SIGNS IN TIME

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An interpretive account of urban planning and design, the people and their histories

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<u>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</u>

0. PROLOGUE

[SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY]
Illustration in John Gerard, The Great Herball, London, 1636, p. 1190[1]

The clover species on the left, below, cannot be identified. It is called by Gerard Coronopus ex codice Caesareo. The emperors codex referred to is the so-called Wiener Dioscorides, dated 512 A.D., an early Byzantine manuscript. The existence in 1636 of this plant species relied completely on a scientific source from a thousand years ago. The plant must have existed since Dioscorides mentioned it. And since plant species were supposed to be spread all over the world, it must grow in England too.

[SIGNIFICATION OF PLACE - CULTURE]
The devil and the brambles

"In Scotland the devil poisons the brambles by covering them with his cloak; in Ireland he stamps on them"[2]

[ETHNICITIES – STATE- PLACES - ACTIVITIES]
Foreword in a flower book for children

"One of the most important fundaments for a healthy patriotism is a thorough knowledge of the fatherland, of its soil and everything living on that soil: plants and animals. In order to evoke in young people as well as in old people a spirit for the countryside, for walking around in the diverse and beautiful regions of our homeland, and in order to infuse the Dutch people with a sense of proud on the beauty and the many facets of nature, we present a series of booklets [...] "[3]

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[1] Illustration in M.RIX, *the art of botanical illustration*, New York, 1990, p.9.

[2] IS. TEIRLINCK, *Flora diabolica. De plant in de demonologie,* Gent, 1930, p. 121

[3] M. KRUSEMAN, R. TOLMAN, *Planten en bloemen* (*Kijk uit je ogen,* 1), Assen, s.d., p.5

[SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY – SIGNS - PLACES]
The cities and the signs

"Man wanders between stones and trees for days. Seldom, his eye rests on something, and only after it recognised something that is a sign of something else: a trace in the sand refers to a tiger passing by, a swamp points at the presence of a vein of water, the hibiscus flower at the end of winter. Apart from that, everything is silent and replaceable; trees and stones are just what they are."[4]

[SIGNIFICATION OF PLACES - CULTURES]
Marcus Aurelius reflects

"It may be clear that the countryside is just like town and that everything here is exactly the same as on a top of mountain or at sea or somewhere else. You will notice that things are exactly like Plato said: he locks himself up in a sheeps cage, and milks his bleating herd."[5]

[PLACE – DISCOURSES - TIME]
Situation

My father has a garden somewhere in Belgium. My grandfather does most of the work, while I am sometimes asked to give my opinion on this or that design feature (I don't come there so often). Sometimes I give my opinion unasked. My brother doesn't seem that much interested in the garden but every now and then he walks around and gives comments. I call it a garden, and try to impose some kind of garden design on the place. My grandfather speaks of the garden too, but has very different design ideas, and in general thinks perfect maintenance is more important than too much design efforts. On the other hand, he does like a design which is much more obvious, much more present in its neatness. My father's ideas are a bit volatile, and he calls the place the garden, the bush, the park, depending on the situation. His attitudes towards design and the presence of design change correspondingly. My brother calls it the garden, but prefers it to become a natural woodland. He is primarily interested in the species of birds appearing in the trees.
My grandfather also likes these birds, especially if they cling to his nets.

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[4] I. CALVINO, *De onzichtbare steden,* Amsterdam, 1995. (1st ed. Torino, 1972, *Le citta invisibili*), p. 17.
[5] MARCUS AURELIUS, *Persoonlijke notities,* Amsterdam, 2002, p. 174 (ch. 10 par. 23; original written ca 162 AD)

[POWER – POLITICS – CULTURE - PLACE]
Macchiavelli on monarchies and how they are conquered

All the states, all the powers that had once or have authority on people, were and are either republics or monarchies. The monarchies are either hereditary, of the line of the sovereign is reigning for a long time, or new. The new ones are either completely new, like Milan for Francesco Sforza, or they are like added members to the hereditary state of the conquering prince, like the kingdom of Naples for Spain. The conquered territories are either used to live under a prince or used to be free; and they can be conquered by other people's arms or by one's own arms, by talent or by coincidence.[6]

[PLANNING – DISCONTINUITY – HISTORY - INTERPRETATION]
La Rochefoucault, Maxime 57,dated 1664[7]

People may be proud of their illustrious deeds, often they are not the consequence of great plans but rather of coincidence.

[PLANNING - USER PREFERENCES – CULTURE - SIGNIFICATION]
On the first day of the first month

On the fist day of the first month, and on the third day of the third I prefer to see a clear blue sky.
On the fifth of the fifth month I prefer a clouded sky.
On the seventh of the seventh month it has to be cloudy too; but near the evening the clouds must disappear and allow for the moon to be bright and the signs of the zodiac to be clearly visible.
On the ninth of the ninth month there has to be a drizzle at dawn. The chrysanthemum flowers are then heavily dewy and the rough silk threads covering the plants are infused with moisture and perfused with the flower's scent.
Sometimes the rain stops in the early morning while the sky remains cloudy and it looks like the rain can come back every minute. I can enjoy these moments intensely.[8]

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[6] N. MACCHIAVELLI,*Le Prince,*Paris, 1980, p. 89 (written 1513)
[7] Nijmegen, 1996, p.19.

[PLANNING – COMMUNICATION – INTERPRETATION - CULTURE]
A battle in confusion

[Before this fragment, Eco gives a long description of the good cooperation and careful battle planning of a number of very different peoples. A common enemy, the Huns, brings them closer together, smoothens the old rivalries, linked to differences in religion, habits, beliefs, appearance. But things do not work out as planned, and miscommunications lead to a complete disaster for the newly formed alliance]

" 'Good and faithful sciapods', Gavai said desperately when he brought the message, 'is not a coward and is brave, but cannot tolerate the insult of the heretic cheese- eater!' To be short, first a incisive theologic dispute developed, after which both parties punched each other seriously, and soon the giants took over the battle. Aleramo Scaccabarozzi, commonly called the lazy one, had tried to persuade his one- eyed allies to withdraw from this silly battle, but they were so enraged that they hit him hard, letting him touch the ground ten meters away. Because of these discussions, they did not nitice the Huns were in there rear already, and a massacre followed. The sciapods fell down and the giants were routed, even if some of these tried to defend themselves by grabbing a sciapod by his ankles and using it as a hitting- bat. [...] When the pygmees, being completely unaware of Ardzrouni's invention, saw the artificial bird's heads emerging from the grass, they started to shout 'the cranes, the cranes!', and assuming they had to confront this age- old enemy, they forgot about the Huns, and shot all their arrows at the Blemmyae- in – disguise. The blemmyae now started to defend against the pygmees, assuming they were betrayed, they shouted: 'Kill the heretics!' The pygmees thought the blemmyae were the treators, and when they heard the accusation of heresy, while they felt themselves to be the only true believers, they shouted in turn: 'Kill the phantasiastoi!' The Huns rammed into this wild bunch, and while their enemies were slaughtering each other, they killed them one by one."[9]

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[8]   SEI SHONAGON, *Het hoofdkussenboek van Sei Shonagon,* Amsterdam, 1997. (English title: *Sei Shonagon's Pillow book)* par. 9, pp. 30-31. Written ca AD 1000, Japan.
[9] U. ECO. *Baudolino,* Amsterdam, 2001, pp. 408-409 (1st ed. Milano, 2000)

[RESEARCH - ETHNICITY]
Situation

Bakchisaray, Crimea, Ukraine. The director of the palace and museum of the Khan's welcomes me warmly. He shows me around, asks my opinion on certain topics of art history, spends half a day talking to me, drinking coffee, eating home-made cookies, telling about the wanderings of his family in the Stalin era. I am delighted by this treatment, keeping in mind the difficulties experienced while establishing a connection with the Tatar community. After several hours, he asks me whether I am a Greek. I acknowledge the presence of some Greek blood, and he smiles triumphantly: "I knew it". He turns out to be a Greek, descendent of the Greek colonists of the Black sea shore in antiquity, sent by Stalin to Uzbekistan more recently. Back in the hotel, I realise that the suddenly opened window on the history and culture of the Tatars was due to a perceived belonging to the same ethnic group. If the director had not seen me as a Greek, he probably wouldn't have said too much, and he wouldn't have connected me with other interesting people in the area. A few drops of Greek blood can make a difference for a researcher.

[USEFUL COMMENTS]
<u>Reader's guide</u>

The shifts in perspective that may have occurred while reading these first pages, the possibly accompanying feelings of confusion, may prepare for what is coming. A first glimpse of some notions central in this book can give the reader an indication of the degree of alienation he or she can expect. Shifts in perspective can be experienced by the reader, and shifts in perspective form a common ground, a common subject, of nearly all the analysis.

1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1. History, people and place, planning and design

Alexander the Great surrounded himself with the worst and the best of mankind[10]. It is difficult to tell whether this architect belonged to the first or the last category. The architect is said to have presented a plan for a new city, in honour of Alexander. First, an enormous mountain had to be reshaped in the form of Alexander himself. In his hand, he would hold something, the city. The architect assumed absolute power was present in the person of Alexander, a power that needed to be eased and soothened, yet a power that could be used to reach his personal goals. The architect had no interest whatsoever in the features of the existing place, how it looked like, who was living there, what kind of histories the mountain represented, and he did not show considerably more interest in the desires of the people who were supposed to live high in the sculpted mountain, their practical needs, their architectural taste, their histories. His project was supposed to be of unsurpassed beauty and overwhelming grandeur, it would make Alexander and himself immortal, and nobody would ask questions about the mountain, its people, and the unwilling inhabitants of the new town.

This dissertation is not about Alexander the Great. It is about urban planning and design as well as it is about people, history and place. Urban planning and design are linked, as people history and place are. Boundaries between planning and design are considered to be contingent, dependent on context and culture, result of ever renewed negotiations. The triad of

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[10] This story is an apocryphal one. It is recorded though in classical antiquity in various sources. References further on will be given in footnotes, in a short form. The complete references feature in the bibliography at the end of the book. The bibliography is structured along disciplinary lines, therefore we added short codes to simplify the search. The codes are

PH is philosophy. S is semiotics. D is discourse studies. A is anthropology. PS psychology. OT other theories. HE History of Europe. HEE History of Eastern Europe. HWE History of Western Europe. AR stands for Architecture. LA for landscape architecture and SP for spatial planning.

history, people and place holds central place in the book. We intend to explore the relations between them, in order to answer our research question: *how can history, historical knowledge and historical objects, play a positive role in urban planning and design?*

We intend to show that answering this question *requires* a careful scrutiny of history, people and place. Using history implies there is a goal to reach. What could the use of history be? We want to assume –and this is an assumption– that history can be useful in planning and design and that we just have to investigate carefully what this use might be. In this book history can mean old things and places, under and above the ground, visible and invisible, it can refer to characteristics of a given place and to stories attached to a place. History is simply the past of people. Part of it is visible in the landscape, part of it is not. Alexander and his architect tell us immediately that power and state are notions impossible to avoid.

1.2. Three basic assumptions, three scholarly traditions

A *first basic assumption* of our research is that every planning and design operation is intended for people, and not for scientists, planners, politicians. This in turn means that spatial quality is not something only visible to scientists or policymakers. We start from the point that spatial quality is quality for someone, more specifically for the intended users of a place.

It is necessary to investigate carefully in different contexts in place and time what history in a spatial form can mean for people and what can be deduced from these meanings regarding future spatial developments. The past is present in many ways in our everyday lives and these diverse ways deserve our full attention if we want to understand how the past is present in the interpretation of our environment and the past in our environment. (*Basic assumption 2*) And this we ought to know before we can change our environment guided by history.

Here we come to a *third basic assumption* of the book: the importance of interpretation. We argue that interpretation is everywhere: all our knowledge of the world and ourselves is mediated. There is no immediate knowledge of things possible. 'Das ding an sich ist ein unbekannte', Kant

already said. This study situates itself in a post-modern tradition, where all knowledge is seen as an interpretation of something, under the laws of the human mind and culture. From the moment we perceive something, culturally coded categories come into action, structuring the perceptions and further on the ideas emerging from these perceptions. In the first chapters, a very short introduction on postmodernism will be given in order to put our research in its proper place. Interpretation is always embedded in cultures. This applies equally to the interpretation of past, environment and traces of the past in the environment. Immediately we can derive from these assertions that the interpretations, or constructions as we shall call them, of past and environment should be studied in relevant user groups, possibly typified by cultures, before we can say anything at all about the use of history in planning and design.

A first rephrasal of the original research question could therefore be as follows: how do people interpret their living environment? What is the role of the past in these interpretations? Afterwards, one can look at the way this knowledge can be used in planning and design.

How do people interpret their environment? An answer to this question will lead us to a theory on history, people and place. It is already clear from the way we mentioned briefly the concept of culture, that in our research it is basically a semiotic concept. A culture in our view is a specific signification of the world by a group of people, including an image of the group itself.

Here we can introduce the three theoretic fundaments of our theory on history, people, place: semiotics, anthropology and discourse- studies

(Planning theory, architectural theory, philosophy, history and history of art are evidently present)

Semiotics is the theory of signs. A sign is something that refers to something else. A road sign refers to a rule, a black cat is a sign of imminent danger. Signs are socially constructed, agreed upon in a group of people, and can only be interpreted by an observer familiar with the codes of meaning. The theory of signs is therefore necessarily a theory of interpretation. Semiotics states that a lot of the issues dealt with in this study can be regarded sign systems: not only language but also architecture, literature, history, landscape, organisations. All these structures deserve to be treated as more or less coherent sign systems,

governed by their own laws of meaning, their own codes and conventions.

Since in semiotics in every sign an element of convention exists, and every communication and interpretation is connected with a group of people sharing vocabularies and rules of interpretation, *anthropology* is at close reach. This discipline is nowadays interested in groups of people in general; it should not necessarily be associated with the exotic places and tribes they used to study until the sixties. Since anthropology is interested in the ways groups signify their worlds, a semiotic concept of culture permeates several of the best branches of current anthropology: symbolic anthropology, interpretative anthropology and also the older structuralists. It is not surprising that anthropology and semiotics therefore mingle well. They also stem partly from the same roots: structural anthropology and semiotics both derive from the early structuralism of De Saussure (see later).

Our third fundament, *discourse studies*, also shares these roots. A discourse in the sense of Michel Foucault, our core thinker in this field, is a set of ideas on a part of reality that makes it accessible and shapes it at the same time; it creates a part of reality while unveiling certain aspects and relations and covering others. Discourses are linked to groups, and can be viewed as elements of the group definition of itself and the world. Discourse studies therefore fit seemless into our theoretical framework. A more thorough introduction into semiotics, anthropology and discourse studies, key concepts, significant backgrounds and developments will be given in various parts of the text.

Starting from these three basic assumptions and drawing mainly from these three disciplines or scholarly traditions, we will develop a *general theoretical framework*, labelled postmodern, and within this general frame a *specific theoretical framework* will be generated, geared at answering the central question (how to deal with history?) This is the method of the dissertation in the most general sense. The general framework is developed in three steps (see 1.3) A historical and disciplinary perspective lead to specific contents being given to and links being established between a series of concepts. This third step, the Compendium of Concepts (2.4) is the general framework. The case studies start from this frame; the empirical situations encountered are viewed from this theoretical perspective. From the case studies emerge in the following chapters

perspectives on history, people and place, as well as on planning and design. These can be interpreted as specific theoretical frames. The construction of these frames is a scientific result, at the same time a method enabling us to analyse the possible and optimal roles of history in a planning and design system.

If this is the general method and the general storyline accompanying it, one has to add that more methods are used in the case studies and elsewhere (observation, participant observation, historical research, interviews of all sorts, discursive and semiotic analysis, design as a research tool,…) Every case study –the same being true for the rather theoretical chapters- is marked by a different combination of methods. The dissertation as a whole is a mix of methods in a post- modern frame. In the case studies, we adopted mostly a methodological principle borrowed from post- modern anthropology. We refer to the constant adaptation of method and subject to empirical findings. A linear model of question-method- research was avoided if possible. In every case study, a central issue was maintained as the core subject, but the precise definition of the subject depended on the findings; in the same vein the choice of method was pre- defined in a general way (we did not expect to practice maths) but all the same the situation in the field could dictate the use of this or that qualitative method. (In the meantime, it becomes clear that the concept of method in the postmodern tradition we are situated in, differs from the methodological concepts used in the modernist schools and disciplines)

Semiotics, anthropology and discourse studies can help in the deconstruction of existing frames of interpretation, the deconstruction of declared truths in a number of disciplines and user groups, in order to reconstruct some truths, some valid conceptual frames, afterwards. Deconstruction unveils the mechanisms of construction. The same theoretical fundaments help us to construct new knowledge, inductively and deductively, on history, people, place, as well as on spatial planning and design. Deconstructive and reconstructive efforts alike require a mix of methods. Methodological paragraphs will reoccur every now and then when methodical questions arise. We will elaborate the theme of compatibility and incompatibility of methods in the next chapters.

1.3 Concise map of the book – Summary

Right now, we slightly shift the perspective and unfold a map of the book. It shows an outline of all the coming chapters, in order of appearance. Consider it as a preview, a summary in anticipation, but also as a methodological analysis of the book's structure, therefore a supplement to the paragraphs above. This map can be used every now an then while reading the book – use it as a reader's guide. The introductory paragraphs on the diverse parts of the book will be repeated on the proper places. The book can be divided in three parts: theory of knowledge, case studies on cultures of users and planners, and identity theory.

1.3.1. First part: theoretical frame in three parts

The first part consists in turn of three chapters: a historical perspective, a disciplinary perspective and a conceptual perspective. The three together can be labelled the general theoretical frame of the book, the frame from which the case studies start, and from which the identity theory is constructed. The first part sketches briefly the historical development towards post- modernism and post- modern views on theory, science, culture. Kant's *Kritik der reinen vernunft* is the starting point of this story, as his *Kritik der praktischen vernunft* will finish it. Key figures in the history of ideas towards post- modernism are discussed, and since post-modernism itself is not a disciplinary matter, people belonging to different disciplines are mentioned. The historical sketch aims at giving an insight in the development of ideas and simultaneously in the ideas themselves. Therefore, the historical perspective is a first step in the construction of the theoretical frame. Since the disciplines we situate ourselves in -spatial planning, urban planning, landscape architecture- are not yet satiated with post- modern thought, we considered it all the more useful to add such an historical perspective. The frame of the frame could be perceived absent without such an introduction.

The second part of the theory is a disciplinary perspective on the types of post- modern thought we selected to use here, selected as useful in answering our research question. As said earlier, a combination of discourse studies, anthropology and semiotics is used. All three of them are useful in studying processes of interpretation and communication in

cultures, against a background of social construction of worlds. All three of them have early and late modernist variants, and what we try to do in the disciplinary perspective, is give an idea of the presence of the developments towards post- modernism in the three intellectual traditions. This way, we locate our theoretical frame more precisely in these traditions, in the post- modern variants of them, at the moment the dominant ones. This way, the frame is defined more clearly, its construction is brought one step further.

Last part of the theory is a conceptual perspective. We draw the consequences of the theoretical frame for the content of a number of concepts essential in the reasoning in the following chapters, essential in the understanding of the case studies too. Concepts like power, interpretation and more will receive a first interpretation in the light of the theory, and this interpretation is part of the theory construction itself. One could say that the historical and disciplinary contexts outlined in the first parts, are shown to define a number of key concepts used later on to look at spatial planning and design and create new theories there. In order to smoothen this process, this theoretical transition, we look ahead too, and make a first sketch of theoretical frames in planning and design that result from the use of these concepts defined in this post- modern way.

1.3.2. Second part: three case studies

Next, second major part of the book, come the case studies, three in number: one on parks in Almere, a second one on small allotment gardens in Wageningen, the third on a new city district in Utrecht. All three of them are located in Holland. Nonetheless, we try to look for generally valid mechanisms in the signification of place, history and history in place in these Dutch case studies. In the case studies, a constant alternation between empiry and theory is strived for, by which we mean that we try to study the empirical situation at hand from our theoretical perspective, and develop the theory at the same time. In the text, this is translated as an alternation of more descriptive and more theoretical paragraphs. Theoretical paragraphs can be inductively or deductively produced, the first way of theory production deriving theory from the empirical situation, the second way deriving theory from theory and looking for confirmation of the new theory in the empirical situation.

The Almere case is studying the cultures of the users, the pathways of signification of place, history and historical place in the users of a place. We investigated how people attribute meaning to their environment, to history and to history in their evironments, and tried to list, inductively and deductively, the most important mechanisms in this respect. One can say that it is mostly semiotic in nature. The second case study, on the Wageningen gardens, is more anthropological. Individual significations of place and history form a starting point, but afterwards the features of the gardeners as a group are at stake, as well as the significations of the place by other groups, and the interactions between gardeners and the rest. Also, the planning system -at a local level- enters the picture. The interactions between gardeners and planners are studied, and the interactions between gardeners and other stakeholders within the planning arena designed by official planners. The third case study, on Leidsche Rijn Utrecht, is mainly focussed on the cultures within the planning system: professional cultures, organisational cultures, disciplinary cultures, their interactions, their constructions of place and history, the influence of their interactions on the final plan. This way, the three case studies span the range from individual user signification to group signification, and from user culture to planning culture.

In the three case studies, a move from users to planners is made. The same relativist and interpretive perspective is used to look at the groups involved in the planning system and the groups using or potentially using the place one is talking about. Using this perspective, interpreting the users signification and the planners and designers signification as culture- based, and interpreting the roles of history in a materialised plan as the result of interactions between all these cultures, implies the introduction of a long list of socio- cultural factors as relevant for planning with history. And a long list of uncertainties and discontinuities. A new view on the limits of planning -and therefore on its characteristics and opportunities- can emerge from this new starting point.

1.3.3. Third part: identity theory in threefold

The third part of the book, the most extensive one, is in the first place theoretical, be it that a lot of empirical examples are given and a few case studies are incorporated. One can say that generally speaking,

induction and deduction are combined, the emphasis being on deduction. Again, three parts can be distinguished: one concerning identity construction in all cultures, one focussed on planning cultures and the role of history, a third part being an extensive but rather illustrative case study on history and planning in Ukraine.

In the pages on identity construction in all cultures, the cultures of users and of planners, we chose the identity concept to organise the relations between culture, labelled group identity, cultural image of place, named spatial identity, and cultural construction of history, here named image of history. All three identities are seen as interrelated within a culture, mutually defining each other in a triangular relation. All aspects of this triangular scheme of identity formation as social construction, are investigated separately. Also the conceptual embedding of the scheme and the embedding of the identity constructions of one group in the context of a society with other groups constructing identities, are treated. The significations of place and history that were uncovered in the case studies, can gain importance if they function in processes of identity construction as represented in the schemes. More cultural factors affecting the potential use of history in planning are therefore uncovered in constructing these schemes. In this case the factors can be called potential sensibilities more significant in a planning perspective, since histories and places are shown to be potentially essential in the self- definition of groups. And a planning perspective can expected to take into account group preferences and sensibilities.

The pages on planning culture and the role of history and historical knowledge can be summarized as an attempt to give an outline of a planning system from our interpretive perspective -a redefinition of a planning system in post- modern terms. In this drawing, the roles of knowledge and of historical knowledge are analysed. Often, the Dutch planning system serves as an example, but once more we are not primarily interested in the specificity of this case. In our analysis of the roles of historical knowledge in planning, several metaphors are used. Several planning metaphors (planning as a game, as…) are combined to unravel more mechanisms of the planning system, to unravel more potential roles of history in the system. In doing so, we aim at giving a more complete picture of the forces working on the constructions of place and history featuring in the cultures of planners and users. In the game metaphor e.g.,

the characteristics of a game define a number of forces co- determining the outcome, the actual roles of histories in a plan. And the same goes for the other metaphors. What happens in the planning process to the images of history and place present in the cultures of planners and users can be better understood while using a combination of metaphors in a post- modern perspective. And such an understanding is necessary to give realistic recommendations later on concerning the potential roles of history to improve -urban- plans. One has to know the triangles and what happens to them in the planning process.

In the final case, on spatial planning and history in Ukraine, focussing on Kiev, the capital, we do not intend to uncover much new mechanisms on significations of place and history and their roles in a planning system. We intend the case to be rather illustrative, showing the constructions of place and history by the users and the state, as well as the roles of histories and heritage in the actual planning practice. Interactions between cultures looking for an identity and a state looking for an identity, trying to impose it, are studied, as are the powers working on all these histories and identities in the planning system. An overview is given of the historical building blocks used by the identities, of the identities using the building blocks, and an outline is made of the attempts of the state to impose a new frame of identification for all the identities under its rule. This analysis is followed by a brief description of planning practice, where in the planning games not too much remains of the historical preferences of the user groups and even of the state itself.

In the diverse chapters we labelled identity theory, the concept of identity was only used to organise the links between culture, place and history. Culture was defined in a semiotic way, as a group distinct by its signification of the world, as this typical signification itself, and cultures were identified among the users of a place and among the groups involved one way or another in the planning system. The design disciplines were included in the planning system, which is therefore more than the planning disciplines.

1.3.4. About the general conclusions

About the general conclusions we do not want to say too much here, but we can point already at the importance assigned to the numerous types

of uncertainty, discontinuity, ambiguity, introduced in the planning system by the interpretive account of the users and the system itself. The complexity of the potential spatially related roles of history for the users, and the relativist perspective on expert knowledge in this respect, combine to the recommendation of a shift from content to form in the planning system, from planning and design ideals to better ways of organising the process, giving the knowledge of the users and the disciplines a fair chance to enter the final plans.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMES – BASIC CONCEPTS

2.1. Introduction

This first part of the book consists of three chapters: a historical perspective, a disciplinary perspective and a conceptual perspective. The three together can be labelled the general theoretical frame of the book, the frame from which the case studies start, and from which the identity theory is constructed. The first part sketches briefly the historical development towards post- modernism and post- modern views on theory, science, culture. Kant's *Kritik der reinen vernunft* is the starting point of this story, as his *Kritik der praktischen vernunft* will finish it. Key figures in the history of ideas towards post- modernism are discussed, and since post- modernism itself is not a disciplinary matter, people belonging to different disciplines are mentioned. The historical sketch aims at giving an insight in the development of ideas and simultaneously in the ideas themselves. Therefore, the historical perspective is a first step in the construction of the theoretical frame. Since the disciplines we situate ourselves in -spatial planning, urban planning, landscape architecture- are not yet satiated with post- modern thought, we considered it all the more useful to add such an historical perspective. The frame of the frame could be perceived absent without such an introduction, and the frame could be perceived as a wholly personal construction, which is not the case.

The second part of the theory is a disciplinary perspective on the types of post- modern thought we selected to use here, selected as useful in answering our research question. As said earlier, a combination of discourse studies, anthropology and semiotics is used. All three of them are useful in studying processes of interpretation and communication in cultures, against a background of social construction of worlds. All three of them have early and late modernist variants, and what we try to do in the disciplinary perspective, is give an idea of the presence of the developments towards post- modernism in the three intellectual traditions. This way, we locate our theoretical frame more precisely in these traditions, in the post- modern variants of them, at the moment the

dominant ones. This way, the frame is defined more clearly, its construction is brought one step further.

Last part of the theory is a conceptual perspective. We draw the consequences of the theoretical frame for the content of a number of concepts essential in the reasoning in the following chapters, essential in the understanding of the case studies too. Concepts like power, interpretation and more will receive a first interpretation in the light of the theory, and this interpretation is part of the theory construction itself. One could say that the historical and disciplinary contexts outlined in the first parts, are shown to define a number of key concepts used later on to look at spatial planning and design and create new theories there. In order to smoothen this process, this theoretical transition, we look ahead too, and make a first sketch of theoretical frames in planning and design that result from the use of these concepts defined in this post- modern way.

2.2. A short history of ideas towards post-modernism

2.2.1. Antirealism as epistemological core assumption

The theoretical position that the structure of things is constructed rather than discovered is in epistemology commonly called 'antirealism'. The opposite notion of realism implies a correspondence between what we perceive and what exists out there, or more strictly put, that it is possible to know reality as such.[11] This book is clearly situated in the antirealist tradition, as are Foucault, Barthes, Eco and most of the other intellectual sources of inspiration used.[12] First let us explain the word discourse: it is a set of ideas and actions concerning a part of reality that make that part of reality accessible for human thought. It highlights certain aspects of it, and relations within it, focussing on certain characteristics and forgetting about other ones (so −called blind spots) This definition of discourse is in the line of Michel Foucault, a French sociologist and philosopher we will meet frequently on the following pages[13]. In the next chapter a list of words will be explained more in detail, discourse will feature there, but at the moment this short explanation can suffice. We must only add here that roughly speaking a strong and a weak version of the concept exist. The weak version says that a discourse sheds light on a part of reality, discovers it. Therefore, we cannot agree. The strong version, which we prefer and is the only one suitable for a Foucauldian perspective, states that a discourse makes a part of reality accessible by constructing it. One can say that a discourse in this sense is a humanly constructed net on reality, allowing to grasp something of reality indirectly, by the way the net is folded over the rugged geography of landscapes of reality. Properties of the manmade net, eg its stifness, determine the image we have of reality.

Antirealism is a discourse in itself, a discourse allowing to think in terms of discourses and discover discourses at work in all areas of human

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[11] Van der Veken, p. 32 (PH); Russell, p. 18 (PH)
[12] Adams, (PH) gives an overview.
[13] Foucault (D) Most important for the argumentative line of this whole book are *Les mots et les choses* (Engl. Translation in the bibliography. *The order of things*), *L'ordre du discourse* and *Surveiller et punir.*

thought and action. Discourses therefore are allowing me as a researcher to structure parts of realities, see patterns in them, within the frame of a general antirealist philosophy. Simultaneously the patterns discovered can be labelled as contingent; they could have been different given different circumstances, they are not universal, objective, necessary. Antirealism can be called anti- essentialism too, because it implies that there is no essence of reality that can be uncovered. Not only does it break the direct link between human knowing and reality −link as correspondence. Given the assertion that the realities are produced by human thought in cultures, there cannot be one truth that is universal, objective, necessary. Therefore, not only the relation between the objects brain and outside world is reconsidered, but the whole concept of outside world. Antirealism implies necessarily anti- essentialism.

2.2.2. History of anti- essentialism since Kant

Where does this attitude, this theoretical stance come from? It is in our society mostly associated with post- modernity, with the period starting around 1980. In philosophy however it is much older, and derives ultimately from Kant in the 18th century. In his *Kritik der reinen vernunft* Kant claimed after an extremely detailed scrutiny of the human capacities of knowing and their limits, that every bit of knowledge we can find bears the mark of the human mind. Everything we perceive must pass the senses, the brain, language, culture. Every step in this line (which is a simplification of ours and should not be seen as a chronology) has its own structures, categories, preferences, limitation etc. All of these influence the result, i.e.: knowledge. It is impossible for man to take enough distance of himself to wipe out all the influences mentioned One can never be completely aware of the moulds and the moulding process applied to sensorial stimuli by all these elements and environments of man. Therefore, Kant said, "das ding an sich ist ein unbekanntes". Or, in another statement of his, "ein X"[14].

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[14] Kant in Van der Veeken. The interpretation of Kant presented here derives mainly from Van der Veken (also from lectures by prof H. Parret at Leuven University, who demonstrated the continuous presence of Kant in postmodern thought, e.g. in Lyotard)

Kant himself did not end here. He thought an essence of reality was after all accessible for man, through divine intervention in ethics (discussed in his *Kritik der praktischen vernunft*) In the voice of conscience a God was active that gave us the possibility to follow that conscience and do objectively good things –that must therefore correspond with an objectively true world, unless we complicate things far more. But, since God faded away in much of 19th century philosophy and the natural sciences exploded in the same period, it became impossible to rely on such a foundation of truth. Kants tragic fate was in the 20thcentury to have initiated a philosophical movement he would have never approved, because of his religious nature. Still, if one ignores the existence of God, it is difficult to ignore the quality of Kants thought on human reason and to dismiss his observations on the human structuring and thus production of knowledge.

In the 19th century, Hegel believed in an essence of nature, and the possibility of knowing this essence, but he did not mean this in the way a modern scientist is inclined to interpret it. He saw a historical process of increasing awareness of the one divine mind that is present in nature as well as in man. In man, God is present, and slowly starts to realise that he is really there, creator of man and nature alike. The divine mind laid itself in its creation, and historically grows towards self- awareness. Man becomes closer to God in a historical process which determines the type and possibilities of knowing we have at our disposal. Truth can never be universal and eternal therefore, while nature is mind in essence. In a very different meaning from Kant, mind produces reality. It is an eternal mind that was sleeping most of the time that creates reality, albeit via the human mind for some time now[15].

2.2.3. Masters of distrust: Marx, Nietzsche, Freud

One generation later Marx was heavily influenced by Hegel and to Marx are attributed the famous words "Hegel is going good but he is walking on his hands" Because the complexity of both Hegels and Marx thought it is fairly impossible to determine exactly what kind of interpretation Marx gave of the epistemological aspects of Hegels work. If one sees Marx direction in this as Hegel upside down, one comes to the

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[15] Roelandts (PH), p. 35.

conclusion that Marx saw Hegels position as the production of reality by the human mind, and more specifically human culture. His reversal of ideas meant then that culture, ideas, are produced not by the human mind, but rather by nature. Or, more precisely, that the human mind and all the ideas there, are an offspring of the position one has in nature. Nature is not a place in this context, nor a state of wildness or lack of civilisation or society (as in Rousseau's case[16]). The most important aspect of nature determining man is the economy. Man's ecological environment is the economy. His relation to the means of production, main features of economy, are determining for the types of thought he is inclined to develop or not[17].

Later in the 19th century Nietzsche, who declared God dead so couldn't use Kants trick to save essentialism, produced a different epistemology, though somewhat related to Marx'. Nietzsche saw the will as the prime formative power of reality and knowledge. Related to Marx is the production of reality by man and the roles of social positions in this. As long as one is in an enslaved role, as long as ones will is weak because of this, one cannot know much and achieve much. Nietzsche's uebermensch, an ideal for mankind, is not a proletarian after some stages of revolution, but it is a strong- willed and free-willed man freed from slavery to people and to delivered ideas. One of the main enslaving ideas is God (and the church a dominating institution), as also Marx and Feuerbach had ascertained. But not only this idea and institution prevent the development of the will and the production of superior knowledge. Most of our present ideas (in Nietzsche's time, if we take him historically here) are derived from patterns of thought connected to dominating structures, institutions and powers. This means man needs to change drastically if he intends to transcend his simple self and becoming an *ubermensch*. Some moral boundaries have to be transgressed in the process, since these are mostly enslaving structures, with a fictitious God as a legitimation and fundament. Indeed, not only is God dead in his view, but also man is nearly dead, man defining himself according to ideas produced by dominators[18]. (Foucauld alluded on this by ending his seminal *Les mots*

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[16] Wokler (PH), passim.
[17] Auzias (PH); Banning (PH)
[18] Duhamel (PH), 37

et les choses by telling us calmly that man is disappearing like a face drawn on the beach, washed away by the tide[19].)

After Nietzsche, next protagonist in the drama of antirealism is Freud, who had a profound influence on 20th century thought, so too on philosophy. Freud had his own contribution to the diminishing of man as the autonomous seat of reason and the unveiler of objective truths. Freud himself considered psycho-analysis as a positive science, intending to study the normal human mind (and therefore human knowledge) by studying the obvious diversions and digressions from it to be seen in mental illness. Freud showed that our personal histories do not work like the official histories of states. After an event, especially some significant events in childhood related to the family bonds, this event won't stop working. It is never finished, in the sense that these events can structure personality in such a way that future events will be directed in this or that way and that they will be interpreted in this or that way. History determines the interpretation of histories and the actions upon them. History determines truth therefore, in diverse ways because of diverse influences on personality and behaviour. In the meanwhile, we think to perceive objectively, deliberate our actions objectively and carry them out objectively (in some cases) This unawareness of the reasons for our actions and an unawareness about the truth of our ideas (the direction of our interpretations underneath) is thinkable thanks to the concept of the subconscious. Part of human nature is closer to nature than most of our official self- recognised thoughts, and we are not aware of this raw part because the impulses and ideas involved are not socially accepted and would trouble our functioning in society and- or our mental stability. This part is the subconscious in psychoanalysis[20].

So, our past built in our personality, our will, and our economic background and social position were around 1900 already present as factors influencing the construction of knowledge, however diverse the

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[19] On the presence of Nietzsche in Foucault: see Van Middelaar (PH); Dosse (PH), part 1, pp. 54 etc.

[20] For the lines on Freud, see both books by Gay (PS) but mainly Vergote and Moyaert (PS) It might be useful to point out that Jungian notions of the collective subconscious are avoided in this book, despite the attractive simplicity of these concepts in analysing the mechanisms of social memory. See also Verschraegen, p. 3. (OT)

mechanisms involved may be and how different the concisely presented exponents of these lines of thought may be. The impact of their ideas could be seen very quickly in some cases (Freud) and less fast in others (Nietzsche) but a combination of their ideas that changed modern thought into postmodern thought had to be awaited for about fifty more years. In the meanwhile, two more important figures played a key role, positive and- or negative in the construction of this revolutionary frame of reference we just referred to: structuralism. Before going into this we will briefly discuss these two key players.

2.2.4. Founding father of structuralism: De Saussure

Fernand de Saussure. He was a Suiss linguist, relatively unknown during his lifetime but very famous after the posthumous publication of his *Cours de linguistique générale*[21], a collection of his Geneve college notes heavily rewritten by some of his students (luckily he had a few brilliant students) De Saussure is seen as the founder of what is called general linguistics. He was the first linguist to study language in a non historical way. He considered language for what it fundamentally was, in his eyes, a sign system. As he drew special attention to what created coherent functionality of the system, i.e. its structure, he is considered as a founding father of structuralism, though he never called himself like this and he lived in an alltogether different intellectual environment. He claims that meaning in language is formed by sets of binary oppositions. The meaning of black depends on the presence of a concept of white. The semantic universe, the encyclopaedic mental structure that enables us to understand language, is seen as a giant web of binary oppositions. Also on the more basic level of sound-patterning, a precondition for speech is according to him the human introduction of sets of binary sound oppositions.[22] This binarity is therefore a characteristic of language on all levels, of sounds, words and concept. The difference between word and concept is important for him and important to stress here, since a lot of confusion in discussions on structuralism, postmodernism and antirealism is caused by a lack of clarity on this point.

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[21] In 1911
[22] Mounin (PH); Dosse (PH), part1, passim. Also Kwant (PH), first chapters.

The word cat refers to a concept cat, not to a 'real' cat. Words are signs, things referring to something, to ideas. Semantic universes of certain languages (and, in extension, of cultures) are webs of ideas, not of things. Only indirectly, via ideas, can one talk about and know reality. The ideas and the words are as said structured necessarily in pairs to make meaning possible. The concrete word is called *signifiant*, the connected idea *signifié*. Both are structured in pairs. There is no chronology in the structuring process of signifiant and signifié; structure at the two levels arises simultaneously. A new pair of words is formed together with a new pair of ideas; the systems of speech and thought are necessarily connected. Words and thoughts are linked. The language seen as this system of interconnected sets of oppositions is called *langue* by de Saussure. *Langue* is opposed to *parole* in his theory. Parole is the everyday form of language, the language as it is used, in its historical aspect. In parole words have shades and histories, whereas in parole they are a sharlply defined part of a smartly designed language machine. De Saussure said near the end of the *Cours* that his new version of linguistics was only the start of a new discipline, a scientific branch that ought to study not only linguistic but also other sign- systems. It is there that the name sémiologie appears for the first time, the theory of signification.

2.2.5. French structuralism: Levi Strauss as a starting point

Let us shift the focus now to France in the fifties. In that period, structuralism was founded. Some of the works that were named structuralist in the sixties were written in the fiftees. Four main proponents should be mentioned here: Claude Lévi- Strauss, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan. All of them helped greatly in dismantling man as autonomous producer of truth and knowledge. Meaning derives mainly from structures, be it linguistic, cultural, psychological, historical.

Lévi- Strauss was an anthropologist that revolutionized that discipline by adapting linguistic methods to anthropology. He used structural analysis as a tool for the study of cultures and cultural products, where binary oppositions are identified as underlying structures determining the meaning of this or that. His main fields of application of this analysis, and related the main variants of the analytic method are the study of myth (four books of *Mythologiques e.g*), the study of family relations, of art and of

classification systems (e.g. *The savage mind*). Linguistic sources were De Saussure and Roman Jakobson, a Russian runaway that worked in New York with Lévi- Strauss. Jakobson developped De Saussure's thought into a more complete and more formal system (e.g. on the sound patterns)[23].

In the meantime, some followers of De Saussure started to call themselves *sémiologues*. Greimas, but also the early Barthes, devised distinctions based on De Saussures langue- parole distinction. Without elaborating on the terminology here, it can be said that Lévi- Strauss, following these early semioticians (see later) used variations of langue- parole to talk about cultures as systems that can be studied synchronically, in itself, as abstract and stable constructions of the mind, and on the other hand as confusing, ever changing groups that are not always easy to delineate. He saw a concrete culture as a kind of expression, a kind of sentence formed with elements that are nevertheless in different combinations present in other cultures and combined according to the same rules. Structural analysis is analysis not of style but of grammar, not of expressions but of rules and basic elements[24].

Another intellectual connection to be mentioned here is the presence of Freud in Lévi- Strauss' thought. He scarcely wrote on this subject, but is nevertheless very clear. Importance of cultural structures that are not as such perceived by the people themselves can only be claimed if one agrees on the existence of a subconscious and its importance. Part of the driving force in cultural development and of the rules that limit and shape its outcome are not present as such in the mind of the individuals within a specific culture. The subconscious is therefore not chaotic, not only a meeting place for instincts and oppressed feelings, but at least partly structured −this is where the structures belong. Nature and culture are at close distance here, and difficult to distinguish. It is easy to understand why nature- culture was the most basic distinction for Lévi- Strauss.

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[23] Leach on Levi Strauss (A), p. 45; Levi Strauss *The savage mind*, (A), passim; Simonis on Levi Strauss, (A),pp 45–56.
[24] Dosse, (PH), passim; Leach (A), p. 47.

2.2.6. From structuralism to post– structuralism: Roland Barthes

Roland Barthes was at first interested in literature and later widened his horizon. He became famous with his *Mythologies*[25], short pieces on various subjects, originally written for a newspaper[26]. They uncovered modern mythologies of all sorts. It has to be noted that in these pieces there is still a single truth that is hidden beneath the myth, a myth often constructed and made to appear natural by a bourgeois society trying to maintain itself, staying unchanged. A marxist influence is immediately clear from this description. This is not very typical for Barthes, since French intellectual circles in the fifties, sixties and seventies were predominantly (neo-)marxist in appearance, even if one must add that their interpretations of Marx were extremely varied and most often completely different from the Sovjet interpretations these days. However, it is something to be aware of[27]. A few years later, Barthes became influenced by Greimas and from time to time tried to reach the same level of formality in his reasoning and text construction[28].

During his life Barthes, who started to call himself a semiotician after a while, often switched styles, sometimes writing informally and seemingly intuitive, thereby allowing for an interpretation of semiotics as a gaze, a highly sensitive way of looking at things and finding relations unnoticed before. On other occasions, he wrote in the Greimas– style, and constructed very formal studies of certain sign– systems (see *Systeme de la mode*[29]), giving rise to a definition of semiotics as a very formal and rigid discipline, interested in finding the grammar of all sign systems. However confusing this may seem, we think it is almost the same confusion that we found with Lévi– Strauss. Barthes is interested in style as well as in

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[25] Paris, 1957. See bib S
[26] Calvet (S), p. 27.
[27] Auzias etc. (PH) tend to overestimate the links between structuralism and Marxism however, by trying to formalise them and make them appear a matter of logic.
[28] Calvet (S), tells us about the series of attempts Barthes made to produce something like a phd, a book he wanted to be extremely formal in character. He became one of the most celebrated scholars in France but never took the doctor´s degree.
[29] Paris, 1975

grammar of the different sign- systems, and is sensitive for the restricted application of some rules and the multiple interpretions of others.

A distinction in his oeuvre that we can agree upon very clearly, is that between a structuralist and poststructuralist phase. Most readers place it in the book *S/Z*.[30] Barthes distantiated himself from some aspects of his earlier work in a way that is consistent with contemporary developments in intellectual France. But what is this poststructuralism all about? Poststructuralism implies a dissatisfaction with structuralism. It was said that structuralist theories were too static. This meant generally that they a) did not take into account the historical and social characteristics of the production of meaning, and b) that they supposedly neglected the possibility that meaning cannot be fixed at a given moment. Barthes as well as Greimas (*Du sens*) moved towards poststructuralism. The incentive to build formal systems of meaning, to unveil sets of rules, moved to the background simultaneously, first with Barthes, later also with Greimas, once the master- architect of semiotics.[31] If the influence of social and historical factors becomes more important and if the variations on multiple interpretation become numerous, it becomes less and less likely to build systems of meaning, formal models of sign- systems, in the hope to construct in the end a general model for the production of meaning.

2.2.7. Poststructuralism: Michel Foucault

In the oeuvre of Michel Foucault we find it much more difficult to see such a transition from structuralist to post-structuralist, although he was right from the start labelled as structuralist. In *Les mots et les choses*[32] and *Histoire de la folie a l'age classique*[33], two of his early works, it is almost impossible to find the paradigms of structuralism. Apart from the more general intention of structuralism to dissolve man as the center of meaning −see the comparison between man and the vanishing face in the sand. Also for Foucault human knowledge derives from structures beyond our grasp and control. One important set of these structures according to him are

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[30] Paris, 1970; Dosse, part 2, p. 35; Calvet, passim; also: Barnes and Duncan (D), ch. 2.
[31] Greimas (S); Chandler (S)
[32] Paris, 1967
[33] Paris, 1965.

discourses, and it was said before that the notion of discourse used in this book and quoted above, is taken from Foucault.

Some discourses are more stable than others, some have a wider audience and application, some are more restrictive, some are less clearly defined and so on. Discourses are contingent and historical and shifting constantly, although at varying speeds. That makes it easy to call Foucault a poststructuralist, even if 'discourse' can as well feature in structuralist studies. One can say that structuralism and poststructuralism are often more different perspectives useful for different types of questions and objects than alternative options for one and the same question, or alternative and mutually exclusive epistemologies.

Foucault's heritage from Nietzsche and Marx can be found among other places in his analysis of the relations between knowledge and power. Already in the 16th century, Francis Bacon equated knowledge and power, but with Foucault, this equation becomes something very different: knowledge produces power and power produces knowledge[34]. Discourses represent power directly because they give access to reality and can deny access. And indirectly because power is at the basis of the configuration of a lot of discourses and according to Foucault even scientific disciplines. Configurations of power create and perpetuate configurations of discourses, discursive networks, to consolidate their positions. Unveiling discourses, deconstructing them, is therefore a potentially liberating and at least politically subversive act. One could say somewhat schematising that the emancipatory part of this message is more related to Marx, and the formation of knowledge by power to Nietzsche (where also the will could create knowledge)

2.2.8. Post– structuralism and post– modernism

We arrive at post-modernism. The term appears early in Lyotards *La condition postmoderne[35]*, and points at more general changes in science and society, due to the loss of faith in what he calls master narratives. Political ideology, religion and science are the most influential master narratives in western history. The movements of structuralism and post-structuralism, although not creating new disciplines, did have a thorough influence on a

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[34] See Foucault (D), *Surveiller et punir*
[35] Paris, 1979.

number of scientific disciplines (notably in the humanities) and directly on wider audiences via media, arts, in some cases politics. One can say that the lines of thought and the more isolated signals mentioned in the earlier pages of this chapter converged in structuralism, evolving in post-structuralism that can mostly be named post-modern in the more technical- philosophical definition (antirealist epistemology, social embedding of science, relations power- knowledge) What is seen as the post-modern movement in wider circles derives from this type of thinking influencing the arts and the humanities, often coincidentally overlapping with internal evolutions in literature, architecture, and several of the disciplines drawn into the orbit of these relativist tendencies[36].Some of the post-modern authors in the diverse disciplines involved (e.g. Appadurai in anthropology) have explored the limits of relativism in a way that goes well beyond our beliefs.

Our theoretical and therefore methodological frame is mostly post-structuralist, with some structuralist elements where it is suitable for the question at hand.

This is true for the general theoretical framework as well as for the more specific framework, combining structuralist and poststructucturalist methods in a post- modern way. We will further the construction of the general theoretical framework. In order to do so, the next chapter will choose a more disciplinary. We will treat anthropology, semiotics and discourse- studies, the main sources for the construction of our conceptual framework on history, people and place, as separate intellectual traditions. In the last chapter we treated one type of relations between them, namely the lines of development towards postmodernism crossing the borders of disciplines and traditions. The next part will observe these borders for a moment, whereas the chapter following that one will choose once more a different perspective, and treat in extenso a number of concepts that will occur frequently in the rest of the book. These concepts together form the general theoretical framework, the origins of which are dealt with in this and the coming chapter.

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[36] Jameson (PH); Defoort (PH)

2.3. Semiotics, anthropology and discourse- studies

Here, we choose the disciplinary perspective, as outlined in 2.1.

It was already said that semiotics, discourse studies and anthropology are he main sources of inspiration for this book. We must add that elements from different traditions and disciplines are incorporated now and then. And that the worlds of planning and design, under analysis with these three theoretical traditions, will generate a host of concepts appearing later on.

2.3.1. Anthropology

Anthropology is considered a scientific discipline for more than a century. We do not intend to give a complete history here of the discipline (neither of semiotics nor discourse- studies). We do intend to sketch briefly how the ideas presented in the lines towards postmodernism are present in, interwoven with, anthropological traditions. Anthropology is seen in the definitions of its more contemporary schools as the study of cultures, the study of socially motivated human behaviour and signification, or simply as the study of signification. These diverse definitions, related to different anthropological schools, all leave space for an application to western societies.

From the fifties onwards, Levi- Strauss is seen as the most influential anthropologist. Lévi- Strauss stems mainly from the French sociological tradition of Durkheim and Mauss, one of the three lines of descent often recognised in anthropology. The other two are American and British. American anthropology is roughly speaking based on Boas (who made it a science in the States), Kroeber and Lowie, whereas the British line incorporates Radcliffe- Brown, Malinowski and Evans- Pritchard[37]. These are of course simplifications. In Britain, the core of the anthropology since the thirties was derived from Malinowski's idea of functionalism: a society should be studied as a whole; every part can be explained by its position in the whole. Malinowski's highly mechanistic theoretical fundaments were refined by his followers in England (he himself came from Poland), and

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[37] Poirier, 64 (A); Barnard, ch 5 (A)

were accompanied by a methodological stress on long- term, precise participant observation.[38]

In Britain, after hostile reactions on Lévi- Strauss' innovations, a British variation on structuralist anthropology arose, often keeping the name of functionalism officially. Most famous exponent of this British structuralism is Edmund Leach[39]. In Leach, we find the same love of mathematical clarity as in Lévi- Strauss, but here combined with a transparent style of writing, in the line of Evans- Pritchard[40], and a focus on participant observation, following Malinowski's example. In his later works (e.g. *Culture and communication: the logic by which symbols are connected*) Leach introduces clearly a simplified version of French semiotics. Ungrateful as it may be, the development in itself is significant. French and British traditions are connected, and the path to a more post- modern British anthropology was (more or less) paved.

In America, things were different. Structuralism never gained a significant foothold but in the early seventies Clifford Geertz was one of the early representatives of the so- called interpretative anthropology school (e.g. *The interpretation of cultures[41]*) It is possible to say that anthropology in the States didn't have a structuralist period, but jumped immediately to a poststructuralist phase (at least, part of it; older traditions are still alive) Interpretative anthropology is interested in interpretation; Geertz used an explicit semiotic definition of culture[42]. He wanted anthropology to develop in a socio-semiotic direction: it studies the diverse ways a group of people constructs its world through signs. A world of signs enables us to interpret the signs attributed by ourselves and make sense of our surroundings. Since Geertz, American anthropology produced a host of semiotically inspired authors and schools[43].

Since the late eighties, poststructuralism in the Foucault tradition has permeated anthropology at several places. Arjun Appadurai's early works[44] betray his influence beyond doubt. An interest in discourses, genealogies

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[38] In the vein of Malinowski
[39] Cambridge, 1976.
[40] See Geertz on Evans- Pritchard (Geertz 1989 (A), ch. 3)
[41] New York, 1973.
[42] Geertz 1973 (A), introduction.
[43] Barnard (A)
[44] See e.g. Appadurai on hierarchy (A)

of ideas, power positions, power creating knowledge, can be found easily in a whole array of writers.[45] Simultaneously, a heightened sensitivity for the anthropologist's own position and influence on the research outcomes could be seen all over the world. He himself has power at his disposal and is used by power in relation to his research. Research on earlier anthropologists, reinterpretation of some of their case studies, showed the colonial embedding of much of early anthropology, and more interestingly the construction of a lot of social groups and cultures studied by these early scientists and their followers. The tribes under scrutiny were often result of colonial policy and- or anthropological prejudice or specific intentions[46].

One reaction on this heightened self- awareness was the origin of a new school of anthropology, the so- called narrative school. Narrative anthropologists use narrative experiments, experiments with style and text-construction to tackle the problems of subjectivity, and the impossibility to capture the unique qualities of other people's ideas. They can use e.g. combinations of personal reflection, stories told by the people studied and classic- anthropological passages in one text. An influence can be noticed from post-modern philosophies but also from post-modern literature[47], where multiple perspectives and styles are commonplace since the early eighties. (e.g. in Italo Calvino's novels).

The narrative school often implies post-stucturalist stances. Often, their writings are also labelled post-modern, in anthropology often opposed to post-structuralist. Postmodernism in anthropology is more consistently then in other disciplines associated with multiple perspectives and methods, and an attempt to stretch the limits of anthropology to the individual experience. (And to the arts) Therefore, in a post–modern anthropological study it is not strange to combine structural analysis with post-structuralist parts and even phenomenological observations. If it is impossible to determine the nature of reality anyway, if it is impossible to built a theory consistently from a few theoretical fundaments, then it is not necessary to limit the combination of methods to these methods that share fundaments or at least have fundaments that are not opposed, that are not

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[45] e.g. Bhabha (A)
[46] Van Wolputte, ch 9 (A)
[47] Appadurai on ethnoscapes (A)

mutually exclusive. That is why the three –isms mentioned can appear in one study.

Our own position in this, our own position towards post-modern anthropology as just defined, is moderately conservative. We tend to take a post-structuralist position, not a post-modern one in the sense just given to it. Elements of Geertz can be recognised in this book, as wel as bits of Appadurai. The only post- modern feature in anthropological perspective could be the combination of structuralism and post- structuralism here and there. Such combinations are only applied if deemed logically possible; an idea of complete incompatibility of the two perspectives mostly stems from simplified versions of the theories.

2.3.2. Semiotics

Semiotics is the theory of signs and interpretation. All sorts of signs exist, grouped in sign systems governed by diverse types of rules. Communication depends on the interpretation of signs and knowledge, implicit or explicit, of the elements to be interpreted and the rules of interpretation, the codes involved. Sign- systems can be linguistic and non- linguistic. Architecture is a non- linguistic sign- system: buildings can mean things, more or less clearly, more or less objectively, according to more or less widespread and more or less clear rules. The same goes for sign systems like gesture, fashion, painting and so on. Semiotics has roughly speaking *two lines of descent, one European and one American.*[48]

One main line of descent has been mentioned already: the one springing from De Saussure's linguistics. Via the Prague school linguistics and structural anthropology it became fashionable in French intellectual circles from the sixties on to talk about sémiologie, the French version of semiotics. In Prague, Mukarovsky and others already developed a semiotics of culture in the forties, also starting from the Saussure, but applied to literature and non- linguistic sign systems like folk art and folk dancing (and in this anti- elitist choice bearing the mark of communism)[49] In France, early attempts at semiotic system- building came from Algirdas Greimas. Greimas knew Barthes and influenced him in his efforts to combine his more interpretative and deconstructive (avant la lettre)

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[48] Chandler (S); Bal- Bryson (S); Henault, 84 (S)
[49] Mukarovsky is a key figure here; see Matejka and Titunik (S)

approach to semiotics of literature (and later film, architecture, fashion,…) with a more systematic quest for the architecture of sign systems. (Notably the quest for isolation of meaningful elements and rules for combination of these elements) Barthes called himself semiotician (see the title of his book *L'aventure sémiologique*[50]). In Barthes' oeuvre as well as in the works of Greimas, one can see a structuralist and a poststructuralist phase, as was said before.

Another line of descent comes from America.

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), logician and founder of the philosophy called pragmatism developed a general theory of signs and a sophisticated semiotic typology that he called 'a speculative grammar'. As the general theory and the typology did not have linguistics as a model, Peirce and his followers did not use linguistic notions borrowed from general linguistics as metaphors; that made their approach especially appropriate for the analysis of non-linguistic sign–systems. Peircean semiotics stayed for different reasons unknown to European intellectuals in 20th century decades when Saussurian inspired semiotics (sémiologie) started to be developed Europe and influenced thinking outside semiotics itself. Peircean analytical concepts where first introduced and used in Germany by Max Bense and in Italy by Umberto Eco.

Peirce, as a philosopher, defined three modes of being, which he called *Firstness*, *Secondness* and *Thirdness*. A *First* is something that has no relation with something else; it is just a potentiality. When a First comes into relation with something else, it comes to existence as a *Second*, that is something real, be it physical, spiritual, imaginable. When a Second comes into relation with something else, be it a First or another Second, it becomes a *Third*, that has the property of possible or real generality. These ontological presuppositions explain why in Peirce's semiotic theory and typology triads are omnipresent.

For Peirce signification has to be accounted for as a process. To him a *Sign* is something that for somebody represents something else, present or absent, that he calls the *Object* (others say Referent) and that, doing so, produces in the mind of the interpreting person another Sign, called *Interpretant*. Representation (referring) is bringing into relation a Sign and an Object, while interpretation is bringing this elementeray

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[50] Paris, 1964.

relation of referring into relation with an Interpretant. The triadic Peircean model of semiosis (i.e.giving meaning to something) is not only in accordance with Peirce's ontology, it gives, think semioticians who practice it, a better idea of the dynamic character of the semiotic process. As the Interpretant,born in the human mind, is in its turn a new Sign, the semiotic process is ever unfolding. The Sign is an event, a moment in a potentially never ending series of interpretations, interconnexions of Signs, Objects, Interpretants.

The Sign can be related to its Object in three ways. When the two have at least one characteristic in common, the relationship is created by some resemblance, some likeness, and this is why Peirce called this type of Sign an *Icon*. When the relationship depends on some contiguity, be it spatial or temporal/causal, the Sign is an *Index*, which makes us think of the pointing finger (the traffic sign that has the form of an arrow and leads you to a town or a nearby castle is an evident Index, just as the finger of the person who shows you the road to the railwaystation). There are Signs that do their semiotic work thanks to a convention, an agreement, a social convention. Peirce called them *Symbols*. As they have a conventional, institutionalized character, the Signs used in collective communication are always Symbols; the red traffic light for instance, and also the red color and round colour on traffic signs. There is no doubt possible, nor permitted, about these semiotic elements. No Icon is a pure Icon, because the Icon is a First. It has to be embedded in Secondness. Every Index implies something iconic, and every Symbol, that is a Third, implies iconicity and indexicality. It is an interesting thing to analyze the functioning of the representative characteristics in a Sign that has the overall aspect of a Symbol. Where visual art and visual communication have their impact, the functioning of iconic Signs is important.

In immediate human contact, as in love, for instance, the main role is for the Index.

When law making, justice, of scientific investigation and cooperation is at stake, we cannot do without scrupulous use of Symbols.

The Interpretant starts in Peirce's view as a a potentiality (First) of some proposition (Second) tot constitute eventually a Third, that he called an *Argument*. The traditional forms of these Arguments are those of *Induction* and *Deduction*. Be it in scientific reasoning or in interpretation in every day life situations, we start with facts and come to conclusions that

are general rules or, the other way around, we start with general rules and come to interpretative conclusions. Peirce discovered that much interpretation follows another line. Our semiotic activity follows ways of backward reasoning. The car that refuses to start (Fact! And not the most pleasant one) makes us search in our mind for general rules that lessons of life or teachers have learned us (No gas? No ignition? Empy battery? Otherwise?). This is the interpretative way that is supposed to lead to the most plausible hypothesis. That is why Peirce called this kind of Argument first of all Hypothesis. Later he gave it the name of *Abduction*. Peircean semioticians are nowadays convinced that abductive interpretation needs research, especially where people meet who use, in discussions and evaluation of situations, presuppositions they are often not aware of. Therefore, it is a way of reasoning that will often be used in the following pages.

Our position in semiotics is poststructuralist —we do not look for formal laws of signification or the map of the semantic universe. It is also eclectic, since we combine elements of the Peircean tradition with elements of the French (continental) tradition. In this respect, we follow the standard set by Umberto Eco.

2.3.3. Discourse Studies

We want to be very short on this subject. Discourse studies are, like semiotics, not a real discipline. Discourse studies became a subdiscipline of several disciplines: they can be found in history, psychology, media studies, policy studies and much more. They tend to be studies on this or that discourse; sometimes unveiling discourses, sometimes analysing clearly present ones. Originating from Foucault's notion of discourse, diverse types of studies emerged. An Anglosaxon tradition focussed mostly on the details of language use, a tradition building on Habermas strived for the absence of power in communication and tried to build discourses according to certain rules[51]. Both traditions have nothing to do with Foucault's interpretation of the concept. The Anglosaxon one because it reduces discourses to structures in language and notably structures that can be found by counting words, and therefore nullify the power of the concept. The Habermas version can be discarded here because it fits into the theory of this last modernist; for him power has to be avoided. With

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[51] See e.g. Koningsveld (PH)

Foucault, power is just there, neither good or bad. Habermas thinks discourses can be designed, while Foucault shows how they originate and are present everywhere[52]. One can always try to invent a discourse, but the unpredictable behaviour of such creations does not leave room for planning and design.

Our use of discourse studies is based on Foucault, therefore post- structuralist. The activity involved is defined here as the unveiling and analysing of discourses and their dynamics, their relations to social structures, knowledge and power.

The materials used can be linguistic but also patterns in human behaviour and products of human culture. Discourse studies as applied methodically in this book are mostly attempts to find patterns in signs, be it linguistic signs or else, to verify the existence of these patterns in comparable situations, to link patterns to each other and to social realities. Significant for a lot of discourses are hidden assumptions. A part of reality is presented in a certain way because of and thanks to a set of basic assumptions. Sometimes people are aware of them, often not. Discourse analysis has as one of its prime goals to identify hidden assumptions, connect them, check the connection and –again– try to establish links with the social world and the powers and ideas present there.

2.3.4. Other traditions involved

Semiotics, discourse studies and anthropology constitute the main sources of inspiration for the construction of the theory. However, there is more. More disciplines and intellectual traditions are to a certain extent present in this book. More disciplines are infused with the lines of thought we situate ourselves in. Some of these can be traced in this book. French historiography, communication studies, policy studies, art history are noteworthy. In fact, one of the implicit models for our theoretical endeavour is Michel de Certeau, a French Jesuit that combined history, theology, semiotics, anthropology, psycho- analysis in pieces of writing that are distinctly local: they investigate local practices and histories from such an interdisciplinary perspective, often undermining general theories on history, modernity and more by this sharp and multifacetted look at small situation, often in everyday life[53].

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[52] Foucault 1970 (D); Eribon on Foucault (F)
[53] See De Certeau 1975 and 1987 (OT)

The theoretical perspectives we try to unfold here are present because they form the background of this book and at the same time are an integral part of it. They shape the necessary frame of reference to understand it, give meaning to a host of the concepts used, explain the choice of methods, the basic definitions of knowledge in action etc. This unfolding theoretical frame, a prerequisite for our own frame construction, needs to be brought one step further before we introduce the first case studies.

2.4. Compendium of Concepts

We refer to 2.1., where the coming pages are described as the conceptual perspective. We try to investigate the presence of the theoretical frame in a number of key concepts, concepts that will feature prominently in the case studies. We present a number of concepts, featuring in the whole book, interpreted in specific ways due to the theoretical perspectives chosen. These concepts form a conceptual frame, a general conceptual framework capable of generating more specific frames and itself drawing on the more general frames of post- modern thought. Frame in frame in frame. Spelling the concepts out can avoid misunderstanding, can clarify the consequences of the theoretical positions for the content of certain basic concepts, and delineate more sharply some of the methodological procedures that fit into the basic framework. In the meanwhile, examples from spatial planning and design can draw us to the actual subject of this book: the use of history in space. Looking backwards and forwards simultaneously, so to speak.

2.4.1. Knowledge

Knowledge and reality are looked upon in a certain way, they are seen as social constructions. Furthermore, an aim of this study is to develop knowledge on the ways history can be used in planning, an on the ways historical knowledge can be used in these processes. Knowledge is seen as a social construction. There is no Kantian transcendental subject that remains untouched by perception and language. There is no necessary correspondence between sign and reality. And between knowledge and reality. Knowledge can never be eternal, universal, necessarily true, completely objective. This does not imply science is impossible: only the conventional character of its frame and the limited applicability of its methods and models should be perceived more sharply.

2.4.2. Science

Science is defined and demarcated differently for every era and culture. The lines disciplines draw in the field of knowing change, as does the boundary between scientific and non- scientific knowledge. All these

lines are constantly shifting, sometimes slow, sometimes faster[54]. Whereas since the 19th century the idea of progress has taken hold of scientific thought, in 20th century philosophy, sociology and other sciences, this notion has been attacked. Science and innovation are often equated since 19th century. Knowledge belonging to other cultures and periods is often qualified negatively by labelling it non- scientific. The label 'scientific' has, apart from other functions, a distinct social function. To qualify something as scientific means here and now that it acquires more importance in a network of people and institutions that grant authority and create possibilities –and the opposite is also true.

In the attempts to uncover this type of mechanisms, in the search for blind spots in a number of discourses, e.g. in one's own discipline, it proves to be very rewarding to look from one discourse to another one – what we try to do by using an interdisciplinary approach- and to take a position in the margin of a certain discourse, where the official truths of the discourse are often tested and contested. Some of the case studies take such a marginal position (e.g. the one on the allotment gardens) Foucault himself had a distinct preference for marginal perspectives; his most famous works are on insanity, crime, illness, the way societies deal with it and develop knowledge on these subjects. Both the interdisciplinarity and the marginal position are ways of changing perspectives at common knowledge, strategies to debunk the mythologies of discourses, strategies of discourse studies in general.

2.4.3. Discipline

A discipline is a branch of science, a classificatory unit of knowing, a related systematic way of producing and limiting knowledge, a boundary of discourse, all according to Foucault[55]. The negative aspect of a discipline always accompanies the positive aspect. This is logical because the classification of knowing and talking in disciplines necessarily brings about a focus on certain relations between concepts and certain boundaries between other concepts. Boundaries between concepts can be drawn because the dividing lines between disciplines are accidentally situated

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[54] Latour (A); Bastide, 214 (S); Foucault in *Les mots et les choses,*but also in other works (D); Greimas (S); Van Assche (OT)
[55] Foucault *Surveiller et punir*

there. Disciplinary boundaries are solidified because within the separated territories people start to develop all sorts of distinctive codes, codes not only related to the scientific content, also codes that have nothing to do with the actual object of study[56]. Development of specific methods creates a new focus and new blind spots, the necessary knowledge to be a scientist in a certain discipline multiplies (so the possession of other knowledge becomes increasingly difficult), knowledge is transferred differently in every discipline en is presented differently in education.

Theories are usually built within the frame of a discipline, the same goes for methods and machines, and all of these built on each other, assume each other while the disciplines moves towards scientific progress. These mechanisms further solidify the disciplinary boundaries, make it more and more difficult to pass them. Disciplines have a natural tendency to move away from each other. People are inclined to fall back on what is known, what is learned long ago, what colleagues said on conferences and in journals that are mostly organised along disciplinary lines. When something new is introduced in a discipline, it will only survive if it is adapted to the new environment. Crises do help to build bridges.

Scientific and non-scientific discourses alike, disciplinary knowledge and other knowledge, can be tied to basic patterns of a culture or a period. Large scale discourse studies can reveal these ground patterns, called the *épisteme* of an era by Foucault[57]. An episteme can emerge and disappear, a new sense of what knowing is and certain associations with it, a new sense what man is and knowledge and so on. Disciplines can originate and disappear along with these developments Foucault himself elaborated the examples of psychology and criminology[58], their birth and childhood, related to one episteme; he also studied in detail the role of notions of analogy, metaphor, emblem, sympathy in the construction of the fundaments of Renaissance thought[59]. Disciplines move away from each other but stay within the same basic pattern, allowing bridges to be built, still allowing interdisciplinarity, and buidling new disciplines by combining elements of older ones.

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[56] Van Assche (OT)
[57] Foucault, *L' Archeologie du savoir* (D)
[58] Foucault, *Surveiller et punir*
[59] Foucault, *Les mots et les choses*

Among disciplines analogies can be shown that are less related to internal developments in the disciplines, knowledge building on older knowledge, and more to one type of view on man, knowing, nature, God. This general view on basic issues of humanity, as we present the episteme here, does have its own history, and is in Foucault's work not presented as a blind force completely untouched by human action and impossible to grasp for the human mind Even on this fundamental level, one episteme is partly a reaction on a former one, and is caused by human action and thought, how much passive man may seem to be towards the resulting discourses, results of changes induced by other men.

2.4.4. Discourse

Discourse is not a new word here. We met it several times before. As said, we follow Michel Foucault's notion of discourse. It is embedded therefore in a context where knowledge about reality is seen as socially constructed, historically contingent, discontinuous, and culture- based; consequently all this applies to reality itself as well. Discourse became the gaze of one group in one period on a part of reality that highlighted some aspects of reality while hiding other parts (in fact: constructing other parts) Discourses produce the world.

Subconscious elements play a significant role in the functioning of discourses. A discourse is not the sum of what is said or done, rather a frame, a structure of collectively conscious and subconscious elements present in a certain culture at a certain time, determining interpretation of things there and then. What a person says and thinks and writes cannot be thought apart from the world of discourses. He cannot think outside the discursive world, but cannot be reduced to one discourse at the same time, nor is he controlled by the existing frames completely. People can change discourses slowly, sometimes quickly, but only in a way that is conceivable within the frame of the existing discourses[60]. People also combine diverse roles in society and belong to, participate in, are formed by a multitude of discourses. Man is not one- dimensional. Discourses constitute the subject, influence the personality, do not allow man to express everything what he wants, express things he did not intend to share or is not aware about himself, about himself, his group, culture, time. That is why meaning in

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[60] De Certeau *Histoire et psychanalyse* (OT)

communication and in interpretation of someone's actions is not limited to the conscious intentions of that person.

Space, landscape, town are fields where a lot of different discourses meet and are mingled[61]. Space is a thing in itself, at the same time a background for a multitude of things, objects, actions, histories, for a lot of different people. A landscape can mean very different things for people looking at them and moving in them in a different discourse. Its identity can change according to the discourses used. (Later more on this). Spatial planning is a field where the presence of all the different discourses becomes clear, has to come to the surface, in order to allow a clear deliberation and decision- making.[62]

2.4.5. Practice

Practice is seen in opposition to theory. This study tries to look at practices from a theoretical frame, while building a new theory that helps to understand practice better, has some theoretical value in itself and may lead to a few practical applications (if the community of practitioners would allow it) Some clarification of the relation theory- practice may be useful to interpret this study better, and may be helpful to improve the understanding of both of them in the case of spatial planning, where a special version of that relation exists.

Practical tasks for the planner will always exist, and sometimes rest on theory. One notices that what is considered at one time a theoretical insight, evolves into a practical thing, into a tool that stops being questioned after a while[63]. Practice and theory are impossible to define in advance; an insight becomes practical or theoretical depending on its use. Abstraction can be part of practice and the gaining of practical insight. While looking for fixed criteria for the distinction theory- practice, one often finds the concrete- abstract distinction. No solution. A definition in Kantian style could be that theoretical use of knowledge only serves the purpose to produce more knowledge, while practical use of knowledge

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[61] Barnes and Duncan (D); Barthes *Mythologies* and *Semiologie et urbanisme* (S); Roger (PH); Van Assche 1996 and 1997 (D)
[62] Hajer 1995 (SP); Dryzek (SP)
[63] Latour (S)

also serves other goals. Theory and practice can never exist in pure form, they are always mixed to a certain extent.

Planning as an applied science tends to define itself as a practical science. This can mean that it is directed towards direct improvement of the practical skills needed for planners. One can also argue that planning has to study planning practices and the way they are embedded in society, this way acquiring knowledge not only of social process and planning but also of ways to improve planning, an activity necessarily part of society (the way we want space to be organised cannot be disconnected from the question where do we want to go as a society?)

Every culture has its own planning system, and every planning system has its own planning culture. A planning culture is characterised by some dominant discourses. In more liberal economies planning is seen as a matter of process: how can we develop ways of facilitating people to reach their own goals. (United States) Other countries, like Holland, tend to see planning also as a matter of content: planners define goals themselves, thereby interpreting other people's goals in such a way that an optimal result for the whole society could be reached. And they adhere to types of knowledge related to space and landscape that would create a set of conditions for a good plan, apart from the conditions already defined by the actor's goals[64]. Every type of planning system and planning culture has its own vision of knowledge in the planning science.[65] Some systems require more practical knowledge that others, some systems have different versions of the practice- theory distinction.

Planning cultures, planning discourses shape the need for knowledge in a planning science, define what kind of knowledge is needed and whether it is called practical or theoretical. This is an important issue, in order to avoid expectations that planning research is applicable in every planning system, to avoid expectations that knowledge can function in planning the same way as in physics, only because both are labelled scientific disciplines. Planning is culture- bound, planning practices and planning theories are culture- bound, and the practical and theoretical knowledge needed and accepted is culture- bound too[66].

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[64] In the line of Hidding (SP) rather than Faludi (SP)
[65] Van Assche and Jacobs 2002 (SP)
[66] Faludi and Van der Valk (SP); Healy (SP); Westerman 2001 and 2002 (SP)

The effect of the pages you are reading now can only be determined within the planning culture it is read in. An important goal of discourse studies in general, and also here, is the unveiling of discourses. In planning, such an unveiling we deem necessary to raise the self- awareness within the discipline of the various ways national cultures, planning cultures and scientific cultures permeate the methods and solutions of a science that often pretends to deliver objective and universal solutions.

2.4.6. Theory

Spatial planning and design are meeting places of all kinds of interests and stakeholders, an object of knowing that is multi – layered, an aggregation of systems partly ruled by their own laws and partly connected to other systems and their dynamics. That's why the disciplines studying spatial planning and design, and the landscape they act upon, can be described as either studying one of the subsystems (e.g. landscape ecology) or as semi- independent conglomerates of other disciplines (like urban planning, landscape architecture,…) Seen from within these disciplines, this image will probably be rejected, something easy to understand, since every discipline tries to see itself as consistent, different, tries to maintain itself and the related identity. A kind of complex relation exists between the complex object and the complex of disciplines that are studying the object and acting upon it. Therefore, there is a strong tendency towards fragmentation of knowledge, exactly in matters where consistency is asked for[67].

A paradox can be identified here: the complexity of the object, with its multifaceted questions, is asking for a multitude of angles and methods, only to be supplied for by a number of different disciplines. At the same time, actual places have to be planned and designed, projects have to be realised, where the fragmented knowledge has to be gathered again, reinterpreted, understood, made useful. The object requires a strong fragmentation and a strong gathering of knowledge, a strong divergence of research and a strong convergence of results, a powerful analysis and a powerful synthesis. A strong fragmentation of knowledge in disciplines brings about sociological consequences too: every discipline is a group of people that will try to separate itself from other groups, to reach own goals

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[67] Tress etc (OT)

and to look for its own identity in contrast with others[68]. Processes like this tend to stimulate the divergence of disciplines. Just like ethnicities disciplines tend to diverge from others more strongly, tend to accentuate their identities in presence of –many, powerful- others.

From this one does not have to deduce a tragic perspective on science, history or more specifically spatial planning and design. One of the strategies that remain open is the constant renewal and reformulation of common goals.[69] Every now and then the idea comes up that something is wrong with spatial planning in a country, that more or less should be done in this or that direction[70]. The types of problems that are really behind the question can be diverse. Sometimes there is a lack of knowledge, sometimes a surplus of knowledge can be a problem, inducing problems of synthesis and simply of understanding[71]. Sometimes knowledge is not at stake; people's preferences change and are not satisfied anymore with the existing planning and design

In planning cultures that are in themselves more oriented versus process (facilitation), problems will not so easily be identified in this way and the same goes for solutions. Still, these things can happen there too, since some kind of planning system is present in most of the richer countries (and the ex- communist countries), science is highly regarded there, a sense of control is necessary in planning systems, science can create such a feeling, and planning systems try to perpetuate themselves[72]. Even in these more liberally oriented models of planning systems, the same type of reflexes occur. And prevent people from finding real solutions. Fundamental problem here is the unawareness of one's own culture, in this case the planning culture.

2.4.7. Memory

Taken literally, memory exists only in individuals: that what makes it possible to recollect something, what permits to remember old facts. New knowledge can only be possible thanks to the existence of a memory,

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[68] Foucault *Les mots et les choses* (D); Greimas (S)
[69] We meet the influence of the American pragmatists here, people like Dewey, James and Peirce. This influence will reappear in the book every now and then.
[70] Van Assche and Jacobs 2003 (SP)
[71] Van Woerkum (SP)
[72] Wissink, conclusions (SP)

enabling a person to combine new and old facts. What is perceived as new knowledge, depends on the quality of the memory[73]. If one fails to remember anything at all, everything is new and innovation looses its meaning completely. Metaphorically –and avoiding Jungian psycho-analysis- we can identify a kind of collective memory, by pointing at the image a culture has of its own past and its own knowledge, an image traceable in the discourses present within a culture.

Just like an individual life history is being reinterpreted constantly –as shown by Freud- this can be seen with collective history. Images of the past are constantly being created by groups to give identity to places, groups, and configurations of knowledge (see below) Old images are therefore constantly being demolished, or simply set aside, banished to the collective subconscious. Collective memory, or social memory, cannot be interpreted as a massive thing, rather more like a complex of images alive in the discursive fields[74]. Constant rearranging of the past also creates new 'facts' and new relations between hitherto unrelated facts and areas of knowing. The conceptual framework used to look at history co-determines the shape of the resulting history, and people are not completely aware of the framework design. Memory of a group and history are inextricably bound[75].

The same goes for the production of knowledge in general. Whenever a discipline renews itself or new knowledge tries to cross disciplinary boundaries, an image of the histories of these disciplines is involved. In order to produce something new, the memory of a discipline sometimes needs to fall apart; as long as people think all relevant questions are already answered, there is scarcely an impulse for innovation.

The moment some of the more fundamental categories of a discipline are being questioned, the whole history of the discipline is under revision and is being rewritten. A gap is seen or a link is broken. The discovery, or in fact construction, of a gap in the knowledge, is often accompanied by a loss of memory, a loss that can take on several forms and lead to several consequences. The loss of memory can lead to a diminishing certainty on a solution or a subject, it can lead to the discovery of a gap, to the rediscovery of something old, to the reinterpretation of something known.

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[73] Latour, ch 8 (S)
[74] Halbwachs (OT); Comaroff, introduction (A); Candau, 51 (A)
[75] Axel, passim (A)

This may help to explain why some theories are over and over again reinvented and rediscovered[76]. A constant rearrangement and restructuring of knowledge, be it conscious or subconscious, is a prerequisite for the constant renewal of knowledge.

In spatial planning, the memory of the discipline varies according to country and planning culture. The case of Holland, one that will recur consistently in the latter parts of this book, shows a remarkable past of technocratic thinking. Spatial planning was mostly considered as a practice –and related discipline- transforming spatial questions into problems, and problems into technical problems asking for technical solutions[77]. Knowledge development was interpreted as the completion of a tool box, aimed at solving spatial problems of such kind. Conversely, the past of the discipline became a series of problem solutions and the lessons drawn from them. As long as this –here simplified- image of the discipline's history does not change, new types of knowledge development are blocked out systematically.

2.4.8. Power

Since Flyvbjerg power is an honourable subject in the planning discipline. Flyvbjerg[78] showed that planning should be studied from an amoral perspective, to be capable of understanding the realities of spatial planning. Amoral is defined here in the way Macchiavelli, one of Flyvbjerg's sources, spoke of it: as opposed to moral and immoral, it means that one takes a position outside morality (Beyond good and evil, to quote Nietzsche, another source of Flyvbjerg) Macchiavelli's *Il principe*[79] treats a series of positions, systematically classified, where a ruler needs to reach a goal: several situations where a town has to be conquered, defended, an army beaten etc. Macchiavelli advises the good ruler to discard morality in taking decisions on the best strategy: do not deliberately break moral rules, but ignore them, unless obeying them brings you tactical advantage. Macchiavelli believed this amorality to be a good quality for the ruler, in order to deploy his power maximally, in order to become more powerful.

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[76] Latour (S)
[77] Faludi and Van der Valk (SP); Wissink (SP)
[78] *Rationality and power. Democracy in practice,* Chicago, 1998 (SP).
[79] Florence, 1513.

We agree on this and, with Flyvbjerg, observe that spatial planning is an important arena for power play (a lot of money and power is involved), some of the players are better than others, some of the best players do take such an amoral position in calculating advantages and choosing strategies. And one can never be sure about the absence or presence of an amoral position, the absence or presence of power play.

Therefore, for a planning researcher, it is crucial a) always to be critical about the officially formulated intentions of actors, b) to assume an amoral position in the actors, until the opposite has been proven, and c) take an amoral position yourself: what would you do as a good Macchiavellian ruler to win the game?

Insight in the amoral strategies can help to discover patterns in the actor's behaviour, to discover power play and hidden intentions. Next step can be the cautious testing of this analysis, and further on the difference between official and real intentions can be fruitful to investigate. In planning research, an interest in power and power play was, before Flyvbjerg, difficult to sell. This was due to at least two factors. *First:* the shared myth of good intentions, care for the general good, and therefore absence of power play within the community of people interested and active in planning[80]. *Second:* the theoretical presence of Habermassian and Popperian models of communication, organisation and power.[81]

To the first reason we should add some nuance. A lot of planning practitioners knew for a long time about the existence and even prominent role of power in planning practice. While talking about their own professional circles, they seem to be unaware of it. Power is coming from outside, from the money- driven powers in society trying to hinder the planning process and the general goals of planning. However, within the community, and within situations where community- members play a role, power play is present too. Apart from that, in planning studies there was (and is) a strong tendency to present the questions at hand as technical problems, to be solved in a neutral, power- free environment (cf supra) Of such a tendency, the related discourse, has as a blind spot the workings of power: if one wants to believe that the profession and the discipline are solving simply technical problems, then it is normal to keep ones eyes shut for power at work or to stay ignorant about it. This discourse in science

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[80] Van Tillo, ch 5 (SP); Flyvbjerg (SP)
[81] Like Alexander (SP); In Holland partly due to the influence of Koningsveld (PH)

and the idealism in practice reinforced each other and shaped the myth of a neutral planning system.

The second factor, the presence of Habermas and Popper, also added to the strength of the myth. Both philosophers represent the last wave of modernists, already exceptions in the postmodernist environments of their own discipline, but highly appreciated in the circles of positive sciences, mostly implicitly leaning on modernist, positivist theories of knowledge. Habermas erected an ethical theory where an action is good when it arises in an ideal communication situation[82]. Ideal means a lot of things in his theory, one of them being the absence of power. Power is bad, corrupts the communication and therefore morality. Apart from remarks one could make on the purely formal character of such a type of ethics (the procedure of deliberation is more important than the act itself to be judged) and the practical impossibility to create power- free situations, one can say that this negative image of power is unrealistic and counter-productive. If one limits oneself as a theorist to demonising power, saying that is something bad and should be banned all the time, one does not really look at it, one does not study it thoroughly. Such an attitude to power creates blinds spots in a series of discourses, it creates myths about human behaviour and communication, one of which is the myth on power- free planning just mentioned. (Because of the high standing of Habermas and his theoretical relative Popper in planning cultures inspired by positive sciences) Much wiser would it be to accept the presence of power, see it as neither good nor bad, take an amoral stance, and look for the presence of power carefully.

This kind of attitude would be inspired on Macchiavelli, Nietzsche, Flyvbjerg, and certainly Foucault. Foucault's analysis of power- related mechanisms in *Surveiller et punir* is in our view still unsurpassed. He argues that power is present everywhere, its shapes are historical in a radical manner. On the other hand, configurations of power determine evolutions in politics and science, co- determine the course of history. Foucault argues extensively that 'man' in its present general layers of definition, man as an object of knowing, and the history of the human sciences, are the result of changes in power configurations, and not vice versa, as was commonly accepted by scientists before him. Indeed, most of the

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[82] *Theorie des communicativen handelsn,* 2 dln, Frankfurt, 1980.

theoreticians and historians at that time (1975) were convinced that changes in penitential practices and law resulted from changes in the image of man and the development of some human sciences.

These long- term developments are not as such interesting for planning, but the mechanisms involved can be traced in short- term processes as well. Not only is power present in every organisation and communicative situation, power also creates knowledge. This has been said before, but we think it is useful to repeat it, since the full implications are not easy to grasp. It applies to the origin of disciplines, the evolution of disciplines, but also the use of disciplinary and other knowledge in negotiations, communication, all types of situations typical for the planning profession. We will notice in several of the case studies that sometimes there is an opinion first, and some scientific knowledge to base it on, next a planning goal related to opinion and knowledge, while other times we find a fixed planning goal where arguments can be invented for, and in still other cases we see the power to achieve things, next argument, then a goal. Every combination is possible; sometimes knowledge creates power, sometimes the other way around.

Power in planning according to this view is present in the positions of actors in a participatory process, their use of language, in the structure of the disciplines devoted to spatially relevant questions, in the positions of these disciplines in and around the planning system, in the choice of the discipline to formulate the planning problem or solution etc. Power is inextricably part of discourses, is spread through discourses and helps discourses to spread and multiply. Power is part of the grid we apply to the external world to enable us to talk about it, to objectify it, control it, exert power over it. Power is in the general concept of the grid, in its design, its application; only part of this is consciously manipulated. In another book[83], Foucault speaks about Linnaeus, categorising the plant and animal worlds in the 18th century, and opening up these worlds more completely for human thought and control, by the mere act of classification, the circulation of this classification, its approval by the scientific community and later on the rest of society.

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[83] Focault, *Les mots et les choses*

2.4.9. Rhetoric

Rhetoric is the art of speaking well and speaking beautiful[84]. Good speech and writing is related to qualities of the words and their effects. A message is rhetorically strong when it is well- conceived and convincing. Qualities can be intellectual and esthetical. According to ancient rhetoric, the ideal rhetorician needs to strive for logical consistency, esthetical harmony, optimal persuasion. A good combination of form and content is rhetorically strong; a simple emphasis on form often fails to persuade and cannot be seen as the quintessential rhetoric. Artful is he who hides his art. A good combination of form and content is adapted to the audience; a profound knowledge of the audience is of foremost importance to the rhetorician.

Often a myth is upheld whereby rhetoric should be absent in science and the development of knowledge in general, because it diverts attention from the pure representation of things, from objective truths. Since truth in our opinion is fragmented and connected to discourses, rhetoric does play a role. Not only in politics it is essential to persuade opponents and colleagues with words. Also science has its forms of rhetoric. Scientific quality is something that can only be recognised through signs, as is everything. A general label 'scientific' can be granted thanks to clothing, choice of words, preference for categorisations and types of concepts,…, and a more specific label 'scientific in the frame of discipline A' can be granted after a play with the signs of science dominant in that discipline (geologists wear blocked shirts and rarely have their hair cut)[85]

As most of the signs of science depend on conventions, these can be learnt, imitated, manipulated, since a general characteristic of signs according to Umberto Eco is that they can be used to lie with[86]. One could argue that the shirt is an example of superficial rhetoric, while the adherence to certain procedures and concepts, even in cases when they seem to be less than the best, can be called deep rhetoric, trying to achieve effect by playing on deep structures of the discipline and science in general. In a post- modern perspective there is something rhetorical in

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[84] Crowley (OT); Barthes *L'ancienne rhetorique* (S)
[85] Latour (S); Van Assche and Jacobs 2002 (SP)
[86] Eco 1992 (S)

every communication[87]. If knowledge is a social construction, transferring knowledge –like in science- is always a matter of convincing people you actually followed the conventions belonging to this or that type of knowledge, always in part rhetoric.

In planning, this myth of an absent rhetoric in science, stemming from the myth of modernist objectivity, is combined with a belief in the application of positive sciences in matters where they are not always on the right place (positivist influence in the planning world) and the myth of the absence of power already referred to. These myths, this mythical environment, create a strong belief in the technical, positivist, objective essence of planning and present power and rhetoric as absent or, if acknowledged, as mere marginal phenomena, regretful diversions of a true planning practice (and theory)[88]

From our perspective it is clear that power and persuasion are necessarily part of planning. Whether one defines planning rather as an activity of process design or as an activity of spatial design, the designs proposed always have to convince people of their quality. In the case of the planner as a process architect or facilitator, persuasion will form an integral part of the activity within the arenas designed by the planner[89]. If he did not design them, but only facilitates the process within the arena, his role is not a neutral one either. He can sustain or block certain schemes and strategies, facilitate some actors more than others, be inclined to oppose to some ideas and not others, in short he is a man in a game of persuasion where he can never be the distant observer, but always partially acquires the character of a player. Apart from this reflection on his own role, one must add that the planner's facilitating skills will never cause a rationally or objectively best course of events; the actors persuade each other beyond his reach. In the case of the landscape architect or urban designer, visual rhetoric, in the shape of drawings, plans, paintings etc., plays a major role in the game.

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[87] Jameson (PH)
[88] Metze on the Dutch polder model (SP)
[89] Bryson on arena´s (SP)

2.4.10. Quality

Quality is something attributed to things by people. Quality is constructed in discourses and therefore necessarily takes on all the qualities of discourses. Quality is socially constructed, contingent, discontinue, reactive, historical, plural[90]. Quality in everyday language is reduced to positive qualities. Positive qualities are linked to values. In the landscape, in towns, space can be seen as an object in itself or as a background of objects and events.[91] The objects and structures within space, against the background- space, can acquire value. Since diverse types of objects are identified, diverse qualities are assigned; things can have an ecological value, a geological, historical, artistic value. To space as such, as an object, is also attributed value and quality; this is called spatial quality. In Holland, to take an example, Dutch planners intend to take into account spatial quality as well as a host of values, e.g. spatial quality and historical value. In this book, dealing with history and its capacities to improve space, constructions of historical value and spatial quality are interpreted in such a post- modern perspective.

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[90] Van Assche and Jacobs 2003 (SP)
[91] Van Assche on plant symbolism, 1996, 23 (D)

3. CASE STUDIES, EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL

3.1 Introduction

In this second major part of the book, we present the case studies, three in number: one on parks in Almere, a second one on small allotment gardens in Wageningen, the third on a new city district in Utrecht. All three of them are located in Holland. Nonetheless, we try to look for generally valid mechanisms in the signification of place, history and history in place in these Dutch case studies. In the case studies, a constant alternation between empiry and theory is strived for, by which we mean that we try to study the empirical situation at hand from our theoretical perspective, and develop the theory at the same time. In the text, this is translated as an alternation of more descriptive and more theoretical paragraphs. Theoretical paragraphs can be inductively or deductively produced, the first way of theory production deriving theory from the empirical situation, the second way deriving theory from theory and looking for confirmation of the new theory in the empirical situation.

The Almere case is studying the cultures of the users, the pathways of signification of place, history and historical place in the users of a place. We investigated how people attribute meaning to their environment, to history and to history in their evironments, and tried to list, inductively and deductively, the most important mechanisms in this respect. One can say that it is mostly semiotic in nature. The second case study, on the Wageningen gardens, is more anthropological. Individual significations of place and history form a starting point, but afterwards the features of the gardeners as a group are at stake, as well as the significations of the place by other groups, and the interactions between gardeners and the rest. Also, the planning system -at a local level- enters the picture. The interactions between gardeners and planners are studied, and the interactions between gardeners and other stakeholders within the planning arena designed by official planners. The third case study, on Leidsche Rijn Utrecht, is mainly focussed on the cultures within the planning system: professional cultures,

organisational cultures, disciplinary cultures, their interactions, their constructions of place and history, the influence of their interactions on the final plan.

In the three case studies, a move from users to planners is made. The same relativist and interpretive perspective is used to look at the groups involved in the planning system and the groups using or potentially using the place one is talking about. Using this perspective, interpreting the users signification and the planners and designers signification as culture- based, and interpreting the roles of history in a materialised plan as the result of interactions between all these cultures, implies the introduction of a long list of socio- cultural factors as relevant for planning with history. And a long list of uncertainties and discontinuities. A new view on the limits of planning -and therefore on its characteristics and opportunities- can emerge from this new starting point.

3.2. Little parks in Almere, Holland

3.2.1. Introduction

In our first case study, conducted together with Harro de Jong, we started with our exploration of the limits and possibilities of planning and designing with history. We made a series of designs for new parks in Almere using archaeology one way or another. Then we conducted a series of interviews, and tried to figure out what kind of references can be understood, and what kind of resulting design forms are preferred for what kind of reasons? The results are interesting for us intrinsically, for the theory on the signification of place, history, and history in place, and extrinsically, for the light they shed on the limits on planning with historical objects and places. As said, this case study is mostly semiotic in nature, studying the pathways of signification of places and histories for individual users of a place, a designed place.

Archaeology is a historical discipline. It differs from the other historical disciplines by its object and by its method. Its object cannot be defined extremely clear, but in general terms, one can say that it consists mainly of man- made objects, traces the material culture left in the landscape, and in the past of the discipline, preferably older objects than the other disciplines (history, art history) were interested in. Because of this history of object focus, the methods applied were somewhat different from the ones used at the neighbours'. Digging trenches became the core of the popular imagination of archaeology uptil now; in the scientific reality of the discipline it has often been supplanted by indirect and non-intrusive techniques. After the gradual extension of the object focus, the clearer incorporation of visible objects and younger objects, the methods used and the associated techniques, nowadays often high- tech and capable of reading a lot in a tiny old fragment, stood at the centre of the discipline's identity. Squabbles with the neighbouring disciplines were fought with the presence of these techniques as an important argument for the value and the different character of archaeology as a discipline.

Even than, even if mainly methods and techniques are nowadays the key defining features of archaeology as a discipline, the bulk of the objects investigated share the characteristic of being invisible. Coming back to

planning and design, this poses obvious problems. If one intends to use 'archaeology', a category of historical objects defined within the frame of the discipline archaeology, as a means of improving spatial quality as we defined it, then one has to address the problem of this invisibility. How can an 'application' of archaeology make a place more interesting, beautiful, for the users when the things in question cannot be seen? How can this application look like? A first distinction can be made a priori between strategies of showing the old things and keeping them under the ground. A second one between referring to the objects when left hidden, and refraining from such a reference. A third distinction, less clear, between more and less literal, direct, references.

We did not start from the assumption that historical (here archaeological) objects and historical references are evidently understood and appreciated. We want to investigate carefully how the process of signifaction of these objects and their places unfolds. Almere Hout, an unfinished urban development to the SE of Almere, was chosen as a case site, firstly because it represents a kind of limit: the recent, open, large-scale, uniform polder landscape posesses few features a designer can use to build on, and history in the landscape is virtually nonexistent. (from the exceptional we try to draw conclusions concerning the general, a bit like Freud who compared the sick mind to a broken crystall, interesting to study the normally hidden fault lines that constitute the crystal's normal structure) Second reason is the existence of a plan for the unfinished new town district, a plan devoting a lot of attention to archaeology[92]. Indeed, archaeology. Before Flevoland was land it was sea, and before that, land, inhabited by several cultures, dating from mesolithic till roman times. In the plan, a few dozens of small plots, half an hectare in size, are indicated as special reserves for archaeology. The exact location of the plots is yet uknown (the archaeological searches are not completed), but the idea is to use them as a means of preserving archaeology in the urban contaxt, while enriching the city, by adding a new layer of structure, ignoring the other structures of squares, streets etc. A post- modern design principle[93]. Such a combination of structural layers is intended to strenthen the cities' identity,

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[92] Gemeente Almere (SP)
[93] Baljon (LA)

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a real concern for a new town built on new and almost featureless land. Using history is supposed to be a way to achieve this stronger identity.

3.2.2. Method

We chose three spots where a more or less clear image existed of the archaeology present; no excavations were done yet, only drillings in certain areas. First, we observed the area, talked about it and on the existing plans with four local experts. Next we selected three sites; for each one of them we produced four sketchy designs. For every site we made four plans where it was used as a kind of park, every time referring to the past of the place in a different manner. Our background as Wageningen- educated landscape architects undoubtably accounts for some of the ways we were trying to make the sketches varied enough; this can never be avoided. There is no pre- existing objective typology of historical references and- or design forms and types, something that would be necessary to measure the amount of relevant variation. After the design, we did 24 semi- structured interviews, ranging from half an hour up til two hours. We showed the sketches, told the story behind each, asked their opinion and other people's opinion according to them. We checked their background, their interest in history and archaeology, landscape, Almere.[94]

3.2.3. Results.

Old things are shown, or they are referred to. If historical references are used, they can be recognised or not. If recognised, they can be understood in the way the designer intended, or otherwise. If understood according to the intention of the designer, the user can find this important in one way or another, or not.[95] This small tree of possibilities has to be kept in mind while using history and historical references in plans and designs. Using historical references does not necessarily improve the quality of a place.

Every step in the reasoning can be placed in several directions. If the reference has not been understood or recognised, the place can be appreciated anyway, because of several reasons. One has to remember

[94] For the municipal plans see Gemeente Almere (SP)
[95] See Vanbergen, 116 (S)

carefully that knowledge of history and understanding of the objects, structures, references used, does not lead automatically to a higher appreciation of the place. One respondent saw similarities between one of the designs -a labyrinth of allotment gardens- and a French labyrinthine renaissance garden filled with vegetables, at Villandry, Val de Loire. That same person thought that same design to be nonsensical for Almere. In the following pages we will try to identify, in the interview results, some factors relevant for the interpretation and valuation of historical (archaeological) objects and references in the park designs. It will be clear immediately that the interpretation of the historical things is closely linked to the interpretation of the place as such; therefore, that the interpretation of place, history and history in place are inextricably bound.

3.2.4. Context and text

This distinction starts from the metaphor that space is a text[96]. Of course this metaphor has its limitations, limitations sometimes not enough acknowledged by its users, but still it has some explanatory relevance, and it allows to import some notions from literary theory and linguistics in the study of the interpretation of place and space. The meaning of a text is always partly determined by the context, things outside the text, e.g. other texts. One classic semiotic problem arises instantaneously: what is the size of the context[97]? How far can one move outside the text before the influence on the actual text is dissipated, irrelevant, before the interpretation of such an influence would become overinterpretation[98], in some cases intellectualism, in some cases paranoia, in all cases prejudice. In this study, the respondent's image of the city of Almere co-determined the interpretation of the designs clearly; so it is part of the explanatory context. The same goes for the image of the landscape category 'polder'; the category was common knowledge for all the respondents, clear images existed of this clear landscape, and clear appreciations where attached to it; appreciations that coloured and structured the perception of the 'historical' park designs. Polder, city and the city of Almere are relevant contexts. Holland in general is only indirectly a context: the spatial image of the

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[96] See Barnes and Duncan, 24 (D); also Eco 1972 (S)
[97] Bal en Bryson (D)
[98] Eco 1992, 67 (S)

country does not influence the interpretation clearly, but the image of the Dutch people does influence it. Regularly, responses where of the type: "this design will not be used and appreciated by Dutch people". The perception of Dutch cultural identity leads to differences in the perception and interpretation of the designed places. Spatial images of Holland usually don't.

A negative image of Almere is widespread, determining the reactions on the designs in various degrees[99]. It is interesting to notice that a negative image of the urban context can lead to opposite appreciations: a little park can embellish an ugly city, but it can also be seen as waisted expenses because of this ugliness. (overdone according to Jeroen) A negative image of the surrounding polder landscape can produce a more positive image of the city ("In town, you don't notice a thing of the emptiness ") or on the other hand a more negative one (The sad city in the sad polder) And the interpretation of parks within the city within the polder can be sent in different directions guided by the same principles. Park- town- polder- Holland can be seen as a series of frames, ever wider contexts, determining the interpretation of the parks. Every frame influences the interpretation of signs in the smaller frame, but the result cannot be predicted. As said: the interpretation in the smaller frame can be sent opposite directions because of ideas on the bigger one; apart from the opposites, about every middle way is thinkable. A negative image of Almere cannot prevent people from thinking positively about certain designs for smaller areas within Almere; people can be surprised by the design possibilities on such a spot ("I never expected such nice places in Almere; it reminds me of the atmosphere of an old French village") No structure in the interpretation of a place can be predicted by knowledge on the interpretation of the spatial contexts. It remains important to remember that these contexts are often present in the interpretation (and therefore appreciation) of the smaller places. Understanding the reasons for appreciation of places, e.g. newly designed places, can never take place in isolation from the spatial context[100].

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[99] Compare Brouwer (SP)
[100] Hess –Luttich, introduction (S)

3.2.5. Categories of place concepts

Next factor structuring the interpretation is the specific manner the observer categorises places; formed categories of places are present in his mind. Concepts like 'park', 'garden', 'pub', 'square', 'zoo', 'allotment garden', 'nature' are commonly known in our culture, and quite uniformly defined. Still, there are individual differences in the number of these categories and the specific ways of definition. The combination of similarities and differences determines the interpretation: the ideas behind some sketches were only understood after clarification of the category or category combination they belong to. ("Oh, it is an allotment; well, then…") An influence of the researcher on the results can be seen here: the words he uses to describe the designed places refer directly or indirectly to place categories the respondent is familiar with.

Associations with these categories often determine the reactions on the design most strongly: if one sees allotment gardens generally as messy and old- fashioned, this will be a serious reason to judge an 'allotment' design negatively. If one doesn't describe the general design idea as a new type of allotments, then the appreciation can turn out to be very different. Labelling is a strong force in the human mind. Another label is possible, another category can be chosen and can change the perceived reality. The social construction of realities is nothing more or less than the construction of networks of categories covering all aspects of reality the human mind is capable of imagining, and the construction of agreements on combination and use of these categories.

Hangplek

The concept of 'hangplek' (hangout for youngsters, often in open air, with negative connotations of social deviation, alcohol abuse and so on) is a Dutch concept. In Flanders, the Dutch speaking part of Belgium, this concept is not so well- known. Some of our respondents were Flemish, sometimes they knew the word, sometimes not. It is however not only the less frequent use of the word that is significant here; rather, the frequent absence of such a spatial category and if present, the minor importance in Flanders of the concept in the processes of place recognition, categorisation and further interpretation. The problems associated with the spatial concept of 'hangplek' are probably as much present in Belgium than in Holland, but this does not imply that the concept arises

automatically in Belgium as well. Different conceptualisations of the problems are possible; it is possible to group the social problems with the 'hangplek' differently, it is possible to group them in a comparable way, but without a spatially defined category as main label, without special spatial significance. It is important to notice here that language and culture are different. In the line of interpretative anthropology we adopted a semiotic concept of culture[101], where culture is seen as the picture a group creates of itself, the others and the world, and the practices related to that socially constructed world. Language co- creates that world[102]. A group, a culture, necessarily uses a language. Some cultures see the use of a certain language as an important ethnic marker, as an important sign of their difference from other groups (traditionaly the neighbours)[103] In other cases, language does not serve as an ethnic marker at all. Language cannot be equalled to culture. Groups can identify themselves in many different ways, can use a host of ethnic markers. Some markers influence directly the sets of categorisations that are most relevant for the semiotic definition of culture, some others are within the culture itself seen as quite superficial, as distinctive features, features speaking of the distinctiveness of this group, of difference, but not so much about the ways the group sees itself and the world. In Flanders, the language is Dutch, the culture is not. Ofcourse, this cannot be deduced from the absence of the Dutch category 'hangplek' in Flanders alone. Sets of other differences cooperate in creating and maintaining this cultural boundary. The boundary cannot be deduced from this difference, but is present in this difference. Drawing cultural boundaries is always to a certain extent a matter of interpretation[104], a matter of agreeing on a certain degree of consistency to be found in differences between groups before one can start speaking of 'groups' and consequently of cultures[105]. A helping hand comes from the groups themselves; the moment a collection of people recognises itself as a cultural group, it starts to be so. A researcher cannot deny the presence of a group if it definies itself as such[106].

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[101] Geertz 1973, introduction (A)
[102] Kroskritky, 110-5 (A); Gupta etc (A)
[103] Vlasselaers (D)
[104] Lamont (A)
[105] Sahlins, 241 (A)
[106] Eriksen, 38 (A)

Coming back to the reason for this reflection on the semiotic nature of culture, the concept of 'hangplek', it was clear that the Dutch respondents, especially the older ones, suspected uneasy feelings, feelings of unsafety and stress in designs they labelled as potentially 'hangplek'. (It may be understandable now why we don't use an English translation for the word) Because the category is strongly present in Dutch discourses on planning and design, on public space, and on youth and education, it was easily and frequently projected in the most diverse designs. More types of places, more different design shapes, are associated with these uneasy feelings because of existence of the concept 'hangplek'. Feelings exist on certain spots; a discourse originates and people start to recognise these feelings and these spots; within the discourse the concept of 'hangplek' originates.

Success of a spatial category in a culture

Because of the discourse, the concept, and their growing importance in Dutch culture, it became gradually easier to relate a number of diffuse feelings to each other, to a group of people and to a type of place. This little network of conceptual relations, of which 'hangplek' is part, became a strong conceptual tool to categorise a part of social reality. Its succes can be seen in the ease with which people recognise these places. The conceptual network, in fact the discourse itself, after enrichment with the new concept, reinforces itself: it subsumes more and more places, feelings and people, and starts to evolve in a stereotype. It sets off a principle of positive autofeedback[107]. In this respect, concepts and discourses, as types of categorisations of reality, the one element, the other collection of elements, can behave in similar ways. Not every concept and every discourse becomes succesfull, but every one of them does posess a principle by which it tends to multiply itself in the social world, or, put more precisely, a principle to increase the part of reality, the number of phenomena covered, 'explained'.

In the semiotic theory of culture by the Tartu school semioticians Lotman and Uspenski[108] this 'innate' mechanism is described as the drive cultural codes have to move from the periphery of culture, where they are born, to the centre, where it is widely accepted and understood. The drive

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[107] Latour (S) on socio/ scientific networks –passim
[108] Lotman (S)

to move to the centre is related to social motivations of the users of the concept -ambition, acceptation,…- ,it is related to the inner principle of amplification and growth of domain, and to another principle not yet mentioned here: the drive towards simplification. It is not always possible to determine cause and effect among these factors related to the drive to the centre; in some cases, one factor is cause while in other cases it is effect.

Anyhow, closer to the centre, the cultural codes -in our terms concepts and discourses- tend to be simplified because of adaptation to the series of contexts they had to pass direction centre; they became 'ossified' in the words of Lotman and Uspensky. Once generally accepted, the codes tend towards stereotypes. They became so simplified and they covered so much diverse phenomena, that the attraction for the social circles that once launched the codes has vanished. And, it must be added, another reason for invention of new codes is exactly the fact that some others became too widely accepted, used, modified[109]. This mechanism is related to a general characteristic of discourses we mentioned earlier on: they are reactive, their features are partly understandable as a reaction on earlier discourses; they cannot be understood in isolation.

'Hangplek' is a prominent concept in a widespread discourse in Dutch society now. It subsumed a wide range of phenomena, is widespread itself, strongly influences the perception of a wide variety of places (some respondents labelled more than half of the designs as potentially 'hangplek') and is already criticised as stereotpyical by others ("you must not be too afraid of creating 'hangplekken' everywhere"; "you can see 'hangplekken' everywhere if you like")   The analysis of the function of the spatial category 'hangplek' gave us the opportunity to explore some more semiotic mechanisms.

3.2.6. Categories of place, categories of time

The importance of spatial categories in the interpretation of the 'historical' parks shows simply that the parks are firstly interpreted as places, not as backgrounds for historical references or preservation. They are at first 'places', next maybe 'parks', only afterwards possibly 'historical places' or 'backgrounds for history'. (The words of the researcher could

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[109] See Eco 76 and 92 (S)

influence the order by which these frames of interpretation were applied) Therefore, it is normal to see spatial categories take a central position in the interpretation of the designs, more central than historical categories (e.g. historical periods, cultures, types of objects, structures) Our respondents stated frequently this preeminence of space above history; the historical aspect was not considered the most important one of the place: "it is an added value"; "it is a nice source of inspiration for the designer, but the design itself has to be good".

Even then, knowledge of the past of the place -and therefore of the past in general- can resonate with the use of spatial categories. And with the appreciation of the designs. Sometimes, an idea about a period or kind of objects implies that this should be presented clearly, sometimes that it is enough to refer to it dimly, sometimes the type of spatial setting for such a thing, visible or invisible, is the most important aspect of the historical place. In other words, historical knowledge and interest does not lead to similar conclusions on how to present history spatially, how to embed it spatially, on how to handle the places where old things are present or things happened a long time ago. In the cases where people want history to be represented and- or remembered in a place, the demands for the design can be high or low. They can be specific or general; a general demand may be that the 'historical place' has to fit into a limited set of spatial categories.

Some respondents deemed a sport facility, a playground, an allotment unsuitable for an historic place, unsuitable for a place where history had to remembered one way or another. Here we find the resonance between spatial categories and historical categories just mentioned. Ideas on the importance of certain types of historic events and objects, leading to the creation of an 'historical place' (we will come back on this) and ideas on the characteristics of types of places (spatial categories) can resonate, can influence each other. If one has ideas on historical settings in general, then these ideas will determine the appreciation of the designs pretending to use history to improve the spatial quality. Then the harmony between the specific design and the spatial category it belongs to on the hand, and the specific historical object, event and the category of 'historical place' on the other hand will structure the interpretation of the designed place strongly. As an example of such a case, we can tell about one respondent who saw allotment gardens as positive places, quiet reminders of old and bygone

years, peaceful islands in a stressful world. That same person was willing to identify and tolerate historical places more than willingly, but only if they were designed or left alone as simple, humble places, respectful for the past. (Neolithic tombs in the woods should be left untouched and unaccentuated) For that person, the setting of the allotment garden was a suitable one for a historical reference.

Linked categories of space and time: 'historical places'

Whereas categories of space and history both influence the appreciation of the designs, the harmony between the two sets of categories can also influence the interpretation and appreciation, as shown in the last example. The concept of 'historical place' or 'historical setting' can serve as an intermediary concept between ideas on history and ideas on place. In some cases, it functions as such, like in the last example. People can be interested in history, link it to a place, and define a category of 'historical places'. This definition can place its demands on the design of such a place and can interfere with the definition of the other spatial categories. Indeed, history in this case becomes also a spatial category, just like park etc. Since a place can belong to several categories at once, this does not pose a logical problem (There is no universal encyclopedia, no singular typology where everything can be placed in; therefore a thing, here a place, belongs to a lot of categories appertaining to overlapping typologies[110])

In other cases, as also the interviews showed, there is a spatial category 'historical place'[111] that functions independently, without almost any connection to ideas on history, whether they were present or not. Sometimes, even in these cases, such a category was very important for the interpretation of the place, and the requirements for it. People without the slightest interest in history could consider it of foremost importance to give a historical place a historical character. This can be linked to one of our first observations, i.e. that people can acknowledge the importance of things without being interested in them. Here the importance of a proper presentation of historical places is acknowledged while staying disinterested personally. Government spending on this kind of things is not only tolerated, but deemed necessary. The presence and correct design

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[110] See Eco 1991, 338- 366 (S)
[111] cf P. Nora in Revel (HE)

of historical places is -silently- seen as a duty towards the community. Even if the community in question is not clearly defined, and the reasons for the duty are not clear, and the knowledge of history is minimal, such a sense of respectful duty towards the past can be present. Such a role of history can be called *ritualistic*. There is no outspoken evil to be kept outside, no real fear for the ancestors like in some other cultures[112], there is no clear profit to be gained from the attention to the past, still it has to be paid, unreflective, ritually, as a necessary element of the social organisation. The degree of indifference can be different. ("Ofcourse you should design this, but I will never go there", can be contrasted with "It is good to see these places. Why? Hmmm")

3.2.7. Words, images and categories of place

A word and an image are both signs belonging to, referring to, concepts; the word cat refers to the concept 'cat' as well as all kinds of images of cats do. Now, everything can be a sign for everything, according to Peirce. In a Proustian manner, a cookie can bring back childhood memories of smells, places, colours. In the case of place categories, general place concepts, there is not one typology of place concepts and there is not one, verbal way of referring to them. There is not only the series 'park', 'zoo', etc, one should refer to mainly by using the words park and zoo, inducing reactions in the respondents. As said, sometimes the word was indeed the clue, sometimes only the clarification of the image by using the verbal sign of a common spatial category could bring about an idea and an appreciation of the place. Sometimes, however, the image was the main sign for the categorisation in that same typology. The image lead people to think of it as a park, garden, square, before the explanation was given, or even after the description of the place as in fact an allotment, zoo, playing ground, pub. The same typology has visual signs too, and sometimes they are strong, sometimes they structure the interpretation primarily. Especially the visual signs for 'park', its imagery, dominated in this study; people tended to recognise parks everywhere after seeing the drawings, and the application of the category 'park' made it more difficult to see other functions, other possible categorisations. We can therefore call the park imagery dominant visual signs; they tend to

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[112] Kommers in Driessen (A)

dominate the interpretation of a wide variety of visual representations of places. Everything green in an urban context tends to be called 'park', and this naming tends to exclude different possible namings.

So, we have verbal and visual signs for the spatial categories[113], and the spatial categories can be arranged in several typologies, more or less consistent and more or less widespread. However, as was said before, one should be aware of the fact that a lot of overlapping typologies of concepts constitute our semantic universe[114]. It is possible to refer to place in a lot of ways, it is possible to categorise them in potentially unlimited ways. Ofcourse, our language forms one kind of limit, and the necessity to communicate and therefore a shared frame of conceptual reference forms another limit. Of all the possible typologies, the one where 'park' and 'square' are usually placed in is a common one (people asked to produce a row put these concepts together) Other typologies are less widespread. In the case of the typology featuring 'park', 'square', 'zoo' etc, the visual *and* the verbal signs can be dominant. In some other typologies, or in other more free- standing concepts, the verbal *or* the visual signs can be dominant. A typology, not too common probably, of 'baroque landscape', 'impressionist landscape', 'expressionist landscape' etc., will be dominated by visual signs.(since they are placed in a context of art history)

In some cases, respondents were indeed seduced by the image to think of types of places impossible to categorise the same way as 'park'. Places were described as 'romantic places', 'dull, boring, sad' places, 'places where kids can play' etc. The image of the place was a sign for possible uses of the place, possible atmospheres, feelings to be experienced there. The place concept referred to was a concept where other than formal typologies had an influence on. Typologies of feelings, of activities, of atmospheres, were linked to place concepts that were not delinated primarily by design principles or formal features. One must add that the more formal typology of 'park etc', can serve as an intermediary. It is possible that people think of a park first, then of the possible functions and moods of a park. The cases we refer to here are of a different kind, here the image directly leads to an interpretation of feeling, use[115].

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[113] Eco 1976 (S)
[114] Eco 1991, 356 (S)
[115] Bourassa (LA); Gottdiener 1986 (S)

3.2.8. The fine mechanics of categorisation: pertinence

Finding out what exactly makes a place or a sign of a place belong to one category, can be hard. What exactly is the relevant feature of a sketch to make it fit one category, is a question that can be difficult to answer. A respondent can qualify a sketch in the first place as 'allotment', but what part of the description or sketch (supposing that the researcher did not simply use the word allotment) did lead to the interpretation as an allotment, can vary individually. Every individual version of a concept in a culture is somewhat different; apart from the common features, individual associations are added. (The interpretant is individually coloured according to Peirce, whereas the object, also a social construction, is not) Depending on shared and individual features of a concept, *pertinent features* are defined in perceived realities that produce the interpretation of part of reality as referring to such an object and interpretant, to such a concept.[116] Interrelated pertinent features produce an interpretation of the structure of relations as a concept.

Individuals have different interpretations of spaces, and on the micro level of interpretation this means that they recognise different patterns of pertinent features in their spatial environment. Pertinent features can vary enormously: looking at the sketch, some people will recognise easily a spatial structure and will see this as pertinent, while in other people the interpretation starts from pertinence of a colour or colour combination, a texture, a memory induced by a similarity with the general composition of a famous painting, the recognition of one object that is loaded with memories. A pick- nick place on a sketch reminded one respondent of German highways in summer, overcrowded, noisy, dirty tables, full waistbins, and the accompanying smell. The same smell might in the future remind that person of our design sketch…

The reasons for pertinence of features can vary accordingly. It depends on the variety of associations that can be attached to places and to the verbal and visual signs referring to places. Personal experiences, media, popular culture, cookery[117], can produce pertinence in space and signs of space. One respondent had to think of the movie Notting Hill. He saw the sketch of a walled private garden as a place like in the movie, where

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[116] Cf Thom (S), Eco 1976, 23-25 (S)
[117] Sutton (A)

two people climb over the wall late at night to meet and have a good time. The movie produces a new type of feeling that belongs to a type of places; it constructs a new place concept too, because of the exclusive link with the feeling.

Uneasy feelings and difficult categorisation

A lot of people feel uneasy when they experience difficulties in categorising a place. Extreme uneasiness can become anxiety. One does not feel at home in these places; some of the sketches aroused similar feelings. People "can't do a thing with it". This phenomenon relates to problems of using the trusted sets of categories. Trusted sets of categories produce the world as we know it, the world we feel mostly comfortable in. The more we know things, the more comfortable we feel. From a comfortable position, people normally start to explore the world. Explorators normally don't like 'home' to be new, adventurous, unexpected. The sketches presented all intend to belong to our own world, and are interpreted as such. Reactions of unease build on that feeling of possible proximity of the new places to the home. (After the question "Suppose you lived there?") 'Unheimisch' was a frequently used word in cases of discomfort.

In psycho- analysis, difficulties in labelling situations are related to feelings of anxiety since Freud, since the beginning[118]. The neurotic personality is unable to classify certain sensations, this unability induces a general feeling of loss of control and stability, and therefore anxiety. Labelling the sensations as commonly known, socially accepted, feelings brings stability and can evaporate the fear. Psychotic persons, whose most basic frames of reference can be disturbed, often experience intense anxiety. (One can think of schizophrenics, people where categories of time and place, fiction and reality can distort and mingle in the most unexpected ways. The oven can start to talk in such a slow manner that it is impossible to understand) People need a minimum sense of control over the basic frames of reference in order to experience stability and this stability is necessary for the other mental functions. As always in psycho-analysis, some of the characteristics of the diseases are common for all people. Every person is a bit neurotic according to Freud; this does not mean he is a neurotic personality. The disorders, like neurosis, are

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[118] See Vergote on neurosis (PS); Gay (PS); de Certeau 1975 on Freud (OT)

deviations, freezings and outgrowths of otherwise normal human behaviour.

In theory of the seventies, when a host of new types of places became commonplace in western societies (due to industrial developments etc), a lot of new places received the depreciative label 'non- place'[119], as if it were no place. We argue that this naming is related to a transition period towards a largely large- scale spatial organisation of society; where highways became normal, large industrial farms and more. The new spatial organisation produced new types of spaces formerly unknown, not yet easy to categorise. It was possible to name it literally, but the associative links with other types of spaces, experiences, ideas were still far less numerous than in the case of older types of places. They were inscribed in society. Whereas no literature, movies, songs, histories were devoted to and attached to large- scale farms, highways, petrol stations. And if they existed, they were not appreciated as such by the intellectual elites writing the theories on non-place. (In the States, there were plenty of road movies and blues songs[120]; in the Sovjet Union, the literature on the life on collective farms and industrial plants flourished[121]) Petrol stations are turned into shops and meeting places for youth, places where these people can experience modernity in ways superior to their everyday life –think of Eastern Europe[122]. The label 'petrol station' was known already, but it took a while before it was embedded in life and culture.

Focussing on one moment in time, e.g. the moment the sketches are presented to respondents, one can observe an hesitation in a lot of instances. Of course such an hesitation can be a sign of a series of cognitive processes, we do not want to simplify to the processes of association and labelling discussed in these paragraphs[123]. Yet we argue these processes play a role too. While hesitating, doubting, one tests the fit of the sketch and the referred place into several preexisting categories: "O yes, it's an X; no rather an Y". One design featured a wisent, a European bison in a quite

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[119] Auge (A)
[120] And Edward Hoppers paintings; see de Botton 2002 (PH) on Hoppers appreciation of all kinds of non- places, and codification of a new esthetics for their representation.
[121] Westerman 2002 (SP)
[122] Drakulic (A)
[123] Eco 1976 (S)

empty space. This design caused a lot of doubts concerning the label: is it a zoo, a children's zoo, a farm or otherwise?[124] After a decision was taken, the appreciation of the design depended largely on the appreciation of the chosen label and the degree of fit between the design and the chosen category: "This is a lousy zoo". If seen as a children's zoo, the place was generally appreciated, but when interpreted as a real zoo, the appreciations were more varied. Some people saw the animals suffering in all zoo's, some people liked the places and thought the animals had a better life there than in nature. The general image of the zoo directed the interpretation of the sketch seen as a small zoo.

Switches in categorisation

In the course of an interview, after viewing several more sketches, the interpretation of one singular design can suddenly change, categories can be switched or the meaning can change in other ways. In the light of new information or new association, certain design features can unexpectedly come to the fore or gain importance. Things previously perceived unstructured can suddenly fall into a pattern, structuring the interpretation of the place[125]. This means that a new layer of meaning is discovered on the spot[126]. (Possibly restructuring the interpretation of the surroundings of that place too, as we saw in the case of the allotment variant, where recognition of some old remains in one part of the design changed the intepretation of the whole for several people) A new layer of meaning is not always simply added to the existing layers. Sometimes, this is the case. Some people look for complexity in places, love ambiguity and multiple meanings. ("I love layered places; I don't like places that are uniform, flattened out historically") Such an attitude was in our study linked to a general intellectual attitude, a preference for deciphering codes [127]("I always want to know what is hidden beneath the surface; I want to know why things are as they are")

However, it is also possible that the discovery of new patterns and new meanings does not lead to an increased complexity of meaning. Another path of signification is the switch of foreground and background. Some previously unnoticed characteristics of the place, hidden in the

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[124] See Vanbergen (S) on Gombrichs *Meditations on a hobby horse*
[125] Thom (S); Eco 1992 on estoricism and hermeticism.
[126] Schama (D)
[127] Eco 1992 (S)

background, are focussed upon, while things in the foreground disappear in the distance. Foreground and background refer to fotography and painting[128]. There, it is a long standing fact that it is impossible to show everything at once in an image. One cannot focuss on everything at once, and that's the reason to divide pictures in plans. (Traditionally three in landscape painting since renaissance[129])

If we connect this property of perception with the metaphor of landscape as text we introduced earlier on, then one can say that text and context can switch places. Something that is present in the background, playing a secondary part in the signification, something contextual, can suddenly determine the meaning more strongly, can become text[130]. This case study was presented to the respondents as a research on the use of archaeology in an urban design context, and this framing of the gaze probably brought about changes in perception of the sketches that can be labelled text- context switches. How far this influence exactly went, cannot be traced. That such an influence was really exerted, can be deduced from reactions as "O yes, we were talking about history, weren't we? Then, I must say…". Respondents tried to switch roles, tried to think as a designer, and appreciated some drawings because of inventiveness, creativity and so on concerning the use of history in the design, while the history and the designed places were not in the least appraised and valued. In other words, normally they would not have thought as designers dealing with history, different criteria for appreciation would have been used, text and context would have been defined in other ways.

3.2.9. Dynamics in categorisation and signification

Just like a camera, we can switch foreground and background swiftly and frequently, and the same goes for a change of focus. Roland Barthes spoke in *Camera Lucida* about the codes of photography, the most realistic art, and in popular opinion the least coded one. Still, they are present, because of the technique and because of human perception and interpretation. The type of codes and ways of signification he treats in the case of photography, are applicable to human signification in general, as

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[128] Barthes *Camera Lucida* (S)
[129] Blunt *Artistic theory…*(AR) on theories of landscape
[130] Barnes and Duncan, on Barthes and the landscape (D)

e.g. the text- context switch shows. The way we process space in general is in some respects comparable to the ways a camera works. Without reducing the human mind to a camera or another type of machine, we can say that the process and the outcome of camera and mind dealing with spatial signs are comparable in this respect that the mind can change plans and focuss as it wants, and that the resulting images, in the mind and painted, drawn etc by man, are still the subject of some different interpretations, the same principle being true for photographs[131]. In the case of the mental image, the main difference is a far greater flexibility here for all the manipulations of imagery, switches etc, that can only be applied in a restricted way to paintings, drawings etc, and to the product of the camera, the photographic picture.

The visual metaphor of foreground and background can also be placed in the context of Michel Foucault's discourse theory[132]. Foucault's discourse concept as said produces reality, but in order to understand its mechanisms, a visual metaphor is useful (potentially misleading as it might be, because of the associations between vision and discovery of an 'objective' reality). A discourse unveils things while hiding other things. Every new discourse on a subject redraws the borders of that subject and restructures it internally. A new discourse brings things to the foreground hidden hiherto under the reign of former discourses and vice versa. One can therefore say a change of discourse brings about text- context shifts that are on the smaller scale and on the shorter term also present in the constant reinterpretation of space.

Dynamic interpretation and the ideal reference

The dynamics in interpretation of places, due to mechanisms already discussed and other yet to be unveiled, in any case leads us to the conclusion that an ideal way of referring to the history of a place is nonexistent. Even for one person, sudden shifts of the kind just discussed can occur, as well as slower processes of changing signification. The pertinent features change from time to time, foreground and background change, and to start with: the historical place is seldom a historical place, it is much more often a place where by accident an historical reference takes place than a background for that historical reference. This means it holds a

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[131] Vanbergen (S); Vanbergen leans here on Gombrich, art historian and psychologist.
[132] Cf supra

position firstly in typologies of places, only secondly (if at all) in classifications of history or historical references. Design of the historical reference, attempts to manipulate designwise the way the reference is understood and appraised, will therefore rarely lead to a much different valuation of the place. For designers and planners, it is more important to think about the type of places one tries to make. For a researcher, it is impossible to study the processes of historical reference (in an application-orentied perspective) apart from the types of places such a reference is taking place. The place is a necesssary context to study the reference to the past, a bit like in early times it was impossible to study a text apart from the parchment or paper it was written on.

In this comparison another characteristic of the necessary spatial embedding of the historical reference comes to the fore: the place is partly a medium. By means of the place people can refer to the past in that place. Like the medium of television (structured by its financial organisation, need for commercials and therefore a large audience at certain points in time) has effects on the content of the programmes, the characteristics of place as a medium (e.g. the systems of categories, influence of feelings and memories) have an effect on the possibilities for historical 'messages'. Not every message can be conveyed by means of a spatial ordering, and some intended messages will be altered because of the medium. Earlier on, the example of allotment gardens was cited frequently, for some people a quiet place, suitable for historical references, for others not at all.

Interpretational dynamics: at different speeds

Dynamism in the signification of place occurs at different speeds. The French historian Fernand Braudel[133] distinguished three types of processes in history, characterised by different speeds. The slowest type of processes, the *longue durée*, was to be seen in the evolution of ladnscape features as far as they influenced the development of human cultures. Foucault criticised the partition of processes and speeds in three. According to him, it is a priori impossible to make a typology of processes and speeds[134]. Discourses emerge and vanish, sometimes slowly, sometimes quickly, sometimes covering more areas of reality, sometimes less. Changes can occur suddenly, discontinuities can disrupt the course of

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[133] in his famous trilogy on the Mediterranean (HWE)
[134] Revel offers an overview of French thinkers on history; several of them treat the theme of the diverse tempi (HE)

events and the content of truths in a moment. Since discourses are radically contingent and historical in Foucault's view, truths are historical. Typologies of historical processes and their speeds are therefore immediately to be seen as typologies of knowledge and knowledge production. Or, put differently, typologies of mechanisms according to which the interpretation of things can shift. Shifting views on realities influence our perceptions of parts of these realities. Braudel could never be right according to Foucault[135] because a partition of historical process in three would imply the existence of only three major speeds and types of knowledge production, while the variety in types and speeds is endless in his view, and speeds can instantaneously change. The epistemological grounding of the number three is in such a perspective very dubious.

We agree with Foucault, as usual, and acknowledge the variety of types and speeds and the unpredictable behaviour and variability of each type. This assertion can offer a general perspective on the dynamism in the signification of places. Places in this respect are not different from other objects; their interpretation is constituted in discourses and they obey all the laws of discourse formulated above. Shifts in the discursive fields, in the configuration of discourses, can be read in the different readings of place. Discourses on place itself, but also on very different subjects, like nature, emotion, and so on, can exert an influence on changing perceptions of place, on the dynamics of signification. It is possible that a change within one discourse can lead to a different intepretation, or that a new discourse can take a more central place in the interpretation of a place. Changes in discourses and changes of discourses.

Against this background should be interpreted the next paragraphs on mechanisms of slow or fast change in interpretation. Things in culture are changing at different speeds, realitites are constructed and deconstructed all the time, and in the meanwhile persons make their own socially accepted and personally suited cocktails of realities, mixes of discourses. A personal mix of discursive fragments does not lead to automatic behaviour, since one can change the combinations of truth all the time. Looking at a place, the same background can switch colours ever so often because of mechanisms related to changes of discursive configurations at all scales. Changes in cultural perceptions play a role, emotions, mechanisms typical

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[135] Visker (D); de Certeau on Foucault in *Histoire et psychanalyse* (OT)

for the working of the human mind in general, knowledge just acquired etc…Within the frame Foucault has designed, all the mechanisms discussed are playing.

Faces of familiarity

One type of slow dynamism we would like to mention is the gradual removal of a certain meaning of a place to the background, because one gets used to it, because of growing familiarity. When people familiarise themselves with a place, when the place becomes part of their life histories, it acquires new meanings. The place, the landscape, turns into a background of private histories, memories. The stage is part of the memories, can revoke those memories, as well as the other way around, and stage and memory together can become part of personal identity[136]. The human inclination towards nostalgia adds an attractive colour to this background.

People can become attached to places, and this attachment can imply a growing complexity of signification[137]. Some people are looking for this kind of experience ("When I arrived in Wageningen I thought it had very little of interest, very little character. After an excursion I got to know it better. The place acquired a special character and I felt more at home")Familiarity can make meanings more complex and make people feel at home because of this.

Places can move to the background after a while, sometimes after a period of added meanings, sometimes there is an initial interest in the shapes, but no real interest in learning things about it, and it moves to the background too. Only a few people stay constantly interested in the characteristics of the landscape (the landscape architects among our respondents, and even they did not always pay attention to the surroundings of their homes) The move to the background can therefore not be equalled to a loss of knowledge: it depends on the case. And it can not be equalled to a loss of importance: in some cases, the background becomes intertwined with emotions experienced on the spot or attached to these experiences afterwards ("I used to walk there with person X")

For most of the people places are usually backgrounds of activities, places they pass or do things in. Some of these people can be very attached

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[136] Harwood on the identification between people and gardens (LA); Magris 1988 and 2001 (HE); Schama (D)
[137] Hirsch etc (A)

to one place (garden, sporting club, house) that means a lot to them (something that cannot be reduced to an esthetical judgment of the forms) Some of them also had an intitial interest in historical knowledge about the place, but this interest disappears after a while, when the normal activities are proceeded. ("In my town there a kind of historical reference in the pavement. They used different colours of blocks to say something about a special place. I heard it once, payed attention, but nowadays I hardly see it. "; "Such a ship on a pole is nice to look at once or to talk about for a little while; but then it's over")

Things that are perspicious in the beginning, as a point of orientation or a must- see, often loose this quality after a while. This becomes clear on holidays or after people moved. A new town and a new landscape have to be discovered –by those interested. Points of orientation and sights loose their significance after a while. People living in Barcelona tend to forget about the Sagrada Familia, and tourists spotting romanesque churches in France often fail to pay attention to remarkable buildings in their own environment. From a designer's point of view, this illustrates the strength and weakness of these kind of things as markers of identity of a place. The strategy is powerful because a lot of people recognise the markers, yet it is weak since the markers are subjected to forces eroding their significance.

Use and the practical demands associated with it, are one of the reasons for this erosion of meaning. People decorating a home often pay an excessive amount of attention to esthetics, but a few years later the practical use places demands on the space that prove more important. At certain times, often moments of relaxation, the esthetical characteristics come to the fore again, switch from background to foreground again. The design of a new neighbourhood and green space in it, can look interesting and beautiful, but when living there, the image can become dominated completely by a few practical disadvantages[138]. If you are very tall, the romantic image of an 18th century English cottage can be thoroughly spoilt when your head hits the 18th century oak ceiling daily (thus spoke a quite tall respondent) It is interesting to notice how some people are aware of this principle and take it into account while taking decisions, giving opinions on a design: "OK, it looks nice, but I can tell you right now this and that will look like shit after three months"; "This garden looks nice,

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[138] Van Assche 2000 on identity and functionality (LA)

but it will prove useless since everyone will go there and steel things and the gardeners will start to hate the noise and the fuzz and ofcourse the theft."

3.2.10. Everyday life and distance from it

Interpretations of places can be determined by features of the place, features of the observer and interactions between them. The same goes for switches in the signification. Just like the interpretation of a novel can change during the course of time, after rereading[139], because structures in the book are suddenly noticed and because of changes in the frames of reference[140], the moods etc of the reader. Here the metaphor 'space is text' holds. The moods of the reader are structured in many ways; a persons mood can be influenced by whatever happens to take place. Experience in general can be structured in many ways because of all kinds of events. One structure that is important in this respect according to a lot of sociological theorists, is the distance from everyday experience[141]. Without going into detail here, we can say that a lot of theorists see a leisurely experience as an experience defined by such a distance to everyday life. One can argue that it is not fruitful to define an 'everyday experience' that is supposed to exist empty of leisurely experiences, and one can argue that it is not realistic to present even ritualistic behaviour in everyday life as devoid of the pleasures associated with leisure. Apart from these criticisms, we do see an interest in the ideas behind the scheme.

One way or another, there are experiences defined by people as leisure, relaxed, beautiful, different from the surrounding time. Whether one defines the collection of moments before and after these experiences as everyday life and the moments of difference as leisure, is a different question. Still, we think it fruitful to conceptualise the moments of difference. They take place in spatial surroundings. Switched experiences, moments of different experience, can induce a different experience of space and a certain perception of space can induce a switch in 'general' experience. Again, it is difficult to separate the experience of space from the general experience, since space is object and background at the same

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[139] Eco *Lector in fabula* (S)
[140] ibidem
[141] Treated eg in Lengkeek (OT)

time, and background can be intertwined with the events or not. Underneath experience lies signification according to our semiotic point of view. New experiences imply new significaton[142]. Switches in signification can be traced by changes in the experience.

Leisure and spatial interpretation

Fissures in experience can be called transitions to moments of leisure, enabling people to perceive things differently, including spaces[143]. Several respondents were interested in history or architecture, mainly "on holidays", or said to appreciate park- like surrondings on a holiday, while others needed these surroundings for small breaks in everyday life and still others did not see any good in them at all (e.g. because they suspected quick deterioration of the places) In everyday life too, some of the known places can regain their original meanings or just regain a depth in significance in those moments of relaxation or leisure. Sometimes, in some answers of the respondents, the relaxation was a prerequisite for a renewed appreciation of a space, sometimes a beautiful space could lead to relaxation or leisure, sometimes the sheer discovery or rediscovery of meaning and beauty in a place could cause the same. This means the experienced fissure in everyday life can be cause and effect of new signification of space, sudden or slow. The same goes for the use of the label 'leisure' by the way: It can be cause and effect of a leisurely experience and a new interpretation of space. The applicaton of the label, a socially accepted container of experiences and time devoted to it, can lead to an experience of leisure ("Now I can relax") or the other way around: the experience can bring about the label leisure, or relaxation for the moment and the experience.

It must be added that not every experience of leisure and relaxation is connected with a new signification of place. Some people just relax with place as a background. Other people look for experiences of excitement on holidays, say climbing mountains, and there too –trivial it may seem– we have to say that for some people the spatial surroundings are important, and can shift meanings because of the experience, while others don't care a damn[144]. We are interested here in the existence and analysis of mechanisms causing shifting significations, dynamics in signification of

[142] This is implied in the oeuvre of Eco, Barthes, Foucault
[143] De Botton, 21 (PH)
[144] see L. De Cauter, *De archeologie van de Kick,* Leuven, 1995.

space, not in statistics and mechanisms that are necessarily at work all the time and everywhere. In the case of leisure, we still avoid to take a general position on the subject, we do not defend any grounding or general theory, but we do acknowledge that one class of mechanisms causing dynamics in the signification of places can be linked to experiences we generally call leisure. In life of modern and postmodern man categories of time and experience related to leisure are a structuring force of life.

The categories of time and experience are so much linked that they evoke one another, and start structuring time and experience simultaneously[145]. Space can be present or absent in these restructurings, but our point is that they *can* simultaneously restructure the signification of a place. After the experience called leisure, after the fissure in experience appeared a second time, and people fall back in everyday life, or in another aspect of everyday life, as one prefers, the experience of space, its underlying signification, does not necessarily falls back on the same patterns as before. It is possible that people will hold on to the new signification. A rediscovered beauty on a moment of leisure can lead to a permanent accessibility of that beauty, sometimes revoking the experiences of leisure, sometimes not (unless we would include about every positive aspect of life in the category 'leisure' , which is analytically and intuitively an unattractive option)

3.2.11. Special categories: nature, culture, art

Images of the past determines the interpretation of the historical references used, and these images, are social constructions.[146] Groups produce their own constructions of the past. We can also say that cultures colour their own past. In this study, it was very clear that most of the respondents thought it important to call themselves Dutch, and these people wanted to see references to the Dutch past (one can be proud of, learn things from, show respect to) At the same time, there is a fascination for some non- Dutch cultures: the Vikings, the Romans −there is a strong general interest for these people all over Europe. Also, it is clear that all-too- direct references to the past are seen by other respondents as tutelage: "Men, this design makes me thinks of a tv- spot telling us how to behave.

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[145] Gell (A)
[146] Comaroff (A)

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It works on my nerves." However ambiguous, often there is a framing of history through Dutch eyes, a framing due to the nation- state and its monopoly on the production of history.

We did not interview foreigners in Holland (some Belgians in Belgium were included), but most of the Dutch people thought that the historical references were probably impossible to understand for foreigners, and the designs would be less apreciated because of that. "We like this because we are proud about some Dutch achievements in the past. But what does it mean for foreigners? Maybe they are just puzzled " In the case of a few designs (e.g. a fruit garden) several people did refer to an assumed interest for foreigners, but this did not imply an interest in the historical character of the place, rather a culturally motivated difference in practical use. Picking fruits and pick- nick were often described as Turkish and Moroccan habits, traditions, while Dutch people, individualists, owners of decorative gardens, do not know them. The foreigners in Dutch eyes were not likely to understand the history of the place and its use in the design, but they would probably appreciate the places because of other reasons.

Cultural self- image and history

The Dutch people we interviewed were inclined –like probably every nation in the world- to project a positive self- image on history and to deduce it from history. Some periods are highlighted, some remain in the shade, all of them are interpreted from a more or less chauvinist perspective. In Almere the shipwrecks spoke to the imagination among other reasons because they were assumed to belong to the 17th century, the golden century for Holland. 'We (I rephrase some stereotypes here in Dutch historiography) freed ourselves from the tyrants in the south and brought by our own bare hands the country to prosperity. Moreover, we are the people who struggled against the watery forces of nature for centuries and won, thanks to good models of cooperation, leading to our present- day polder model[147].' These stereoptypes represent some historical elements in Dutch cultural identity.[148] The grand Flevo polders, where Almere is built on, are strong icons of the struggle against the elements and of Dutch cultural identity in general. Every single respondent knew about

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[147] Metze (SP)
[148] Van Ginkel (A); Van der Horst (A), de Vries (SP) etc

the polders, once sea, now land, and of the new town of Almere, built swiftly in about 25 years and still growing on the former sea- bed. References to this maritime past were quickly understood and appreciated. Not many people (only one person) knew about the land before it became sea and about the habitation of the land.

Constructions of the past can be determined by national cultures[149], ethnicity, religion (fragmented enough in Holland), professional cultures, disciplinary cultures, organisational cultures,…[150] In this research, not too much could be noticed of such mechanisms, apart from the influence of the Dutch nation just discussed and some influence of professional cultures related to spatial planning, an inclination to identify rather quickly with (recent) governmental ideas and policies and take a conservation perspective in matters of history and heritage. In the coming chapters, we will meet more and clearer examples of the mechanisms referred to.

Culture implies a view on history, a construction of history and therefore an attitude towards historical references in planning and design[151]. We think it interesting to deal with two more basic categories of western thought briefly here: nature and art[152]. This is not the place for a full exposition of the relations between these three concepts, but they cannot escape attention completely. Inductively, we see that the respondents use categories of nature, culture, art in their reactions on the designed places and the historical references used there. Deductively, we use literature on this subject to built a few thoughts under the structure we percieve in the responses.

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[149] Anderson (A), Hobsbawm, 105(HE)
[150] Eriksen, 47 (A); Barth (A)
[151] Leman (A); Lovell (A)
[152] Cf Glacken (PH)

Nature and culture are conceptualised differently in every culture. This can be seen as the main theme of Lévi- Strauss work[153]. Since a culture contructs its own world by means of concepts, also the concept of nature is a social construct. It can be stated that albeit every culture has its own self- image (culture creates itself), and its own image of nature, and the variation in images of both is enormous, there is always a conceptualisation of a relation between a nature and a culture that is considered of prime importance for the culture in question. In some cultures (ours now e.g.) nature has aquired the meaning of a type of places, whereas in other cultures it has or had more the character of a force, a primeval chaos, a tendency towards chaos, a general layout of things, or an intended but imperfectly present layout etc. The own culture can be seen as a product of a natural order, a proof and guarantee of a natural order, a victory on a natural order, as a structure imposed on a natural chaos, or elseway. Between nature and culture the relations can be diverse, and the position of man in one version of the relation can vary too. Man in every culture belongs to culture, but the presence of nature in and around him can be presented in many different ways.

A design for a place loaded with historical references is as said still a place. People respond mostly to the place, not to the historical references displayed. The place is a thing and a background of things, e.g. historical references, events, events in the past. As a place, the interpretation of the design is determined firstly by the action of the categories and typologies of places. As a background for historical references, historical categories and frames of reference can gain importance. In our culture, nature is conceptualised among other things as a type of place; the concept has acquired a spatial aspect, next to other aspects. This implies that a spatial category of 'nature' exists, and can be activated in the interpretation of places. This could be observed in the responses of persons interviewed: "Just a simple natural place"; "What a nice piece of nature in the middle of the town". The category is quite a dominant one: places are called natural very easily. The moment something is green, it is likely to be called 'nature'.

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[153] Leach on Levi-Strauss (A)

Several labels can be applied simultaneously to places, they can be placed in several typologies at the same time. A place can therefore be called 'natural' and 'historical' at once, we noticed in this study. Since history is a product of culture, belongs to the sphere of culture, this raises the question of the possible relations in the triangle nature- culture-history. In our culture, history can be referred to in a natural place and in a cultural place; so far everything clear. While looking for short term design applications, it is not necessary to explore the relations in the triangle more fully, therefore. From a theoretical point of view, and being interested in long term cultural changes too, it is worth devoting some more attention to.

Natural spaces: a cultural creation

Looking back, in our culture, nature only became a type of places in the late 18th century, in the age of romanticism[154]. And nature became in that same period for a lot of people an ideal for culture. Culture had to reinvent its naturalness. Their own culture was seen as deviated, since deviated from nature[155]. Before that time, nature had been the plan God designed for us and our surroundings. Nature was something naturally present in man and nature, and rationality was an exquisite part of nature. Suppose one had to refer to history in a park- like place in 16th century France, one could not refer to history in nature, since this was not a place. One could refer to nature as God's intended but imperfect plan for our world by using geometry. One could refer to history using sculptures of important figures of the past. Probably this would not be the past of the country since you would probably be a member of the aristocracy referring to the past of the family, possibly owning estates in several countries. According to the artistic conventions of your time, you would probably interpret the sculptures as the most important objects of the place, glorifying the family using its past.[156] Maybe the box hedges would attract attention, and the rare bulbs applied within the box patterns, because they displayed the wealth and therefore social significance of the owner[157].

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[154] Glacken (PH); Roelandts, 62 (PH)
[155] Wokler (PH); de Botton, 13 (PH); Orieu, 361 (PH)
[156] D. and J.P. Le dantec, *Reading the French garden. Story and history,* Boston, 1990.
[157] Joyce (LA); see also Hobhouse on renaissance garden plants (LA)

Such a small flashback in our own culture reveals immediately the culture- bound contingency of a whole series of conceptual relations implied in the interpretation of place, history, and history in place. In culture, ideas on history and nature can change all the time and influence the interpretation of history in place. If nature is present in man, then a reference to history is more easily a reference to nature too. If nature is very different from man, then a reference to history is less likely to be an reference to nature. If nature is not a place, the interpretation of the historical place will rarely be influenced by ideas on nature. If nature is a type of place, like here and now is the case, then the interpretation of the historial place is influenced by the spatial categories linked to the concept of 'nature'. And so on. Every combination is imaginable. Since history is linked to culture, to the image a culture has of itself, and the relation nature- culture is almost always significant in a culture, it is natural that concepts of nature and concepts of history can interfere. Since cultures change, this interference is variable too. And because we look at historical references taking place in a place, and nature has acquired spatial characteristics in our culture, it is worthwile investigating the web of possible conceptual relations between nature, culture and history, and their influence on the use of history in places. This can be relevant for the study of cultural change, the study of cultural difference and the study of subcultures within one society.

In the little picture of the French Renaissance garden, we mentioned artistic conventions. In the Almere study, we met the category 'art' first of all as a kind of *residual category*: if the interpretation of the place is difficult, unclear, than the term 'art' comes to the surface. If a place is not too green, and obviously designed, it is art. Abstract shapes and geometry are in our culture easily associated with art. "If the straight lines are not well-kept, if they are grown over, than it ceases to be art, it becomes a park again", one person said. If one refers to history in a place, then the place or objects on the place will regularly fall under the category 'art'. The object and- or the place can be labelled artistic; both place and object can be seen as a work of art (since architecture and landscape architecture are regarded as partly artistic disciplines) If one leaves an old thing or place untouched and shows it to the people, one can recognise it or not, but it will normally not be labelled art (maybe some avant- garde people will,

defining the work of art rather as framing than as an object[158]) . If one adds visible design features to the place, to accentuate the surviving past or refer to a vanished past, the same uncertainty exists about the recognition of the historical aspect of the place, but it can be interpreted as art.

Art in space/ space as art

The place can be art, the objects referring to the past, the objects accentuating the past. From the designer's point of view, an artistic way of dealing with the past is a normal option, since the designer of places is partly trained as an artist, considers himself to be an artist, and therefore part of artistic traditions. Depending on the discipline of the designer, the balance between nature and culture and nature and art will move in this or that direction. A landscape architect in the traditional sense would probably use more green in the design, can consider his use of plants as artistic or natural. An architect designing a place would traditionally use less green. Wanderers in such a place are generally more inclined to see the stony version as art, the green version as nature, despite possible artistic ideas of the designer. The stony version, the artistic one, will often seen as art because it is made of stone and metal, yet it is not a known type of functional space. Art functions as a residual category, apart from the intentions of the artists.

We should not disregard this point, trivial it may seem. One can deduce from it that the artist's intentions and related categoristations of space are not the ones shared by most of the visitors of such a place. Here we touch for the first time an issue that will recurr in this study: the language of art is not understood by most people[159]. One consequence is that it has become almost impossible for a lot of people to define what art is. The definition of the category is vague, people are aware of the existence of the category, and of an experimental character of contemporary art, the result being that the label art is applied to objects and places that cannot be labelled otherwise. In the case of places, the categorisation is often taking place at first along lines of function, and a problem of categorisation is translated as a problem of assigning a function to a place. No clear function, a clear presence of design features (removing

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[158] see Stangos (AR)
[159] Vanbergen 84 (S); Eco 1976, 11 (S)

it from a natural space that can lack other functions) lead to an interpretation as art.

Another consequence of the difficulties people experience with the artistic language is the difficulty to communicate with the visitors of a place by means of an artistic language. Art is non- expendable for designers referring to the past, it is nearly the only language they speak, but it is a language hardly understandable for most of us. In order to clarify this point, we recall the semiotic notions introduced earlier on.

Historical references and the language of art

Every reference is a reference to something using a sign that is understood by means of shared codes, shared between sender and receiver. A historical reference is a reference to something in the past, to a style or a place or a person, an object, an event, whatever, in that past. In terms of Peircean semiotics the sign used to bring about the historical reference, refers to an object and an interpretant. An object as Peirce defined it is not an object in the common use of the word, but a socially constructed concept. In Middle Ages, a dragon could be the object of a sign, because the average person would recognise a dragon if shown. An interpretant is the individually interpreted version of the object, the personalised version of it, embedded in personal webs of association. Sign, object and interpretant assume each other in order to produce meaning. Every reference to the past needs to be interpreted as a sign to allow a further understanding. Is that the case, then a different object and interpretant can be attached to the sign (a reference to a prehistoric camp site can be regarded as a play ground for kids) If it were the designer's first intention to communicate something about history, then he failed. If he intended to make the place more useful or beautiful, then maybe he achieved his goal.

A reference to history comes in various shapes. It is always a sign, functioning in a sign system. A sign system's evolution is always influenced by the evolution of other sign systems, of evolutions in ideas, of cultural change in general. Even then, it is also partly autonomous: it has its own codes, its own dynamism. Architecture reflects trends in society in art, science, society in general, but it also must be understood in terms of older architecture, of architectural codes and traditions[160]. If one refers to the

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[160] A quick look at R.Van Pelt´s *Architecture in the age of historicism* is telling enough in this respect

past of a place by means of a steel sculpture, then one does not only refer to the past of the place, but also to traditions of sculpture and steel sculpture. These sculptural traditions have their own codes, typologies, debates, rules of development, practical constraints and so on. The chosen sign system, in this case an artistic genre, makes some messages easier and others more difficult to sent. The medium moulds the message. By means of sculpture, one can not express everything, and not all the expressed things will be understood[161].

The dynamics of the artistic language

We might add that in comparison with other sign systems, art has a more complex evolution. At the moment, the dynamism in artistic evolution is extreme. At certain points in the past, this was not the case. Artistic evolution accelarates and slows down from time to time[162]. A new stage in art entails a new code for the interpretation of art. What a work of art means depends on the ideas what art is at the moment, what it can and should say, what not, and how. Since impressionism, styles are changing frequently, and since romanticism, connoiseurs consider interesting in art what is authentic (expression of the individual artist) and what is new. New things are not simply new shapes and colours, new outward features of the work of art, but also new ideas on what art is and how it communicates. Good art since romanticism is art changing the definitions of art, art changing the rules of artistic communication.

According to Eco[163], the key defining feature of artistic communication is that every message changes the codes for the next message, the constant reinvention of codes of communication. A lot of 'good' art learns to look at things differently, to look at the world and to look at other works of art. This implies that a knowledge of very much works of art is necessary for an understanding of art (as far as the artist himself intended it) Historical references that are understood clearly by the audience will therefore be labelled kitsch or inferior art by the leading artistic circles. It becomes clear that the fast evolution of art and the proclaimed principles of ever changing communication pushed art towards the limits of communication. Even other artists can hardly understand a lot

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[161] Vanbergen 35 (S)

[162] See E. Panofsky, *Studies in iconology. Humanistic themes in the art of the renaissance*, New York, 1972, and his other works on renaissance and renascences.

[163] E.g. in Eco 92 , 59 (S)

of art, since the knowledge implied is too much. In some cases, no knowledge at all is implied, but one can never know this in advance. Here we find what we might call a meta- convention of modern art: that it is not that necessary and interesting to be understood by a wider audience. The avant- garde is always avant, and the rest might follow once. Linked to a sign system is in some cases a group with their own codes and meta- codes of communication. Such a thing can never be deduced from the work of art solely.

Historical references and the nature of the design disciplines

Architecture, landscape architecture and urban design are design disciplines, related to distinctive professional cultures and sign systems. Within these disciplines, a long- standing debate exists on historicity[164], on the relation between new spaces on the one hand, and old spaces in the neighbourhood and old spaces in the tradition on the other hand. Modernism in the designing disciplines was related strongly to a simple and geometrical design language and to a weak relation between the new space and older environments and traditions[165]. Modernism took on somewhat different shapes in the different disciplines and lingered on longer in some disciplines and some regional or national variants of the disciplines.

In post- modernism, a collection of attitudes and styles, historical reference and adaptation to the environment is generally more accepted[166]. In some countries, post- modern architecture, landscape architecture and urban design, have never taken root completely. Modernist and post- modern attitudes towards historical reference can be accepted, rejected and mixed very swiftly, according to the tastes and the power positions within the disciplines and the professional cultures. This is not stated as a problem here. While studying historical references, one should be aware of it. It constitutes one extra reason for the impossibility of an historical reference that is pleasant and understandable to everyone. Because of the artistic character of a lot of references (apart from other reasons discussed above), it will be misunderstood by part of the audience. Because of the dynamics

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[164] See van Pelt, ibidem.

[165] Castex (LA); Frampton (AR)

[166] Jenks as analysed in Frampton (AR); Aldo Rossi had a particular personal version of architecture already in the seventies that mixed post- modern historicism and modernist ideas on an eternal grammar of architecture

of the disciplines designing places (apart from other reasons), part of the group of 'senders', creators of the message, will disagree on the way to do it, even on the value of historical references as such. At a given moment A in discipline X a certain type of historical reference is accepted, five years later this is the case in discipline Y, while in discipline X the taste and the ideas have changed already. This type of dynamics cannot be neglected when the designer of a place is trying to refer to the past. It follows out of the relative autonomy of the artistic domain in the west since renaissance[167], the cult of personal expression since romanticism and the urge towards permanent renewal since the invention of avant- garde, about a century ago.

An additional factor in the interpretation of the reference is the relation between the sign system of a place and the sign system of an object on the spot. A work of art in the context of a forest is interpreted differently than in case it is placed on a square using the same language of forms as the object itself. In case of the square, the visitor will be inclined to interpret object and place as part of one and the same work of art or at least design, and suspect one message for both. He will look for relations between the object and the place, similarities, differences, and try to deduce a meaning intended by the designer (if he is interested at all) If placed in the woods, the object will probably be perceived as less related to the place; the place will become more background than object; it will become rather context than text. The square will be part of the text.

The reflections on the influence of sign systems on the interpretation and production of historical references can not be deduced directly from the interviews. They are derived from the theoretical position chosen and literature. It fits the facts however. These paragraphs are written from the vantage point of the sender, in contrast with most parts of the Almere case, where the receiver of the message is central. Such a change of perspective and addition of theory were deemed necessary to clarify some interpretive problems of historical reference we did meet frequently in the empirical situation.

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[167] Blunt, ch 4 (AR); Adams, 84 (PH)

3.2.12. The image of society: me, myself and the government

How people react on our historical parks also depends on the image people have of society: how does society look like (the discursive constuction of society can be seen here[168]), how should it function, what are the tasks of myself, the others and the government? When asked directly, people state that the government should pay attention to history, to historical places, and that the design of new historical places, as endeavoured in this research, is no waist of money.

But, from the moment this type of government spending comes closer to home, or from the moment it becomes very concrete, a whole range of other interests and goals enter the picture, and the decision gets harder to make. It is often allowed to lay out an historical park in the backyard, but the closer to the backyard, the more conditions are being added. In the backyard a lot of different things need to happen. Taking care of history is one of the things the government is supposed to do, without any specification being given. People expect a lot from the government. A lot of things just need to happen, need to be "arranged", "taken care of". We, the citizens, do not needto know the answers and are not supposed to be aware of conflicting interests and contradictory desires. Often, it is assumed that the proper experts reside somewhere in the administration. It is remarkable that at the same time there is an obvious lack of trust in government and administraton. This applies in our case to the design, actual lay out and maintenance of public space. Concerning the design features, we met several times responses of the kind "What the hell do they come up with now?" (implying that we as researchers-designers are part of the same governing system) Such a response is typical for a common attitude, where the behaviour of government and administration is perceived as unpredictable, strange, not transparant, far removed from the actual wishes of inhabitants. At the same time, it remains unspoken what exactly the citizens want.

Trust and distrust, interpretation of designs

Most of the complaints aimed at the government are concerned however with maintenance. Several people assume immediately that a plan

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[168] Bowers (D)

will not hold, that a newly designed place will deteriorate immediately because of lack of maintenance and abundance of crime. These two things are often connected, and the image of a negative spiral is brought forward quite often: "Rubbish brings about rubbish" An idea is quickly disapproved because there is no belief in the sustainablility, because they think the government will abandon its duties (assigned quickly) Even people interested in history and nice places and parks and approving of one specific design, will loose their enthusiasm after thoughts of a demolition of the place. This type of negative ideas is widespread, and the distrust in government is often accompanied with a distrust in man in general (at the moment). Cultural pessimism is everywhere. A lot of people see things being destroyed in their neighbourhood. This is ascribed to a failing government, to the responsible authorities refraining from appropriate action. And to youngsters and parents incapable of giving a good education. Places become "hangplekken' (see above) and become useless because of vandalism, little parks and bushes are seen as hangouts for dirty men, unpleasant places for most of us. Feelings of unsafety are very commonly projected in the designs. For a designer, this is difficult to change. It is important to be aware of the fact that feelings of unsafety and distrust can have a serious impact on the interpretation of all kinds of places, but especially park- like places, and these feelings can easily overshadow all kinds of other considerations and appreciations.

Conversely, feelings of trust can create space for more positive appreciations of the designs: they can allow for soial cohesion, common activities, shared responsibilities and so on. If one thinks of a cooperating neighbourhood as realistic, then more of the designs are considered realistic and sustainable. This can be related to an improvement of the possible and conceivable functions of the designs ("Here the gardeners can have their coffee"; " Here the neighbours can party"; "Here the kids from the neighbourhood can play quietly") But, as ever, there are exceptions. People who are mostly cynical about the sustainability of designs and the intentions of our fellow citizens, can look very different at some of the designs. A square dominated by spring- like colours can evoke images of playing children where nothing asocial or bad can be ascribed to, an allotment can remind another person of old people and a way of living where one was not eager to vandalise things, were people did not feel bored anyway. Dissatisfaction among people can be linked to a period or a

group that is being idealized[169]. These groups and periods can still be present and be judged very different from the rest. Places and designs where something happens related to these periods and groups can be looked upon much more positively than the surroundings.

The Dutchman and his government: ambiguity and paradox

On the relation between the Dutchman and his government can be said much more. Building on the Almere research and on some works on Dutch anthropology[170], we would like to make a few remarks relevant in this context. Dutch people feel famous because of their capacity to cooperate, to organise themselves efficiently (ascribed to the war against water[171]) And they are proud of an individualist approach to life in general. Both selfperceptions are well- entrenched in Dutch cultural identity. It can be expected that at some point ambiguities have to arise. One can track down some of these ambiguities in the position of the Dutchman towards his government. On the one hand government is seen as the representation of the collective will, the result of the delegation of power by individuals proud and willing to do so. On the other hand, government is perceived as a strange and dominating force, hegemonic. We can point at several causes of this experience of alienation from the government. One of them is the existence of strongly developed institutional cultures in some domains of government (e.g. spatial planning in the widest sense) Another reason can be found in the inherent paradox in Dutch cultural identity we just referred to, the Dutch as 'collective of individualists'.

Typical in this respect is that about everyone thinks the people should be educated by the government, also in historical matters, as long as one is not regarded as one of the persons to be re- educated. People are permanently calling for a government that arranges about everything, and spreads value systems among the people, but simultaneously one can notice a vigourous protection of the personal identity from all kinds of obligatory education and change. (In the education of little kids autonomy is a higher- ranking value than in the surrounding countries) Even if one thinks more attention should be devoted to history by the government, also in public space, people will easily feel treated like little kids, will

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[169] Anderson, 117 (A); Assche 2000 (LA)
[170] Ginkel (A); see also Hajer etc on public spaces (SP); and Metze on the poldermodel (SP)
[171] De Vries (SP)

experience tutelage very quickly. Extra information on the site or even all too explicit references to the past will often evoke reactions of the kind: "Why do I need to have an opinion on this?"; "If I want to go to a museum, I can do it myself"; "Very irritating, it reminds me of the vicar".

The strategy to immediately recognise 'hangplekken' in every plan the government triumphantly presents, can therefore be interpreted as 'counterworks' in the words of anthropologist Van Wolputte[172]. Counterworks are in this context counterdiscourses adding a secondary voice[173] to a signification of space that is experienced as alien and imposed from outside, a secondary voice that is more in accord with the own cultural identity (contradictory it may be) "What the hell do they come up with now", is not seen as a real answer to the most important questions of the inhabitants. Public space that is perceived too abstract, too unpractical and too incomprehensible is labelled 'art', not because of the beauties of the place, or just because art functions as residual category (see above), but also because the label expresses irritation about the functioning of the government ("It's useless, it's expensive, probably it's art")

Despite this negative attitude towards government, everyone of the Dutch respondents assigned a very important role to government, and hesitated when asked if action is necessary to change things. Even if they did not believe in the chances of a design, they accepted one variant as the one to be carried out. We interpret this attitude as resulting from at least two things: first the afore- mentioned ambiguitiy within the Dutch cultural identity, ambiguity towards a government that is distrusted but needed. Secondly, we interpret it as a half- hearted acceptation of government practices. These two things are related though not identical: the first can be seen as conflicting desires, the second as an accepted negation of one desire. The accepted negation by the government of one desire is linked to the acceptation of government in its present form, acceptation of the precise ways restrictions are placed on individual freedom.

If asked to choose one of the parks, people did so and underlined the necessity of parks in general, and the interest of historical parks and places more specifically. However, once presented the option of abolishing the

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[172] Van Wolputte (A)

[173] Mikhail Bakhtin, talking about the interpretation of literary texts, used the term polyvocality.

parks and enlarging houses and private gardens in stead, people were positive about this option too and were very surprised this was an option at all. They were surprised about such a possibility, not only in the context of this study, but in the context of Dutch spatial planning as a whole. The option did not come to the mind of the people accustomed to a system of strict government control of spatial planning. If this study would be a real planning project, the government would be consulting the inhabitants on their preferences concerning park layouts, would feel it fulfilled its democratic duties, the inhabitants consulted feel treated in a democratic way, feel they could review all the options, and this way the existing planning discourse reinforces itself, as it does in Dutch planning reality. Everyone thinks this situation is the normal one, the only possible one, the objective one. Different options are turned into blind spots.

3.2.13. The visible and the invisible

This far we did not distinguish between archaeological objects and structures, and other types of historical materialities. All the designs we made, were related to presently hidden things. They were sometimes shown, sometimes not. If referred to, the reference itself was visible one way or another. Referring to a visible or unvisible thing did not make a real difference (events and decomposed objects as invisible things). What did make a difference, was the question: authentic or not? People preferred to see the real thing, if some monumumental value can be assigned to it. Invisible things left invisible, without a visible, material reference, were generally rejected as a design option. Only in cases where the events on a place are widely known and renowned, when they are important in a culture, it becomes imaginable to leave such a place untouched while still interesting as an historical place. Such cases we did not find in Almere, so we could not use their fame in our designs. If Attilla the Hun would have been beaten in Almere, it would be possible to preserve the battle ground without adding anything at all, leaving it all to the imagination. Fortunately for the inhabitants of our regions in the 5th century and unfortunately for our research, Attila did not reach Almere (he did stop in Belgium) The construction of objects and values that took place in the context of the historical discipline archaeology must be carefully separated from the signification of place and history by non-

archaeologists, if we want to understand this signification fully and try to keep it into account in urban planning and design.

3.2.14. Conclusions:

The disciplinary perspective adopted in this case study was mainly semiotic. The study can also be interpreted as an introduction to semiotics of space, starting from the empirical data of the Almere interviews. We investigated mainly how individuals attach meaning to space and time by using and interrelating categories. The several systems of categorisation applied are dynamic, complex and they can resonate. A special role in the signification of place in our culture is played by the concepts of nature, culture, art. We were primarily interested in the mechanics of place-making, therefore in the dynamics, the shifts in signification occurring every now and then. Our aim was to show and partly unravel the complexity of signification of space and time at the individual level; group- related mechanisms were hardly studied here.

Already at this point we can state that an ideal historical reference is plainly impossible, even for one individual. This is an important fact to remember while studying planning cultures later in the book. We will draw on this case study in the parts on identity theory and on planning systems. Next case study moves the focus slowly to groups of individuals, and the games of several groups in a small- scale planning situation.

3.3 Notes on a Dutch allotment garden (Wageningen)

3.3.1. Introduction

I rent one of the allotment gardens studied here myself. Before the study was conducted, I rented my spot there for five years. So I knew the place in advance and had some ideas about it. I always wondered why so much difference existed in the lay out and use of the plots on my allotment, and I was fascinated by the difference between the several allotments in the area. In the following pages I would like to explore this initial interest in a systematic, scientific manner, trying to avoid the prejudice ubdoubtably developed in these five years. We will distinguish three spatial scales to be scrutinized. At every scale, we were interested in the signification of place and history, the actors present. Next we tried to analyse the interaction of the actors at every scale and the interactions between the different scales. Users and municipality (as relevant planning agency) were taken into consideration. First, we looked at the individual gardeners and their interactions, next to the allotment as a spatial unit and thirdly to the Wageningse Eng, the landscape unit the allotments are situated in, roughly speaking the eastern edge of the town of Wageningen. It was never the intention to present a new plan for the Eng. We do intend to gain better understanding of the cultures of users and planners, and their interactions. In these interactions we tend to unveil some more cultural mechanisms in the signification of place and history that did not attract our attention yet.

3.3.2. Method

This study was conducted between may and august 2002; 25 semi-structured interviews were done with 30 people, the interviews taking between 1 and 3 hours. A combination of anthropological and planning methods was used. The anthropology is interpretive, in this study modelled on Clifford's Geertz approach, combined with a few structuralist elements in the tradition of Lévi- Stauss[174].

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[174] Geertz 1973 (A); Zonabend (A)

3.3.3. Place

The gardens we are talking about are situated next to the Diedenweg. As said, they are part of the Wageningse Eng. An Eng or Enk in this part of Holland is usually an area of old agricultural land, on the edge of the old settlement or town, stemming from the middle ages, often the early middle ages. An Eng consists of several parcels, and should be seen as an open landscape in the first centuries after the land reclamation. This open character will recur often as an issue of debate. This particular Eng exists since Carolingian and possibly Merovingian times, given the presence of the proper place- names in 9th century documents and the presence of a 5th century graveyard.[175] The Eng is connected with the earliest history of Wageningen: apart from the graveyard we have the Diedenweg, presumably dating back to prehistoric times. The Diedenweg links up the western edge of the Veluwe woodlands with an easy passage of the river Rhine, and the graveyard as well as the oldest settlement were adjacent to this road. The oldest urban core was clutted around a wooden and later tufa church on the slopes of the Wageningen Mountain (a small one), and fell into decay after the construction of a new church and a new core more to the west, closer to the river. Church, graveyard and the old boundaries of the Eng are invisible by now. The boundaries of the farm land were moved mainly in the thirties and fifties, when social housing projects occupied the western part of the area. Virtually nothing remains of the mediaeval appearance of the place, apart from the open character, and even that is under threat. Partly because of allotments.

3.3.4. Functions of the gardens and roles of the gardeners

A real tour of the gardens in our allotment and its bewildering variety of detail cannot be offered here. Let us say that there are a few vegetable gardens, fruit gardens, flower gardens, herb gardens, bee gardens, mixes of these, in formal and informal styles, sometimes arranged around little ponds, arranged like collections, or arranged in ways that are hardly discernible because of the respectful treatment of weeds or the lack of distinctions between weeds and other plants. Let us ask ourselves why people do what they do there? First of all, because they put the place to a

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[175] Holwerda (HWE), Renes (HWE)

practical use: people grow herbs, fruit, vegetables there. In some cases because of relaxation, in some cases because of superior taste or the idea of producing your own food. Still others look at the prices of biologically grown vegetables, and start a garden. A few antroposophical gardeners were present (biologisch- dynamisch), people who followed Steiner's advice and produced vegetables and fruit in a way that is very labour-intensive (sowing at night, using preparates, leaving room for weeds), making the products expensive. (At least, production was the original intention, but they abandoned the place quickly) Some women of foreign descent were growing herbs difficult to find in our shops, herbs relating them to their homelands via the cultivation of Dutch soil.

Apart from these practical functions, we find a long list of 'functions', reasons to rent a garden, that are less easy to define. Two of them are relaxation and 'finding the balance'. We do not mean there is a necessary link between the two, but they are related. One can appreciate positively the calm and quiet of the place without attributing a therapeutic value to the place and the activities there. One can value the calm without a stress problem. One can say that the activities in the garden, and the social activities connected, form a relatively simple world. A simplification of the world, experienced in a simple role. This does not imply that one tries to escape from the 'normal' world, from everyday life. We can refer to the paragraphs in the Almere study on ruptures in experience and signification, and their potency to generate new meanings of places (and history)

Changing spatial identities, resignification of the self

This place however, these gardens, can generate a different experience once entered, once crossed the boundaries of the allotment. The signification of the place brings about a resignification of self, a theatrical play with the role of the gardener, that implies a different view on the rest of the world[176]. The place has a signification very different from the environment, producing a temporarily different signification of all other places, via the gaze of the persona 'gardener'.[177] We did not meet such a mechanism yet in the Almere study, where people had to respond to drawings of places; they had no real aquaintance with these places, they

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[176] Wilson (PS)
[177] Reiss (D)

did not have the possibility to develop such a socially defined and theatrically coloured attachment to the place. But, just like a preference for order can be induced by a genuine love for order, not only negatively by an anxiety of whatever kind[178], the love for the simple and easy world of the garden and the gardener, is not necessarily a kind of escapism from the real world, from everyday life. It can as well be an addition to it.[179]

The complexity of the relation between the role of gardener and everyday life is much greater now than it was after the war, when the first allotments in this place appeared. People have more roles now and switch more easily from one role to another. To this adds up the post- modern stylisation of the role gardener: people are no simple gardeners anymore, people who need the extra income or the products of the place. There is a multitude of reasons to rent a garden, and a series of possible relations to everyday life. The role of gardener has acquired an esthetic character, has become more like a theatrical role than a mere social role. We can observe a stylisation, a temporary moulding into the image of the countryman, the eternal type of the simple gardener living a simple life on the countryside. Life is closer to a cultured nature, in a sketchy and idealised past. The aspect of theatrical play is intimately connected with the simplification of time, place and character[180]. People are very well aware of the existence of this type of images, the set of related ideas circulating around the 'countryman'[181], the set of simplifications of the world connected to the place, enabling people to play the role. Some of them call themselves gardener on cocktail parties, tend to speculate on the quality of the potatoes this year at family gatherings, tell people at length about the provenance of the flower decorations in the house.

It is interesting to notice how subtle the play can be, how the role can take over the person for a while at certain times, while at other moments it can be played with distance, ironically. The distance can appear and vanish in a blink of an eye, the irony can be present or absent every second. The sudden shifts from serious to ironical that can occur in the play from time to time, can imply sudden shifts in the signification of the place and its history. If 'in' the role, seriously, one looks through the

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[178] Douglas *Purity and danger* (A)
[179] van Veen, conclusions (D)
[180] Reiss (D)
[181] Glacken on the rural idyll (PH)

eyes of the dramatis persona and the place acquires a new meaning, as well as the rest of the world. Time is theatrical time for a moment, and the view on history is therefore different too. Time stands still, or at least moves slower, and the present time is the idealized and simplified past just referred to. The rest of the world is resignified but simplified; not everything in the world acquires a new meaning since this theatrical world revolving around the 'countryman' is much smaller and simpler, like the stage of a theater, to which are added a limited series of ideas on the outside world expressed in the theatrical text.

Roles of the gardeners and images of 'the countryman'

Escaping from stress is only one of the many reasons to play the game, one of the functions of the image- complex of the 'countryman'. Versions of the complex, always different but bearing a family likeness strong enough to identify it as one complex, are widespread and ancient, dating back to Greek and Roman times, to writers like Hesiodus, Vergilius, Varro, Horatius[182]. The complex of images is so common in our culture that it also legitimizes all the activities associated with it: it is acceptable to grow vegetables, also for an intellectual, to read in the garden, relax there; nothing of this is considered weird or raises social tensions. Versions of the complex are present in about every corner of our culture, and in every case different associations come to the fore as the most important ones, different aspects of the role, different activities, different significations of place and time, depending on the moment, the personality of the gardener and so on. Gardening is an acceptable katalyst for different kinds of intellectual, emotional and esthetical interests that are linked up in the conceptual complex of the 'countryman'. The 'countryman' functions as a matrix of possibilities, connecting these interests and activities and possibilities. The garden as a type of place allows for all this to happen; at the same time it places its own constraints on the shape and the content of the matrix: the characteristics of the material object garden do not allow every type of activity, role, form, signification.

Not everyhing can be explained by the 'countryman'. For some of the gardeners, it is really about practical functions that are only to be understood as such. The reason of the function is the function and nothing

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[182] van Veen (D); See also Gelderblom in Zoest 1986 (S)

else. The antroposophist with the plots of strawberries really wanted to earn some money; he was not able to find a place elsewhere. Elderly gardeners at the neighbours (the allotment next door) have the garden because of the same reason. Some of them supply local shops, even a supermarket. Beekeepers need space for their hobby, just like the plant collector among the gardeners. Still, very often, the 'countryman' comes back. Sometimes there is a practically inspired need for space, where the rural ideal sneaks into the practice, sometimes there is a longing for rest, and a more or less vague rural ideal, where a practice, a hobby, and a place are connected with. After a while, in both situations the 'countryman' easily takes root.

Among the gardeners, the influence of the local university (Wageningen University) is easy to spot. Knowledge plays a more important role than in other allotments we know. Erik and Mark have gardening diaries, in the British tradition from the 19th century until Rosemarey Verey nowadays[183]. Myself and most of the other gardeners have at least a few gardening books. People work at the university, used to do so, or still study there. This also applies to the older generation of gardeners (one old man, now left, did experiments in plant breeding in his garden, trying to improve some tulip species) Among the gardeners, more then half obtained a master's degree, and most of them know a lot about the surroundings, about history, plants, nature, geology. (Most important reason to grow herbs seems to be the knowledge attached to the species planted, the stories, historical uses, etc)

Historical and social distribution of 'the countryman'

We will come back to this density of knowledge later. Right now we want to add to the observation of the influence of the university and the intensity of knowledge, the interpretation that the types of people linked to the university, and gardening here, are probably more sensitive for the charms of the 'countryman', and that the intellectualist attitude of most of them makes the succes of the role in these gardens more understandable. The complex of images is old and widespread, but among more intellectual circles, its traditions are still normal. The archetypal countryman was an urban intellectual looking for the idealised charms of rural living, and while democracy has taken hold of our culture, while the

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[183] see Wimmer (LA)

imagery and the roles are nowadays present in all layers of society, a preference among intellectual types can still be observed. The neighbours, working another allotment, mostly come from old local families, not too intellectual, and there the 'countryman' is present, but less common, more vaguely, devoid of the theatrical and ironical aspects of the gardeners role we met in the allotment we're discussing. It is less dominant in the definition of the role, in the signification of the place and its history (these people did have an interest in the history of the place; see further)

Let us come back shortly on the complex of images and ideas we called 'countryman', before closing this subject. The complex as we identified it in action in the allotment gardens here and now, has a long history, as said. It functions as a whole now, is analysed here as such, but parts of it also have separate histories can be analysed in these frames of reference. In history, art history and philosophy, they are often studied in that kind of perspective. In the 18th century philosophy of art, the esthetical category of the beautiful was joined by the category of the sublime and later on the picturesque.[184] The sublime and the picturesque categorised esthetical experiences that were not categorised before as such, that were not seen as esthetical experiences. Certain aspects of nature became images of nature that were associated with these newly defined experiences, and the new experiences induced new categories of art too, art being the domain supposed to evoke esthetic experiences. Landscape painting rose to importance in the time, since it was deemed suitable to express the new feelings by representing in a new way pieces of nature. (Nature had become place by now) Landscape gardening came into being too.

Gardening traditions existed before, place could be interpreted as a work of art before, but now the new esthetic categories, naturally linked to aspects of nature and landscape, could be represented much more compelling in the redefined art of gardening. After the genres of landscape painting in the picturesque and sublime style, and landscape gardening, had built up their own traditions, after people got used to this kind of imagery, popularised in travel literature and other media[185], the simplified and stereotyped imagery started functioning as images of nature and

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[184] Vanbergen (S); Dixon Hunt (LA); Wimmer, 167 (LA)
[185] de Botton, 64 (PH)

landscape in general. This is how nature looks like, how landscape looks like, how it should look, if it remained unspoilt by man, in its original beautiful state. What was intended originally as a representation of a new kind of beauty, became a representation of nature and landscape, in an idealised original state. In 19th century England, plans were made to improve the rural landscape, e.g. along new railroads, in the style of the picturesque (subsuming some elements of the sublime and the beautiful)

Life in nature, activities in nature, became part of the pastime of the middle class too, and they assumed the background and the surroundings of these activities was to be the picturesque landscape, in real or in the shape of the landscape garden[186]. As far as possible, people tried to recreate some of the landscape garden features in their private gardens, often too small for such a display. The available space puts constraints on the reproduction of the imagery in private space for most of the people, even now. And if available, the garden can be designed nowadays in different ways, since garden art has moved on since the 19th century. People can choose for a Japanese garden or a formal one again (post- modernism has entered the garden)

Greek and Roman roots of the 'Countryman'

In the meantime, the Roman and Greek writers on the rural idyll revived since Renaissance were not forgotten. In classical times and afterwards, within these writings several genres or subgenres were distinguished. The Georgic referred to Vergil's *Georgica*, while the Bucolic referred to the same writer's *Bucolica*. Vergil wrote the *Bucolica* first, a collection of sheperds songs situated in an enchanted nature in an eternal spring- like state, referring to the Greek poet Theocritus. *Georgica* is written in the tradition of the Greek Hesiodus, idealising not an idyllic landscape setting but rather the noble simple work of the farmer, cultivating the soil and a working ethic close to a cultured nature. Vergil's fellow poet Horace pictured in his *Odes* more the life of the urban intellectual enjoying the products and the fine moments of country life, without the labour.[187] These three versions of life on the countryside were revived in Renaissance and lived on since. They were accompanied by different images of nature and landscape, and enjoyed varying successes in

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[186] Dixon Hunt, passim (LA)
[187] Bartelink, 115 etc (OT)

different periods and different genres of culture (the sheperds were popular in 18th century French painting, ballet, music e.g.)

We described briefly three literary prototypes of life in the country and two philosophic categories connected with it. In literature and philosophy categories were defined that were at one moment or another linked with nature, landscape and activities there, a way of life that was sometimes permanent, often more like a role in life or an aspect of life. The picture is not complete. More literary genres can be defined by a literary historian. More artistic sources can be identified. Types of architecture were developed or reinterpreted in the frame of country living or living in nature (18th century huts e.g) About every domain of culture contributed one way or another to the representation, continuation, legitimation of activities and experiences of country lving by framing it artistically. At some moments, all the imagery we heap together now was not seen as a unity; sometimes more genres of art and experience were seen separately, as different and even unrelated traditions. Sometimes a few categories mingled, formed one complex, one discourse, and later on the histories of elements of the discourse were reinterpreted, making the discourse dissolve into separate traditions, lines of thought and image, discourses, again. The dynamics of discourse is very high in this field, lines are converging and diverging all the time, lines can come from remote parts of culture, producing complexes and dissolving them every now and then.

Discursive dynamics and discursive stability

Looking back, using a time frame of about 500 years, we can see however that since renaissance a lot of new things do arise in relation with landscape art, nature perception, garden art, life outdoors, urban- rural relations, but that a lot of things recur in various combinations, and that a lot of the new elements (e.g. the esthetic categories appearing in the 18th century, and the landscape garden) are modelled on older elements in the post-renaissance traditions or on the same Roman and Greek writers and materialities the renaissance writers referred to already. (Pliny's gardens were models for landscape gardening; Roman painting influenced landscape painting again in the 18th century) We do not go as far as saying we identified a matrix of matrices, but we do say that, despite the irregularities in discursive dynamics that are present everywhere, a lot of

similar patterns recurr, that several of the independent lines come together every now and then to form complexes of imagery and thought.

One such a complex we called 'the countryman' and we identified it in the Wageningen allotment. The 'countryman' , was found inductively on the spot, and in the last paragraphs we tried to frame it historically and theoretically, deductively. It should not be seen as a construction functioning as the matrix of matrices we just referred to, as a complex surviving since renaissance, but rather as a connection of several of the interweaving lines of discourse that is typical for here and now. The 'countryman' played a role in the stylisation of self and activities in the Wageningen gardens in 2002, in the signification of self and place. Many of the images and ideas behind this particular structuring of experience and signification are only diffusely present. Purely picturesque gardens one cannot observe here, no pure bucolic way of life (other people in the Eng do play sheperd for a hobby), no places devoted completely to comtemplation and philsophy in the tradition of Erasmus and Seneca before him[188]. Images and ideas from the past, coming to us via the interweaving lines of discourse, remained in the collective memory in a fragmentated state. The images that are seen as related are combined in ways that produce individual combinations bearing a family- likeness: every individual is different but a series of characteristics is spread throughout the group, betraying common ancestry, defining the group itself. Every individual manifestation of the combination, of the complex, can be seen as a structured collection of fragments deriving from a series of frames of reference with their own histories, from a series of different traditions that were often linked.

The 'countryman' as a matrix

It functions as a matrix, metaphorically speaking, originating from a piling up of old texts that are only partially readable. We call the complex the 'countryman' a matrix, since it bears resemblence to the mathematical matrix, a structure of figures that can take on various shapes, has many manifestations, while keeping its structure, allowing it to be identified as a unit. A matrix of meanings we define here as temporally situated: the structure with the many faces is defined here an now, in this case in a

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[188] We bring in mind the tradition of so- called Erasmian gardens. See Wimmer on renaissance gardens(LA), Joyce (LA), Halkin (PH)

small ethnographic reality. Discursive dynamics can produce different matrices in the future. As we remarked earlier, some of the matrices in the past also showed similarities with the one we identified, but in the context of this study we do not want to state that this implies the existence of a kind of master- matrix, of a different dimension. We think it a reasonable eplanation for the moment that the cultural identity of the west has recurrent patterns, that the west identified as the west very often, and that this self- image included some notions on the relation with nature and the life outdoors, despite the discursive dynamics on this subject too (we referred to in the Almere case)

Thanks to the blurring of the borders between high culture and low culture in our post- modern world, to the democratisation of aristocratic culture in the course of the centuries, thanks to reproduction of knowledge and image on a more massive scale, thanks to the presence of the university and the strict Dutch system of spatial planning, bringing relatively well- to- do people in the allotment gardens, thanks to this all, the 'countryman'can be found in the allotment.

Resuming we can say that the matrix = the 'countryman' = the complex of images and ideas. It mediates between the desires and needs of the gardener and the appearance and function of the garden. It is a katalyst for these desires and needs (e.g. a need to play roles, a need for variation, for relaxation, for tradition, …) It was already noticed that it cannot be observed everywhere and with the same clarity. The complex does not function with everyone and not necessarily in the allotment. One can also have a private garden or a country house and more. Given the obvious limitations on the average budget, and given the rules of Dutch spatial planning (producing scarcity and high prices), this is not an option for most of the people. The matrix serves to understand the own experiences and structure them; they are being katalysed and also localised: they need a place to materialise. In the context of Dutch spatial planning the allotment is the easiest option, fitting the imagery of the 'countryman'. Originally, the meaning of the allotment was more one- dimensional, intended for practical purposes. Most of the old gardeners outside our allotment are therefore less susceptible for the matrix. In other countries allotments are known too, but in the neighbouring countries, they deteriorate far more often, considered marginal places, oldfashioned. The planning system in Holland unknowingly gives an impetus to several types of revitalisation of

the gardens, one type of which could be found in the allotment we described.

3.3.5. Perceptions of structure and differences in signification

Differences in signification of the place rarely lead to conflicts among the gardeners. Despite the differences, they label themselves as a club of individualists, willing to tolerate other opinions and practices. Interested as we are in the mechanisms in the signification of places, we won't fail to consider the differences. Things about every interviewed gardener dislikes thoroughly are an abundance of weeds, uncultivated soil, lingering litter and rubbish. All of these things can be related to a shared signification of place, a gaze of the gardener. We will see that this common gaze simultaneously contains a lot of differences. All of the generally condemned things relate to perceptions of structure. It is remarkable to see how these points of understanding are relative, while presented as absolute. We mean that rubbish and weed mean different things for the individual gardeners, but still the confirmation of being against this and that as a group brings people closer to each other. A sense of mutual understanding emerges, even if people mean very different things by the words they use, and even if these people are aware of that, when asked directly. The awareness of difference is minimised for a while, and the common language reinforces the feelings of unity.

The semiotics of weeds

Weeds are all plants not on the proper place. For the person growing vegetables, weeds are all plants apart from vegetables, for flower gardeners everything not bearing flowers. Some flower gardeners make a distinction between cultivated plants and the wild species, the last one being labelled 'weed'. In this allotment, people are usually fond of 'nature', and do not care about this, can prefer the wild species as much as the cultivated ones. Also wild species can be beautiful. Some flower gardeners make a distinction between planted species and species that grew spontaneously on the spot. Also this distinction has no significance in these gardens. Plants can be allowed in the garden even if they grow spontaneously there, plants can spread over the whole allotment and will be accepted, if only they are considered suitable for the spot by the individual gardeners, if they fit into the design, or suit the function one had in mind for the place. Some

species are still generally seen as weeds: urtica dioides, chenopodium spp., artemisia vulgaris, couch grass. Even then, artemisia is accepted if it creates a hedge or a desired contrast in height. Conversely, raspberries and brambles are cultivated species but they occur at undesirable times and places[189].

Some plants thrive better than other on this particular place, because of the soil characteristics, the drainage situation, the position in the open landscape. These natural conditions bring the gardens closer to one another. Some designs do not work very well because the plants refuse to grow, some other plants doing well at the neighbours are also bought, or allowed to spread naturally in the own garden, on places where they were not permitted at first. This way, the natural conditions draw the gardens closer to a visual unity, and the definitions of plants and weeds in the separate gardens start to resemble more and more. This implies that the designs of the other gardens are more and more appreciated, and, firstly, recognised. If one is not aware what is weed and what not in the neighbour's garden, if every single gardener is using a different definition of weeds and garden plants, then it is very difficult to recognise the intended design in a garden, if present. Then it is easy to interpret a garden as lacking a design, lacking an idea, lacking maintenance, as abandoned. If the definitions come closer to each other, the recognition of patterns, of structure, becomes easier, as well as the deciphering of the design, and a possible appreciation of it.

Couch grass is about the only species considered weed by everyone all the time. It has no decorative value whatsoever, no tinge of nostalgia, it does not say anything about the history or the qualities of the place, and especially: it hinders every possible plan. Whatever one has in mind for a garden, you can forget it once couch grass has taken over the place. While picking weeds the rhizomes of couch grass stay behind in the soil and keep on producing new shoots almost eternally. It also makes picking weeds more difficult because the roots of the grass tend to weave into the roots of the real garden plants. Even Erik, having a special preference for wild grasses, attributing decorative value to them, using them to give a wild and plentiful aspect to his rare plant collections, is fighting the couch grass.

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[189] Levi-Strauss treats the subject of weeds several time in his works, e.g. in *Anthropologie structurale*

Uncultivated plots of land are a source of irritation for everyone. Weeds tend to proliferate from these places, it looks ugly, neighbours and other actors traditionally negative about the allotments receive an extra argument against the 'messy' allotments. Behind and next to these reasons lies the disgust of every gardener, of every kind, of complete chaos, the absence of any cultivation, emptiness. Uncultivated parcels have not only a negative meaning, they are also strongly associated with the absence of meaning. Gardeners hate this void: behind every act of gardening is the assumption that human interference, ordering, gives meaning to a meaningless place. It makes it into a place. Every definition implies structure. Gardening is creating meaning and meaning needs structure. Uncultivated plots represent the zero degree of gardening, to paraphrase Roland Barthes.

Gardening is structuring

The precise character of the desired order differs for about every gardener in the allotment –and in general- but the desire for order (and therefore meaning) is a shared feature of all gardeners. It is the core of what it means to be a gardener, the core of the common identity. Every single gardener hates rubbish and likes order, everyone is positive about a mix of order and irregularity, unity in variety, but the definitions of order, variety, irregularity, rubbish, the views on unity in variety differ greatly. Within this allotment there is a remarkable tolerance towards different definitions of these things, but the differences are real enough. People in the neighbourhood have often slightly different views. A lot of them see this particular allotment as a very messy place, lacking any definition, lacking a general layout and lacking design of the separate gardens. The intended patterns are hardly readable for most of them.

One can deduce already that not every person sees the allotment as a unity, more like a messy collection of objects and places. Often they think the allotments do not fit into the landscape of the Eng, and that this is even more true for the anarchist mess of the allotment currently under study. The gardeners themselves think the allotments, also this one, do fit the landscape; that the small scale and the abundance of variation to be found here suits the landscape very well, enhances its qualities. Both pro and contra allotment try to invoke history as an ally, producing different versions of history. We will come back to this point later. Right now, we want to summarise the last paragraphs by emphasizing that the perception

of structure at all levels of detail has an influence on the perception and the signification of the whole.

Weeds and the limits of the 'space=text' metaphor

The definition of weeds, the way one looks at the difference between weeds and garden plants, colours the signification of plants, the gardens and the whole allotment. Since this definition is not shared by the people in the neighbourhood, they tend to see the whole allotment as one giant weed- bed, and this identity is about the only unity they perceive in the complex. The patterns of the intended designs are not seen, not recogised as such. And if recognised, the other people would probably dismiss of them because they do not suit the idea of an allotment and even if the design of the garden is accepted, the very idea of the allotment could be condemned since it does not suit the landscape of the Eng.

The definition of weeds can be seen as the definition of acceptable building blocks of patterns that are equated to designs. Since this definition is different for every gardener on the allotment, and since the general agreement on the definition of weeds is much greater in the surrounding gardens and houses, it is unlikely that the sheer idea of a variety of definitions, enabling experimental design, is imagined by these neighbours We also heard this clearly in the interviews with these people. Once the idea of variety in definition of the building blocks is accepted, one can start to investigate whether this giant weed- bed might be interpreted differently. (We might call this idea on the possible variation of definitions a metacode, a code on the use of codes) But ofcourse, even then, it would ask a lot of interpretive labour to decipher the place since it would be necessary to unveil the definition of weed and garden plant in every single garden. Such an interpretive labour is too much for most of the neighbours, not because we consider them incapable, but because, apart from different general views on the place and the landscape, different traditions of gardening too, there are different views on the expected and allowed complexity of the signification of the place. Even the attempts to communicate the ideas of the gardeners to the neighbours resulted in irritation about the experimental character, the complexity, things they labelled as, dismissed as 'artistic' (see above)

If the building blocks are not agreed upon, and even the possible variation in the definition of the building blocks, the miscommunication on the larger scales is impendent. And indeed, most of the intended

patterns by the gardeners, even if they succeeded in materialising in their own opinions, were not recognised as intended patterns, patterns possibly bearing a meaning, communicating something. In cases they were recognised, they were not allowed as acceptable patterns for garden design (often conceived in formal styles) Not only were the designs disapproved of, they were not recognised as real garden designs (not even ugly ones) because the patterns (using mostly plants as building blocks) that made up the garden did not fit into the repertoire of forms to be combined in a garden design (egg- like shapes dug out in the ground, where local pebbles are added to, are not seen as acceptable words in the grammar of the garden) One can say that there is disagreement on the definition of characters, words and sentences in the spatial language of the allotment. Miscommunication at every level arises. A clear communication, an understanding of the place, would imply a common idea on the definition of these signifying units at various scales, and an agreement on the ways to combine them[190]. Landscape is not completely a text, but in this case the metaphor can explain and link up a wide variety of phenomena. The case simultaneously clarifies the boundaries of the use of the metaphor: spatial signification functions partly as a language, where communication depends on the definition and combination of signifying units at several scales, but the Wageningen allotment shows too that it is very difficult to reach agreement on the definitions and the rules, that there is no language one can simply assume as shared[191]. The communication works in similar ways, but the peculiarities of space make it difficult to communicate .

3.3.6. The gardens in the planning

The Wageningen Eng is an area protected in many ways. It is considered valuable in an historical and an ecological sense, and there are no indications presently that the function of the area will change in the near future. It seems that even the more expansionist elements in the city council have no plans to turn this city edge into a new development site. At least, no traces of such strategies could be found in the official documents or deduced from the interviews. This does not mean the Eng has no meaning in the context of the planning. Debates are going on for

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[190] Vanbergen, 45 (S); Dosse, part 1 (S)
[191] Barnes and Duncan, 142 (D); Daniels (D)

years about the Eng. An area of apparent calm and passivity is in fact the battle ground for a host of parties defending their vision of the Eng, its future and, indeed, its history. One party intended to make a golf course of the Eng, but the majority of the stakeholders was always opposed to this plan, and it was never perceived as a real threat to the present situation of precarious stability.

We treated extensively the signification of the place by the gardeners in our allotment and we mentioned already some of the differences in opinion with the neighbours, people working on the adjacent gardens and fields, living in the houses in and around the Eng. Their opinions, their visions of the Eng, do play a role in the planning process, since the municipality has founded an organisation called 'friends of the Eng', where every stakeholder is supposed to be present, and the discussion on the future of the Eng is supposed to be held. However, the gardeners are absent there. There is one person representing the gardeners, but he is not recognised as a representative by the gardeners themselves. In fact, they refuse to organise themselves and construct in this way a gate for the municipality and its planning system to enter the world of the gardeners. The gardeners themselves prefer the strateggy of silence, non-organisation, absence from the gathering with other stakeholders. The gardeners represent about 500 people, and more than half of the surface of the Eng. They form a force to be reckoned with, even if they generally do not own the plots they use. Indeed, most of the owners want to please the gardeners, or at least do not want to chase them away, since the income derived from the allotments is higher than the income out of agriculture here and now, and ofcourse it does not require too much labour (virtually nothing)

A strategy of silence

A strategy of silence is chosen because it does not take too much effort, every subgroup can continue to go its own way, people do not have to organise especially to enable the municipality to press plans they are not interested in. Silence and passive obstruction of planning efforts are indeed a forceful and efficient strategy to obtain what they want: nothing, no change. The present situation, where a lot of people are complaining about the gardens but no one can change it, and the largest group is sitting still and quiet, minding their own business, is advantageous for that group. And, it must be added, there is among the gardeners also a shared aversion

against planning strategy and against planning in general, so a minimalist strategy, effective and considered as a non- strategy suits them best.

And the lack of interest in plans for the future, the passive weight exercised by the gardeners, suits very well the imagery of their gardens as places outside time, outside planning, outside strategy. Also the more practical gardeners, the people on the other allotments, share this view on the gardens as different places. The roles of the intellectualist gardeners described in the pages above, are not general on the Eng, but the boundaries drawn by gardeners between the signification of place and time in and outside the garden are shared. A lot of older people on the other allotments have the work in the garden incorporated in their lives, but still see that boundary. In some cases, the boundary functions very differently in comparison with the gardens of our allotment. Some of the older people hold on to old styles of living in the allotment. It is there they can still be sure of some of the certainties that seem to be lost in the rest of their world, susceptible to the dynamics of our time. Unlike the young intellectuals, these people hold on to a self- image in the gardens. Instead of playing a role, they try to maintain their identities.

A reversal of function, one could argue, but a function also implying a boundary between the garden and the rest of life, a spatial boundary that accompanies a boundary in experience and a different perception of time. A different perception of time means a slowing down of time, a blurring of the frame of time of reference, an illusion of an eternity assigned to the place and the activities[192]. Despite the reversal of roles, this is a common feature of the signification of the place for the old functionalists and the young intellectualists alike. A feature that makes the strategy of silence and the aversion for planning suitable for both groups of gardeners.

In the debates held at the 'friends of the Eng' gatherings, the differences in ideas among the groups of gardeners are therefore invisible. Several other stakeholders, parties present on the meetings, do have their opinions heard, on the gardeners in general or on one of the subgroups. Several actors find the gardens in general unsuitable for the Eng, because they disturb the open character of the landscape. Some of them think only the type of messy gardens, with less structure and more high shrubs and even trees (the type we were discussing) are an offense for the identity of

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[192] Rietbergen, ch 1 (D)

the landscape. Some people, especially the old farmers in the meetings, are against every non- functional use of the area (ofcourse they themselves can define what a function might be)

Histories of the Eng in the planning arena

Two more things we would like to accentuate on the place of the Eng gardens in the planning. First the use of history. Secondly the relation between knowledge (also on history), strategy and power. On history we can say that several of the parties participating in the debates within the official structures (city council, friends of the Eng) and outside it (in the local newspapers, on the local radio station,…) are sensitive for this issue. Several parties use a vision of the history of the place to argue for different things. Some people (gardeners, ecologists,..) defend the presence of smaller structures bringing variety in the area by using the argument that this variety has always been a characteristic of the place, that it suits the identity of the place. It is felt that history is an issue right now, a type of argument that is not only really important for them, but also capable of winning arguments in the present political climate. Other parties (people living next to the Eng, people living in the Eng,…) try to get rid of the allotments or at least regroup them (intention of the municipality), and use as an argument the famous open character of the Eng. The suitability and non- suitability of the gardens in the Eng can be argued for by referring to the identity of the place, and historical elements in the definition of that identity[193].

It is probably true that in the first centuries after the reclamation of the Eng, it had a quite open character. Even then, in the centuries following that period a lot of things happened on the site, making it possible to interpret as open, semi- closed or closed. Wageningen was never a very prosperous town before the arrival of the agricultural school in the second half of the 19th century, turned into a university- level college in the beginning of the 20th century[194]. It was once member of the hanseatic league but failed to pay the annual memership fee and was kicked out. Since 17th century, tobacco rose to importance as a staple product. The Eng was from that time until the 19th century an area devoted to the cultivation of tobacco. The tobacco culture had a specific

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[193] Van Assche 2000 (LA)
[194] Regeling (HWE)

shape here, using high fences around small raised beds, raised by the use of considerable quantities of pigeon menure. A special type of red flowering beans (Phaseolus sp.), still present here and there on the Eng, was used to cover the replacable fences, make them more useful. Sometimes this dense high fencing is combined with low fences made out of small twigs and overgrown with pea species.

Tobacco needed half – open sheds to dry in open air, and these wooden structures could be found on the Eng too, in some cases until the beginning of the 20th century[195]. Added to this can be the small bushes, planted with trees and shrubs producing the sticks and twigs for the high and low fences. In the 19th century, tobacco prices dropped sharply and the almost colonial economy of Wageningen, based on this monoculture, collapsed, to revive only after the arrival of the university, related research institutes and all kinds of spin-off from there. In the meanwhile, brick industries had occupied much of the river polders of the Rhine in the region, employing masses of labourers at very low salaries. Some of these workers rented a plot of land on the edge of the Eng, next to the Veluwe forest. They grew some potatoes there, had a few chickens, maybe a pig.

During all these centuries, tobacco had not supplanted other crops. Potatoes and several species of cereals were produced, mostly by tenant farmers. One of the responses these relatively poor farmers had to the ending of a contract, was refraining from using fertiliser of any kind in the last year(s), and near the end let grass (couch grass!) take over the place. Some early industries could be found too on the Eng. Most important one was a tannery. It left a lot of poisonous waste behind, present in the soil uptil now. In the course of the 19th and 20th century, whole plots were dug out, lowered, because of sand extraction for roads and urban developments. In the 20th century, the university and the research institutes owned several parcels serving as experimental fields. Fertilisers were tested there, herbicides, weed killers and so on. Even now, some plots are unsuited for growing vegetables because of the high nitrate concentrations in the soil.

What to think of this historical description? At least, one can say that the assumed open character of the landscape can be questioned, if one takes the history as a whole. Some periods had a more open and empty

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[195] Renes (HWE)

Eng, while in other periods it was probably crowded enough, full of small- scale structures of varying height. It also depended on the time of the year: in wintertime, all the tobacco- related things vanished (apart from the sheds), leaving the landscape much more open and empty. In the present- day planning debates, the historical character of the place is a real issue, it is considered important by most of the stakeholders. These stakeholders all have some historical knowledge, but refer to different aspects and periods to legitimise their goals and ideas. Main issue as said is the question open or closed landscape. The stakeholders against the allotments argue that they do not fit into the historically open landscape while the gardeners see the landscape as historically varied and more closed. They all agree on the historical value of the place. Some of the neighbours appreciate the open character mainly because it permits a view from their houses to the edge of the woodland (an edge that is far less old than the Eng itself)

For nearly all the stakeholders, the historical value of the place is beyond any doubt; the area is seen as a last reminder of positively valued old times, while the definition of these values and these old times differs strongly among them. The historical description we just gave was of course a selective one, aimed at showing the variety of possible constructions of the past, but also aimed at showing the darker sides of the place in old times. Even if it is close to the oldest urban and rural settlements in the area, since late middle ages the Eng can be typified as peripheral. Mostly poorer farmers occupied the place, small tenants, waist was dumped there, it served as a quarry for the local community, toxic products were tested. It is fascinating to see how despite all their differences the stakeholders idealise the past of the place, albeit in very different ways. And this idealisation probably relieves the planning pressure on the place a bit, a pressure that could otherwise be considerable, given the very limited space available in Wageningen for urban development and the proximity of the Eng to the town centre.

Strategy and power in the Eng

It is also fascinating −and this touches the second point we wanted to make- how the historical knowledge and values can be related to strategy and power[196]. Part of the neighbours' community broke away from the

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[196] Inspired by Flyvbjerg (SP)

'Friends of the Eng', because that last organisation was not able to fight the municipality by legal means, since it had not the proper legal status to do so. These people founded a new organisation with a very long name, intended to safeguard the ecological and historical qualities of the Eng. In fact, these people owned the few houses within the Eng, beautifully situated, far away from nasty neigbours, and were confronted with a small municipal plan, introducing a hand full of new villa's in the edge of the woodland area, overlooking the Eng. The owners of the houses in the Eng would be forced to look at these new villa's, only half- hidden in the forest. And they didn't like the prospect, saw it as a possible threat for the value of their houses, examined the possibilites of a legal procedure against the plan, and founded the new organisation in order to do so.

They succeeded uptil now, and used a detailled historical argument on the way to succes. These people were well- studied and well- connected. One can say they had a perceived interest, and used the historical knowledge to defend it. Since history is an issue in general and especially in this place, the strategy to use historical knowledge had a greater chance to succeed. In other cases, history came first. Some people did see it as a real threat to the intrinsical historical value of the place if some things would happen, and therefore opposed them (villa's, allotments, sheds) In this last case, the attitude towards spatial plans is derived from historical knowledge, while in the other case there is first an attitude towards a plan and next the historical knowledge is put to use in a strategic way.[197]

Power is also situated in the well- educated and well- connected character of the inhabitants of the Eng. Not only the people in the allotment we analysed, but a lot of people in and around the Eng have at their disposition a considerable knowledge on the place, its history, ecology and on the legal system and the system of spatial planning. Most of the stakeholders are represented by university trained people with an eye for spatial planning. It does not make things easier for the municipality, if they want to impose plans. People know the rules, know their rights and use them. They present alternatives for the municipal plans and show by this mere act that the official plan does not represent the only possible future for the area, the only possible solution for its problems.

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[197] Using Foucault´s notions of knowledge and power

The municipality tried to change the situation they define as an impasse (while the gardeners see it as the best state of affairs) by starting the 'Friends of the Eng', but as we saw earlier, the organisation did not meet the municipality's expectations, since a part split of.

The attempt at organising a process of reflexion and debate that we can interpret as part of an interactive planning process, did not succeed completely because several groups did not trust the administration's intentions, and they did not really believe in the possibility to take part in the decisionmaking. The general level of knowledge among the stakeholders present in the 'Friends' was very high and linked to a high level of distrust. Stakeholders were watching each other and the administration, and knew too much to be convinced easily by the other stakeholders' arguments and the municipality's discourse on win- win situations. The impasse the gardeners had preferred from the start, continued to exist. Presently, they are about the only group satisfied with the existing situation. The power of knowledge became useless since everyone has equivalent knowledge. Power positions, strategies, produced knowledge, trying to make it useful for its purposes, while knowledge did not really produce power. (The new organisation stopped the little villa plan but did not achieve its other goals, including a strict policy towards allotments)

3.3.7. Conclusion: interactions between planners and users in the margin

The allotments on the Eng are situated on the edge of the town, in the margin. In these margins, all kinds of experiments thrive, as may be clear from our analysis of the allotments. The places are not only spatially but also conceptually in the margin, in the margin of the Dutch planning system, in its Wageningen personification.[198] They group meanings and functions that are otherwise difficult to place; a variety of people flock together in the allotments to experience and signify the places in the most diverse ways[199], in ways that are not possible closer to the centre of control and regulation of the planning system. In the margin, control is weaker, and things are tolerated that were not originally planned, functions that

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[198] de Boeck (A); Bhabha, passim (A)
[199] liminal spaces in the anthropological sense

arise spontaneously. Therefore, it is a breeding ground for new experiments and a reserve for old habits, old cultural codes. Longing for an old organisation of the world and longing for a new one find places close to each other, producing higher tensions than on the average, but these intense differences do not produce a lot of conflicts, because all seem to be aware of the marginal position and its implications. The strategy of silence we met with the gardeners can also be linked to this awareness. On another level, one can say that both the old and new significations of place contest the official system of ordering place and culture[200], of ordering place while categorising social functions in this way and not in that way, devoting space to this function and not to that function. The social- spatial appearance of what Foucault called the principle of universal mathesis[201], the exercise of power by categorising things and imposing your system of categorisation onto the world, finds the limits of its control in these margins.

Still, within the planning system one mostly perceives these margins as a problem, as here. In Dutch planning, there is a tendency to evolve from technocratic towards sociocratic planning, a tendency to increase the degree of user participation in the planning process[202]. Still, this participatory planning is often framed in such a way that the desire to control and to categorise remains untouched. Participative planning is often interpreted by the authorities as a means to find support for existing official planning goals, a way to help them materialise. In this perspective, an organisation as the 'Friends' is not an exception. The 'Friends of the Eng' did not function as a true democratic tool for participatory planning, since the largest stakeholder did not believe in the process, was virtually absent, kept silent. The municipality failed to see what cultural role the allotments played, because these functions of the margin as we defined it, were difficult to perceive from and did not fit into the frames of reference and the self- image of the planning culture, defined by the Foucaultian mathesis.

The planning system right now creates tensions in the field, by the attempts to impose unwanted plans and unwanted organisations perceived as starting points for planning processes. One of the democratic principles

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[200] Van Wolputte, 143 (A)
[201] Foucault, *Les mots et les choses* (D). Saunders (A) on Foucault
[202] Faludi and van der Valk (SP)

used by the authorities to unlock the game situation was the assumed belief in the power of free debate. They did not see however how much the debate they organised was framed by their own institutional and professional cultures, they did not see how the use of debate, in an organised way, was seen as a misuse of this democratic principle. And it was overlooked how the largest stakeholder, the gardeners, preferred the absence of debate, rejected this application of this democratic principle because it did not represent the best strategy.

We will calm down a bit here, in order to avoid the impression that our opinion of the planning system is wholly negative. This is not the case. It was said that the margins, in this case the allotments in Wageningen, represent the boundaries of the planning discourse, the boundary between things that can be planned and things evading planning. The functioning of these peripheral zones, zones with quickly shifting signification and contestation of the discourse, are ideal places to study the discourse, its possibilities and limitations. From the margin one can see the centre clear, since a lot of the accepted truths in the centre are not so evident anymore. The tpyes of misunderstandings we met in the Wageningen case however, do plea for a raised self- awareness within the planning practice. (and discipline), a raised awareness of the characteristics of the planning discourse and the characteristics of the users one is working for.

Remarkably, one can add that the long standing tradition of Dutch spatial planning, causing high pressure zones in the margins, produced the very experimental zones they have difficulties in dealing with. The system produced its own contestants, its own sources of revitalisation.

3.4 History in a new city district: Leidsche Rijn Utrecht, Holland

3.4.1. Introduction

In this study, carried out with Martijn Duineveld, more attention will be devoted to the cultures of planners and designers and archaeologists, their interactions and their influence on the actual use of history, in case archaeology, in a large urban development project. We will analyse Leidsche Rijn Utrecht, a building site to the W of Utrecht, Holland, where in 1998 a project started entailing about 30.000 houses, parks, recreation areas, industrial zones and more. Also here, as in the Wageningen case, we will move inductively from small scale to a larger scale, in the meanwhile deducing things and adding theory to frame and interpret bits and pieces of empirical findings[203]. In Leidsche Rijn, we will start examining one park, the so- called Big Archaeology Park (Groot Archeologiepark), how it looks, how it was intended to look, what the different government- related actors thought about it, how they interacted. Next we will discuss the role of the park in the neighbourhood and finally we will move on to the role of cultural history in planning and design of Leidsche Rijn as a whole. At this level, we will also pose ourselves the question, not only why an archaeology park was located where it is located, but also why such a park was devised at all. While doing so, while following this path, all the relevant actors will come across. A number of 12 interviews was held, semi- structured, with designers, planners, archaeologists (focus is not on the users here) Main source of information in this study however is a discourse- study of policy documents related to Leidsche Rijn[204]. (looking for shared assmptions and building a further interpretation on this, see above) It may be useful to remind here that our intention formulated in the first chapters, the intention to take a Macchiavellian amoral stance, is safeguarded carefully in this study too. We tried to leave all normative ideas on how to use history behind us, and just tried to interpret the interactions of the diverse ideas on this topic and the influence on the materialised park. Nothing is

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[203] Model for the analysis: Althabe (SP); Mondada (D)
[204] See also Van Assche 2000 (LA)

declared good or bad. It is impossible to be fully aware of one's own assumptions, but the credo of present- day anthropology that it is as much about self- observation than about observation of the outside world, was taken very seriously in this study.

At the moment the research was carried out (early spring 2003) the Archaeology park looks rather like an undulating meadow or a sporting ground. It is situated between Parkwijk N and Parkwijk S, two neighbourhoods close to the centre of Leidsche Rijn. The field is segmented by the presence of a low- lying athletics facility and groups of trees in patterns not easy to recognise. To the E a building site (a school under construction) The park is surrounded by buildings, in diverse styles and heights, to the S in denser packings for more modest budgets, to the N in several more expensive styles, sometimes referring to unspecified holiday destinations. Since the northern area has a more open layout, the visual impact of the park there is higher, while also to the S some vista's are drawn into the built zones. The E part of the park is dominated by the tartan and the school, while the W is planted with clumps of tree and the western extremity houses several buildings related to a centre function for Parkwijk and Langerak. A large ditch lies to the S between park and an urban façade, and somewhere in the middle a public transport line crosses the park from N to S. A lookout will be added, as well as benches and other small commodities. The elevation of the site, the gently sloping terrain, is completely artificial.

3.4.2. Archaeology in the Archaeology Park

Where is the archaeology? Under the ground, as usual. Nothing was made visible in a direct way. The elevation of the site is telling though. Under the ground are mainly traces of iron age and Roman age farmsteads, with serious quantities of organic materials in well- preserved condition. According to the archaeologists, the precise nature of the materials is yet unknown, since only drillings were done, no excavations yet. (Some were being carried out to the W in spring 2003) The documents and the chief designer tell that the elevation is resulting from calculations of soil mechanics, of the maximal weight and movement of the added soil, while leaving the fragile old organic materials intact. An older version of the park design showed a somewhat more rugged terrain,

using higher elevations and steeper slopes, but this idea was left because the small artificial hills would damage the stratification and therefore preservation conditions and information value of the hidden archaeology.

The landscape architect designing the park invented a way of referring to the past of the place while avoiding to exceed the allowed heights (and pressures on the soil): in some places the soil is less vulnerable for pressures, and on these sandy spots more sand can be brought up. Conversely, the wetter, rather peaty spots, cannot endure too much pressure, not too much extra elevation. Sandy spots are related to the presence of fossilised river banks here, since this is the area where the river Rhine used to flow up til the year 1000. Peaty areas are the streambed and the lowlying areas further away from the banks. In bringing up more soil on the sites where the river banks used to be, and less on the inside and the outside, the present- day design magnifies the old terrain elevation, the old landscape features and structure. The reference to this geomorphological characteristic of the historical place is at the same time a reference to the human presence there, to the nature of the still hidden archaeology, since man's presence was in iron and roman ages very much determined by these conditions in the landscape. River banks have the oldest marks of inhabitation here, different parcelling and so on. In the design of the park, the large ditch enclosing the park to the S, is meant as a reference to the old river bed. A bend in the ditch is meant to enhance the river-like character, meant to clarify the reference. However, for many of the users and other actors, this type of references is still difficult to understand. On the view of the different disciplines involved on historical references: see later.

Still stands the question: Why an archaeology park and why there? Avoiding detailed histories here, we can summarise the matter along the following lines: At the beginning of 1996, it seems that the decision was taken to design an archaeology park, in circles around the chief urban designer for the area. One of the reasons for that decision was the prediction of a sharpening law concerning historical and archaeological heritage. In order to avoid delays in the planning and the execution of the works, if suddenly these regulations whould sharpen, it seemed reasonable to calculate stronger regulations, and keep them in mind while designing the place. The perception of the possibly sharpening rules (a perception that proved correct in the end) was probably influenced by the team of

Utrecht city archaeologists, a highly active team, present at the negotiation tables right from the start of the planning process. The team obtained protection of a few sites as a monument (a status granted by the national archaeological service), and of several more sites by convincing the other actors in the planning process of their value.

Still it is not so easy to understand why the park was located there and not somehwere else. Not much had been found during the early stages of the planning process (some drillings had been carried out in '93, and some minor researches followed) And in the proximity of this site lies a site famous for its archaeology since the forties, when a Roman castellum, a bath house and more were unearthed and again covered. The excavation of a roman ship and roman watchtowers in the area are from a later date, and cannot have influenced the decision. Part of the answer appears to be again the relatively strong position of the Utrecht city archaeologists, who claimed more than the protected monumental sites. Another answer is the necessity to draw lines around protected zones, parks of whatever kind at an early stage of the planning process. The financial decisions related to such a large scale urban development are of major importance, for the private and governmental actors alike. Since the Leidsche Rijn project had as one of its novelties a strong public- private cooperation, which in fact means an introduction of private builders as major players in the planning process, the financial calculations of the private parties had to be introduced in the process at a very early stage. And this in turn meant that more spatial decisions than in the past had to be taken in this stage, that the general lines of the design, as well as some detailled lines in the built-up areas had to be known almost from the start. Changes in design on such a scale can cost a lot of money, uncertainty on the design lines is simply risking a lot of money, introducing uncertainty that is economically destructive (scaring investors off) Therefore, the edges of the park had to be known very fast, and the site had to be chosen immediately. Very superficial research was at hand at the time the decision had to be taken. So, an element of chance could not be shut out. (And indeed the major finds in recent years where situated outside the park) But the archaeologists did not oppose since the gentlemens agreement that was reached between private and public actors in 96, an agreement preserving a percentage of the project area for archaeology, was in all respects a

positive exception from the Dutch practice (in the archaeologist's perspective)

3.4.3. Cultural history in the Leidsche Rijn project

Why did history had such an prominent role in the project? The existence of an archaeologypark in the new city district is related to the overall importance attached to the past and its relics in the planning and design process. It seems that in 95, when the Masterplan[205] was sketched, an interest in history and in the possible use of history in planning and design, was awaking slowly, and the chief designer and organiser of the masterplan was very susceptible for new trends in the field. Furthermore, she forged a coalition of various actors around the Masterplan and around the preserved historical character of the place. Serious opposition had to be tackled before anything could be built. Ecologists bemoaned the loss of part of the old polder area to the W of Utrecht, internationally important for several wetland species of birds. Historically interested people pointed at the presence of the Roman castellum[206], the old riverbed of the Rhine, early mediaeval parcelling on the river banks, late mediaeval castles and more. The municipality of Vleuten- De Meern formed the major obstacle. A fair share of the urban development of Utrecht we call Leidsche Rijn was situated on their territory. They opposed it, saw it as a sign of colonial behaviour of Utrecht and the central Dutch government, who appointed the place as an important urban development site (the largest in Holland in these years) already in 1994. Vleuten- De Meern perceived itself as a rural commuinity, even if it was situated on the fringe of Utrecht.

The Masterplan designer convinced the municipality to cooperate in a joint plan with Utrecht. Between Utrecht and Vleuten De Meern, a huge central landscape park would form a buffer between city and community. The park itself would preserve the major characteristics of the old landscape, as well as the most important archaeology suspected for the place at that time. Also, a fair part of the bends in the old Rhine riverbed is included. Anayway, the central park would make the whole of Leidsche Rijn more rural in appearance, it would refer to its rural past by preserving it, it would protect the villages from the influence of Utrecht. The park

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[205] Gemeente Utrecht (SP)
[206] Barends (SP)

would have an axis that is roughly speaking running from N to S. To the W of the park, Vleuten and De Meern, the two villages constituting the 'rural' municipality, would receive a form of urbanisation that is befitting their small- scale character. In one word: the central park, and therefore the most general layout of Leidsche Rijn, was a political compromise. No problem. It becomes more interesting when we notice that the rhetorics used to defend the plan never spoke about this –ofcourse- but also that history and archaeology play a prominent role in the argumentation. As said, the plan gained acceptance by retaining the rural past of the area.

This position can be defended. In the meanwhile, the same goes for other positions too. From an historical point of view, one can say that most of the traces of the past in the area, are connected one way or another to the old Rhine. We already preluded upon this. The riverbed, extremely sinuous in this area, is oriented E- W. A serious place for history and archaeology in the new town area can therefore be materialised in a legible, understandable, transparent way by using a general layout using this E-W orientation. Such an orientation would imply a division of the area in three parts: the old river area, one area N of it, one to the S. It is clear how difficult the combination is with the division chosen in the masterplan, whereby a park holds central place, dividing one W part and an E part. The Utrecht archaeologists preferred a layout based on the old river system, but acquiesced because of the advantages of the gentlemen's agreement. Rob Krier, postmodern urban designer invited to take part in sketching sessions for one of the parts of Leidsche Rijn, also tried to bring back the river more prominently. We shall see that, however a compromise was reached on the Masterplan, in the detailing some archaeologists tried to restore the importance of the river to a certain degree. Even if the archaeologists did not interpret the final design as properly reflecting the hierarchical patterns of historical structures (the river standing at the top of the hierarchy), they accepted. And they accepted the use of the historical argument in the selling of a plan that was advantageous to them in a different way, merely by the amount of hectares preserved for them. It is important to keep this in mind in reading the next parapgraphs, a more theoretical reflection on the case, centred around a number of concepts, adding some empirical detailling not mentioned yet.

3.4.4. Cultures in a planning process

Cultures are everywhere. Planners, urban designers, landscape architects, politicians, archaeologists, historical geographers, art historians, all these people, labelled here by discipline and profession, are in various degrees coloured by the cultures attached to the labels. In every culture, people are only partly aware of the shared commonplaces, the shared beliefs and value systems. The structure in the web of hidden assumptions is hardly visible. In the case of professional cultures and scientific disciplinary cultures, there is the extra complication that these groups of people in our society see themselves as necessarily dealing with an objective truth. A perceived demand from society combines with a perceived methodological core of the discipline leading to a singular truth. In the case of Leidsche Rijn and the Archaeology park, this can be illustrated easily by the unspoken differences in the definition of the object to be reckoned with, the archaeological site[207].

Structures of the object

For the urban designer and the landscape architect, the site was the place where old things are under the ground. For the archaeologists, this site was important not because they had knowledge on special objects presumably hidden there, but because they had knowledge on the outstanding conditions of preservation on the spot. They were not interested primarily in the objects there, also because they had an attitude of learned ignorance on the relative importance of objects: they shared an assumption that it is nowadays not possible to do the best of excavations, because techniques will improve, and to do the best of historical interpretations, because the frames of reference determining the importance of finds are still in development. As a black box however for perfect preservation of old objects, especially organic materials (ground and roasted cereals from the Roman age had been found in perfect condition), the place should be carefully preserved, and not only the surface conditions but especially the conditions of the deeper soil strate should be monitored. This monitoring of soil conditions was the maintenance of the historical monument in their interpretation.

For the urban designer the edge of the site was a clear line, the boundary of the area with the old objects, a line that can be accentuated in

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[207] see the lines on Peirce above

order to create contrasting spaces, as was done here. For the archaeologist the edge of the site is a construction fabricated out of coincidence and educated guess. It is the edge of the window on the past, the boundary of a collection of drillings, observations telling things about hidden objects, soil conditions, preservation conditions. A third difference in interpretation can be identified while looking at the archaeological object itself. For designers, and most of the users of the place, an archaeological object is an object as all others, a thing, something tangible. Excavating in this interpretation is finding the object, making it visible. For a present-day archaeologist the object is the collection of items on a place in combination with the surrounding soil strata. This conglomerate of things and context makes the 'thing' of archaeology, it is the source of information they want to take care of. For a present- day archaeologist excavating is destroying the archaeological object, while for most of the other groups it is merely showing it, making it accessible for the public, making it more valuable and relevant for society (in the Almere case a clear preference was also found for the park designs where the old things, if big, were shown, not just referred to) These three related differences in perception and interpretation are among the main causes of a series of conflicts and misunderstandings related to the choice of the location of the park, the precise boundaries it had to acquire, its possibke uses and design options. Too much detail would be superfluous, but it is easy to see that conflicts can arise if the only clear reference to the past in a park is about the worst solution for the other party. In the case of another small park to the N of the Archaeology park, such a conflict was even more clear, when the landscape architect wanted to dig up and use a mediaeval tower in the new park, and the archaeologists did not agree at all.

Subcultures in archaeology

In the case of the other park, park Grauwaert, it became also clear that not every archaeologist is the same. People from Utrecht city archaeology were prepared to excavate the tower, have it used and weathered, in exchange for a non- intrusive design in the case of the Archaeology park we started our investigation with. A deal, a compromise. The national archaeology service (ROB) blocked the deal because of the difference in perception just analysed. The position of the national service, mainly concerned with preservation and less with the everyday role of archaeology in urban development, is probably due to the

difference between the two groups of archaeologists. In other words, the disciplinary background produces a culture typical for archaeology, but the place of the smaller pockets of practitioners and researches in the framework of public institutions adds a colour. A city archaeologist is an archaeologist and part of the city administration. The institutional culture of the local adminstration, geared at practical application of knowledge and execution of plans often developed elsewhere, and trained in dealing with contradictory aims and interests, avoiding the contradictions to halt the realisation of projects, is pervasive in such a way that the mentioned attitudes and ideas are shared among a lot of groups and disciplines constituting the adminstration. The overlapping networks of disciplines, institutions and professions are in this locus strongly coloured by the identity of the institution.

Of course, this is not the only explanation. It is also true that the Utrecht group of city archaeology perceived itself as a group of forerunners —and this perception was shared by a lot of other towns and archaeologists. They wanted to play a more active role in planning and design processes, devised media strategies, political strategies and scientific strategies (as far as the budget allowed) to improve the role of the past in new projects. In order to do so, they also forged alliances with other disciplines, notably historical geogrpahy and art history, producing jointly booklets intended to serve as new planning tools: CHER's, studies intending to assess the impact of new plans on the cultural and historical values of an area. Even then, it would be difficult to imagine the same attitudes in a group at the national level, in an institution traditionally aimed at pure preservation. The structure of the local institution, where the attitudes and ideas described are often more prevalent, makes it more easy to devise a new strategy for archaeology; in a way the new strategy for archaeology, be it a remarkable initiative of a group of inspired people, is also an old strategy of local institutions. An important difference with some other sections of local institutions though, and again a factor bringing them closer to archaeologists in other institutions and outside the institutions, is a strong belief in the importance of archaeology, and a related belief in the lack of due interest and resources at the moment.

So, cultural differences can be traced even within a discipline, depending on the institutions part of the discipline is embedded in[208]. The discipline itself is an institution, but most of the people formed by the institution are working and living in different contexts too, shaping thought and behaviour. As said, people are part of a series of discourses, and the same goes for groups of people. A group can be embedded in a series of institutions and cultures, can be the node of a series of discourses, fabricating an individual version of the matrix of possibilities arising at the cross- roads. Every discourse has its blind spots, and hidden assumptions. It is therefore normal that conflicts in intercultural communication arise frequently.[209] A planning process, involving a lot of different actors belonging to different cultures according to our definitions, is also a form of intercultural communication[210].

Ethnocentrism

One of the mechanisms causing troubles there is the innate tendency of all people to be ethnocentric, to pronounce ethnocentric judgments, claiming prime importance for the frames of reference and the truths belonging to the own group[211]. In a planning process, this tendency is aggravated by the scientific or otherwise objective elements in the selfdefinition of the groups. Six or more groups who are all thinking to be objective, and think to attach values to objects and places in a neutral way, are bound to miss the point in a series of discussions. If the first assumption is the existence of a singular truth and the next assumption the superiority of the own methods, models and procedures to reach that truth, than differences in opinion in the intercultural communication of the planning process will often fail to be interpreted correctly. In some cases, the hidden assumptions are after analysis indeed contradictory and the practical solutions for a place impossible to combine, but this is not always the case. Point is here that at first the idea of the social construction of knowledge in disciplines, institutions and their cultures, should gain hold, before the possibility of analysis of the cultural differences can arise. Attitudes reflected in little sentences as "These people do not understand it", "Ofcourse these regulations on old things are an obstacle for a good

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[208] Latour (S) Van Assche (OT); Wissink (SP)
[209] Segall, 208 (PS)
[210] Van Woerkum (SP)
[211] Segall, 184 (SP)

design, but we managed", but also the arrogant refusal to even discuss the assumed superiority of the own frame of reference (scientific method, operational strategy, design principles,…) form a very serious obstacle in planning and design practice, and this could be observed easily in this case too. (People also complained afterwards about the lack of mutual understanding and the lack of trust in the later stages of the planning process, even if they had a positive overall impression of the project; point here is not the overall judgment on the project)

In probably most of the cases the hidden assumptions will turn out to be not contradictory at all, or they might contradict but leave room for shared practical solutions and strategies. Even if one defines the archaeological object differently, the site, even if one has a different perception of the main historical structures in a an area, one can appreciate a park that is designed starting from these differing assumptions, a park that is in the mind of the designer deriving part of its identity from a general layout of the area that is irrelevant or wrong for other observers. Fortunately, reality is as complex as that. Our main point here was that the analysis of the different participating cultures is necessary in order to avoid ethnocentrism and miscommunications and to enable a more realistic analysis of the planning and design situation. After such an analysis, which is essentially an interpretative account of afffairs, it can become clearer what are the differences and shared beliefs, the codes of communications, the means and the goals.

3.4.5. Power and strategy

Reducing all problems in a planning process to problems of clarity and communication would however be naïve. In our first chapters, we devoted already attention to the role of power in the creation of knowledge and vice versa. Also here, a variety of strategies could be identified by the diverse actors, to reach official and unofficial goals, and knowledge was used and devised in many strategic ways. Strategy and negotiation take place at all levels, at various moments, formally and informally, entailing different combinations of actors, framed in a host of juridical, economical, institutional contexts, involving different combinations of disciplines that are perceived convincing in the matters at hand. People are personalities and (this is not an addition) they are part of

different discourses. One could say that strategies can be construed from the perspective of every discourse one is part of, and from a combination of them (probably linked to social roles) Some of the strategies in one and the same person are contradictory, since nothing guarantees the absence of contradictions in the discourses one is associated with, because of unawareness of all the assumptions and because of contradictory desires[212]. It is also important to acknowledge the fact that decisions taken in planning- related negotiations do not acquire a neutral value and a power to impose themselves on the parties around the negotiation table. Actors can still be dissatisfied and try to reach the old goals or at least different goals in silence[213]. An agreement that is reached within the frame of a procedure that is regarded as democratic, open, fair,…does not guarantee its strenght. The values of the procedure do not guarantee the practical value of the result. The values embodied in the agreement can only materialise if all the actors in the negotiation do really feel obliged to do so, and stop calculating differently in every following situation.

Strategy stops after decision?

As one can see in European history before and after every war, and as one can see in Leidsche Rijn, an agreement, in this case a plan agreed upon, is not automatically an eternal codification of a change in intention and will with all the parties. One can observe how different parties interpret the agreement as a necessary step, and officially restate their goals, while sticking to the old goals and using new strategies. This implies an interpretation of the agreement as a superficial representation of an ever-shifting balance of power, a representation necessary however because there is need of some sort of codification structuring the decision- making towards the actual building activity. Strategy does not stop after the agreement, the context of strategy- formulation is defined wider by some of the parties trying to be involved in next steps of the planning process. And the agreement, the plan, itself is not seen as a correct representation of the power balance, not a realistic conclusion from the situation on the chess board. Different actors assume about other actors that they will not stick completely to the plan, or they think they will reinterpret it in such a way that the underlying ideas are lost, exactly the ideas a consensus was

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[212] Gellner, (A); Peeters, 57 (PS)
[213] Stacey, ch 7 (SP); Ashenden (PH); Flyvbjerg 1998 (SP)

built upon. Or there is some distrust in the officially formulated goals of the actors.

Towards the real estate firms involved in the process, there was a variety of attitudes. All of the actors agreed they were absolutely necessary partners for such a project. Some archaeologists found partners in these private actors because the references to the past proposed by the scientists did fit into the idea of a nostalgic and rural touch to the area, a touch that is not easy to quantify directly but nevertheless very much marketable. Other actors, e.g. designers, were very distrusting towards the firms, assuming that they would restrict the possibilities of designers because of economic calculations. Even after the plans were made, this distrust kept in place and influenced the perception of the other parties and of the plan itself. (What does the signature on the plan mean exactly?) Another reason for distrust towards the real estate firms (acting as developers) from the side of designers, was exactly the susceptibility of these private builders to nostalgic and other kitsch ideas and styles. The companies would build things that confronted the esthetics of the Dutch design disciplines, in the case of Leidsche Rijn urban designers and landscape architects in a late modernist tradition (with some postmodernist tinges, like the acceptance of a multitude of contrasting design layers, in this case belonging to different times) Private builders would allow the public taste for architecture and landscape to take too much space. Since the superiority of the disciplinary knowledge was not doubted, the public taste was distrusted and the same goes for the builders as necessary representatives of that public taste. A degrading attitude towards the knowledge of the users is directly linked with a strategical position in the game of the planning project.

Multiple interpretations of plans

In the sketching session for one part of Leidsche Rijn (the part featuring the Archaeology park e.g.) where Rob Krier took part[214], a session we referred to, another interesting mechanism could be observed, also relating to the strategic significance of plans and their openness to achieve other goals within the frame of an existing plan. Krier knew very well the ideas behind the Masterplan, and was asked to lead one of the workshops in a quick sketchy detailling of the masterplan for one area,

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[214] Koekebakker on the Krier Charrette (LA)

within the frame and the frame of mind of the masterplan. We said that Krier did not follow the guidelines, and tried to restore the old Rhine to its former importance, by digging a new bed and orienting the new urban structures on the river and river- related landscape features. Furthermore, he took up the historical theme by referring not to the rural past of the place (as in the central park was done) but to the history of the urban developments of Utrecht. He chose a traditional conception of urban space as something left over by the building volumes. This conception is traditionally opposed to that of modernist architecture and related disciplines, where space is more like a surface where objects (buildings) are placed upon. Late modernism dominates the Dutch architectural scene and Krier got the reaction he provoked: a serious quarrel with the chief urban designer.

Even if this happened in a sketching session, and the resulting sketchy plan did not have any formal significance, we think it is still interesting to quote this example because it highlights the flexibility of plans, their openness towards very different interpretations.(Unless every detail is designed) The theme of openness will be resumed in the next paragraphs. Here it can suffice to note that the chief urban designer thought the Masterplan would lead designers in the later stages of the design process in a certain direction, that the ideas laid down in the Masterplan would be followed because of the plan. Krier proved this to be untrue. One must add that several Dutch members of the Krier workshop, detailling Kriers sketch even more, were able to reverse the interpretation of urban space present there, and bring a modernist veneer into a postmodernist fragment of a modernist plan. Krier had to experience the same openness of the plan he himself used strategically.

A third and last example form the Utrecht city archaeologists, we know so good by now. The Utrecht Archaeologists we can describe as good Macchiavellists, in the neutral way we defined it. They were active on many fronts, used the openness of the planning process, and realised the relative strategic value of every temporary codification of the will of the parties, every single plan in the planning process. The Masterplan was accepted, but the idea of the importance of the river never left. In designs for fragments of the area, designs where the archaeologists were taking part in the discussions, parts of the riverbed and related structures reappear. And some of the new developments are focussed on these structures.

3.4.6. Seven types of uncertainty

Strategy and power in planning bring about unpredictability. A factor of chance is introduced in the planning process. However, this unpredictability is not distributed evenly among the diverse parties. In the description of the process as a power play, it acquired a game- like character, and in games the winner is generally unpredictable. But there are lousy players and excellent players and some of them do not stick to the rules of the game. For the best players and the foul players the uncertainty is lowest. The uncertainty typical for every game- situation (we hold on to the metaphor for a while) is complemented by extra sources of uncertainty, due to the special characteristics of this game. Let us make a brief summary.

Firstly The number of actors is growing constantly nowadays, introducing specific problems. In the Dutch situation –and here parallels can be drawn with other European countries- there is a tendency to introduce ever more actors in the planning process, be it intended user groups, governmental actors, private companies.[215] In Leidsche Rijn, we noticed the important role of private builders in the process. In earlier decades, Dutch planning did not take the interests of these parties into account. They were perceived sometimes as a threat, sometimes as an irrelevant group, and were not included into the planning process. The government felt it did not need them to have the planning machine run smoothly and thought it was unproper to have them participating –private actors do not represent the common good and planning is related to a fair spatial distribution of means in order to promote even chances for every member of society. Once they are allowed to enter the process, they form an extra factor to reckon with, an extra player on the chess board, and the uncertainty about the course of the game increases.[216]

Secondly The number of players can change during the game, in the course of the planning process. Evidently, the calculations of the remaining players will have to change afterwards. Players who foresaw the disappearance of the actor or were trying to remove him for a while, will be less surprised but will nevertheless have to keep different scenario's in

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[215] Hajer and Wagenaar (SP)
[216] Watson (SP)

mind before the actor actually left. Also for these foreseeing people, the sheer possibility of actors leaving and coming, increases the complexity of the game, and the uncertainty. In the case of Leidsche Rijn, there was no archaeological service in the municipality of Vleuten- De Meern. From the state service, one person was dropped in the local administration. He was considered a foreigner in the local institutional culture in the beginning, but after a while the local officials started to identify with the goals of the archaeologist. They saw a chance to reinforce the identity of the community by referring to a very interesting and rich archaeological past, a strengthening of identity that was very desirable in the context of the protracted struggle with Utrecht (they feared Utrecht would annex them and use the Leidsche Rijn project as a pretext) The municipality did not foresee the coming of the archaeologist and at first did not interpret his presence positively, they did not see him as an ally. The example of the archaeologist also serves to illustrate the possible strategic use of knowledge brought into the process by new actors, in new alliances.

Thirdly Diverse types of rules of the game can change during the game. Sometimes this does not effect the game greatly, sometimes it does. And the effect can be as diverse as the types of rules that are liable to change. A large scale project like Leidsche Rijn is affected by regulations on various domains. Also, the implicit rules of the game can change. Codes of behaviour, values, communication codes, codes on transactions and contracts used etc. Some of the changes in rules and codes can effect the project up to a very detailled level. If the arrangments for the disposal of waist in Utrecht change, some design details in Leidsche Rijn might have to be altered, and these details might be very important for the designers. Given the span of fifteen years between conceptualisation and completion, the policies regarding urban development, housing, safety, environment etc are bound to change somewhere in the process.

Fourthly It is often difficult to pinpoint to which extent the process is a game or not. This is at the same time a question concerning the limits of the game metaphor. We mean that for some of the players, the calculations made in the process, are not completely the calculations he ought to be making in his role as player. Sometimes, people can be pursuing different goals at the same time, playing a role as officially recognised actor in the planning process, in the meanwhile calculating profits and chances from a different role's perspective. (e.g. owner of a

firm, inhabitant of a neighbourhood) In these cases, people are aware of the different roles they play and we would say they are deliberately cheating. It is the same game, they are still playing, the metaphor can still be used, but they are hiding goals, related to a hidden role. A special subtype of this can be found in participatory planning, where often groups are represented by one person. In some cases, the actors are organisations with a very clear structure, line of command, and tradition in participation in planning processes. One might assume the representative to be really representative here. In other cases, e.g. when user groups are concerned, the representativity of the representatives can often be doubted, and since a clear organisation is mostly lacking, it is also very difficult to check it out.

The borders of the game are crossed when the players are not aware anymore that they are playing a game. In many cultures, games are a very serious matter, and emotions can flare up strongly, but still a game is always perceived to be different from reality, and the role one is playing is always seen as different from the normal personality of the player. However, as one can observe in actors, the play is also a means to develop parts of one's own personality and/ or to show them, and a means to deal with certain emotions and problems that are difficult to deal with in normal circumstances. This might have a therapeutic value —we do not want to discuss here- but there is a real danger that people get addicted to the play, to the theatre, that they become dependent on the play to show their personality and to deal with their emotions. It is not our intentions to develop a psychology of planning based upon a psychology of drama and theatre, but it can be useful to make the comparison since also in planning, in the games played at dining parties and around the negotation tables, one can observe that it is easy to get carried away. The more since real or perceived power is at stake, or at least a possibility to obtain power by participating in the game. It can become difficult to draw the line between person, culture and planning actor in such an environment. If the role taken in the planning system, a role where one is assumed to represent a group or a function related to the process, becomes interwoven with the personality and its culturally defined characteristics, then it becomes more and more difficult to determine whether a decision was taken, a strategy devised, purely from the perspective of the actor, or from the perspective

of person and- or culture. Seen from the outside, this adds to the unpredictability and uncertainty of the planning process.

Fifthly Influences from outside can suddenly change the positions on the board and urge to adapt strategies swiftly. Here again a boundary of the game is transgressed. One can say that the outcome of a different game influences the course of this game. In the Leidsche Rijn case, we saw that the general layout of the area, the basic spatial structure with the central park and two urbanised zones to the E and to the W, was mainly developed as a strategic tool to produce a commitment to the plan by the two former enemies Utrecht and Vleuten De Meern. The identification of the two territorial units as major players preceded the choice for a strategy and correspondinlgy a design. If the designers believed Utrecht would annex Vleuten after all, and if they were serious in making a plan, then it would not be necessary to take the interests of Vleuten into account, and then a whole range of different basic structures would have been possible. Now, in 2000, the game changed suddenly.

In Holland, a serious debate was going on concerning the role of the major cities in their respective regions. It was argued that these cities, including Utrecht, should be the nuclei of new territorial organisations, responsible for a number of tasks in the wider region. The province of Utrecht felt threatened by this development, thought it would loose some of its responsibilities to the new structures (Stadsgewesten) and made a deal with the city of Utrecht. The province, responsible for the demarcation of the municipalities, proposed the city to withdraw its support to the construction of Utrecht Stadsgewest. As a reward, they could expect to annex Vleuten- De Meern after all. And that is exactly what happened in 2000. In the meanwhile, the Masterplan was made five years before, and the actual building was started somewhere in '98. A discussion on the provincial level on a very different subject caused a deal on territorial gains for Utrecht, directly affecting the negotiations in and around Leidsche Rijn. (Several players vanished instantaneously. Some of them returned, after incorporation in Utrecht municipality, like the archaeologist from Vleuten- De Meern)

Sixthly Societal change can influence the behaviour of the actors in a planning process and induce change that is unpredictable at the start, induce uncertainty. This we do not wish to see as the outcome of different games, rather as a much wider context of the game, where the metaphor

does not hold anymore. Neither do we refer to the influence of changes in society directly on the calculations of the actors in the process. The chief of the Masterplan probably felt an increased awareness of historical values in society, and used this sensibility to shape the marketing strategy of a plan hiding very much different considerations. We do refer to slow changes in society that are not directly influencing strategies.In Holland, it seems that some conceptions on order and spatial structure are changing gradually, ideas on democracy and participation, on the role of the state, on social engineering and its limits.

Positions in the modernism- postmodernism debate are shifting slowly and in complex patterns, bringing about different views on knowledge, the role of knowledge and science in society, on the hierarchy of disciplines in government service and elsewhere. Some types of knowledge, deriving from assumptions formerly unknown or rejected, belonging to disciplines formerly deemed low or unscientific, can appear on the agenda, can acquire status and start structuring debates on certain topics. All this is unpredictable, brings in more uncertainty. All these developments are not part of the game, but they can shape it nevertheless. Sometimes, discourses can stand still for a long time, and next enter a phase of intense transformation. We refer to the paragraphs on the properties of discourse in the first chapters. Planning processes deemed objective and the best technical solution, suddenly become criticised, or the other way around.

In the case of Leidsche Rijn, several groups of potential inhabitants of the area, jumped in and produced personal plans of small- scale neighbourhoods, reflecting personal lifestyles and subcultures not taken into account yet –historically inspired, ecologically inspired… This was not foreseen, and initially the reactions from the side of planners and designers were not encouraging. After a while the attitude changed and it seems now that several of the alternative lifestyles can find a place in self- designed neighbourhoods (They also hired professional designers to materialise their ideas). Anyway, the change in ideas on the role of planning and design in society that was implied in the action of the potential users, did find a response within the planning and design system at the local level. Uncomfortable it may have been, the system adapted to changes in conceptions on this basic level.

Seventhly We spoke several times about the relations between knowledge and power. They can produce each other and often the precise relation of the two is difficult to trace, as well for the person using and possessing the knowledge, as for the observer. Speaking about uncertainty in planning, we have to identify this as a seventh source. One can never be sure about the colouring of knowledge used in the process by power. Power and power aspirations can colour, select, arrange, produce knowledge, and make the way for certain types of conclusions. And since the precise operations are afterwards difficult to distinguish, it is very difficult to find out how and why the knowledge was produced and intended to be used, and to find out what position one has to take towards the knowledge presented by other actors, the planning organisation, the participating disciplines etc.

Of course, in practical situations one cannot be Sherlock Holmes all the time, and the impression of distrust provoked by a demystification of all the available knowledge would be counterproductive, therefore a poor strategy. From a theoretical perspective however, it is necessary to distinguish the related mechanisms as a source of uncertainty. Translated to the game metaphor, we can argue that this inextricable relation between knowledge and power produces difficulties in finding and assessing information on the positions on the board and the possible courses of events in the game. It makes it even more complex to assess the whole game situation. If the information at hand in a planning process is distrusted, given the possible relations with strategies, then the image of the other actors too becomes more vague. Once an observation is made of a relation between knowledge and power, the gaze of this person tends to look for these relations everywhere.

And the image of the information becomes unclear together with the image of the sources of information, the other actors and so on. Once a study on the ecology of a potential building site offers precisely the conclusions an ecological faction in a planning organisation was waiting for, and once both expectations from the faction and results from the study are known, the keen observer will probably start distrusting both the faction and the scientists. The value of the study becomes unclear, the situation the study is talking about becomes unclear, and the perceived alliance between the faction and the scientists changes the image of their

interests and strategies and therefore changes the image of the positions on the game board.

In the case of Leidsche Rijn, we saw the private builders' interest in the past of the site, their interest in archaeology too, and the distrust towards them and their archaeological interest from the side of the designers. The knowledge of archaeology would probably be used to legitimate plans that were in the eyes of the designers nostalgic and plainly ugly. The designers interpreted the possible use of one type of knowledge (archaeology) by the builders as a pretext to use another kind of knowledge (design principles, style) they did not appreciate very much. From their point of view, the sudden coalition between archaeology and real estate companies made the game board more complex, but they reduced the complexity by interpreting the coalition in the frame of long-standing stereotypes concerning the public taste in architecture.

3.4.7. Rules and flexibility, open and closed systems

In Leidsche Rijn, we saw openness and flexibility in the planning and design process taking on different forms. Openness can be intended and unintended, and it can have positive as well as negative consequences for the actors in the process. Intended openness does not always produce better effects than an unintended one. Assuming the opposite would imply a limitless belief in the technocratic powers of the state. And such a belief has in planning practice and theory been proven to be untrue. Concerning the types of uncertainty discussed in the preceding pages, we can say that they urge to conceive of the planning process as an open and flexible system. This applies to the conception of a planning process in general and a planning system in general, as well as to the organisation of specific projects.

In this study, we stressed several times that the use of the historical and archaeological objects and structures could have been different anyway. That the dynamics of the planning process did not allow for one ideal solution to pass all the barriers. And that the nature of disciplinary knowledge does not allow for the designation of one plan, one strategy to deal with the past, as the best. Knowledge, valuations and plans are contingent, they could have been different and could have functioned as well in these different forms. This is not a problem as such. There is not

such a thing as an ideal ordering of space, an ordering that is scientifically valid for all the disciplines and that is acceptable and desirable for all the user groups and interest groups. Contingency is neither good nor bad; like power, it is beyond good and evil. An awareness of contingency is important to the extent that it produces an awareness of the multitude of possible courses of events. The game metaphor can clarify a number of the uncertainties introduced in the planning system by the acceptance of contingency and power as relevant factors in the analysis.

Two general types of uncertainty

Our seven types of uncertainty can be roughly divided into two categories: uncertainty mostly related to the game- like character of the planning process, and uncertainty related to the unpredictability of societal changes (discontinuities mark discursive dynamism) Concerning the first type, we can say that they are generally unwanted. An element of uncertainty is necessarily part of a game, it cannot be avoided. However, once the game- like character accepted (necessary in the analysis), one can try to limit the usefulness of the metaphor, one can try to restrict the game as much as possible, make it look like a game in the minimal way. Some results of the process are regarded undesirable in society, by large groups. If despite the knowledge on these desires the result of the planning process is still the undesirable plan, the rules of the game have to be revised, the division of power, the representation, the policing of the rules. Things can go wrong at any stage, but one may assume that an increased clarity in the course of the game, clarity on the players, the rules and the information, will frame the game in such a way that the chance at certain unwanted results decreases.

Increased clarity implies that possibly problematic game situations, situations where the values and expectations of society are neglected, can be detected much earlier and can be corrected. However, this not as simple as it might appear, since the possibility to interfere in the game, and change the rules possibly, will probably be considered as part of the game by some of the players. And since the interference in the game and the change of rules can bring about important negative side- effects, such as the loss of trust in the process and practical problems, not in the least economic ones. Courses of action decided upon cost money, and changes of plan, will require a new start and loss of investment. The cost to change can exceed the cost to maintain the lesser plan, the lesser strategy (question

here is what kind of costs are taken into account and what not) In each case, the instruments devised to police the game, to make it more clear and democratic, can also be abused and can produce worse results than the ones avoided. Universal solutions cannot be offered.

One instrument to make the game more democratic and less game-like, is the addition of extra rules. If things go wrong, if reality turns out to be more complex than expected, add some more rules. What was said in the last paragraphs on interference in the game applies to this type of interference too. An overabundance of rules can be abused, since it creates a power position for the few people who know the rules, and since it increases the chance at contradictory rules and ways to use these contradictions for one's own purposes. Such an overabundance also creates negative side- effects, since the cost of maintaining the rules increases, the cost of the process in general, and since the planning process will take so much time that the needs and desires in society to be adressed by the plan, will probably have been changed in the meanwhile.

Despite all these remarks, we can say that the uncertainty linked to the game- like character of planning requires rules that are as clear as possible and as well guarded as thinkable. Our second main type of uncertainty, the one linked to unpredictable changes in society, asks for something of the opposite: a large measure of openness and flexibility in the planning process. Here we touch upon the paradox of planning in a dynamic environment. The strategies to solve one type of problems will probably create another type of problems. Indeed, many of the remarks we made on the disadvantages of interfering in the game, of placing too much emphasis on perfect rules and their observance, can be interpreted as shades of this paradox. (Some were also related to the limited power of rules in general to structure the game and banish certain types of strategies)

A balance between rules and flexibility

One thing we can say here is that in planning practice there will always be needed a mix of rules and flexibility, of open and closed features of the system[217]. This may seem trivial. We want to point here at tendencies observed in planning systems and planning literature, where the need at regulation is far more stressed than the need for openness. We want to refer to the third part of the theoretical chapters, where several

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[217] Faludi (S), Nasr (SP), Weaver (SP)

times a distinction was made between stronger and weaker planning systems. Strong planning systems can be divided into systems focussing on process and systems focussing on content. A strong system focussing on content will try to force its idea on a specific spatial organisation, while a strong procedural system will try to monopolise and codify the procedures leading towards a non- specified spatial organisation. Both types of strong systems will tend to focus on rules. We argue that Holland nowadays is a strong content- type system evolving into a procedural system[218]. In the argumentation in and around the debates on Leidsche Rijn, the transition was easy to notice, as it is noticeable in the Dutch planning literature. The small example of the lifestyle groups bringing in their own designs (content), being treated suspiciously first, and next incorporated into the existing system, falling back on a role as process- coordinator, is telling in this respect.

In this transition, the emphasis on rules is maintained. Whoever brings about the possibility of loosening the rules, is labelled a proponent of the Belgian model, and that model is interpreted as one without rules. There is always the fear of "Belgian situations". So, we can say that even the possibility of a balance between rules and flexibility is difficult to conceptualise in Dutch planning culture. The fear of a chaotic spatial situation is so pervasive and the belief in the role of the state as chief-organiser of affairs is still so strong (remember the Almere case too), that the idea of leaving more things open, provokes violent reactions, provokes images of complete loss of control. The fear of disorder creates difficulties in conceptualising more flexible systems[219].

Even more difficult to conceptualise in the context of Dutch planning culture is the idea of a necessarily shifting balance between rules and flexibility. Still, this is a clear inference we can make from our analysis of the game- metaphor in planning, its limitations and implications for the coping with uncertainty. Deductively we came to this assertion, and inductively it can be found in empirical situations wherever one looks. In the Leidsche Rijn case, the same seemingly insignificant example of the lifestyle groups can illustrate this. At first, the rules seemed to be set, and suddenly, when groups of people came to the fore with new ideas, the

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[218] Faludi and Faludi and van der Valk (SP); Wissink (SP)
[219] Douglas *How institutions think* (SP)

interpretation of the rules changed and the balance between planned and unplanned shifted.

Why is it so difficult to conceptualise in Dutch planning culture? In the interpretation of the facts of planning, it is of foremost importance to separate the desired images of the world and of planning from the things one can perceive amorally. From within the planning culture, it is difficult to conceptualise permanently shifting balances between open and closed, since things are not supposed to be so. Empirical observations testifying of this volatility are missed or interpreted in a different way (as exceptions or unfortunate mistakes, deviations, or as irrelevant for the frame of core decisions or core mechanisms) Seen from outside the planning culture, it is difficult to miss the contingency of the organisation (things can be organised in a different way well enough) and the permanent shifts in the balance between planned and unplanned. As said, there is a strong fear for chaos, making it difficult to handle loosening of rules in general. Such a fear makes it more difficult to imagine reality as one of permanent negotiation on the rules and their limits.

Images of self in the planning discipline

An additional factor in this respect is the self- image of the planning community as a group responsible for long- term decisions and investments, decisions where not only the opinions of the present inhabitants need to be taken into account. The perceived need for such a long- term perspective is connected with the perceived need for strongly fixed and lasting rules. That everyday practice can work very well without this perspective, and that many of the rules considered as long-standing are in fact constantly negotiated and reinterpreted is difficult to conceive from such a perspective. Closely connected with the selfperception of planners as being responsible for the long term, is the elevation of the disciplinary knowledge high above the users knowledge of and intentions with certain places. This attitude is in present- day practice changing gradually, but also here the situation seems to be a transitional phase. Old and new beliefs are combined, and the arguments for the long run are still often quoted in contexts where the expert knowledge is perceived as belonging to a natural order, whereas the users knowledge is seen as a collection of opinions. If this is the case, the perception of the rules and the balance between planned and unplanned by the planner, is to a high degree the perception of a balance between fact and opinion. In this case, the division

between planned and unplanned things is in his eyes scientifically grounded, and belonging to a natural order of 'good' spatial organisation and organisation of procedure.

Open and closed in Leidsche Rijn

Let us come back to the Leidse Rijn project now. The preceding pages were a combination of induction and deduction, as was often the case in these case studies. Theory emerges from the empirical situation and theory is used to interpret this situation; both tracks are combined continuously. We will devote the last paragraphs of this case study to the Utrecht archaeologists, the ones we labelled 'good Macchiavellists'. They complained from time to time that they had to reopen negotiations several times. Once they thought some of their ideas were accepted by the planners and designers, once these ideas were codified in plans, they noticed that in the detailling of the plan or the handing over of the plan to another group of responsible authorities, they had to monitor the survival of the ideas very carefully. Sometimes the ideas were not recognised, sometimes they were flatly opposed or ignored, sometimes they were officially accepted, but interpreted in such a way that the original intentions were completely lost out of sight. Different types of designers, belonging to different disciplines and schools, had very different ideas on the use of historical things in their designs, as they had different views on design in general. Some of the designers were more compliant in following earlier and more general plans, others less. Some designers were more interested in history, others less.

The archaeologists complained they had much less legal backing in their struggle, compared with e.g. the environmentalists, helped by a series of detailled laws affecting spatial planning procedures and design properties. Still, the archaeologists themselves thought of Leidsche Rijn as a succes, and a lot of other actors shared this evaluation: they also saw a succesful archaeological lobby at work. One can say that exactly the lack of clear rules and the shifting boundary between planned and unplanned created possibilities for them they were skilfull in using. They did not rely on general laws since these were not very helpful. Instead, they succeeded in reopening negotiations several times, keeping an oversight, smuggling some of the rejected ideas back into the planning and design realities. If the designers in the next phase did not take care of all the agreements in the former phase, maybe they could be convinced of some ideas formerly

rejected. Conversely, some of the successes in the former phase had to be safeguarded. But, in the end, it seems they did well, and their lack of legal backing and –it must be added- obvious distrust in the binding force of agreements and plans, gave way to a flexible attitude that enabled them to reintroduce the guiding principle of the Old Rhine in several design contexts. Even if it was kept out of the Masterplan years ago. Even if the archaeologists agreed on the plan. Nobody –as far as we know- broke the rules, but the shifting interpretations of the rules and their limits were used to full extent by the Utrecht archaeologists.

3.4.8. Conclusions

In this case study, we focussed on the cultures of the professional, disciplinary, organisational cultures involved in the planning system, their views on history and historical things, their interactions and the influence of their interactions on the result of the planning process, the materialised design. These cultures are shown to have a lot of features in common with the cultures of the users, having their own image of self and others, their own image of place and of history. The interpretive and post- modern perspective adopted enabled us to see these similarities.

As last of the three case studies, the move from users to planners was made more completely here. The study of the planning actors enabled us to analyse the planning system, and that study also required such an analysis. The characteristics of the planning system that emerged from the several case studies, but mainly from this one, will recur in the parts of the identity theory speaking about planning cultures and their dealings with history.

4. IDENTITY AND THE USE OF HISTORY

4.1. Introduction

This third part of the book, the most extensive one, is in the first place theoretical, be it that a lot of empirical examples are given and a few case studies are incorporated. One can say that generally speaking, induction and deduction are combined, the emphasis being on deduction. Again, three parts can be distinguished: one concerning identity construction in all cultures, one focussed on planning cultures and the role of history, a third part being an extensive but rather illustrative case study on history and planning in Ukraine.

In the pages on identity construction in all cultures, the cultures of users and of planners, we chose the identity concept to organise the relations between culture, labelled group identity, cultural image of place, named spatial identity, and cultural construction of history, here named image of history. All three identities are seen as interrelated within a culture, mutually defining each other in a triangular relation. All aspects of this triangular scheme of identity formation as social construction, are investigated separately. Also the conceptual embedding of the scheme and the embedding of the identity constructions of one group in the context of a society with other groups constructing identities, are treated. The significations of place and history that were uncovered in the case studies, can gain importance if they function in processes of identity construction as represented in the schemes. More cultural factors affecting the potential use of history in planning are therefore uncovered in constructing these schemes. In this case the factors can be called potential sensibilities more significant in a planning perspective, since histories and places are shown to be potentially essential in the self- definition of groups. And a planning perspective should take into account group preferences and sensibilities.

The pages on planning culture and the role of history and historical knowledge can be summarized as an attempt to give an outline of a planning system from our interpretive perspective -a redefinition of a planning system in post- modern terms. (We speak about the chapter on planning culture and the two chapters on histories in a planning culture) In this drawing, the roles of knowledge and of historical knowledge are

analysed. Often, the Dutch planning system serves as an example, but once more we are not primarily interested in the specificity of this case. In our analysis of the roles of historical knowledge in planning, several metaphors are used. Several planning metaphors (planning as a game, as…) are combined to unravel more mechanisms of the planning system, to unravel more potential roles of history in the system.

In doing so, we aim at giving a more complete picture of the forces working on the constructions of place and history featuring in the cultures of planners and users. In the game metaphor e.g., the characteristics of a game define a number of forces co- determining the outcome, the actual roles of histories in a plan. And the same goes for the other metaphors. What happens in the planning process to the images of history and place present in the cultures of planners and users can be better understood while using a combination of metaphors in a post- modern perspective. And such an understanding is necessary to give realistic recommendations later on concerning the potential roles of history to improve -urban- plans. One has to know the triangles and what happens to them in the planning process.

In the final case, on spatial planning and history in Ukraine, focussing on Kiev, the capital, we do not intend to uncover much new mechanisms on significations of place and history and their roles in a planning system. We intend the case to be rather illustrative, showing the constructions of place and history by the users and the state, as well as the roles of histories and heritage in the actual planning practice. Interactions between cultures looking for an identity and a state looking for an identity, trying to impose it, are studied, as are the powers working on all these histories and identities in the planning system. An overview is given of the historical building blocks used by the identities, of the identities using the building blocks, and an outline is made of the attempts of the state to impose a new frame of identification for all the identities under its rule. This analysis is followed by a brief description of planning practice, where in the planning games not too much remains of the historical preferences of the user groups and even of the state itself.

In the diverse chapters we labelled identity theory, the concept of identity was only used to organise the links between culture, place and history. Culture was defined in a semiotic way, as a group distinct by its signification of the world, as this typical signification itself, and cultures

were identified among the users of a place and among the groups involved one way or another in the planning system. The design disciplines were included in the planning system, which is therefore more than the planning disciplines.

4.2. Cultures in general

Why identity? This part of the book is concerned with identity. In the previous chapters a study was made, using case studies, of the cultures of planners, architects and the users of the spaces they produce. We chose a perspective where a priori no difference was made between the planners and the planned people. A number of mechanisms was unearthed related to the signification of place, history and history in place in the cultures of the users and the planners and designers. And a number of mechanisms was unveiled related to the interaction of user groups, planners and designers in several combinations. This necessitated reflections on the self-image of planning and design cultures, and a partial redrawing of the maps of the planning and design worlds as they are officialy presented to the outside world.

Now, our initial intention was to combine the chosen theoretical perspectives in such a way that a somewhat different light could be shed on the use of history in urban developments. After the case studies, it seems that the urban context is not different from other human inhabitations. The mechanisms unveiled in the user groups play wherever human cultures spread. And the planning and design cultures cover both urban and rural landscapes and everything in between. From our perspective, the urban- rural distinction is one obviously liable to deconstruction: the labels are constantly shifting and are most persistent in contexts where money is attached to organisational boundaries using the urban- rural divide as defining features.

Still, the question stands on how to use history in new neighbourhoods, whether we call them urban or not. We argue that a lot of mechanisms uncovered and analysed yet can be systematically linked in a theory focussing on identity. This does not mean that the use of history can improve the quality of a place only via the concept of a spatial identity. A history characteristic of a place made visible, can make the place different from other places, indeed. Yet at this point in the

reasoning, we do not want to tie ourselves to such an important intermediary role for a concept of spatial identity in between history and spatial quality. The precise functions of identity concepts will have to result from the coming analysis, they cannot be a starting point.

The identity theory we will try to unfold now is rather intended as one strong unifying perspective to look at the mechanisms arising from the case studies with the help of the selected postmodern theories. In other words: other perspectives are possible too, and theories circling around different concepts can have a unifying power too, can also produce insight in the use of history in planning and design. There is not one way towards a solution; there are many ways and there are many answers. This could also be deduced right from the start, after the first theoretical pages, and from each of the case studies separately. The choice for identity as central concept was made because of its power to systematise relations between a wide range of the mechanisms analysed, mechanisms in the cultures of users, planners, designers.

The choice for identity is easier to understand if we add that we distinguish several forms of identity, central position being held by group identity. And group identity we equate to culture. Before we analyse this equation further, it might be useful to say that the concept of identity can play a central role in our theory since it is so closely linked to culture. And notions of culture, social constructions of the world and interactions between diverse worlds, played a key role in all the analyses made this far. This may be clear, and it can elucidate the role of identity.

4.2.1. Identity construction: a simple model

We will start with our first scheme of identity construction[220]. Every relation in the scheme will be elaborated further on. We distinguish three types of identity: personal identity (personality), spatial identity (images of place) and group identity (culture). Then there are images of the past. All four concepts are considered social constructions, and they constitute each other continuously as presented in the scheme. Every relation is bidirectional: both concepts imply each other in their definitions.

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[220] Of our own making, inspired by Eriksen (A), Cohen (A), Barth (A), Rajchman (A), Leman (A) etc

Image of history ←→ Spatial identity

Culture
Group identity
↕
Personal identity

Let us start with the aforementioned equation of group identity and culture. Every group identifying as a group apart from the purely functional roles they are assigned or they assign to themselves, is called a culture. A professional group can be called a professional culture more rightly when the group is not only tied together by a common professional role, but also by shared views on science, on society, by dress codes, codes of communication and so on. A group identity is a group and at the same a property of the group; a culture is a group and a property of it. Some professional groups can better be described as professional cultures than others. We must modify our first equation now by stating that not every group identity is a culture. There can be a professional group identity resting solely on the functional definition of the group. So, a culture is one type of group identity; it still is an identity and can be treated as such. Group identity and culture as properties of a group are different, while a culture entails necessarily a group identity.

A professional culture cannot be assumed present; it has to be uncovered empirically. Sometimes, features of the cultures can be deduced by looking at shared basic assumptions. This observation is linked to the next equation that is implied often in the coming pages, an equation that was also used in the case studies, at the same time emerging from these studies: culture= discourse. A discourse needs to be uncovered too, it cannot be assumed. This equation we will not modify but frame: a culture is characterized by a discourse, and all the properties of discourse apply therefore to culture. It is contingent, dynamic, plural, reactive. Some cultures, as some discourses, are more commanding and pervasive than others. One can be member of a surfers club and one can be part of a

religious sect. Some cultures contain an array of discourses but have still principles of unity, shared features and basic assumptions holding them together. Despite all the differences in France, it is still possible to speak about French culture. This is not an undue generalisation, a logical mistake, but a search for signifying patterns in a culture.

One aid in the search for these signifying patterns, can be found in the postmodern principle that the selfimage holds central place in the definition. A group starts to be a group the moment it perceives itself to be different from the rest. A group identity arises. And the moment these differences gain content in a way different from the practical roles, we call it a culture. A culture is always an identity and can be somewhat easier defined thanks to this observation. The postmodern element is situated in the assumption that the selfdefinition is the only possible definition to rely on. If a people invents its history and defines itself in relation to this invented history, then an outsider, a researcher, can say the history is invented, but he cannot say the group is false or nonexistant, he cannot say that "in fact" they are this and that. The selfdefinitions, the group identities, the cultures, the discourses, all these are social constructions and nothing else. Kinship ties, histories, racial definitions are often fabricated, and if they exist they can lack significance in the culture.

We use all these different terms for culture because they stem from different frames of thought and enable us to slightly switch perspectives on the same thing, to reveal more mechanisms and relations. We will mostly refrain from using the term ethnicity, since it does not completely fit the series of equivalents and related terms we use here to cover the phenomena related to group definitions. In general, we interpret it as one category of cultures. Not every culture in our definition can be labelled an ethnicity. As Eriksen pointed out, it is difficult to draw the boundaries of ethnicity, but it seems pointless to speak of an ethnicity of surfers. Conversely, one must be aware of the socially constructed character of ethnicity too: the word has an essentialist ring, it is more than 'culture' associated with presumed genetical similarities, associations that are highly misleading.

Let us take a closer look now at every interaction present in the scheme. Short historical and ethnographic examples will be given. Most of the examples refer to the signification in groups we could call user groups, but it must be stressed that the groups in the examples are presented here

as cultures in general. In other words: the analysis applies to users as well as to the other groups involved in a planning process. Examples_are taken from a wide range of historical and geographical contexts, and selected because of the clear presence of the mechanisms at stake; contexts are chosen where the relevant bits and pieces of the cultural mechanics are better visible compared to our own culture, closer to the surface.

4.2.2. Image of history defines spatial identity

History is always constructed from a certain perspective. One can say a series of frames are activated while producing histories, narratives of the past. Most of these frames are connected to social conventions and therefore to groups. In this sense, history is a social construction. Not only time but also space has to be constructed socially. The Cartesian conception of space is a cultural construct in itself, functioning perfectly to perform the operations of mathematics and physics, but not a more objective representation than others[221]. One always perceives images of space, and these are interpreted, acquire meaning in the activation of – again- a series of socially constructed frames of reference. We will go more into detail on the principles of placemaking later. Here we say concisely that the images of space can be constituted by ideas on the most diverse subjects. Image must not be understood here in a literal sense. We use the word for sake of convenience, but use it as a synonym for spatial identity. And spatial identity we define simply as the structured set of ideas a group has on a certain place, distinguishing it from other places. A spatial identity is constituted in a discourse, in a culture.

One of the areas in culture that produce defining features for spatial identities is history. History on the geological scale and human history shape the physical features of a place, naturally. Apart from that, a spatial identity can be defined by historical narratives. Spatial identity is more than the image. All the connotations of a place influence the perception of the image in the literal sense: things look different if one likes it or not, look different if one knows something about the place or not. This principle will not be denied. Now, we are talking about the whole set of ideas on a place structuring its interpretation, its experience, and everything that happens there. Not only the image is affected by the

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[221] Roelandts, 104 (PH), Saunders (A), Nijs, ch 4 (PH)

identity of the place, also its experience and the interpretation of things in the place and events having the place for a background. The spatial identity *is* an interpretation of the place, including an image, structuring other interpretations in the place and the perception of other people's interpretations of the place (e.g. as expressed in paintings, poems, songs,…) History can in various ways be part of the identity of the place.

A place can be the place where this and that happened, it can be the place where an atmosphere of old ages can still be felt, events from the national and international history can have taken place there, personal experiences, events in the personal history, and it can be the place where old artefacts or old geological structures can be seen or are suspected. In different places and for different groups and individuals different histories and historical features of the place come to the fore. We could see this in the Almere study, and also in the two other cases, where diverse groups attributed different meanings to the same place and added varying historical colours to their definitions. The histories referred to or playing a role indirectly are social constructions, and this could be observed very well in the Wageningen case, where an old atmosphere was attractive, revolving around a matrix of imagery we labelled 'the countryman'. An analysis was made of the historical tinge to the place, an attempt was made at reconstruction of the histories of the matrix, and of the diverse pathways of signification that could be placed within its frame.

A few short examples may illustrate some ways history can enter the spatial identity.

– A place can be the background of a personal experience. A park can be remembered mostly as the place one met his wife. Personal histories colour the picture. It can be the place one experienced the smell of roses at a sunny day just beforre one met his wife. All the senses can be involved and can recall the history. The event defines the place and the place can recall the events. Some of the events separately –the smell e.g.- can recall the more significant event –the meeting- and the place. All the memories can evoke each other and mutually define each other too. The smell of the roses can become mainly the smell one experienced in this situation, at that place.

– It can be the background of a major historical event. The *Camp d'Attilla* close to Metz, France, is largely an empty place, and probably it was not even the place where in 451 the battle between Attilla the Hun

and a Roman- Germanic coalition took place, but its identity is defined in large part by this historical event. That in the army of Attilla many Germanic officers held high ranks, does not matter for the present- day perception. It is a blind spot; the event is interpreted as one of the important rescues of Europe and the army of Attilla as thoroughly foreign[222].

– A place can contain an historical object or structure that defines it strongly. In Ghent, Belgium, the *Gravensteen*, an 12th century fortress, is one of the oldest buildings in town, if not the oldest one. It was the seat of power in middle ages, until in 16th century on the outskirts of the town a Spanish castle was built. The castle was perceived as foreign, as dominated by foreigners, and once Spanish power had gone, it was demolished. In the meanwhile, the old castle, former seat of the Counts of Flanders, became more and more associated with the freedom of the Ghent community, while this had been the opposite in the early years of the building. The building dominated its surrounding, with negtive associations in the beginning, but after a few centuries, it acquired a new positive meaning, with a strong historical element, while still dominating the spatial identity of the neighbourhood[223].

– A place can contain an object or structure commemorating history. In Belgium, the *Menenpoort,* close to Ypres, brings to memory the horrors of the first world war. In Diksmuide, in the same region, the *Ijzertoren* is a monument referring to the same dramatic events. Both dominate the places they stand, define them historically. Important difference is that the tower has become a symbol of the Flemish nationalist movement, organising pilgrimages to the tower every year, and politically inspired festivities, while the *Menenpoort* did not acquire this symbolic value. The Flemish nationalist movement identified with the first world war strongly, because some of the first signs of recognition of Flemish rights were seen right after the war, a war where in Flemish eyes a disproportionate amount of Flemish blood was shed. Both monuments refer to the same events and period, define the surroundings, but gained different symbolic values.

– Places can contain objects or structures referring to a geological past. History is human history. Still, the past of a place in more general sense

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[222] Collins, 41 (HE)
[223] Decavele, 62 (HWE)

can also define its identity. A geographer or a geologist or someone just interested in rocks or dinosaurs or fossil shells can go to Dinant, Belgium, or Nismes and Philippeville in the surroundings, and his focuss can be on the calciferous rock formations to be found there, just to the North of the Ardennes. These limestone hills and crevices and caves contain a wide variety of fossils, while displaying all the principles of the mechanics of rock formation and deformation described in the geological handbooks.

– Places can evoke old atmospheres. Bruges in Belgium was discovered by English tourists in the early 19th century as a beautiful remnant of the middle ages. Bruges' prosperity declined sharply in the 16th century, and nothing much had been built afterwards. In England, romantic interest in the middle ages awoke earlier than on the continent, neogothic experiments flourished since the middle of the 18th century, and Bruges was situated nearby the Channel. A colony of English tourists and permanent residents developped around 1800[224], and their interest in the town and its past evoked an interest on the continent as well. French and German tourists trickled in and the neogothic movement spread across western Europe[225]. The identity of the place was defined largely by the old atmosphere still tangible there. The Bruges example also shows the culturally constructed character of such a perception. The middle ages had to be rediscovered and reinterpreted, and the perceived interesting features of the period had to be discovered in and attached to the image of Bruges. The interpretation of the ensemble as typical middle age, and the experience of a mediaeval atmosphere there, rested on this kind of constructions, aided by a cloud of literary and painterly expressions of the middle ages, addressing more directly to emotions, co- creating a mediaeval atmosphere that could be recognised in the streets of Bruges afterwards.

4.2.3. Spatial identity defines image of history

An image of history can be defined by spatial identities too. In the Bruges example, an image of middle ages produced a spatial identity of Bruges, but it works the other way around too: middle ages became to be associated with the image of Bruges. Showing the middle ages is showing

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[224] Vlasselaers *De stad als tekst* (S)
[225] de Maeyer, on the spread of the style (AR)

Bruges; in the definition of the middle ages (and certainly the middle ages in the low countries) Bruges and its imagery play an important role. As said above: each of the relations discussed here is bidirectional.

In more general terms, one can say that history necessarily has a spatial setting. Events have a spatial setting and longer- term developments are also situated against a spatially defined background. In some cases, this background becomes more important, it becomes inextricably bound to the historical image. The spatial setting enters the core features of the definition of the event or development. The battle at the field of the Blackbirds, where Serbian troops faced an Ottoman majority in the 14th century, is a battle evidently connected to its setting. In the European (and certainly the Serbian) historical narratives one does not speak or cannot speak simply of "the battle of 1389" or "the big battle of the Serbians"; it is difficult to skip the spatial setting from the definition of the event. If we bring in mind that the last war in Kosovo was fought also because the Field of the Blackbirds is situated in present- day Kosovo, and the historical battle played an important role in the group identity of the Serbians[226], then one can say safely that the spatial setting has become a key defining feature of the historical event (and the event and the place key elements of Serbian culture)

If we look at developments rather than events, the spatial setting can also be attached to history to a varying extent. The history of France cannot be separated0 from French geography (and from a political structure and a group of people defining themselves as French) This is evident. The Greek colonisation, starting in bronze age Crete, ending with the conquests in the Hellenist period, is rather attached to groups of people that are in retrospect often −not always- labelled 'Greeks'. In antiquity, some of these groups in some circumstances identified as Greeks[227]. In each case, the development is connected far more with a 21st century construction of an ethnic identity than with a geography. It is certainly not connected with the existing Greek state. There is ofcourse a geographical component in the definition of the history in the dominant narratives, but it does not affect the core definition.

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[226] Kaplan (HEE) ; Mazower for a more historical approach (HEE)
[227] Boardman (HEE)

4.2.4. Culture defines spatial identity

Every spatial identity, being a social construction, is definied within a culture. In this sense, this relation does not need further elaboration. It might still be useful to analyse the specific ways it happens. More detailled attention will be paid to the relation, we call placemaking, in a separate section of the text. In this paragraph we will limit ourselves to some general remarks. A culture defines places and places are defined within cultures. This means that the places bear the marks of a culture. In a place one can learn about culture and knowledge of a culture can on the other hand deepen the interpretation of a place. This applies to physical space as well as to the painterly, literary, historical, musical,… constructions of place. A baroque garden like Marly or Vaux- le- Vicomte tells a lot about French Baroque, and vice versa. A landscape painting by Poussin, dating from the same French 17th century, does not depict geometrically arranged spaces, and still tells things about French Baroque. Conversely, also the Poussin painting can be kept in mind while interpreting landscapes that were already present in his time. (And the combined presence of Poussin landscapes and geometrical parks in the same social circles should be understood if one wants to fully grasp the conception of space in French Baroque culture[228])

Cultures are inscribed in space, and can be read in places. Part of the inscription is intended, part is not. We already discussed the limits of the text metaphor to analyse landscapes in culture, the possibilities to communicate with places (In the study of the Wageningen gardens) Here we can add that in general the intention of the individual designer of a place or of a group of people forming a landscape, the meanings they intentionally transfer by means of the place and in the place, are only part of the complete meaning of the place.[229] Like a text conveys more than the intended message of the writer, reflecting also stylistic genres, personality, referring unknowingly to other books and to cultural backgrounds of the writer, a place reflects culture in many ways not intended by the people making it. Marly was intended to be beautiful, the Tuscan agricultural landscape not, but both can be beautiful for the modern beholder. Versailles was intended to reflect the power of the ruler,

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[228] Le dantec, 46 (LA); Laird on baroque gardens (LA)
[229] Vanbergen, 126 (S); Eco 1972, 63 (S)

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but did not intend to convey the less than optimal economic conditions at the beginning of the 21st century in France, or the shrinking importance of culture in French politics, inferences that could be made from the deplorable state of park and buildings, and the issues the debate is revolving around.

In a culture, spatial identities can be constructed in several contexts. Literary genres and the arts in general, produced an imagery, produced place identities that influenced the perception of physical spaces, but did not structure them completely[230]. Paintings can influence the ways one perceives real landscapes, but the landscapes themselves can acquire very different meanings too, stemming from cultural domains different from art. In a landscape anything can take place, and all the different activities and histories can frame the signification of space. All the activities taking place within a certain culture in a certain place can structure the spatial identity. The Wageningen case showed how small the groups could be attributing different meanings to the same places. Differences in activities led to different spatial identities, as well as different interpretations of the same identity. A wide array of culture- based assumptions could influence the interpretation of the place, despite the small place, the limited groups of people, their identical historical situation. Nearly all were Dutch, the activities displayed were mostly easy to recognise, and still major misunderstandings could arise due to significant differences in the attribution of spatial identities to the place. We meet once more one of the paradoxes of culture: the amount of perspectives within one culture is potentially infinite, but this does not prevent the existence of a unifying culture. A discourse can contain an infinite number of discourses. This is related to the relativity of the perceived unity: the unity in a discourse can look very different from different perspectives.

The Wageningen case also showed that identities of place can switch easily within one person, depending on the role one takes on. Some roles are more clearly defined than others, so the corresponding switches in spatial identity (changing perceptions of some surroundings) can also be demarcated in varying degrees. This does not imply that the person switches cultures at the same time. People can have different roles, some roles are linked to cultures, so they can belong to several cultures. Still, not

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[230] Dixon Hunt (LA)

all roles are cultures, not all roles are connected with discourses and not all discourses with cultures. This is not a problem. It was our intention to demonstrate how cultures define spatial identities, not to prove that one culture allows for only one spatial identity.

4.2.5. Spatial identity defines culture

In the preceding lines this relation was already briefly discussed. Spaces define cultures and cultures define spaces, and both terms can be used to study the other. It may be interesting to add a reference to the paragraphs on spatial identity defining images of history. One can say that the relation analysed here can be paraphrased as: spatial identities define selfimages of groups. As in the case of histories, cultures also have a necessary spatial setting. Sometimes this functions as a netural background, sometimes it becomes more important, becomes part of the selfimage of the group, it comes closer to the key defining features of a culture. How spatial identities constitute culture, depends also on the history of the culture. Still, nothing can be predicted. Groups that are mobile can devote as much attention to place than groups with a more or less stable area of settlement. Groups that have a long tradition of identifying as a group while remaining in the same area, are somewhat more liable to having this place as a key feature of the selfdefinition. But, as said, nothing can be predicted, there are no clear rules. "We are the people from the lands of Rus", one could read in mediaeval documents from the Kiev Rus state, even when the state was in our perception ethnically not homogeneous at all, and even when most of the groups constituting the political entity had moved into the area a few centuries before and had switched identities several times.[231]

Cultures on the move

Cultures that moved on during a long time can disappear. The group of people can split up into several parts, some of these parts can assimilate in larger groups while other parts can stay independent in another form[232]. It is impossible to predict what kind of role notions of place will play in the culture. In Kiev Rus, the founding military and merchant elite was of Scandinavian origin, but after circa two centuries, they lost completely

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[231] Franklin, 54 (HEE)
[232] Franklin, 36 (HEE); Leman (A)

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their distinctive features as northmen. Still, their descendants were recognisable as an elite, adopting a new culture made up from elements of diverse origin, and gradually adopting descendants of Slavic or other origin in its ranks. The elite still pretended to be a family, upheld a myth of common ancestry (though the location of the origin was relatively unimportant) Scandinavia did not play a role in the culture of Kiev Rus, in its selfimage.[233] Some of the formerly nomadic groups incorporated in the Kiev Rus state started identifying with it, lost their nomadic characteristics, and Central Asia or other eastern countries lost significance in their culture. Their culture disappeared anyway. In the Kiev Rus culture fictive kinship ties, religion and trade held the group together[234]. Place was not of foremost importance in the selfimage. In the 10th century, their ruler Sviatoslav attempted at moving the whole state direction SW, and founding a new capital on the Danube river.

Other cultures on the move, cultures avoiding assimilation, do have places as defining features in their culture. The importance of Israel and Jerusalem for the Jewish people is known. Before the existence of Israel as a modern state, the land of origin, in mythic proportions, was also of foremost importance to their selfdefinition[235]. Jews spread all over Europe in the middle ages, and always retained distinctive features, even in places where the conditions of their existence allowed for free interaction with other groups and freedom of movement. A common history was perceived as a strong bond, linking them with a land origin. The shaping of history as a matter of retelling common ancestry, devoting chapters to generations, is related to this function. Religion served as a strong ethnic marker, and the myth of common ancestry underpinned an idea of culture and religion being equal in the case of the Jews. That this was a myth, also with the Jews, is testified by the Khazars, a Turkic nomadic people settling in the area between the Caspian and the Black sea in the early middle ages. They were friendly with the Byzantines and hostile against the early Rus immigrants in the area, and at least the elite adopted the Jewish faith[236].

Armenia

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[233] Jones (HE); Wilson, 204 (HEE)
[234] Franklin, 18 (HEE)
[235] Potok (HEE); Speake (HE)
[236] Norwich (HEE)

Armenian communities worship the Ararat mountain[237]. Armenia was the first state to adopt christianity, in the early fourth century, before Constantine the great. The importance of a mountain for their culture can be traced back to Persian times, before and during the Christian period – several Persian empires had their presence felt in the Caucasian mountains up til the 18th century[238]. The Persians were mostly mazdeists, adherents of the faith of Zarathustra. Ritual fires were an important part its worships, especially at significant places in open air. E.g. some mountains. Ararat played a role in Armenian imagination from the earliest times. But, an important event was a battle in 1055, when the early Seltsjoek Turks beat the Armenian empire in the present eastern part of Turky. That area became Turkish territory, a second Armenian state being tentatively constructed in the south of Anatolia (Cilicia)[239]

The imagery of Ararat followed the Armenians. In the first world war, a genocide fell upon the Armenian communities under the sway of the Ottoman empire, and the first diaspora, going on since the 11th century, was followed by a second one, bringing Armenians to places all over the world. Large communities existed in Europe and America. Armenians usually stay a distinct group. Also in the middle east, groups of Armenian traders and craftsmen can be found in Syria, Lebanon[240]. Everywhere, despite all the movements, the scattering of people in two diaspora's, Armenian families have pictures or paintings of Ararat in their houses. Armenians abroad (more of them live abroad than in Armenian) sing songs about Ararat, know poems by heart on Ararat. The mountain fell outside Armenia since the 11th century, and when the Russians conquered the remote Ottoman province of Erevan in the beginning of the 19th century, a place that was peripheral in the first Armenian state too, they called it Armenia, invited Armenians from other countries to settle there, but could not include the holy mountain in the Russian- Armenian territory.[241] The mountain is a symbol for the country, even if it does not

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[237] Marsden, 34 (HEE)
[238] Karny, 248 (HEE); Weitenberg (HEE)
[239] Runciman on the crusades, vol 2 (HEE); Weitenberg, historical chapter; Reynolds (HEE)
[240] Marsden (HEE)
[241] Figes, 104 (HEE); Karny, 200 (HEE)

belong to it officially, and a strong symbol for a group continually on the move. Spatial identity defines culture, despite everything.

4.2.6. Culture defines image of history

An infinite amount of perspectives on, constructions of, history is conceivable. It is not only a matter of arrangment and selection of facts, it also concerns the definition of what a fact is, the narrative structures opted for, the types of causalities looked for, conversely the role of contingency and chance, and more. The way histories are constructed is linked to the role the histories play and are supposed to play in cultures. And groups and organisations that want to influence or shape culture. Not every culture devotes a lot of attention to history, not in every culture history is important in the image of self or in other respects. Still, in every culture it holds a somewhat different place and therefore the perspective will differ.

A nation state will write history from its perspective and has a history of attempts to dominate the writing of history[242]. Histories are often the history of France, England and so on. Conversely, histories from the perspective of a group were also used to define the group more clearly and to sustain a quest for independence, for an independent state. Italy proves such an example. Histories of Italy and the Italian people were devised to forge unity and pave the path for the *rissorgimento*.[243] Once the writing of history from the persepctive of a nation state has taken hold, it becomes increasingly difficult to conceive it in different ways. Not only institutional obstacles will grow more serious, it also becomes more difficult to imagine, because one is not fully aware of the extent to which the historical imagination is framed by the nation- state. Jews, as a culture without a state for more than 2000 years, cultivated a history built along genealogical lines and using narratives focussed on individual lives. Biography and genealogy structured the writing of history. We already referred to this. The genealogically shaped history functioned as a tool to strengthen the ties in the community and to reinforce the ideology of shared genetics.

Planning and design cultures

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[242] Anderson (A); Hobsbawm, 64 (HE); de Boeck (A)
[243] Anders (HWE)

Planners and designers, being professional cultures directed towards the future, have distinctive views on history. In the cases, it could be noticed that the designers cultures were more closely linked to artistic developments, and that trends in wider artistic circles were much more reflected in designers attitudes than in the atittudes of planners. Interpretations of history and its role are also subject of artistic trends, and where a new artistically inspired version of history emerged, this was bound to be noticed earlier in design than in planning. An interest in the future, in accomodating changes in society in new spaces, necessarily implies a willingness to change things, a willingness to leave history behind. Questions have to be solved in a plan, needs to be addressed, esthetical aspirations to be pursued and so on. Design and planning attitudes changed over the years, but in a general sense the professions ask for a capacity to devise new spatial structures and ignore old ones. They can be used, but the capacity to ignore them is generally valued higher than a tendency to cling automatically to existing structures and objects. Interest in old structures existed within the disciplines from time to time, but often the interest in history in planning and design was ressuscited from outside, e.g. from the historical disciplines or art.

If we look at urban planning and design, we want to point again at a difference we came across in the Leidsche Rijn case already: different pasts can be referred to while designing new neighbourhoods. One can e.g. refer to the rural past of a place close to the old city edge, or one can refer to the history of urban developments and city form. One can ignore the existing structures and objects of the building area complete, while referring explicitly to the history of the city. The new quarters are perceived as belonging to the old city, and therefore the history of the city is supposed to dominate if one wants to pay attention to history at all. A different interpretation of the spatial identity leads to a different history used. In a certain planning and design culture, the tendency can be cemented to opt for this or that type of history, for the existing structures on the spot or the neighbouring structures of the older town.

This choice can be part of the planning or design culture. And the culture, take an urban design culture, can be further defined by the types of urban histories one is choosing, by the types of old cities one tends to refer to. Urban designers mostly had an image of an ideal city in their mind while designing new cities. Apart from the hard- core modernists,

this model of an ideal city, which sometimes took the shape of an actual city, sometimes a grammer of forms, sometimes a set of design principles, was based on certain historical models.[244] Camillo Site had mediaeval towns in mind, the garden city propagandists constructed their own mix of mediaeval and postmediaeval[245], some designers chose the French baroque town as an ideal, the American New Urbanists are inspired by the garden cities and some mediterranean models[246], producing an reinterpretation of a reinterpretation of old European towns.

While working on new designs, versions of history are present in their ideals for the future. One version of history induces the designer to neglect traces of other histories in the area he is designing in. In the new designs, in the new town, references can be found to some histories and not to others, while some old features of the place, before the building, were left intact, were used or referred to and others had to disappear, had to make way for the new structures. The references and remainders of the old situation bear witness of a preference for one type of history and for the neglect of others. This is always the case, since the histories referred to are always selections and since the profession is defined by change. Sometimes, the urban designer really dislikes certain histories and their material traces, sometimes he is just disinterested in them, sometimes he does not perceive them, because they are not framed by the images of desirable and undesirable histories that are defined in his professional culture. Cultures define images of history and act upon this.

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[244] Hoogenberk (LA)
[245] Evers (AR)
[246] Duany, passim (LA)

Communist states

The communist states had their own distinctive vision of history[247]. Marxism was oriented towards the future, and had a mechanistic and deterministic version of history. The future was much more important than history, a certain type of future was implied in the present course of events, history was interesting to study the mechanisms leading to this future, and to find exemplary situations of the more primitive stages in history. Preservation of old things in planning and design was only necessary if it could serve these purposes, or if it could reinforce the cohesion of the state one way or another. Open air museums of folk architecture were started in all communbist countries, referring to the first stage of Marxist history[248], the agricultural stage (leading to industrialisation, from which the proletarian revolution could start) Churches were preserved as 'museums of atheism', and filled with religious art presented as signs of superstition. It is interesting to notice how within such a general Marxist view on history, a very strong planning culture could develop with a design focus on modernist urbanism. The state organised things, so also the spatial organisation of developments. History was necessarily heading towards increasing urbanisation, so planning had to be primarily urban planning. The past did not function optimally and had to be replaced by more functional structures, unless it could serve a didactic purpose. Old architecture was not functional and also referred to bourgeois, religious or feudal worlds and ideals that were despised. Some periods were detested more than others. In Stalin's days, the 18th century represented Peter the Great and the pervasive influence of French culture in Russia and 18th century buildings could therefore meet a worse fate than e.g. mediaeval buildings that testified to the glory of Kiev Rus (some nationalist elements where built into communist doctrine under his rule, and Kiev Rus was seen as a protorussian state)

In each case, the Marxist view on history was well- entrenched in the communist states, combined with nationalist elements, and framed the cultures of planning and design. A communist discourse on history was also present in the planning and design discourses. Modernist architecture, also existing well outside the communist world, fitted very well the

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[247] Westerman 2002 (SP); Vleezenbeek (HEE), Subtelny (HEE)
[248] Banning, 75 (PH); Westerman 2002 (SP)

communist attitude towards history and architecture. Modernist architecture –and planning- tended to ignore the history of the site and the history of urban developments in the area and in general[249]. None of these types of historical references was used, none of the corresponding types of historical city- models was used. Different political systems, different wider cultures framed the same architectural and planning ideology[250].

One may add that in both cultures, in east and west, the modernist ideology was presented as neutral, as the most functional one. In the west, arguments were added by referring to democratic principles, in the east communist arguments were added. Familiar planning and design practices arose in very different cultures. Modernist views on history were common good for decades in eastern and western planning systems, while the views on history in the rest of society differed greatly. We argue that the singular situation in the west can be partly explained by the isolation the modernist planning and design discourses knew to produce from the rest of society, an isolation obtained by presenting the chosen solutions as objective and technically superior and by a symbiosis with technocratic governments. (In western Europe)

4.2.7. Image of history defines culture

Every concept is defined in a culture. At the same time, cultures define themselves by means of concepts they defined before. Cultures use concepts of history to define themselves. Who are we? We are the people that have this or that history, that experienced this or that. Obviously, the constructions of history present in the selfdescription have mostly positive associations. The culture defines the history it wants to be defined by. Sometimes, a history is adopted, and in the meanwhile the definition of the group changes, its selfperception, attitudes, actions. If one suddenly identifies with a descendant of an important line of Roman gladiators (probably nonexistent due to their short life- expectancy) then one can start rethinking the own personality. A group can choose a history and choose to change itself because of this. The change in identity can be immediate and conscious, it can come gradually and unknowing. Groups

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[249] Kopp (SP)
[250] Castex (LA)

can start identifying slowly with a certain history and start to copy the perceived characteristics of the people in the history. Intellectual elites in Europe started to identify very slowly with the ancient Greeks. Some of the perceived clarity of mind, democratic principles, philosophic reasoning, artistic principles, one perceived to be typical of classical Greece, grew more and more important, when more was discovered and the identification with the Greeks became more intense and accepted ('our common European roots')

We mentioned already that the history one identifies with is a positive one, preferably. If one recognises a history as one's own, like in the Greek- European case, then the interpretation of that history will be a positive one. Democratic principle was limited to very few people in ancient Greece, but this was not highlighted when the identification started somewhere in the 18th century. Also in cases where the distance between the present group and the appropriated history is perceived smaller, in cases where one agrees easily that we are talking about the same people, a positive selection and interpretation of history is produced. Present- day nation states write their histories in a national perspective, mostly, and few people question if the French people existed in middle ages or even 17th century. Most of us will agree we are talking about the same culture, the same group. Even in such a case, the histories produced will select some features to underline, some to forget, and the same goes for historical periods.

French historiography will present the age of Louis XIV as a golden age, while the state was virtually bankrupt most of the time. French armies were waging war all over Europe, but France was not affected itself. The 14th and early 15th centuries are presented as troubled periods. Battles were fought on French territory, and it was often bemoaned that England held positions on the French mainland. One can argue as well that the English rulers where descendants of William of Normandy, a French noble, and that one clan of nobles held England and parts of France, while another, related, clan held larger parts of France. One was of Frankish descent, Germanic, and the other (William) of Viking descent, Scandinavian. If the French state would have taken a different course in history and if historiography would not have been dominated by that state, then a different selection of historical golden ages would have taken place, and the mould of historiography would have been very different. In the

given example, the distinction foreign- local structures the perception of troubled vs succesful periods, and this distinction is constructed largely in the perspective of the modern nation- state.

We presented this last example also because it shows how history can frame the ways in which history is used to defne a group.We are the French, because we have this history. We appropriated this version of history because of our history. This is an example of what Michel de Certeau called the sneaky routes of history (*Les chemins de l'histoire*[251]): history creeps in at unexpected places. The dealings of a culture, also the ways it deals with history, are coloured and framed by the history of the culture in ways that are difficult to trace. In the few lines we devoted to psycho- analysis was observed that history is not dead matter. It keeps on working, unconscious, not only in the construction of new versions of histories but in all our actions and thoughts. This applies to individuals as well as to cultures. One can see the workings of this principle without recurring to psycho- analysis as a general cultural theory. History frames the framing of histories, in unexpected ways.

History moulds historical perceptions

In linguistic anthropology, a simple model taken from systems theory elucidates the ways the history of a culture can be cemented in its structure. The model speaks about language, culture and world. A language functions within the context of a culture and a culture in the context of a physical world. Like organisms, the systems are adapted to their environments. Not in optimal ways: they are not completely adapted. They are just enough adapted to survive and the way of adaptation is determined by the characteristics of the system. Every change is materialised in ways that are possible within the frame of the system, and this frame is the result of a history of earlier adaptations.[252] How things are perceived within a culture, conceptualised, how histories are constructed depends on the wider functioning of the culture (in a physical environment and an environment of other cultures, we must add), and it depends on the history of older adaptations to the environment, including the ways older histories were written and functioning. How histories are

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[251] see Delacroix (OT)
[252] Maturana (OT); Foley, 208 (A)

used now, can therefore be linked to a history of interactions between our culture and its environments.

Part of the reasoning above can also be described by the property of discourse we called reactivity: a discourse is partly defined in response to other discourses. The ideas on history in a certain discourse, can be structured by features of that discourse that are defined in a series of responses to other discourses. The precise manner this process of reactivity took place, differs from the concepts of the history of the period of these interactions: A view in discourse A on period X can be structured by an interaction with discourse B in period Y, and this influential interaction can be perfectly absent from the ideas in discourse A on period X and Y and on discourse B. (It can also be structured by histories of internal developments, that are lost out of sight) Discourses tend to perpetuate themselves, as organisations do, and once certain structurations of history become traditional in a certain discourse, they tend to stay in place, and frame the construction of new histories.

A frequently observed phenomenon in this respect is discursive migration[253], where discursive fragments migrate from one discourse to another. Ideas, e.g. structurations of history, that proved succesful one reason or another in a certain discourse, can become model for other discourses, will be imitated, multiply, become more widely accepted, grow into the role of truths or methods leading to truth[254]. The historical and contingent character of these truths and methods and interpretations is forgotten, the history of interactions with other discourse is forgotten. The interpretation of history happens while the historicity of the interpretive frames is turned into a blind spot. Unawareness of this historicity of frames of historical interpretation is to a certain extent necessary, for several reasons. One of them is simplification: full awareness of the histories of our histories would make reasoning too complex and slow and hinder our functioning in everyday life and in science.

4.2.8. Culture defines personal identity

Culture and personal identity can relate in many ways. A theory on personal identity will not be unfolded here. Psychology speaks of

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[253] Bal 1985, 51 (S)
[254] Foucault *Les mots et les choses*

constructions of personality and we do not want to interfere there. Just a few concepts were borrowed from psycho- analysis. We will limit ourselves to speak of some influences on personality that are clearly related to the mechanisms described by means of the scheme we are still analysing (see above) Culture, group identity, holds central position in the scheme. Influences from place and history on individual have to pass culture according to the scheme. An arrow lacks from personal identity to culture. All this does not mean one cannot have personal ideas on history and place or that an individual cannot shape culture. It does mean that all ideas on history and place are mediated by words and concepts that are necessarily constructed in a culture. The moment one starts to speak or think, culture enters our world.

Concerning the absence of the arrow: this reflects our mostly poststructuralist assumption that structure and actor define each other, while socially defined structure remains the most important source of identity. This in turn does not imply the negation of a free will or the impossibility of individuals to change structures. Individuals can change the course of history and the history of ideas, but even Alexander the great and his teacher Aristotle were defined in infinite ways by a series of discourses; they were limited in their capacity of thought and in their capacity of expression and action by socially constructed systems of signification of self and environment. Alexander could not do certain things without being considered a fool or a madman, Aristotle could not think certain things without considering himself mad, he could not say certain things while avoiding the label 'madman'. This interpretation of the relation between structure and actor derives mainly from Foucault. Gidden's supposed discovery of mutual definition of structure and actor was more like a reformulation of thoughts already present in Foucault, Barthes, Derrida and others.

Arnhem land aboriginals

One example may serve to illustrate influences of images of history, and spatial identities via culture on personal identity. The aboriginals of Arnhem land, in Northern Australia, are one of the darlings of anthropology: a host of literature is devoted to them. Ad Borsboom[255], Dutch anthropologist, wrote several articles on his experience with the

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[255] Kommers in Driessen (A); Borsboom (A)

clan of the wild honey bee. He describes how the aboriginals experience all kinds of troubles when moved from the ancestral grounds, or when these lands are changed, being redesigned, in western eyes. Aboriginals, also according to other authors, seem to be extermely vulerable to changes in their old environment and changes of environment. Alcoholism and drug abuse are widespread, as well as a long list of mental illnesses, as defined by western medecine. How can this be? In our interpretation, based on Borsboom, Kommers and other anthropologists, it is due to the extremely close links between personal identity, group identity and spatial identity in the culture of the aboriginals. The first link is not very special: many more cultures define their members to a high degree. In western societies, it has become relatively simple to move out, to live among different groups of people. In some traditional societies it is much more difficult to imagine such a move. A much larger part of the structuring of everyday life is motivated by the group, be it a clan, tribe, caste.

The strong link between spatial identity and group identity needs some more explanation. Every aboriginal clan identifies with a totem. Borsboom studied a clan identifying with the wild honey bee. The honey bee is one form of one of the god- like entities that participated in the creation of earth. Creation is continuous, a bit in the way Saint Thomas Aquinas represented creation as a permanent process sustained by God, not a single act by his hand. For the aboriginals, the creation of visible things took place during the dreaming, a time before time when the map of their world was drawn for once and for all. The dreaming did not stop after the birth of visible things, it became a dimension of life only accessible during certain rituals. In these rituals, acts of the gods in the dreamtime are revived, in which the dreaming is not only represented but also ressuscitated. During some of the rituals, the map of the landscape, as it was created by the totem, was represented in dances. Dancers followed the footsteps of the totems in the dreaming, in their sequential and spatially ordered creation of things. The gods created the world in the manner of a walk and the same path is followed during rituals, this way showing the map of creation to each other. Landscape features define creation in the most essential way: Creation was not conceived as a list of beings or a set of ordering principles, but quite literally as a map of the regional landscape supposed to surround them eternally. One can add to this that the god-like totems are still present in the landscape, in special, revered, places.

Therefore, one can expect serious things to happen when the physical landscape is changing. And this is the case too. Holy places can be touched, but also lines and objects that are perceived as the structures of the landscape as laid down in creation. Spatial structures are not only seen as extremely old or very obviously structuring the landscape, but also seen as part of a normatively interpreted natural order. Changing the landscape is changing the order of things as it was meant to be. The continuous creation is the creation of *that* order, and every group and individual is defined primarily by its position in this frame of reference. The spatial frame of reference is the most important conceptual frame of reference, constituting meanings that are fundamental in the creation of meaning and identity in general. Individuals identify strongly with clans, clans with totems and the landscapes they produced and inhabit. Changes in the landscape can therefore affect the identity of the group directly. Group, totem and landscape are seen as identical *in some circumstances*. (e.g. during some rituals) The rules of identification are complex in their culture. This implies that changes in the landscape can leave people unaffected at certain times, while leaving them completely disoriented at other moments.

Borsboom tells about the events after the forced migration of the members of the clan. In the new town they were told to settle in, the aboriginals recreated the landscape they lived in, in miniature. A new map of the old land, in its social ordering, in turn a consequence of the rules laid down in creation, was literally cemented in the layout of the new town. The mental topography of the area, socially constructed, could be read directly in the spatial structure of the town. All the social divisions were kept intact, and the small groups lived in spatial relations to each other in the old way. Neighbours stayed neighbours, people separated from each other by houses of three kinship groups kept the same type of separation. Not every element in the old map, as e.g. presented in the dances, could be recreated, so the new map, in the town, was necessarily a simplification of the old one and could not bear all the meanings of it.

About the effects on individuals one can be short: they were devastating. The range of addictions and mental diseases occurring in this and other aboriginal clans after forced urbanisation and drastic changes in their ancestral landscapes is rarely found in other societies. We argue that the particularly strong links between spatial identity, group identity and personality in their culture is due to the range and the intensity of the

problems. Every individual problem can be diagnosed in other cultures as well, but this combination in this degree can be interpreted as a sign of the rigidity of the culture. The extreme attachment of the group to the landscape and the individual to the group are probably the result of a succesful adaptation to a hostile environment, but the success depends on a stability of the system. The extreme adaptation unfortunately produces a vulnerability to the types of changes that follow western colonisation.(we meet again the principle of sufficient adaptation to the environment, as different from best adaptation) Changes in the landscape induce changes in personal identity, via culture. Unfortunately again, and we refer to the paragraphs on Freud, this structural relation can best be studied by analysing problems, looking at personalities seen as deviating or ill.

Let us finish this part by mentioning that Lévi- Strauss, in *Tristes tropiques*[256], quoted fifty years ago another interesting example of influence of spatial structure on culture and personality. He did not talk about mental problems. He tells that the Boro Boro indians, in Brasil, were impossible to convert by the Jesuits in the 17th century, until these priests discovered that the structure of a typical village, a number of concentric circles, represented the ordering of the universe and of the social world. Once they succeeded in changing the layout of the village into a grid, the resistance to Christian ideas weakened fast, and the Boro- Boro could be converted without recurring to military means.

4.2.9. Pathways of identity formation: more complex patterns

We finished our tour of the relations mentioned in the scheme of identity formation presented above. Now we must add two things. First that identity formation is a dynamic process, where several pathways can lead to similar identities and identities can shift. (this might be clear from several parts of the text) Secondly that the scheme has to be seen as embedded in a more complex conceptual structure, allowing for more complex pathways of identity formation. The first addition refers to a phenomenon we met several times in the discussions of the separate relations within the scheme: they can seldom be discussed completely in

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[256] Paris, 1955

separation of each other. Images of history produced in a culture can influence spatial identities influencing the image of different histories in turn, and this can lead to a redefinition of the culture. This is what we call a pathway of identity formation. The imaginary example just given is situated within the scheme as presented above. The second addition refers to the fact that this scheme is part of a bigger scheme. Cultures define themselves partly by reference to other cultures, to histories and to places. The processes related to these type of definitions were analysed this far.

However, as a lot of anthropologists and semioticians [257]already postulated: groups can define themselves by means of every thinkable thing and property. History, language and religion are since long recognised as ethnic markers, as important criteria for the selfdefinition of groups, as e.g. Leman pointed out[258]. In the history of anthropology and the other social sciences, they tended by times to be regarded as the only real ethnic markers. Since Frederick Barth's research on ethnicity, this view has changed. About everything can be interpreted as a sign of self and a sign of difference. In a semiotic view on culture, we adopted from e.g. Geertz in anthropology and Uspensky in semiotics, a culture constitues itself and its world by means of signs. And according to Peirce everything can be a sign of everything. Eriksen, writing in the 90's in anthropology could therefore not escape the conclusion (not related to Peirce in his case) that a culture can define itself in every possible way. Literally anything can be turned into an ethnic marker of a culture within that culture. A little grey cap can become the main marker of identity, as we noticed in Crimea, with the Karaim community.

We isolated place and history as markers of identity. We must add that the term marker comes close to the term label and could lead to the idea that it is merely a matter of form, not of content. In the case of the socalled ethnic markers, it is important to say that in some cases, they can be seen as labels, while in other cases they are sets of ideas important to them in their view of the world and their everyday lives. The distinction form- content in relation with ethnic markers can be linked to a distinction between two types of selfdefinition: from within and from the outside, looking for similarities and looking for differences. Boundaries can

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[257] Eriksen (A), Leman (A), Barth (A)
[258] Leman, introduction

be drawn around a group by focussing at the differences with the environment, looking for distinctions with other groups, and they can be drawn by stressing the similarities within a group. Since a group always lives in an environment inhabited by other groups, some contact cannot be avoided, the two strategies of selfdefinition will always have to be combined to a certain extent. Some identities will be defined mostly externally, e.g. by the existence of a common perceived enemy, while others will be defined by a web of intricate relations between subgroups. An ethnic marker functioning as a label will mostly be used in situations where the definition is externally, when something is needed to distinguish oneself from other groups.

This being said about the functioning of ethnic markers and the strategies of definition of groups, our initial scheme has to redrawn. If we accept that language, communication codes, religion, material culture, political system, moral values, physical appearance, habits, fictive kinship ties and more things can become signs of the group identity, that they can be designated as criteria for the definition of self (and others at the same time), then the bigger scheme can be presented, simplified, like this:

For reasons of clarity all the possible relations within the scheme were not indicated. Still, they can exist. Not every culture knows all the relations and the existing relations will have a varying significance, but they can be imagined, they cannot be excluded a priori. Within the elaborated scheme much more complicated pathways of signification, of

identity formation, are possible. The triangle culture, spatial identity, image of history can be affected by the other concepts. In a culture, generally speaking, everything can define everything. This is a general semiotic principle (the semantic universe). But not every concept has the same importance in a culture, so the definition of the culture itself is bound to be related to a limited set of concepts important within that culture. The scheme above is therefore potentially infinite, but not in realit. Everything can be related to each other, but some relations exist while others not, and some are relevant for the selfdefinition of the culture while others are not.

Possible pathways of identity formation within this scheme are numerous. Looking at the definition of place by history, one can say that it can happen directly, or it can take deviations like spatial identity – material culture – religion – culture –history. And the same goes for all the other relations. In the cultural construction of a past, sounds of other histories, of habits, of scientific traditions, of religion and much more things can be heard. The habit of defining a hero in a historical narrative, or summing up three causes for something, can be related to literary traditions in the first case and religious number symbolism in the second case. Beware that in our schemes culture is linked to discourse, so a person can be part of a series of cultures, and these cultures overlap all the time. Just like the semantic universe is impossible to categorise in one ideal way, the world of cultures cannot be divided in a number of mutually exclusive groups. Some groups are connected with roles and roles can be combined. Some with religions, and the same religion can be adhered within different societies.

4.2.10. Political contexts

A political system can become an ethnic marker: we are the democratic countries. At the same time, it can be an important context for identity formation. In different political systems, different forces can work on the creation of say place identities and historical images.A political system can try to create deliberately an identity. A state can try to create a nation and become a nation- state. The model where culture is nation is state, at least in the state ideology, was upheld in different countries at different times, but in general the 19th century showed the zenit of this

idea.[259] And by now the idea has been so succesful that it has been forgotten often that other possibilities of state formation exist, that nation and state do not have to be equivalent. In Europe before WW I, the Ottoman and especially the Habsburg empire represented such different states. It is interesting to see how historians of the Habsburg empire often fail to grasp the difference between this state and the modern nation-states[260]. Criticism directed against the Habsburg monarchy is often framed in general conceptions of state that are too closely related to the nation-state. The surviving model of state is unrightly seen as the only good model for a state. This assumption makes it difficult for present- day historians to interpret the multi- ethnic empire. In general, this difficulty in interpreting different state systems is related to the unawareness of the influence of the nation state on the conception of history. The same one might add on the conception of places.

A place is seen as a place in a state, in a land, and the characteristics of that state are projected in the place, the place is compared with it. The state is an important spatial context for the interpretation of place, an important driving force in the creation of spatial identities. A place is a Dutch, German,… place. Place and time are succesfully framed in the context of a nation- state. The succes is due to the succes in creating a common identity. What we see here is not the functioning of the political system as an ethnic marker, but rather the function of the system as a shared context for the signification for place, history and group.

The Habsburg state

Coming back to the example of the Habsburg empire interwoven in these lines, we see that the factors perceived to hold the state together were religion, the Habsburg family itself and a moderated version of a functionalist and enlightened view of the state: the monarch was supposed to create wealth and support the welfare of its subjects, the structures of the state had the same purpose and had to be designed in an efficient way because of that purpose[261]. Bureaucracy became an important defining element of the Habsburg state since this class became numerous and since it was closely linked to the image of the state the leaders wanted to

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[259] Anderson (A); Hobsbawm (HE); Vlasselaers *Literature and cultural identification* (D)
[260] Fichtner, 114 (HE)
[261] Fichtner, 47

promote. People did not have to think too much for themselves –and they were not allowed to- since the royal family aided by the huge administration looked for their well- being[262]. Within this state, the notions of social class gained more significance then in other states. Croatian, Slovak, Tsjech, Hungarian, German bourgeois were able to identify as bourgeois, as citizens of the monarchy, as Croatians etc, and these identities could be added up without a problem[263]. In the absence of an idea nation= state, there was no problem in being a Croatian and an Austrian at the same time, since the Austrian regime was not built on the same type of identification as e.g. the French state –especially since Louis XIV.

Groups identified themselves within the frame of the empire in a different way than in other states. Languages could co- exist without too much problems –apart from episodes with emperors trying to force German as the sole language of government. History was written mostly in the frame of the empire. Places were places in the Habsburg monarchy and e.g. German towns in Transsylvania, inhabited by Hungarians, Romanians and other people as well. Histories of the separate ethnicities were often interpreted as signs of a will to be independent. And indeed, if they were written, they were used mostly as a tool by groupings within the ethnicities that claimed more distinct identities within the empire, more rights, maybe independence. The European context of the 19th century, seeing the rise of a series of new states based on the assumption nation=state, created a long term problem for the Austrians, since in other countries the equation of nation and state became to be seen as normal, as belonging to the natural order of things[264]. Groups within the empire started believing this idea, saw themselves distinct from their age- old neighbours and asked for a separate state[265]. In cases where ethnicities within the empire saw themselves related to groups also present in other countries or having their own state somewhere in the neighbourhood, the new ideas perceived to be natural gained hold even more quickly[266]. New

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[262] Magris 1988 and 2001 (HE)
[263] Magris 1988 and 2001
[264] Vlasselaers *Litrature* (D); Barthes *Mythologies* (S)
[265] Mannova (HEE)
[266] Anders, vol 2 (HE)

groups came into existence, writing their histories, claiming their 'natural' rights, in the end claiming their own state.

A definition of the state causes the collapse of the state

This long- term problem was one of the main causes of the collapse of the monarchy, enhastened by WW I. Before its collapse in 1918, the political structure of the Habsburg state produced identities that were impossible to maintain in other states. Claudio Magris devoted the major part of his oeuvre to the study of these mixed identities, linked to mixed histories, in the monarchy and the present countries formerly belonging to it. He also noted that the monarchy was well aware of the growing centrifugal forces within the empire, linked to the development of nationalist ideas in other countries (ultimately deriving from Herder's writings in the early 18th century) Magris interpreted the literature of the late Habsburg era and more recent literature in the Habsburg lands, and he sees the strong nostalgia about the certainties of the empire linked to the empire's strategies in politics and historiography[267].

Simply stated, we can say that the empire deliberately tried to add a historical and traditional glance to its decisions and structures. Some degree of protest against the rigid order of the state was allowed, deemed necessary, as long as the perception of an old order was maintained. The monarchy preferred protest against order to a perceived absence of order. And many of the protesters were indeed deeply attached to the order they opposed, an order that was naturalised by the fiction of a long and stable history. Only after the disappearance of the empire, the structuring power of the empire of the lives of its inhabitants was understood. The feelings of disorientation in large parts of the population, expressed in the literature after the collapse, were one of the signs of this. The strategy of naturalising the existing order by giving it a new history[268] worked too well, and people became only aware of that after the order had disappeared. Ofcourse, important regional differences could be observed, and some of the new states originating from the old empire were capable of building a new sense of order. Often, this attempt failed, partly because of the distribution of people forced to identify as being different now.

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[267] Magris 2001 (HE) on the myth of the Habsburg monarchy in Austrian literature
[268] Barthes *Mythologies*

The political structure of the Habsburg monarchy served as a context structuring histories and ethnicities (and places). All the mechanisms described in the schemes presented above can be traced in the monarchy. Histories could define places and people and people could define histories and so on. The precise ways this happened, the content of the identifications and the speed of the occurring shifts, were determined by the mechanisms inherent to the scheme and by the context of the political system. Within every political system, a certain approach towards the identities it contains, exists, as well as ideas on the desired changes in identification of the subjects. History from the perspective of the state was most often not an end in itself, rather a tool to shape itself and to shape the identifications of the subjects. An identification of the subject with the state, and an absence of conflict in combining several identities, is in the interest of the state. It minimises risks at revolts and can produce a loyalty that is interesting to exploit in all kinds of circumstances[269].

History as a tool with the functions described was self shaped in diverse ways related to the precise aim and the precise cultural context. Only a finely tuned use of history could maybe change the identifications of the subjects and reinforce the power of the state (and the people directly associated with it) In its function as a tool for state- builders, history often serves to naturalise a certain order. In the Habsburg case, it served to give the order an old and stable appearance. In the case of a series of nation- states, the histories of the newly discovered people were written to prove they were naturally defined groups deserving their own states. The borders of the states aquired indirectly a natural appearance by this use of history to construct oppressed peoples.

Much more can be said on the diverse roles of political systems in the formation of identities[270]. We would like to summarize what is important for us in the present study. Political systems perform roughly speaking three functions in identity formation. Firstly, it may be clear that the political system can be an ethnic marker. Secondly, a political system can function as a relatively neutral background for identity formation, a frame within which all the mechanisms described work, in the manner of a

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[269] Macchiavelli, *Il principe,* Florence, 1513; Kaplan om Macchiavelli and Chinese relatives (SP)
[270] Rajchman (A)

genre serving as a background for interpreting a literary text. Thirdly, a political structure can be a major power deliberately creating and reshaping identities, using history as a tool to achieve this aim. One can say that there the background becomes foreground. The state always creates itself and its subjects, at the beginning of state formation or in periods of marked transformation it tries to direct the occuring shifts in identities.

4.2.11. Conflicting identities: Crimean Tatar heritage as a case study

In the lines on political systems and in a number of the given examples, it becomes quickly clear that cultures know conflicts and that some of these conflicts are induced by their way to define themselves, places and history. Every relation in the schemes above, the construction of that relation in a certain group, can cause troubles with other groups. We will not make a second tour around the scheme to analyse all the relations and look for types of conflicts and typical reasons for conflicts. In stead, we present a small case study on the Crimean Tatars and their histories, at the heart a series of conflicts. The political context is analysed and narrowed down to the issues concerning identity, history, place and spatial planning. This way, we come closer to the next theoretical chapter, where we will focuss on the use of histories in the context of planning and design cultures –both strongly embedded in political systems. The Tatar case is based on literature, 16 interviews in Kiev and Crimea (Ukraine, sept- nov 2003), and observation in Crimea.

In Ukraine, the ethnic group of Crimean Tatars plays an important role in the collective memory of the nation. In Ukraine, as well as in the former Sovjet Union and the Russian Empire, Tatars were depicted as evil raiders and rapists, and the early history of the Muscovian state was often conceived in terms of a prolonged struggle against the Tatars- Mongols, a struggle finally resulting in the liberation from the 'Tatar Yoke' [271]. Ofcourse, this history of prejudice left its traces.

In this paper, we would like to focus on the heritage of such collective images in present- day Ukrainian culture. We will investigate the ramifications of these social memories in the processes of identity

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[271] Heller, 348 (HEE); Subtelny (HEE)

construction taking place in Crimea. First we will analyze the current state of the Tatar built heritage. The conflicting views on the palace of the Khans at Bakchisaray, the most famous example of Tatar architecture, bespeak the conflicts between several ethnicities, between their attempts to rewrite and reshape the histories and identities of themselves and the others, attempts to redraw the ethno- historical map of Crimea. All of this happens in a situation where the Crimean Tatars feel badly undervalued and underrepresented in the new Ukrainian State, and where the negative historical image of the Mongols pervades the thoughts of people. An environment came into existence that could aptly be described as a pressure- cooker for identities.

The Palace of the Khans at Bakchisaray, Crimea

Tatar architecture derives mainly from Turkish sources[272], but in the palace complex some other, sometimes surprising influences can be identified [e.g. several fine renaissance elements] Questions of authenticity can be raised in connection with the ongoing restoration process and the restorations and additions of the past. Since Catherine the Great conquered the last remnants of the Crimean Tatar Khanate in 1783, and showed off the Bakchisaray Palace to Western ambassadors [and the heir to the Habsburg throne in disguise; see Subtelny], frequent alterations were made to the complex, often refashioning it according to the most recent trends in western Orientalism[273]. The Palace of the Khans was lifted from its cultural context, diconnected from the rest of the Tatar heritage, and cultivated as a more innocent western dream of Persia and beyond.

In the meanwhile, Tatar villages were simply removed from the Crimean south coast and replaced by parks, buildings, towns designed by Western architects reshaping the area as a twin of the French an Italian Riviera's[274]. When Stalin in may 1944 moved virtually the entire Tatar population to Uzbekistan, there were few protests from the other ethnic communities to be heard. Mainly Russians took the place of the Tatars, took over their houses, gardens, furniture. When in the Gorbachev era a few hundred thousand [descendants] of these people returned to Ukraine,

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[272] Stierlin (A); Fisher (HEE)
[273] Said (A)
[274] Ferentseva, 94 (HEE); Asscherson (HEE); Subtelny (HEE)

they found the new inhabitants of their former property not eager to move[275].

Against the background of these developments, it can easily be understood that the definition of 'Tatar heritage' is a controversial issue and that the treatment of Tatar architecture already recognized as heritage [such as the Khan's palace] is a delicate matter too. The Bakchisaray palace survived because of western orientalism and is restored nowadays in a western orientalist fashion, despite the negative image of the Tatar. It is seldom by the Russians and Ukrainians acknowledged as Tatar heritage as such; even now Tatars play no significant role in the decisionmaking process concerning the palace

This decisionmaking process was first dominated by the Sovjets [and therefore mostly Russians], next by Ukrainians in Kiev, and now by the semi- autonomous government in Simferopol, Crimea, dominated by – again- Russians[276]. Tatars are, due to some clever adminstrative regulations, nearly excluded from political representation in general, and cannot decide on their own heritage. Ukraine is struggling with land reforms and land property laws as a whole, leaving often doubts about the precise ownership of certain plots and areas, and if thousands of Tatars suddenly enter the new country from Uzbekistain, claiming their former property and heritage, the confusion is predictable. The tensions rising from the general ownership problem, combined with the generally negative image of Crimean Tatars, produce a situation in which Tatar houses of a few centuries old are still being demolished and certainly not rcognized as heritage, whereas a century old Russians or western- built mansions on the coast are well- protected and generally labelled as heritage.

Bakchisaray, its old town with the famous oriental aspect, is hardly given attention by decades of Sovjet planners and 14 years of Ukrainian and Crimean planning, despite its very rare urbanistic structure and a whole series of very special houses, graveyards, public buildings in a distinctly non –russian and non- western style. That the Bakchisaray palace is still standing now, depended on western orientalism [as mentioned], on the detachment of the complex from the Tatar image, and on the figure of

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[275] Allworth (HEE)
[276] Wilson (HEE); Dzhemilev (HEE)

Pushkin, the Romantic poet who wrote a poem on the fountain of tears in the Bakchisaray palace. Pushkins poem is part of the canon of Russian literature and it is the main reason for early tourism to the palace, for the survival of the placename 'Bakchisaray' and for the greater part of the present Russian and Ukrainian interest in the place[277] Even if the fountain is likely to be a Western fake dating from the early 19th century, according to the present director. At the moment, the horde of tourists and their cash make another reason for conservation of the site. The 16th century hamam is currently rebuilt .

Ofcourse the renewed Tatar community is glad the complex still exists, but it is often deplored that there is no way of participating in the decisionmaking −as we said. Bakchisaray municipality can however be called an exception concerning Tatar heritage, since it is one of the very few places in Crimea where an effort is taken to preserve and integrate a number of freestanding Tatar monuments, mainly turbes, mausoleums[278].

In the rhetorics of the Tatar officials that are present within the Bakchisaray administration, as well as in the rhetorics of Tatar representatives at regional and state levels, the question of Tatar heritage, and the reason for preservation, is often linked to a specific interpretation of the Tatar ethnic group and a specific version of Crimean history.

Heritage as a means and an end for the Crimean Tatars

The heritage, defined by the Tatars as architectural monuments and some agricultural landscapes too [on the coast], serves as a tool to strenghten the ethnic ties by representing a common history; at the same time it serves as a tool for political emancipation of the ethnic group. The mere presence of these monuments proves the Tatar presence in the past and reinforces their political claims. The modest political power they have at the moment [also indirectly, by ways of NGO's addressing western organisations possibly putting pressure on Ukrainian authorities] is also used for the safeguarding of the heritage. So, the heritage is means and end simultaneously.

It is reasonable to say that heritage is used as a tool in politics, and that such a historical focus combines with a redefinition of the Tatar

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[277] Ferentseva (HEE); Figes, 214 (HEE)
[278] Stierlin, 57 (AR)

ethnicity. The redefinition is also tool, intended to improve the political position of the group. The strategy of redefinition consists in

a) widening the boundaries of the ethnicity, incorporating among others the presently tiny Karaim and Krimchak communities in the Crimean Tatar community [whereas these groups could be labelled Jewish as well] and

b) drawing new boundaries between the Crimean Tatars and other Tatars [Volga, Kazan, Siberian,…]

As a result, Crimean Tatars are seen fundamentelly different from the other Tatars since they have a far smaller part of mongol ancestry [the mongol army consisted mainly of turkish tribes and was small in these regions anyway], and since their line of descendance includes most of the other ethnic groups present in Crimea before the Russian conquest [late 18th century] We can see currently that the Crimean Tatars present themselves as distinctly non- mongolian [the image of the Mongol yoke still pervades Slavic thought], and as the only sizeable "indigenous people'" in the area. [instead of children of foreign invaders]

History and ethnicity of the Crimean Tatars according to themselves

They have two main arguments for this. First they claim that at the arrival of the mongols [and their turkic armies] there was a strong presence of Turkic tribes in Crimea, e.g. the Khazars[279], in western literature depicted as Turkic origin- Jewish religion people but according to the Crimean Tatars only marginally Jewish. Afterwards, they mingled and mixed with the complex mosaic of ethnicities present in Crimea in the middle ages, a complexity that can be linked to the image of mediaeval Crimea as a reserve for the last remnants of otherwise extinct ethnicities. [Goths, Sarmats, Genuese, Greeks, Armenians, Karaim, Krimchak, Feodorites,Khazars[280]] This resulted in a common Crimean culture [second argument], preserving most of the ethnic boundaries in the meantime. According to the Tatars we spoke the unity in Crimean culture before the arrival of the Russians was far greater than the differences [Western and Russian sources interpreted this differently[281]] and traces of this unity can still ben seen in shared dances, decorations, cookery of some the preserved ethnicities in Crimea.

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[279] Asscherson, 118 (HEE)
[280] Franklin, 136 (HEE)
[281] Pelenski , 83(HEE)

When the Russians came, and started reshuffling the ethicities of the area, starting with Catherine II and ending with Stalin, they destroyed the ethic fabric of Crimea, and before Gorbachev's perestroika, nothing was left of the common Crimean culture [still according to the Tatars] When in the early nineties a quarter of a million Crimean Tatars returned from Uzbekistan and some other central- asian republics, they were the only people still carrying the original Crimean culture. [And therefore their political claims ought to be taken more seriously]

The Tatars were commonly described by foreigners and conquerers as the last mongols in the west[282], the last traces of the once vast and glorious empire of the Golden Horde [the Khazan and Astrakan khanates were in Russian hands long before] Now they try to reverse the image and present themselves as the only remaining indigenous people of the peninsula. It is striking to notice the all- embracing ambition of their attempt to rewrite history: about every people is incorporated in their line of descendance by now: they have Khazar blood, Goth blood ["some of us have blue eyes"] and so forth. The Sarmats are incorporated in their history and presented as a Turkic tribe, while they had Indo- Iranian origins[283]. So, the Crimean Tatars represent all the people and the whole history of Crimea; and they are the only survivors of a former hybrid Crimean culture. It is easy to see that these two aspects of the present selfdefinition of Crimean Tatars relate to each other in a somewhat uneasy way. The image of the complete Crimean mix present in their blood combines poorly with the image of the Tatar as the only survivor of a series of indigenous people [supposing the continuous existence of ethnic boundaries and limiting the degree of ethnic mixture]

History and ethnicity of the rest according to the Crimean Tatars

Of course, it is easier to redefine oneself than to redefine someone else, if this last one is still around. It is easier to convince people about your own identity and the identity of other peoples in the past than convince people they should redefine the identities of a neighbouring people or of themselves. Still, this is necesary in the Tatar case, because some of the actors in the historical storylines they try to write still live in Crimea. There still is an Armenian community e.g., despite Stalin. It is

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[282] Greve (HEE)
[283] Phillips (HEE)

difficult for the Tatars to deny their existence and incorporate them in their own lineage. The strategy chosen in connection with the Armenians is therefore different: the present Armenians are according to the Tatars not related to the Armenians arriving from eastern Turkey [then Armenia] in the 11th century. [They left some architectural traces dating from that period, which makes this early presence easily clear[284]

In each case, the redefinition of the own identity and past necessarily implies a redefinition of the rest; it requires a complete redrawing of the ethnic maps in all the historical periods [this is true in general, but it applies strongly to this situation because the rewriting of history and ethnicity proposed by the Tatars is rigorous in every way] History and identity of e.g. the Armenians are rewritten by the Tatars. Armenians living in Crimea are mainly settled there in the 20th century. We already mentioned the historical Khazars redefined as hardly Jewish, and the present Krimchak and Karaim communities as –indeed- hardly Jewish.

The case of Krimchak and Karaim is particularly fascinating because of their complex identities and because of their present strategic role. Both have Jewish elements in history and identity. Both are extremely small: a few hundred members in each group. The line of descendance of the Karaim can be traced back at least 2000 years [as was done by mr Firkovitch in the 19th century, collecting Karaim-related manuscripts in the Caucasus and the middle east[285]] During the German occupation, the Karaim were not considered as Jewish and therefore spared, while the Krimchak were seen as Jewish and deported. After the war, both communities never overcame the deportation and the anxiety [in the Karaim case] concerning the identity raised by German actions. Nowadays, they are represented by Tatars who see in these small communities on the verge of vanishment possible allies.

They need allies in their struggle for emancipation, and they present these allies as the cultures closest to their own in present- day Crimea and best representatives of the disappearing Crimean culture they claim to have existed. The allies are small and not menacing and too small to have spokesmen themselves. They are both redefined in the Tatar frame of mind, too small to protest against it and not eager to do so: most members

[284] Nickel on Armenian architecture (AR); see also Weitenberg (HEE), section on architecture
[285] Ferentseva, 67 (HEE)

of the communities are old and the degree of identification with the karaim and krimchak labels of identity is not very high. The Crimean Tatars can easily redraw this part of the ethnic- historical map and turn it to their own use [which is not difficult to understand given their precarious situation]

Resistance to the Tatar perspective on Crimean history and ethnicity

But unfortunately for the Tatars not everyone is that easy to convince or to use; in general, Ukainians still consider them to be direct descendants of the Mongols and a reminder of foreign invasions[286]. The Tatar image is still negative, linked as it is to the negative image of the Mongolian invaders and the Mongolian Yoke, supposedly limiting the development of a Russian state for a long while and influencing it in only negative ways. The Russian and Ukrainian reduction and negation of positive and constructive Mongol influences on Russian state formation and culture is easily visible. In Russian and later Ukrainian historiography the Mongol influence is persistently downplayed and where it is shown, this is done exclusively in negative terms. Russians and Ukrainians use supposedly Mongol influences as proof of negative characteristics they ascribe to each other. Russians ascribe Ukrainians weak abilities of government to a history of Mongol occupation, and Ukrainians say the Russians, descendents of the Muscovian state as they are, owe their absolutist and totalitarian tendencies to a longer Mongolian presence there[287]. Russian history presents the empire of Kiev Rus as the first Russian state, temporarily disrupted by Batu Khans invasion in the 13th century, and continuing with the Muscovian state, in the beginning a vassal- state of Khans residing on the Caspian shore [at Sarai more precisely] The whole course of Russian history [and later Sovjet history] is largely defined [in the Russian historical tradition] by the Mongols- Tatars, as the negative force to oppose, the archetypical enemy [modern research proves this image to derive mainly from religious sources, unfortunately the only written sources from the early Moscovian state we possess[288]

So, the negative image of the Tatar is too strong to counter. Crimean Tatars tried deal with this problem by differentiating themselves from the Mongols, but didn't succeed. They tried to find allies but they were to

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[286] Wilson passim(HEE)
[287] Ostrowski, 98 (HEE)
[288] Ostrowski (HEE); Pelenski, 143 (HEE)

small to be perceived by the authorities. And if so, they were dismissed, by the Ukrainian authorities but also by the intellecual elite, as a Tatar invention. Indeed, in Kiev, the Karaim and Krimchak communities were labelled mostly −if they were known at all- as identities under construction or simply as Tatar inventions. Ironically, Ukrainians themselves were labelled in the 19th century as Habsburg inventions [Polish elites within the Habsburg empire saw themselves opposed in certain areas by a Ruthenian community −later renamed Ukrainian- they perceived as a Habsburg invention to counterbalance Polish power in the east: divide et impera[289]

Invention or not, Ukrainians gradually began to consider themselves an ethnicity and finally got their own state[290] . Point is that an ethnic community is to a certain point always an invention: there is no natural order prescribing the formation of identities. If a group starts to perceive itself as a group and as different from the environment, an ethnicity can emerge. Sometimes, the emergence of identities can be stimulated by external forces for external purposes. But this does not mean the sometimes resulting ethnicity is not 'real'. Again: an ethnic group exists from the moment the group thinks it is a group[291]

Rebuilding forgotten ethnicities along the way

It is however ironical to see one 'invented community'[292] refusing to take another community serious because it is invented. Remains the question if Karaim and Krimchak communities are indeed invented [by Tatars] One cannot deny the historical presence of these communities on Crimean soil, so we would have to speak of a re-invention. And there is a classic paradox present in the situation: the moment an identity is vanishing can equally be interpreted as the moment of invention. Karaim and Krimchak communities were already shrinking and russifying for a few centuries when WW II gave the final blow to the dynamism of the commuinities. After the war, very few people regarded themselves as Karaim or Krimchak in the first place [maybe first Russian, than Karaim] Only aged people define themselves as such nowadays. No special schools exist, the language disappeared, only one priest survives for the two religions. The kenasa in Kiev, this is the Karaim religious building, is the

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[289] Subtelny (HEE); Fichtner, 169 (HE)
[290] Wilson (HEE)
[291] Eriksen, 64 (A); Van de Vijver (A)
[292] Anderson (A)

only religious building not returned to its community after communism, simply because there was no community asking for it. Assimilation with the Russian ethnicity, not only adopting the Russian language, was the most common strategy for Karaim people to survive or to climb the social ladder. [even if the russians showed some folkloristic interest in the tiny community with its exotic characteristics]

It is almost impossible to say what gave the impetus for the present attempt to rebuild the ethnicity: the increased self- awareness typical for the moment a group is waning [or in general something is disappearing, becoming rare] or on the other hand the external stimulus of the Tatar interest in the small neighbouring communities [one should say: the interpretation of certain similarites among neighbours as a sign of an ethnicity] Neither can one predict if this attempt at reconstruction will succeed: it depends obviously on a series of external factors, but also on some internal ones, starting with the accessibility of the community: will they accept new Karaim or Krimchak and what does it take to become a member?

If the attempt succeeds, it is uncertain whether the refreshed or reinvented community will stay a faithful ally of the Crimean Tatars in their political struggle, if they will still accept the interpretation the Tatars gave of their history and identity. A lot will depend too on the position of the Tatars in the future: if their struggle produces satisfying results for them, it is likely that the ideological pressure on the rewriting of history and identity will diminish, allowing for more different interpretations and critical reexaminations. From their point of view, a Ukrainian recognition of a Tatar problem is a necessary first step in the emancipation process. As long as Ukrainians perceive the Tatars as already privileged [which they are in a limited number of cases, e.g. entry to universities] and still foreign, and as long as they see the Tatar problem as an invention by the EU to keep Ukraine out of the club, history and ethnicity, and therefore heritage, are likely to stay the battleground for Tatars and Ukrainians.

Once again: the model of identity construction

Let us take a step back now and try to schematize some of the points mentioned earlier in this text. First, we will reproduce a scheme we presented earlier on, a scheme on identity production. The case of Bakchisaray and Crimean Tatar heritage, the way this is linked to the permanent reconstructions of histories and identites, serves as an example

of the relations and the mechanisms presented in the scheme. These relations and mechanisms exist elsewhere too, but here they have a clarity seldom to be found; things hidden under the surface in Western societies are in the open in Crimea.

PLACE IDENTITY   **IMAGE OF HISTORY**

GROUP IDENTITY

PERSONAL IDENTITY

By which we want to visualize that personal identity derives from [a series of] group identities, but mainly that place identity, group identity and image of history mutually define each other. In the Tatar case, there is obviously a specific version of history promoted by the Tatars, different from the view of Ukrainians; there is a specific selfdefinition [group identity] different from the image Ukrainians have of the Tatars, and there is a distinct view on place identities [on the Crimea in general, on some cultural landscapes and architectural monuments in specific] One can say that the heritage is a category of place identities closely linked to group identity and image of history, because it is the collection of sites and objects that are defined by the group as typical for the group and the version of history they want it to have. It makes the group version of history visible in the landscape.

The group needs a history to define itself in a proper way in a given situation, and the Crimean Tatar situation asks for a stress on and strong reinterpretation of history[293] This particular group in this particular situation needs to reinterpret history and integrate this reinterpretation in the core of its identity because the place of the group in society is contested, and a negative version of history is at the core of the problems. Therefore, Tatars themselves were forced to focuss on history as well, and

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[293] Semena, 12 (A)

a vigorously reinterpreted version of history was used to rebuild the ethnicity.

Conflicting Crimean identities as expressed by the model

They had to redraw the historical– ethnic map to make the operation more convincing and logical –for themselves and the outside world. Existing and vanished ethnic groups and their histories were redefined in order to fit the new selfdefintion and history of the Crimean Tatars. Vanished people do not oppose this, some existing people [Russians and Ukrainians, Armenians] do oppose; some people, Karaim and Krimchak are presented as allies [or merely invented according to opponents] The Tatar attempt at redrawal of the mentioned map can be presented as follows, reasoning similarily as in the former scheme: It presents the Crimean Tatar point of view.

TATAR CRIMEAN HISTORY:

INCORPORATING KHAZARS, GOTHS, ITALIANS, ARMENIANS, KOSSACK SARMAT, SCYTH HISTORIES

DIFFERENT FROM KHAZAR, GOTHS, ITALIANS, ARMENIANS, KOSSACKS ETC. HISTORIES

DIFFERENT FROM TURKISH HISTORIES

VERY DIFFERENT FROM RUSSIAN- UKRAINIAN-WESTERN HISTORIES

TATAR IDENTITY

VERY CLOSE TO KARAIM AND KRIMCHAK ID

CLOSE TO TURKISH ID

REMOTE FROM ARMENIAN ID

REMOTE FROM MONGOLIAN ID

VERY REMOTE FROM RUSSIAN ID

VERY REMOTE FROM UKRAINIAN ID

THE ONLY REAL CRIMEAN PEOPLE

TATAR HERITAGE

HERITAGE OF ALL CRIMEAN PEOPLE

HERITAGE OF THEIR OWN

TATAR VERSION OF E.G. ARMENIAN IDENTITY –HERITAGE- HISTORY FITS INTO THIS SCHEME

ARMENIAN VERSION OF ARMENIAN IDENTITY- HERITAGE- HISTORY DOES NOT FIT INTO THIS SCHEME

ARMENIAN VERSION OF TATAR IDENTITY- HERITAGE- HISTORY DOES NOT FIT INTO THIS SCHEME

TATAR VERSION OF E.G. KARAIM ID –HER- HIST FITS INTO THIS SCHEME

KARAIM VERSION OF KARAIM ID- HER – HIST FITS MORE OR LESS INTO THIS SCHEME

RUSSIAN- UKRAINIAN VERSION OF KARAIM ID- HER- HIST DOES NOT FIT INTO THIS SCHEME

JEWISH VERSION OF KARAIM ID- HER- HIST DOES NOT FIT INTO THIS SCHEME

TATAR VERSION OF TATAR ID- HER- HIST FITS INTO THIS SCHEME

RUSSIAN- UKRAINIAN VERSION OF TATAR ID- HER – HIST DOES NOT FIT INTO THIS SCHEME

This elaborate scheme tries to represent the necessary redrawal of the ethnic- historical map of the area in the reconstruction of Tatar identity, and to give an impression of the contestation aroused by this attempt in the different groups. Every line in history and identity that is drawn in a different direction, every link broken or strenghtened can make friends and enemies. People can or cannot accept the new versions of self and other resulting from the identity reconstruction process. In a situation where ethnic complexity is a hallmark of the region, resources are scarce and a history of conflicts exists between the ethnicities, every action is more likely to encounter more sensitivities than in the west. Still, every process described here is also present in the west. Also here, in Holland, they are present, however often in disguise, due to the more abundant ressources etc. Moreover, there is a long- standing tradition in the Netherlands, especially in the authorities dealing with spatial planning and heritage to present spatial and historical values as objective and neutral[294]. We argue that the links represented in the schemes and discussed in the text, links between group identity, history and place identity, every

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[294] Van Assche 2004 (SP)

concept in all its manifestations, exist everywhere. And therefore values of place, quality of place, value of history, quality of heritage, can never be assessed apart from cultural factors and the political use they are put to.

Conclusion

Crimean Tatar heritage, history and culture [ethnicity] are redefined in one and the same movement, as presented in the scheme of mutual definition of identities [identity construction]   Heritage, history and ethnicity are rewritten for a political purpose: a better representation, more rights, a recognition as indigenous people, a solution for the land property and housing problems. It is fascinating to see how in political power struggle the group transforms itself; the culture returning from Uzbekistan has already changed because a different selfdefinition was politically advantageous. This points again at the impossibility of looking for essences in culture [and consequently heritage] and at the impossibility of an objective and lasting assessment of the value of cultural heritage. This does not imply that it is unimportant. On the contrary, the Crimean Tatar case shows very clearly how important cultural heritage can be in real life, as a means and as an end. It shows how pervasive the influence of these signs of a certain history can influence the political sphere of a country and its people.

4.2.12. Conclusion

The model of identity construction we just analysed extensively can be seen as one important class or cluster of relations between people, history and place. It is valid for the cultures involved in the planning process as well as for the cultures of the users of the place. It is not the only type of relations –as can be deduced simply from the material of the other case studies- but the sole existence of the type of relations visualized in the identity model leads to the conclusion that history, people and place cannot be treated separately in a planning process and more generally in planning systems. The links between history, people and place, interconnected with an identity concept *can become relevant at any given moment* and cannot escape our attention a priori. Apart from that, the observation is important that it marks planning cultures too. This leads to the conclusion that the planning cultures themselves should be studied constantly, since in planning cultures views on history, people and place

can emerge that are too much coloured by the own culture, without one is being aware of it. This is a separate argument undermining most of the technocratic and scientific ideals still to be found in a host of planning cultures. In every planning system a strong planning culture can be born that develops its own version of history, people and place, its own distinct preferences in dealing with them, apart from the real preferences of the people one is officially working for.

In the next chapter we will give an interpretive account of the Dutch planning culture, without judging it, rather using it as an interesting model for planning cultures in general. We will point at a series of mechanisms that are present in most other European countries as well, mechanisms relevant for our subject- matter, and we will observe some mechanisms and characteristics that are typical for the Dutch situation.

4.3. The cultures of planning in society

4.3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, we will focuss on the cultures of planners and designers, by which we mean cultures of urban planners, landuse planners, urban designers, landscape architects and related fields[295]. We will not define these cultures here, but investigate them within the general conceptual frame outlined in the previous chapter. The cultures have to emerge empirically and cannot be defined a priori, in accordance with the methodical paragraphs on discourse and discourse- studies. All the mechanisms described in the last pages will reappear, and to this will be added typical mechanisms for the planning etc cultures, characterised –this we can say now- by a tradition of involvement with the state and politics. In this chapter, often the Dutch system of planning and design will feature as our central case. Here and there examples from other cultures will appear.

Within this conceptual and geographical frame we will investigate how images of place, history and group interact, and how the planning system shapes the use of historical objects, structures and knowledge in practice. Power, politics, strategy and so on, as used in the coming chapters on planning, have to be interpreted aigainst the background of the conceptual frame constructed in the first chapters. We will also refer back to the three case studies where mechanisms or characteristics of the planning and design cultures are analysed we met there before.

In the compendium of concepts we briefly discussed the roles of knowledge and power in a planning system, and in the case studies many examples emerged of the various roles of these concepts. In this chapter we want to come back to this, in a more systematic fashion. The maps of the planning and design worlds presented to the outside world are mostly maps drawn by themselves, resting on certain assumptions. We will try to make clear that an optimal use of history in the planning and design systems must rest on a redrawal of these maps. A redrawal implies a critical

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[295] Models for this analysis are Hajer (SP), Westerman 2002 and 2001 (SP), Flyvbjerg 1998 (SP), Allmendinger (SP), Faludi and van der Valk (SP), Dryzek (S), Foucault (D). The view on new forms of democracy implied is partly inspired on Mouffe, Kohn, Saward, Warren, Wright, Hillier and Hajer (SP)

examination of the differences between ideal and reality, between acts and thoughts in these cultures. In the case of the planning and design cultures, there is a special reason to adopt a critical stance towards the selfdefinitions: the groups studied have a clear function, for which they are paid by government money. Planners and designers have a responsibility to use these public spendings in an efficient way, avoiding waist of money and trying to reach the goals as good as possible. If the selfimages prevent this task from being carried out well, they ought to change.

In the context of this book, it is important to look at a series of elements in the selfimage of planning and design cultures. It is crucial to study what the image of planning and design from within is, next what kind of images of knowledge, power and their roles exist. Then the imagined role of cultural and historical knowledge in planning and design can be studied. This imagined role is constituted by, rests on, the assumptions made in the other definitions and images. If we want to deconstruct this imagined role and replace it in the conclusions and recommandations by a more realistic role, enabling planners and designers to achieve the goal in a democratic way, one has to deconstruct the former assumptions too. In other words: a realistic study –starting from an antirealist theory of knowledge- leading to realistic conclusions needs to look at the images of planning, the images in planning of knowledge and power, and the images of (the role of) historical knowledge. And compare them to observed practices.

4.3.2. Planning in society

In order to understand the workings of planning and design cultures, we need models of society in general. It is not our intention to elaborate much upon this; the models presented here are simple and serve only to illustrate the reasoning followed on planning and design cultures. Let us start with the simplest model of all, while all- embracing. How do we look at planning in society?

Administration — Politics

Science — Citizens

As in the schemes on identity formation, the bidirectional arrows mean that these four actors shape each other, define each other. The meaning of defining is somewhat different compared to the identity schemes, but in a general sense they define each other. We will not analyse every relation in this scheme separately. We do want to point at a few assumptions underlying this scheme. Most important one is that these different actors do not function independently. Every actor has a different selfperception concerning independence, but none of them is really independent. Science perceives itself to be independent, but is also shaped by society in general, by the administration responsible for funding and defining important research areas and questions and sometimes directly by politics, able to do the same things. This interdependence of science and society, this mutual definition, is derived from Latour borrowing in turn from Foucault. It is based on the basic postmodern assumption of social construction of reality, we discussed earlier on.

The political system is supposed to be independent from the administration (in Europe), but in practice, people in the administration outlive the responsible politicians and politics and administration shape each other. This assumption counters the enlightenment myth of complete independence of political systems (a prerequisite for a smooth representation of the collective will of the people in politics; the administration is not elected and is not supposed to exert influence on politics[296]) Citizens adopt a political system but once adopted they are shaped by it too, as well as by the bureaucratic structures erected to make the system work and pervade the daily lives of the citizens[297] (The Habsburg example demonstrated the potential power of this relation)

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[296] van Westerloo (SP)
[297] Crozier (SP); Yiftachel; Tewdwr-Jones; Scott (all SP)

One important part of the administration for us is the planning administration. Sometimes it exists as one recognisable organisation, sometimes not. In some countries it is more powerful than in other countries. Mostly, it exists in one form or another. Professionally trained planners, urban designers, landscape architects can be part of this administration, apart from economists, lawyers, architects, engineers, ecologists, hydrologists and others. Every country, every political system, every culture has a different abundance and relative importance of every group. This can be linked to the characteristics of culture, the culture of the administration in general, the design, role and important of the different institutions within the state.

An example: In Holland the polder- boards, being the oldest official institutions, responsible for organising the struggle against the water, have a history of importance. The local polder boards where in former centuries often as powerful as the municipalities or other local administrations. Polder boards are traditionally dominated by lawyers (at least in the last century). On the other hand, the importance of water in the Dutch state organisation can also be linked to the importance of the ministry of Rijkswaterstaat (responsible for waterways and roads). This ministery used to be responsible or feel responsible for a series of matters now perceived to be pertaining to spatial planning (in Holland) It was and is dominated by engineers. This means that some questions in spatial planning were treated by people from the polder boards and Rijkswaterstaat. If happening now, it would be perceived as an interference of lawyers and engineers in a world of more or less design- oriented professions. This example illustrates at the same time the shaping of the administration by scientifical disciplines (We might add that several disciplines looking at the same spatial question can define problems, methods and solutions in different ways)

4.3.3. Power in society and in planning

Let's make the scheme a bit more complex now by looking at the role of power. First, we want to look at the official role of power, i.e. the roler power plays within the selfimage of the state organisation. Power is

exerted through representation and participation[298]. Citizens delegate power by electing politicians representing them. Politicians are aided by an administration that branches off, from national to local organisations, this way influencing the daily lives of the citizens. This line of power we call power by representation. A second line we may call power by participation. Sometimes the decisions taken by local adminstrations (and other ones) do not represent the will of the citizens sufficiently enough. In the series of interpretations of the will of the people starting after the elections and ending in small scale municipalities anything can go wrong, and it is difficult to guarantee that the resulting decisions at a local level are still congruent with the initial intentions of the voters. This was often experienced by Dutch citizens in recent years, and the answer to the problem formulated by the Dutch state was a more direct way of asking people their preferences in –mostly- local matters. In the field of planning, it resulted in so- called participatory planning, planning processes whereby a series of non- governmental actors are represented and are supposed to co- decide. These two lines of power can be illustrated by the following scheme. The arrows symbolise the direction power is exerted in.

Representation is encircled by an arrow designating that power is delegated to politics by citizens and exerted by politics via administration on citizens, whereas participation shows a straight arrow meaning that

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[298] Hajer and Wagenaar (SP), Pellizioni (SP), Dryzek (SP); Kohn; Sager; Saward (all SP)

citizens decide more directly, exert power direction adminstration (and sometimes politics) Science can shape or influence the ideas of every actor in this scheme, as well as the interactions between the actors. By the addition of the word knowledge to science we want to point at the distinction between scientific knowledge and lay knowledge, a distinction that plays an important role in planing culture, a distinction that is socially constructed partly within the planning culture. More on this later. Here it may suffice to say that the introduction of user groups in a planning system because of the new line of interactive or participatory planning, brings in their knowledge simultaneously. The distinction between the expert-scientific knowledge of the professional planners (and architects) and the lay knowledge of the user groups and other non- planning actors comes to the fore inescapably in such situations, and the definition of expert knowledge, scientific knowledge becomes a matter of debate much quicker than in the more closed environment of an autonomous planning agency, free from interaction with the user groups[299].

Let us reformulate the scheme as far as the lines of power are concerned. We will heap up administration and politics for a moment, and divide this heap into three spatial scales, relevant in Dutch administration: municipality, province and state.

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
[299] van Woerkum (SP); Huxley, Kohn, Gordon (all SP)

People elect politicians at the various scales, people can participate in decision- making mostly at the local level and in the case of specific projects that can be located at the various scales. We present this scheme primarily because it shows how municipalities and projects are the strongest potential meeting places of the two lines of power. In this sense, they are crossroads of power, places of confrontation and places of communication. These types of organisations are closer to the daily lives of the citizens and their everyday interests, and are places of strong synthesis, because a wide array of group cultures can be influential in the context of participatory planning. It can be argued too that the degree of synthesis is higher at the state level, since all the groups' interests have to be regarded at this level. We can reply that at the state level the official actors interpret the interests of the diverse groups, while at the lower levels, the groups can present their preferences more directly. In the last case, the synthesis will be more 'real' in combining different preferences in stead of interpretations of preferences.

Let us come back to power now, in its other forms. In the case on the Wageningen gardens, and in the first chapters, we came across several mechanisms related to the mutual construction of knowledge an power. Power can create knowledge and knowledge can create power. To this we can add a specification, i.e. that the special type of knowledge we call science creates power in a special way and vice versa. In an ideal- typical present- day Dutch planning process, combining the two lines of power discussed above, both scientific knowledge and other knowledge can play a strategic role. In the old line of power, including the traditional roles of the planning administration, diverse disciplines play a role (cf supra) The traditional planning system, we can label technocratic, also produced knowledge[300]. In the urban planning and design disciplines, the research areas and questions where partly shaped by the Dutch planning organisation. New types of participation bring in new types of non- scientific knowledge into the planning system: user groups or other actors simply *like* places, be attached to places, be attracted to certain design styles and so on. Apart from that, one can notice a growing role of traditional science in the planning arguments of the user groups (they have ecological assesments written) and a growing interest in non- scientific knowledge

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[300] Faludi and van der Valk (SP)

within the planning administration (experience studies are ordered) This network of relations can be represented as follows

Power representation ⟷ **Science**

Power participation ⟷ **Other knowledge**

4.3.4. Planning power and networks

There are limits to the new line of power. The users of a new space have constraints on available, time, knowledge, other resources. Their interest in the matter at hand can be moderate or small. These limits can prevent further participation or it can induce another solution, normal practice now, i.e. indirect participation. In this situation, an organisation represents the interest of user group or other interest group. This becomes a new kind of representation, taking part in decision- making, a form of representation outside the official state administration and its mechanisms of clarity and control. In the context of this changing socio- political organisation of planning, it is easy to understand that networks become more important to hold a grip on the process, to prevent the new organisation from shifting permanently and simply to make it work. Networks always existed, were always important, but in the case of the Dutch planning system in transformation, they gained more significance, since the introduction of participatory planning created new opportunities for old networks, as shadow structures overlapping organisations, to come to the surface, and it created a new demand for networks[301].

In relation to spatial issue X we can simplify a Dutch networks like this

Administration ⟷ **Organisation A**   **Organisation D**

Organisation B

Organisation C

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
[301] Compare Hajer- Wagenaar (SP)

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But the administration is not one monolithic block. It consists of several layers and segments and the smaller units have preferential links with organisations and groups outside the administration; they can have their own cultures and their own goals (a minimal one being the goal to survive, apart from the question whether this unit is needed in the whole design of the administration[302]) Therefore, we make the scheme somewhat more complex. Parts of the administration are mentioned separately and several scientific disciplines feature in the scheme, for having preferential links with certain parts of the administration and certain organisations.

In this scheme groups of actors can become more closely linked, can start to develop together, can develop common characteristics, a common culture. In the case of spatial planning we call this a planning culture. An a priori definition of how a Dutch planning culture could look like schematically can be deduced from the scheme below. The line delineates a Dutch planning culture. Segments of economy are added to the scheme, since they can be important actors in the planning network, while organisations are left out for sake of clarity. It must be kept in mind that the links with the organisations still exist. It must be acknowledged that in the following scheme two types of networks are combined: an old one and a new one. The old one, supposed to be present (the arguments come later) in connections between science, administration and companies, and a relatively new one, due to interactive planning, involving some of the

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[302] Wissink (SP); Stacey (SP); Mouffe; Mumby (SP)

old network actors in an envigorated way, as well as user groups and interest groups freshly entering the planning system.

How to study a planning culture in the sense implied in this scheme? How to delineate? **One way [A]** to do it, is using an anthropological method in a certain place[303]. In our three case studies, we did the same, and it will be repeated in the next chapter (on the Ukrainian planning and design system) We combined it with semiotics and discursive analysis. The cases on Wageningen and especially Leidsche Rijn revealed characteristics of the Dutch planning and design cultures, and the existence of such cultures as such.

Another method **[B]** can consist in the analysis of concepts used within a planning and design system[304]. The ways concepts acquire content and function in a certain context are revealing about that context. This method is adopted in parts of the case studies and the theoretical chapters. E.g., elsewhere[305], we demonstrated that the Dutch use of the concept of Multiple Land use marks a tendency towards blurring the borders between model and reality in Dutch planning culture, a related tendency towards simplification and an inclination to objectify things, make them look objective and subject of scientific planner's knowledge.

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[303] de Boeck (A); cf Douglas (SP); Barth 2000 (A)
[304] Hoppe (SP); Hajer and Wagenaar (SP); Hajer (SP); Healy 1999, Phelps (SP)
[305] Van Assche 2004 (SP)

In this book, we do not try to study Dutch planning culture extensively and exhaustively. We only analyse what is important in order to understand the potential roles of historical objects and structures in urban planning and design. Features of Dutch planning culture, as we interpret it, do appear in the compendium of concepts, and in the case studies too, a number of characteristics was analysed. The drive towards objectification, neutrality, absence of values and simplification mentioned in the last paragraph, was also described in the case studies and in the theoretical parts (based on literature and my own research)

An historical component is largely lacking, due to the chosen subject and general method. The case studies and the theory presented do not produce an overview of the development of Dutch planning culture, but this is unncecessay for the issues at hand. The study of the development is in our view the *third way* **[C]** to analyse a planning culture,[306] however not really practised in this dissertation.

4.3.5. Networks and planning cultures

Coming back to the scheme above, and to the development of Dutch planning culture, we shall add only a few historical lines, necessary to understand the next pages. In Holland, a long standing relation exists between certain disciplines, parts of the administration and companies. The Dutch state is marked by strong centralist and technocratic tendencies since the second half of the 19th century at least[307]. This is combined with a tradition in hiring private firms or founding private companies to carry out works ordered by the state. In 1860 the Heidemij was started –still alive under the name Arcadis- with the explicit aim to cultivate the barren grounds of the Veluwe, mostly heaths. A variety of engineering firms became closely linked with the government, the same being true for building firms. The Dutch state planned large- scale building projects but had them carried out by private builders that became big too, thanks to this close association with the centralist and keenly planning government. After a while, the government needed the builders to keep on planning, reclaiming land and so on, and they started to take the companies' interests

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[306] van der Woud (SP)
[307] Van der Valk 1991; Faludi and Van der Valk (SP)

into account[308]. Government and companies became interdependent in a high degree (especially in more ambitious phases).

Concerning science, it is useful to say that a lot of government money was invested in the creation of new knowledge thought useful in redrawing the land. Agricultural institutes, engineering schools, planning and architecture school received far more money than in the neighbouring countries. At the same time, the demands were high: the new knowledge needed to be applicable instantaneously, needed to fit into the ruling ideas in politics and planning administration. This demand did not always fit easily into the traditional definitions of a scientific discipline.

One can say that a group of companies, a number of disciplines and a set of governmental organisations developed in a very close symbiosis, bringing about remarkable practical achievements (the influence of the planning sector in Holland can be noticed in the wink of an eye) and bringing into existence a planning culture, a group of people sharing views on how to plan the country, and more. The engineering firms gave advises the administration expected and the scientists did the same, in the meanwhile providing the governmental planning system with a permanent scientific legitimation.

The system was widely accepted and seen as one of the things Holland could be proud of. One can say it is well- routed in general Dutch culture. More authors have underlined this last point, have stressed the decisiveness of the congruence between culture and planning culture as a succes factor for Dutch planning[309].

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[308] More research is needed on this issue. However, it is very clear that the symbiotic relationship between firms and parts of the administration existed for a long time in Holland. People could be easily exchanged between firms and administration, the firms grew big –compared to other countries- due to a constant flow of state investment, the same rationalities became characteristic for firms and administraton alike. This situation originates in the second half of the 19th century. Nowadays, market mechanisms operate more freely, but the international strategic advantage of the Dutch engineering firms is still partly due to the long- standing relation wth the Dutch state. Within Holland, the modified version of free market that goes with the situation of symbiosis is still largely intact. (a discursive analysis of publications like *60 jaar Heidemij*, Apeldoorn, 1946, could be revealing; compare Healy 1999, SP)

[309] Faludi and van der Valk (SP); Wissink (SP)

4.3.6. Planning culture and general culture

At this point we want to take a normative stance: we say that such a congruence[310] is a necessary condition for good planning. (The case of the design cultures differs slightly here, because of the artistic element involved) In Holland, the system works because it fits the general culture, not in the first place because it is objectively good in one way or another. Arguments have been made that the amount of planners and designers in Holland is an important sign or a proof of its succes, others have said that the procedures have an objective quality −e.g. guaranteeing perfect democratic legitimation- still others tended to think that the design styles had objective value or that the specific implementation of scientific knowledge made the system superior.

We argue that none of this is true but that it doesn't matter whether it is true, as long as it fits the general culture. If people are satisfied it is a good plan, if they think it is beautiful, it is o.k., if they feel represented in a sufficient way, there is no problem. The attitudes towards the state, its role, the procedures of government, the ideas on rule and order, on democracy, ideas on the utilitarian criteria applied to knowledge, all these things are defined within a general Dutch culture. A representation of the people is good if the general idea on democracy is compatible with the existing procedures. Planning is good and its assumptions are true if it works. An instrumental definition of truth −in logical terms- is the only one applicable to planning.[311] All the other truths are constituted within the discourses of the participating groups, truths that meet each other and confront each other in the planning arena's. And they meet in a good way if the arena's are constructed according to the taste of the groups and the rules of the game are acceptable for all the participants (we refer to the lines on gaming in the Leidsche Rijn case)[312]

But, often, and we argue also in Holland at the moment, such a desirable congruence between planning culture and general culture cannot be found. A congruence can exist and disappear after a while, producing

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[310] Pelizzioni (SP); Allmendinger 2001; Mouffe (SP)

[311] Such a conception places us once more in the line of the American pragmatists Dewey, Peirce, James, Rorty. See also Mouffe (SP), Kohn (SP), Warren (SP)

[312] And to the theoretical tradition under construction represented by such authors as: Dryzek; Hillier; Healy; Bryson, Allmendinger and the others present in the references above.

dissatisfacton with the existing system and the results it produced. Let us present a situation of congruence the following way. General culture permeates organisations influencing a planning culture consisting of companies, disciplines and ofcourse parts of the administration.

Administration A   **Administration B**

Discipline A   **Discipline B**

Economy A   **Economy B**

Group 1   **Group 2**   **Group 3**

General culture

Organisations, groups, and especially institutions take a time to evolve, they always have a certain degree of rigidity.[313] Problem is that different organisations and groups evolve at different speeds, that ideas can gain a following very quickly too. Or loose it. And the planning system has an extra problem: the paradox mentioned in the Leidsche Rijn case, the paradox according to which the game- related uncertainty in the system has to be diminished by the augmenting of the number and rigidity of rules, while the society- related uncertainty can be controlled only by dropping rules and increasing the flexibility of the system. The planning system needs to provide a frame for action on the longer term, providing a secure environment encouraging actors to act and to invest, while at the same time the behaviour of the actors and their preferences cannot be predicted (the unpredictability and discontinuity of discourse) Ideally, constant adaptation is needed, but this would make the whole planning

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[313] Stacey (SP), de Jong (SP), Scott (SP)

system useless.[314] Therefore, a balance between flexibility and rigidity has to be defined and publicly discussed every moment, and an ideal balance does not exist. An eternally valid balance does not exist either (we refer again to the Leidsche Rijn case)

4.3.7. Gaps between general culture and planning culture: decalages

Result of these combined forces is the almost permanent existence of what we call a *decalage*[315], a difference between planing culture and general culture. The administration and the related disciplines usually do not evolve as fast as the societal actors. And the groups chosen to be the representative actors in society can become far less representative in a brief time span. The representatives of these representative actors can also loose their representativity quickly, and the other actors within the planning culture are not necessarily aware of these evolutions. Apart from the speed differences in evolution and the impossibility to monitor all the evolutions in culture that might be relevant for the organisation of planning, there is an extra problem. Once an organisation exists, once a new department of the administration is founded, it becomes gradually more difficult to erase[316]. An organisation always tends to survive and to broaden its scope, responsabilities, size; it tries to acquire more power. These processes go on apart from the questions whether the organisation fulfills its function. Functions can be redefined, the same being true for goals, internal structures, participants. Another aspect of this process is the mere fact of a traditional existence after a while. If an organisation has a history, it becomes normal for the other actors to take it into account in their strategic calculations, always containing a ritualistic element[317]. (People are used to deal with these and these parties, are even used to certain standard–defined enemies)

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[314] compare again Maturana (OT)

[315] I owe this concept to the late professor Voordekkers, expert in Byzantine culture at Leuven university. He used the term to denote the different evolution of cultural and military power in the empire. A few decades after the disastrous battle of Manzikert (1071) Byzantine artistic production reached its zenith.

[316] Stacey (SP), Wissink (SP), Macchiavelli;

[317] Kaplan (SP); Wissink (SP); Warren; Mumby (SP)

These characteristics of organisational dynamics tend to maginify the decalage, make the gap wider between society and planning culture. To a certain extent, a decalage is normal, has to be accepted. And the knowledge of planners will be regarded by society as somewhat difficult to understand, but still accepted as expert- knowledge. If the decalage becomes too big, people become dissatisfied with the planning system, then the formerly assumed objective knowledge of the planners looses its perceived objectivity, becomes part of just one idea on the spatial organisation of the land, one idea amongst others. In a post- modern society, this tendency to attenuate the expert- character of planner's knowledge is aggravated, since more and more groups in society experience the plurality of truth as an everyday fact[318]. Conversely, one sees attempts at redefinition of the planner's role in society, moving from an expert role to a facilitator's role, mediating between different interest groups[319].

4.3.8. Responses to decalages[320]

Such a redefinition of the planner's role is one type of response to a perceived decalage in the planning culture. Other responses might include ignoring the societal changes and the decalage, interpreting it in different directions, making a change in selfperception unnecessary, trying to change society according to the planner's image −go back to the old ideals of social engineering. Another type of response can consist in the planning culture changing itself according to a perception of the societal changes highly coloured by its own culture. And the planning culture can change itself based on a generally accepted interpretation of the cultural changes, but in such a way that the important forces and organisations in a planning culture survive and retain at least part of their own goals, now becoming more and more implicit. The old forces, goals, ideas, organisations are not necessarily useful in the new situation, but can often manage to survive at least partially thanks to a self- chosen reframing of the organisation driven

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[318] Hajer- Wagenaar (SP); Van Assche and Jacobs 2003 (SP)

[319] Faludi 1973 (SP)

[320] It might be useful to stress that it is not our intention to demonstrate the existence of very problematic decalages in the Dutch planning system. We are first of all interested in the mechanisms causing decalages and some internal responses to decalages that can potentially aggravate them.

by a perception of changes in society that are strategically important to reckon with. Examples of the diverse types of responses to an important decalage can be found everywhere in planning practice. An attempt at changing society can be found in all the Dutch government rhetorics, e.g. in planning, about the urgence of creating a basis of support for ideas and plans launched by the administration. An attempt at transforming the own organisation while reinterpreting the societal changes in the old frame of reference can be found in processes of interactive planning where the government nevertheless feels to be the only responsible party, feels the need to organise the process completely and thinks the decisions made in the self- constructed arena can be turned into a law, a plan or a regulation functioning the same way as the old style regulations etc.[321] An attempt at coping with quite realistically perceived changes in society while retaining the old importance of the organisation, even improving it, can be seen in the way the Dutch provinces produced integrated plans on water, environment and spatial planning (omgevingsplannen), dealing with new questions in society while turning a threatened position in the government system into a comfortable one[322].

It is interesting to notice that some ways to cope with a decalage lead to a new one, and that some strategies to deal with it and ways to perceive it are traditional within one organisation. We can refer back to the lines on the evolution of discourse, where we spoke about the adaptation of a discourse to its environment. An organisation can be marked by a discourse[323]. The history of interactions with and adaptations to its environment are inscribed in the structure of the discourse. The ways a discourse deals with other discourses, with changing discursive environments, are partially structured by this history of former interactions. Responses can be driven by ideas that have become traditional or the responses themselves can have become traditional, unquestioned. The discursive character of organisations (explaining also the tendencies to perpetuate, to spread influence, to become comprehensive) constitutes on of the reasons making it impossible to design a well- functioning planning system once and for all. (Other

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[321] Van Ark (SP), forthcoming
[322] Wissink (SP)
[323] Dryzek (SP); Mumby; Tewdwr- Jones (SP)

important reasons being the permanent shifts in society and the game- like character of planning discussed earlier on)

4.3.9. Concluding remarks

We consider it important to keep this sketchy interpretive analysis of the Dutch planning system in mind in the discussion of potential roles for historical knowledge within a planning system in general. We will continue to use the example of the Dutch planning system, but will try to indicate as clear as possible where the analysis can be generalised. In general, we can say that all the mechanisms unveiled in the Dutch case are present in other planning systems, albeit in different combinations and intensities, due to different planning histories and different histories of the planning environments, i.e. the general cultures and the architecture of the political and administrative system. In all systems, user groups exist carrying ideas on space and history, and governmental and non-governmental organisations exist trying to interfere in the spatial organisation of a country. In all systems, organisations have a discursive character, planning a game- like character and society is changing all the time. In all countries, people want to know things, knowledge is used and power plays its games with people. Right now, we want to focuss on the role of knowledge in a planning system.

4.4. History in the cultures of planning and design: a simple model

4.4.1. Introduction: historical knowledge and identity formation

What about knowledge in this system? And what about the knowledge on history and historical things? What roles does the knowledge play and what can we deduce from it concerning potential roles of history in new neighbourhoods (with the intention of improving these places one way or another)? Some ideas on the role of knowledge were already explained or were implied by the presence of the disciplines in the schemes presented. At this point in the reasoning, it has become clear that culture and history are linked to places and each other in various and complex ways.

One practical conclusion that can be drawn already is that the places, groups and histories should be treated together in a planning system doing right to all its subjects. Ways of dealing with places have consequences for groups and histories, and the other relations in the triangle can become significant as well. Spatial planning cannot escape the questions rising from this triangular relationship, it cannot escape the questions of history and culture, even if we would like to do so from time to time. (People can choose to ignore these histories in order to achieve practical goals, e.g., but in these cases they decided about the treatment of their histories and culture themselves) And if spatial planners have the intention to use histories, they are forced to think of the related cultures and places.

If not, the version of history and the preferred groups and places that come to the fore will necessarily reflect the historical and cultural preferences dominant within the planning culture, or within the disciplines and schools within disciplines that obtained a good spot within the planning culture. In that case, the planning culture produces its own version of history in space, and their image of the relevant groups in society is implied in the process. And the decalage between planning culture and user cultures becomes larger.

If we want to avoid this, and do what was recommended in the last paragraphs, it is necessary to have a realistic image of the planning system, and be aware of the games played, the networks present, in short the

forces that work on the knowledge imported in the system. This in order to avoid a representation of things as if the road to a 'better' use of histories would only consist in the input of more disciplinary knowledge of the same kind. The knowledge has to be different, in the light of our post- modern perspective devaluating the value of expert knowledge, the image of the planning system has to be different, after our interpretive account of it, and in general we shall see that the sheer possibility of defining a 'better use' has to be doubted seriously.

4.4.2. Reformulation of research questions in the light of remaining enlightenment values

Before we elaborate upon this, it might be useful to take a few steps back and consider what we have been doing uptil now. In the previous chapters, knowledge was redefined in a postmodern theory of knowledge (this was done in the first theoretical chapters) Next, culture, place and history were connected in a theory on identity, that is valid for the cultures of the user groups as well as for the planners and designers. And spatial planning in society was redefined from the same interpretive perspective that was used in the identity theory and constructed in the first chapters. The case studies in the meanwhile generated empirical situations where mechanisms could be observed and analysed concerning the signification of place, group and history in the cultures of user groups, planners and designers. Now comes the question *what this redefined knowledge on redefined history means for a redefined version of a spatial planning system?* The question is a crucial one in this book –hence the italics.

An answer that is often feared in the worlds of planners and designers is that everything becomes possible, all solutions become equal in such a relativist perspective. This fear often inspires an outspoken negative attitude towards all kinds of relativist theories: if this is true, what the hell are we doing then? Can we throw away all our truths and procedures? We argue against this, by saying that the discursive formation of truth can be understood in a practical sense as an awareness that our ideas and procedures are grounded in a truth we decide upon as a community, and not grounded in an objective reality. In the case of spatial planning, the major advantage of and awareness of the social construction of reality and the plurality of truth is a raised awareness, a more clear insight into the

processes of signification that underly the preferences of user groups, and a sharper self- awareness, insight into the properties and mechanisms of the planning culture itself. These combined insights in self and other can prevent in turn the construction of pseudo- objective truths and fictive and simplified world- pictures that can direct planning in an undesirable direction.

That we still speak of an undesirable direction implies the possibility of firm ground under our feet, of guidelines and truths, even within a post- modern perspective. In the case of the practice and discipline of spatial planning, some of the principles of enlightenment we consider to be firm ground[324]. By this we do not refer to a supposed rational core of human personality, and an assumed objective and eternal truth to which this human capacity can lead. But a transparency of government, a protection of the rights of citizens from all kinds of government, a clear and fair representation of the people within the government, an efficiency of government, a respect for the variety of opinions and cultures, all these 18th century enlightenment principles are still agreed upon as ideals for the organisation of the state in general.[325] Thus they ought to be taken as guidelines for the organisation of spatial planning as well. Most important difference between the original interpretation of these principles and the postmodern reinterpretation of them, is that the ideals are now seen as ideas we decide to believe as a community, not as ideals to be reached when the human capacity for objective truth is brought to full fruition (the construction of society was seen as an extension of the rationality of the individuals, so the existence of one ideal construction could be expected for)

In this line of argument, rationality in a different sense, stays a criterion for good planning. By which we do not mean that people are rational in essence, not that rationality is a sometimes obscured essence (bounded rationality). Rationality in human decisionmaking in a postmodern perspective is context- related. Several types of rationality

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[324] Orieux (PH); However not by Mouffe and other late neomarxists (SP)

[325] Cf Watson, as related to our point of view and as opposed to Flyvbjerg and Hillier concerning the validity of several enlightenment values in planning tought and practice. (all of them SP)

exist, differences between cultures and within cultures[326]. Emotions have their own rationality, just like practical thought, and these and other types of rationality are constructed within a culture: every culture decides what is rational in which circumstances, every culture defines its own repertoire of rationalities. The type of rationality in planning which according to us can be agreed upon in our society, irrespective of the chosen theoretical perspective, is grounded in the remaining principles of enlightenment.

We argue that once a decision has been taken in a planning process, and agreement exists on the procedure to follow afterwards, this must be done in a rational way, with the greatest clarity and simplicity. Contradictions between agreed- upon goals and actions and contradictions between several goals should be avoided. Waist of money while reaching these goals should be avoided and condemned if it occurs. Courses of actions and paths of decisions should made as clear as possible and the lines of power should be subject to a maximal clarification. Planning should be rational in this sense. These ideals of rationality can still be upheld, in the conscience that they are ideals and that power and knowledge mutually tend to define each other in the practice of the game.

4.4.3. Knowledge and power revisited

Starting from this clarification of the epistemological context of the game, we would like to take a closer look at the possible relations between knowledge and power in a planning process. In a very simplified manner, we would like to start by asking ourselves what are the key defining features of a position taken in a planning discussion, in a context of decision- making in planning. We identify, to start with, science, other knowledge, power. Before and during the real discussion, and the decision- making, diverse paths can be followed by individual actors in the formation of a position. We refer to the Wageningen case, where similar pathways could be observed. Let us schematise a few possible lines of development in an individual actor on the same planning issue.

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[326] Cf Gellner (A); cf Foucault (D) in most of his works; cf the early works of Appadurai (A); see also the masterly *Emblemes de la raison* by J. Starobinski (Geneve, 1979) on the representation of reason during and after the French revolution.

No position > power > arguments (science, knowledge)> position 1
Or
Position 1 > arguments > power> arguments > position 2
Or
Position 1 > arguments > position 2
Or
No position > power > position 2
Etc ad infinitum

This scheme is too simple since power is everywhere. Nevertheless these lines may exemplify some types of situations. They illustrate that at some points thoughts are developing more freely and at other points the direction and content of thought is rather more oriented towards a possible goal. More properly said: new goals can become visible because of power, and arguments can be invented in order to achieve them. Sometimes power creates new goals and arguments; sometimes power reinforces old, forgotten or just silent goals. Power is the possibility to do things, sheer possibility, potentiality. It is a means but it can be a goal at the same time, because it is rewarding to have power, even without using it. People will know you have power and you know it yourself; it is admired. People can fight for power and that fight can be rewarding in itself: power is a means and a goal. Power can be a means to a goal, it can be a goal and the struggle for power can in turn be a goal.[327] Glory in battle can feature high on the ladder of values in a culture. The attitudes towards power and therefore power itself, its mechanisms, are partly determined by culture. In our time, Europeans tend to have a negative opinion about power and reaching it[328]. Still, it is present, it cannot be avoided and it is better to be aware of it.

In the section on power in the compendium of concepts and in other places in this book the possible relations between power and knowledge came across several times. Here, it is important to keep these relations in mind while studying the role of kowledge within the spatial planning system. Power can create knowledge, not only facts but also the structures producing facts: discourses, e.g. scientific discourses. In planning, people

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[327] Kaplan (SP); Foucault
[328] Habermas (PH); Sager (SP), Tewdr- Jones (SP)

can have firstly an idea on the direction to go, the goal. Sometimes they have arguments for this goal, sometimes not really. In the negotiations in a planning process, the arguments can help to reach this goal −in that case, knowledge is literally power. Or the knowledge can make no difference at all −e.g. in cases where there is a quick vote without debate. It is also possible that in the process someone with power but no clear goals and arguments is listening and copying goal and arguments of one of the parties involved and will reach that goal. Another possibility can consist in a situation where the one in power had arguments and goals, or only the goal, copying other people's arguments if necessary. All these arguments are possible.

Once a decision is taken, e.g. a plan is agreed upon, in retrospect the process of decisionmaking is in our culture often presented as one with a prevalence of arguments and an equal weight of opinions. This is culturally coded rhetorics; nobody will positively acknowledge the smart strategy of parties or their dominance. The rhetorics can help to reach the goals or to legitimize the result afterwards. It is good in our culture to present things like that, to veil the preence of power, and therefore it is useful to reach goals. The pretended absence of power and dominance of argument is a powerful rhetorical tool. In earlier chapters we pointed several times at the importance in spatial planning and analysis of spatial planning of these power- related mechanisms.

4.4.4. Knowledge, power, history before and after decisions

Looking backwards from the moment an important planning decision has been taken, say the agreement on a plan, it is very difficult to distinguish the roles knowledge, history, and historical knowledge have played in the decision- making[329]. The diverse relationships between knowledge and power are one important factor adding to this complexity. Another factor is the multitude of actors often involved one way or another in the process, and bringing with them their own knowledge, their own histories and significant places. All the actors can bring scientific knowledge and other knowledge to the negotiation table. Some of the researches can be interdisciplinary, considering the accepted perception of

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[329] As it is difficult on the personal level to be aware of all the motives of a deed. Freud but also Kant was aware of this.

landscape as something to be studied from various perspectives. Let us first visualise the situation in a simple scheme, before zooming in on the diverse roles of knowledge.

DECISION

KNOWLEDGE

General culture

Discipline 1   **Discipline 2**

Knowledge 1   **Knowledge 2**

Cultures around the table

By which we mean that the shared culture of the parties around the imaginary table determines the types of knowledge used in the process, framing the cultures of the parties involved. These cultures, their implicit knowledge, determine the types of knowledge explicitly staged in the decision- making and the related negotiations. This explicit knowledge can be scientific and non- scientific and the scientific knowledge can consist of one or more disciplines, combined in interdisciplinary research or not. If we move back to the schemes above starting from a network perspective, we can imagine for the just presented scheme a network situation like the following. Users organisations, disciplines and parts of the

relevant administrations feature in the scheme. The lines between actors symbolise preferential links.

Organisation 1   **Administration 1** ———————— **Discipline 1**

Organisation 2   **Administration 2**   **Discipline 2**

Organisation 3   **Administration 3** ——— **Discipline 3**

If we assume that a decision is going to be taken about the fate of a place, that history played a role in the decision- making process, and that every actor is marked by a different perception of the place, of history and of the history of the place, then this scheme could translated e.g. in the following way:

History 1   **History 2** ———————— **History 2**

History 4   **History 1**   **History 4**

History 3   **History 1** ——— **History 1**

Assuming that these histories are clearly the object of debate and that arguments prevail in the debate and the decisionmaking, then one might expect that history 2 takes the lead, becomes implemented in the final plan and the design. However, this is not always the case. A series of factors are relevant, among others differences between actors in other respects than history −defining their strategies and alliances- the layout of the broader network, the precise nature of the links between the actors, power relations and more. We will reorganise these factors a bit later in our discussion of planning metaphors, but at this moment it is already possible to assess that this simple scheme cannot be used to predict roles of history

in a planning process. And it is an appropriate moment to add one more important reason why this representation of social variation and distribution of histories in a planning network will not lead automatically to a planning solution: one version of history does not imply logically the importance of one place or object in a planned area. Shared histories do not preclude shared significant places. To this we add that if such a common definition of important places does arise from the shared histories, then different design solutions by landscape architects or urban designers might lead once more to disagreement between the actors sharing so much ideas and preferences. A design is always an interpretation of the plan, bringing in other frames of reference and a variety of possible interpretations –as we saw in the Leidsche Rijn case. A plan is to a certain extent open to different interpretations[330], and the variety of interpretations is greatly multiplied if a more artistic role is taken by the designer. We refer to the lines on the dynamism in artistic codes and the culturally coded need to constantly reinvent the codes of artistic communication[331]. We can summarize this in the following way:

History 1 >   Significant place 1 >   Decision 1 >   Plan 1 >   Design 1

Can often be replaced by:

History 1 >   Significant place 2 >   Decision 1 >   Plan 1 >   Design 1
or
History 1 >   Significant place 1 >   Decision 2 >   Plan 2>   Design 1
or
History 2 >   Significant place 3>   Decision 1 >   Plan 2 >   Design 1
or
History 3 >   Significant place 1 >   Decision 1 >   Plan 1 >   Design 3

Decisions, plans and designs cannot be deduced a priori from history 1, 2 or 3 neither from each other. Sometimes one version of history can inspire the designer, sometimes an object, sometimes one spatial characteristic, sometimes a very different place or artform etc. Not one of

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[330] Eco 1965 (S)
[331] Eco 1993 (S)

the steps can be deduced logically from the former. It would be unrealistic and undemocratic to say that one has to start from a history in a planning process; history should not always be the starting point for decisionmaking and design. But if this is the case, the line from history to design, passing the other stations, can be helpful in the clarification of the choices for the participants (as it can be helpful to the analytic researcher) But this too is not compulsory at all: one can decide to take one history as a start, but be inspired very quickly by a beautiful design or a brilliant decision, without recourse to a lot of historical knowledge and the selection of historically important structures, places and objects.

In the next paragraphs we will ty to draw more conclusions concerning the role of history and historical knowledge in planning and design, from a somewhat more complex model of planning and knowledge, drawing on observations and bits of theory scattered in this book (the cases provide materials for several models)

4.5. Multiple metaphors: a model of knowledge in planning and the role of history

4.5.1. A model of knowledge in planning and its consequences for the role of history

In the last chapter we tried to clarify some of the roles history can acquire within a planning system. We also tried to clarify some of the limitations of that use, by which we mean limitations to the desired scientific character of such a use and the limitations to the possibly democratic character of it. In doing so, in this modest attempt at elucidation, we used just a few of the concepts concerning planning and history that we met in the earlier chapters. In this chapter we will try to combine some more concepts used and some more findings already familiar. In order to do so, it is necessary to rethink once more what we have been doing. If we focus on the case studies for the moment, we see that in these three studies, each of them focusing on different types of signification of space and different types of interactions between cultures, more then one implicit metaphors for planning were used. In order to interpret the empirical phenomena we encountered as fully as possible, to draw the possible theoretical conclusions as sharp as possible, we changed angles at the phenomena in question several times. Changing angles, perspectives is sometimes linked to the use of different root- metaphors. In some cases, aspects of planning and the roles of history within planning became more clear while using this metaphor for planning, while in other cases the empirical situations proved more suited for an explanation by means of another metaphor. In this chapter we will list some of the more important metaphors implicitly and explicitly used in the previous chapters, and reconsider some of the things we can learn about the role of history in planning from the viewpoint of every one of them.

We have to add that most of the metaphors are useful to study the role of knowledge in general within the frame of a planning system. The disciplines of spatial planning and urban planning as well as the design disciplines are framed within a planning system. Historical knowledge is just one type of knowledge in the models of planning based on this or that metaphor. If we combine several metaphors, and say this is a better way to get a full picture of the use of history, then too the use of historical

knowledge is intrinsically not very different from the use of other types of knowledge. We can say that the multiple metaphor model we used implicitly and make explicit now, and which we recommend to other researcher too, is in the first place of a model of knowledge in planning systems.

Within the post- modern theoretical frame we operate in, two relations become particularly important in theories on knowledge in planning, important and more complex compared to modernist planning theories based on rational people and singular truth. We talk about the relation between knowledge and power, frequently met, and secondly the relation between knowledge and action. This last one appears e.g. in the schemes of the last chapter. Both relations deserve special attention in the analysis of the metaphors undertaken in the follwing paragraphs. *We will treat briefly planning as a game, planning as a power play, planning as a network of actors, planning as an institution, planning as a meeting ground for cultures, planning as a culture.*

4.5.2. History in: Planning as a game

Planning can be compared to a game. In the Leidsche Rijn case a lengthy analysis was made of this metaphor and its limits. A metaphor is based on a comparison and since Cicero we know that every comparison is faulty in one way or another, because a comparison is always made between two non- identical things. Therefore, every metaphor has its limits, is suited to analyze certain aspects of the situation under analysis, less suited to understand other aspects of the case, probably misleading while studying still other things. The game metaphor for planning, with its emphasis on players, boards, rules, strategies is helpful in understanding the types of uncertainties characteristic for every planning situation. Even in a communist planning system, games are played and the outcome of a planning process is not a result of objective science or transparent decision- making and objective weighing of arguments. Such a situation is impossible in every type of planning system and therefore the game metaphor is to a certain extent valid everywhere. Since some results of the game are clear before the start in some planning situations, and since all kinds of context can influence the game, the metaphor has clear limits too. Some games are ritual, in a context of overwhelmingly clear outcomes,

some games are more like chaos, in a context of complex shifts in influences.

Knowledge and power

Knowledge and power, being interrelated and mutually defined, influence the course of the game, as could be seen in the cases and in the last chapter. Knowledge can be used to deploy a certain strategy, it can be used to change strategies, it can be used to understand the strategies of the other players. Knowledge can be produced thanks to a certain strategy, a certain objective, a promise of power or existing power. In a planning game situation, not much power can normally be gained from historical knowledge. Unless history plays an important role in the society one is planning in, or history is much present in some important debates at the moment of the planning situation. In societies in transition, where questions of ethnicity, national identity, history are prominent (we anticipate the Ukraine case) historical knowledge and historical arguments can be potentially powerful in a planning game.

Power can be gained however, also in western European societies, from historical arguments if it works as a way to make new places more interesting. In these cases, the argument can only be convincing if there is a real interest in historical aspects of living environments. This cannot be predicted and cannot simply be produced in a society by a small group of planners and designers, or historical scientists. If a historical argument will not prove convincing, planners and designers playing the game can use different arguments to defend plans and decisions where old things and styles are important. Historical knowledge in these situations has to be hidden, and combined with openly used other types of knowledge, to reach the historically tinged plan as an objective. The metaphor of the game, and all the influences on the game, tell much about the unpredictability of the use of historical knowledge in a planning process. The power of historical knowledge, used directly or hidden in plans and decisions, can never be predicted.

Referring back to the last scheme of the last chapter, we can say that in the game the steps between history and significant place, between place and decision, decision and plan, plan and design, none of which can be objectively made, is potentially subject to discussion, is a potential place of negotiation, strategy, power play. To this one might add that the line followed in the scheme can be much more complex or simpler in

empirical situations, and that the focus of discussion and negotiation can jump backwards and forward in this chain of decision- making. This means that a design, result of some of the assumed steps, can be subject of discussion several times, and that discussion can be reopened about certain places that are significant for the historians, about the relevance of some of the implied histories, about some of the design features. Planning is a cyclical process and the game shows cycles likewise. A beautiful design incorporating the most interesting historical features of a place can be rejected in a final phase of decision- making, the final phase can turn out to be not final at all, and in the following discussion the question can be raised if history is relevant at all in this place. This is not tragic, it's part of the game, made clear by the game metaphor.

Knowledge and action

The second relation we wanted to analyse in every metaphor was the one between knowledge and action. One example of a difference between knowledge and action was just given: importance of historical knowledge can be hidden in the course of the game, and the plan can be covered in different types of arguments. It can also be less rewarding to give historical knowledge a place at all in a plan or decision. People can have a lot of historical knowledge, yet think it unimportant to spent much money to it in spatial planning in general or in a specific planning situation. The use or non- use of historical knowledge –hidden or explicit- depends on the game situation –is it rewarding?- but also on the objective put for this situation by this player. If the player thinks it is not appropriate to devote special attention to history in this situation, he can decide not to do it, even if he or she knows a lot about history, in general or of the planned area. A decision not to take historical knowledge into account in defining the objective –objectives liable to change during the game- can be based on assessments of the situation coloured by group loyalties –e.g. political parties- or by personal preferences –in turn tinged by a series of cultural contexts.

People can be persuaded by other parties to make history important or not in a plan. What they knew in advance, can be more or less influential in their actions because of that. Persuasion is part of the game: coalitions are constantly made and broken in a planning situation and actors can copy other actors strategies and knowledge without forming

coalitions[332]. Or they can differentiate their use of history from the way other actors use it because they see it does not work or it interferes with other objectives. Another source of difference between knowledge and action is the lack of complete consistency present in all people's actions: goals can contradict without people being aware of it, strategies can be left suddenly and without apparent reasons, strategies can be internally inconsistent without notice. Because of all this, an extra source of difference between knowledge and action is introduced. Man is not essentially rational. The game becomes more unpredictable.

Complexity of patterns

Concluding these lines on the game metaphor, we want to refer a second time to the scheme in the last chapter and repeat it in a simplified way:

History > significant place > decision > plan > design.

Several consequences and aspects of this scheme have been treated. Now we want to add that historical knowledge can be seen as the first step, and that all the following steps can be seen as possible actions stemming from this knowledge. After every step an array of possible next steps arises, so a multitude of patterns can evolve from the same knowledge and a multitude of designs can be the result, while the same designs can veil very different historical knowledge and uses of it. This we knew. In the light of the distinction knowledge- action it is useful to add that the rest of the line can be seen as a model for courses of actions, and that the pattern of possible lines can be seen as a pattern of courses of actions. Differences between historical knowledge and action can arise at every point in the line, since negotiations can restart, and the strategies may have to be adapted. The chance that in the end, in the real design, there is still a strong link between the historical knowledge and the plan, between knowledge and action, is very small (unless the negotiaton table is small, the questions simple, the power involved litte) This probability is further diminished by the absence of purely logical links between all the steps. Since a design cannot be logically deduced from a decision, and such a logic lacks in the other links too, it becomes even more difficult in the context of the powers of the game to hold on to certain ideas and translate them into action.

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[332] Hajer 1995 (SP); Warren, Wright (SP)

4.5.3. History in: Planning as a network of actors

Planning, a planning system, can also be presented as a network of actors. In the chapter on planning cultures we stated already that networks of actors always existed, that the official system of planning always operated in a context of and aided by shadow networks containing people from the administration and other groups in society. We do not place much weight on conceptions of the network society as something new. We argue it is not even new that people can belong to a series of groups, each of them embedded in different spatial networks, and producing individuals that are spatially embedded in much more complex ways than in the past. We refer to the chapters on identity, e.g. the small Habsburg case, and the lines on the Vikings earlier on and in the Ukraine case, to show how identities could be complex in the past as well, and how the spatial embeddings could be complex in the same way. New technologies make it more easy to communicate and to travel, but the human capacity to belong to a series of groups and cultures has not changed much. Since ancient times –Fenicians, Greeks,..- network- like societies based on trade existed alongside territorially based societies or simpler tribal societies.

What's new in the network society?

What is new in a number of western planning systems nowadays, e.g. the Dutch system, is the more official recognition of such shadow networks, and the more official recognition of the limits of planning and social engineering in general. The shift from government to governance that marks the policy- oriented sciences of the last decade, bear witness to this process[333]. It is more accepted than earlier that a society produces its own form, its own organization. And that the traditional structures of political representation, the traditional lines of representation of the common will, are not fully capable of implementing such a shift. Therefore, new structures, enabling governance, have to be created. In spatial planning, all kinds of structures related to so- called interactive or participatory planning emerged in a host of western countries, characterized by different planning traditions. These structures had to remove the differences in planning culture and general culture, what we labeled decalages. In our analysis of official responses to decalages, we already said something about attempts at interactive planning. Some of the

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[333] Hajer- Wagenaar; Pelizzioni; Dryzek; Saward; Allmendinger (all SP)

reactions implied a simple recognition of existing networks, other reactions consisted in creating new networks in ways harmless for the existing planning culture.

In each case, the shift from government to governance, labeled as an answer to a decalage, induces a revitalization of old networks and the creation of new networks. In spatial planning, new actors enter the planning arenas. Concerning the distribution of power, this might have serious consequences, since new groups, well defined or ill- defined can acquire power without the normal procedures of democratic delegation of power. There is a perception that the traditional structures are not sufficient, but the newly created structures, in this case networks, miss some of the testing procedures and controlling mechanisms of the old system. It is not always clear who represents who and therefore it remains unclear if the sum of actors in the newly formed planning network forms a fair representation of the common will.

Knowledge appertaining to some actors may therefore gain more or less weight than is desirable. Historical lobbies well- entrenched in local politics may receive too much attention in the planning process, while areas, topics, networks, where history is not adequately represented, will produce plans with an underestimation of the importance of history for the people one is planning for. The layout of the networks is essential for a clear representation of the role of history in a community, and by layout we mean the list of actors as well as the link between the representatives of the organization in the planning arena and the organization itself, added with the link between the organization and the real social distribution of the subject area it pretends to reflect.

All these features of the network layout may have their own repercussions on the role of historical knowledge. If there is no historically interested actor in the system, one depends on the historical interest and sensibility of the other actors. This is not necessarily a problem: it may be the case that some of the actors, e.g. some of the governmental actors consider it to be a matter of common responsibility, and will not expect a historical interest group to be present in the planning network. If there is such an expectation of representation of history, and missing awareness of a common interest, then the role of history in a planning process conducted within such a planning network will probably be very modest indeed.

Historical actors in the network

If there is an 'historical' actor present, its representative may be linked to his backbenchers in a fair way, and his opinions on historical values to take serious in the planning process, may reflect the opinions of his followers. Or it may be different. Representatives can be not so much representative. Organizations can be erected around individuals, or can revolve around individuals, lacking structures and possibilities to allow for other opinions or to seek a link with the group in the background or to create such a real group. If an individual representative represents mainly himself or a small clique, it is likely that a minority interpretation of historical value, backed or not by certain scientific disciplines, enters the picture of the planning reality. And a minority interpretation that never had to convince the other historically interested parties and individuals. The effect of such a situation is not necessarily negative, but the procedure is faulty since unfair.

Even in the presence of an 'historical' actor in a planning network, the other actors can be interested in certain aspects of history too. Some of them may be backed by historical disciplines, e.g. reports they have written. In these cases, one cannot say that the allegedly historical lobby has a monopoly on history. Even if there is a real and large group of people standing behind the historical lobby, it still has to convince the other parties in the planning network, also on the subject of history and its use. This is logical since people belong to a lot of discourses, play several roles, and several of these roles may imply varying views on history and varying uses of historical knowledge. One person may be represented in a participatory planning process by several actors, actors that may have conflicting opinions on history.

Assume that there is a historical actor in a planning network, and that the person representing this actor in the network really does represent the opinion of a group of people, even then there can be an unfair representation of the role of history in society. Since a lot of people interested in historical subjects can prefer to stay outside clubs of historical hobbyists, for several reasons. They can e.g. stay outside these clubs exactly because they are dominated by certain discourses they are not interested in –too much focused on certain periods, techniques, too much or not enough socializing, the wrong kind of people etc. In this case, the picture

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of historical interests in society that enters the planning network is distorted too.

Network design & history

From all this, using the network metaphor, we can deduce that networks are not new, and that network design is essential in obtaining a clear representation of the role of history in society within a planning network. This is a normative stance. We add an analytical stance that it is impossible to have a perfect representation at a given time and that a good representation at one time can become irrelevant very quick. Therefore, constant and open debate is necessary, keeping in mind the advantages of the old system. The shifts in importance of planning networks, and the different aspects of the problem of representation of history in networks, adds more forms to the repertoire of uncertainties in planning, and shows more boundaries to social engineering and spatial planning. The network metaphor also adds arguments to the position that nothing can be said about an objectively good use of history in planning: one person might have conflicting views on history, and these may be represented by debating parties in a planning network. Criteria can be made concerning good form –in this case network layout- not concerning good content – essential historical knowledge leading to objectively good plans and designs.

The remarks on the relations between knowledge and power made in the discussion of the game metaphor remain standing. Within the network, actors play their games, historical knowledge can be used or not, can be changed, can influence resulting plans or not. If the network operates in a context of growing relevance of historical issues, the chance increases that more historically actors will be added to the network – improving the chances of implementation of decisions taken- or that some of the present actors develop more interest in historical matters. In such a context, historical knowledge will become potentially more powerful, and historical arguments have more chance in dominating the debates on spatial planning. Also the remarks on the relation between historical knowledge and action remain untouched within the frame of te network metaphor. People representing historical values in a planning network can change opinions because of all kinds of reasons and can translate this interest in the most various courses of action.

4.5.4. History in: Planning as a meeting ground for cultures

Planning can be seen as a meeting ground for cultures. This was the central metaphor in the previous chapters. Histories and place identities were multiplied in relation with a multitude of cultures. Different cultures attribute different meanings to places and have different images of history and historical places. They have different strategies to deal with history in place. Culture was defined in a very open way: all the groups of people that have a sense of identity and are marked by a more then functional discourse are considered cultures. In a planning system, several cultures are present, even in a traditional system with limited user participation. Scientific disciplines, planning organizations, professional groups play a role in planning systems with or without elaborate user participation schemes. Disciplines can be marked by scientific cultures, and organizations and professional groups can be labeled cultures as well. If users participate in the planning system more frequently, if the network is extended and externalized, more groups and more cultures enter the planning arena. Planning is a meeting ground for cultures[334].

Cultures were defined in a semiotic way too: they are in our view social groups creating views of the world, worlds of socially constructed concepts. Therefore, they have their own perceptions and experiences of things historical, and their own modes of communication about it. History can be more or less important in a culture, but in each case there is a distinct view on history, and a different construction of historical values in every culture. Some value ladders may be more elaborate, others less, but they are different. In a planning system, these differences come to the fore or should at least do so. An objectivist and essentialist view on space and history can only serve to mask these differences and produce a strategic advantage for the versions of history held by a dominant technocratic government or by a positivist historical discipline. If history plays a role at all.

Cultures are meeting places of cultures, and we argue that this metaphor is a currently undervalued one. During this book, this metaphor was investigated at length, and we met several mechanisms in late modernist planning systems trying to veil the presence of a host of cultures in the planning system and among its users. This is due to the belief in an

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[334] Cf Healy; Hillier (SP)

essential history, an essential truth and a preference for positive science and technocratic solutions in some planning systems. In systems with different characteristics, the presence of a lot of cultures is more easily acknowledged. (As one can see in the States)

Meeting ground of worldviews

If we present planning as a meeting ground for cultures, and interpret culture in a semiotic way, then a planning system is a meeting ground for different types of knowledge of the world. Communication and interpretation of the worlds of the actors involved becomes a central theme of planning. If planners and designers are part of cultures as well, this is an extra argument to reinterpret the difference between expert knowledge and lay knowledge in planning systems. Historical knowledge owned by historical disciplines, and knowledge about strategies concerning the use of historical things and places present in the planning and design disciplines, cannot be considered superior to the historical preferences of the non- governmental and non- scientific actors. Apart from the democratic argument –planning needs to reflect the preferences of the user groups- there is an epistemological argument: historical knowledge and knowledge about is potential use is constructed within cultures, and is equally valuable in all of them, scientific or not, governmental or not. This undermines the role of the expert (It has been said that a redefinition of the role of the planner is one of the responses to a perceived decalage)

If knowledge on history, the signification of history, and of places takes place within a culture, than all the mechanisms of signification in cultures become applicable to place and history. And all the aspects of unpredictability, variety, discontinuity related to processes of meaning-making. In the case of the Almere parks, we undertook a quite extensive investigation of the semiotics of place and history, its fine mechanics. It may be clear from this case and other parts of the text, that the complexity of the semiosis of place and history, the number of possible influences on the perception of place and history, and the volatility in signification, make it once more impossible to arrive at an essential interpretation of a place and its history, even for one person, let alone for an actor in a planning system. The roles of history in cultural identity building make the plurality and unpredictability of values all the more important to consider in spatial planning.

If we refer to the other metaphors already analyzed, we can say now that a planning network is a network of cultures, related in one way or another. Within a network, negotiating tables are formed from time to time to discuss certain spatial problems and make plans, and around these tables the cultures meet and the full scale of cultural differences, within the network, becomes visible. Around these imaginary tables some important episodes of the planning game are played, while other episodes take place outside the gatherings of actors. (See e.g. the Leidsche Rijn case) All the dynamism of signification of place and history, partly due to the connection with group identities, which is typical for cultures, becomes present around the negotiation table, becomes present in the network and in the game. Along these lines, the metaphors can be combined.

Knowledge- power

Power in planning, when seen as a meeting place for cultures, can take the form of dominance of one culture over another, and this can take the shape of dominance of one social construction of the world over another. Power can consist in the imposing of one signification of place and history on the other cultures involved. If these cultures loose their own ideas on history and place voluntarily, this is not a problem. The variety in cultural significations cannot be considered as an ecological variation to be preserved at any cost. If people are convinced by other groups to change their perception of the world, this is not a problem. There is only a problem when they were forced to follow the other interpretations, or misled by a pseudo- objective representation of place and history. An unfair overvaluation of expert knowledge can lead to an all-too dominant power position of governmental actors, aided by positivist sciences.

Apart from this aspect of the relation between historical knowledge and power in planning, all the other aspects of the relation present in the other metaphors, can be viewed from the cultural metaphor too. Power and knowledge are interrelated in all intercultural contacts. In a network and in the game cultures meet and historical knowledge can be used by different cultures. Their constructions of history can be different, and can partially explain the different goals groups have concerning the use of history. The cultural metaphor can explain the behavior of the actors in a planning system: knowledge of the participating cultures helps to explain the 'historical' goals they set, the ways they talk about it, the strategies they

try to unfold while playing the game. It can also help to explain the layout and the functioning of the network, the preferential links and conflicts between actors in a network and so on. Again, the metaphors can be combined smoothly. The elucidation of the actors behavior in the game is at the same time a clarification of the relations between knowledge and power within a culture (something that has to fit the relations knowledge-power as perceived by the other players one way or another, if this culture wants to have a chance winning the game)

Knowledge- action

Concerning the relation between knowledge and action, we do not want to add much to the statements made earlier on. The cultural metaphor does increase the complexity of the picture since the relation between knowledge and behavior is not only defined in general human ways —e.g. the remarks on rationality- but also by the cultures one is part of. Within different discourses, different views can exist on the relation knowledge- action. To know a thing does not imply communication and later on action the same way in every culture. Knowledge can be important in one way in a culture, being present in actions related to spatial planning, while the same knowledge can have the same importance in another culture, not leading to perceivable actions at all (think of different conceptions of fate, submission to the will of God, different conceptualizations of coincidence, signs of higher forces and so on) The complexity of cultures extends to the knowledge- action nexus as well, and adds to the complexity in behavior on the part of the cultures present in a planning process. A valuable historical thing can be allowed to disappear during a planning process for certain cultures. (Old temples in Bhutan can be demolished, if only a new temple is built on the same spot. The place is valuable, not the historical object)[335]

4.5.5. History in: Planning as a culture in itself

Planning can be seen as a meeting ground for cultures, it can also acquire the character of a culture in itself. One can say that a certain core-network becomes cemented after a while in some planning systems, and this network of governmental and non-governmental actors becomes pervaded by shared notions on planning, on values, on strategies, on

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[335] An example: Dujardin on monuments in Bhutan (A)

communication, in short shared notions on more than practical things and in more than objective ways. Therefore one can speak of a planning culture. We sketched the genesis of a Dutch planning culture, spoke of its advantages if routed in a general culture and disadvantages if a decalage comes into existence, a too important difference between planning culture and general culture. Planning cultures are mostly due to a long standing symbiosis between different actors. Such a symbiosis becomes more powerful, its vision of reality becomes more powerful if scientific disciplines take part in the legitimation of the actions undertaken within the planning culture, and if considerable amounts of money are distributed within and by means of the planning culture for a considerable amount of time.

Planning cultures can be interested in history or not, knowledge can be important or not. What interests us for the moment is that such an encompassing planning culture, tying the cultures of a number of actors together, can have a distinct influence on the ideas and actions of the actors involved. To the explanation of ideas and actions, in order to understand the game, must be added the possible existence of features of a planning culture. In some planning systems, a limited set of actors remained distinct from each other, while influencing each other thoroughly. In such a situation, a planning culture arises that forms a necessary component in the explanation of the game and a component in the strategic thinking of the actors involved.

A planning culture can be disinterested in history, but it will have a typical view on historical things and places. Historical knowledge plays its role within the frame of the planning culture. The relative importance and unimportance of certain histories and places will be co- determined by a planning culture if it exists. A major difference between a planning culture and the cultures of the actors is that the first one is mostly backed by more means, by a tradition, and scientific disciplines guaranteeing the truth and objective usefulness of the types of –historical and other- knowledge used for such a long time and the courses of action undertaken in this time. This discursive configuration can be far more powerful than the individual participating discourses; its truths can be much harder to unnerve, its goals and methods much harder to doubt. The stronger the identification of some actors with the planning culture, the longer the tradition, and the stronger the control of the means, the more difficult it becomes to

deconstruct the truths and actions of a planning culture. The more since a planning culture necessarily ignores its own existence: the knowledge and the actions can only be authoritative if they are objectively best, and not the product of a planning culture –and therefore relative. This has to be kept in mind while studying the role of history in planning and design.

If a powerful planning culture exists, as we argued for Holland, the balance of power is influenced by this culture, and the strategic use of historical knowledge will follow to a large extent from the presence of this power. Uses of history in plain contradiction with the ideas upheld in the planning culture will have a small chance to affect the resulting plan, if they are allowed at all. And the link between knowledge and action will be defined largely by the planning culture: if in this culture e.g. a historical valuation implies a full protection of a site but no creative incorporation in a landscape design, then this traditional strategy and this traditional link between idea and action will prove difficult to ignore.

4.5.6. Conclusion: Roles of history and multiple metaphors

In this chapter we tried to say some more things about possible roles of history in a planning process. In order to do so, we reflected on the use we implicitly made of several planning metaphors during the earlier chapters, mainly in the case studies. In these studies, we tried to uncover as much mechanisms as possible related to the roles of history in planning and the connections between history, people and place. It proved that more could be said if perspectives were changed from time to time, depending on the nature of the empirical situation at hand. We switched perspectives several times and say now that this can be labelled too as switches from one planning metaphor to another one. Some empirical data can be better analysed –and found- starting from a metaphor 'planning is a game' while other situations can better be analysed starting from a network perspective.

The metaphors can be combined without any problem in our post-modern perspective since none of the metaphors is used to assign an essence to planning systems. None of the metaphors were used to give an impression that planning is in essence this or that, and that accordingly it should be studied exclusively from that perspective. We argue that a better and more complete picture of planning processes and planning systems can

be obtained by combining perspectives, mixing metaphors. One should always be aware of the metaphor one is using at a given moment, but there is no problem in switching. On the contrary, we argue that there is a problem in not switching metaphors, and on a larger scale trying to impose one metaphor on the study of planning and design. There is no clear argument for the exclusive use of this or that metaphor in the scientific analysis of planning and design; one can choose to use this or that metaphor in one particular study, but the grounding of the use is not more than a choice, which can be suitable for the situation analysed. And even within the frame of one study, it can turn out to be a necessity to change metaphors: one can never predict the empirical data to be found in a study, and therefore one can not say a priori which metaphor is the best to uncover the structure in the data.

It would be possible to devote a lot of attention to the implication of such a planning – theoretical stance, and the relations with existing theories[336], but we consider it to be too much of a sideline in the present book to do so. Our aim was to unveil as much mechanisms as possible in the data, mechanisms concerning the signification of history and place and concerning the use of histories in planning systems. And a combination of metaphors emerged as a very fruitful method, while this combination was not problematic at all from the general theoretical frames opted for and developed in the first chapters of this book. We will only say that most of the existing theories are either unaware on the nature of some of their fundaments –metaphors- or lacking in argument for the exclusive choice of one metaphor. Planning is often depicted as communication, as an institution, as decision- making or otherwise. We can add views on spatial design as being either science or art. Of course, each of these theories has its advantages, and proved very fruitful too. Each of the root metaphors in these theories enabled viewing certain structures in the data and made certain conclusions possible. However, in our opinion, the problem arises when the presence of the metaphors is forgotten –reinforcing the fiction of objectivity and single truth- or their mutually exclusive character is stressed –resulting in very much the same fictions. The identity of

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[336] We will not list authors preferring this or that metaphor. Most frequently used metaphors are probably: 'planning = communication', 'planning = decision-making', 'planning =negotiation', 'planning =designing', 'planning = the search for technical solutions', 'planning is economical planning'

planning cultures in most European countries, placing much emphasis on objectivity and single truth, encouraged, conscious or unreflective, the rise and dominance of these one- metaphor theories, and makes it more difficult to debunk them, to clearly show their limits of applicability. We argue that in this way, by promoting one- metaphor theories, existing planning systems reinforced their views on reality and re-imposed their power positions.

If we accept the value of a method combining metaphors, and return to our main topic- roles of history in planning systems- we can clearly see how every metaphor adds more roles of history to the repertoire. More roles of history in more aspects of the planning system. In itself, this makes the role more complex, and the prospects of designing ideal roles of history in final plans less probable. We can add after our investigations that much of the roles of history and historical things discovered, are more than neutral blocks adding to the complexity of the building, and are rather to be viewed as intrinsic sources of extra uncertainty, extra ambiguity, more discontinuity. Especially the cultural metaphor, central in this book, brought about a host of extra uncertainties and relativities. The identity theory developed, is intended as something interesting in itself, in the study of dynamics of cultures, but also as a contribution to the study of the limits of planning. The possibility of constantly emerging new group identities, creating new signification of place and history, adds greatly to the complexity of planning and design, and shows clearly some of its limits. Anticipating our general conclusions we can deduce at this point already that from a multiple metaphor perspective no indications can arise concerning a 'good' use of history in planning and design, not because we do not know, but because we know for sure it is an impossible task. It must be possible however, and here we refer to the chapter on planning cultures and the scattered remarks on democracy and enlightenment values, to give recommendations concerning a good organisation of the process, good procedures, in short: a good form (as opposed to content) Before going to the general conclusions however, we want to present a case study illustrating the mechanics of a planning culture and user cultures dealing with each other and each others histories: Kiev, Ukraine.

4.6. Spatial planning, identity and history in Ukraine

4.6.1. Method and introduction

The field research in Ukraine upon which this case study is based was done together with Martijn Duineveld from September, 2003 until November, 2003. 45 semi- structured interviews were done, mainly in the capital Kiev, with critical observers of the planning system –artists, writers, other intellectuals-, with scientists interested in history, ethnography, archaeology, planning, architecture, and with officials related one way or another to spatial planning. We also talked to a number of representatives of ethnic communities: Russians, Armenians, Jews, Greeks, Tatars, (here this case study overlaps with the pages on Crimean Tatar heritage) Apart from this, 60 structured interviews, with a question list, were done by assistants with people from various ethnic and other social backgrounds. Space, history and identity were the main concepts around which the study revolved, and therefore this wide variety of sources had to be investigated. Besides the interviews, policy documents were scrutinized, some English- language magazines, and scientific literature on history, culture, politics of all the powers that had an interest in present- day Ukraine in the course of history.

Main question we asked ourselves was: how is history dealt with in the spatial planning system of Ukraine (if it exists), history being fragmented according to the scheme present in our first identity chapter. Therefore, the question could be reformulated as: how does the assumedly existing planning system deals with the histories of the different communities. Since Kiev is the centre of power in a still centralist state, and all the major planning decisions are being taken there, we conducted most of the research there. An extra advantage of Kiev was its feature of being the only city in Ukraine significantly growing, with a large number of urban redevelopment projects included –and therefore potentially historically interesting situations. The situation in and view from Kiev was put in perspective by shorter stays in the southern region of Crimea, Galicia in the west and Trans-Carpathia in the south-west. In these different regions, different mixes of ethnic communities, marked by

different interpretations of place and history, responded differently to the policies made in the capital.

Kiev and Ukraine were chosen as a subject for a case study on history, identity and planning because of several reasons. We can categorize them easily by saying that the area has a remarkably rich history, Kiev being one of the most complex crossroads of cultures in European history, and a long list of powers being interested in the area for a long time, and that the questions being posed to history, the pressures on the construction and reconstruction of history are remarkably strong in this new state (born in 1991), trying to build an identity and impose it on a wide variety of subjects. One type of reason to investigate Ukraine was an interesting supply of histories –and therefore historically significant places–, a second type relates to a complex and interesting demand for histories. We will use this distinction between offer and supply to structure the coming pages.

4.6.2. A rich offer of histories: short overview of the history of Kiev in Ukraine

As the title above suggests, we can only give a sketchy presentation of the histories involved. A selection was made of the 'facts' and narrative lines that will play a role in recent debates. We will not go back to very ancient times, except for some small remarks. It appears that the languages we call Indo- European originated more or less in present- day Ukraine. It is far from clear this is true, but the possibility led to this fact being given a prominent place in Ukrainian history books. In the Ukrainian view, before the Indo- Europeans emerged, the so- called Trypillian culture, an early agrarian society, based on Ukrainian soil, was far ahead of its time. It is often identified in Ukraine as a proto- Ukrainian culture, while even its existence as a distinct culture is doubted in other sources. The reader will notice that a complete separation of offer and demand in the historical matters of Ukraine is impossible to maintain; the objective facts –the constructions normally accepted by western historical scientists- are very hard to establish in Ukraine, even in more recent times. The demands to history, its ideological and ethnic functions, define partly the materials available for the modern western researcher. We try to indicate as clearly as possible whether something is considered a western- style fact or

something else. It must be clear however –and in the Ukraine case this is not a trivial methodical remark- that our western historical constructions, and some of the assumptions on which they are based, start to fail in the margins of Europe, and prove to be faulty tools to clarify historical processes and structures on the edge of the normal western historical perspective. This theoretical remark emerged immediately after the start of our historical overview, and it should be kept in mind. One consequence is the necessity to sharpen the sensibility for historical constructions and reconstructions: the frame is never something to be taken for granted. Eastern nor western frames can be trusted and the socially constructed character of history is and should be much clearer while studying areas like Ukraine.

4.6.3. From antiquity till the Vikings

Returning to our concise history, we make a leap to 1000BC, when the so- called Cimmerians arrived in these regions[337], from the east. It is difficult to establish where they came from, but they are Indo- Iranian, and they are one way or another ancestors of the more famous Scyths. The Scyths conquered Syria one time[338], but their heartland lies in Ukraine. At least, if one looks at the western branches of the material culture labeled as 'Scythian'. To the east, very familiar material cultures, referring to very familiar beliefs and customs, were found as far as the Siberian Altai mountains, where ice caves produced some of the most spectacular finds, including tattooed bodies, utensils, golden objects, weavings and more. The zenith of Scythian culture was reached around 500 BC.[339] To the west, Scythian territories stretched into Rumania and Bulgaria. Since the 6th century BC, Greek colonies sprang up around the Black sea shore, and to the north of that sea, the Greek colonists, mostly traders, came into contact with the Scythians very quickly.[340] In time, a variant of Greek art developed for the Scythian market, using materials, subjects, objects appreciated by the Scythians. A number of golden objects in this style, excavated from the 17th century onwards, form one of the most valued

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[337] Asscherson (HEE)
[338] Phillips (HEE), passim
[339] Phillips, 56
[340] Asscherson, 215

collections of the Hermitage museum in Saint Petersburg[341]. They were often found in 'kurgans', burial mounds varying in size, but often several tens of meters in circumference. In periods where Russia turned away from western culture, they often referred to their barbarian, Scythian, ancestry.

After the Scythians came the Sarmatians, another Indo- Iranian people from the steppe. Like the Scythians, they were nomadic when they arrived in the area, but all kinds of semi- nomadic lifestyles can be found in later centuries. They acquired dominance over the Scythians around 300 BC, but pockets of independent Scythians survived for centuries after that, mainly in Crimea and in the western territories[342]. The Sarmatians in Ukraine also cooperated with the Greek cities around the coast, while the artistic production springing from this cooperation is less valued –less figurative- nowadays than the Greek- Scythian art. We can add that also the Sarmatians seem to have spread in two directions. Their eastern branches, unaffected by Greek influences but rather by Persian and Chinese material culture and artistic styles, reached Northern China, where the famous Ordos- bronzes bear striking similarities with bronze objects in Ukraine. Polish nobility, dominant in the area in the 16th- 17th century, tended to identify with the Sarmatians[343].

Romans, Goths, Huns

The Romans fought battles against the Sarmatians every now and then –to this bears witness Trajan's column in Rome- and never conquered them completely. Roman influence was mostly limited to Crimea, a small stretch of land on the eastern shore of the Black sea[344], and the Balkan lands. The Sarmatians do not disappear from the picture completely, since some of the ethnicities that originated from the Sarmatians, moved to the west after the fall of the western Roman empire, and some of them even settled in Spain and Portugal. The Alans and Sueves are the most famous of these wandering Indo- Iranian people in early middle ages[345].

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[341] Figes (HEE)
[342] Franklin
[343] Phillips; Asscherson, 218
[344] Visantiiski Cherson (HEE)
[345] Franklin (HEE); Collins, 46 (HE); Asscherson (HEE)

Before this happened however, some other people moved around. In the 2nd century AD[346], the Goths arrived, a Germanic people coming from Northern Germany and probably Denmark. It is unclear whether they formed a consistent confederation very quickly, and how numerous they were –the same remarks can be made about the nomadic people arriving earlier- but at least they formed a kind of military elite in Crimea and the regions a bit more to the north until the fifth century. In the early fifth century, the Gothic dominance –not certainly a kingdom- in southern Ukraine was swept away by the Huns, a recently formed steppe federation coming from western China[347], whose eastern branches brought the empire of the Sassanids in Persia in serious troubles. The middle branches destroyed Gothic dominance to the North of the Black Sea, as said, while the Western branches caused the collapse of the western Roman empire, despite the victory of a Roman- Germanic coalition over the army of Attilla in 451 AD (mentioned already). The Huns played -not much before Attilla- an important role in the western Roman armies, as mercenary soldiers, fighting Germanic tribes, while other Germanic tribes and individuals held high ranks in Hun armies[348] fighting Germanic peoples (and Romans and more) This may serve to illustrate the complexity of the situation in the 5th century AD.

No people identified with the Huns in the last centuries, and we refer to the case study on the Crimean Tatars, to the paragraphs on the negative image of everything near to Mongolian in Slavic cultures. Only the Hungarians, in their nationalist revival in the 19th century, claiming independence from the Habsburg empire (see above[349]) and claiming difference from the Slavic cultures almost surrounding them, identified with the Huns and even presented Attilla as a typical Hungarian name. Hitlers third Reich identified with the ancient Germanic tribes in general, also with the Goths, and after the conquest of Ukraine Hitler established a new province of Gothia in and around Crimea, moving in German settlers to strengthen its Germanic character.[350]

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[346] Diesner (HE); Franklin, 79 (HEE); Subtelny (HEE)
[347] Phillips; Franklin; Collins, 154
[348] Collins, 54
[349] And see Magris 1988 (HEE)
[350] Wilson (HEE), Asscherson

After the Hun empire collapsed in the late 5th century AD, two new steppe confederations came to power in present- day Ukraine. The Avars, a Mongol tribe probably coming from an area to the east of lake Baikal[351], occupied western Ukraine and a large area more to the west, extending into modern Austria. The Turkic Khazars are probably a recently formed ethnic group when they arrived in the region in the 7[h] century. They established a stable rule over the northern shores of the Caspian Sea, the northern Caucasus and the south of Ukraine. They ruled the steppes, and the mixed forest zone to the north of it. The Khazar confederacy comprised a genuinely Khazar elite, converted to Judaism in a way that does not fit the modern conception of Jewish identity (claiming a one- to- one relation between ethnic group and religion), several types of Bulgars (Turkic tribes, not Slavic[352]), Alans and other Indo- Iranian heirs of the Sarmatians, pockets of Goths, Greeks and other ethnic groups. Some Jewish groups identify with the glory of the Khazars (marrying in the Byzantine empire), while others deny them the status of real Jews. We already noted in the Crimean Tatar case that the present- day Tatars also identify with the Khazars, stressing their Turkic character as well as their own Turkic character (as opposed to Mongol, in their view)

The Jews were almost certainly present in Ukraine before the Khazars arrived, but probably the conversion of the Khazar elite improved the position of the Jews. Little is known however about the religious politics of the Khazar regime[353], apart from their relative tolerance: we know that Itil, their capital on the northern shore of the Caspian Sea, contained mosques and christian churches apart from synagogues.[354] Only in the 19t century Jews became numerous in Ukraine, especially in the western part.

The Byzantines, or eastern Romans saw their holdings shrinking in the first centuries after the fall of the western empire, but succeeded in regaining some of the territories, notably the Balkans and some areas around the Black Sea, in the 9th and 10th centuries, after slaying the Bulgars and other steppe peoples[355]. Crimea was largely Byzantine in middle ages,

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[351] Phillips, Franklin
[352] Barford, 31 (HEE)
[353] Franklin, 154 (HEE)
[354] Jones (HE); Franklin
[355] Norwich on the Byzantines (HEE)

with the exception of a number of enclaves held by a bewildering variety of ethnicities –it became a reserve for otherwise extinct species.[356] The mouths of the Danube, Dniestr, Dniepr and Don rivers, strategically important for trade and warfare, were mostly controlled by the Byzantines[357]. The city of Chersonese, in the SW of Crimea, stayed Byzantine until the late 14th century[358]. Byzantines spoke Greek, were called Greeks, but called themselves Romans. The Ukrainian Black Sea Greeks we meet in modern times, identify often with the first Greek colonists, but can better be traced back to 18th century Greek settlers or surviving Byzantine communities.

The Slavs

In the meanwhile, the people arrived that dominated the region during the last centuries: the Slavs. Entering the Balkans from the North in the late 5th century, they radiated to the N and the E from Poland from the 7th century onwards. The move to the north happened slowly compared to movements eastwards[359]. Slavic communities mushroomed in Ukraine under Khazar rule, and they can even be found in the steppe zones, something that is possibly due to the protection of the Khazar regime. In Kiev, a Slav settlement was excavated, small in size, dating from the 5th century. That at least is what Ukrainian and earlier Russian sources say. In western eyes, it remains unclear who lived in this first documented settlement in Kiev. Nevertheless, the Ukrainians and more generally the Slavs see themselves as the original inhabitants of Ukraine, tracing their ancestry back to the Tripyllians –cf supra– and claiming Kiev as a Slav foundation.[360]

4.6.4. The Vikings and Kiev Rus

And finally we meet the Vikings, the centre of the most important controversy in Ukrainian and also Russian historiography. Most of the western sources think Kiev is a viking settlement, protecting the trade route from the Baltics, via a network of intermediary streams, to the Dniepr and further on the Byzantines and Constantinople. In mediaeval

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[356] Asscherson, 64 (HEE)
[357] Franklin, 78
[358] Visantiiski Cherson, 34
[359] Barford; Franklin, 11
[360] See many examples in Wilson

sources, the Dniepr river is called the way from the Varangians to the Greeks, Varangians meaning Vikings and Greeks meaning Byzantines[361].

It appears that at first the northern traders, robbers and soldiers where mostly interested in Muslim silver that passed to the North via the Caspian Sea and upstreams the Volga river. Viking expeditions plundered the shores of the Caspian several times but never gained a permanent foothold there, due to the presence of strong Muslim towns in the S, and the Khazar towns in the N[362]. And they had to pass the well- organised state of the Volga Bolgars around the middle Volga, a society that had become Muslim and quite hostile to vikings. Next the vikings, ruling over a mixed population of Slavs, Khazars, Jews and other groups, founded Kiev -a fact in western eyes- as the centre of a permanent viking power on the middle Dniepr[363]. However, it took only a short time, and we are in the 10th century now, before the disadvantages of the middle Dniepr -surrounded by rapids, far from the richest countries- prompted the viking ruler Sviatoslav to move his capital to the mouth of the Danube[364]. This place had a better climate, proximity to the Byzantines, a shortcut to western Europe by way of the Danube and a sea route crossing the Black Sea to the still desired Muslim silver. The Byzantine emperor however did not fully appreciate this proximity of a viking -called Rus- power, and used a combination of Byzantine armies and alliances with nomadic steppe tribes to root the new power. The Rus leader had to move his capital back to Kiev and there it stayed.

The state, or confederation states, that emerged from the 10th century onwards under Viking rule, with Kiev as a capital, is mostly called Kiev Rus. Kiev Rus became Christian around the year 1000, adopting Orthodox Christianity, and in the wake of the Byzantine priests imported to do the job came architects, artisans, artists, writers, bureaucrats[365]. Christian faith took root in the course of the 11th century, which is often seen as the golden century of Kiev Rus: the ethnicities merged into one culture, the state expanded -at some point conquering the northern Caucasus-, nomadic tribes were routed or incorporated, trade flourished.

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[361] Jones (HE); Subtelny, 54; Franklin
[362] Franklin
[363] Subtelny, 345, Wilson, Franklin, 110
[364] Franklin, Norwich
[365] Norwich, 214, Jones, Franklin, 116

Everything went ok -despite some prejudiced accounts in mediaeval chronicles- until the 13 the century, when the Mongols came. The Kiev Rus armies fought Bulgars, Pechenegs, Alans, Polovtsians, Hungarians and other steppe tribes, the intricacies of whose ethnogenesis is often unexplained yet. The Khazar empire was decisively beated, only to make place for the more fierce Pechenegs and later on Polovtsians, filling the power gap in the steppes.

Kiev

Kiev was situated in the southern edge of the mixed forest area, quite vulnerable to nomad attacks, and a lot of attention was paid by the Kiev Rus princes to conquer and populate the region to the south of the city[366]. It worked out very well until the early 13th century. In 1241 Batu Khan and his Mongol- Tatar armies, probably consisting of mainly Turkic tribes, crushed a coalition army of Kiev Rus and the Polovtsians[367]. Kiev was sacked and burnt -it stayed an essentialy wooden city until the 19th century- and Kiev Rus disappeared from the map.

4.6.5. The Mongols and the successor states of Kiev Rus

The Mongol tribes, called Tatars, invading the west moved on to Hungary, which they ravaged completely, but never really established rule that far west. Middle- Ukraine was the western frontier of the khanate of the Golden Horde, a well- organised state, based on Chinese models of administration, with its capital at Sarai, in the Volga delta region near the Caspian Sea[368]. The Rus cities around Kiev lost significance for centuries, while the memory of its glory stayed alive. To the west, the princes of Galicia- Volhynia, still independant, claimed to be the heirs of Kiev Rus, while in the north the relatively young Rus cities of Moscow, Vladimir and Suzdal, under Tatar rule, held the same claims. The princes of Moscow became prominent in the north, conquering more and more Rus cities, all this under the sway of the Tatars. The princes of Moscow went to Sarai nearly every year to pay tribute to the Khan, and were probably supported by the Khan more than other Rus cities. Some of the oldest

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[366] Franklin
[367] Ostrowski, 97 (HEE); Subtelny
[368] Ostrowski, 54; Heller, 364 (HEE); Pelenski (HEE)

Moscovian noble families bear –Russified- Tatar names[369]. Only in the late 15th century, a much enlarged Muscovy dropped its allegiance to the Tatar Khans, and in the 16th century the tables were turned and the Tatar territories were gradually conquered by an expansionist Moscovian state, guided by leader that labelled themselves Tsars, Caesars, heirs to the imperial throne of the Byzantine empire vanished in 1453. Moscow called itself the third Rome, Constantinople being the second one. Rome, Constantinople and Kiev – holding the oldest and still functioning monasteries of the Rus states- were seen as the sources of Moscovian authority and identity.

In the south, the Tatars were almighty, and stayed in place in Crimea until 1783[370], when Russian troops rolled over the last eastern army in Europe. In the course of the 15th century, the Tatar Girai family, aided by Lithuanian princes[371], proclaimed the independence of the south- western part of the Khanate of the Golden Horde, and the Crimean Khanate was born. On the Crimean coast, a series of Genoese and Venetian trade posts developed under Tatar rule, the Italian fortifications often erected by Tatar labourers[372]. There, silks and other eastern valuables entered Europe, profiting from the silk roads reopened under the Pax Mongolica.[373]

In the west, Lithuania, the last heathen state in Europe, grew at enormous speed in the 13th and 14th centuries, to become the largest European state in the late 14th century, stretching from the Baltics to the Black Sea shore[374]. The Lithuanians were the first western power to inflict serious defeats on the Mongol armies, in the 14th century. Galicia-Volhynia was taken over by Lithuania, and the Kiev Rus cultural heritage could be claimed by the Lithuanians too now[375]. After Lithuana formed a commonwealth with Poland in the 15th century, and more completely since the second half of the 16th century, the Kiev Rus heritage could be called Polish too. While the Moscovian state was destroying the successor Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan in the 16th century, the Polish-

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[369] Figes (HEE); Ostrowski
[370] Subtelny; Heller, 342; Figes, 154
[371] Kiaupa; Ostrowski, 75
[372] Ferentseva, 51 (HEE)
[373] Halbertsma on the pax mongolica(HEE); Epstein (HWE)
[374] Kiaupa (HEE), Ostrowski, 62
[375] Pelenski, Wilson, 114

Lithuanian commonwealth greatly diminished the size of the Crimean Khanate.

Near the end of the 16th century, most of Ukraine was in Polish–Lithuanian hands, the south being held by the Tatars, and the east mostly a no- mans- land sparsely settled by fugitives from Muscovy and the commonwealth[376]. Kiev became once more an important outpost of the west in nomad territories, close to the steppe frontier. To the south, one could also find empty regions, formerly inhabited and fertile. Also there, under threat of Crimean Tatar raids intended to capture large numbers of slaves, one could find communities of fugitives. These fugitive communities, specialised in raiding the Tatars and even the Ottoman Turks on the other side of the Black Sea, came to call themselves Cossacks, and would play an important role in Ukrainian history.

4.6.6. Russia, Poland, Austria

In the early 17th century, several Cossack revolts, partially a response to the worsening conditions of the labour force in the Polish lands, led to a Cossack appeal to Muscovia for help, an abuse of the situation by the Muscovians -turning into Russians gradually- and an imposition of Russian rule on the part of Ukraine situated on the left bank of the Dniepr (the eastern part[377]) The Cossacks never held a truly independent state, and the breaking of promises by the Russians led to ever renewed revolts, ending in the early 18th century with Cossack leader Mazeppa taking the side of the Swedish king against Peter the Great. Peter felt betrayed, crushed the revolt and the Ukrainian Cossacks kept silent ever since. Russification intensified, Polish influences were washed away if possible, and Russian territorial expansion continued. The Crimean Khanate, protected by the Turks, crumbled slowly, and disappeared in the late 18th century, by that time completely surrounded by the Russian empire. The northern shores of the Caspian, and large parts of the Caucasian mountains were Russian[378], and in the meantime Russia had also absorbed right-

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[376] Subtelny, 207
[377] Subtelny, 287; Heller, 334
[378] Karny (HEE)

bank Ukraine during three successive divisions of Poland between Russia, Prussia and the Habsburg Empire[379].

The Polish legacy in the west is much stronger than in the east. Italian influences on Polish architecture, spreading from the capital Cracow, can still be seen in a vast number of baroque and renaissance building scattered over the western Ukrainian regions[380]. Baroque however was also adopted in the Russian part of Ukraine, especially since Peter the Great started to import western architects and plans on a large scale at the beginning of the 18th century.[381]

Neither in the Polish part nor in the Russian part of Ukraine, a distinctly Ukrainian ethnicity emerged. Both countries suppressed printing and education in Ukrainian- like- dialects, predecessors of the Ukrainian language, this must be acknowledged, but on the other hand nothing that would nowadays be called a Ukrainian identity emerged. People identified as Russian, Polish, Catholic, Orthodox, Uniate (a mix of Orthodox and Catholic faith originating in Polish Ukraine, and part of the Catholic Church), and spoke Polish, Russian, Rusyn (proto- Ukrainian) or something else. There was no necessary connection between state, religion and language in the identification of the people[382].

Such an identification, typical for the ideas of 19th century nationalism (see also above), came in from the west, from Habsburg- held territories, not from the southern or eastern parts of the country where cossack traditions were most strongly rooted[383]. The Cossacks were not a national movement, never were, but were reinterpreted as such in the late 19th century. And this reinterpretation sprang up in the west, where the Habsburg monarchy spread a moderately conservative version of enlightenment ideals, and allowed for education in the Rusyn language and for the development of some western- style nationalist ideas. (As the Polish monarchy spread renaissance thought in the region, however limited to noble and wealthy circles) We already mentioned the idea of the Polish nobility in Habsburg Ukraine that the Ukrainians were an Austrian invention to break the power of the Polish. Indeed, it is probable

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[379] Fichtner, 68 (HE), Heller, 28 (HEE), Subtelny (HEE)
[380] Bujak, passim (AR)
[381] Figes (HEE)
[382] See Magris 2001 (HEE); Subtelny, 116; Wilson, 87
[383] Subtelny; Fichtner, 125

that the definition and empowerment of a Ukrainian ethnicity was seen as strategically useful by the Habsburg government, as a counterbalance to the still very heavy influence of Polish nobility on Ukrainian affairs. In the Crimean Tatar case, we pointed already at the uneasy distinction between extinction and invention of an ethnic group.

After 1860, the Habsburg Ukrainians could vote[384]. Such a thing would not take place very often in the Ukrainian lands. In the Russian part, now by far the largest part, Russification was intensified, one of the reasons being the fast industrial development of eastern Ukraine near the end of the 19th century. Russian workers were brought in from all over the empire and added to the Russian character of the region. Since Russian was the only language enabling social promotion and intellectual development, Rusyn became more and more the language of the uneducated peasant, and Ukrainian things were only interesting every now and then as exotic folklore[385]. In 1918, the Habsburg Empire collapsed and its Ukrainian holdings were attached to a revived Poland. In Russian Ukraine, in the meantime, communist rule took root slowly in a very complex and confusing episode of history. Only in 1922 or 1923 the situation became stable and clearly communist, and a few years before six different armies were crossing Ukrainian territory and fighting each other.[386]

Kiev

Kiev slept for a long time. The symbolic value of the city, as the main centre of the vanished Kiev Rus state, and the origin of Russian orthodoxy –the centre was moved to Moscow in late middle ages- did not decline however. After the Mongol sack of Kiev, some of the gaps in the city fabric were not filled until the 17th century.[387] Few things remain from Polish rule in Kiev –there are Gothic fragments in one building–[388] but since the second half of the 17th century, Kiev belonged to the Russian empire –a Russian enclave in Polish held right- bank Ukraine- and the symbolic significance of the city for the Russians led to an intensified building and renovation effort. Some switches of capital occurred in

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[384] Subtelny, 246
[385] Asscherson; Subtelny, 118; Figes, 347
[386] Subtelny, 297
[387] Malakhov, 102 (HEE)
[388] interview with expert

Russian Ukraine, but in general Kiev attracted most of the attention, and in the 17th to 19th centuries, the wooden city enlarged and was dotted with richer streets of stone architecture, buildings of local brick and not to forget dozens of churches[389]. When the Russians arrived, not too much was left of the Byzantine style stone churches of the Kiev Rus era, and the so- called Ukrainian Baroque style was adopted for most of the new churches –until the 1860's!- and for the renovation of some of the Kiev Rus building still extant –like Saint- Michaels church.

A real building boom took place in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, due to the rapid industrial development of the east –coal, steel- and a somewhat less spectacular agro- industrial development in the west – sugar beets, wheat. One can say that the present structure of the city only arrived in this period, and that only then Kiev acquired the appearance of a stone city, a city in the western image. Western neo- styles entered the town, sometimes referring to styles that never got a grip on Ukraine. Neo- gothic architecture can be found here and there, mostly linked to the Polish –Catholic community, a reminder of the period of Polish rule, while Gothic architecture was always extremely rare in these regions, apart from a few towns in the west (notably Lviv). Art nouveau, art deco and modernism, all in regional variations, appeared in the streets of Kiev and some other Ukrainian towns.

Ethnic diversity

In the two centuries before the communist revolution, the ethnic diversity of Ukraine and Kiev more specifically did not really decline, despite Russification and Polonisation. The steppe peoples, apart from the Crimean Tatars, losing their nomadic lifestyle too, lost their distinctive identities[390], and were assimilated by either the Crimean Tatars (see above) or the Russians. As said before: some of the most important and oldest noble families of the Muscovian state are of Tatar descent, and to this bear witness their names and sometimes their physical appearance. Rachmaninov is one example. After the incorporation of the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates, part of their elites joined the Russian nobility. But a new diversity arose: Jews grew numerous, especially in the Polish and Habsburg parts of Ukraine, and other communities started to define more

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[389] Subtelny, 416
[390] Ostrowski, 97; Pelenski, 157; Franklin

as a community or to gain influence in public life, gaining visibility in the process. German settlers were brought in by several Tsars, Armenian traders and later on industrials and bankers became influential, Crimea was resettled by a mix of western nationalities: Greeks, French, Germans and others. Some of the western tongues are still spoken in Crimea nowadays. Polish Catholics knew a revitalization in the 19th century, and the same goes for Lithuanian Catholics. The centres of culture were always far away –Saint- Petersburg, Cracow, Warsaw- but Kiev in the east and Lviv in the west followed all the developments in the respective capitals. It must be added that the Ukrainian- speaking countryside was a world very different from the large cities and the new industrial areas in the east.

4.6.7 The communist era

The present boundaries of Ukraine were produced under communist rule. Lenin was of Kalmukkian descent, the Kalmuks being a Mongolian tribe residing to the north of the Caspian before the Russian conquest in the 18th century[391]. Nevertheless, he was not much interested in keeping intact ethnic boundaries; on the contrary: communist man needed no ethnicity, was internationally oriented and looked to the future. Stalin radicalized some aspects of his thought and mixed up the ethnic map of the Soviet- Union, in order to break as much nations as possible. The nationalities were only interesting if they referred to innocent and primitive lifestyles, to be overcome by the communist revolution.

Stalin wanted the Sovjet Union to look like a federation of states joining the union out of free will, and therefore demanded a degree of organisation of the states, and a degree of representation in international bodies. After WW II, Stalin obtained a seat in the UN Council for Ukraine and Belarus, separately from Russia[392]. Of course this was a sham, but the organisations and local elites that resulted from this masquerade, became very real, and became a feeding ground for Ukrainian –and other- nationalisms. After the same war, Stalin added the former Polish and Habsburg territories in the west, some of them never under Russian rule before, never considering themselves to be Ukrainian, never occupied by Cossack armies. In doing so, and naming the new state under Soviet rule

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[391] Figes, 387
[392] Subtelny, 471

clearly 'Ukraine', something that was new, he defined its present boundaries and unknowingly laid the basis for the present Ukrainian state. Stalin played a pivotal role in the definition of a Ukrainian state and the creation of a Ukrainian identity, but was its most severe scourge at the same time.

The communist regime thought that a genuine communist society could only emerge from an industrialist state[393], and the class of land–owning farmers, too much opposed to communal land property and too unwilling to become industrial workers, was perceived to be a serious obstacle for the communists. In Ukraine, with its fertile soils, the class was bigger than average. In the thirties, Stalin ordered several purges in the new regional party elites he had created himself, and, much more horrible, he engineered a famine costing the lives of six to ten million lives. Compared to the Jewish holocaust, this episode of Ukrainian history has received very little attention[394]. Stalin won the war and his deeds could not be presented as horrible as Hitler's exploits. One can say that he destroyed social structures and identities in present- day Ukraine –he also deported Crimean Tatars, Armenians, Greeks and others in 1944- while creating unknowingly new identities, filling up the theatrical frames he designed, and making them real.

In 1954, Chrustsiev donated Crimea to Ukraine, an act of friendship between two people's and a way to increase the percentage of Russians in the Ukrainian state.

Kiev

Kiev under communist rule grew speedily. It was the recognised capital of Ukraine, and a lot of money was spent to the enlargement and embellishment of the town. Massive neo- classical architecture and urban design was applied under Stalin, the most famous example being the present main street Chrestjatik, while under Chrustsiev the mass production of five- storey apartment buildings began. The largest development schemes took place under Breznjev; it was in the late sixties and the seventies that the west bank was transformed from swamp into a mega-city dominated by high rising modernist architecture in endless repetition and long broad streets at straight angles. The left bank districts

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[393] Westerman 2002 (SP)
[394] Subtelny, 506

where the results of a highly accomplished 'scientific' planning system, involving a large bureaucracy and a large number of state- employed architects and urban planners.

The planning system was completely aimed at the future, and little attention was paid to the heritage, let alone to the heritage of different communities. It is fair however to add that Kiev in the communist era was still considered to be of special significance, and its history was treated somewhat different than elsewhere[395]. In the Soviet Union, Russian nationalism re-emerged in the later Stalin years, not to disappear later. And Russian nationalism attached special meaning to the heritage of Kiev Rus and the religious centres in Kiev[396]. Therefore, even the communists treated the past of Kiev with some respect –they restored e.g. the 12th century golden gate[397], or attempted at least to make a replica. And even the communists accepted the religious importance of some Kievan churches and monasteries, notably the 11th century Lavra, monastery of the Caves, and the church of Saint Sophia, dating from the same period and part of the palace of the Kiev Rus princes. Happily, these buildings were not too severely affected by the war and by the wave of church demolitions started by Stalin in the thirties (in all the major cities of the Soviet Union, but especially gruesome in Saint- Petersburg and Kiev[398])

4.6.8. New demands to history: An independent Ukrainian State

At the start of this case study we spoke of the Ukrainian situation being interesting because the offer of histories is that rich and because the demands placed on history are so heavy. These heavy demands can be explained by the existence since 1991 of an independent state called Ukraine, counting circa 50 million people, and with a size comparable to France. The new state faced and faces serious economic troubles and right from the start an identity crisis, aggravated by the re- emerging of some social problems suppressed in Soviet times. The new state tried to solve its identity crisis –what and who the hell are we?- by constructing new

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[395] Source: interviews
[396] Heller, Pelenski, 154
[397] Made famous by Mussorgski
[398] Figes, 401; Subtelny, 512

histories and trying to impose them, while several ethnic groups revitalized and produced a flood of historical counter- narratives. What happened?

An account based on literature[399] and interviews: In 1991, the acclamation of independence was firstly not a sign of a strong nationalist movement. The nationalists resided in the west. There, as said, was no Cossack heritage, but thanks to Habsburg rule some proto- Ukrainian nationalism came into being. In our times, the people from western Ukraine consider themselves to be real Ukrainians, even if the western influences are much stronger there. The political and economic interest groups of the eastern cities Dnjepropetrovsk and Charkiv were and are the most powerful groups, and thought they would loose grip on local power if Russia would opt for a democratic revolution. Party officials held economic key positions and feared for their jobs if the communist state would disappear. Independence seemed the best solution, an early independence, anticipating a possible revolution in Moscow.

In order to achieve this, a monster contract needed to be made between the old party and industrial elite of the east, Russian speaking and thinking communist, and on the other hand the western, Ukrainian speaking nationalists of the west, believing in western democratic and economic principles. The somewhat uneasy cooperation succeeded, and Ukraine declared independence, while avoiding an attack from Russian and an internal collapse of the state. The first presidency was not that stable, but the second president, Kuchma, still in place, proved to be a compromise figure acceptable for east and west. Kuchma started as a representative of the Russian speaking eastern elite, but adopted more nationalist rhetoric to stay in power.

In the meanwhile, Crimea tried to become independent from Ukraine and if possible be attached to Russia. In Crimea, Russian is the predominant language, but the proper interest in maintaining an independent Ukrainian state was perceived to be much lower then in eastern Ukraine. After some tense situations and serious quarrels about the Russian Black Sea fleet based in Sevastopol, Crimea, a new balance was found and Crimea stayed part of Ukraine, enjoying an autonomous status. The Crimean Tatars, returning from Central Asia since the late eighties,

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[399] Wilson. Subtelny, Asscherson, Dalton (HEE), ten Hove (HEE), Vechersky (HEE)

sided with the Ukrainians against the Russians in Crimea, thinking they could ensure a better position for themselves in Ukraine than in Russia, and Ukrainian promises in this direction were made.

Economic disasters

The economic troubles of Ukraine were in large part caused by the chaotic transition. Party officials that adapted easily to the new situation combined with –very- young entrepreneurs and knew to acquire most of the valuable state assets. Private property did not exist in soviet Ukraine, so virtually all the present- day fortunes were made one time or another in an illegal way, selling state property or using it for own purposes. One can say that power under the Soviet regime consisted not in property but in access to use of state property, and such an access depended on a far-ranging and well- balanced network of party officials. After independence and the transition to a market economy, the old networks were mostly intact, and flexibility was the most important property needed by key players in the old networks to turn access to property into their own private property. The chaotic situation was deliberately maintained by the networks in power, organised along regional clan- lines, to keep the realities of economic transactions out of –national and international- sight. And the president enforced the law only selectively, gathering evidence against all possible opponents, and using it only when necessary.

The result of all this was the amassing of huge fortunes by small groups and the collapse of all types of communal infrastructure –health care, education, housing,…- and therefore, in the end, the disappearance of what can be described as the communist middle class. Teachers, doctors and more groups became suddenly poor, because of this economic banditry and because of the disintegration of soviet economical networks: Ukrainian machine factories e.g. needed parts of all over the Union, and a lot of these parts either stopped being produced or became too expensive. The loss of the middle class meant instantaneously a loss of possible buyers, a loss of market for possibly emerging new industries, and virtually all economic development came to a halt. This situation was aggravated by the policy of the desperate government to impose ever rising taxes. Since taxes became unrealistically high –up to 98%- paying taxes became generally considered as unrealistic, and also the taxation system collapsed.

State organisations were themselves getting dependent of illegal practices to cover their expenses, often to fulfil the normal tasks. The fire

brigade in Kiev e.g. started to ask huge sums to potential builders, to obtain a safety certificate they themselves declared compulsory, necessary to get a building license. Thanks to old friends in the architectural department, this need of a safety certificate was enforced, and the builders could not escape the obligation. The fire brigade did not get richer by this practice; they only used the money to continue the old procedures in other parts of town, where less money could be earned. This situation, combined with a faulty law on land property, should be kept in mind in the description of the planning system and planning practices in Kiev. First, we will take a look at the use of history by the new state.

4.6.9. History and the quest for identity

The use of history in the search for a new and common identity was especially intense in the first years after independence[400]. A most bewildering variety of theories and histories came to the fore claiming the ancient roots of the new state, and finding connections with the most obscure cultures in dark pasts. A long line of descent needed to be constructed to give the new nation a feeling of a common identity and a feeling of safety. If the new state existed 'in fact' for a very long time, however not acknowledged by a long list of 'foreign' aggressors, then it was not necessary to ask oneself continuously 'who are we?' and 'why do we have this state?' Scientists along with other people wrote these historical- political books, and in these years the political pressure on the historical and political sciences was the strongest, since the state assigned high priority to the construction of an old and common history one could be proud of, a history believed to result in a common identity.

After a few years, the economic problems were perceived to be more urgent, and the importance of history declined a bit. At the same time, the fear of a collapse of the state diminished, so the stress on common identity less important. Still, the influence or desired influence of the new state on the constructions of history and identity is still present. In the next paragraphs, we want to investigate briefly, how this works. One important assertion we want to make already is that *a redrawing of the frame implies a redrawing of the elements*. By which we mean that a redrawing of the ethnic map implies a redrawing if the ethnicities on the map, and a redefinition

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[400] Wilson, Subtelny, Asscherson; Serry (HEE)

of their histories. The same goes for attempts at redesigns and redefinitions. The new state is looking for an identity of itself, using history to achieve this, and tries to impose this new identity as a general frame of identity in the state. This new frame brings about a new ethnic map, a redefinition of all the elements on the map. One can clearly see that the quest for identity on the state level, giving places to this and that identity, produces a series of redefinitions or reassertions of old definitions in the multitude of ethnicities populating Ukraine.

The elements, the existing ethnicities, as well as the state, can use in the reconstruction of their identities the rich offer of historical and ethnic building blocks presented by the complex Ukrainian history, as outlined in the first pages of this chapter. We devoted much space to the history of Ukraine to instil in the reader a feeling for the complexity, for the socially constructed character of the histories, for the wide variety of possibilities in present- day ethnic reconstructions of histories, and historic reconstructions of ethnicities. One 'element', one existing ethnicity, was already studied in their process of historic and ethnic reconstruction in response to the new state's policies: the Crimean Tatars.

4.6.10. A few elements: histories in a few redefined ethnicities on the map

We will not repeat too much of the Tatar study here, but want to direct the reader's attention at the two scales of ethnic redefinition present in their strategies: the old ethnic maps are redrawn as well as the new map. The redefinition of their present position on the ethnic map, the network of differences and similarities they recognise now with other groups, implies a rewriting of the histories of all the groups involved, and therefore a redrawing of the ethnic maps of several periods in history. The representatives of the Tatar community we spoke, but equally other Tatars and Kievan observers of Tatar affairs, were keenly aware of these processes and strategies, and used in the arguments they expressed in conversation with us, while defending their version of the ethno- historical map, an astonishing amount of historical 'knowledge'. Most of the identities presented in our historical overview of Ukraine, were used by some of the communities in their historical narratives. Let us take a look at the narratives of some of the important communities in Ukraine.

The Crimean Tatars

We will first continue with our brief recapitulation of the Tatar case. The Crimean Tatars are seen by the other communities as being very close to the other Tatars in Ukraine, descendants of the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanats (a few from Siberia can be added), while they redefined themselves in present Ukraine in such a way that they are very different from these Tatars[401]. They see themselves more like a product of a long list of indigenous peoples, and therefore an indigenous people themselves. The peoples included in their ancestry cover mostly vanished groups, often steppe confederation, and these peoples are presented as indigenous too, and related to the present Tatars. The Khazars are seen as Ukrainian by the Crimean Tatars, even the Scythians are presented as proto-Ukrainian, and both are seen as plainly Turkic tribes[402]. In the case of the Khazars, this is probably partly true, but the short formation period of this steppe federation has to be reminded, pointing at a probably heterogeneous original mix of ethnicities. The Scythians, as told before, were Indo- Iranian of origin, not Turkic. (It can be brought in mind that even large parts of the far east –northern China- were populated by Indo-Iranian and other Indo- European people until the first centuries AD[403])

Armenians

The roles the Crimean Tatars assigned to the other ethnicities and their histories, was often contested by these communities. We can give the example of the Armenians. The first Armenians arrived in Ukraine, probably Crimea, in the 11th century, after a defeat inflicted on the Armenian Kingdom by the Seljuk Turks (opening the gates to the Byzantine empire[404]) The Armenians themselves stress the continuity of Armenian settlement in Ukraine since that age. The Tatars, trying to transform from sons of invaders into the only indigenous population, deny such a continuity, and say that all the Armenians in Ukraine nowadays are offspring of the groups imported under Catherine the Great, of immigrants coming in after the Armenian genocide in the first world war, or even more recent immigration. The Armenians disagree with this

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[401] Dzhemilev (HEE)
[402] Fisher, 64 (HEE)
[403] Phillips, 21 (HEE)
[404] Marsden, 110 (HEE)

attempt at redefinition and point e.g. at continuous Armenian building activities since middle ages.

Testimony to the importance of the Armenian community in their view is the presence of a 14th century Armenian cathedral in Lviv, constantly used except for a communist intermezzo. This is very rare outside Armenian itself. In the beginning of the 20th century, some Armenians were among the richest people of Ukraine, and one of the symbols of the continuity of their culture they erected in that time was the neo- mediaeval church in Yalta[405], in the style of the 11th century church at Ani, presently Turkey. Continuity in general is an important value for Armenian communities in diaspora, but in Ukraine, the continuity within these regions is also thought to be of serious importance. Armenian traders are still considered to be a significant interest group in Ukraine, and the community is not very much oriented towards emigration to the States or Europe. Therefore, a line of continual presence in Ukraine can be a valuable argument to maintain a good position in the identity debates in the new state. A perceived good position can be lost, and in the types of debate going on, a continuity is a good argument. The Armenians argument needs not much further redrawing of the ethnic maps, in comparison with the Crimean Tatar redefinition. Already from this sketchy description of the Armenian position, it may be clear that some strategies of self- definition imply more redefinitions of the others than other strategies

Jews

The Jewish community in Ukraine is shrinking quickly. Especially in the west, and in the bigger cities elsewhere, the Jewish communities were considerable in the 19th and early 20th centuries[406]. Before that, more severe restrictions on the numbers of Jews and their rights were in place. Jews were never part of the countryside, and therefore quite foreign to the Ukrainian speaking peasant population. And if they knew Jews, it was in a not very sympathetic role of tax collector, land agent or banker[407]. Presently, the Jews see Ukraine as a country with an anti- Semitic past and present, and this is used as an extra argument to get out as quick as possible. If possible, Ukrainian Jews emigrate, to Israel, the States,

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[405] Ferentseva (HEE)
[406] Subtelny; Fichtner, 54 (HE)
[407] Asscherson, 204

Germany. The picture of Ukraine as a hostile country for Jews is used to obtain more visa, and to get aid from Jewish organisations, mainly in the States. All very understandable.

It is noteworthy however that in the States, there is also a Ukrainian diaspora[408], and that these people do not like the representation of Ukraine and its past by the Ukrainian Jews. They consider it an unfair picture and also point at the modest role devoted in this historical interpretation of Ukraine to the Ukrainian sufferings in and before the war. They argue that more Ukrainians died under Stalin than Jews died under Hitler, while the Ukrainians never profited from the role of acknowledged victims. In descriptions they give of the famine of the thirties, and more generally the recent events of Ukrainian histories, they copy some characteristics of the Jewish narrative, to stress the similarities between Jewish and Ukrainian fates in recent history.

The Jews do not seem to be that much interested in proving a continuity in Ukraine, and this is probably related to the perceived absence of an interest in staying there. Most of them do know about the Khazars, and stress they were Jewish. For Ukrainian Jews, the Khazars are mostly Jewish[409]. The definitions of being Jewish that are important in Israel and some of the diaspora communities in the west, are mostly not valid in Ukraine. The issue of definition is generally not that important, and the presence of an old mighty power that can be labelled Jewish makes it more attractive to skip the Israeli definitions. And the Tatar stress on the Khazars being Turkic is of course thought ridiculous, their Jewish character being seen as far more essential.

Russians

The Russians form a special case, since the definition of being Russian is very ambiguous in a country that is not accepted by all of its subjects, where being Ukrainian is thought to be impossible. If one denies the possibility of being Ukrainian, and thinks speaking Ukrainian can be combined with being Russian, then one tries to cling to the old frame. Some Russian and Ukrainian speaking people still do not believe in the new state and consider themselves Russians or inhabitants of the former Soviet Union. The attitudes to the communist regime can still be very

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[408] Subtelny, 473
[409] source: interviews

positive, not difficult to understand in a collapsed economy. One can say that some people do not accept the Russians to be an element, one ethnic community. They still perceive it to be the frame, the binding factor of the ethnicities, albeit a frame under pressure in an illegitimate new state.

The Russian stress their continuous presence in the area since the early middle ages[410]. The first Slavic communities in Ukraine are seen as the direct ancestors of the Russians, in Russian and in Ukraine. The cultural connections between Russian and Ukraine are underlined, and the dominance of the Slavic element in the different historical periods is stressed. The first settlement in Kiev is presented as purely Slavic, and the Kiev Rus state is also interpreted as Slavic, the other elements being underrated. Kiev Rus is seen as the forerunner of Russia, not of Ukraine, and in Kiev still lies the spiritual heart of Russia. Vast numbers of Russian tourists still come to Kiev to study the old buildings, reminders of Kiev Rus, to study their roots. The role of the Vikings in Kiev Rus is often completely denied[411], while Byzantine influences are mostly limited to a very short period and a very small number of architectural, artistic, intellectual styles and habits. The military, religious and cultural splendours of Kiev Rus are all attributed to the ingenuity of the Slavic soul that created Russia a bit later.

Russia and the Slavocentrist historiography

Periods and areas where Slavic dominance cannot be testified for, where another dominance cannot be denied are presented as periods and places of foreign oppression and- or decay. It still is very difficult to acknowledge for Russian –and Ukrainian- historians and politicians that Italian Renaissance architects were indeed working in the Crimean Khanate[412], and that French theatre was indeed performed at the Tatar court in the 18th century. The Mongol mark on Moscovian society is still downplayed, the Mongol society presented as chaotic and barbarian (we refer back to the import of refined Chinese systems of administration in the Golden Horde Khanate very quickly[413]). In Russian historiography, the general narrative of the Polish territories can be summarised as follows: the Polish nobility, in charge of the area, consisted of magnates treating

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[410] Wilson; Pelenski, 157; Ostrowski, 84
[411] Jones (HE); interviews
[412] Interviews; observations; Ferentseva, Ostrowski; Fisher; Serry
[413] Ostrowski, 12

their labourers in a mediaeval feudal way. This may be true, but a town like Lviv[414], flourishing from middle ages continuously until the 19th century, accommodating an international trade, forms a notable exception, and more modest examples can be given. It is also true that the educational level in the Polish territories was considerably higher than in the Russian or Cossack parts, due to the activities of some Catholic religious orders and sometimes the nobility itself (often interested in Renaissance ideals[415]) Additionally, it can be said that the labour conditions in the Russian regions were not better than in the Polish (- Lithuanian) parts. Serfdom was abolished in Russian in 1860, and even then the situation did not greatly improve for a lot of labourers −the landowners using the new law to their advantage[416].

In the Russian view, also in Ukraine, the west became an important model for about everything in society since Peter the Great, in the early 18th century[417]. French culture was considered superior, French was spoken at the court in Saint- Petersburg. French music was performed, ballets, French clothing was copied, manners, food, architecture. In architecture, a special interest for Italy too existed. This period can be found in Ukraine too, e.g. in Kiev, where Italian architects worked in the 18th century, designing among other buildings the imposing Andreevsky church. In this period, the own Russian past was a source of shame, something to be hidden. Russians, also in Ukraine, labelled Malorossia (Little Russia), identified with the past of western culture, and historical references in this Russian context were made to western histories or histories important in the west −think about the classical subjects in art.

Later on, and this process started after the French Napoleon turned against the Russians and was beaten by them in 1812, this identification with western culture and its past eroded, and gave way to identifications with pasts and peoples that were previously considered barbaric and strange. We already referred to the vogues of Russian identification with the Scythians[418]; the first of these, in Romantic spirit, can be identified shortly after 1812. Later on, also the Sarmatians became fashionably seen as

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[414] Anon., *Lviv city guide*, Lviv 2002
[415] Fichtner, 136 (HE); Subtelny (HEE)
[416] Figes, 341 (HEE)
[417] Figes
[418] Figes, 364; Asscherson, 208

proto- Russians. Another type of diversion from the western identification was the quest for the pure Russian soul, to be found in the pure, simple and good- hearted Russian peasant. A renewed interest in the orthodox religion, as a marker of a non- western identity can be traced in the same 19th century. Stalin particularly detested the western- style 18th century, and if he labelled a building 18th century, this meant a sure death by dynamite. This was exactly what happened to the St.- Michaels church in Kiev, of which the Kiev Rus core was denied existence by the pro- Stalin scientists[419].

In the present Russian view on history in Ukraine, Kiev Rus as well as the 18th century are things to be proud of and to identify with. The gap with the west is not seen as a rivalry but rather as an economic difference, and the western influences on Russian culture are perceived to be an integral part of it –leading to the famous tradition of Russian novelists and composers. It could even be noticed that a positive aspect of the Ukrainian state for the Russian critics of it, was the bigger chance of a western orientation, maybe even membership of the EU. Western histories are therefore generally accepted.

Much more can be said, but we think this brief analysis of a few mechanisms at work in the interactions between a few ethnicities can be illustrative enough for our topic. Before we go into the use of history in the planning system of Kiev, we do want to take a look at the historical position of the new frame: what kind of histories does the new state wants to promote?

4.6.11. The new frame: history and ethnicity as perceived by the new state

Ukraine presents itself to the west as well- treating its ethnic communities. We do not wish to confirm nor deny this. Some of the identities involved accept this interpretation, others not. Some are happy with the place they seem to have in the new state, others not. We try to avoid overtly political stances in this respect. We do assert that the new state pays a lot of effort to build a new identity and impose it on its population.

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[419] source: interviews

Orthodox religion is fully accepted, but a different version of orthodoxy is promoted by the Ukrainian government, propagating a separate Ukrainian metropolite, instead of being dependent of the head of the Moscow orthodoxy. Language, another possible ethnic marker, is the pivotal point of fierce debates since independence. We will not discuss this issue at length, but can say that the position of the government changed several times already. Sometimes it looked as if the new state was going to be completely bilingual, sometimes a clear distinction between domains of bilingualism and Ukrainian domains seemed to arise, but some of the most recent developments indicate a tendency towards the sole use of Ukrainian in the administration. The linguistic policies of the government can have dangerous effects, since it can affect the identifications of large parts of the population. If one can only be a real Ukrainian if one speaks Ukrainian, then half of the population can decide for themselves they are not Ukrainian, and the stability of the state can diminish greatly. Our main focus is the use of history in identity construction, and there some consistency in policies can be found.

We paraphrase the most commonly found official narrative[420]: Kiev was founded more than 1500 years ago by Kyi, his two brothers and sister. They were Slavic and the town was Slavic. They chose a Viking prince one time, but his successors cannot be called Vikings anymore. The first Kievans were direct product of an old Ukrainian lines of cultures, starting from the Trypillian culture in Neolithic times. The Scythians and Sarmatians are proto- Ukrainians and Kiev Rus was Ukrainian, not Russian. In Kiev Rus Ukrainian was spoken –while this language did not exist then. The Byzantines brought religion, writing and architecture, but the Kiev Rus- Ukrainians adapted all the imported ideas immediately, turning it swiftly in native styles of architecture and religion and so on. The Russians in fact stole the name of Kiev Rus, since the present Russia comes from Muscovy, while the term Kiev Rus was originally referring only to the Ukrainian lands, with some more obscure northern dependences.

The Mongols destroyed Kiev Rus, and it did not live through, neither in Muscovy nor in Galicia- Volhynia. Kiev Rus slumbered, in

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[420] Destilled from interviews with officials, professors, guides. This version is taught at secondary schools and frequently at universities.

times of a purely negative presence of the Tatars, seen as pure Mongols. The Lithuanian state before the commonwealth with Poland is seen as the best of the foreign rules, at the same time the most closely related to Kiev Rus, since Galicia- Volhynia bore some resemblance to Kiev Rus and it was integrated peacefully into Lithuania. The Polish and the Russians were seen as foreign invaders, the Russians culturally closer but even more aggressive conquerors. The Cossacks, revolting against Russians and Polish alike, frightening Tatars and Turks, are seen as the prototypical Ukrainians (even if you had Cossack groupings all over the Russian empire; in the Caucasus, in Siberia and elsewhere) In the 19th century, Ukrainian nationalism revived forcefully –even if this was in fact more a linguistic and folkloristic renaissance- culminating in the figure of the poet Taras Shevchenko, exiled by the tsar personally. The Russian yoke was relieved shortly after the first world war, and the president of the short- lived Ukrainian republic, Michael Hrushevsky, was a historian, author of the first monumental work on Ukrainian history. Right now, this work of about a century old still largely defines the frame of the historical narrative propagated by the authorities.

Kiev Rus, Cossacks, the Romantic Ukrainophiles and the early republic are the highlights in the official historiography of Ukraine, and around the symbols of these periods a frame is built which is supposed to guide the identifications of the inhabitants: in this history, the inhabitants should feel at home and able to identify as Ukrainians. We shall see that in spatial planning, these periods prove to be the focus of attention in policy making and practice too. In order to fulfil the demands of the west and the own desire to be a modern state, it is added that Kiev Rus – Ukraine was always a multicultural place and that nowadays the ethnic minorities are well- treated. Avoiding a position on minorities, we can say that the historical perspective that should shape identifications does not leave much room for non- Ukrainian groups, if they fall outside the enlarged definition of a Ukrainian (incorporating a host of vanished cultures and denying the perspectives of some present cultures on the vanished ones) In a Ukrainian perspective, the Tatars are still Mongols, and unrelated to the Scythians, which they include in their own line of descent. In the preceding pages more examples of such a mechanism were given.

Let us turn to spatial planning now, and ask the question how this official construction of history and identity is visible there. We will try to

answer this question in a concise way, by giving a short description of the planning system, and looking at the way the heritage of the different communities is dealt with. Interviews with experts inside and outside the planning system served as a source, as well as interviews with the users. The cultures of the users and the cultures of the planners were taken into account.

4.6.12. The spatial planning system

Players

We will not give a full description of the spatial planning system in Kiev and Ukraine. The intricacies of the system are not relevant here, and we are more interested in the actual planning practice, in the differences between the official version of the system, the self- image, and the practical reality as perceived from outside the system. It is important to say that a complex planning system still exists, a reminder of communist society where urban planning was considered a highly scientific and worthy task. At the moment, things are somewhat less scientific and worthy −not saying that the results are always bad[421].

In Kiev lives the president. That is not supposed to be directly relevant for the study of the spatial planning system, but it is. A number of issues he considers to be of national importance, also spatial planning issues in Kiev, he decides upon himself. In Kiev lives the mayor of Kiev. Spatial planning is largely organised at the town level, so he is supposed to be important. And he is. He can decide to pass the relevant organisations and take decisions himself. The most relevant organisations here are the architectural department of the city of Kiev, the monuments department − especially relevant for our question- and the Masterplan department. There was also a governmental organisation called Kievproject, aimed at project development, but it became privatised last year, owned by one former city architect, and we did not succeed in gaining access there and analysing its functioning. The Masterplan department was important in Soviet times, and was geared to formulate general guidelines for urban planning on the longer term. Nowadays, a Masterplan is officially still functioning, but set aside constantly. Architectural department and the

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[421] Interviews; no official documents say this

department of monuments still function in a more and more privatised real estate market, every now and then passed by mayor or president.

Some people might expect the planning system has disappeared completely. This is not the case. The departments mentioned are growing. In order to obtain a building permit, 22 other permits had to be obtained in late 2003. Some areas of government are close to lawlessness –rules vanished, policing of the rules absent. Other areas of policymaking became more complex; rules were added and they are policed carefully. The departments of architecture and of monuments are examples of this last type. The general problem seems to be that small units of the administration operate individually, control from the top being limited to certain areas interesting for the leaders of the moment and the interest groups backing them. At the top of these units stand bosses that have near to absolute command. Their power grows if their organisation becomes bigger and harvests more money from diverse types of clients - private, political, governmental.

Rules

Control over the creation of rules and knowledge of the rules is essential for such an administrative clan to move on. Blanks in the law are maintained by certain groups because they profit from them: lack of legal clarity allows for all kinds of practices. Hyper- complex parts of law and regulation are maintained because they are profitable too for some groups: very few people know the rules, and can help a client through this labyrinth, for a modest fee. Permits are a favourite tool to create income, but so are the studies required to accompany a file needed for a permit. As said before, the purpose of the money can be reasonable and acceptable – we bring in mind the example of the fire brigade suffering from salary cuts- and one cannot suffice by saying that it is all about corruption and self- enrichment. It is as much about maintaining some services at any price, about survival, and about power, a position in the implicit hierarchy of the administration –the importance of which is probably a Soviet heritage. One can notice that some auto- feedback mechanisms are at work here: the more money a clan finds, the more people it can pay. The bigger it becomes, the more important its boss becomes. The more important the boss, the better access he has to the controlling mechanisms of rule- making. The better access to rule- creation, the better knowledge

of the rules and the more advantageous rules come into existence, and the more money one can earn. Etcetera.

Selective enforcement of rules is also a strategy that becomes more realistic and more rewarding the higher one gets in the hierarchy of the administration (politicians also seem to like it) Friends can be asked less, enemies more. Perceived enemies or neutral clients can be asked to comply to the rules better, they can be allowed to break the rules for a moment but blackmailed afterwards, or can be kept ignorant about the rules and asked for money afterwards to solve the 'problem'. Selective enforcement of the law can also be maintained for a longer period, while archiving every breaking of the law. This way, a powerful tool for blackmail is gradually built, to be used only when people turn against you. Such a strategy can only work for people high on the ladder, and the president himself is often mentioned as an adept. (We are not a lawyer and have no legal proof for this)

Network design

Within this situation, an administration lacking a balanced design and a balanced top- down control, the relations between the units in the administration, the clans, shift continuously, a situation that is aggravated by the competition of the clans to control the rule- creation, to control the controlling mechanisms. In this situation of fierce competition, the locus of power is never stable. The heads of both the architecture and monuments departments were fired by the mayor right after our stay in Kiev. Their power struggle had irritated the mayor and affected some of his interests. Within the respective administrations, the balance of power between the smaller clans shifted immediately, and the clients had suddenly different requirements to meet.

The perspective of the competing gaming units is not enough though. It can reasonably be combined with a network metaphor here. Networks overlapping different parts of the administration, and involving private actors as well, exist everywhere. We spoke about this in the chapters on planning systems in general. However, the Ukrainian situation differs from this general pattern. The network links between private and public actors, and between public actors, here parts of the administration that seem unrelated at first sight, are often more consistent and more important than the links between administrations that seem important in the organisation charts and that should be important if the official

procedures are taken at face value. Combine this with laws and rules which are subject to the principles just described, and strange things -in western eyes- can happen.

The most disturbing consequences —disturbing from a western conception of good governance guided by good old enlightenment principles- spring from the combination of this network design with an ambiguity of the land property law.(The law is under revision right now, so the situation might improve) A few examples. A multitude of parks and avenues lined with chestnut trees are important in the image of old Kiev, an image people in Russia and Ukraine still have, an image that is reflected in literature, movies and more. Now, project developers or civil servants turning into or combining with developers, realize that parks in or near the historical centre are valuable building sites. If the civil servant realizing this opportunity has in his network the people that are responsible for the permits or responsible for punishing building crimes or some politicians, then he can seize the opportunity, as long as he shares the profits in the network, which is reinforced by every common action undertaken. The park disappears, to great dismay of the inhabitants of the neighbourhood. They can complain in a democratic fashion, write about the problem very democratically, but nobody will listen. They may be protected by the Masterplan or other regulations, but nobody will listen. The system fails to do what it is supposed to do because of this type of network design and the design is possible because the walls between the compartments in the administration are too permeable. This permeability is due to the unclear rules, the constant shifts in the networks, the lacking of consistent and balanced oversight from the top. Weird links can become forceful suddenly.

Another example: a school in a highly valued old building in the centre of town. Suddenly, it is decided that the school must disappear, to be replaced by a parking lot and a high rising building. Protest of well-connected parents led to the construction of a replacement school on the outskirts of Kiev, unrealistically far away. The land prices in the centre are much higher than on the periphery, so a profit could be made. We could not trace who took the decisions, but it is possible to say that the normally valid regulations were set aside because a link between normally unrelated parts of the administration evaded the official compartment map of the administration. Third example: a series of underground malls adjoining

metro stations were rapidly built in the last few years. Co- owner of one of the biggest ones is a senior member of the architecture department. It turns out that he is a part- time developer too, jumping into a gap left by the land property law concerning the underground. Under the ground there is no ground, was the reasoning, and therefore no price to pay for the building plots. Once more, we cannot tell this for sure since no access was gained, no official documents could be analysed. We consider our sources well- informed however, and trustworthy. One clan in the administration noticed the gap in legislation, profitable in a situation of diminishing gaps, used the monopoly on knowledge about the rules, discarded the official procedures −partially controlled by the clan- and became a private developer.

We can assume the reader has some picture now of the present state of the spatial planning system in Kiev, Ukraine. What about the role of history in this system? What kind of histories are taken into account? Is there special attention devoted to the histories of the different communities?

4.6.13. The uses of histories in the spatial planning system

One thing one can observe easily is the attention paid to restoration of the old town. Part of these actions can be explained by the hope for touristic revenues. Part of the effort can be explained by the actions of the monuments department, trying to become ever more important. But part of it must be explained by state and town policies aimed at glorification of a 'Ukrainian' past. What kind of past is glorified? The answer is an easy one: the past of the official historical narrative of the new state, the past of Kiev Rus, Cossacks, Romantic nationalism. Since the Cossacks built virtually nothing and certainly not in Kiev, and the Romantic nationalists were not very productive builders either, their past is mostly one of commemorative sculptures and plaquettes. Kiev Rus buildings are the main focus of attention. Since virtually nothing remains of Kiev Rus architecture, not after Stalin and the war, the only way open to glorification of the past is the rebuilding of demolished or otherwise vanished Kiev Rus buildings, mainly churches. The Pirogova church, Byzantine in appearance is an example at a modest scale, St. Michaels church an example of enormous proportions, rebuilt at enormous costs.

So, compared to the communist planning system, more attention is paid to the past. But the past is a very small one. Kiev Rus and to a lesser degree, Ukrainian Baroque and neoclassical architecture are considered interesting to restore or rebuild. The desire to recreate some of the splendour of Kiev Rus is that great that virtually every scrap of material referring to the period is highlighted. And things from this period are much more likely to be reproduced. The fundaments of a replica baroque gate at the present Freedom square, are replica Kiev Rus. In several churches, parts of the baroque stucco is seemingly removed, to show parts of the original Kiev Rus brickwork, or opus mixtum, a Byzantine combination of stone and brick layers. These seemingly authentic parts are replica as well, dating from a few years ago. Archaeologists rebuilt the ground plan of the oldest stone church, built before Saint Sophia, rebuilt a few layers of brick high, on the correct location though. Other archaeologists excavated the remainders of a formerly unknown Kiev Rus church, outside the old city walls. They found it -recently- on a destinated building site. Normally in such a case the archaeologists receive very little time and money to do a quick search and then leave the place, but now the city council decided to build a special museum on the spot, showing the excavations and preserving them.

Notions of authenticity

It is interesting to notice how easily things are rebuild in old styles, in stead of restoring them. A different perception of authenticity is at stake, but also lower costs, higher speed, and possibly better opportunities for money laundry.(no court proof again) This is the case for the Kiev Rus buildings, but also for the less rare architecture. The restoration architect of St. Michaels made in a conversation with us the comparison with the score of a musical composition. The design is the real work of art, not the actual building, and the artistic value of the design stays intact while rebuilding.

Replica's of Kiev Rus architecture and Ukrainian Baroque churches are currently built in all corners of the country. We saw churches in these historicist styles in Lviv, Galicia in Uzhgorod, Transcarpathia, and in Sevastopol, Crimea, three regions where these styles were historically never to be found. In Kiev, from a western perspective the choice for the replica's is understandable. Not much is left of old building in Kiev

generally, the place being built in wood for most of the time. The other regions however have different building traditions, of which quite a lot still stands upright, and it is surprising to see pure renaissance architecture crumbling down while a neo- Byzantine church is being erected a few yards away. Or to see how in Sevastopol the archaeological site of the Greek- Roman- Byzantine site of Chersonese was largely neglected while –indeed– a Kiev Rus church in gold and marble was under construction in the middle of the site. The new national identity, based on a new history focussing on Kiev Rus, has to be present and affirmed all over the country.

In the information given about the buildings, the Ukrainian character of the style and the era is constantly stressed. The Vikings have disappeared from the picture, and the Byzantines have a small role indeed. Even the names of the styles have been given from a Slavic perspective. The basilica shaped churches, rectangular, are called Byzantine, the cross- domed types Kiev Rus, while in fact both types could be found in all variations within the Byzantine empire, and for nearly all the important Kiev Rus churches Byzantine models can be given. This does not deny an interesting local contribution to the later development of orthodox church architecture. But the buildings erected in the Kiev Rus era were part of Byzantine architectural typologies. The seemingly weird and atypical monastery of the caves in Kiev, the Lavra, was also modelled on one specific Byzantine cloister in Asia Minor.[422]

The stress on the Kiev Rus heritage and the replication of its architecture, seems decided at the highest level, and these decisions were quickly made after independence. Several sources attested the existence of a list of vanished buildings, a list signed by the president right after independence and meant to assign priorities to the reconstruction of symbolically important buildings, mostly Kiev Rus. The president and also the mayor of Kiev seem to have interfered every now and then in the planning system of Kiev, to ensure the due respect for the Kiev Rus heritage. Also the responsible departments held this heritage high -we noticed- but the nature of the planning game and the planning networks as described above, did not always guarantee a positive outcome for Kiev

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[422] Franklin, 207 (HEE); Talbot Rice (HEE)

Rus, so mayor and president held a watchful eye on the fate of what they perceived to be a common good and a common interest.

'Minor heritage' and the planning game

What about the architecture and the old places that were not seen to be of national interest? Old parks are particularly vulnerable, as the example above showed. Excavations have small chances, because the building lobbies are too powerful too accept much disturbance of building sites and delay of projects. Private houses can be restored by owners if they have money; the state does not subsidise very much. The architectural department was in the last ten years very focussed on large scale developments in a kind of rough postmodern style in old areas and a grand modernist style in more recent environments, as far as they actually influenced developments. The monument department succeeded very well in becoming big and important, and this was due to a well- connected head protecting more and more 'monuments' and asking for ever heavier studies and files to clients if they wanted to change something to these monuments or replace them by other buildings. The result of this opportunist use of the monuments list, is a selection completely at random in western eyes. An ugly building can be protected to block unwanted developments by an enemy clan, or to earn some money by removing the protected status for a client.

The analysis of what is protected and what not, what renovated and what not, is still complicated by the fact that it is not only a result of the policies of the monument department, but also the result of a history of conflicts between the rival monumental and architectural departments. The protection or non- protection can be the result of a move in a complicated chess- game that is almost impossible to reconstruct. In each case, it is safe to say that the use of historical buildings is generally unrelated to intrinsic historical values attributed to them, here or there. Generally speaking, the use of history is the result of the games in the spatial planning system of Kiev. Two important players in the games are the architecture department and the monuments department, but from the lines on shifting networks could be deduced that new momentary coalitions can mushroom, and influence decision- making on this or that old site. A major exception in the games form the buildings that are considered of national importance; these buildings are Kiev Rus or Ukrainian Baroque, and used to strenghten the propagated new national

identity. Even in places outside the old Kiev Rus territories they get top priority. All of them tend to be more or less unaffected by the planning games.

Heritage of the communities

Still, we do not have an answer yet concerning the treatment of the heritage of the other communities. The Russians consider everything to be Russian, generally, so also from their own perspective, there is no specific heritage deserving a specific treatment. As far as the other groups are concerned: the official Ukrainian point of view is that there is no problem at all, since all the religious buildings were given back to the appropriate communities after independence -the Karaim Kenasa of Kiev forming an exception. In the official version, this situation is true for Kiev and all the regions. From the perspective of the respective communities, there is a problem, not so much in Kiev but definitely in the regions.

In Kiev, the areas formerly inhabited by Jews are now mixed, the Jew population became much smaller, and the remaining Jews are not really interested in returning to the old Jewish neighbourhoods. The Polish catholics assign no special value to other buildings than their neogothic churches, and these are well- preserved. The Armenians have no significant buildings or places in Kiev, are only disappointed that the mediaeval Armenian church that was excavated a few years ago was quickly covered again, without thorough investigation. Archaeologists themselve agree that things would have gone differently if it would have been a Kiev Rus church. After the recent discovery of the Kiev Rus church - mentioned above- Russian specialists were flewn in especially. Ironically, the most important of these, director of archaeology of the Hermitage Museum in St.- Petersburg, was an Armenian. He could appreciate the irony of the situation. There is a Tatar community too, but they do not have places or buildings in Kiev very special to them.

In the regions, there is a problem in the eyes of the communities. Tatar heritage in Crimea is mostly Russian property, seldom returned or even resold. The often centuries- old buildings are seldom considered heritage by the administration in Kiev, while much more recent buildings referring to the massive redevelopment of the Crimean coast in the 19th century are labelled monument, protected, subsidised (in some cases they are splendid, admitted) And if something is seen to be Tatar heritage -like the palace in Bakchisaray- the management is not in Tatar hands.

Armenian heritage is mostly controlled by the Armenian community, and they find the money to renovate, even to build new churches (something the Tatars and others envy)

In the west, monumental buildings and ensembles stemming from the Polish- Lithuanian period are much more frequently neglected, and the regional population, not identifying as Polish but still as different from Kiev and mostly not orthodox, think it unfair that their regional heritage is falling in pieces while new orthodox churches are being built. The few traces of old orthodoxy that can be found in the west -e.g. the two churches in Lviv with 13th century elements- are lavishly renovated, and money is lacking for catholic and uniate churches. Lviv generally stands out as a positive situation however, having received the Unesco world heritage- label. Also the Ukrainian authorities seem to be sensitive for such a sign of international recognition; and the income this might generate. The communities feel not fairly represented in the decision- making about their own heritage. Often, irritation is felt about te state propagation of a singular Ukrainian history, experienced as very artificial, and the veneration and creation of a singular Ukrainian heritage.

The heritage of vanished communities is still more vulnerable. Turkish forts are completely neglected. The traces of Genoa and Venice in Crimea however are cherished as tourist attractions, and often mentioned with pride. By tourists we refer mainly to Russian tourists. Older groups, cultures, are often only of special interest for so- called black archaeology, illegal archaeology. The black archaeologists operate for the art market, but not solely for foreign collectors. On the contrary, collecting Scythian, Goth, Sarmatian, Bosporus- kingdom, …archaeology seems to be a favourite hobby of the new economic elite, and they are proud to have these illegally acquired treasures. They even show their black collections to the audience in the national symbol St. Sophia, and see this as a sign of patriottism, opposed to the esoteric practices of the official archaeology - which is seemingly not so official anymore.

4.6.14. Conclusion: History, identity and planning in a new and multi- ethnic state

Ukraine is a young state, and its start took place in less than promising cicumstances. The west did not know how to respond to this new and

potentially powerful but also potentially unstable country, and there was a real fear of an attack from Russia. The inhabitants of the new state did not embrace the idea of it whole- hearted, and did not know how to identify. Ukraine needed an identity and needed it quickly, and the government used among other things a new history to define this identity. There was a rich offer of histories to use, a lot of cultures had inhabited Ukraine, some of them still present. A mono- ethnic perspective on history was chosen, based on the work of an old nationalist historian, and this was intended to serve as a frame for future identifications of all the inhabitants. But a lot of different communities exist within Ukraine, and a lot of them did not appreciate the position they got in the past -and therefore the present- according to the official historical narrative. The attempts to impose a new frame therefore had as a consequence a series of reassertions of old stories and the rewriting of a number of ethnic histories from within the communities. By trying to impose this mono- ethnic view in education, science, politics, also in the economy, the government started a number of chain reactions in the rewriting of history and ethnicity in the elements, the communities. A pool game. And the game isn't over yet.

The more since the construction of the frame is not always that consistent. There is an uneasy combination between the imposition of the mono- ethnic view and the multiculturalist rhetoric used in some cases. Some institutes where founded to further the aim of a multicultural society, part of the official rhetorics on tv and in the newspapers is also in this direction. One can see that these two official discourses will produce contradictions. And the volatile language policies of the state, referred to above, do not make an identificiation as Ukrainian easier either.

The official historical narrative is centred around the culture of Kiev Rus, something that is especially painful for the Russians, since they see their roots in the same place. Kiev Rus is seen by the Ukrainians as proto- Ukrainian, not proto- Russian or a common ancestry. Both Ukrainian and Russian interpretations of Kiev Rus do not leave room for a Scandinavian role. Both feel it as an insult if too much attention in historiography is given to the Vikings, mostly because they are not Slavic. It must be added that archaeology seems to enjoy more freedom of interpretation in this direction than the discipline of history, more closely linked to the new state ideology, being assigned a more substantial role in education.

In spatial planning too, Kiev Rus monuments are the most important ones, and since they do hardly exist, there is a need of replicas, to be placed in all corners of the country as a sign of unity and a common history. In Kiev this is not seen to be a problem, but the regions do not appreciate this emphasis on Kiev Rus architecture, because a different heritage, be it regional or ethnic, is crumbling down in proximity of new neo- Byzantine buildings, in places where the orthodox faith was not dominant and Kiev Rus never gained a foothold. Again, a friction can be felt between the pressure towards construction of a new and all-embracing ethnicity and the rhetoric of multiculturalism. For the administration, the problem of the heritage of the minorities was solved by handing over religious buildings to them. For several of the communities, and regions, the problem is not solved, and it is seen as linked to the role assigned to them in the new historic and ethnic narrative of the state.

As said, the game is not over yet, and the full ramifications of the ethnic and historical policies of the state cannot be overseen yet. It is important to realize though, that the majority of decisions in spatial planning related to historical places and buildings, are not the result of deliberate historical policies, but rather products of the games played in an administration that lacks cohesion and consistent control. The administration can be presented as a playing field of clans, trying to obtain more power or to fulfill their old tasks, in each case a playing field in which competition is more important than cooperation. In an administration based on the enlightenment principles we still underscore, this should not be the case, as it prevents a balanced design of the administration, aimed at an efficient execution of tasks assigned importance by the citizens.

Network links that are present in other countries as well can become too important in such a situation, which can also be presented as a collection of networks that pierce too easily through the compartment walls of the administration. The official walls are too thin because in the competitive environment, the locus of power shifts often, and opportunities can arise everywhere. Laws and rules are either too sparse or too abundant, are not consistently guarded, and are - and this is the root problem- considered as tools to gain power, in stead of means to divide power according to democratic principles.

In the meanwhile, what actually happens, especialy in Kiev, does not look too bad. The results of the games and the policies are sometimes very beautiful. It can be advantageous for the players to build nice things, it can be a matter of real interest for a highly powerful and corrupt official what happened to the little park in his sisters neighbourhood, or what happened to the Byzantine church that stands symbol for the glory of Kiev Rus. And people can choose deliberately for renovation and restoration activities as a way to laundry their money. There are other ways, but this at least makes our Kiev more splendid.

4.6.15. Reflection

We will not make a comparison with other planning systems here. This is up to the reader. It can be said however that a lot of the mechanisms present in Ukraine are present in western Europe, be it less exteme and less obvious. Kiev was also interesting to study because the mechanisms that are more hidden in the west, veiled by technocratic and democratic rhetoric, are much closer to the surface in Kiev; they cannot be simply denied existence –a response frequently met in western Europe.

Ukraine showed a mix of ethnicities in transition, an economy in transition –be it intentionally delayed– and a planning system in transition. We had the opportunity to study the interactions between user cultures, transforming, between cultures in the planning system, and some interactions between the cultures of planners and users. (Aspects of the three first case studies are combined in this one). It must be said, that the population of Kiev is proud of the city, generally speaking, that they are not dissatisfied with the results of the planning system. And they like the more important role of historical things in recent years. At the same time, they know they do not have a real voice in the process, and they know a lot about the games played and the networks in place. The results are not bad, but the process is wrong. People feel they cannot change political structures yet, so they stay calm and appreciate the restoration efforts.

One important conclusion we would like to make here, heading to the general conclusions, is that a planning system should not be aimed at prescribing a good content, but rather be focussed on good form, by which we mean good procedures, a good organisation, based on the remaining enlightenment principles we refer so often to. A bad form can –

like in Kiev- produce good results, good content, but we cannot say this is a good situation (Normative stance) If a transparent democracy had existed and a likewise planning system, the results would have been different. And, by the way, the multiple metaphors did their job again.

5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

5.1. Introduction: deconstructions and reconstructions

Our initial question was how to use old things to improve the spatial quality of new urban neighbourhoods. Spatial quality was deconstructed from the start as something that is discursively articulated: definitions of spatial quality are defined within discourses, within groups of people. References to the past and preservation of old objects, the two most general categories of use of old things, of cultural history, can be used to make a new place different from its surroundings and different from newly built areas somewhere else. It can improve the perceived quality of places; make them more interesting one way or another. From everything we met in this book, it must be clear that no clear rules can be deduced concerning the good use of history, in order to reach this goal.

Recommendations in this respect can only be realistic if they start from a realistic analysis of the roles of history and historical places in the lives of the intended users and in the worlds of planners, designers and the planning agencies. We tried to develop a theory that enabled us to analyse the worlds of the users as well as the worlds of the groups involved in the planning and design process. To do so, we opted for an interpretative perspective, combining semiotics, anthropology and discourse studies. Such an interpretative perspective can shed light on the ways diverse groups of people construct their worlds by means of signs.

It is embedded in a more general post- modern tradition, present in a number of disciplines for some time, not very much yet in the disciplines of spatial planning, urban design, landscape architecture. The selected types of semiotics, anthropology, discourse studies are postmodern types, but in these traditions and- or disciplines, postmodernism is the dominant epistemologic discourse. The basic assumptions of social construction of reality, fragmentation and plurality of truth, discursive character of scientific knowledge, are not dominant at all in the disciplines we want to situate this study in, and therefore needed explanation. Conducting the analysis of the worlds of users and planners, presenting both as meeting

grounds of group cultures, and the planning process as a meeting ground of the cultures of users and planners –and designers- however required more than the sole explanation of the basic concepts of postmodern thought.

It needed a redefinition of knowledge and science, of the role of power, the relation between knowledge and power, and the consequences of these redefinitions for the fields of planning and design. This meant in fact a redefinition of the planning and design disciplines, necessary to study the actual roles of knowledge and historical kowledge in the planning and design system, and to investigeae the potential roles of historical knowledge and therefore of historical objects and structures. Within a redefined planning system, a study could be made of the roles of redefined knowledge. The redefinition of knowledge took place in the first few chapters, and in fact also in the following chapters, where more diverse relations between knowledge, culture and power came to the fore. The redefinition of the planning system took place in the compendium of concepts, where some consequences of the postmodern frame of thought for the content of some planning- related concepts were highlighted. And in the two chapters before the more illustrative Kiev case. These chapters in turn derived from literature and from mechanisms unveiled and analysed in the case studies.

However, the deconstructive and reconstructive effort was not finished here. Also the histories potentially important in planning and design had to be deconstructed and reconstructed. By which we refer to the identity theory we developed in the chapter after the case studies. In the identity theory, deriving mainly from anthropological sources and our own partly anthropological research, we redefined history, in relation with place and group. Histories are presented as products of cultures, of groups of people, bearing the mark of these cultures and of the places that are important in and for these people. Historical truth was fragmented and connected to place identities –also plural- and group cultures.

After the construction of the conceptual frame of this identity theory, it became possible to analyse the roles of redefined knowledge of redefined histories in a redefined spatial planning system. Within such a system, the roles of history can be various. The Dutch planning system served as the main case to study these roles. However, given the omnipresence of a lot of mechanisms present there, the Dutch system can be replaced by any

other. The combinations and relative importance of the mechanisms at stake will differ in other systems, but the same mechanisms will reappear and the patterns emerging from the games played within a planning system will recurr often. In addition, we say that the lines on planning in the compendium- chapter, take a distance from the dutch situation, and in the latter chapters on planning, the specificity or non- specificity of the Dutch situation is scrutinised as carefully as possible.

While analysing the roles and potential roles of history in the Dutch planning system, it became clear that all the mechanisms discovered in the case studies and sometimes deduced from the theoretical assumptions, had to be taken into account, in order to produce a complete enough picture, a fair representation of the variety of mechanism playing and correspondingly the variety of possible roles of history and historical things. These mechanisms were discovered while using different metaphors for the planning and design. While most of the existing planning theories start from one metaphor, we concluded from our research that it is preferable to use situation- specific combinations of metaphors to get a full picture of the subject. A sideline of our main subject it might be, this can be an important conclusion towards planning theory.

Planning can be fruitfully presented as a game, as a game of power, as a meeting place of cultures, a network of actors and in other ways. Every one of these metaphors allows for the observation of different structures and mechanisms in the planning system. Every one of these metaphors can highlight different roles of history too. Combine this list of metaphors with the mutual definition of knowledge and power we observed and deduced, and a multitude of roles of history emerges. We will not depict this diversity again here. It is important to stress though, that the diversity of roles, and the diverse types of uncertainty in the planning system, introduced by the validity of the list of metaphors, each of one showing new types of uncertainty, underlines forcefully the impossibility to establish lasting rules for the use of history in planning and design.

Changes in the network can lead to changing roles of history, and the same effect can be caused by the simple course of the game, the changing strategic roles of historical knowledge, the changes in layout of the networks involved, changes in the cultural composition of the planned and designed area and changes within cultures staying on the spot. The

patterns emerging from this bewildering variety of planning mechanisms and potential roles of history can never be predicted. To make things even more complex, the histories of all the organisations, people and discourses involved, can lead to stereotypical interpretation of and behaviour in the use of the space and the planning game. The history of the discourse can structure the new versions of the discourse and can structure the interpretation of the past and therefore the potential roles of history. The mere fact of a tradition in interpreting this or that can lead to traditional interpretations of historical things and traditional uses of historical knowledge. Existence of such traditions can diminish the complexity of the pattern, on the other hand it can raise the complexity by adding a possibility of referring to unknown traditions and pasts of actor A or B.

In each case, the sum of all this means very clearly that no scientific expert or a practical expert, be it a planner or an urban designer, an historian or an archaeologist, neither a combination of these, can predict the roles of history for the users of the place and in the planning process. And neither of them can deduce an ideal spatial use of historical objects and structures in a plan, a design. The claims most of these disciplines have in doing so, or in being able to make such a deduction, to speak of ideal solutions, scientifically grounded or grounded in an infallible esthetic intuition, were all deconstructed in the course of these chapters.

The deconstruction of the planning system, the refusal to take the self- image of the planning culture for granted, implied the deconstruction of the several participating professional cultures and disciplinary cultures. Objective, scientific knowledge, preferably technical, played traditionally a dominant role in the case of the Dutch planning system, and such a feature of the planning culture envigorated the general tendency of scientific disciplines to forget about one's own basic assumptions, and to declare the disciplinary findings to be objective truths, to connect to reality without the interference of methods, machines, theories, concepts, attitudes, perceptions, in short without the interference of a culture. Within the context of the Dutch planning system they had to present their ideas as objective, universal, scientific, in order to gain influence within the system, and share in the ressources distributed by and within the system.

While analysing the functioning of the planning system, it is important to keep a distance from the images of self and images of objectivity and rationality. And a realistic analysis, we repeat, is a

prerequisite for realistic recommendations. The historical values attached to objects by the diverse disciplines to historical objects and structures, and the ways to deal with them spatially in new plans, differs strongly among these disciplines and differs from the values and esthetic ideals fostered by the intended or present user groups. And these differences do not mean any of these is being wrong. It just means all these ideas are constructed within a culture. If we add to this our normative stance that the planning system and the resulting designs are there to serve the users, and not vice versa, then one must consider it important not to accept the ideas of the disciplines as objective truths automatically overruling the ideas and the preferences of the users. This is valid for all aspects of the planning pocess and all types of knowledge involved. Historical knowledge, historical values, historical objects, historicising designs form just one aspect of the planning system liable to these comments.

But if all these disciplinary truths are deconstructed, shown to be relative, and if the user's preferences can change suddenly and also contradict heavily, even within one and the same person (see the Almere study and in general the pathways of signification codified in the identity construction schemes), what is left for the planning system and the participating disciplines? And what kind of recommendations can a researcher still give?

5.2. A shift from content to form

Here we come back to the point touched upon several times already: what is good planning and what are good designs. We rejected definitions pointing at a strong government- based planning and design apparatus, definitions necessarily including high numbers of planners, definitions including the necessity of strong similarities between a place after the planning process and the plan itself. Rejected were also definitions of a good plan and a good planning system in general implying a need for absolute freedom of the experts, enabling them to apply to full extent their perceived objective knowledge, perceived to be misunderstood or half-understood by society, by the users.

The only definition of a good plan still standing in our post- modern perspective retaining some of the enlightenment values upheld in our culture, is that of a good plan as a plan leading to a sitation people are

satisfied with. This can be no plan, and it can be a plan or a design produced in the absence of planners and designers. As stated before: a plan is ok if it works and it works if people like it. All the other criteria were dismissed during our deconstructive and reconstructive efforts. If from our investigations could be deduced no direct recommendations concerning the content of plans, since neither disciplines nor users can directly produce knowledge that makes a plan that is more than simply acceptable, our attention must be diverted from content to form at this point in the reasoning. By form we mean here procedure, the design of the planning process. From the enlightenment values still retained, regarded as being generally accepted in our culture, seen irreplacable in the functioning of a chosen society, do follow principles concerning the organisation of the planning system, including the role of designers. Again, our subject, historical things, does not differ from all the other subjects imaginable in planning in this perspective.

The requirements made to the procedure of planning by the principles of delegation of power, economy of means, clarity of governance, division of powers, can however not be translated into one type of process design, apart from the culture and the state people live in. An impossibility to formulate scientific prescriptions about planning and design content turns the attention towards planning process, but there only general recommendations can be given, based on generally accepted principles of governance (at least in Europe). If people are dissatisfied with final plans or with the possibilities to participate in the planning and design process, the design of the planning process should be changed, that is one deduction one can make. The design of the planning process should allow for the amount of user interaction requested for in society, and it should allow for a posteriori comments of the users to be reckoned with in next stages or later plans. But also here, like in the case of content, process architecture is culture- bound, is discursively articulated. There is no a priori good measure of user participation or user preference research, no eternally or universally acceptable and desirable design of a planning and design process. And within such a design there can be no universally accepted method to deal with things from the past, no universal way to be inspired by them.

5.3. Positive deconstruction of form

If we bring in mind the volatile and often contradictory preferences and values of the user groups, an extra problem seems to be added. If people expect contradictory things, then no process design in the world can produce automatically a well- balanced synthesis of all the interests at stake. In the rumour of contradictory signals a planning agency, a planning organisation, a government in general, has to take decisions and to impose measures unwanted by certain people under certain circumstances. This is part and parcel of every form of government and every form of spatial planning. The degree to which people accept such powers from the state and from government- induced spatial planning specifically, will differ greatly among cultures and eras. Like in the case of planning content, planning process should be dominated by the state to a degree which is desired by the people for whom the planning is being undertaken. There is no a priori good measure of power delegated to the state in order to align the conflicting interests in the name of the general interest. This should be decided upon in every culture and at every moment when the issue arises. This, again, is our normative stance, derived however from principles we believe to be generally accepted but not generally followed in European societies. The planning system, in which we include the designing disciplines, is well- designed if it works, and it works if people feel it produces good results in a way that takes into account their preferences well enough. And if their preferences are contradictory or ignorant, then the state should harmonise and synthesise them in a way they allow for. If not, if the state is either to dominant or too absent, then a well- functioning political system, enabling dissatisfaction to result in transformations in rule, can produce a balance of power that is accepted again, and therefore good.

So, summarizing, one can say that from a scientific point of view, a postmodern scientific point of view, no recommendations can be given in general concerning the use of history in a planning system. It is necessary to look at the design of the planning process, and list the requirements made to the process in order to produce plans and designs where history is used in a way that satisifies the users of the newly designed places. A good form can produce all the contents desirable in one society. But a good form is also not more than a desired form; from the enlightenment

principles still ruling a whole array of acceptable forms could be deduced. And from the form of the planning system the attention was shifted to the form of the general political system. Once more, a good political system is one that is desired by its subjects (all the practical goals are set by cultures, cannot be definied outside these cultures, e.g. by scientists) History brings to planning content in general, planning content leads to planning process, planning process leads to political function. In the end, a good use of history in planning rests in a well- functioning political system, where power and means are distributed in a way that is acceptable and desirable for the users of places.

The identity theory we developped in chapter X increased the complexity of the historical issues at stake in a planning system, since the creation of histories and historical objects is linked to the dynamics of emerging and disappearing groups of people defining themselves and places in terms of histories and vice versa. Not only ethnicities show this dynamism, but the schemes presented in this chapter can come into action in about every group of people imaginable, be it professional cultures, disciplinary cultures, organisational cultures or otherwise. It diminished the chances of ever attaining a scale of objective historical values, let alone that they would be attached to places in uniform ways. The unpredictability of the emerging significance of histories and places for people adds to the complexity of the planning process, unnerves the claims of disciplines participating in the planning process about ideal ways to represent the historical values of places and- or people in the planning and design process, and it constitutes an extra argument for the shift from content to form. Apart from the intrinsic value of gaining insight into the dynamism of creation of cultures and of worlds within cultures, this is an extrinsic value of the identity theory, the added insight into the nature and the limits of the planning process.

5.4. A positive appreciation of historical content, if only in well- designed arenas

The proposed shifts of attention towards form and politics, the advised raising of selfawareness within the planning system, and our analytical focus on the limits of planning, does not imply that a planning

system should be devoid of content according to us, or that the scientific and other knowledge present in the disciplines possibly participating in a planning process have no value. On the contrary. If a society is happy with a planning system revolving around ecological principles, or devoted to a classical urban esthetics, then it is not a problem that the knowledge of ecologists, or in the other case of urban designers and landscape architects, holds central place in the planning system. A society can decide to focuss on content in stead of form, but even then the form, the process, should be designed in such a way that a change in content or a raised importance of form is achievable within the process design. The central requirement still stands. Disciplines have the right to convince society of their importance in spatial planning, and society has the right to be convinced by them. Things become problematic only when false claims of objectivity or false claims concerning the clear representation of (hidden, contradictory, subconscious) user preferences hinder a democratically legitimate process design and functioning of the process.

In dealing with history, the questions who's history, who's places, and simply who we are dealing with arose as being connected in the identity theory. Place, history and user cultures were seen as connected and mutually defined. It was added that disciplines and professional cultures were liable to the same processes. Disciplines can have their own preferred histories, places, images of self and others. To this we must add that the role of some disciplines, organisations, professional cultures within planning processes and planning cultures more generally speaking, brings about potential positions of power in the signification of history and place resonating in the plans made. False objectivity, whether it be in assigning historical values or in producing process designs or spatial designs, covers up the culture- bound, discursive, in short the relative character of every disciplinary, organisational, professional knowledge, and is essentially an abuse of power positions in the planning process or an improper attempt at obtaining such power positions. One can be clear about this. The users have to be convinced of the value of these types of knowledge by fair arguments, not by creating false certainties. If the intended users –and the other taxpayers– are not interested in being convinced by the experts, if they prefer to hand over the planning responsibilities completely and directly to the professional and scientific arena's, then the problem disappears again. But this is not the case in most European societies at the

moment. And it is not the case in Dutch society, of which the planning system was analysed in such abstract terms that possibilities of generalisation could easily be traced.

5.5. The rhetorical power of historical knowledge

Considering the use of history and things historical to improve the quality of new urban neighbourhoods, after a long theoretical analysis, the conclusions may be very short indeed: it is done in a good way if the inhabitants of the place like it. Within the limits of such an appreciated design, there are numerous planning and design possibilities, where the experts of various disciplines can play a role, as long as the process is democratically designed, and the participants in the planning game are persuaded in a fair way. Strong rhetorics is not equal to lieing.

A key factor in determining the persuasive force of the rhetorics used by historical disciplines and historicist approaches to the planning and design disciplines is ofcourse the role of history, historical knowledge, historical objects, of the historian and his relatives the archaeologists in a given society. If the values of a society, of the most commonly shared discourses and cultures within that society are oriented e.g. towards immediate utility of knowledge, economic profit, swift adaption to new circumstances, clarity and unity in spatial design, then the value of historical knowledge will probably be deemed low, and the same will probably go for the historian, the historical objects, and the role assigned to history in spatial plans will be small. In such a society the power of the historicist rhetorics in planning and design issues will probably be limited. In such a situation, which seems to be a fair decription for most European countries[423], the disciplines, organisations and other actors that are more committed to history unfortunately cannot escape this premiss and neither should they escape the rules of the planning game routed in democratic principles.

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[423] Emerging and reemerging group and spatial identities in Europe, be it regions, states, towns, make a new appeal to history, but the general influence on the everyday political decision- making seems low, outside certain key subjects, objects and places −things reminding of historical events important for the identity, things important in tourism, things in the surroundings of the ruling elite.

Considering recommendations to practising planners and designers, we cannot escape the conclusion, anticipated several times, that no best design solutions, no best planning solutions, no best designs of the planning process can be given a priori, apart from the empirical situation. Every mix of user cultures at stake will be different, every mix of actors, be it scientific or not, in the planning process, will be different, and the course of the game is in itself unpredictable. Focussing on the scientific disciplines, we bring in mind again the conflicting valuations of objects and strategies to use them, conflicting between disciplines and within the frame of one discipline. The design disciplines, semi- attached as they are to artistic developments, are especially liable to internal dissent, conflicting views, strong dynamism, and there is a tradition of centering conflicts between schools on differing attitudes towards history.

From this we can draw easily the conclusion that from the interdisciplinary perspective we opted for, it cannot be reasonably argued that the disciplines involved in a planning system can scientifically or objectively produce best ways to deal with history. Not the disciplinary perspective, and neither our own interdisciplinary perspective. Not because we don't know yet, but rather because we can positively say that such an objective best use is impossible to define. A host of arguments for this passed our view in the course of this book, stemming from different disciplines, but bottom line in the context of spatial planning is our normative position that the signification and valuation of history, place and history in place of the users should be placed central in spatial planning, not expert knowledge mystified one way or another.

Moreover, from our post- modern perspective stems the same view on the impossibility in formulating best planning and design solutions, related to historical issues or in other respects. The only remaining types of definitions of good planning, good political systems, good designs, good uses of histrory are operational ones: they are good if they work. And they work if they are appreciated by users of the most diverse backgrounds, users capable of producing the most remarkable and unexpected shifts and breaks in signification of history, place, self and other.

5.6. Final recommendations: self– awareness, changing atittudes

Considering practical recommendations once more, we state very clearly that the central tenet of this book could be: try to be more aware of the various roles of culture, interpretation and power in your ideas and actions as well as in the other actors in the process. This does not have to lead to a change in ideas; they can be reframed more easily. It can lead to a more realistic views and calculations concerning the planning process in general and the role of history more specifically. From our relativist point of view follows immediately that we cannot tell other people what is the best idea to foster. It is possible however to tell that certain desires and expectations that are not met in reality, are due to an all– too modest insight in the mechanisms of the own cultures. Fictitious truths are being produced, false expectations about the boundaries of planning, about the (historical,…) interests of users and so on. It is possible therefore to acknowledge the value of a higher self– awareness and a more relativist perspective on the roles, the knowledge and the values of the other players in the game.

On the practical use of history: its role can become more and less important in an interpretive perspective, as compared to a technocratic- modernist perspective. It becomes more important since its functions and faces are more diverse than expected before, more intertwined with group and individual identities, then expected. It becomes maybe less important since the values of specific historical objects and structures are dynamic, and the pattern of the dynamism is complex and highly unpredictable. Therefore its systematic use in planning is less suitable to be incorporated in the planning system of states translating high ambitions in spatial planning in the creation of large planning agencies with scientific aspirations. The less predictable, the less scientific a planning subject is often considered, and the less scientific or technical, the less opportunities for experts in the planning system, and the smaller the plausibility that the historical subject offers the system new roads to expansion.

On the role of the experts: it can still be great, under the new condition that form is prior to content. This assertion, featuring several times above, needs to be seen as a general truth in democratic societies. A

daring statement it may be, it follows logically out of the enlightenment values that we considered still standing, the political, ethical and economic (efficiency) values linked to the concept of democracy. Such a statement does not lead automatically to a lower status or a more modest role of this or that discipline in this or that society. Form takes two meanings: political form and form of the planning process. If the political form is ok, if the citizens accept it as the most preferable one, and if within such a political system a planning system is generally accepted that places high value on the judgment of a certain type of experts, at the expense of the opinions of the people affected by a specific plan, than our formal perspective cannot be critical about it. An empty procedure, even an accepted one, can lead to a disastrous content. Even then, the citizens ought to tell what is disastrous and what not. Form and content are necessarily interrelated, and one can assume that a form that leads to undesired results, to undesired contents, to nowhere, will not fail to get criticized in a democratic environment, and will become an undesired form, procedure. One has to count on the users of a plan, on the people living in the planned area or just aware about it, to tell one way or another if they like it or not. This is the zero degree of planning and all the related disciplines.

5.7. Postscript: Kant, ethics, planning and history

Kants *Kritik der praktischen vernunft* served in a very broad sense as a model for this book, since the ethics Kant designed in his book did not assign any content at all to a good deed, to an ethically correct action. The good resides in the form, not in the content, in Kants ethics in the cognitive procedure followed by a reasonable person before he or she comes into action. The types of content that are valued depend on the circumstances. In our view, a good plan is not different from a good deed in Kants ethics. And a good content, here a good use of history in plans and designs, will emerge automatically if the form, the procedure is correct. If the procedure is good, a voice will be given to people claiming the importance of this or that content, and users can be persuaded to give such a content, such a spatially embodied idea, a central place. Form and content cannot be separated, but the criteria for good planning should be applied primarily to the form.

Main difference between Kants time and ours in this broad perspective, is that Kant could easily build on the model of a rational man, on the idea of a God endowing us with a universally applicable conscience, and the possibility of an ideal ordering of society. These ideas have crumbled in post modern times, and therefore the existence of an ideal form, in ethics as well as in planning, must be said farewell. The switch from content to form can be made outside and before post-modernity, but the present- day fragmentation of truth brings the unevitable conclusion that also the form, the procedures, of spatial planning, as well as those of ethics, are things that are agreed upon in a culture and a society. No ideal, eternal, objectively good content, neither a form of such a type can be found or expected anymore. No tragic consequences should be drawn from this. Doors are open for new forms of freedom. And for a more light- hearted presence of the old in the new .

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It is a poor kind of memory that only works backward – Lewis Carroll

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