickery (misinformation or threats of violence), material wealth and physical circumstances (Ribot, 1998). While property is only referring to legitimate social relationships, access is about the "ability to benefit from things" (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 153).

According to Sikor and Lund (2009: 4), the difference between access and property implies that social actors may derive benefits from resources without holding property rights to them. They argue that the 'grey zone' between which people have rights and what they merely have access to is terrain worth exploring. In this thesis, an attempt will be made to explore this grey zone with regards to the situation of different land users in Koinadugu.

Just like property, access can be gained at different levels and in different categories: capital, markets, knowledge, authority (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Moreover, access to different capitals is related: when there is for example no access to credits, markets or right connections, access to land will be of modest value as well (Ribot 1998). With his access theory, Ribot thus looks at the whole chain and social relations surrounding property.

In this thesis, the focus will be on the broader understanding of property including access.

2.5 Governance: Institutional change

Processes of institutional change falling under the denominator of governance are decentralisation, development processes and reordering processes.

2.5.1 Decentralisation

The decentralisation arising out of the Local Government Act is not only welcomed positively. General doubts are on the shortage of qualified staff, buildings and equipment at local level. The geographical position of Koinadugu District makes it even more difficult to recruit sufficient good staff.

While decentralisation has taken place, the devolution of responsibility takes place slowly. The Act is not clear about the relationship between chiefs and councils and out of a desire for flexibility, ambiguity exists. Furthermore, mutual mistrust and political rivalry among the local parties exists: the new and changed roles are expected to cause frictions between chiefs, councillors and local administration at several issues.

Aside from this ambiguity of the Act, the main issue of conflict is likely to be finance. Sources of revenue previously enjoyed by the chief are transferred to the local council. Chiefs are still regarded as legitimate traditional rulers though; therefore they often enjoy broader political power than the new council chairperson or chief administrator (Jackson, 2006).

In addition, Thomson (2007) doubts whether the decentralisation will succeed in promoting stronger citizen participation and better service delivery, since traditional rural elites remain very powerful. Also Jackson (2006: 98) forecasts that, despite the increased distribution of powers, the "gerontocracy remains able to exercise considerable influence over policymaking […]". Moreover, the Ministry of Local government is not in a strong enough position to deal with these conflicts (Thomson, 2007; Jackson, 2006).

The actors themselves seemed not to be positive about this reform either. According to Jackson (2006: 102), it was difficult to say whether all officials were in favour of decentralisation: "officials certainly knew that this was a route to obtain external funding. There may, therefore have been an incentive for officials to 'say the right things' to external donors […]". Chiefs fear that this decentralisation and modernisation will reduce their influence and potential for income, even though also within chieftaincy there are calls for reform. This call is mostly by newly elected chiefs: around 44 percent of all paramount chiefs were elected after the war. These new chiefs, packed with more education and a network, are believed to build more constructive relationships with other local powers. However, there is a tendency of local people to mistrust these new chiefs due to previous experiences. Notwithstanding protest among some chiefs, a move is made to depoliticise chiefs and give them a more symbolic function. By doing this, an attempt is made to break down the already mentioned pre-war gerontocracy (Jackson, 2006).

Nijenhuis (2003) argues that decentralisation in practice is often not a panacea for all the problems in developing countries. At first the aspect of democratisation is questioned: giving more power to local authorities can strengthen their power while weakening the position of for example strangers. Next, accountability concerns rise. Local authorities are often only accountable to the state and not to the local people. At last, decentralisation, just like colonialism did, introduces another layer of power that can stimulate multiple claims and legal pluralism even more.

2.5.2 Development processes
Besides decentralisation, also globalisation, urbanisation and modernisation have taken place in Sierra Leone, with societal change as result. The war has accelerated these processes: as already mentioned, many people have fled to cities while they had never been into an urbanised area. Post-war returning to rural areas felt as going backward (Myers, 1994), therefore the cities expanded after the war.

After the war with the arrival of the international community for development projects, education is increasingly valued. However, even though or maybe because they attended school together, youth seems to be more aggressive towards other (ethnic or labour) groups than elders are. These sentiments can fuel conflicts between different land users (Moritz, 2006).

Another result of development processes is the upcoming of foreign investors. The advantages and disadvantages of this new actor have already been discussed in section 1.2.1.

2.5.3 Post-conflict situation: reordering processes
There is no formal distinction between war and peace (Richards, 2005). Similarly, Nordstrom (1997) uses the term warscapes: a broad field of dynamics that are part of war-time processes but not necessarily confined to the frontline (Hoffman, 2005: 350). According to Nordstrom (1997: 37), many groups like soldiers, mercenaries, power brokers, development groups, guerrillas, refugees, businesspeople etcetera, act and interact: "local and transnational concerns are enmeshed in the cultural construction of conflict that is continually reconfigured across time and space." Furthermore, as already mentioned, post-conflict states are not a blank slate or in absence of order: "Institutions exist, political processes are underway and prevailing norms are more likely to guide local expectations about the state-building process than the goals of the international community to take advantage of the 'opportunity' of state fragility to introduce secular parliamentary democracy, free market ideals or other accoutrements of 'good' liberal governance" (Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009: 12).

However, even though post-conflict states are not a blank slate, processes of reordering do take place after the war. For example, shifts in entitlements and institutions often due to

decentralisation, but also changes in networks and re-shaping of social relations. Alternative or parallel structures of governance and services such as education and healthcare can be created: with the state failing to provide services, room is created for other actors to seek legitimacy. These other actors can include social movements, local communities, but also international NGOs and intergovernmental agencies (Hilhorst, 2009).

At present, there is a call for recognition of such 'hybrid political orders' (Boege *et al*, 2008) and 'institutional multiplicity' (Hesselbein *et al,* 2006) to understand the situation where post-conflict states are in.

2.6 Historical factors

Historical events that seem to be relevant to understanding the current conflicts will be described here.

2.6.1 Before colonisation

Before the official establishment of the British Crown Colony in 1808, Sierra Leone was ruled by its original inhabitants through largely decentralised administration by local chiefs and communities. The country was inhabited by various ethnic groups who lived in different parts of the country. The settlement of the Fula started probably in the late seventeenth century, encouraged by increasing interaction between the Fula of Fouta Djallon[14] in Guinea and the Yalunka tribe further southwards in Sierra Leone. The Fouta Djallon, part of contemporary Guinea, was one of the nuclei of Fula power[15] (de Bruijn & van Dijk, 2003). This migration to the south resulted in the arrival of the Fula in the Koinadugu District, an attractive area with savannah grassland mixed with farm bush and geographically close to Guinea. The presence of Fula continued to be a source of attraction to other Fula from Fouta Djallon. The Fula were attracted by trade, but they were also earning money as herdsmen and Muslim priest. There was not much contact with their places of origin; the newcomers were culturally and linguistically absorbed. From the late eighteenth century on, Fula arrived also from other regions than Fouta Djallon, like Senegal (Fyle, 1983).

2.6.2 During colonisation

While colonisation took place in 1808, the British were not able to annex the hinterland until 1895 (Fyfe, 1962). The colony was dedicated to demonstrating three principles: civilisation, Christianity and commerce. Concerning the last principle, the British changed the system enormously: from a local economy including local trade networks and currencies, one economic system was introduced. Taxes were implemented and European settlers took over land from native owners. In addition, the government gave itself the monopoly position in diamond trade (Fyfe, 1962). During this quest of economic viability, the colonial administration began several missions to attract trade to Freetown. Many of these missions were sent to Timbo, the capital of Fouta Djallon. This resulted in the movement of more Fula caravans and traders to Freetown. Their migration was intensified with the start of illicit diamond mining in the 1950s (Fyle, 1983).

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[14] Also known as Futa Jalon or Fuuta Jallon

[15] Migration of the Fula in West Africa probably began during the Mali Empire in the fourteenth century, because the empire's rulers promoted their dispersal to prevent them from becoming a threat to political stability. This worked for a long time, until around 1700. Increasing emergence of the Islam, invasion by the Moroccans and periods of severe drought affected the political situation negatively. As a reaction to political instability, the Fula staged jihads throughout the Sahel and established centres of political power. Besides the mountains of Fouta Djallon in Guinea, the main nuclei were in the Senegal River Valley, the Inland Delta of the Niger in Mali, the north of Nigeria and the Adamawa Plateau in Cameroon. In between these big centres, there were numerous small polities dominated by the Fula (de Bruijn and Van Dijk, 2003).

During colonisation, customary land tenure systems persisted in the provinces. They have been summarised within the British statutory laws of the country, although somewhat manipulated in the advantage of the British (Hanson-Alp, 2005).

Different factors led to Sierra Leone's independence in 1961: growing resistance to the colonial rulers, Britain's weakened position due to war-expenses made during the Second World War, consequently Sierra Leone's higher degree of self-government, the denomination of Milton Margai of SLPP as Chief Minister in 1954 and at last the regional example of Ghana gaining independence (Fyle, 1983).

2.6.3 After colonisation
When the British rulers left the new state, the new Sierra Leonean rulers stood for the challenge of governing a country by themselves. Possessing rich natural resources, abundant agricultural and marine resources, brisk GDP growth, a well developed educational system and a democratic political system, Sierra Leone had favourable prospects for human security and sustainable development in the post-independence years (Davies, 2000). However, the lack of experience and the impossibility of going back to eighteenth century ruling methods, caused corruption, ethnic unrest and political and social instability.

During the dictatorship of Siaka Stevens of All Peoples Congress from 1968 to 1985, especially the rural areas experienced aggravated isolation. Trembling for the politically volatile Freetown community, Stevens focused on this biggest threat to his authority. By abolishing local government in 1972, he centralised power and resources in Freetown, neglecting the rural areas (Jackson, 2006; Davies, 2000). This caused large-scale migration to towns by young people, but also resulted in the rural areas eventually being a recruitment base for the rebel movement to seek revenge for their backward position (Davies, 2000). Thirty years after Independence, the war begun.

Neighbouring countries in Sierra Leone faced comparable socioeconomic and political circumstances however. How come that in neighbouring countries except for Liberia these circumstances did not lead to war? Two major explanations given in literature are rootless urban youth and the lure of 'blood diamonds' (Chauveau and Richards, 2008). According to Davies (2000) however, Sierra Leone distinguished itself from neighbouring countries by its pre-war external funding and training by Libya. Because of this financing, grievance could turn into collective action. Chauveau and Richards (2008) claim the conflict is originated in social tensions in the rural areas, where 85 percent of the fighters came from. They see the way rural society was organised as the roots of war; a lineate system where the transfer of rights of access to land is determined by lines of descent and where chiefs usually possess a lot of power. According to them, the young militia wanted to have more options in whom to marry and what to do in life.

2.6.4 War and its consequences
Debated the causes, fact is that in 1991 Sierra Leone was infiltrated by the RUF (Revolutionary United Front) from Liberia. This infiltration was the start of a long civil war that lasted until 2002 and which was full of atrocities against defenceless civilians: rape, assaults, amputations, child abductions for incorporation in the RUF and murder. By trading diamonds with the Liberian President Charles Taylor in exchange for money or weapons, the RUF respectively financed and equipped its rebellion. In total, around 20.000 - 75.000 people died and more than two million inhabitants were internally or externally displaced, which is more than one third of the total population (Davies, 2000).

After several failed cease-fires, peace accords and external interventions, the second Abuja-Agreement in May 2001 resulted in a significant reduction in hostilities, which finally led to the end of the civil war in 2002 (Viveen, 2009).

The war had several consequences for the rural areas. At first, a relatively large share of the youth joined the RUF. Reasons for joining were not only abduction or force, but also the difficult circumstances they were in, or frustration with the one-party regime (Peters K. *et al*, 2003). Because of this RUF mobilisation and because of fleeing the violence, the youth became more accustomed to moving. Maconachie *et al* even state a 'culture of mobility' has developed among youth (2006: 237). In addition, the active role that young people played in the war, led to youth emancipation, which challenges the pre-war authority and lifestyle (Archibald & Richards, 2002). Aside from modernisation as a reason for less interest in the previous agrarian lifestyle (De Bruijn & van Dijk, 1997), the gap between youth and community elders in Sierra Leone has enlarged this lack of interest even more (Maconachie *et al*, 2006; Vesco, 2007; Beeler, 2006).

During the war, because of displacement of farmers, agricultural activities were hardly possible. Consequences of the war for agricultural production in general are a faster shift of upland to lowland ecosystems by rice farmers. Besides, especially in the upland system, which was entirely abandoned during times of insecurity, the war resulted in a loss of rice varieties (Chakanda, 2009).
In Koinadugu District, where no diamonds are and the main income is derived from agriculture, the war was less present. However, since most farmers were hiding in the forest, war still had an impact on agriculture, even though their displacement was not permanent. Concerning livestock keepers, a lot of cattle have been killed during the war, while most of the Fula livestock keepers fled out of the country to Guinea.

2.6.5 Post-war conflicts
By giving two possible consequences, this section will shortly go into the question whether the violent past of Sierra Leone can have its impact on land and cattle conflicts.
Firstly, after war overlapping and competing claims can exist. There can be claims from different historical eras, which can also have induced the war: for example from pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial time (Myers, 1994). Because of a lack of state power (Unruh, 2003) and a kind of 'legal vacuum' in post-conflict period, this can be the moment to (re)claim land: there is a so called 'window of opportunity' (Klein, 2005). This window of opportunity can also cause already mentioned 'land grabbing' (Cramer, 2006; Klein, 2005). These claims may later on be considered illegitimate or unfair as there was coercion and violence involved. This can eventually give rise to new conflicts (van Dijk, 2008).
The second possible reason of post-war conflict or even a risk of falling back into war again, is the displacement of persons. According to Unruh (2003), dislocatees develop or deepen political awareness while dislocated from home areas. This awareness together with mobilisation can challenge post-war authority structures and sources of legitimacy. Another effect of dislocatees can be the emergence of (even more) legal pluralism; people are taking their own customary laws with them to another region, which can cause friction with the customary laws at a particular place. These displacements also have an economic impact: people prefer to stay in congested areas instead of 'their own' rural areas because of commercial interests (Myers, 1994).

2.7 Socioeconomic factors
Historical processes and changes in governance as decentralisation and the upcoming of the council are not the only factors that can explain or influence the situation of land and cattle conflict in Sierra Leone. Some of these other factors can be summarised under the denominator socioeconomic factors: factors that combine social factors like education, place

of residence, ethnic identity or religion with economic ones as income and occupation. In this part, socioeconomic factors that have a possible impact on natural resources, its users or actors related to the land users will be discussed.

Because of change in society or development, these factors can transform. These transformations can cause differences in social, economic or political networks and can have impact on the change of conflicts. The importance of these factors for this thesis has been made clear by Jackson (2005): when for instance socioeconomic opportunities for rural youth lack, there is a significant risk that violence could break out again. Subsequently, there is also a higher chance of land and cattle conflicts.

When a change in economic activities takes place, the socioeconomic positions in a region can change, for example the political and economic relations. Jalloh (2007) states that after independence business started playing a more important role in influencing governmental decision-making on issues like immigration and business ventures. And the other way around: according to him, politics shaped business strategies and revenues more.

Moreover, with an increasing number of cattle and increasing cattle trading in the area because of a growing population and therefore a growing demand of beef supply (Valkenberg, 1989; Hussein *et al* 1999), the socioeconomic positions of different land users can change, which can also change their positions towards each other. In this case, ethnic identity is also involved since most livestock keepers are Fula. As Moritz (2006) argues, the people who profit most of the presence of Fula livestock keepers are generally also most supportive of their presence. Examples are stock-owning farmers, chiefs and livestock traders. This means that based on socioeconomic positions, the society can polarise into people in support and people not in support of livestock keepers.

In addition, it becomes more and more clear that there are some authorities or mediators who profit more from conflict than from peace. Moritz (2006: 15) talks about authorities that "purposefully made decisions that would ensure the continuation of livestock keeper-farmer conflicts as they had to gain more from the perpetuation of conflict than from its resolution". The continuation of conflicts makes their socioeconomic position even stronger.

Concerning ethnic identity and socioeconomic influences, Jalloh (2007) writes in his article on Muslim Fula business elites and politics in Sierra Leone that some Fula need to have political relationships or relationships with other tribes to keep their business up. According to him (Idem: 100), "patron-client relationships embody the essence of politics in non-industrial and agrarian societies such as post-independence Sierra Leone". Growing Fula business will strenghten ethnic ties, which might influence conflicts since there is often an ethnic component to these conflicts.

2.8 Discourse and representations

The term discourse used to be a linguistic concept: it is still used as an analytical tool to study written or spoken language. However, Foucault added something to the discourse concept: he understood discourse as 'a group of statements which provide a language for talking about a particular topic at a particular historical moment' (Hall, 1992 in Hall 2001: 72). In this sense, there is not one truth: truth is constructed. Besides, according to Foucault, truth is not outside power: "Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned […] and the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true" (Foucault, 1980 in Hall, 2001: 77). These constructions of truth together with the power relations will be analysed in this thesis.

Related concepts are socio-cultural dispositions and representations. Representations can be seen as part of discourses. Hall (1997: 17) defines representations as "the production of the

meaning of the concepts in our minds through language. It is the link between concepts and language, which enables us to refer to either the 'real' world of objects, people or events, or indeed to imaginary worlds of fictional objects, people and events". Adapted to land and cattle conflicts, Leach *et al* (2001) mention that land users may invoke representations of for example their community strategically in their interactions with other actors as the State and NGOs to achieve their goals.

According to Andersson (2001), also socio-cultural dispositions can influence discourse. These dispositions as kinship ideology and orientation towards the land are not part of discourse, but they can influence (economic) behaviour of people and therefore indirectly discourses and representations of people. However, it does not imply that people with the same socio-cultural disposition are following solely the same patterns in their lives and have the same discourses.

When applying discourse to conflict, Pinkley and Northcraft (1994) state that before conflicts can be managed, conflicts must be acknowledged and defined by disputants. This is a difficult part, since different disputants have their own discourse about the conflict and therefore experience or frame the same conflict in diverging ways. Disputants' subjective experience is their reality and thus determines the nature of the conflict for them (Pinkley and Northcraft, 1994).

In this thesis, discourse and representations will not be used as an analytical tool. Rather, they will be studied as one of the layers that are part of the construction of land and cattle conflicts. Discourse is seen as narratives of people to represent their truth. The way people talk about each other, which discourse they perceive as true and the prejudices or judgements different groups have towards each other, can influence their behaviour and their role in conflicts.

2.9 Concluding remarks

What can be concluded from this chapter is that conflict in itself is dynamic, multi-layered and agency-centred. To study land and cattle conflict, not only (scarcity of) natural resources need to be studied, since this is in a relatively scarcely populated district as Koinadugu probably not the only explanatory factor.

Also historical, political, governance, social and economic processes, as well as power issues and representations other people have about themselves and others in a society need to be taken into account. These processes need to be studied on a global, national and local scale. The way access to property is regulated in a country or a district is sometimes more important to explain conflict than increasing scarcity of a resource like land. Based on this information, the research questions and the analytical framework for this thesis are constructed and will be treated in the next chapter.

3. Research design and methodology

Based on the information gathered from the background and theoretical framework, this chapter will firstly describe the analytical framework from which the land and cattle conflicts will be discussed and on which the methodology will be based. After this, the chapter will focus on the research questions and the research design ending with a methodological discussion.

3.1 Analytical framework

Grounded on the theoretical and thematic review in the previous chapters and the information gathered during the internship, there are expectations of possible explanations of conflicts over land and cattle. The possible actors and factors to explain these types of conflicts in Koinadugu District are summarised in the conceptual model (figure 3.1).

These factors are interrelated: for instance governance can influence natural resources or socioeconomic characteristics in the district. Moreover, the factors mentioned do often not influence the conflicts directly, but through several 'sub factors'. Due to complexity of these dynamics, only the relations between the different factors and the conflicts have been indicated. The empirical chapters 4 to 7 will elaborate upon these actors and factors.

Figure 3.1: Actors and factors influencing cattle and land conflicts

According to previous research work and following the political ecology theory, the major factors related to cattle and land conflicts in general, seem to be governance, historical and socioeconomic factors. Governance has been split up in actors, institutions and institutional change, as is explained in the previous chapter. Also natural resources themselves play a role, for example whether there is abundance or scarcity. Finally, apart from the political ecology factors of explanation, discourse has been added.

The way these factors relate to the conflicts and their impact differs per factor and per conflict case.

3.2 Research Questions

Taking the conceptual model into account, the main research question has evolved in the following:

How are conflicts over cattle and land in Koinadugu District constructed and how are these conflicts related to the historical context and changes in socioeconomic conditions and governance structures?

Sub questions to answer this main question are:

1. What kind of conflicts over cattle and land are present in Koinadugu and who are the main actors in these conflicts?

2. Which developments in Koinadugu District and Sierra Leone have influenced the cattle and land conflicts and the actors in these conflicts?

3. What distinguishes communities in different problems over land?

4. What are the representations different land users hold of themselves and others? How do the discourses about conflict influence conflicts over cattle and land?

5. What is the prospect of land and cattle conflicts in Koinadugu and what can be recommended to mitigate or decrease these conflicts?

3.3 Research design
In this section, the set-up of the research will be discussed.

3.3.1 Location and organisation field work
Aside from participating in the organisational activities during the internship, empirical data have also been collected in this period. This has been done mostly in the four operational chiefdoms of the CAP: Dembelia Sinkunia, Folosaba Dembelia, Sengbeh and Wara Wara Yagala (see map in Annex II). Because of close cooperation with NGO ENCISS and because of the severity of the conflicts there, also activities have been undertaken in Kasunko chiefdom, where data has been collected independently from other activities. In addition, two trips outside the district have been undertaken. One was a visit to foreign investor Addax that is setting up a sugarcane factory for bio-ethanol export to Europe. The aim of the visit was to study land issues between local population and international companies. Besides, a land tenure conference in Freetown has been attended, which was scheduled by the Ministry of Lands, Country Planning and the Environment and UNDP (United Nations Development Program) to implement land tenure reforms.

During the fieldwork, research has been done in four other chiefdoms (Diang, Mongo, Sulima and Wara Wara Bafodia) in Koinadugu District, aside from some additional research in already visited chiefdoms and interviews in Kabala. Only two chiefdoms (Neya and Nenie) of Koinadugu District have not been visited. In Nenie they do not have cattle due to thick forest and the presence of the tsetse fly, so this chiefdom was of minor importance. Neya was not reachable due to time and access constraints.
The chiefdoms visited are known for their bad road network. To get there, a motorbike with a rider who was at the same time interpreter was hired. The trips to the field lasted mostly three or four days, with Kabala as 'base' town. The major impediments during this period were the accessibility and remoteness of the chiefdoms.

3.3.2 Research methodology
This section will discuss the different methods used to gather data, but also the research population and the operationalisation of the framework.

Data collection techniques
The approach chosen to collect and analyse the data, is a case study approach. This means, multiple sources of data have been gathered to analyse cases in a multi-perspective way.
The methods used to gather data are firstly a desk study: policy documents and literature have been analysed. Besides, during field work qualitative data have been collected during semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, observation and informal conversations. In addition, an attempt has been made to collect quantitative data.
Semi-structured interviews have been the major way to collect data. Upon arrival in the communities, interviews were held with the available chiefs, crop farmers, the nearest livestock keepers and other stakeholders if possible. Factors which could possibly influence the conflicts had already been identified by then. During the interviews, questions would be

asked to verify whether these factors had influence and to distinguish possible new factors, specific for that area or factors not yet incorporated in the created list.

During these interviews, not only questions about cattle conflicts, but also about land conflicts were asked. However, since most parties identified conflicts between farmers and livestock keepers as the most severe ones, the focus was mainly on these ones.

The data collection technique, semi-structured interviews, was chosen because of its flexible research method and because of the sensitivity of the topic: during semi-structured interviews, more information and clarification of answers can be asked (Baarda *et al.*, 1996). In the methodological discussion, the disadvantages of this method will be treated.

Research population

The research population consisted of land users and authorities occupied with land business in Koinadugu District. Since this research population is too large to research all, the focus has been on a small selection of these land users. To get a representative image of the entire population, purposive or theoretical sampling has been applied: upon arrival in a chiefdom, councillors, chiefs or chiefdom speakers who were judged to hold specific knowledge on the topic, were identified. These authorities could give relevant information regarding the policies in the chiefdom on land tenure and conflict. Based on their knowledge a sample selection of the most appropriate villages and respondents could be made (David and Sutton, 2004: 152). The sample selection in this case was to distinguish two communities per chiefdom, where farmers and livestock keepers were both present. In one of the communities needed to be no or minor problems between the two parties, while the other community was selected for its problems.

Operationalisation of framework

A topic list with relevant topics was constructed per 'group': one for crop farmers, one for livestock keepers and one topic list with general information that was needed per chiefdom. These questions were mostly asked to chiefs (see Annex III). When using a case-study approach, it is important to confirm the validity of the given answers. Therefore, not only different people were interviewed to hear different sides of the story (data triangulation), but also different data gathering techniques have been applied, which is called methodological triangulation (Denzin, 1970). For instance, to get more insight in when the problems would be the most prevalent, the idea was to construct a harvesting calendar together with the farmers. This turned out to be more difficult than expected though: almost every farmer has its own way of working and it took quite a lot of time to construct it during interviews. To gather information on the (socio)economic status of different parties, attempts have been made to make a cost-benefit analysis. However, since most respondents were not able or not willing to give accurate information (see chapter 5 for more information), not much data was gathered using this approach.

Apart from this harvesting calendar and cost-benefit analysis, efforts have been made to gather relevant documents of chiefdoms and government as well. According to Nuijten (2004), when studying governance, it is important to study 'up' and 'down' the bureaucratic hierarchy to fully understand the policies. This means that, aside from interviews, a researcher needs to draw on newspapers, policy papers, official documents and legislation. However, these documents, for example bye-laws on land, were almost impossible to collect: almost none of the interviewees possessed a copy of these bye-laws. During the seven month stay, I have been able to collect the bye-laws of one chiefdom.

Lastly, an attempt has been made to gather quantitative data. This quantitative data was mostly about the number of incidents taking place between livestock keepers and crop farmers, the number of cases that go to the local court and the number of cattle in the district. Since this kind of data was often outdated and not accurate, this has not resulted in really

reliable results. Taking this unreliability into account, some information can still be valuable though.

Table 3.2: Number and types of interviews

	With whom?	Number of interviews
Group discussions and interviews	Livestock keepers and crop farmers	5
	Livestock keepers	2
	Crop farmers	26
	Other	2
Total group discussions		**35**
Individual interviews	Livestock keeper	22
	Crop farmer	4
	Paramount chief or speaker	8
	Section or town chief[16]	3
	Council member	13
	Government official	12
	Court chairman or clerk	4
	Local authority[17]	5
	NGO worker	17
	Other	6
Total individual interviews		**94**
Total all interviews		**129**

The total number of interviews or group discussions held during internship and data gathering is 129. This includes also short informal conversations, especially with people from NGOs. In table 3.2 the exact numbers per category are given. All these interviews have given some information. Striking though was that the most valuable information often came from informal conversations: a Fula friend of the family where you pass the night, suddenly pops up in the evening telling interesting stories, or a retired teacher who arrives after an interview with village elders and with whom you have a short conversation. Sometimes these conversations were giving information totally opposite of the interviews of that day, which made it complicated but often more realistic.

3.3.3 Reflection on research set-up

The research proposal presented in Wageningen was written on the basis of scientific literature on land tenure and farmer-livestock keeper societies and specific literature on Sierra Leone and its history. In the field, some of the assumptions made in the research proposal turned out to be wrong or not the most preferable. According to Nuijten (2004: 121), this is not uncommon for scientific research: "The development of a research methodology is a creative process, which besides logical thinking and scientific rigour requires imagination, flexibility and improvisation". The major methodological changes in both Sierra Leone and the Netherlands will be discussed here.

The main research question before departure was: "*How are the crop farmer-livestock keeper conflicts constructed and what is the influence of war on these conflicts?*" In Sierra Leone, however, several interviews and information of colleagues proved the influence of war was less than expected before departure. Furthermore, it would have been difficult to find reliable data on this relationship between the former war and the present conflict, since there is no literature

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[16] Since section and town chiefs are most of the times also crop farmers and most of the interviews with them turned out to be group interviews with all present crop farmers in a village, most of these interviews have been categorised under group discussions with crop farmers.

[17] In this case youth chair leaders, imams, teachers et cetera are meant with local authorities. In the rest of the thesis, court officials also fall under the heading of local authorities.

on it and people's memories tend to be blurred. These findings changed the approach from a war-oriented research question to a question more based on searching the explanatory factors and the developments of these conflicts, since here was no extensive knowledge on. Furthermore, during the interviews, special interest was raised for land conflicts between foreign investors and the communities. This has enforced a change of subject as well: instead of only writing about conflicts between crop farmers and livestock keepers in this thesis, the subject shifted from only conflicts over cattle to conflicts over both cattle and land. However, as already mentioned, since most conflicts are (still) between these two major user group being livestock keepers and crop farmers, the emphasis is still on disputes between them.

3.4 Analysis of data

Most of the data has been drawn up and ordered when coming back from a field trip, with the help of notes made during the interviews in Kabala. During some of the interviews a voice recorder has been used. The reason not every interview has been recorded was that not everybody speaks freely when their words are taped. Especially government officials and NGO workers turned out to give more information "off the record".

The final data analysis has taken place in the Netherlands. In figure 3.1 the main actors and factors influencing conflicts over cattle and land are displayed. The main question of this thesis is how the conflicts are *constructed*. During both the desk-top study and the fieldwork it was found out that the actors and factors mentioned in figure 3.1 are influencing conflicts because they are *part of* the conflict. So they are not the context, they are the conflict.

Since the conflict is composed of different layers, the empirical data has also been analysed per layer: different actors and factors which were identified as part of the conflict have been distinguished. They have been regrouped into larger factors and at last put under different layers. The layers are constructed as shown in figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3: Different analytical layers of cattle and land conflicts

The first layer (the dispute between the different land users involved in the dispute) is the most visible one. It is the layer one can literally see at first sight, for example a cow breaking through the fences of a crop farmer's field. Without needing to study the conflicts in detail, it can be described what is happening. When taking a closer look, it is quite easily distinguished that governance structures like other actors, but also laws and rights, influence the conflicts as well. These laws and for example chiefs are coming directly in the picture when something happens: who is guilty according to the law? Where should one go to when the disputes cannot be settled among the land users? The governance layer is followed by a layer where broader dimensions which also influence the conflicts, but from a more indirect perspective, are shown. These are factors like the influence of the war, but also the geographical position where the dispute takes place, the ethnic identity or the economical activities of the disputants.

Finally, the outer circle is the one displaying discourse. Since quantitative data about conflicts about these conflicts is unreliable or does not exist, the conflicts can only be approached by constructing what people say about the conflicts. Because different persons tend to interpret and see conflicts differently, there is not one truth is such conflicts. Therefore it is important to analyse why people say something in a certain way, which will be done in the layer discourse. This circle is the most far away from the disputes themselves, since discourse is the least visible factor to distinguish: when you see a cow breaking through the fences, you can not immediately discern how the relations are between the disputants or what kind of image the owner of the cow has of the crop farmer and the other way around.

Needless to say, these layers are all interrelated. Especially discourse is present in all different layers of conflict.

3.5 Methodological discussion

A disadvantage of doing research in another country is the language barrier. Apart from authorities as paramount chiefs, councillors or government officials, most of the respondents only spoke their local language and Krio. The majority of the interviews have been conducted in Krio, which was an advantage above other local languages: because of its many similarities to English and personal endeavours to learn it, it was possible to follow the main lines of the discussion and to correct the interpreter if questions were wrongly translated.

As mentioned, the type of interviews, semi-structured ones, can have its disadvantages as well: socially desirable answers can be given and generalising findings is difficult due to the uniqueness of the interviews (Bryman, 2004). These constraints have been diminished by putting interviewees at ease and emphasising that there are no wrong answers. In addition, social desirable answers can be distinguished by using the already mentioned data triangulation: observation, repeating similar questions in a different way and having different interviews with different actors about the same subject (Denzin, 1970). Besides, the value of a social desirable answer should not be underestimated either: it is interesting to analyse why people give social desirable answers.

Moreover, with this type of interviews and with a large study area, one is studying events or case-studies and not the total population. The researcher should wonder whether these events are representative for the whole area and whether it is possible to generalise these events. By using qualitative methods, it is not the numbers or statistical interference that can be generalised (e.g. the amount of crop destruction per conflict case), but generalisations about the dynamics or scientific or causal interference might be possible (Mitchell, 1983). So the event itself cannot be generalised, but the processes can. According to Mitchell (1983: 204), the "validity of the extrapolation depends not on the typicality or representativeness of the case but upon the cogency of the theoretical reasoning". By going to almost all the

chiefdoms in Koinadugu, interviewing different actors, collecting data in different formal and informal ways and by realising that the complexity in events should be left out and only logical connections should be mentioned (Mitchell, 1983), attempts can be made to be able to generalise the outcomes.

In addition, within the semi-structured interviews, there has been variation in the number of people interviewed in one interview, as can be seen in figure 3.2. While with livestock keepers more one-to-one interviews have been held, interviews with crop farmers turned often out to be group interviews or focus group discussions. The reason for this is their different way of living: livestock keepers in werrehs with only their family, crop farmers most often in villages. Living in the same village and often a farmer himself, interviews with town chiefs or crop farmers of small communities were often with the whole community. The socio-demographic makeup of an interview group can influence the answers: men were speaking up in presence of a (town) chief, while women were often not. Therefore, after the 'general' interview, a short interview with only female crop farmers was held. None of the wives of livestock keepers wanted to be interviewed or to answer some questions. I did speak with them on some informal occasions.

One focus group discussion with both crop farmers and livestock keepers was held. The other mixed group discussions were meetings organised by CARE or ONS. This group discussion was not intentional, but because they all left the mosque together for their Friday prayers. However, because this turned out to be quite hectic and my position was more one of a referee than that of a researcher, I did not hold a similar meeting again, even though the data gathered was interesting.

During interviews with livestock keepers, the most occurring problem was their hesitance to talk. A couple of times, the head of the werreh even hid himself upon our arrival. This hiding seems to be a paradox with their status: when they have so much power, where would they hide for? It was explained by the livestock keepers as a cultural habit though. After the explanation of our coming to their wives or other persons present, the livestock keepers all reappeared though and answered the questions. Some of them stayed vigilant however, which influenced their answers.

Various people talking about the same subject can tell totally different versions; they always tell their side of the story. For example, there often seemed to be more interaction between crop farmers and livestock keepers than crop farmers mentioned there was (more on this in chapter 7). However, this does not need to mean immediately that people intentionally give false statements; it can be that people really feel it is like that. The topics of the interviews are also quite sensitive, therefore people tend to tell the story in a particular way, which is often in their own advantage. In addition, there is not one 'truth' in these sensitive and complicated issues (Nijenhuis, 2009). Interesting is to analyse why people are constructing their truth in that particular way. As Paul Richards (2005: 11) puts it: "different interests tell untruths in different ways, and it is a standard part of the anthropological method to reconstruct a more 'objective' picture through careful cross-references of 'versions' and 'interests'". So these different truths are not invalidating one's research, they should be seen as part of doing research. By data triangulation attempts have been made to reconstruct a more 'objective' picture, but due to the absent of people the principles of 'hearing both sides' could not always be followed.

In addition, when one does speak to different persons, one should not forget that as a researcher you have your own presumptions and prejudices. As a consequence, researchers are not neutral either in constructing 'the truth'. Furthermore researchers can even influence certain policies or strategies, for instance governance processes because they give

recommendations to NGOs. One should be aware of the fact that, when giving these recommendations "[…] academic researchers become a small element in a much larger system they are not in control of" (Nuijten, 2004: 119), which can cause bias in a researcher's findings.

Related to this, one last factor of influence is the position of a researcher. Especially in the chiefdoms where the CAP was active, people often linked me with CARE during the fieldwork. In particular during two interviews in the CAP communities, where the aim was to see the differences between communities where CARE is active and where not, people were not giving straightforward answers because they thought this information would end up directly at CARE. After several explanations and reassurances, they came with some critical points, but they still did not seem to be at ease to be totally frank, probably afraid for the consequences it could have for the project in their community. During the trips with the CARE colleague outside the operational chiefdoms of the CAP, he was emphasising that I was not attached to CARE, but just a friend whom he helped. Because these trips were in chiefdoms where CARE was not really active, the people seemed not to be influenced in their answers.

Being a stranger and a white person, especially the crop farmers saw me as a potential source of money or materials. This influenced their answers, since they tended to exaggerate their problems in hope for help or tangible benefits. This is intelligible when realising that time spent in interviews comes at significant cost to vital productive activities with few neither tangible nor direct benefits in return (Walker, 2007). I never had the impression that people were not willing to be interviewed though; nobody refused an interview.

Finally, in qualitative research, the researcher's personal opinions and characteristics and his interaction with the respondents influences the outcomes of the research (Bryman, 2004). This should be taken into account when analysing the outcomes, which will be done in the following chapters.

4. Settings of cattle and land conflicts in Koinadugu

This chapter will present the empirical data related to the cattle conflicts in Koinadugu District. Next, the land and cattle conflicts will be described in general, followed by a presentation of some specific settings of conflicts. In the following chapters, these four settings of conflicts will be studied in accordance with the analytical layers presented in the previous chapter.

To give more insight into the main land users of the district, this chapter will start with two profiles of land users, in the district. Both are fictive stories based on interviews, interaction with and observation of respectively the crop farmers and livestock keepers.

Profile 1: Adama Kamara

While the morning sun is driving her children out of the hut, Adama Kamara has just finished reheating yesterday's rice. The wood was wet because of the rain last night. Luckily they had already set the upland farm on fire the week before, otherwise it would have become difficult to make the soil more fertile there.

Probably it will be a 1-0-1 today: no lunch. There is simply not enough rice for all of them. All of them includes herself, Moussa her husband and their seven children. Luckily the two children who are on the community school in the village get lunch, provided by one or another organisation. The two older ones are in town with relatives, to go to secondary school. Small Kadiatu is sleeping peacefully on Adama's back. The other two died. One while sleeping, the other one because of chronic malaria. It must have been God's will.

She needs to go to the swamp today. The groundnuts need to be harvested. She is really lucky with her beautiful swamp: all the women of her farming group were jealous of the piece of land Moussa had given her when they got married. She hopes the seeds for rice given by the NGO will be in time this year: she really needs them for planting rice upland. With good seed rice she can more or less ensure a good harvest, like two years ago: by then she could even sell some to traders who took her rice to Freetown. What a contradiction with the disaster last year, when she found the cows on her rice plantation, walking around as if they owned it. They ate half and trampled almost all the rest. She was so mad, how could she pay the school fees now? She did not even have enough rice left to send to town for her sons. And compensation of that livestock keeper? She begged, cried, even sued him, but no way: the town chief said he would call the livestock keeper, but she never saw that Fula. Probably too busy with his business in town, while his cows are walking around freely. The court chairman where she went later, told her all the time to come back the next court sitting, but in the end she was tired of walking three miles up and three miles down for nothing. Where is Moussa by the way? She had not seen him since breakfast. Maybe he is untying the goats, so they can search for some grass. Hopefully they will keep it to grass, and they will not eat the millet of the mummy queen again. Luckily she accepted their begging. With her cutlass in the hand and Kadiatu on her back, Adama leaves for the farm.

Profile 2: Alhaji Julde Jalloh
After giving his cows the extra salt they need during the dry season, Alhaji Julde Jalloh is hurrying back to his huts because it starts raining. The first drops of the season, which means better grass in a couple of weeks. This week his cows were lucky: the areas he burnt around the werreh finally sprouted their grass. And that is what his cows like the best, fresh grass. The last time he burned some land, one crop farmer complained that his whole cassava plantation was destroyed because of the fire. Thinking about this incident, he suddenly remembers that he still needs to go to the town chief to discuss this issue. He has a small calf that has just won; maybe he can give that one to the town chief. Then it will be settled. He still needs to go to the section chief as well, for that wounding matter. Those Kuranko wounded his most fertile cow, for eating a bit of eggplant in the swamp. However, it is their fault, because it is still dry season. And dry season means free access to the swamp for cattle to get some water. Their fence was just not strong enough. When he is making his fence for his cassava, he makes sure that it is strong enough. He grows them just fifty yards from his werreh. He is also suspecting the crop farmers of stealing one of his calves. But he should not judge too quick: the other day he complained heavily to the paramount chief about a stolen cow while the next day he found it in the bush, dead because of the 'breeze', the Harmattan wind.
The drops becoming heavier disturb him in his thoughts. Is the rainy season already coming? He needs to plan his trip to the upland again. Luckily his wives have already done some restoration of the huts they left in January. They were not too destructed, a bit of extra plastering for the coming rainy season and they will be bearable again.
Approaching the hut, he listens carefully whether he hears the voices of his wives again. Will they be back already from the weekly market in the nearby village where they sold their milk? Luckily Mariama and Kadiatu are not going to school and are perfectly able to prepare cassava leave: he already smells his favourite meal prepared by his favourite daughters.

4.1 General information land use

To get a better understanding of Koinadugu and the problems between different land users, some general data will be presented in this section. The first part will go into conflicts over cattle and the question whether the number of these conflicts increased, while the next part will focus on land conflicts and the land users in general.

4.1.1 Conflicts over cattle

Out of the interviews, most people stated that cattle conflicts are more present now than they used to be, even though there has been a reduction in livestock because of the war (Bangura 1999; Asenso-Okyere *et al* 2009). As mentioned, exact data is difficult to collect, which can be seen in table 4.1. An increase of heads of cattle by more than fifty percent from 1978 to 1979 seems to be unlikely, just like the differences between the two figures of 2009.

While the number of cattle has decreased during the war, after the war, when the livestock keepers came back with their cattle, there has been an increase in the number of cattle in Koinadugu District (DS 5; M 15; Sul 4,5). According to ILRI (International Livestock Research Institute) in 1978 around fifty percent of the cattle came from Koinadugu, so this would be around 100 to 170.000 heads of cattle (depending on which data used). It depends on which data of 2009 to believe whether the number of cattle has increased or not. The scarcity theory, assuming land surface in use for agriculture did not change much, can in this case not be confirmed nor rejected.

Table 4.1: Heads of cattle in Sierra Leone in different years

	1978	1979	1989	2009	2009
Heads of cattle	207. 100	332.200	330.000	102.000	213.754 (only Koinadugu)
Source	Veterinary Division estimates in ILRI (year unknown)	Livestock census in Asenso-Okyere *et al*, 2009	Research: Valkenberg, 1989	Research: Asenso-Okyere *et al*, 2009	Livestock census by MAFFS (Saccoh, 2008).

The majority of respondents – especially the crop farmers - were convinced the number of conflicts was increasing, giving as reasons there are more cows, more people and more crops at present. While the available land does not increase, the population is multiplying (DS 3; D 4,5; S 2). As a consequence, farming spaces become less, it becomes more difficult to get access to land and people become more aware of and are more ready to fight for their ancestral land (S 2; Kab 12). These explanations seem to follow neo-Malthusian theory.

At the same time however, respondents mentioned other reasons for the increase of the number of conflicts. One was the decreased control over cattle (FD 4), which has to do with a changing interpretation of the occupation 'livestock keeping', which will be treated more under economic change. Besides, before the war livestock keepers and crop farmers were changing fields every year to profit from each other: the crop farmer from the manure of the cows, the livestock keeper from the remainders of the crops. After the war, these arrangements have not been put into practice again (DS 2). The reason why this did not happen again was unknown, but maybe the change from cattle owner to hired herders taking care of the cattle (see 6.2.2), can be an explanation: it would be easier to make arrangements with the cattle owner than with a herder who is not allowed to decide over movements of the herd.

In two cases, it was stated that problems were decreasing. In Wara Wara Bafodia Chiefdom fewer problems were observed since the incorporation of settlement appointments between livestock keepers and crop farmers[18] (WWB 1,5). In Sengbeh and Wara Wara Yagala less land conflicts about ownership were mentioned because of better arrangements between different parties. Before, land was just given without any documents, so that at the time the stranger

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[18] As can be read in Annex IV, in Wara Wara Bafodia attempts have been made to physically separate the livestock keepers and crop farmers. In every village in the South of the chiefdom where these two land user groups live close, appointments have been made who is settling where in the rainy season.

was planting trees, he could be sent away[19]. With signed documents, one can not be sent away without reason, which can decrease the number of conflicts (Seng 2; WWY 2).

4.1.2 Resource scarcity induces conflict?

Even though the scarcity theory can not be confirmed nor rejected by studying the increase or decrease of cattle over time, in this section the scarcity theory will be analysed by using present data. Quantitative information has been gathered about population, cattle numbers and surface of chiefdoms. The livestock census of MAFFS (Saccoh, 2008) has been used for the information on heads of cattle, since this is thought to be a reliable source[20].

Figure 4.2: Population and cattle density per chiefdom in Koinadugu District

Figure 4.3: Proportion between cattle and persons per chiefdom in Koinadugu District

Based on information from council (chiefdom density) and MAFFS (2008)
Note 1: Surface information from council is not accurate.
Note 2: In both Wara Wara Yagala and Sengbeh Chiefdom the city of Kabala is included.

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[19] When a stranger would plant trees, this would mean he had the intention to stay long on the land. Some land owners did not want to give their land to strangers for a long time or were getting jealous at the success of the stranger and they would therefore send him away (Seng 2; WWY 2).
[20] The livestock census of MAFFS seems to be a reliable source since it is a census executed by MAFFS: they are experienced in these censuses and have extension officers who know the livestock keepers. Besides, since it is executed with the aim to get a good insight in the amount of livestock keepers for vaccination purposes, this has probably been a good reason for livestock keepers to tell the right number of cows.

When following the theory of Malthus, Hardin and the environmental school, the chiefdoms where cattle density per square meter and number of cattle per person is the highest, would be the most prone to conflict. The two figures above (4.2 and 4.3) prove something different however. Both show the number of cattle: respectively per square mile and per head of the population. The two figures show that in both cases (per square mile and per person) the number of cattle is the highest in Dembelia Sinkunia and Sulima. According to the information given in interviews though, the problems between different land users in these two chiefdoms are not the highest. This means that other factors also contribute to livestock keeper-crop farmer conflicts, as political ecologists already mention.

Nevertheless, the influence of population increase needs not to be underestimated. One needs to take into account that not all land is suitable for livestock keeping nor crop farming. This means that the figures can be blurred. For example, during interviews in Wara Wara Yagala and around Falaba (Kasunko Chiefdom) respondents mentioned the aspect of pressure on land due to increasing population pressure (Kas 2; Kab 20). These are the areas where population density is high, so in this sense population increase does have its stake; the problems in these areas seem to be the most severe.

4.1.3 Conflicts over land

During interviews, few problems with access to land were mentioned: almost everybody had access to land. Also problems between land owners and occupants were not as prevalent as expected by CARE (CARE, 2008; Nijenhuis, 2009a). Some people even mentioned they welcomed strangers actively because they help them in cultivating the land (M 1). Two types of land tenure struggles that have been mentioned are wrongly gained access[21] to land and confusion about ownership of land.

Problems regarding ownership of land are mostly in swampland: confusion about who owns the swamp (Sul 2; WWB 2). Swamps are more valued than upland, especially when they are under productive cultivation, because they result in better yields and yearlong activities can take place. Because of these characteristics, they often have a particular owner, in contradiction to upland, which is considered as everybody's land unless somebody is already brushing it (Sul 2; Kab 29). Being no native of the land, Fula often have no access to swamp land for crop farming. Their access is restricted to collecting drinking water for their cattle in the dry season.

When ownership of land is unclear and a serious conflict evolves, the paramount chief has the ability to 'flag' the area. This means the area is not available for anybody, until the moods have been tempered and a decision has been made by the paramount chief and the elders. No flagging area has been mentioned during the interviews though. Land cases in local court

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[21] When arriving as a stranger and desiring land, the legal way to get access to land is to first report oneself to the town chief and showing interest in leasing land in his township. While receiving respect of the stranger in the form of a kola nut, the town chief will explain the bye-laws valid in that particular chiefdom. Together with the town chief, the stranger needs to go to the landowner he wishes to lease land from. When the landowner agrees (which is almost always the case when the land is fallow), the stranger needs to inform the section and paramount chief (D 4; FD 5; Sul 2&3). As the custodian of the land, the paramount chief will ask all parties whether they agree. When they do, the land can be leased to the stranger (Sul 2). It can also be the case that the stranger immediately contacts the landowner and when they have an agreement, they go together to the town chief to give respect in the form of kola nut and to make further arrangements on the numbers of years of lease (Seng 2; WWY 2). Family land is never sold and only land around big towns (in Koinadugu only Kabala) can be sold. Strangers normally do not pay for the lease of the land; they only pay respect to the chiefs and landowners (M 1). There are also cases mentioned where the strangers give a certain percentage of their harvest to the landowner (Seng 2).

are not as common as debt cases or cases between livestock keepers and crop farmers. In one local court in Mongo for example, three land cases were reported last year, whereas the court treated more than twenty livestock keeper-crop farmer cases and around 35 debt cases (M 12).

Concerning illegitimately gained access to land, land should always be gained with the approval of the landowners, town chief, section chief and paramount chief. However, this is not always the case: especially the Fula livestock keepers tend to pass over certain actors. This is often the start of the tensions between livestock keepers and crop farmers. While the Fula livestock keepers do not own land, except for some rare cases in some villages in Dembelia Sinkunia (DS 3; K 29), their position is not weak. This is, among others, due to 'gifting': they tend to have amicable relationships with chiefs because of giving cattle to them. Crop farmers and land owners feel ignored because of these actions, while, according to one administrator, these farmers forget they also have advantages by accepting livestock keepers on their land: manure, cow milk, cow butter, extra work on the farm of livestock keepers et cetera (K 29).

4.1.4 Land users

Although livestock keepers have a nomadic nature, according to the interviews and the survey on livestock keepers (Katta, 2009) they do not migrate over large distances in Koinadugu. The majority only migrates two times per year: one time to go 'down' during the dry season to search for water and pasture, one time to go upland during the rainy season, when the pasture and water supply is abundant and the cows can be kept in a small area. Often these two places are not far from each other: a distance of on average 7.1 kilometres has been measured. Moreover, the livestock keepers tend to come back to the same places every year. Over eighty percent of the livestock keepers consider conflict between the livestock keepers and the crop farmers as major problem (Katta, 2009). In another survey, 38 percent of farmers in Koinadugu mention they were involved in a conflict last year. Of those conflicts, 65 percent was with a livestock keeper, while fourteen percent was with another crop farmer. The conflicts were mainly about damaged crops (Bodnar, 2009). Other resource related problems mentioned in the first survey, are lack of portable water, poor pasture (during dry season) and animal diseases (Katta, 2009).

To have an idea during which periods the problems between the livestock keepers and crop farmers are the most prevalent, a harvesting calendar has been constructed with the possible conflicts per month. Because it is too complex to involve all the different crops, the calendar in Annex IV is based on rice, the most popular crop to grow and eat in Koinadugu. During interviews different answers came up when asking when the problems were the most severe. Some respondents said it was during the dry season because the cows are down at that time, while others mentioned the rainy season because that is the growing season. Fact is however, that the cows are, according to the bye-laws, allowed to roam around freely during the dry season and that livestock keepers during that period cannot be sued for any destruction done[22]. Furthermore, in general, most problems between different land users take place during the harvest season, at the end of the rainy period because this is the moment the cows are coming down from the upland. Land conflicts are less seasonal bound, but tend to last longer in comparison with cattle conflicts (Valkenberg, 1989).

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[22] While the bye-laws differ per chiefdom, in most chiefdoms the cows are allowed to come down around January and need to go back up around June. In the period between January and June, the crop farmers are obliged to take care of their crops, while in the rainy season between July and December, the livestock keepers are responsible for damage done (WWB 2,4; WWY 6).

To get an insight in the particular conflicts present in the district, four cases or settings of conflicts will be described[23]. The exact locations of these conflicts can be found in Annex II. These conflicts will be used to study the different layers of conflict, which will be done in the following chapters.

4.2 Conflict I: Kasunko and Diang Chiefdom

The first conflict is a conflict that has to do more with land tenure than with problems between different land users: it is solely a land conflict, no cattle is involved. During the time of writing it was the biggest struggle over property rights known in the district. The struggle was about the border between the two chiefdoms Diang and Kasunko, southwards of Lengekoro along the main road from Makeni to Kabala. The inhabitants of Diang state that within their living memory, the Mawolkor river is the official boundary between the two chiefdoms. Because of a shortage of arable land in Kasunko, their forefathers have given access to inhabitants of Kasunko to farm on the other side of the river (the Diang part) in exchange for taxes. The section chief of Diang Chiefdom was able to show a document originating from 1940, to prove this. In this letter, written to the 'Honourable Colonial Secretary' the Commissioner of Makeni has found evidence from a Route book that the Limba-Kuranko tribal boundary, which is respectively the Kasunko-Diang Chiefdom boundary, has been the Mawolkor river (Dankawali, 1940).

However, since 2007 the Kasunko people claim they own the land on the other (Diang) side of the Mawolkor river and they do not pay their taxes to Diang anymore. In their opinion, the boundary is around Sandia or even the Selli/Rokel river, which means they would own Kondembaia, the headquarter of Diang Chiefdom (D 13). What the exact trigger for this conflict is, is unclear: some mentioned that Diang people suddenly claimed their land back, while the Kasunko people wanted to stay so they claimed ownership over the land and did not pay their tax to Diang anymore (D 14&15). Other explanations suggested the influx of international mining companies that have arrived in Diang; since the particular piece of land is indicated as rich in minerals, landownership can become a reason for conflict (D 1; Kab 19). Because the problems could not be solved at section or chiefdom level, the matter is now taken to the provincial secretary in Makeni, who will try to trace the ownership. The local population has already been waiting for a long time however, because the provincial secretary is demanding a transport fee to come and observe the problem. Since neither of the chiefdoms feels responsible for this payment, the complaints back and forth continue.

4.3 Conflict II: Lengekoro-Kamajimbo (Diang Chiefdom)

This second conflict case is a conflict over both land and cattle. In February 2010, the crop farmers from the nearby villages Lengekoro and Kamajimbo convened a meeting with the livestock keepers of the four or five werrehs surrounding them, to talk about the increasing number of problems between the livestock keepers and crop farmers. According to the crop farmers, one elder in Lengekoro had given a couple of livestock keepers access to pasture and permission to settle in the environment of Lengekoro for one year, without consulting the crop farmers and/or the land owners. This was thus not the correct way of obtaining access to land: the land owners were neglected. This happened two years ago. While the arrangement has formally finished now and the person who gave access to the livestock keepers have passed away, the number of livestock keepers floating into the area is even increasing, which is a nuisance for the crop farmers. As one councillor stated: "at night the cows are even sleeping on the veranda of the crop farmers" (D 1). Because their privately

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[23] Even though especially case IV is more a setting than a case since it exists of different disputes, in this thesis both the words 'case' and 'setting' will be used, since 'case' is sometimes more clear when referring to a specific situation.

owned farming land is threatened by cattle and the amount of farming land is decreasing, crop farmers started to engage themselves in the heavy job of stone breaking. However, they want to have their own farming land back (D 1,3).

During the meeting, the honourable[24] from Freetown and the chiefdom speaker[25] were present, but the werreh owners were absent: only the cattle caretakers were present. However, it was decided that the livestock keepers had to leave within the next two weeks. The villages had appointed a new place for the livestock keepers, around four miles from Lengekoro. During the first visit to the villages, in March 2010, the werrehs had not moved though. During one of the interviews, the cattle caretakers told they did not have any influence in the movement of the werrehs. The werreh owners were the ones to decide, but they were living in Kabala or Freetown and did not show up (D 11).

Arriving there the second time, in May 2010, the livestock keepers were still there, which made the crop farmers in both Lengekoro and Kamajimbo even more furious than they already were.

4.4 Conflict III: Nomokoya (Sulima Chiefdom)

Despite the relatively high cattle density (see figure 4.1), Sulima is a chiefdom with relatively few problems between livestock keepers and crop farmers. Nomokoya, on the outskirts of the chiefdom, is the most problematic part of the chiefdom regarding cattle conflicts. Since the number of livestock keepers is increasing there, the crop farmers complain they are in shortage of land. The main quarrel deals with one particular livestock keeper though; according to the crop farmers, he has already destroyed nine of their plots. Crop farmers state they have been living in that area ever since their great-grandfathers settled there, while the livestock keeper has only been there for eight years and is already pretending[26] to own the land. They want him to leave the area, but in contrast he starts to claim the land based on the fact that he was the first livestock keeper.

An incident took place just several days before the interview. The crop farmers were sent away by the paramount chief because they prepared their farms too close to the livestock keeper. This preparation within one mile from the werreh was not according to the bye-laws, so they were sent off that land. The farmers said the reason they were farming so close to the livestock keeper was that they did not have enough farmland anymore. They did find a new place to farm though. The livestock keeper involved stated he only had problems with the crop farmers the period they were farming too close to his werrehs. Besides, he had some crop destruction cases, because the crop farmers were not fencing properly according to the bye-laws. He helped them financially with fencing though.

4.5 Conflict IV: Surroundings of Kagbasia (Kasunko Chiefdom)

In Kagbasia and its surroundings, different cases of disputes between different land users are prevalent. This setting of different conflict cases will be converged in the present case. The conflicts concern both land and cattle cases. Conflicts are about crop destruction, illegitimately gained access to land, uncontrolled burning and cattle wounding. The

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[24] The person who is representing one or two chiefdoms in the parliament, depending on the size of the population.

[25] The chiefdom speaker can be described as the vice-paramount chief. He is the most important man (just like paramount chiefs, speakers are only men in Koinadugu) in the chieftaincy after the paramount chief.

[26] As stated in chapter two, land in the chiefdoms is mostly owned by families who settled the first in the chiefdoms. Since Fula are not among the first settlers in one of the chiefdoms in Koinadugu, most livestock keepers do not have ownership over the land. Only around Kabala, where land is for sale, they can be owner of land.

problems are mostly between crop farmers and livestock keepers. The livestock keepers are all sons of one particular livestock keeper, who is also causing a lot of problems in the area himself. Therefore, he was chased out of the district a couple of years ago, but he came back after one year. The communities in the Kagbasia area did not support his come-back, but he forced himself in again by giving a lot of cattle to the elders and stakeholders. When he was not in the area, the problems were less (Kas 7).

The first official meeting organised by the ONS about the aforementioned problems, was officially cancelled because the livestock keepers were not able to come. The reason they gave for their absence was that they were busy finding their scattered cattle. During this meeting, one of the crop farmers expressed the seriousness of the situation by stating: "When nothing will be done on the problems today, we are going to fight tomorrow. We are ready for fighting" (Kas 1). During a next meeting, a crop farmer came furiously to the section chief and first threw groundnuts and later cassava leaves in front of the chief. While they had been discussing the problems, uncontrolled fire had caught his farm and destroyed all his cassava and groundnuts. The next day, the livestock keeper residing the closest to his farm, denied being guilty: he was at the meeting when the burning took place (Kas 2). Another issue with this recently settled livestock keeper was that he had given his 'respect' for gaining access to the land, to the wrong town chief. He was on land in Kagbasia, but he had given the kola nuts to the town chief of Kamasuri. In addition, he had passed by the landowner by going straight away to the town chief.

A last issue that came up during a walk through the area was also a case of land access. A brother of the previously mentioned livestock keeper had asked permission to the town chief of Kagbasia to use the palm trees that were on the land of the town chief. The town chief had agreed on this. Upon arrival however, he was not only using the palm trees, but he had also built his settlement and paddock for the cows to stay there for the dry season.

4.6 Concluding remarks

To end this chapter, it was observed that most of the present conflicts around resources in Koinadugu are conflicts between livestock keepers and crop farmers, mostly about crop destruction by cattle (Nijenhuis, 2009). Out of the literature, it was expected that livestock keepers were in a fragile position because of their status as 'stranger' and because they were often not supported by the government (De Bruijn, 2008: Valkenberg, 1989). However it seems the livestock keepers have a better position than the crop farmers: they are the ones having the power to settle where they want, while the crop farmers – although the original settlers on the soil - seem not to play a big role.

Moreover, the conflicts do not necessarily take place in chiefdoms where the cattle density or number of cattle per person is the highest. So, not only scarcity of resources is the cause of the conflicts. Therefore, the question left is: what are other causes for these land and cattle conflicts apart from increasing scarcity? This question can be split out into three different questions. What roles are changing governance structures playing in these conflicts? What are the changing socioeconomic conditions which influence these conflicts? And, finally, what is the influence of discourse and the representations of people on the existing conflicts? These questions and more will be treated in respectively chapter 5, 6 and 7.

5. Governance

Governance is the second layer of conflict in this thesis, after the dispute and the disputing land users themselves. Since it is part of the conflict dynamics, it is important to look at governance and its changing structures.

This chapter will go into governance changes, dynamics and influence. The emphasis will be on the changing role and power of actors in land and cattle conflicts and on institutional changes. The analyses are based on information derived from the four cases mentioned in the previous chapter, but also from the desk top study and other interviews or discussions.

To get an impression of the dynamics and frustrations going on at governance level regarding land and cattle conflicts and conflicts in general, a short enumeration of some people in Koinadugu District is inserted:

The district council chairman who is pro crop farmers but therefore antagonises livestock keepers. A Fula tribal head who says he is not having any problem with anyone while in the mean time he has six severely injured cows and the whole section is grumbling about him. Crop farmers of a remote village who are fed up with the promises of all political parties during election time; a road has been promised every election, but never arrived. Having no problems with cattle and (thus) a good harvest, they are unable to get their harvest in time to the market area, because no motor bike can reach the village. A motivated paramount chief who is helping everybody by clearly explaining and updating his chiefdom on bye-laws. A councillor who feels she is thwarted in solving issues in her ward by the paramount chief. The mummy queen of a village who is taking literacy lessons of an NGO, while at the same time cattle are eating her crops from the land.

A paramount chief who has, together with other chiefdom inhabitants, constructed bye-laws to control the problems between different land users and who set up a 'physical separation' team to make appointments in every chiefdom where the livestock keepers and where the crop farmers would settle the coming rainy season. An imam who tries to mediate between the livestock keepers and crop farmers by emphasising their shared religion. A Sierra Leonean NGO worker who is sued by a native of the district because of abusive language. A court clerk who is advising this same NGO worker to try to settle the case before it goes to the official court meeting, since he will lose the local court's trial anyway because he is not a native of the soil. A Fula schoolboy who is spending the holidays in his parent's werreh. While keeping an eye on a part of the cattle, he discloses the problems of the livestock keepers, but at the same time also explains the problems between different land users extremely well.

5.1 Actors

Actors can influence the conflicts with their behaviour, but the conflicts can also change them in their behaviour. All actors have their own perception of and position in the conflict. To show the struggles taking place between different actors and land users, case II will be singled out here.

A couple of weeks before we went to Diang Chiefdom, crop farmers indicated the problems with the livestock keepers were that severe, that they did not want to live with them anymore. A meeting was held, where all attendants – livestock keepers, crop farmers, a representative of the paramount chief, the councillor and the honourable – had decided the livestock keepers needed to move out of the area within two weeks. A new place was indicated for them.

During the first interview in Diang, a couple of weeks after the livestock keepers should have left the area, the councillor stated the livestock keepers and their cattle were, except for one livestock keeper, still there. She was, after the meeting and the involvement of the paramount chief and the honourable (delegate of one or two chiefdoms in the parliament in Freetown), at a complete loss what to do next with this case. She stated that, luckily, the paramount chief had sent another representative to talk again on the issue. When that would not help, she planned to inform the ONS and ENCISS (Enhancing the Interaction and Interface between Civil Society and the State to Improve Poor People's Lives), a local NGO specialised in problem solving (D 1). Yet, when talking with the paramount chief at the same day, he did not say a word on sending of a representative to the conflict. On the contrary, he stated the problems between the different land users in the area were solved (D 2).

After having met the councillor and paramount chief, it was planned to have some interviews in the area of conflict. Since it was Friday, a spontaneous gathering of both crop farmers and livestock keepers was held after the prayers. During this meeting, the emotions between the two land user groups roused. While the crop farmers were stating that the appointed place was not too far, it was vast, that the livestock keepers' grandfathers used to stay there and that they could "even plant mango trees there", the livestock keepers first stated that the people of Lengekoro never showed them the new place. When the town chief denied this, the livestock keepers took back their words and instead stated not all ground fits their animals: some places are not good for cattle. One livestock keeper told the moment he arrived in the present area, he lost fifty cows. When he would need to leave again, he estimated he would loose another thirty to forty cows. One livestock keeper did leave to the indicated area. Since he only left one week ago, he could not tell yet whether the appointed place was suitable or not.

Apart from the argument of the suitability of the soil, the livestock keepers also came up with another argument why they had not left yet. While repeating they were listening to the owners of the land - the Diang crop farmers - they argued it was not up to them to

make the decision to leave. They were only hired to take care of the cattle, the ones who were able to decide – the cattle owners – were in town. And these 'big men' did not come to give them instructions yet. Therefore, the herders pleaded to the crop farmers to give them another season to stay: they would certainly leave in the next dry season. Hereupon, the crop farmers emphasised their inferior position by stating they were suffering because of the presence of the cattle; they were not able to farm on their own land and thus also unable to pay school fees. Furthermore, the people of Kasunko Chiefdom already ceased a plot of land from them as well – which is case I in this thesis (D 11).

Besides the town chief who was a crop farmer himself and thus had a clear position, the imam was present as local authority. Being the religious leader of both parties, he spoke out in favour of the crop farmers and directed the livestock keepers to leave to the area the crop farmers had appointed for them.

That same day, during a meeting about the same problems in a village close to Lengekoro, it turned out the crop farmers were not only angry with the livestock keepers, they were maybe even more angry with the paramount chief because he was, according to them, not giving any attention to their case (D 10).

A week after the meeting, I met the councillor together with the honourable on the streets in Kabala. After explaining the content of the meeting, the honourable told he would bring the case to Freetown to put some more pressure on it and to show the crop farmers they are really working on it.

During a second visit to Lengekoro, while the other inhabitants were still ignorant and grumbling about the fact that the livestock keepers had still not left yet, the imam told me the livestock owners had come and inspected the area selected for them. They were satisfied with it and had promised to leave to the indicated place in the coming days. Whether they really left could not be verified anymore.

This description of the problem shows the different actors involved in the meeting. All have their own arguments to defend their position and to justify the way they act. In addition, the disputing parties have their own people they consult for finding solutions to the problems. The livestock keepers consult and are dependent of the cattle owners, while the crop farmers want to be justified by authorities as the paramount chief and the councillor. Another governance aspect related to institutions, is that the crop farmers emphasise it is their land, what the livestock keepers acknowledge, but what does not change the situation.

The focus in this first section about the actors will be on actor's roles, functions and powers. In all the four cases mentioned in chapter 4, the role of chiefs seems to be crucial. The influence of the councillor seems to increase as well, but even more the relation between these two actors. These two actors will be described and analysed first, followed by other actors.

5.1.1 Chiefs
Chiefs, paramount chiefs in particular, seem to play a big role in the conflicts. In all the four cases for example, chiefs are involved. The intensity of the involvement and their function (mediator, stakeholder, person who resolves conflicts, advocate of one party et cetera) differs, even though one of their official tasks is to mediate in conflicts (Thomson, 2007). Also their personal behaviour makes a difference in the course of conflicts. In Annex V an overview is given of how several paramount chiefs operate differently when dealing with cattle and land conflicts, while having the same function.

The paramount chiefs' different ways of operating come also to the fore in the cases. In the first case, the case where the two chiefdoms are quarrelling about the border and the land

between their chiefdoms, the function of the paramount chiefs should be to settle the conflict between the two chiefdoms. However, because they did not succeed, the case has moved to provincial level. Especially the paramount chief of Diang is highly concerned about this issue: he seems to be a (personal) stakeholder and a mediator at the same time. This dual function has probably to do with the influx of foreign gold mining investors in his chiefdom; the more mining companies, the more income for his chiefdom. In addition, this influx leads to some personal advantages as well: the newly arrived mining company Lion Mining Ltd. has for example granted, aside from a new road and promised school and hospital, a tractor for the chiefdom to increase food self sufficiency (D 1,7; Mansaray, 2010). So far, this tractor has only been spotted on the paramount chief's land.

In the second case, the case singled out above in which the livestock keepers have encroached the land of the crop farmers with the approval of one man, but without the approval of the land owners, actors such as the councillor and the honourable are trying to solve the case. The paramount chief (the same one as in case I) seems not to be interested however, which shows both the disagreement on the severeness of the conflict and the struggle between the councillor and the paramount chief.

The crop farmers in this case mentioned they were really upset and disappointed about the fact that the paramount chief was not giving them any attention, let alone support (D 1, 10 & 11), while he did talk with the president about the property problems of case I. Out of this, it can be stated that, as Thomson (2007: V) argues, the source of political power in Sierra Leone is traditionally in patronage networks (networks of powerful elites) and that these old patterns seem to be emerging again after the war[27]. The paramount chief has a direct line with the president, but he only uses it when he thinks this is necessary. Obviously, this case was not pressing enough for him, while others think it is.

Not supporting the crop farmers and other actors in sending the livestock keepers away, does not definitely need to be a case of personal gain however. Chiefs are also often supporting livestock keepers in their chiefdom for the granting of cows on special occasions and for the chiefdom revenues[28]. Most of the chiefdom revenues come from cattle settlement fees, enterprises in town and (cattle) trading. In Koinadugu, these three activities – cattle farming, business and (cattle) trading - are mostly executed by Fula[29] (WWB 3).

However, even though the paramount chief of case I and II is contested and does not have a high credibility among his population (D 1, 10&11; Pratt, 2009), the crop farmers in case II still had some believe in him. Namely, the crop farmers believe that the moment the livestock keepers went to the paramount chief to ask final permission to settle, the paramount chief did not recognise the livestock keepers as rightful citizens of Diang chiefdom. Consequently, because the livestock keepers did settle down, the crop farmers concluded that the livestock keepers were not even respecting the chief, because they settled without the chief's permission (D 13). This indicates the crop farmers still have some trust in the paramount chief, because otherwise they would have considered the option the chief lied

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[27] During the war, paramount chiefs together with other symbols of government were targeted by the RUF. Therefore, many chiefs fled or were killed, leading to an anarchical situation (Jackson, 2006).

[28] Chiefdoms gain revenues by collecting government tax and cattle settlement fees. Government tax is paid by all citizens. The amount is around 5000 leones per citizen (5000 leones is around 1 euro). Part of this goes to the State and part of it is for the chiefdom (WWB 3). Livestock keepers who are living in a cattle settlement (so not the cattle owners with some cows in villages), pay one cattle settlement fee per 50 cows. This fee costs 100.000 leones whereof 40.000 goes to the chiefdom for development of the chiefdom. The section and town chief concerned receive both 20.000 leones for the development of respectively their section and town. 10.000 Leones are for the settlement committee (the ones collecting the tax), while 5.000 each goes to the youth representation and police (Kas 7).

[29] Since Fula livestock keepers are strangers, they need to pay fees to settle down with their cattle.

to them. This would have been possible as well: the chief can have given formal access to the livestock keepers and subsequently lie to the crop farmers that he did not recognise them.

This ongoing belief in the paramount chief is probably because of the traditional and mystical powers where the chief is known for (Jackson, 2006). While the crop farmers still seem to see an intermediating role for the paramount chief, the councillor and honourable did no longer, as mentioned above. By approaching other organisations, the councillor is a 'forum shopper': she shops for other forums than only the paramount chief to resolve the disputes (Von Benda-Beckmann, 1981). Since the councillor expects these other organisations to get the, in her eyes, most favourable outcome - the departure of the livestock keepers - she took her claim to them (D 1; Lund, 2002).

The paramount chief in case III, where the remote crop farmers are mostly complaining about one livestock keeper and where the crop farmers themselves farmed too close to the same livestock keeper, seems to be the only one having a positive influence on the conflict. His way of governing, emphasising bye-laws and demanding his population to obey these laws, seems to work out. Moreover, he gives the crop farmers their own responsibility by stating that they have given access to the livestock keepers (Sul 2). This case confirms Sawyer's (2008) statement that chiefs are not only having a negative influence, as is often said because of their contributing factor to the outbreak of the civil war. The reinstatement of chiefs after the war was done because the chiefs "still retain strong support in underpinning rural communities and protecting citizens in a country that has a history of centralised governance and abuses of bureaucratic power" (Idem: 388).

This influence of the paramount chief can be seen in the incident where he corrected the crop farmers in Nomokoya. During this incident in which the crop farmers farmed less than a mile from the farm of the livestock keeper, which was against the bye-laws, the paramount chief reprimanded the crop farmers from the chiefdom capital Falaba by sending a representative. As a consequence, the crop farmers withdrew.

During the interview, the crop farmers seemed to be rather benevolent in obeying him: they were not openly stating they were wrong in farming too close to the werreh, but they were also not actively opposing the decision of the paramount chief in sending them away. Moreover, they were aware of the existence of that particular bye-law they did not obey (Sul 3). On the other hand, they were also criticising the approach of the paramount chief. As mentioned in Annex V, this paramount chief has been called a 'deserter' in Nomokoya: "the paramount chief is more a Fula than a Yalunka chief" (Sul 3). This shows that, because of competing or opposing interest of different land users, paramount chiefs should always balance between these different parties. In this context of resentment, it seems to be impossible to rule without criticism.

In case IV, the case where a whole area is facing problems with one Fula section head and his sons and where the crop farmers are ready for fighting, the role of the paramount chief is understood from indirect sources only[30]. The crop farmers see him as someone who is in league with the enemy. Since the Fula section head has donated a cow to the new paramount chief, they are seen as "partners in corruption", which makes the paramount chief not very active in solving the problems (Kas 1&7). People cannot really hold him accountable for this, since he and other paramount chiefs seem not to bother. Because of their lifelong position, they seem to be unassailable. This means that 'checks and balances' on chiefs are often absent or not effective since the chiefs can hardly be suspended (Ubink, 2006)[31]. Incentives to govern

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[30] Several attempts to speak to him failed.
[31] Only the paramount chief of Diang Chiefdom has been suspended because of his behaviour towards the elders and people of Diang Chiefdom (Pratt, 2009). Besides, it seems to have been a promotional

correctly are therefore small and their position can become dictatorial (Kab 28). It has been debated once in parliament to change this procedure, but since most parliament members originate from a ruling family, acceptance of this change is improbable (Kas 7; Seng 4; Kab 28).

Also scholars talk about a reform of chieftaincy, especially when one desires a sustainable reform of the local government (Thomson, 2007). Ways of reform differ: making chieftaincy more accountable and responsive, establishing alternative institutions, depoliticising chiefs and making them opinion formers and mobilisers. The chiefs themselves are receiving these messages with mixed feelings: they see their traditional roles diminish and for example see the newly installed councillors rather as rivals than as colleagues (DS 7; Jackson, 2006).

In addition, apart from their lifelong position, there is another criticism on the way their position is executed; in their chiefdoms, the paramount chiefs are referee and player at the same time. They construct the rules, but also play and judge according to them (Kas 7). This makes them, as Mamdani (1996) states, decentralised despots. Because there is no separation of powers and because of these different roles, chiefs can act on the edge of legitimacy (Sikor and Lund, 2009). For example, being a chief, a crop farmer and a livestock owner at the same time, chiefs have often more economic and social relations with livestock keepers than most of the crop farmers without livestock. Having more economic ties with and less prejudices about these livestock keepers, can make them more supportive towards this group and less objective in the solving of conflicts (Tonah, 2006; Moritz, 2006). The people supporting livestock keepers are often the ones with power. These authorities seem to have more interest in the continuing than the solving of cattle conflicts (Moritz, 2006).

However, there may be criticism on paramount chiefs, but their importance in present day's society should not be underestimated. Aside from being a political authority, they still function as a spiritual authority (Jackson, 2006). They are active in so-called 'secret societies'[32], which still have a constant influence in politics (Jackson, 2006; Thiebou, 2009).

As can be stated from this section, the influence of the paramount chief is inevitable. Among other factors, their personal capacities and disposition determine the levels of effective leadership and governance in chiefdoms and the way land and cattle conflicts are treated and solved (Jackson 2006). An important change that is taking place in the chiefdom, is that the chief is not the only (political) power in the chiefdom anymore. The arrival of especially councillors and NGOs has resulted in a shift where people work their way around the chiefs and go to these new actors to claim their rights. These actors will be treated in the next sections.

5.1.2 Councillors
Besides chiefs, also councillors, the elected government representatives, were subject of criticism of interviewees concerning their role in conflicts, although to a lesser extent. They were not judged of choosing openly in favour of one of the land users, but the most heard

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campaign of the SLPP (Sierra Leone People Party, one of the two big political parties) to promise to suspend the paramount chief when they would get political power (Kab 19). He left the chiefdom in 2003 and was unceremoniously reinstated in March 2009 with the APC (All People's Congress, the other big political party in Sierra Leone) government into power. The next day, riots broke out, but after that incident the chiefdom seems to be quiet (Pratt, 2009), even though there seem to be still people who want to get him off his thrown, mostly to gain a position themselves (Kab 19). In his absence, a regent chief of the bordering Tonkolili District had replaced him. The chiefdom at that time was chaotic with illegal gold activities (Kab 19).

[32] : Secret societies are gendered sodalities that function as guardians of cultural traditions. Funeral rituals and male and female circumcision are the most important activities (Thiebou, 2009).

criticism was that they are only working for their own community or place of birth and not for their whole ward (Sul 6; DS 2; WWB 10).

Most of the councillors seemed to be concerned with the population in their ward however, playing a role of mediator instead of the more 'siding' role chiefs are playing. For example the intervention and perseverance of the councillor in Kasunko (case IV, the case where many crop farmers face difficulties with the werrehs of one family), seems to have a positive influence on the conflicts in his ward. With the problem of uncontrolled burning, he intervened in a way which was not in favour of any of the parties in particular, but which led to a peaceful solution in the end. When visiting the werreh of the livestock keeper suspected of the uncontrolled burning, he stated metaphorically: "You know monkeys like corn. When corn has been eaten from your farm and you see a monkey, you immediately link the monkey with eating the corn." Since the livestock keeper had just arrived at the spot a couple of days before the burning took place and since the livestock keepers are known for burning because of early grass for their cattle, the livestock keeper was a logical suspect. The livestock keeper did not admit, but he gave in though: he agreed to reconstruct the spoiled fence together with the crop farmer.

As is already mentioned, the arrival of the councillors is sometimes causing conflicts of interest between different actors. Two councillors stated for instance they were not enough involved by the chiefs, for example in guiding NGOs in the chiefdom (DS 3; Sul 13). The reason they want to be involved is not always out of compassion with the population however: "We should be involved [in managing NGOs], in order to sensitise our communities that a programme will be coming. I think that will help us, because as a politician they will know that during your time of office, those things came" (Sul 13).

According to some livestock keepers and a council employee, the number of problems between the crop and livestock keepers increased when the present district council chairman came into power in 2008. He is openly against Fula and makes their life difficult by actively supporting crop farmers, in particular the ones from his own section (WWY 5; Kab 20).

5.1.3 NGOs
As stated the role of the international community is not that prevalent or direct in the four cases. This is mostly due to the relatively new position of this actor in the conflicts. However, interviews showed they do influence conflicts.

This influence can be positive: for example in Kabala, around three NGOs have projects to solve conflicts between land users and organise meetings about this (Kab 12,24,26). The results so far have not been equal to the expectations of the crop farmers though: the NGOs promised to do more than they actually did up till now (FD 4 & 8).

In addition, due to previous bad experiences, Chakanda (2009) remarked during his fieldwork that village communities just after war had distrust for both government officials and NGOs. Moreover, their programs to intermediate between different parties can cost a lot of time, as one paramount chief stated when an NGO wanted to give a workshop: "It is harvesting time now, my people don't have time for workshop after workshop after workshop" (cited by Kab 26). In addition, most of the projects of NGOs are focused on crop farmers, since most projects are agricultural ones. This changes the relationships between the two parties, which can change the interactions in conflicts as well. One respondent mentioned for example they were only talking with the livestock keepers on meetings of the NGO (FD 8). Also, by introducing farmer field schools, farmers become more aware of their rights, which can influence the conflicts negatively (Moritz, 2006). This means that, even though NGOs have good intentions, the outcomes of their interventions are not always positive, possibly due to a certain lack of conflict sensitivity (Brown et al, 2009).

With regards to conflict between land users, there are also indirect links between NGOs and conflicts. In Koinadugu, many projects are incorporated to give alternatives for the slash and burn techniques, which are believed to be ecologically destructing. Since these sustainable agriculture projects that promote producing own mulch and result in a more fertile soil, manure of the livestock keepers is seen as less important. This can change the relation between the two main users of the soil, since crop farmers become less dependent of the manure of the livestock keepers for getting a fertile soil (WWY 1).

Another influence of NGOs on the conflicts is the recent change from relief aid to development aid[33]. This transition means that there is at present more a focus on policies and strategies to rebuild the country. This means there are more projects to rebuild society, wherein people are taught to be independent again. Since livestock keepers are in need for aid, the focus is as already mentioned more on crop farmers, which can thus change the relations between the two.

The role of NGOs in conflict related issues seems to be growing. As already stated, the councillor in case II (where the paramount chief did not seem to be interested in the case of wrongly gained access by livestock keepers) approached an NGO herself to help solving the issue. However, she knew of the existence of this NGO because they came and gave a workshop about their activities in her ward a couple of weeks before (D 1). This shows that NGOs make attempts to become a 'shopping forum' like chiefs and councillors: they try to build the image of being a place where one can go to in case of problems (von Benda-Beckmann, 1981). According to some, they are not doing this to satisfy the local people, as one interviewee stated: "They are coming and promising things, but they are never giving as much as they promise" (WWB 2). Also an NGO worker stated their intervention seemed to be more for their own benefit or to satisfy their donors (Kab 13). This is in line with what Von Benda-Beckmann (1981) state: institutions actively shop for disputes to consolidate their authority. However, to what extent NGO interventions in disputes are meant to consolidate their authority or to solve problems as normally expected, is difficult to say.

5.1.4 State

The influence of the state and formal local authorities was not often mentioned during interviews. On state level there seems to be a growing awareness that land is an important factor in development however. Therefore the government emphasises on the formulation of new national land policies, stating: "Land is an important asset: development takes place on land, not in the air" (O 5).

Since the state was not often mentioned by people in interviews, the land users do not seem to expect national involvement in these kinds of issues: it is mainly seen as a problem at chiefdom level. The paramount chief of Diang however, stated he had discussed the property conflict on the land between the two chiefdoms Diang and Kasunko (case I) with the President of Sierra Leone during an agricultural fair in Koinadugu. In this conflict, the state itself is also involved in the form of the provincial secretary that needs to make a decision in this case. As already mentioned in chapter 4, financial constraints (the provincial secretary that is not able to make it there because fuel cannot be provided by one of the

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[33] While relief or humanitarian aid meets the immediate needs of individuals during crises, development cooperation aims to support policies and strategies that correspond to the priorities of the partner country. While emergency aid is costly in terms of human life and resources and disruptive of development, development policy is often insensitive to the risk of shocks and to the importance of protecting vulnerable households against risk. At present, programmes to link these two forms of aid are increasing, called LRRD programmes: Link between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (FAO, 2003: 1; Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994).

chiefdoms) and probably low priority from the side of the state, are delaying this process, which makes it difficult to solve the issue.

In case II, where the crop farmers have demanded the livestock keepers to move out to another area indicated for them, the role of the state is shown in the fact that the councillor has involved the honourable to give more weight to the case. Yet this seems to be more an act of despair than a normal procedure: the major reason is because the paramount chief is not giving the case any attention (D 1).

The Ministry responsible for these issues is the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security (MAFFS). According to an interviewee working for this Ministry, agricultural production has substantively diminished after the pre-war closure, out of financial constraints, of the agricultural sub-station in Gberia Timbaku (Kab 31). This was maybe also in Sulima Chiefdom due to a change in focus of the government. Valkenberg (1989) states she remarked a change during her research regarding the preference of the state for land users. While the policy makers first favoured crop farmers because cash crop farming was thought to be more economically favourable, later the focus shifted towards the, in the end, economically more favourable livestock keeping. This was shown by the way government exerted pressure on land owners to accept livestock keepers even though the land owners did not want the livestock keepers because of the crop destruction. In case of conflicts, the government usually also supported the livestock keepers, since they were highly appraised regarding their contribution to the country's income.

During this research, it has not been observed that the government was supporting one of the parties. The government seemed to have a rather minor impact in Koinadugu District anyway. One government official stated that the remoteness and the believed presence of mystical powers[34] in Koinadugu District have always resulted in a low zest of government officials to work in the district (Kab 31).

The role of the state is obvious in cases where foreign investors are involved though. Even though many people seem to be satisfied with the arrival of foreign investors (D 4; Sul 13; O 3&4), there are also more critical sounds: according to a chiefdom speaker, the government is allowing everything they can get money from, to the detriment of the local people. He stated for example that regarding foreign investors in sugarcane for bio fuel, the state pretended as if the local people would produce sugar for the country and export some to increase government salaries. In reality this was totally different: local people would not benefit at all from the production of sugarcane on their land since it would be exported directly (Seng 4).

5.1.5 Other local authorities
Besides the paramount chief and the councillor, also other local authorities are present in Koinadugu District. Of these other local authorities, only the court chairmen have been mentioned often during interviews and never in a positive way. Especially crop farmers are indifferently negative about the functioning of the local courts. In general the complaints are about court officers postponing meetings, the high fees of the court, the low compensation price paid, being ignored by the court chairman, the distance to the court and court chairmen deciding cases in favour of the richest one (DS 1,3; D 4,8; FD 6; M, 2,6,13,16; Sul 3; WWY 1; Kab 20). The crop farmers in Nomokoya (case III, where the paramount chief has instructed the crop farmers to leave the already prepared farming land since it was too close to the werreh of a livestock keeper) state that "they [livestock keepers] have plenty of money, but when they are sued to court, no action is taken against them or they are not showing up. […]

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[34] Koinadugu District is known for its mystical powers. Especially in the past, people from other districts, were afraid to come to Koinadugu. Nowadays, the fear still exists, but not anymore for Kabala: only remote villages are still seen as places where witchcraft takes place (Kab 32).

Our right is abused, because we are poor" (Sul 3). This is in line with the literature, where the ability of local courts in Sierra Leone in resolving issues has been judged as relatively poor (Sawyer, 2008). In contradiction, according to others (WWY 1; M 12) in most cases the crop farmers win and according to livestock keepers, they need to pay a lot of compensation (M, 9&12). This is confirmed by Valkenberg (1989: 90) who emphasises that the crop farmers attempted to send the livestock keepers away by claiming "exorbitant compensations" in court.

When talking with court officials themselves, the impression was often that court clerks knew more than the court chairmen. Explanation for this can be that the court clerks are not appointed for a certain period, while the court chairmen are. Another explanation can lie in their way of appointment. Court chairmen are recommended by the paramount chief[35], while court clerks are appointed by the government for their ability (DS 3).

Furthermore, other local authorities who were assumed to be important were the Fula tribal and section heads[36]. Being the only power of the Fula with an expected mediator function between the Fula and other tribes, they were expected to be updated and involved in conflicts. However, out of interviews with some of them or with others about them, their involvement turned out to be minimal (Kab 2&27; WWY 11). During all the interviews, there was only one case where the Fula tribal head had played a mediatory role. This was however not between two different ethnical groups or between two different land user groups, but between two Fula livestock keepers about settlement and theft (Sul 9). In another interview, the livestock keepers told they were not backed up by the Fula tribal head in a theft case, while the paramount chief did support them. The reason was according to them that they had voted for another candidate during the elections for Koinadugu's Fula tribal head (Kab 27).

The reason why their influence in disputes is minimal is unclear. At first, their whole position is unclear: nobody could exactly tell what their tasks were. Besides, the Fula do not have a tradition of strict political structures (De Bruijn, 2008). Even though there are some nuclei where Fula have political power (de Bruijn and Van Dijk, 2003), in Sierra Leone they do not have a history of this power. This probably has to do with their migration motives: they came to Sierra Leone mostly as business men, not to get political power or to settle permanently (Jalloh, 2007).

Yet, since many of the Fula are now born in Sierra Leone and identify themselves as a Sierra Leonean, there seems to be a growing tendency of becoming a 'full' Sierra Leonean citizen, which means also being involved in political issues or gaining property rights (Sul 4,5; Kab 27,28). The present Fula tribal and section heads however seem not to be from that generation yet: they seem not to be interested in playing a big role in societal problems. As stakeholder they do though, since most of them are elected for their big herd, which can cause a lot of problems (D 5; Kas 2,7).

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[35] Paramount chiefs recommend a court chairman, who is afterwards officially appointed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Local Government and Community Development. Court chairmen serve a term of three years. Court members are chosen independently by the paramount chief. They officially serve a term of three months (Castillejo, 2009).

[36] Fula section heads are elected Fula representatives per section with an intermediate function: to be the contact person between livestock keepers and political leaders, but also crop farmers. The Fula tribal head is the representative of the Fula section heads in the district headquarter (Kabala in this case).

5.1.6 Foreign investors

Foreign investors are not (yet) a big player in the conflicts. Only in case I - on the land dispute between the two chiefdoms Diang and Kasunko about an expected mineral rich piece of land - the increasing number of foreign investors are probably influencing the conflict.

With the arrival of the international mining companies (D 1,2,4&9) and with the Chinese investors starting to be interested in buying agricultural land in Koinadugu for their own food security (Sul 13), foreign investors will probably become more important.

However, whether a modern 'tragedy of the commons' takes place as Toulmin (2005) argues, cannot be concluded from this small number of cases. Up till now, the local population does not seem to be aware of this tragedy anyway: most are willing to give their commons to the foreign investors in exchange for money.

At present, the influence of foreign investors on conflicts can be found especially in the property rights aspect: who is profiting of them buying land, how will property rights be managed, what will be the future of the common land et cetera. While in the past the land value was not thought to be very high because of slow plant succession and land degradation (Valkenberg, 1989), people seem to become more conscious of the value of land, especially in mineral rich areas as case I shows. The following citation shows that foreign investors can still make good profit now however: "We don't know the particular thing they [Chinese investors] look out for. [...] But we already agreed that we will give the land, because we need investors" (Sul 13). This benevolence to give land can cause property right problems and conflicts between different land users in the future, as is warned for in present literature (Baxter, 2010; MADAM, 2010; von Braun and Meintzen-Dick, 2009).

5.1.7 Corruption

In many interviews, corruption was brought up. Since this is the reason some paramount chiefs are losing credibility from crop farmers or other authorities, and because it can (thus) change conflict settings as well, it will be shortly mentioned here.

Not only the court chairmen are accused of accepting bribes, crop farmers and authorities have indicted paramount chiefs as well. The livestock keepers admit that they have a good relation with paramount chiefs because they give or offer one or two cows per year to the paramount chiefs, like the Fula tribal head did in case IV (Kas 7; WWY 5). Accepting cows of livestock keepers is mentioned the most as form of corruption (FD 1; K 7), even though it is difficult to prove, since "accepting bribes is a midnight business" (FD 4). In addition, as land is getting more important, new forms of corruption at state level, emerge. Currently, there are already land officials bribing to the detriment of poor people, and false documents that are produced by lawyers or government officials increase (O 5, 6).

Reasons for this poorly established rule of law at local level can be that the court chairmen are badly or not paid so they simply decide cases in favour of the richest one. Also, these authorities often have their own cows with Fula, which makes them less willing to judge in disadvantage of Fula (M 2). Moreover, court chairmen need to obey the paramount chief who has appointed him in order to stay in function and paramount chiefs are, for the mentioned reasons, often giving preference to livestock keepers (DS 3).

The corruption can also be explained according to the way the society is built. Because there is no separation of powers, corruption can be seen as institutionalised (Kas 6). When a livestock keeper for example does not give something to local authorities, he will be punished by getting no access or bad plots of land. Not only local people can be accused of corruption however: to be accepted, NGOs tend to offer local authorities something as well (WWY 11).

In some interviews, people warned to be careful with labelling actions as corruption though (WWB 3; O 6). For example, giving of cows should not always be seen as bribing: chiefs do not get paid a lot (they only receive allowances) and the livestock keepers gain access through chiefs, so to give something can better be called 'mutual respect' or 'reciprocity'. As a crop farmer chairman stated: "In the end you need to sacrifice [for a religious or cultural purpose] cattle and not cassava" (Kab 20).

5.2 Institutions
In this section, customary laws including bye-laws and property rights and access issues will be discussed in relation to cattle and land conflicts.

5.2.1 Customary laws (including bye-laws)
Customary laws, bye-laws in particular, are in this case constructed to prevent or solve issues between different land users. Bye-laws concerning land usage are not introduced in every chiefdom. It is unclear which chiefdom has them and which chiefdom does not: even within chiefdoms, authorities are sometimes not informed about the existence of bye-laws on these issues (WWB 2). It is sure however that Dembelia Sinkunia, Kasunko, Sulima, Wara Wara Bafodia and Wara Wara Yagala created bye-laws on these conflicts. The next section will go into the bye-laws and their functioning in case III in Sulima Chiefdom.

The bye-laws have a positive effect in case III where the crop farmers were mainly complaining about one livestock keeper. The paramount chief judges the crop farmers in his chiefdom as really stubborn: they do not want to obey physical separation between them and the livestock keepers. The problem of the livestock keepers is according to him that they do not look sufficiently after their cattle. Yet the enforcement of bye-laws and yearly updates resulted in less quarrels between these different land users. Last year the bye-laws were for example updated by giving an obliged distance between the werreh and the farms of crop farmers. Because of this change, the paramount chief was able to correct the crop farmers in Nomokoya when they were farming too close to the livestock keepers (Sul 2).

A second example of a successful change in the bye-laws according to the paramount chief, was the change in the payment of compensation. A couple of years ago, there was a lot of wounding and killing of cows in the chiefdom. Since it was difficult to find the perpetrators, it was decided to change the bye-laws: when no perpetrator would be identified, all the neighbouring crop farmers needed to pay. This was the moment these problems stopped (Sul 2).

According to the paramount chief, the bye-laws in his chiefdom are effective because of several reasons. Firstly, because the revision of the bye-laws takes place in consultation with the livestock keepers and crop farmers. The meetings to change these bye-laws can take long, but in the end they pay off because everybody agrees on the content and is thus more likely to obey them. In addition, a strict supervision on the compliance makes the bye-laws also effective. Every local court has an updated version of the bye-laws so they can act in accordance with the latest law. Furthermore, the enforcement of the bye-laws has been encouraged: the paramount chief gave the responsibility to the section chief to enforce the bye-laws (Sul 2).

One NGO worker remarked however that the land users in his view were not really consulted in one of the update meetings for the bye-laws: "the paramount chief was dictating the changes together with some of the section and town chiefs who are his followers" (Sul 12).

By talking with and observing other people in the chiefdom though, it can be stated that people were more informed about the existence and content of the bye-laws in their

chiefdom than in other chiefdoms. They were updated on the latest changes in the bye-laws and knew their rights, but also admitted their responsibilities (fencing, keeping distance from the werreh). In addition, more fences were observed than in other chiefdoms.

As mentioned, the good functioning of bye-laws often coincides with the way they are constructed. If everybody is involved in the process, the bye-laws themselves will have more legitimacy since more people will obey them. In the case of Sulima Chiefdom, even though criticism came from one side, it seems the way of construction makes the bye-laws more legitimate: the consultation of different parties and regularly updates keeps them relevant. This is also the case in Wara Wara Yagala, where the gathering of both a crop farmer and a livestock keeper team together with authorities has resulted in effective bye-laws that have decreased the number of conflicts in the chiefdom (WWY 7, 9; Kab 20).

In the boundary and land property case (case I), the problems are not really due to customary laws: chiefdom boundaries are determined on provincial or national level. In the other two cases, the customary laws are not perceived as positive. Case II, the case where the livestock keepers encroached the land, shows the fluidity of laws is not in everyone's advantage. Because the livestock keepers did not obey the legal way to gain access to land[37]: they did not ask permission to the land owners, who are crop farmers. Therefore, the crop farmers are disadvantaged now: against their will, the livestock keepers encroached their land. Moreover, they do not have enough farm land, because the cattle use *their* land and spoil their farms. The crop farmers state that the livestock keepers should obey the law, which would have been firstly to ask permission to the land owners to get access to a piece of land and second to obey the agreement that is made with the elder who had given access to the land of the land owners. This agreement was to leave after one year. The crop farmers state "when they [the livestock keepers] are not obeying the law, we have to chase them like bush animals" (D 11).
According to the councillor in Kagbasia, the explosive stage of cattle conflicts in Koinadugu of three years ago has been diminished because of the bye-laws. This has become clear in the example of the livestock keeper mentioned in case IV, who had given his respect to the wrong chief and who had missed out some actors in asking access. When the councillor explained his mistakes, the livestock keeper recognised his fault and said he would ask formal permission to the land owner and then to the good chief. However the town chief of the community where access was asked should have told the livestock keeper that he was asking permission to the wrong one. Instead, he has accepted the respect and gave access to someone else's territory. When the chiefs with their exemplary role do not obey the laws they need to enforce themselves, who will?

5.2.2 Property rights and access
The flexible character of property rights and access is shown in the change of property rights and access in types of soil. While Valkenberg in 1989 states that "swamp farming is not highly appreciated and the right to use swamp plots is easily acquired", this has totally changed twenty years later. As mentioned in chapter 4, swamp land is nowadays the most

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[37] As explained in chapter 4, the legal way to get access to land as a stranger is to either first report oneself to the town chief and showing interest in leasing land in his township. Together with the town chief, the stranger needs to go to the landowner where he wishes to lease some land from. When all the parties agrees, the stranger need to inform and get permission of the section and paramount chief (D 4; FD 5; Sul 2&3). The stranger can also go first to the landowner and with him to the town chief.

valued land, which means property rights in these areas are more important and to get access to swamp land is more difficult than to upland (Sul 2; Kab 29).

In case I, the property rights of the land between Diang and Kasunko is central in the conflict. Since property rights are more and more seen as important by the state, among others because of the arrival of foreign investors in the country, the rights gain in power. This can be seen in this case, where the section chief arrived uninvited early in the morning to show an old document that proved the rights of Diang Chiefdom to that piece of land. Since people in this case are keen on getting the land and using property rights to prove their right, the (documented) property rights themselves become more important.

In case II, about the encroachment of the land by livestock keepers, the crop farmers - being landowners at the same time - do not have the power to send the livestock keepers away. Or, better to say, they have the power in the form of property rights, but these rights are not recognised by the livestock keepers nor some authorities (Kab 20). According to the crop farmers, they are not able to fence their farms, so they have less effective farming land and they are forced to engage themselves in other economical activities. Even though they want to farm on *their* land, they are only partly able to, and subsequently their harvest decreases. This is in relation to what Sikor and Lund (2009: 6) state about property rights: "People may hold property rights to some resources without having the capacity to derive any material benefit from them". The crop farmers in this case are thus lacking real rights or effective ownership. There is no acknowledgment for their property rights, so they have no control over their own land, because another party – the livestock keepers - is having more power without holding property rights.

Moreover, the distinction can be made between property and access in this case: they do have the property, but not the effective access. In this case, it is, like Berry (1993) states, not a problem that the land rights in Africa are ambiguous or negotiable; the problem is the access of people to these land rights.

In general, it is shown that people are becoming more aware of their rights; they increasingly use the law or their rights as a strategy to claim something. Sometimes people from both sides say they have right to the land (D13,14&15), while in other cases especially the crop farmers appeal to the law, often without having exact knowledge of what is in it (D 10; Kas 2; Sul 3). This increasing knowledge on (the existence or vocabulary of) rights, has been fuelled by NGOs and their stimulation of education. Educated children of livestock keepers are going to the werreh to sensitise their parents and other family members by stating that they should not accept the other party sending them off a piece of land, that they have rights as well, while the crop farmer children teach their parents that "You are the owner of this land, so you have the right to send them away" (Kab 28). This change has also been remarked in literature, unclear is however what the exact relation is between education and this increased aggressive attitude towards 'the other' (Moritz, 2006).

Another change which can be remarked regarding rights is that for Fula the historical ties with the soil increase as well. Before, the livestock keepers were coming from the Fouta Djallon with no roots with the soil they were staying on in Sierra Leone. Nowadays however, many livestock keepers are born on the Sierra Leonean soil, so they have their roots there and claim rights according to these roots. Especially livestock keepers who settled first in an area claim property rights. For example a first settled livestock keeper is claiming land with the fact that he is born on the land (D 10). Another first Fula settler and at the same time the most contested livestock keeper in that area, is often repeating that he has "no case with anybody". According to the crop farmers, he is already pretending as if he owns the soil (Sul 3). Furthermore, also another Fula is presenting himself as a son of the soil by stating that even the Devil knows him there (Kas 5). This status was confirmed by another interviewee:

"he speaks better Limba than the Limba do, he has given one of his sons a Limba name and he raises two Limba children" (Kas 7).

5.3 Institutional change

Institutional change is distinguished as last facet of governance in this thesis. Changes as processes of decentralisation and development processes with their consequences will be presented here.

5.3.1 Decentralisation

That decentralisation in Sierra Leone is a difficult process, can be concluded from the only positive remark Jackson (2006: 108) could mention about it: "there are elected local councils which are more or less functioning". A councillor is clearer in his statement on the status of decentralisation. According to him, the government has "only decentralised corruption, no power or anything else" (Kas 7).

Because of decentralisation, tensions are observed between the council (the decentralised government) and the chieftaincy (D 2; FD 3; Kab 9, 17). This is not illogical: at first, their tasks are more or less the same and unclear (FD 3; Seng 2). For instance, the district council chairman officially has the highest political position in the district according to him, but the paramount chiefs unofficially hold this position. However, even this explanation is contested: another council member explained the council is the supreme organ in the district, but the paramount chiefs are still the highest political authorities in the chiefdoms (Kab 28).

Furthermore, the Local Government Act has removed rights of chiefs (for example collecting tax) and given these to local councils. This has resulted in power struggles between the parties and in more incentives for corruption, since chiefdom staff's wages are low (Jackson, 2006; Kab 16).

This uncertainty of tasks can fuel conflicts, since authorities are more occupied with their own function than with problems in the chiefdoms. A positive consequence of decentralisation is that the increase of forums for people to go with their problems, even though this can also induce the indistinctness just mentioned: people do not know what they can demand from authorities since their tasks are unclear.

Even though the distinction in tasks is unclear, people seem to have still more faith in their paramount chiefs than in their councillor: "The councillor is working, but we do not see it" (Sul 6). In literature, it is emphasised it is not necessary to make an either/or choice: according to Sawyer (2008: 403): "the parallel systems of local councils and chiefdom authority can ensure that both remain downwardly accountable to their electorate." So far, however, the decentralisation is more seen as a burden than a chance for, among others, more accountability. This can be explained because of its lack of legitimacy up till now. However, this can change, because councillors have a more dedicated constituency than paramount chiefs, since the former are elected during elections where everybody can participate and not only people from a ruling family as is the case with paramount chief elections. When these councillors will be increasingly recognised by their constituency, the legitimacy of the council and thus decentralisation can increase.

5.3.2 Development Processes

Development processes as an increasing number of foreign investors and education have been mentioned in other sections already. The influence of increased connectedness with other people and countries changes the attitude of different land users towards each other. Because of this development processes and its consequences, the clarity around the frontier and property rights in case I is of increasing importance for both chiefdoms, since increasing globalisation and development have stimulated the arrival of the foreign mining companies to Koinadugu.

A setting where the land also gets another value is in case IV, where the different livestock keepers cause troubles. Development processes are making this area increasingly important: also among livestock keepers a certain urbanisation and wish for connectedness is taking place. Kagbasia and surroundings are close to the highway, close to the second biggest city of Koinadugu and relatively close to Makeni, while the ecosystem suits their animals. Therefore, the area is appreciated and popular by livestock keepers: while taking care of their cattle, they are able to enjoy the facilities of the city, sell their milk nearby and trade their cows easily.

These two examples show the stakes on some parts of the land become higher. Just like swamp land is becoming more important and therefore most property conflicts are about swamp land, the land in certain areas increases its value as well, due to external factors: when foreign investors arrive, the property rights are suddenly more important, because the land is more worth. And because of this increasing value and popularity of land, the likelihood of land and cattle conflicts increase as well.

Also education has its influence on the conflicts. Especially the crop farmers seem to be influenced by increased quality and access to education. For example, one of the arguments why crop farmers chase livestock keepers off the land is the inability of the former to pay school fees of their children since the arrival of the livestock keepers. In addition, because their children were going to school, the crop farmers were unable to fence everything, because they lacked manpower (D 10,11; M 13; Sul 7). As is already mentioned, education makes people more aware of their rights (Kab 28; Moritz, 2006). Crop farmers seem to increasingly know their rights and they claim their land back by falling back on these rights, for instance by stating the livestock keepers have gained access in a wrong way.

5.4 Concluding remarks

Since the war has ended eight years ago, governance problems expected during reordering processes as legal pluralism have only played a minor role: multiple claims on land in the 'warscape' – where it is known that there are often several people putting claims on the same piece of land - have been mentioned only once (WWY 2).

However, governance is highly influenced by other reordering and development processes taking place after the war. Firstly, because of decentralisation, chiefs have got different functions and the council came into being. Next, NGOs have constructed a parallel structure of governance: their emergence changed governance and society. Because of these changes, Sierra Leone can be called a society with institutional multiplicity (Hesselbein *et al*, 2006). Thus there is maybe no post-war 'legal pluralism', but one can speak of 'actor pluralism' or institutional multiplicity. This actor pluralism has a positive impact on conflicts between land users in the sense that not only the chiefs decide or judge in cases anymore: people can go 'forum shopping' to get their most favourable outcome. The flipside is however that people can get lost in the different structures of governance and that there is disagreement between institutions or actors on who is doing what. Moreover, as Robbins (2004) and Nuijten (2004) state as well, due to foremost financial domination, livestock keepers are more able to get access to and to mobilise the most important – apart from the land users themselves - actors in the conflicts: the paramount chiefs and the court chairmen. The crop farmers have better access to actors as NGOs and councillors, but these actors are not (yet) as important as the traditional authorities. Therefore, the increase in shopping forums and the increasing awareness of people to be able to shop these different forums does not seem to lead to other outcomes of conflicts up till now.

These unequal relations of land users with other actors has also influence on the institutional part of governance: access to and use of environmental resources in Koinadugu. To state it

metaphorically, the livestock keepers have no access to the bundle of rights, but they have better access to the bundle of power than crop farmers. This chapter has shown that the access to the sticks of power is in the end more important: livestock keepers seem to prevail over crop farmers in for example getting access to land (Verdery, 1999). The structures around official legislations as social relations and financial means, only treated in the bundles of power and not in the bundles of rights, seem to be important to explain conflicts in this area. This is related to what Drezner (2006) states in an international context: due to an increase of international institutions, shifts are made from rule-based outcomes to power-based outcomes, because a proliferation of institutions enhances the great powers to engage in forum-shopping. This can be applied to the local situation in Koinadugu as well. Livestock keepers are maybe not directly engaged in forum-shopping, but their main shopping forums – the paramount chiefs and court chairmen – are the ones with power. These powerful actors use this supremacy to influence outcomes: outcomes are also on this local level. Thus not rule-based (anymore), but rather power-based.

At present, one can see the society not anymore as a 'warscape'. However, in Koinadugu with all these land and cattle conflicts, one can speak about a 'conflictscape': even though the conflicts seem to be small, isolated cases, together they result in a landscape with different conflicts at the same time. They can revive and fade like flowers in a landscape, while different interventions try with different means to reorder the conflictscape to diminish the conflicts.

The understanding of conflicts over land is however not limited by the notion of governance: one should, among others, also understand the broader socioeconomic and historic context. This will be presented in the next chapter.

6. Historic, socioeconomic and geopolitical factors changing conflicts

Scholars have identified three topics important to political ecology: social systems, property rights systems and historical experiences. The property rights systems have been treated under the more comprehensive concept of governance in chapter 5. This chapter will among others, explain the broader perspective of the social system and historical experiences that can explain cattle and land conflicts in Koinadugu. However, when collecting data it turned out that the three topics mentioned under political ecology, did not account for the whole situation. Especially geographic and geopolitical factors also turned out to be important. Furthermore, the social system has been broadened to socioeconomic factors, since the economic part seems to be of influence as well.

6.1 Historical perspective on change in conflicts

It is clear that cattle and land conflict has been present as long as different land users make use of the same land (Valkenberg 1989). Whether these conflicts used to be more intense, is often difficult to measure, since it is hard to collect reliable data. In chapter 4 the neo-Malthusian scarcity theory, which relates cattle and land conflicts to population increase and natural resource depletion, was not confirmed. The two chiefdoms where the cattle density and number of cattle per head of the population were the highest, were not the chiefdoms where the problems were the most severe. The outcome can maybe be explained according to historical facts: the chiefdoms where the Yalunkas own the land (Dembelia Sinkunia, Folosaba Dembelia and Sulima) were the chiefdoms where the Fula arrived first. This was not only because they bordered with Guinea, where the Fula came from, but also because the Yalunkas were already having business contact with the Fula (Kas 27). At that time, around 1900 according to one paramount chief (DS 7) and around 1920 according to Valkenberg (1989), the livestock keepers were welcomed in those chiefdoms as a source of revenue. Moreover, there was economic exchange: Yalunka did the farming for Fula in exchange for milk and animals (Valkenberg, 1989). These chiefdoms are thus more used to the presence of Fula and are more aware of the economic advantages. This makes them less aggressive towards the presence of livestock keepers.

Historical events can certainly contribute to a change in type of conflicts. Two historical events seem to have influenced the conflicts the most: colonialism and the recent war. According to Bryant (1998), the politicised environment can be traced back to the legacies of colonialism. In Sierra Leone, the most known and influential legacy of colonialism is the installation of the chieftaincy system[38]: the chiefs and their functioning have a relatively big influence on the conflicts. This has already been shown in chapter 5, therefore this section will go into the recent war and its consequences for conflicts in Koinadugu.

6.1.1 Consequences of war

In the theoretical background, it has been stated that war may have its influence on conflicts. The major consequences of war on land conflicts mentioned in literature - overlapping and competing claims and the displacement of persons – have not influenced the conflicts in Koinadugu though. As already mentioned, competing claims have been mentioned as an issue just after the war only once (WWY 2).

Furthermore, also the 'culture of mobility' observed by Maconachie *et al* (2006), is not relevant for Koinadugu. Out of the interviews it can be concluded most crop farmers stayed around the area where they came from. Thus there was not much displacement except for the group of livestock keepers. Of this group, the Fula livestock keepers almost all went to Guinea (DS 3,7; D 1,4,5,6,10; Kas 7; M 2,8,9,11,15; Sul 3,4,6,9; WWB 1,4,6,9; WWY 2; Bangura, 1999). This displacement did have consequences for conflicts, but not the legal pluralism or authority struggles that are mentioned in literature.

In addition, the violence of the war did not continue during the land and cattle conflicts. People stated they were tired of fighting and one authority even said: "We do not like to fight" (WWB 3; M 13; FD 1). The only actual threat of violence because of cattle conflict was in Kasunko Chiefdom, where, as already mentioned, one participant of a meeting was saying they were ready for fighting (K 1). According to one councillor the local population knew what they needed after ten years of war: not a new war, but money. Therefore the population stimulates the influx of foreign investors (Sul 13).

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[38] To keep an eye on the inner parts of Sierra Leone, the British colonialists installed local chiefs. See also chapter 2.

Consequences of war which are noticed are the depletion and damaging of agricultural production and infrastructure on the one hand and livestock on the other (Bangura, 1999). Regarding the latter, it can be stated that a differentiation regarding the possession of cattle has taken place on the basis of ethnic identity. Because while the Fula livestock keepers almost all moved to Guinea, the non-Fula livestock keepers or crop farmers with some cattle stayed almost all in Koinadugu with the exception of the ones living close to the border. The people who stayed, were not able to save their cattle from attacks of the rebels or from hungry people staying in the bush. Since the Fula livestock keepers stayed in Guinea for a long time, they had the chance to restock their herd and so they came back with the same number of or with more cattle (DS 3,7; D 1,4,5,6,10; Kas 7; M 2,8,9,11,15; Sul 3,4,6,9; WWB 1,4,6,9; WWY 2; Bangura, 1999).

An example of this ethnic differentiation of cattle can be seen in case III, the case where the crop farmers are not satisfied with the livestock keepers surrounding them and where the crop farmers were sent off a piece of land they wanted to farm because they were, according to the bye-laws of Sulima Chiefdom, too close to the livestock keeper. The crop farmers in the village told they had a lot of livestock before the war. However, during the war all of these animals were slaughtered during rebel attacks. As a consequence, the crop farmers in Nomokoya are now left with only a small number of cattle. Crops can be seen as their only source of income. This segregated situation cannot be ignored when analysing conflicts. In this case, it has had negative influence on the relation between the livestock keepers and the crop farmers, since crop destruction means immediately a big drop in the crop farmers' income (Sul 3,6).

Another consequence of the war is that during the war crop farmers have experienced what it is to live and to farm without cattle. Even though their farming activities dropped, they did not have the problems of crop destruction by cattle, which has been a positive experience (FD 4; Kas 2). To go back to a situation that is worse regarding crop damage, is difficult. Especially since the crop farmers are not backed up by the government as they were before. In the eighties, the government focused on cash cropping, stimulating crop farmers to grow more, since this was seen as the economic potential for the country. However, from the end of the eighties onwards, the government shifted its focus towards livestock keeping, since in the end this was thought to be more economically viable (Valkenberg, 1989).

In addition, after the war, livestock keepers were the only economically strong people. According to a councillor, at that time the newly appointed paramount chiefs left their own population unattended to go for the money of livestock keepers. And the crop farmers need to deal with these paramount chiefs, for the rest of their lives (Kas 7). This image given of corrupt post-war paramount chiefs is in contradiction with the image Jackson (2006) gave of the newly elected paramount chiefs. According to him, these chiefs, packed with more education, were open for reform and were not planning to continue the old paramount chiefs' strategies.

A last consequence of the war, according to interviewees, was that during the war the paddocks in the cattle settlements (the werrehs) were often destroyed. As a consequence, cows are able to walk around freely during night time, whereas before the war they were kept in the paddock at night. According to one respondent, most Fula have no interest in repairing these werrehs again since it costs them less to bribe a chief than to reconstruct the fences. Moreover, he mentioned that "Fula are more interested in motorbikes than in rebuilding werrehs" (WWY 1).

In the next part, economic, geopolitical, ecological and social trends that also play a role in explaining conflicts over land and cattle will be mentioned.

6.2 Socioeconomic change

Socioeconomic changes, part of the third layer of cattle and land conflicts, have just like the other factors, their impact on the actors involved in conflicts or the other way around: the cattle and land conflicts can induce social changes.

6.2.1 Diversification of activities

Regarding economic changes, an increase can be remarked in diversification of activities. In theory, income diversification can be judged as positive: people become less risk prone. This can be seen in Diang Chiefdom, where in the mineral rich areas crop and livestock keepers are also engaged in respectively mining and (illegal) gold trade (Kas 19). In these areas, the conflicts are less, even though livestock keepers and crop farmers are partly living together. The most logical explanatory factor is the income diversification of both groups: this makes crop destruction less severe and less conflict worthy. Nevertheless, part of the difference can also be explained due to geographical circumstances: the Solar Mountains, where the cattle stay during the rainy season, are not suitable for crop farming, so no crop damage can be caused.

However, not all land users are able to diversify their income. In Koinadugu, livestock keepers diversify their activities more than crop farmers do. For instance, almost all livestock keepers farmed crops besides from their cattle activities. This was not new however; most of them were doing this since their childhood. With regard to new activities, livestock keepers are increasingly engaged in businesses in town, house renting or cattle trading. The future of (commercial) livestock keepers is bright: the supply of cattle is still not reaching the demand (Asenso-Okyere *et al*, 2009).

This commercialisation of cattle and globalisation leads to another economic activity: cattle raiding (DS 5; M 3; Sul 9; WWB 6,12; Kab 4,7). Since it is easier to get transport nowadays, meat can come easily to the 'bigger' cities where it is more difficult to distinguish stolen meat (Kab 20). The victims of raiding blamed other livestock keepers: especially the Fula migrating in and out of Guinea are suspected of these illegal practices (Sul 9; WWB 6). This leads to an increase of conflicts among livestock keepers. However, the raiding does not take place on a large scale yet: five livestock keepers mentioned it (DS 5; WWB 12; WWY 4,6; Sul 9).

For crop farmers, income diversification takes place on a low scale. They used to have some more cattle and work oxen, but, as already mentioned in the previous section, most of this cattle has died during the war. In addition, some youth originating from crop farmer families were engaged in timber business before the laws changed and the business collapsed (Seng 2). Crop farmers most often engage in extra income activities because they have no other option. For example, they can become engaged in stone breaking as was the case in setting II, where the livestock keepers encroached the land of the crop farmers. In this case the activity diversification of the cattle owners and, as a consequence, the installing of caretakers (see next section) impeded the relation between the two types of land users. Since the owners of the cattle were staying in Kabala and Freetown, having businesses there, the decision making process took longer. In case IV the crop farmers state that the problems with the livestock keepers force them to go to Kabala to get crops they were normally growing and selling themselves (Kab 7).

Some respondents however also remarked that crop farmers seemed to forget the arrival of livestock keepers can also brings them economic advantages: they can use their manure, cow milk and cow butter will be available and crop farmers sometimes give cattle that passed away to crop farmers (D 5; Kab 28). Moreover, with the arrival of livestock keepers, crop

farmers often have the opportunity to execute farming activities at the plots of the livestock keepers in exchange for money or a part of the harvest[39] (D 5; M 9,15,16; Kab 28).

6.2.2 Cowboys

As a consequence of these increasing economical activities for livestock keepers, the owner of the cattle is thus often not living with the herd anymore. Leaving the cattle in the hands of cowboys[40], the cattle owners are moving to town for their other occupations. The type of cowboys changed as well. While they used to be young boys - the sons of the livestock keeper - who were helping with taking care of the cattle now the number of hired cowboys or herders is increasing. This is due to societal development: children often go to school, so they have less time for taking care of the cattle. In addition, they do not want to go back to the werreh afterwards, but prefer to study more or to become for example a motorbike taxi rider in town (Kas 7; WWB 10; Kab 20).

Since these hired cowboys do not own the cows they feel less responsible and the number of problems between the different land users increases according to crop farmers (DS 3; WWB 10; Kas 7, 20; Bassett 1988). Bassett (1988; 1994) acknowledges this relationship between cattle ownership and herding practices. According to him research showed that as the number of animals owned by the herder himself declines (thus not the number of animals herded), the incidences of careless herding increase and livestock productivity reduces. This is mostly due to the fact that, as crop farmers and authorities state as well, herders do not devote much care to their work (Kas 7; WWB 10; Kab 20; Bassett 1994). Not only the fact that the cattle are not owned by the herder, but also power struggles between cowboys and owners can reduce this devotion (Bassett 1994).

This change of type and decrease of cowboys can have a negative impact on conflicts over land. In case IV, where the crop farmers were desperate to protect their crops against cows, one man told during a meeting that he was sleeping on the farm to protect his children and that he was taking his family with him to help him. This was happening more often, showing a paradox: since children of Fula are more and more going to school, the children of crop farmers attend less since they need to take over the tasks of the cowboys (Kas 2,7).

6.2.3 Education

As mentioned in chapter 5, people's increasing awareness of their rights, induced by among others education, resulted possibly in more segregation between different parties in conflict. Implications of increasing education on conflicts aside from people becoming more aware of these rights and of different 'shopping forums', are unclear. Tonah (2006) mentions that because of schooling and socialising together, farming and herding youth know each other much better than their parents do. This would mean that relations should be better between the two, which would have the potential to decrease the number of conflict. However, respondents emphasised the increased differences between the two opposing parties induced by education. Since the rich livestock keepers often have more opportunities for good schooling (buying books and uniforms, having light for studying) than poorer (often crop farmer) people (Kas 7; Kab 13). Furthermore Fula children are relatively more often going to Arabic schooling or schools in bigger cities, which means crop and livestock keepers from the same communities are not on the same schools (Seng 4).

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[39] Because of a shortage of seeds, human and financial capital, crop farmers are not able to use this land themselves.

[40] Cowboys are often members of the family who are taking care of the cattle of the livestock keeper owner. A cowboy is supposed to live with the cattle, mostly with his whole family. Most often, they do not get paid, but the milk the cows give is theirs (they can sell this on a nearby market) and they receive one full grown cow per year for their work (DS 5; Kab 27).

6.2.4 Ethnic identities
When studying livestock keepers with different ethnical identities, there is controversy about which livestock keepers are causing the most problems. In case III, the case where the crop farmers were reprimanded by the paramount chief, the Yalunka crop farmers were convinced that Fula livestock keepers were causing more problems than Yalunka ones, because Yalunka livestock keepers take better care and have few cows than Fula livestock keepers (Sul 3).

This difference in causing problems can maybe be related to the reason livestock keepers have cattle. While for Fula cattle are often a matter of status, with the bigger the herd the higher the status, for Yalunkas cattle can be more seen as a bank: cows are meant to put your wealth in (Sul 3; M 2). Therefore, the Yalunka state their cows are taken better care of, because the cows represent almost all their money. For Fula, because they have big herds, one cow more or less does not increase or diminish their status immediately. In addition, as mentioned, Fula increasingly hire herders, while Yalunka take care of them themselves. As a consequence, caring for the cattle is maybe more a priority of Yalunka livestock keepers than of Fula (Sul 3,7; M 2; Bassett, 1988). The differences can also be part of discourse though, as will be mentioned in the next chapter.

However, others crop farmers mention that livestock keepers from their own ethnic group are causing more problems. For example in Wara Wara Bafodia Chiefdom, it was said in several interviews that among the same landowning ethnicities it is more difficult to send your ´brother´ off the land since he has ownership rights as well, while other ethnic groups do not have these rights in the chiefdom. Moreover, from a brother one can only ask a small compensation for damage done (WWB 8,9,10). Hagberg (2005) states that crop damage caused by animals of people of the same ethnic group rarely involves state administration. Yet, this is not a sign that there is less crop damage of these animals.

Regardless this division in opinions on the consequences of ethnic identity on conflicts, fact is that increasing interethnic marriages are decreasing the ethnic divisions (D 11; Kas 2; Sul 2,13; WWB 4; WWY 5; Kab 27,28). Yet Fula are still the ethnic group the most hesitant towards these interethnic marriages (WWY 5). In addition, the economic activities seem to be still quite separated according to ethnic identity. For instance, the few Limba men who have a werreh, all have a Fula wife, since "Limba women do not know how to take care of the cows, especially the milking part" (WWB 8).

6.3 Geographical and geopolitical change
The impression in general regarding geographical location was that people, who were far away from chiefdom headquarters, had more difficulties in finding their way to authorities in case of problems. For instance, in the outskirts of Mongo Chiefdom, people were paying their Sierra Leonean tax with Guinean francs. According to them, they were living in no man's land and nobody bothered about them and their impoverished status (M 13,14).

In addition, the paramount chief of Wara Wara Bafodia Chiefdom seemed to care less about the border areas within his chiefdom than about the areas close to the capital of the chiefdom: while he had incorporated the initiative of physical separation and more emphasis on bye-laws to decrease the problems between the livestock keepers and crop farmers in the southern part of his chiefdom (under the Mongo River), the northern part was not involved even though the situation there was deteriorating with regards to cattle conflicts (WWB 2,3,4,8,9,10). On the other hand, in the border region between Wara Wara Bafodia and Guinea, the people seemed to take advantage of their 'uncontrolled' position; the trade with Guinea and (illegal) mining and logging was an addition to their income (WWB 8).

The exception is case III, the one where the crop farmers were farming too close to the werreh. With their geographical location close to the Guinean border and the biggest 'city' nearby in another chiefdom, the inhabitants of Nomokoya (case III) have more business

linkages with Guinea and Gbindi[41] than with Falaba, the headquarter of their own chiefdom. This isolated position however did not mean that the paramount chief of their own chiefdom did not have any influence on them. Even though it is a four hour trip by motorbike, the crop farmers were informed quickly by a representative of the paramount chief that they were not allowed to farm close to the werreh of one of the livestock keepers (Sul 2,3). In this case the authorities were thus able to find their way to remote Nomokoya. However, the other way around seems to be more difficult; since the paramount chief had not come to their community for years, they have the feeling he is not interested in them and their side of the story. According to them, he is not coming "because he says we [the crop and livestock keepers] are all the time quarrelling" (Sul 3). However, as mentioned, one of the tasks of paramount chiefs should be to mediate in conflicts (Thomson, 2007).

Because of development and urbanisation, people tend to value land that is close to the highway or villages more than land further in the rural areas as is mentioned in chapter 5 under development processes as well. The increase in cattle trading, but also the will for more 'connectedness', makes livestock keepers settle closer to the main lines (FD 4; Kas 2; Kab 7). As one respondent put it: "Fula also want to watch movie nowadays" (Seng 4). Since most (crop farmer) villages were already settled along these 'highways', many crop farmers complain that livestock keepers are settling closer and closer to them, increasing the pressure on certain parts of the land. Therefore, there may be abundant land in Koinadugu, but a large part is inferior land: far away from the main line or river, no minerals and upland or rocky land (see map in Annex II). Thus, in addition to O'Bannon (2006), we could state that it is not just land and the productivity of land that is critical to understand farmer-livestock keeper competition, but also the geographical location of land.

In case II, the unwillingness of the livestock keepers to move to the appointed area, has not only to do with being obstinate or with the fact that they do not know the soil features of that area. It has also to do with the fact that the area is more remote. This makes it more difficult for them to sell their products (D 10,11; Kas 2). Moreover, as one interviewee in Kamajimbo stated: "They want to go where their Hondas can take them" (D 10).

However, apart from this movement towards the centre, another opposing movement is noticed. Increasingly sent away because crop farmers are more aware of their rights, there is also a trend of Fula migrating towards the less densely populated areas. For example, there is an increase in the number of livestock keepers in the Solar Mountains region in Diang, but also shifts towards the remote chiefdom Neya were remarked (D 1; FD 5; M 3; Kab 7).

While the first geographical trend has a tendency of increasing the number of especially cattle conflicts, the second could result in a decrease since population and farming density is less, so crop damage is less likely. However, one should be careful in stating the latter, since the already mentioned geographical distance from authorities plays a role as well. For instance, in areas as Neya Chiefdom where people are even more distant than in the visited chiefdoms they may have a lot of problems with the arrival of livestock keepers, but not the means to communicate this (Kamara, 2010; FD 5).

6.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, it is shown that conflicts are not only explained by changing claims on resources or by looking at governance issues, but also by looking at changes that are around these issues, such as the political ecology scholars state as well.

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[41] Gbindi is a town close to the border with Guinea in Dembelia Sinkunia chiefdom. On Sundays, the biggest cattle market of Koinadugu District is held there, with many (cattle) exchanges between different livestock keepers or even more traders from both Guinea and Sierra Leone.

With regards to history, it is not directly the colonial legacy that is having its influence on the contemporary patterns and relations in resource use, as Bryant (1998) suggested. Indirectly, the colonial legacy does play a role because of the start of indirect rule in the provinces and the appointment of paramount chiefs. Nevertheless, it seems the recent history of war has influenced the conflicts more, in different facets mentioned in this chapter.

The conflicts seem to have been influenced by a change of economic activities as well, especially on the side of the livestock keepers. Their intermingling of activities has resulted in less attention for livestock keeping, which seems to have resulted in more incidents because of inattentiveness. Other developments influencing these conflicts are the increase of 'modern' interventions or inventions: not only NGOs as mentioned in the previous chapter, but also education and for example movies, which makes people less willing to go back to the peripheral areas.

Furthermore, the understood population and cattle increase and the influx of foreign investors, has put more pressure on natural resources, especially land and water. People therefore become more aware of the economic value of these resources, which can have a negative influence on conflicts. However, these consequences are still more future perspectives, even though with the geographical changes of especially livestock keepers, pressure becomes higher in some areas.

When looking at the reason why in some communities more problems between land users are noticed than in others, it can be stated that besides for governance differences, also economic features influence this. When land users have different economic activities or natural resources available, problems are less likely to occur since people are less dependent on one resource or one activity.

Regarding geographical differences, there is more a difference in type of conflicts than in the number of conflicts. When a community is closer to a headquarter people are more able to complain, while in frontier areas people feel often more neglected by authorities. This problem is also related to governance, since people have less or no access to governance. This absence of political access can result in more problems between land users in peripheral areas, because they can not enlist authorities in their conflicts. However, as is shown in chapter 5, the interference of authorities is not a panacea to solving problems either and in communities closer to the highway they complain more about increasing pressure on resources. Therefore, it can be stated that the remote areas face 'absence of governance' problems, the more connected areas face 'urbanisation' problems.

Having analysed all this, there is one 'layer' of conflict left: the discursive one. This one is not really incorporated in the political ecology theory as part of the construction of conflicts, but came across while interviewing people. The way people talk about each other, their representations and discourse, will be discussed in the next chapter.

7. Discourse and representations

The last layer of conflict treated in this thesis is the 'discursive layer'. With this layer the narratives of people, their perception of conflicts and the prejudices they have towards each other will be studied. In this chapter, these discourses and their influence on (solutions of) land and cattle conflicts will thoroughly looked into.

Since most interviews were with crop farmers and livestock keepers and because these parties are having the most opposing discursive construction of conflicts, the chapter will foremost focus on these land users and their cattle conflicts. The views other people interviewed have about them will be taken into account as well.

The discursive layer is the last layer of the cattle and land conflicts. It is chosen as the last one because discourse is the least visible one: what people's representations are and what kind of image they have of others needs to be read in between the lines. These representations are not good or bad; they are, just like other layers, part of the construction of conflict. And just like the other layers are interwoven, discourse is having its impact throughout the layers.

This chapter will first focus on representations: representations are a part of discourse, in this case how the crop farmers and livestock keepers present themselves and 'the other' will be studied. The next part will focus more on the discourse different land users have about the problems between the two parties. Some are exaggerating, while others seem to undermine the problems. After this, something will be said on other discourses that seem to influence the conflicts. Lastly, the solutions people mention will be analysed. This is also seen as part of the discursive layer, since the way people talk about solutions and the various solutions they come up with, say something about their construction of conflict.

7.1 Representations of land users

This section will be divided into representations the crop farmers and livestock keepers have of themselves and of the other group. The analysis - throughout the text and at the end of 7.3 - will focus on why they have these representations of themselves and the other, not on whether these representations are truthful or not.

7.1.1 Representation of themselves
The section will be split up in a part on crop farmers and a part on livestock keepers, about the presentations of themselves.

<u>Farmers</u>
Crop farmers present themselves as the 'original people' of the soil, the ones who have the property rights: "I am a son of this soil" (WWB 10). Since they are not the only ones on their soil anymore, they are suffering, because they suddenly have less or (in their view) no influence on *their* land anymore. Crop farmers in Diang Chiefdom stated for example: "Kasunko has already ceased a plot of land from us [the land talked about in case I] and now the livestock keepers come and destroy the crops we have left on this small piece of land" (D 11).
Related to this, the crop farmers often place themselves in a victim role: they are blaming the livestock keepers for their socioeconomic situation. They stated for instance: "We are suffering. We have nothing. When we cannot farm [because of the presence of cattle], how can we pay the school fees?" (D 11). Besides, in some communities they said they felt left out because the paramount chief is not backing them up and they do not receive any help from NGOs (M 13; Sul 4; WWB 10).
Furthermore, the crop farmers present themselves as dependent on other actors or dependent on God. Some citations of crop farmers illustrating this:
"*We do not have any power, the paramount chief should solve the problems*" (D 6).
"*We are not talking with them [livestock keepers] ourselves, we are only talking at meetings of CARE*" (FD 4).
"*Now we are looking to God*" (FD 8).

<u>Livestock keepers</u>
The representations of livestock keepers seem to be less clear than those of crop farmers. They present themselves mostly as not causing any problems. Like one of these livestock keepers was stating: "I do not have problems and I have never had a case in court. But my friends in other werrehs have (M 8)". Similar, during the visit to the livestock keeper in case IV who was identified as the most troublesome by crop farmers, he stated the problems had been solved between the crop farmers and him (Kas 2,5). However, he had many just wounded cows in his cattle, and the councillor said: "He is always saying things are fine or solved, but then the rest is still grumbling" (Kas 7). However, there is rarely someone who will present him or herself as the problem.

7.1.2 Representations of the other group
During the interviews the opposing groups were also talking about the 'other', which will be discussed here.

<u>Farmers about livestock keepers</u>
Crop farmers portrayed the livestock keepers as people who were reluctant to look after their cows and only riding around on their Hondas (D 1,10,11; DS 3; FD 4; Kas 7,8; M 2,11; Sul 2; WWY 1). Or, as one crop farmer claimed: "Instead of chasing the cows, they [the livestock keepers] were chasing our wives" (Kas 6). This seems to be representations made out of jealousy because of class differences: most farmers do not have the ability to buy Hondas.
In addition, the crop farmers stated the livestock keepers do not search any contact with them (FD 6,8; M 6). However, there is more contact between the two parties than the crop farmers want to show; during interviews, when they were asked about the contact they had with livestock keepers, they never mentioned they worked on the farms of livestock keepers.

Livestock keepers did mention this and it was confirmed by observation that this took place (D 5; M 9, 15; WWB 6). This underestimation of the amount of contact the crop farmers have with livestock keepers can imply experience the contact as too little or it can be interpreted as a strategy to get more attention for their case.

Livestock keepers about farmers

Livestock keepers sometimes blamed the crop farmers of talking too much about the problems or of exaggerating them. For instance, one of the livestock keepers said during a meeting about the problems that crop farmers do not try to prevent the cows from coming on their farms in the first place: they are hiding until the cows come and then take the livestock keepers to court (WWY 3). Other livestock keepers state crop farmers are sometimes even deliberately burning plots of land and pretending as if the livestock keepers did this, to get money from them (WWY 5).

In these two cases, the livestock keepers, just like crop farmers, represent themselves as victims. However they do not represent themselves as powerless: they are just victims of some harassment of crop farmers, but they do not lose their status because of this (WWY 5). Furthermore, these two cases are in Wara Wara Yagala, where the bye-laws are effective and where suing people to court is relatively easy. In other chiefdoms these reports seemed less, even though authorities there also confirm crop farmers can exaggerate in the way they describe the problems between the two parties (Sul 2; M 12).

7.2 Discourse of land users about cattle and land conflicts

Here the discourse crop farmers and livestock keepers have on the conflicts in Koinadugu will be discussed. First the discourse in case I, the case about the border and ownership problems will be mentioned in order to show how discourse is part of conflict.

> During several interviews with authorities in Diang Chiefdom, the problem of the property title to the land between Kasunko and Diang was mentioned. Because this seemed to be the most disputed property rights case in the district, it was decided to visit the place to experience the situation in the area and to do some direct interviews with persons involved.
> We started from Kafogo, a village next to the Mawolkor river. This village was in Kasunko Chiefdom and the persons interrogated claimed their chiefdom was also on the other side of the river, without having real arguments for this. Crossing the river through the water – in the rainy season a canoe is used for crossing people and goods - a small path led to some farms. These farms belonged to Kasunko people who farmed there because their forefathers received access from the forefathers of the present Diang people to farm on the other side of the river in exchange for the payment of taxes. Continuing the small path for around two hours in the direction of Sandia, the amount of land prepared for farming decreased; big swamps and flat upland parts were fallow. Apparently, scarcity was not what the issue was about, even though a Diang section chief claimed in a previous interview that the Diang people did not have enough farming land in that area anymore (D 3). The Diang people however still had the ability to farm there: the only difference was that Kasunko people who were farming in that same area did not pay their taxes to Diang anymore.
> When finally reaching some settlements, nobody was there, probably because of the secret society meeting going on in Kafogo or because of the weekly market in Fadugu. On the way back, experiencing the first heavy rains of the season, we crossed some people on the path. At first a group of four people on their way back to Sandia in Diang, carrying palm wine tapped by the Limba people of Kasunko. Starting about the ownership of the land, they knew about the matter and got furious: "How can those

Limba think they own this land? They just want to have Kondembaia [the capital of Diang Chiefdom]."

The next person we ran into was a palm wine tapper who was living in another district, but had come back for the secret society occasion. He was a Limba and came originally from the Kasunko side. According to him, the land was from the Diang people (so not of his 'own' Kasunko people), but because especially one Diang man in Lengekoro started making troubles, the Kasunko people decided to stop sending tax, palm wine and harvest to them.

Approaching the river again, we came across another group. They were living on the 'Diang' side of the river, but were themselves from Kasunko. They used to pay their taxes to Diang until the authorities in Kasunko Chiefdom told them to no longer do this, but pay them to Kasunko instead. They obeyed this, without being aware of what was actually going on.

The last group we met were Diang people who were also coming from the market in Fadugu. They were, just like the first group of Diang people, getting angry when talking about the matter, stating more or less the same as the first group did. Besides, they mentioned the Kasunko people probably wanted to profit of Diang's gold.

While the Diang people got heated when talking about the encroachment of *their* land, the Kasunko inhabitants seemed to be less agitated. They were obeying what the authorities said and following the discourse of the Kasunko authorities, while for the Diang people it was a question about ownership. This agitation can also be a part of an enforced discourse from the Diang side. This case shows that these different discourses, imposed by others or coming from people themselves, are part of the conflict. They are justifying their actions (not paying taxes, sending people away) with their own arguments that originate from discourses ("he was quarrelling", "we were here first"). Moreover, the discourses maybe 'hide' where they are really quarrelling about: gold instead of land.

Farmers about problems
With regard to the problems between the two parties, crop farmers can have the tendency to ethnicise the conflicts by only talking about Fula instead of livestock keepers (DS 4; FD 4; Kas 1,8; Sul 2,3,7,8). In Wara Wara Bafodia, the respondents did not distinguish between ethnical identities, but between permanent and nomadic livestock keepers, the latter causing more problems (WWB 9).

Another discourse among crop farmers was to only talk about the problems they faced with cows and not the problems they had with cane rats (also called cutting grass) or other small animals or ruminants that were causing problems, while the problems caused by the latter are, according to some, more serious than the problems caused by cows (Sul 7; WWB 8).

Moreover, it seemed that crop farmers tended to overestimate the problems. In one village, according to everyone, their biggest problems were cows destroying their rice and cassava just after harvest[42]. After asking who had experienced these destructions last harvesting season, it turned out to be nobody of the around fifteen crop farmers. Comparable was the interview in a village where the crop farmers stated there were around twenty werrehs around them. By stating "we try to talk with them, but they are not listening, because they have money", they were showing their victim position and the seriousness of the case. When

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[42] Just after harvest, the crops are piled on the farm. Before and just after harvest are the moments the cows are often damaging the crops (D 6). Besides, after harvest, there are also cases known of people stealing other people's harvest. Crop farmers often sleep on the farm around that time, because of this threat of stealing harvest overnight (Kab 12).

leaving for the nearest werreh however, it was more than ten miles off (Sul 7,8,9), while ten miles is the maximum cows can walk on one day (D 1). Therefore, the words the crop farmers expressed showed more their frustration and their feelings of powerlessness than the actual problems.

In Nomokoya, case III, the crop farmers first stated that *the* livestock keepers and *the* Fula were not keeping their promises to fence[43]. Instead, these livestock keepers were giving money to the paramount chief, bypassing the town and section chiefs. However, when asking more detailed questions, it turned out to be only one livestock keeper who acted this way (Sul 3).

These discourses can be seen in various ways. First, it can be a strategy to convince someone – a white researcher in these cases - of their problems. Second, it can also be that people want to have acknowledgment for their problems or they want others to understand their problems the way they understand, believe or perceive them.

In case IV for example, where a conflict meeting was interrupted by a crop farmer throwing burned products from his farm towards the section chief, it turned out that the man in the end was not only furious about the burning of his farm and the destroying of his fence. The next day, while having a conversation with the particular crop farmer and suspected livestock keeper, his fury turned out to be more about the livestock keeper's arrogant attitude and disrespect towards the crop farmer, by denying that it was his fault. Furthermore, he was angry that the livestock keeper was quickly hiding his cows in the bush upon arrival. This was visible, since the livestock keepers often settle on strategic places, so they can see people coming, but also the other way around: we could see them sending their cows into the bush as well. Sending his cattle away was a sign for the crop farmer the livestock keeper had something to hide: maybe he did not want to show the number of cows he possessed. This hiding predicted even more problems according to the crop farmer, since the cattle all needed fodder and the crop farmer's farm was the closest. The fact that the livestock keeper hid this "future problem" and was not honest made the situation even worse according to the crop farmer (Kas 3).

<u>Livestock keepers about problems</u>
Also livestock keepers set up discourses about the 'opposing' party. For example in one village the town chief found out the report of livestock keepers about maltreated cows in another village was false: no maltreated cows were to be found. According to the town chief, it was a retaliation act because of a report sent by the crop farmers about crop destruction of livestock keepers (D 7). Needless to say, with all these stories the origin of the source needs to be taken into account as well. In addition, as mentioned, the livestock keepers often stated they did not have any problems, but their family or their brothers did have some conflicts with crop farmers (M 2,16).

7.3 Other discourses
Here other discourses that are part of the conflicts will be analysed. These discourses often originate from of socio-cultural dispositions prevailing in the district.

7.3.1 Ethnicity
While Fyle (1983) stated that Fula arriving in Sierra Leone were culturally and linguistically absorbed, this seems not (anymore) the case in Koinadugu: on the contrary, as a consequence of the conflicts, ethnic identities are more emphasised.

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[43] In the rainy season, livestock keepers are according to some bye-laws, obliged to help the crop farmers with fencing their crops.

The ethnic division is not the same for all ethnicities however. The ethnic identity of Fula is more emphasised than that of other ethnicities. For example, Yalunka never talked with such a negative connotation about *the* Limbas or *the* Madingues. This can maybe be explained due to the difference in class the other ethnicities have with Fula. While the other ethnicities are more or less comparable regarding wealth, Fula are more upper class.

7.3.2 Mystical powers
In Koinadugu, the representations land users have about each other seem to be intensified by socio-cultural beliefs people have. In this case, this is mostly beliefs in mystical power. For instance, the reason why the number of cattle in Sengbeh Chiefdom is relatively low (see figure 4.1), is not only because of the thick forest, presence of tsetse fly or because inhabitants and the paramount chief do not stimulate livestock keepers to come. It also has to do with mystical influences. Since the inhabitants complained about the presence of livestock keepers a couple of years ago, leopards suddenly arrived in the chiefdom, killing cows. Different sources told these were human beings who could turn themselves into leopards (Seng 1,2; Kab 4,10). Because of this discourse about this chiefdom, not many livestock keepers will move to Sengbeh Chiefdom.
One NGO worker told me he once had problems with his personal rice harvest. He had gathered around thirty people to harvest for him the next day, but arriving at the farm the rice was had already been harvested during the night. He followed the traces of feet and rice and in the end he found the thieves. However, he would not have done this when he would have been in a Limba dominated area. According to him, Limba are certainly 'going to swear', which means they will use black magic against you (Kab 12). Also during another interview, respondents emphasised Limba are known for their black magic practices (WWB 2). However, this discourse seems not to be shared among Fula or at least the Fula seem not to care about this belief: in Limba chiefdoms even more cattle conflicts exist between crop farmers and Fula than in Yalunka or Kuranko chiefdoms.
In the area of case IV, one livestock keeper is known for possessing mystical powers. It is widely believed he can change himself into a cow when people search him because he has caused problems. In addition, he can also transform himself into a cow to steal other cows. Furthermore, when other livestock keepers come to his section without having asked permission, they will not have any offspring anymore (Kas 1,7; Kab 10). This widespread belief in this person's mystical powers is a discourse in itself, which gives him a powerful position, since nobody – authorities nor crop farmers nor his own sons - dares to speak up to him. It can be seen as a metaphor for his power. Out of this, it can be stated crop farmers who spread this discourse, are aware of their limitations: they can not fight someone who is stronger or more powerful than they are.

7.3.3 Ecological Change
Ecological change is normally seen as something measurable. However, because research done on ecological change is scarce and unreliable in Koinadugu District, ecological change has turned into a discourse. For example, in 1989, Valkenberg talked about deterioration of the soil. According to her in that time soil fertility was decreasing and erosion increasing because of cattle moving through the fields. Every year uncovered and trampled soil was blown away as well.
In addition, the fallow periods were lasting not as long as they used to due to increasing population pressure. This left less room for the forest to recover, which deteriorated the soil even more (DS 7; Valkenberg, 1989).
It is acknowledged that the slash and burn techniques of the crop farmers are, just like the burning for early grass or increasing soil fertility by respectively the livestock keepers and crop farmers, destructive for the environment on the long term (Kab 1; Chakanda 2009).

However, more than twenty years later, the soil in Koinadugu is still really fertile, even without the use of fertilisers (DS 7; Kas 2; M 11). This perceived soil deterioration is why NGOs like CARE, CAUSE (Kab 12) and CRS (Kab 14) have programmes to promote more sustainable ways of farming though.

In addition, crop farmers used ecological arguments against livestock keepers. They stated because of the increasing number of cows, there was more pressure on water in the swamps and the water was contaminating faster, especially in the dry season when people used to go to the swamp for their drinking water (WWB 5). Besides, according to other respondents, plots are drying out because of the cattle business (M 6). Even though evidence lacks whether this is true, it can be seen as another way of crop farmers to emphasise the disadvantages of the presence of livestock keepers. With this ecological argument, they can maybe get more attention of NGOs, who seem to be sensitive for ecological discourses.

What can be stated from all these representations and discourses is that crop farmers often want to illustrate their powerlessness by representing themselves as victims and the livestock keepers as ignoring the cases. Also the portrait of livestock keepers possessing mystical powers contributes to their discourse of a powerless position. Even though the crop farmers are sometimes indicated by livestock keepers as perpetrators as well, they still keep up their victim positioning. For example, cattle wounding is according to crop farmers a retaliatory act: they would not have done it without the crops being damaged first (Kab 20).

This difference in discursive strategies of different land users can be explained by several reasons. Crop farmers position themselves in a victim position because they are convinced they are supposed to have more power because they have property rights. Since they have in the end less access than livestock keepers, makes them portray these livestock keepers as 'the problem' of them not having access. Related to this, they have feelings of jealousy towards the livestock keepers, since the livestock keepers have the power, while being strangers. Furthermore, the crop farmers feel they are left alone by their own paramount chiefs.

Additionally, it is not only important to keep in mind *why* the different land users have different discourses, but also *to whom* they are disclosing these discourses and representations. In this case, this was to NGO workers and/or to a white researcher. As Leach *et al* (2001) mentioned, the representations land users give can be strategically in order to achieve their goals. This victim position and the ecological arguments can be interpreted as a strategy: by creating a dependent image or by emphasising environmental deterioration, crop farmers may have thought to have more chance to be helped by other actors. Yet this is probably not the only reason: they also want to have recognition for their problems, otherwise they would not have given their problems so much attention.

A last analysis about discourses is that the prevailing discourse disclosed to others does not necessarily need to be the only discourse. For instance, crop farmers preferred to stress the problems they had with Fula livestock keepers, than the problems they had with cane rats or among themselves about land or gold (D 5,6). The same goes for livestock keepers: problems among livestock keepers or between Fula were mostly only told when asking exhaustive questions (Sul 9; WWB 12; Kab 27). As mentioned in chapter 5, also local courts and the judgements of the court chairman have been perceived differently by different parties. While crop farmers stated they did not receive good compensation and the court chairmen were corrupt (DS 1, 3; D 4,8; FD 6,7; M 2; Sul 3; Kab 20), livestock keepers emphasised they needed to pay a lot of money to compensate crop damage (M 9,12; Sul 4; WWB 2,3). Court officials in Mongo Chiefdom argued the crop farmers just wanted to have more compensation than the damage done (M 16).

7.4 Solutions

During interviews, questions have been asked to respondents to come up with solutions for conflicts. This could be solutions to property or access problems, but also to problems between different land users, according to what was relevant during the interview. In this section the emphasis will be on the way people talk about solutions and the kind of solutions they come up with, because this says something about the discourse they have about the conflicts.

Land conflicts as property rights disputes and illegitimately gained access to land, were considered as less problematic than the 'cattle conflicts', the problems directly between the livestock keepers and crop farmers. The land conflicts were thought to be solved by strengthening of the bye-laws and creating awareness among strangers to show the right way to gain access to land. These solutions are foremost governance and process oriented, just like the one mentioned in literature by Toulmin (2005): formal registration of land ownership.

The question what would be possible solutions for cattle conflicts, was answered with many different options. This shows every community is likely to have its own solutions due to the circumstances. Besides, there seems to be a difference between livestock keepers and crop farmers in the way they look to solutions for the problems. Firstly, only six livestock keepers answered questions about solutions, because the rest stated there were no problems, so they could not come up with solutions either. Second, while crop farmers emphasised they want the intervention of authorities, better control, mutual respect and direct solutions as fencing and physical separation, livestock keepers were almost only indicating these direct solutions as valuable ones. These different solutions given stem from the difference in discourse about the conflicts. This can be shown in one of the incidents in setting IV.

> The livestock keeper in this case had asked the town chief permission to use the palm trees on the land owned by the same town chief. Yet, when arriving at the spot during a tour in the area, it turned out the livestock keeper did not only use the palm trees: he had also settled on the land. When confronting him with this appointment, the livestock keeper begged to be excused by giving the town chief a financial compensation. The town chief accepted his begging.
>
> A day later, the councillor confronted the Fula section head with the situation of illegitimate encroached land of the livestock keeper, who was the son of this section head. Also the section head immediately pulled out some banknotes and made an attempt to give them to the councillor. The councillor, however, did not accept the money and stated instead the Fula section head should go to the town chief to talk about the issue. His son had already given financial compensation; the section head's role was to prevent a similar conflict. Therefore, the section head should go and talk with the town chief to set up better regulations concerning these issues. The section head reacted this was a good idea, but the distance to the town chief was far. Meanwhile, he tried another time to give the banknotes to the councillor by saying he would talk about it with the town chief when he would see him the next time. The councillor was perseverant in not accepting the financial compensation however.

From this incident, it can be stated the discourse of different land users and authorities on how to solve the conflicts, is different. While the livestock keeper and the Fula section head (also a livestock keeper) took the line of least resistance by giving some money as compensation for the faults made, the councillor emphasised the process should be improved and the different parties should talk instead of only giving financial compensation. He wanted to come to a more structural solution for the problems. The town chief seemed to be quite satisfied with the financial compensation however: he was not in need for the land himself and like this he had even gained some money with his fallow land. He did not seem

to bother about a sustainable solution, what would officially be his task as a chief. However, he was already satisfied with his personal gain.

In the next part, the most mentioned solutions by respondents will be discussed (see figure 7.1). While mentioned the most by respondents, fencing is often contested by crop farmers. Crop farmers often stated they were not able to do this heavy job anymore, especially because they did not have any support of their children since they were going to school. Support from the livestock keepers was an informal arrangement that did not often work out according to the crop farmers (D 10,11). By stating this, the crop farmers are positioning themselves again as victims. In addition, when fencing is done, but the fences turn out to be not strong enough to resist cattle, the relations between the two land user groups can even aggravate. However, in Sulima Chiefdom for example, great effort has been put into fencing by both parties. The problems are considered as minor there, but it is difficult whether this is due to the fencing or maybe because of (a combination of) other factors, like the attitude of the paramount chief.

Like fencing, physical separation is also contested by some respondents, stating people will never leave their piece of land because of the special bonding they have with the land (Kas 6; WWB 9).

Bye-laws are also often mentioned as a possible solution. To make this a viable solution, respondents stated cooperation between and a behavioural change of authorities together with an improvement of the legal system are crucial.

Figure 7.1: Solutions to conflicts between livestock keepers and crop farmers

Note: number of solutions mentioned is 91, but the number of interviews where these solutions derive from is 39: some respondents proposed multiple solutions.

The intervention of authorities was mostly mentioned by crop farmers, stating they did not have enough power to change the present situation. However, according to one councillor, paramount chiefs should intervene less. They should take their hands off the court, so that

the court and the court chairmen are not influenced by them anymore. The paramount chiefs should not be the only ones to have the technical know-how to put a court in place. Moreover, they should not be allowed to recommend a chairman anymore, because this implies there are never other candidates besides for the one the paramount chief put forward, since nobody disobeys the paramount chief (DS 3).

The solution 'mutual respect' is explained properly by a councillor. He mentioned the conflicting parties should "Make fun, drink some cow milk and poyo[44] and solve issues like that. Just be good neighbours" (Kas 7).

Under 'other' solutions are solutions that are only mentioned by one or two respondents, like constructing a dike or dam to have more water upland so cows do not need to go to the swamp for drinking water and giving more voice to local people. One expert in conservation agriculture, who visited the project, mentioned the option of growing extra fodder crops for cows to keep them separated from crops and to give them more nutritional fodder (Kab 1). However, the major constraint of this solution is that this demands a shift in lifestyle from livestock keepers; they would need to become even more sedentarised than they are now.

The abovementioned solutions can be ordered roughly into three categories. At first the practical and direct solutions: fencing, physical separation and leaving of the livestock keepers. Secondly, solutions that are focused on the improvement of governance or the issuing of rules are mentioned, like better control, a maximum amount of werrehs in the chiefdom and bye-laws. Lastly, process oriented solutions are mentioned: the intervention of authorities and NGOs and mutual respect.

These last two categories – governance and process - seem to be related to the wish for having a better pro-conflict set up how to deal with the conflicts. They are relatively more mentioned by crop farmers than by livestock keepers what shows their longing for a fixed procedure of what to do when problems arise. They probably opt more for these kinds of solutions to reduce the power-based decisions and induce a return to a rights-based society. This would be an advantage for crop farmers, since they possess more (land) rights than livestock keepers.

In addition, intervention of other authorities and better functioning of bye-laws would change the position of both land users: crop farmers do not need their victim representation anymore, while livestock keepers have clearer indications what to do instead of immediately bribing chiefs. For example, some stated the farmers and livestock keepers should go back to the time when they were settling the problems among themselves. By that time, there was still mutual respect and the problems were settled on a friendly level. This could be step number one in a procedure for problem solution, instead of directly going to court (DS 5; WWY 5).

7.5 Concluding remarks

Representations and discourse are part of cattle and land conflicts. The discourses and representations show people tend to have a more negative image of 'the other' and a positive image of the 'self'. Crop farmers see themselves as the original people who have become victim of this situation wherein livestock keepers have more power in the sense of access to natural resources, but also in access to governance than they have. They are passive: they see themselves as incapable to change the situation. Livestock keepers, often not acknowledging the problems between the land users, can portray themselves also as victims: the crop farmers lure the cattle in order to get more compensation. However, they do not portray themselves as powerless or passive.

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[44] Poyo is the local term for palm wine.

Furthermore, both groups often tend to emphasise their own problems in comparison to the problems of the other. In addition, both land user groups talk more about the problems they have with another ethnicity than about the problems they have among people with the same ethnic identity or with other animals than cattle.

With their discursive strategies, both parties try to get acknowledgment for their situation, but also show how they perceive the conflicts. Crop farmers perceive the conflicts as more severe than livestock keepers. They also suggest more solutions, which contain more procedural changes and the intervention of other actors. The livestock keepers mostly stated there were no problems, so also no solutions could be proposed.

With the finishing of this chapter, all different layers indicated to construct the conflict, have been analysed. The next chapter will therefore come back to the main research question and present the main conclusions and points of discussion.

8. Conclusion and Discussion

This chapter aims to reflect on the main findings from the desk top research, internship and fieldwork. Furthermore, this chapter will answer the sub and main questions posed in chapter 3. The chapter will end with a discussion and recommendations.

8.1 Conclusion

The main research question of this thesis was:

How are conflicts over cattle and land in Koinadugu District constructed and how are these conflicts related to the historical context and changes in socioeconomic conditions and governance structures?

To answer this question, the sub questions (see chapter 3) will be treated first, followed by the main research question. The sub questions partly answer and help to answer the main research question.

This thesis is written with a political ecology and constructivist approach. The political ecology theory assumes conflicts do not derive solely from increasing resource scarcity. Rather, also surrounding actors and factors should be taken into account as part of the conflict. Since this thesis is focused on the construction of conflicts and the role of history, socioeconomic and governance changes in this, a political ecology was considered as the most useful theoretical approach for studying the cattle and land conflicts in Koinadugu District.

Furthermore, a constructivist approach has been chosen since the conflicts in Koinadugu District can not be seen as static and containing one truth: different actors construct various truths in changing contexts. Therefore a discursive layer is added to the already mentioned three factors – historical context, socioeconomic conditions and governance structures – forming part of the construction of conflicts and analysing the discursive construction of conflicts.

Perspective on conflicts
As shown, conflicts in Koinadugu can have many different forms: from conflicts about property because of the presence of minerals as gold, to conflicts about crop destruction by cattle and illegitimate access to land by strangers. The main distinction can be made between conflicts over land, including property rights and access cases, and conflicts over cattle.
The most common form of conflict in Koinadugu District, where crop farmers and livestock keepers form almost the whole population, is the cattle conflict between livestock keepers and crop farmers about, among others, crop damage. Yet when studying the conflicts better it is often not only conflict about increasing scarcity of natural resources. Most conflicts have different layers and insight in the power and access structures is important for understanding the conflicts.

Involved actors and changing governance structures
In a society where laws are fluid, it is the attitude and feelings of responsibility of individual people, especially powerful ones, which counts. Not mentioned in literature, it is shown in this thesis though that studying actors' personal attitudes and the way they execute their task or function is necessary for acquiring an in depth understanding on the conflicts. When powerful persons are in favour of creating peace and stability in their area of work, they have the ability to change situations.

A major development influencing the cattle and land conflicts has been the post-war decentralisation of the government. The arrival of the council in the chiefdoms has, together with the influx of NGOs and foreign investors after the war, emphasised governance is not solely the concern of the government. At present, not only the chieftaincy and the national government in Freetown, but also other actors are involved in governing the country. That these practices of governance are never neutral as Nuijten (2004) states, seems to be confirmed in the case of Koinadugu. Councillors, taking over part of the tasks of chiefs, are often not welcomed warmly in the chiefdoms, especially not by the paramount chiefs who see their power wither away. Expected to improve livelihoods of people, transnational polities like NGOs can have a controversial position in the conflicts due to their emphasis on problems and problem solving and their thinking in dichotomies.
Foreign investors, willing to pay to get access to land for mining or agriculture purposes, are up till now always accepted in chiefdoms. Yet it is doubted whether authorities and the local population are aware of the (long term) consequences of these foreign investors. Moreover, their influx has resulted and will result probably even more in the future, in a growing awareness of the value of land with its consequences.
These changing governance structures and increasing 'institutional multiplicity' can on the one hand be judged as positive, since people are less dependent on one actor: in case of problems people can go forum shopping to try to find the actor who suits their needs best.
On the other hand, the decentralisation has resulted in strife among different actors and in less clear tasks, which creates confusion among the actors and among the population. Moreover, following Drezner (2006), an increase in international institutions can shift a society into a power-based instead of a rule-based one. This influences the conflicts negatively since power is unequally distributed in Koinadugu District.

However, the impact of the increasing actor pluralism is up till now low: chiefs and court chairmen are still playing a big role in the conflicts. When the chiefs are actively engaged and bye-laws are actively incorporated, the conflicts seem to diminish. The inconvenient truth however seems to be that chiefs in particular are mostly not actively engaged in incorporating these laws. They are the ones who profit the most of the 'midnight businesses' that are taking place to gain access to chiefdoms or to settle conflicts. The upcoming of more institutions did thus not (yet) lead to corrections of the corrupt chiefs: some of them can still be identified as decentralised despots (Mamdani, 1996). The pre-war gerontocracy, identified as one of the factors causing the war, has thus not been broken down yet.

Historical and socioeconomic changes

Major developments that have influenced the conflicts are, when looking at the historical perspective, the colonial regime and the recent war. The colonial regime has influenced the conflict since this was the moment paramount chiefs have been installed in the chiefdoms. Appointed as custodian of the land, the paramount chiefs had the ability to influence the way the mainly family owned land is managed, which makes their position in land disputes a powerful one.

The war has influenced the conflicts especially in the sense of changing social relations. This is, mostly due to reordering processes taking place in the aftermath of the war. After the war, crop farmers had to accept the return of the Fula livestock keepers, who mostly fled to Guinea during the war. While the crop farmers were impoverished since they were hardly able to farm during the war, the livestock keepers came back with herds sometimes bigger than before. This is in contradiction with the non-Fula livestock keepers, who mostly stayed in Sierra Leone during the war and lost all their cattle due to rebel attacks or hungry people. The war has thus resulted in an ethnic differentiation of the possession of cattle. This seems to induce feelings of jealousy towards the Fula: while being an ethnic group without land, they are richer and (therefore) more powerful than the landowning crop farmers in the district. The possession of a metaphorical stick out of the bundle of power is thus more important than a stick out of the bundle of rights.

In addition, another change that influences the conflicts is the decreased control of the cattle, because of several reasons. At first, the werrehs (paddocks) have not been rebuilt by the livestock keepers, so the cattle are no longer kept in paddocks at night. Secondly, the end of the war had as a consequence the arrival of development organisations. Stimulating the population to educate their children, the control of the cows has decreased since this is traditionally a task of the young boys. Because of fewer cowboys in the family, herders are increasingly hired, which is positive in the sense of more control, but also brings negative consequences with it: they do not have power to decide over the cattle and they feel less responsible.

Role of discourse

Even though the construction of truth in courts is not necessarily in favour of livestock keepers – crop farmers possess the property rights and livestock keepers are still considered strangers – their wealthy status and the advantages of their presence for chiefdoms and chiefdom authorities, makes powerful actors often decide in favour of these land users. This confirms Foucault's statement that truth is not outside power. Because especially paramount chiefs and court chairman are charged with what counts as true, livestock keepers profit of their dominant discourse.

While farmers positioned themselves as victims and seemed to overstate the seriousness of the conflicts, the livestock keepers denied problems with their cattle and seemed to understate the problems. Crop farmers saw livestock keepers as people who were more

interested in other jobs or motorbikes than into looking after their cattle. Livestock keepers, although not talking as much about the 'other' as the farmers tended to do, stated the crop farmers were exaggerating the problems or creating them themselves by deliberately allowing cows on their farm.

These discourses and representations land users have about themselves, the other and the conflict, are part of the construction of conflict. The two different land users have opposite ways to construct conflict. The crop farmers want to solve problems, but are powerless, while they think they should be the ones with the power since they hold property rights. At the same time, the livestock keepers do not see any problems and seem not to be willing to change their behaviour either. Their different ways of coping with problems are part of the construction of the conflict. Since these ways of coping and solutions to change the situation are contrary, the conflicts can even aggravate because of these different discourses.

Difference between communities

When studying differences between villages where conflicts occur and villages where no conflicts occur, while both are having crop farmers and livestock keepers in the neighbourhood, the first difference has an economic nature. If another economic activity is present in the chiefdom besides mainstream activities as crop farmers and livestock keeping, the problems seem to be less. For instance, because of the presence of a mineral resource like gold for crop farmers, cattle problems are perceived as less catastrophic, because their income is not only dependent on their harvest. However, one needs to take into account that the presence of mineral resources and the consequently arriving foreign investors can increase other problems, especially regarding ownership over land.

Moreover, governance is influencing the conflicts: as already mentioned, when authorities or powerful individuals are actively engaged in solving problems between land users, the problems are more likely to be solved than when powerful actors care more about their own benefit than about the striving land users.

Third, related to the former, the implementation of bye-laws plays a role in explaining differences between communities. When bye-laws are properly put in place, when they receive acknowledgment and support of all different users and when there is a possibility for making adjustments according to societal, ecological or other changes, the problems in communities tend to be less.

Finally, geopolitical factors have also influence on differences in conflicts. The closer to the main cities or villages in the district, the easier to complain about problems and the more chance an authority will get involved in the problems. However, this does not necessarily need to be an advantage regarding corruption and the personal gains of authorities within conflicts. The problems in remote areas seems to be more related to governance issues: crop farmers there often fume at the absence of the paramount chief in solving their problems, while the problems closer to the highway or headquarters have more to do with problems because of increasing 'urbanisation' and 'desire for connectedness'. Thus this geopolitical difference is not as much a difference in the number of conflicts, but more in the type of conflicts.

Diversity in solutions

Population increase, more demand for agricultural products and a decrease of the amount of grazing grounds. These prospects for Koinadugu District seem not to be positive for decreasing the number of conflicts. One respondent did not expect to have cattle in Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom anymore in fifteen years. Not because the landowners and/or crop farmers will send them away, but simply because not enough grassland will be left (Kab 20).

However, as this research has shown, it is not only the increasing scarcity of natural resources that is resulting in conflict. Therefore, other developments as the ongoing

decentralisation process, the introduction and consolidation of bye-laws and the accountability of actors seem to be even more important than the prospected increasing scarcity.

According to respondents, problems before the war were solved among the disputants. As a consequence of reordering processes, especially crop farmers are not satisfied anymore with the way problems are dealt with at present. Solutions to the problems, given by respondents can be categorised into three different types. The first ones were direct solutions, as fencing and sending the livestock keepers away. The second type was more governance oriented, to improve governance structures as bye-laws, while the last one was focused on procedural issues like the intervention of authorities and mutual respect. The emphasis on procedural and governance solutions by especially crop farmers and local authorities indicates there is a demand for the regulation of the conflict.

<u>Constructing cattle and land conflicts and their relations with history and governance and socioeconomic change</u>

The aforementioned reflections on the data and answers to the sub questions will help to answer the main question. The interconnectedness of politics and the environment as stated by political ecology has been shown throughout this research. Conflicts in Koinadugu are not constructed as may be believed at first sight; the conflicts are not only about (increasing) scarcity of natural resources. Following the neo-Malthusian theory, increasing population will lead to a decrease in farming land, while the demand for crops will be higher. This increasing scarcity will lead to conflicts over land and over, in the case of Koinadugu, cattle. However, this thesis shows the land and cattle conflicts are not the worst in the areas where the scarcity is the highest. Therefore, it is argued that, in order to get a complete image of the construction of conflicts, not only scarcity needs to be taken into account, but also other actors, factors and processes and the (discourse of) the land users. This image will not be the same for all conflicts: even though every conflict can be placed in the general historical, socioeconomic and governance context of Koinadugu District and Sierra Leone, the conflicts need to be analysed on themselves as well to get a complete overview of the dynamics. Furthermore, in every conflict discourses and representations of the actors can differ. In short, cattle and land conflicts consist of multiple agencies, perspectives and layers.

Changes within the layers of conflict have their impact on the cattle and land conflicts. However, simultaneously, it works also the other way around: the conflicts themselves also change the socioeconomic conditions, governance structures and discourses and representations. For example, conflicts seem to emphasise ethnic identities of land users, they spread discord among different actors and as a consequence of the conflicts NGOs set up projects in the district. The influence of these projects cannot be properly analysed though since their involvement is relatively new in the district.

With regard to the historical context, both the colonial legacy and the recent historical context of Sierra Leone influence the conflicts. Socioeconomic factors that, among others, influence the conflicts are the increase of the quantity and quality of education and the diversification of economic activities. While the latter takes place among livestock keepers, crop farmers are still mostly having farming as their only economic activity, which makes their socioeconomic position fragile.

Actor pluralism because of the influx of foreign investors, the arrival of international and local NGOs and the arrival of the council due to decentralisation, also changes the conflictscape in Koinadugu. The influx of foreign investors predicts more land conflicts on property rights, which is not a major problem for now.

Concerning governance processes, the legal system and access systems play a role. Because of the fluidity of laws, individual actors and the way they execute their function are important. Moreover, it is more important who has the bundle of power than the bundle of rights: power is not or no longer rooted in property rights to land. Access to property is more important than property rights themselves (Ribot, 1998; Sikor and Lund, 2009; Ribot and Peluso, 2003). The grey zone between what people have rights to and what they actually have access to, seems to be crucial in understanding the conflict in Koinadugu. Livestock keepers have no property rights to resources since they are not from landowning families and therefore still have the status of 'stranger' although their presence in the district is now exceeding hundred years. However, while crop farmers possess all the sticks in the bundle of rights as landowners, livestock keepers have in the end more (financial) means to get access to the sticks or to people who have access to the sticks in the bundle of powers. Therefore, these livestock keepers are able to derive benefits from resources without holding property rights to them. Because of this ability to access social power, they are prevailing over the (landowning) crop farmers and are more likely to win the battle.

8.2 Discussion

In chapter 3, a general discussion is held on the methodology used in this thesis. This section will reflect upon the whole research. Firstly, because of time and access constraints, not the whole district of Koinadugu has been visited. Nevertheless, the number of chiefdoms visited and the number of interviews held, indicates the image of Koinadugu shown in this thesis is a truthful one.

The main theory used is the theory of political ecology. This theory foremost focuses on the relation between politics and the environment, taking into account historical and social changes. This thesis has shown that, even though not treated directly in the political ecology theory, the role of discourse should not be underestimated. This means not the whole thesis could be linked to this theory, since even the political ecology theory does not fit totally to the specific situation in Koinadugu. As a result, it is difficult to put the problems in a wider context: generalisations are difficult when conflicts are environment specific. However, as Mitchell (1983) stated, even within a case-study approach, generalisations about the dynamics or processes can be made.

A characteristic of qualitative research is the double hermeneutic Giddens (1984: xxxii) talks about. According to him, in qualitative research, a "mutual interpretative interplay between social science and those whose activities compose its subject matter" can be distinguished. The construction of conflicts in this thesis has been influenced by this double hermeneutic and by the way qualitative way information has been gathered: via semi-structured interviews with actors who were often involved in the conflicts and via observation.

The main challenge in this thesis is to understand the subjectivity of the respondents – their discourses – and to come to an understanding why they use certain discourses and representations. Furthermore, when analysing these narratives, it needs to be taken into account that the double hermeneutic can have influenced respondents' discourses.

It was not planned on forehand to study these discourses and representations, because the topic did not focus directly on this factor. However, during the research it was found out that this factor was part of the conflict, therefore it has been incorporated. The delayed stage of incorporation seems not to be a problem though: discourse is not something one can purposely ask questions about.

Another point of discussion that is also already mentioned under the answering of the first sub question is the influence of NGOs in these types of conflicts. Before going to Sierra Leone, CARE sent some documents. In these, they emphasised the seriousness of the problems

(CARE, 2008). However, upon arrival, these conflicts seemed to be less pressing than what the document led to believe. The image NGOs create of situations and the way they deal with problems can also influence the discourse and behaviour of local population. Yet, because the NGOs are a relatively new actor in the conflictscape of Koinadugu, their impact is not that high. Their increasing influence can be both positive and negative for the nearby future. Positive because they can help trying to find solutions and having the means to actually change something. Negative, since NGOs' behaviour can create segregation between different land users and worsen situations. The international community needs to be aware of their potential influence when getting involved in conflicts: they need to be 'conflict sensitive' (Brown *et al*, 2009).

One of the most important ways of changing cattle and land conflicts seems to be to make authorities more accountable. This implies a whole societal change however, especially of the role of paramount chiefs, where Richards (2004) already pleaded for after the war to prevent returning to the situation that caused the war. Further research on options and possibilities of returning authorities is interesting and perhaps necessary to come to effective solutions for the problems in Koinadugu District.

8.3 Recommendations
Recommendations to mitigate or decrease conflicts are not ready-made. Per conflict it needs to be investigated how the conflict is constructed, what the different layers of the conflict are, in which context it should be seen and what possible solutions exist to reduce problems. Moreover, there is not one recipe for solving conflicts: even though similarities between conflicts exist, every conflict is constructed in its own way and none has a clearly defined begin or endpoint. This makes solving cattle and land conflicts difficult, since it is never sure whether it can break out again, especially in a conflictscape as Koinadugu District.
Concerning land conflicts, more formal land registration as Toulmin (2005) advises can be an option to avoid property rights problems and future problems with foreign investors. A more challenging task would be to decrease the 'gifting' in exchange for access from strangers to authorities in the chiefdom.
In addition, it is important to keep track of developments of foreign investors in Koinadugu District and the implications of these foreign investments on land issues, since the property rights of valuable pieces of land for foreign investors – mineral rich land or large plots of mechanically cultivable land – will probably become more important. Related to this, it seems to be important to make people more aware of the especially long term consequences of giving land to foreign investors. A recommendation would be to investigate more on the prospected arrival of foreign investors and the long term consequences of foreign investments in land.
With regards to the solutions given for cattle conflicts, it was clear there is a demand for (re)instating procedures of problem solving. Decreasing conflict can probably be done by (re)creating mutual respect and clarifying where and to whom to go when problems occur, since this has become unclear during the decentralisation and reordering process. Physical solutions as (life) [45] fencing and physical separations can be recommended as 'quick' solutions, but maybe not sustainable ones.
Bye-laws, being the most important and relevant regulations present, seem to be crucial to legally support these procedures. Yet it needs to be stressed they will only be effective when all the different stakeholders will be involved: without legitimisation of all the different parties, they will become as powerless as most property rights are for crop farmers at present. This strengthening needs to be done however in a combination with an increase in

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[45] Life fences are fences made of natural materials: bushes, small trees, crops et cetera.

accountability of authorities, especially paramount chiefs and court chairmen. Because when bye-laws are properly implemented, but court chairmen are still postponing cases of crop farmers until they give up or when chiefs can still instruct the police to halt investigations on powerful people (Castillejo, 2009), strengthening the customary law system will not be effective.

One last remark regarding solutions is that this thesis has shown that power and access are influencing cattle and land conflicts in Koinadugu. When one wants to mitigate or decrease conflicts, it needs to be made certain that powerful people or people with access to power have more interest in solving problems than in continuing them, which is at present not always the case.

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Annexes

Annex I: Data Collection Overview Interviews

Remarks:
1. The data is ordered per chiefdom. In the thesis, the abbreviation together with the number of the interview is used.
2. Explication 'type of interview':
    Individual   : 1-3 persons
    Group   : everybody who is coming
    Group – meeting   : data gathered from a meeting (mostly organized by NGOs or the ONS)
    Informal   : not via questionnaire, often unplanned short conversations
3. Names have not been mentioned out of privacy considerations. Only functions are mentioned.
4. Although often mentioned as 'town chief', the town chief is also most often crop farmer.
5. When mentioned crop farmers in a group meeting, this was the dominant occupation. Sometimes there were also traders or people with other occupations present.

Dembelia Sinkunia (DS, number)				
No	**Date**	**Village**	**Type of Interview**	**Function respondent(s)**
1	19-11-09	Mannah II	Group	Crop farmers, members FFS
2	19-11-09	Jedia	Group	Crop farmers, members FFS
3	9-12-09	Sinkunia	Individual	Councillor
4	24-01-10	Gbindi	Individual	Cattle and crop farmer
5	24-01-10	Gbindi	Individual	Cattle and crop farmer
6	24-01-10	Gbindi	Individual	Town chief Gbindi
7	7-4-10	Sinkunia	Individual	Paramount chief

Diang (D, number)				
No	**Date**	**Village**	**Type of interview**	**Function respondent(s)**
1	10-3-10	Kondembaia	Individual	Councillor
2	10-3-10	Kondembaia	Individual	Paramount Chief
3	11-3-10	Kondembaia	Group	Section chief Lengekoro
4	11-3-10	Kania	Group	Town chief and crop farmers
5	11-3-10	Between Kania and Woroworia	Group	Werreh inhabitants 3 werrehs
6	11-3-10	Bengekoro	Group	Town chief and crop farmers
7	11-3-10	Yarah	Group	Town chief and crop farmers
8	11-3-10	Between Yarah and Yissaia	Individual	Werreh owner
9	11-3-10	Yarah	Individual - informal	Employee Dutch company selling mining plants to Lion Mining Ltd.
10	12-3-10	Kamajimbo	Group	Two town chiefs and crop farmers
11	12-3-10	Lengekoro	Group	Town chief and crop farmers
12	14-3-10	Kabala	Individual	Councillor and Honourable
13	1-5-10	Between Kafogo	Individual	Farmers – Diang

No	Date	Village	Type of Interview	Function respondent(s)
		and Sandia		
14	1-5-10	Between Kafogo and Sandia	Individual	Poyo collector –Kasunko
15	1-5-10	Between Kafogo and Sandia	Individual	Farmers - Kasunko
16	1-5-10	Kamajimbo	Individual - informal	Two town chiefs
17	1-5-10	Lengekoro	Group - informal	Crop farmers
18	1-5-10	Lengekoro	Individual - informal	Imam

Folosaba Dembelia (FD, number)				
No	Date	Village	Type of Interview	Function respondent(s)
1	18-11-09	Musaia Junction	Group	Crop farmers, members FFS
2	8-12-09	Musaia	Group -Meeting	Participants local convention
3	9-12-09	Musaia	Individual	Councillor, chairman cattle settlement committee
4	22-4-10	Musaia Junction	Individual	Youth chairman
5	22-4-10	Musaia	Individual	Paramount chief, chiefdom administrative clerk Neya and town chief Musaia
6	23-4-10	Karimuya	Group	Crop farmers
7	23-4-10	Musaia	Individual	Local NGO worker
8	23-4-10	Laboya	Group	Crop farmers, members FFS

Kasunko (Kas, number)				
No	Date	Village	Type of Interview	Function respondent(s)
1	4-12-09	Kagbasia	Group -Meeting	Meeting livestock keepers and crop farmers
2	11-2-10	Kagbasia	Group - meeting	Meeting livestock keepers and crop farmers
3	12-2-10	Werreh I (close Kagbasia)	Individual	Werreh owner
4	12-2-10	Werreh II (more remote)	Individual	Werreh owner
5	13-2-10	Werreh III	Individual	Werreh owner, Fula tribal head
6	17-2-10	Kakarima	Group - meeting	Crop farmers
7	26-2-10	Fadugu	Individual – informal	Councillor
8	12-3-10	Kafoko	Group – informal	Crop farmers

Mongo (M, number)				
No	Date	Village	Type of interview	Function respondent(s)
1	2-3-10	Mongo - Bendugu	Individual	Section chief

2	2-3-10	Mongo – Bendugu	Individual	Crop farmer, Chairlady VDC
3	2-3-10	Mongo – Bendugu	Individual – Informal	police officer Mongo-Bendugu division
4	3-3-10	Mongo-Bendugu	Group -meeting	Crop farmers and livestock keepers
5	3-3-10	Serria	Individual	Town chief
6	3-3-10	Lensenia	Group	Town speaker and crop farmers
7	3-3-10	Lensenia	Group	Female crop farmers
8	3-3-10	Werreh I –Lensenia	Individual	Werreh owner
9	3-3-10	Werreh II – Lensenia	Individual	son of werreh owner
10	4-3-10	Mongo – Bendugu	Individual	youth leader
11	4-3-10	Mongo - Bendugu	Individual	councillor
12	4-3-10	Mongo-Bendugu	Individual	Court chairman and Court Clerk
13	4-3-10	Gbongbongdon	Group	2nd town chief and crop farmers
14	4-3-10	Gbongbongdon	Group	Female crop farmers
15	4-3-10	Gbongbondon Werreh I	Individual	Werreh owner
16	4-3-10	Gbongbondon Werreh II	Individual	Werreh owner

Sengbeh (Seng, number)

No	Date	Village	Type of interview	Function respondent(s)
1	17-11-10	Foronaia	Group	Crop farmers, members FFS
2	10-12-09	Bambukoro	Individual	Chiefdom speaker
3	5-2-10	Furunaya	Individual	Head master Furanaya Primary School
4	17-3-10	Kabala	Individual	Chiefdom speaker

Sulima (Sul, number)

No	Date	Village	Type of interview	Function respondent(s)
1	7-4-10	Sinkunia	Group - informal	Shopowners and visitors shops
2	7-4-10	Falaba	Individual	Paramount Chief
3	8-4-10	Nomokoya	Group	Youth chairman, mummy queen and crop farmers
4	8-4-10	Nomokoya – Werreh	Individual	Werreh owner
5	8-4-10	Dokoto-Fula (werreh)	Individual	Werreh owner
6	8-4-10	Simitia	Individual	Chiefdom speaker, section chief, townchief and some elders
7	9-4-10	Gberio Timbaku	Group	Section chief, crop farmer and others
8	9-4-10	Gberio Timbaku	Group	Female crop farmers, Mummy queen
9	9-4-10	Modubaya - Werreh	Group	Werreh owner and other werreh population
10	11-4-10	Kabala	Individual	Former NGO worker

No	Date	Village	Type of interview	Function respondent(s)
11	11-4-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	Veterinary Officer – MAFFS
12	12-4-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	NGO worker
13	16-4-10	Kabala	Individual	Councillor

Wara Wara Bafodia (WWB, number)				
No	Date	Village	Type of interview	Function respondent(s)
1	23-03-10	Kakamba	Group	Village chief and crop farmers
2	23-3-10	Bafodia	Individual	Courtclerk Bafodia and headteacher primary school
3	23-3-10	Bafodia	Individual - informal	Courtclerk Bafodia
4	24-3-10	Bafodia	Individual	Treasury clerk
5	24-3-10	Sememaia	Group	Crop farmers
6	24-3-10	Werreh I (Sememaia)	Individual	Werreh owners and others
7	1-4-10	Taelia	Individual	Retired Reverend
8	1-4-10	Taelia	Individual	Employee ONS and Journalist radio Bintumani
9	2-4-10	Taelia	Individual	Chiefdom speaker, Section chief, Headteacher
10	2-4-10	Mandia	Group	Village chief, section chief and crop farmers
11	2-4-10	Taelia	Individual – informal	Chief Agricultural Tracking Survey
12	2-4-10	Werreh (close to Serekude)	Individual	Cattle owner and others

Wara Wara Yagala (WWY, number)				
No	Date	Village	Type of interview	Function respondent(s)
1	18-11-09	Kamabonkai	Group	Crop farmers, FFS members
2	23-11-09	Kabala	Individual	Councillor
3	14-12-09	Yataya	Group	Participants local convention
4	14-12-09	Yataya	Individual	Court chairman
5	8-01-10	Werreh Kabala	Individual	Sons of werreh owner
6	12-01-10	Kabala	Individual	Supervisor local court
7	18-01-10	Kabala	Individual	Veterinary officer MAFFS
8	6-2-10	Kabala	Individual	Werreh caretaker
9	26-3-10	Werreh – Yataya road	Individual	Werreh owner
10	26-3-10	Katauya – Werreh	Individual	Werreh member
11	28-3-10	Kabala – behind hills	Individual	Werreh owner

Kabala (Kab, number)

No	Date	Place	Type of interview	Function respondent(s)
1.	20-11-09	Kabala	Individual - informal	Representative Howard G. Buffett Foundation
2.	23-11-09	Kabala	Individual	Fula Tribal Head Kabala
3.	23-11-09	Kabala	Individual	Councillor
4	9-01-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	Veterinary officer - MAFFS
5	12-01-10	Kabala	Individual	Supervisor local court Koinadugu District
6	13-01-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	NGO worker
7	18-01-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	Veterinary officer - MAFFS
8	26-01-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	NGO worker
9	26-01-10	Kabala	Individual	District council chairman
10	1-2-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	NGO worker
11	2-2-10	Kabala	Group - meeting	MAFFS and NGO representatives
12	3-2-10	Kabala	Individual	NGO worker
13	4-2-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	NGO worker
14	4-2-10	Kabala	Individual	NGO worker
15	6-2-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	cattle caretaker and trader
16	15-2-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	District council chairman
17	15-2-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	Council employee
18	15-2-10	Kabala	Individual	Supervisor local court Koinadugu District
19	9-3-10	Kabala	Individual	Mining officers Ministry of Mineral Resources
20	17-3-10	Kabala	Individual	Chairman crop farmers Wara Wara Yagala
21	26 and 27-3-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	Conflict sensitivity consultant
22	11-4-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	Former NGO worker
23	11-4-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	Veterinary Officer – MAFFS
24	12-4-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	NGO worker
25	13-4-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	NGO worker
26	15-4-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	NGO worker
27	15-4-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	Werreh owners
28	16-4-10	Kabala	Individual	Deputy chief administrator
29	24-4-10	Kabala	Individual - informal	NGO workers

30	28-4-10	Kabala	Individual – informal	NGO worker
31	29-4-10	Kabala	Individual	Manager MAFFS
32	29-4-10	Kabala	Individual - informal	Extension officer MAFFS

Other (O, number)				
No	**Date**	**Place**	**Type of interview / meeting**	**Function respondent(s)**
1	14-01-10	Yinkisa Junction	Individual	Manager Addax sugarcane factory
2	15-01-10	Yinkisa Junction	Individual	Mechanic Addax
3	15-01-10	Yinkisa Junction	Individual	Town chief
4	23/2/10	Freetown	Group - meeting	Meeting formulation national land policy formulation and implementation process.
5	24/2/10	Freetown	Individual	Consultant UNDP, Lecturer Fourah Bay College
6	25/2/10	Freetown	Individual	peace and conflict lecturer Fourah Bay College
7	25/2/10	Freetown	Individual	Two NGO workers

Annex II: Map Koinadugu with conflict case studies

KOINADUGU DISTRICT

Rep. Of Guinea

Rep. Of Guinea

Dembelia Sinkunia

Sulima

Folosaba Dembelia

Sengbeh

Mongo

Neya

Wara Wara Yagala

Nenie

Wara Wara Bafodia

Kasunko

Diang

Legend

· Koinadugu settlements
▪ District headquarters
△ Built up areas
A + B road network
Feeder roads
Main rivers
Lakes

○ Main mining area
○ Case I Kasunko - Diang Chiefdom
○ Case II Lengekoro - Kamajimbo (Diang Chiefdom)
○ Case III Kagbasia and surroundings (Kasunko Chiefdom)
○ Case IV Nomokoya (Sulima Chiefdom)
| Chiefdom boundary (foll. river)
| Chiefdom boundary
National boundary_2004

Scale 1:250.000
Scale only applies if map is printed in original size (36x28 inches)
Kilometers
0 5 10 20 30 40 50

SLIS Map
Code 0123
21 July 2008

This map has been produced by DACO / SLIS - Sierra Leone Information System

Annex III: Topic lists

Topic list crop farmers
1. Origin and migration
2. War
   - Locality during war
   - Changes after war
3. Income: crops, cattle, other activities
   - Crops: type of crops, type of land, size plots, harvests
   - Animals: type, numbers, use, care taking
   - Other sources of income
   - Harvesting calendar
   - Cost-benefit analysis
   - Education: children
4. Land tenure
   - Ownership land, access, rent paying
   - Problems land tenure or gaining access
5. Bye laws
   - Type of bye-laws, construction bye-laws, involvement in construction
6. Changes in livelihood
   - Change regarding farming / livestock rearing
7. Problems: before war, war, last years
   - Problems before, during, after war? Kind of problems? Change? Involved actors?
8. Contact
   - Contact other land users, authorities
9. Court
   - Number of cases in court, topic, outcome, involved actors
10. Solutions
   - Solutions to problems

Topic list livestock keepers
1. Origin and migration
   - Origin, migration patterns, getting access to present location
2. War
   - Locality during war
   - Changes after war
3. Income: cattle, crops, other activities
   - Animals: type, numbers, use, care taking
   - Crops: type of crops, type of land, size plots, harvests, who is farming
   - Other sources of income: cattle trading, business enterprises, housing
   - Cost-benefit analysis
   - Education: children
4. Land tenure
   - Ownership land, access, rent paying
   - Problems land tenure or gaining access
5. Bye laws
   - Type of bye-laws, construction bye-laws, involvement in construction
6. Changes in livelihood
   - Change regarding farming / livestock rearing
7. Problems: before war, war, last years

- Problems before, during, after war? Kind of problems? Change? Involved actors?
- Cattle injuries or killings

8. Contact
- Contact other land users, authorities

9. Court
- Number of cases in court, topic, outcome, involved actors

10. Solutions
- Solutions to problems

Topic list government officials and paramount chiefs

1. General
- Population, ethnicities, economical activities, surface land, facilities, NGOs

2. Governance
- Role chiefs, councillor, changes since arrival council, relation chief-council
- Bye-laws: land tenure, livestock keeper-crop farmer, developments

3. Livelihood
- Crop farming: land owning families, swamp/upland land
- Landowners: which land rented, relations authorities
- Livestock keeping: number of werrehs, migration
- Diversification of economical activities
- Role women

4. Main problems land users
- Crop destruction, cattle damage, cattle theft etcetera

5. War
- What happened in chiefdom, refugees in chiefdom

6. Possible solutions problems

Annex IV: Calendar cattle farming – crop farming Koinadugu

Season	Month	Rice activities swamp	Rice activities upland	Livestock keepers' activities	Possible problems crop farmers-livestock keepers
Dry Season	January	**Harvesting**	Brushing	Cattle upland	
	February	*Planting groundnuts or vegetables*	Brushing	Cattle going down, settlement	Land access problems for farmers
	March		*Planting groundnuts/vegetables* Brushing Cut sticks	Cattle down	Cattle allowed in swamps, when farming in swamps crop farmers responsible.
	April	Brushing (when area heavily forested)	Land preparation Burning Remove sticks		
Rainy Season	May	*Harvesting groundnuts or vegetables* Brushing	Land preparation Digging **Planting/ Broadcasting**	Cattle down Preparations to go up	Uncontrolled burning by livestock keepers.
	June	Brushing (when developed swamp) Burning	*Harvesting groundnuts/vegetables* **Planting/ Broadcasting**	Cattle moving up	
	July	Digging soil	Controlling rice Weeding	Cattle upland	Cattle eating crops upland, livestock keepers responsible.
	August	**Planting/ Broadcasting**	Weeding Fencing		
	September		Fencing **Late: harvesting**		Harvesting time: cows eating mature rice or already harvested rice.
	October	Weeding	**Early: harvesting**		
Dry Season	November		**Harvesting**		
	December	**Harvesting**	Storing or selling		

Note 1: Based on interviews in Folosaba Dembelia, Kasunko, Mongo and Wara Wara Yagala and on information CARE colleagues

Note 2: This is only for rice cropping. Vegetables, groundnuts, potato and cassava have other calendars.

Note 3: Cattle are getting salt every 3 months, indifferent which months.

Note 4: Cattle wounding can be done any time of the year, therefore not incorporated in this calendar.

Annex V: Paramount chiefs and their way of dealing with conflicts over land

Paramount chief	Ways of dealing with problems	Conflict case	Citations of the paramount chief	Citations about the paramount chief
Dembelia Sinkunia	Convinced should sit together as friends or brothers to solve problems: should be settled between them, not in court.	Fula man came with forty crop farmer relatives from Guinea. Livestock keepers did not want them, but paramount chief did not want to send them away since they were interesting for the chiefdom revenues.	"My great grandfather accepted the Fulas in Fulamansa and he worked together with them to rebuild the town after the [Samura] war. Ever since, the people in my chiefdom are accepting cattle rearing." "As their paramount, they [the population] are more loyal to me than to the councillor. I mean, without even paying them and with my supervision we could do really good things."	Councillor: "Solutions for the [land] conflicts are that cases should not be directly sent to court. People should first talk among each other, so chiefs do not profit of the conflicts."
Diang	Denying existence of problems.	Kamajimbo: convinced problems are not too severe, matter has been settled already according to him.	"We face some minor problems, but not too much. [...] Crop destruction takes place once every four years."	After one interview, one town chief told me the cooperation between the town and the paramount chief was not as smooth as it should be and as he pretended it to be during the interview: "We face big problems with the paramount chief and his behaviour."
Folosaba Dembelia	PC is not tolerating any killing or fighting. Is executing good governance: listening and solving problems.	Currently no specific case.	"This chiefdom is violent free, due to good governance. Listening to the people, giving hands to their problems. That minimises problems." "When you ask the crop farmers, to satisfy themselves, they must say that they have problems with livestock keepers. When you go to the cattle owners, they will say that crop farmers are their amis."	According to former chiefdom administrative clerk: "The paramount chief is a model leader, he is one of the good paramount chiefs." Miscommunication between the PC and the interviewer (I): I: "The ethnicity that possesses the land in this chiefdom, are Yalunka?" PC: "Yalunka, I am a Yalunka." [...] I: "Do Fulas also own land here?" PC: "Fulas are under my command."

Sulima	- Pointing at own responsibility of crop farmers. - Regularly updating bye-laws	Nomokoya: new bye-law of farming more than 1 mile from livestock keeper was not obeyed by crop farmers. Consequently, paramount chief sent crop farmers away.	- About livestock keepers to crop farmers: "We are lodging them, not I am lodging them." - About updating bye-laws: "Meetings can take long, but in the end it pays off. It is a matter of educating and having regular meetings."	Crop farmers Nomokoya: "Paramount chief is more a Fula chief than a Yalunka chief".
Wara Wara Bafodia	-Conceptualises Fulas as 'strangers' and in Sierra Leone is culture of accepting strangers. - Chiefdom organised meetings to diminish conflicts in southern communities where crop and livestock keepers were present: made bye-laws and physical separation.	People in Kadanso declared they did not want any 'strange' Fulas anymore. PC did not accept: they are strangers, should accept them.	Not available	Crop farmers Sememaia: "We still [even after changes] want the livestock keepers to totally go away. But we can't, because the big men don't agree."