


TRUSTFUL RELATIONS



A perspective on trust in actor relations
in forestry

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Proefschrift

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PREFACE

"To travel is to live" the Danish writer of fairytales Hans Christian Andersen stated many years ago.¹ The truth of this came to mind when looking back at the course of this work, which has been a journey in several respects. Most of all it has been a journey into the world of social thinking, and for a student trained in forestry it has been intriguing to explore this diverse and vast country of thought with its many different locations and points of view. The purpose of the journey has been to search for theoretical tools that can be of help in understanding the re-organisation in contemporary forestry towards sustainable forest management.

In addition to being a journey in the world of literature it has more literally been a journey in the world. Starting out from Denmark, equipped with a research grant from the Danish Research Council, the first stop was Albert-Ludwigs-University in Freiburg, Germany with the purpose of inquiring into the role of Non Governmental Organisations in European forestry policy. Beautifully situated on the fringe of the Black Forest, it was intriguing to be in one of the houses of German forestry research whose tradition has been so influential in shaping forestry practices in many other parts of the world, including the United States, which became the next stop on the journey.

Hosted by the Environmental Science, Policy and Management department at University of California at Berkeley, this stay became influential for the approach taken in the work. During the stay in Freiburg, the focus of the work had changed slightly from a focus on NGO influence on forest policy to co-operation between organisational actors in forestry. This shift was triggered by the desire of the university to understand better the potentials and pitfalls of co-operation on the forestry scene, where the quest for sustainable forest management made existing and new forestry interests combine in new ways. Understanding co-operation between actors, however, required that one had a good basis from which to understand the different actors, and somehow the 'right' theoretical basis for understanding them had not yet fully materialised. This process was improved greatly, when introduced to Heidegger's *Being and Time* at a course taught by Prof. Dreyfus at the Berkeley Philosophy department. It was somewhat ironic that the acquaintance with Heidegger should happen in the United States since I just came from Freiburg where he was once rector.

Equipped now with an approach to understanding actors that seemed promising, the journey went back to Europe and the focus sharpened into a concern for understanding the trustfulness of relations between actors in forestry.

¹ Author's translation of "At rejse er at leve". Andersen, 1975 (1855):300

While being away, the situation had changed a bit in Europe and an opportunity had opened to spend one year in Wageningen in the Netherlands. So by now the journey had also turned into a very instructive tour in the different worlds of universities. Being on leave, however, from a job at the Danish Ministry of Environment, the trip ended back in Denmark after three years with a lot of new inspiration, and a dissertation well underway but not quite finished.

Although the full time job at the ministry prolonged the process of finishing the work a bit, the involvement in the daily practices of forest policy-making was very helpful in shaping theoretical thoughts. When one's work is also one's object of study, a good opportunity is provided for seeing both in a different light.

The result of the journey, which is now coming to an end, is the present dissertation. Whereas the responsibility for its content and interpretations is mine alone, the journey could not have been accomplished without the kind help of many people to whom I am very grateful. It has been greatly enriched by discussions with colleagues from Germany, USA, Holland and Denmark.

In order of appearance I would particularly like to express my warmest gratitude to the following: To the Danish Research Council for their patience and their generous project funding. To Prof. Oesten at the University of Freiburg for accepting me as a student at his institute and for supporting the transfer to Wageningen University where his assistant became professor. To all the organisations of the Danish Forest Stewardship Council Process that were willing to participate in interviews. To Heiner Schanz for accepting me in Wageningen and supervising the work through highly constructive suggestions and lucid critique, and not least for being supportive of my ideas. In Berkeley I was hosted by Prof. Louise Fortmann and extend warm thanks to her for a highly stimulating stay. She found room for me in a period when she had her hands full and for this I am very grateful. Michiel Korthals, Professor of Applied Philosophy at Wageningen University, I would like to thank for taking the time to discuss my work and for bearing with a novice to philosophy. Finally, I remain indebted to Prof. Finn Helles at the Danish Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, who has been the Danish contact person for the project and has generously offered housing and help in the final phase of the study.

Although the work is theoretical and in the present form aims at an audience with a theoretical interest in the understanding of social relations and the analysis of these, its application may be of relevance to actors and policy makers in the field of forestry.

1 INTRODUCTION

The substantial shift in the societal understanding and awareness of forests that has taken place during the last decades has confronted forestry with a challenge to reorganise. This challenge of reorganising to meet the political demand for new sustainable practices in the field of forestry is what forms the background for this work.

The changed understandings of forests and forestry have caused a shift in the social relations that make up forestry and accentuated the need to improve the understanding of these relations. The concept of *Sustainable Forest Management* is the loadstar of the changes in forestry. As this concept is framed in the international political deliberations on forestry, it conveys and implies an ideal democratic style of organisation that emphasises the desire to base management of forests on genuine co-operation between all interested parties.² Such a form of organisation is very dependent on good relations between forestry actors, and it is against this background of a desire for ideal democratic relations that this work finds it important to improve understanding of social relations between forestry actors.

The form of this work is theoretical. Its aim is to propose, exemplify, and discuss an existential perspective on trust in actor relations. This account is developed relative to and focuses on the actor relations in the field of forestry, and its purpose is to suggest a theoretical perspective that can improve the understanding of the relations between forestry actors. As such, the motivation behind the effort is practical.³ Increased understanding of social relations, however, is not the

² Cf. Egestad, 1999. Cf. also UN-CSD-IPF, 1997; FAO, 1999; Unasylva, 1998 for reference to this intent in forestry. The relations it seems to imply are the ones that produce a civic and democratically based form of community, which is discussed in closer detail by e.g. Putnam, 1993 or Selznick, 1992.

³ For the readers who are not familiar with forestry, a reading of the paraphrased interview statements in Annex 2 is recommended. These statements from the Forest Stewardship Council case, that is used to exemplify the perspective in chapter four, may provide a good basis for understanding the positions and views of the Danish forestry actors.

same as a recipe for how to establish trustful relations in practice. The actual establishment of trust is much more about 'metaphysics' in the sense of creating shared values and understanding. According to Putnam, science is of limited help towards this end:

"Science is wonderful at destroying metaphysical answers, but incapable of providing substitute ones. Science takes away foundations without providing a replacement. Whether we want to be there or not, science has put us in the position of having to live without foundations."⁴

But what science can do is to help improve understanding. The ambition, therefore, is to introduce a perspective that can elucidate aspects that may help to understand some of the difficulties of establishing the ideal social relations that sustainable forest management seems to imply.

1.1. Background and problems

The changing understandings of forests and forestry⁵ have to a large extent evolved around the discussions of sustainability that have dominated the environmental policy arenas for almost two decades. In forestry, sustainability — expressed in the concept of *sustainable forest management* has generally been interpreted as a set of forestry practices that are economically viable, socially acceptable, ecologically sound, and based on a co-operative and participative democratic style of interaction.⁶ Since this understanding was articulated in the 1980's, many scientists, policy makers and interest groups have struggled to implement sustainable forest management. But its institutionalisation has proven difficult in practice. It remains controversial and so do many of the social relations making up the forestry it seeks to organise.

Changing forest values

The desire for changed practices in forestry has, to a large extent, been triggered by changes outside forestry. It has taken place within a more general process of change in society.⁷ This general change in society is characterised by a gradual shift away from the industrial understandings and spirit of mind that have characterised the modernisation of Western societies. It is within this larger frame of change that the changes within forestry must be understood.⁸ Most of the 20th century has been dominated by what some have called a technological way of being

⁴ Putnam, 1987:29

⁵ Cf. e.g. Kennedy et al., 2001 for an overview of changes in forestry during the last part of the 20th century. And cf. Schanz, 1999a for a theoretical account of the meanings of social change in forestry. See also Schanz, 2000 for the shifting understandings of forests and forestry.

⁶ The World Commission on Environment and Development was among the first to articulate this intent to the broad public in 'Our common future'. WCED, 1987:8.

⁷ Cf. e.g. Schanz, 1996; Harrison, 1992, for the linkage between values in society and in forestry.

⁸ Cf. e.g. Giddens, 1990.

and thinking.⁹ It has been an age of industrial progress and material growth, but in recent decades the technological values seem increasingly unable to create shared meaning and to gather society.¹⁰ Within this process of change to what some refer to as a post-modern society, doubt has been cast on the ability of the more traditional values of growth and material progress to ground a sustainable society.¹¹

Some of the factors that have contributed to a changed understanding of forests in society relates to a changed way of living. Population growth and urbanisation has shifted the balance from rural to urban living. Most people nowadays live a city-life distant from primary production. To most people, wood comes from a shop and not from the forest. Shorter working hours and better transportation have made leisure activities more feasible and increasingly popular. And even though our technological progress to a large extent has been able to conquer nature, it has also created new human induced risks such as e.g. pollution, devastation of forest ecosystems, threats to clean drinking water, desertification, and other environmental disasters.¹² Mass communication and transportation has made the world smaller so that awareness of ecological problems in other parts of the world and knowledge of the risk that these may assert on our own existence has accentuated our concern about these problems.

So whereas forests in the industrial spirit of mind especially were valued in society for their production of timber, they are increasingly valued nowadays as sanctuaries, recreational sites, or ecosystems.¹³ The dominant focus on production of wood in forestry made perfect sense within an industrial society that generally valued production. But in a society that has more spare time for recreation, that experiences ecosystems to be generally threatened, and that experiences a much less direct need for timber, preferences are different. And such a shift in understanding seems to be true for the societal understanding of forests in many industrialised societies.¹⁴

In Danish forestry these changes have in recent decades contributed to a gradual transition from the more traditional production understanding that has dominated most of the previous century, to a *multiple-use* understanding of forestry.¹⁵ In multiple-use forestry, forests are perceived as a source of multiple benefits to be managed and planned for the society by the professional forester. But despite wide support for and acceptance of multiple-use forestry, especially in the late 1980's and early 1990's, this understanding was still being challenged by other understandings.¹⁶

⁹ Cf. e.g. Dreyfus & Spinosa, 1996.

¹⁰ Inglehart, 1997.

¹¹ Cf. e.g. Luhmann, 1992:7-8

¹² See e.g. Beck, 1986

¹³ Cf. e.g. Søndergaard Jensen & Koch, 1997

¹⁴ Cf. e.g. Koch, 1990

¹⁵ Koch & Kennedy, 1991

¹⁶ During the late 1990's an *ecosystem* or *biodiversity* understanding of forests seems to have gained increased support in some circles. In this understanding, the main concern of forestry is to maintain and preserve the ecological functions of the forest. Forests, in this understanding, are not primarily sources of multiple benefits, but are ecological entities that have a dynamic of their own that should be identified and respected. The multiple-use concept of forests

The changing understanding of forests is evident in several societal systems where it has triggered new activities. At the *political* level global international processes such as the World Commission on Sustainable Development and the World Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 stand as major symbols of this change. They have led to a complex web of international political processes concerning forests with the purpose of agreeing upon and creating commitment towards new and more sustainable forest management practices.¹⁷ In the *economic* arena the change of values and preferences regarding nature has created new situations for business actors. The environmental dimension has increasingly become part of economic thinking.¹⁸ New concepts such as green accounting and forest management certification provide evidence of this. But while an increased focus on the environmental dimension has provided opportunity for some, it still remains an obstacle to those who prefer 'business as usual.' In the *sciences* the changes in forestry have led to increased emphasis of research on the forest as an ecosystem which is seen as an integrated element of an overall landscape or bio-system (ecosystem-management, biodiversity, climate change research, etc.), and on research on planning in the new setting where co-ordination and reconciliation (conflict management) of incompatible interests have become more important.

The above shifts in understanding of forests have led to changes in the social organisation of forestry. The new objectives and approaches have brought with them new actors, new roles and new ways of interaction. The social relationships that developed within the more traditional understanding of forests and forestry and were successful in organising it, do not seem to be equally appropriate relative to the problems, preferences and concerns that have come with the new and still emerging understanding. Existing forestry actors may, therefore, have to redefine their roles and relate to each other in different ways. Thereby the entire web of relations and roles that constitutes forestry is shifting.

The important point to make is that so far no clear new forestry practices have crystallised. No new organisation of forestry practices characterised by certainty and stable social relations has emerged. The process of change is still going on. In that sense, forestry is still in a process of institutional change¹⁹ and the situation is marked by a degree of uncertainty because the new forestry, relative to which the actors shall define themselves, is still emerging. It is not yet clear what sustainable forest management means. It is not yet clear what it means to be a good forester and what good forest management is. It is not clear who are the good ones, and who are

is still acceptable in this understanding, but only as long as it does not compromise the ecological integrity and dynamic of the forest and the landscape.

¹⁷ Cf. e.g. Humphreys, 1996. An overview on the UN activities on forests after Rio can be found at the UN website at www.un.org/esa/sustdev/forests.htm.

¹⁸ Cf. e.g. Esty, 1994

¹⁹ Cf. North, 1990, especially chapters 9-11, or Ostrom, 1990.

the bad ones. Such a situation is likely to be political²⁰ and the still ongoing political deliberations about forestry at both national and international levels provide an indication of this.

An indicator that can be interpreted to express the change and the political situation that has come with it in Denmark is the interval between changes in the forest act. In Denmark there has been a long period of stability from 1805 to 1989,²¹ where the forest act, and the understanding of forests and forestry expressed in this act (forests should be managed to produce timber), was able to gather forestry as a social system fairly well. It expressed an objective that was found meaningful to most of the involved actors and it was able to meet the societal demands. In 1989 the forest act opened up for multiple-use forestry, which was made mandatory by a 1996 amendment. This meant that forests should now by law be managed to consider a wider array of products: timber, recreation, protection, preservation, etc. And the newly appointed Minister of Environment proclaimed that another major revision of the forest act would take place within a couple of years. These more frequent changes in legislation indicate a situation of instability.

The problem of establishing new well-functioning relations

The political desire is that sustainable forest management should take place within, and be a product of, a democratic and open style of interaction and be based on genuine co-operation between all interested parties.²² This desire adds to the challenge of implementing sustainable forestry practices and it has also proven difficult to establish well-functioning co-operation and participation between forestry actors in practice.²³

In Denmark the lengthy process of developing shared and agreeable standards for forest management certification under the auspices of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), which this thesis shall use as a case for analysing actors' relations, mirrors these difficulties.

So the desired and ideal democratic situation where all actors work constructively together and participate in a responsible manner towards the development of sustainable forest management practices has not yet occurred. Instead of co-operation towards a shared goal, the situation often seems to be one where different actors interact in a more strategic manner to accommodate their own concerns and where they compete for a position in the emerging order. Such behaviour makes good sense in light the changing forest values and the change in the organisation of for-

²⁰ Cf. e.g. Laclau, 1990:35 for the distinction between a political and social situation. The social situation is characterised by shared and taken for granted relations, and the political is characterised by lack of shared values and more suspicious relations.

²¹ Smaller revisions were made in 1935

²² Egestad, 1999:18ff. The concepts that are used to define the style of interaction in sustainable forest management encompasses are e.g. 'committed partnerships', 'participatory decision making and consensus-building among all interested parties'. This desire seems to reflect a more general trend in contemporary democracies to involve citizens in decision-making. They express a desire for sustainable forest management to be a product of genuine co-operation and the focus on them may also be interpreted to express a desire to improve the existing relations between forestry actors and improve the existing level of co-operation in forestry.

²³ Cf. e.g. Boon, 2000

estry, but it does not yet seem to meet the desire for genuine co-operation between all involved parties that is expressed by the international forest policy community.

There is more, therefore, to good co-operation and participation than the mentioning of these concepts in political documents, and it is the perceived gap between the desire for good co-operation and for participation in the organisation of forestry and the difficulties in implementing this in practice that have s triggered and seem to justify this inquiry into the understanding of actor relations. This work, therefore, hopes to contribute to a narrowing of the perceived gap by proposing a perspective on trust, as an indicator and key component of good social relations, which can then help to improve the understanding of these between actors in forestry.

The problem of seeing the problem

Forestry has traditionally been dominated and organised by a technocratic style of problem solving. By a "technocratic approach" is meant a style of inquiry that emphasises an expert-driven search for technically objective and impartial solutions.²⁴ The quest for objective and measurable standards for sustainable forest management that has characterised the last decade in forestry has to a large extent taken place within such a technocratic style of inquiry.²⁵ The processes of identifying impartial criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management²⁶ are examples of processes that are taking place within this style of inquiry. Another example is the effort to establish standards for forest management certification, which serves as the empirical example later in this work.²⁷

The problem of sustainable forest management in these processes becomes, to a large extent, a matter of objectifying and seeking to define it by objective and impartial standards. As such, the focus is on the object of sustainable forest management.²⁸ This style of inquiry, however, is likely to be insensitive to the social relations that have an important place in the equation. By focussing on the object, problems of interaction and differences in understanding between the subjects who seek to define it, easily become discarded as noise or a matter of irrationality. It seems that sensitivity to the social dimension of the process of framing sustainability in forestry may contribute to explain why the process has been so controversial in practice. It may help to explain why the search for sustainability has "proven frustrating and elusive" to use the words of McCool and Stankey.²⁹

²⁴ Phenomena are then framed by e.g. threshold values, quotas, criteria, indicators, etc.

²⁵ Technocratic behaviour exists within what Collin, 2001:4-5 refers to as a narrow, but dominant and ubiquitous frame of understanding of humans, society and science.

²⁶ The attempt to establish criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management has e.g. happened within the UN forest process under the Commission on Sustainable Development (UN-CSD) and regionally in Europe by the Ministerial Conference on the Protection of Forests in Europe (MCPFE). Cf. e.g. Bass, 1998.

²⁷ Cf. e.g. Rametsteiner, 2000, Pajari et al., 1999;

²⁸ Cf. Egestad, 1995

²⁹ 2001:94

Part of the problem is that sustainable forest management is not an unchangeable and observer-independent object that is waiting to be discovered. It is socially constructed and a *wicked concept*³⁰ to the culture of measurement in the sense that there is no solution to what it is, independent of the social values and objectives behind the definition. In this light the quest for sustainable forest management is not about identifying *the* understanding of sustainable forest management as an object, but about finding *one* understanding of it that is shared and which makes us able to interact well around the resources we value. In this light it is more about moving from a way of organising forestry practices that is characterised by change, instability, unpredictability and suspicious social relations, towards a way that is more stable, predictable and well organised towards a shared objective.

There are many different forestry actors involved in the processes of developing standards for forest management such as the different environmental organisations, the public agencies, the foresters, the forest owners, and the forest industry. And many of them have diverging, but in their own understanding, consistent interpretations of what sustainable forest management is and should be. So many different rationalities are involved in the process of framing the concept. And they are expected to co-operate in the understanding of sustainable forest management that is being striven for. In the understanding of sustainable forest management as a normative concept that depends on the rationality involved in framing it, therefore, the technically inspired search for *one* set of objective and impartial standards is likely to remain futile because objectivity exists within rationalities and rarely across them. Although the different actors in forestry can each come up with each their own set of scientifically based standards for sustainable forest management, this will not solve the social and organisational problem of bringing them together to form a shared set of standards which can provide effectively co-ordinated interaction and problem solving in forestry as a whole. A technically dominated approach to sustainable forest management may, therefore, be less helpful in solving the social problem of choosing between and integrating the different understandings of sustainable forest management, than it is in understanding the forest as a biological system.

Successful forestry practices, defined relative to the democratic frame of mind that inspires sustainable forest management, will depend on successful co-ordination of social relations. An attempt to define sustainability technically, in terms of independent standards or criteria for sustainable forest management, risk getting the sustainability discussion caught in a web of technocracy that is insensitive to these relations.

So within the democratic spirit of interaction that inspires sustainable forest management, it becomes more important too see this concept as something that *is not* objective, but *becomes* objectivised by its persuasive content and shared meaningfulness to the involved actors. In this way, objectification of sustainable forest management becomes a social process.³¹ In such a set-

³⁰ Cf. McCool & Stankey, 2001:96 and Allen & Gould, 1996 for sustainable forest management as a wicked concept.

³¹ Cf. e.g. Romm, 1993

ting the objective of sustainable management depends on the ability to accommodate and facilitate the merging, in an open and transparent manner, of the views of the involved actors into a shared set of values that can form the basis for sustainable forest management.³² This means that if we desire to manage forest resources in a democratic and participatory style it is very important for forest actors to understand each other and to understand the importance of shared meaning and trust in their relations.

In this light, therefore, the problem of implementing sustainable forest management becomes a social problem of establishing good relations between actors and establishing shared meaningfulness. The existential perspective proposed in this work aims at contributing to this process by seeking to increase understanding of trust in actor relations. Though the proposed perspective cannot provide answers to how we *should* see and value our forests, it may be of help to point to some of the social and relational barriers that impede the development of a shared understanding of sustainable forest management.

Academic approach

Instead of looking in the compelling light of objective science for true versions or definitions of sustainable forest management, this thesis has sought for appropriate scientific tools in the social and human sciences to help illuminate the difficulties of establishing co-operation in the development of new sustainable forestry practices. Trust became the main theoretical concept of the inquiry because it seems to encapsulate the genuine relationships, which are desirable in the development of new forestry practices.

The understanding of science applied in this work follows the phenomenological or interpretive tradition that can be traced back to the philosophy of Heidegger.³³ This philosophy will be elaborated further in the coming chapters. Scientific validity in the process is sought through consistency in argumentation and through the use of traceable citations from other works.³⁴ The scientific perspective and the proposed perspective on trust, however, make no claim of being objective. The genesis of this work is a product of many rounds in a hermeneutic cycle³⁵ of interpreting existing literature, applying this interpretation on the forestry situation, and evaluating its ability to explain the situation. The result, however, remains an interpretation which is a product of a certain light of inquiry. As such, the process can be compared to the process of tak-

³² This argument should not be read to say that scientific findings in the field of forestry should be ignored. Understanding of the forest ecosystem is crucial for the establishment of sustainable forestry practices. But it is important to keep in mind that scientific understandings of the forest also exist within a cultural system that values forests in certain ways. Cf. Kuhn, 1996. Cf. also Peters, 1991 for a critique of ecology as a science and Chase, 1995 for an account of the impact of ecological thinking on forestry.

³³ The perspectives of this tradition have many names. Sometimes also referred to as philosophical hermeneutics or hermeneutic phenomenology. An overview of and an introduction to the perspective can be found in e.g. Gadamer, 1976; Rabinow & Sullivan (Eds.), 1987: chapter 1; and: Bernstein, 1983 or to Seiffert & Radnitzky, 1994:242ff.

³⁴ Citations are used throughout the work to exemplify and substantiate the arguments presented. They furthermore provide links to the existing literature in the field. The language of the citation used is kept to avoid misinterpretations through translation.

³⁵ Gadamer, 1999:270ff

ing pictures: when using x-rays, a different picture is taken than with a normal camera. None of the two pictures are necessarily truer than the other, but they may be helpful in different situations. And when interpreting the pictures, it is important to know which technique has been used. Similarly the perspective presented in this work casts a certain light on trust in forestry actor relations.

1.2. Overview of the work

The work falls into three main parts. In the first part, chapter two discusses and evaluates the concept of trust. In chapter three an existential account of trust developed in this work is presented. In the second part, chapter four is used to exemplify the proposed account of trust in the case of introducing Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification of forest management in Denmark. Finally, in chapter 5, the usefulness of the perspective to forestry is discussed.

The theoretical treatment of trust in chapter two is a review of existing literature on trust. The purpose of this chapter is to portray different existing understandings of the concept. It is structured according to different assumptions about human being and starts with understandings of trust based on rational understandings of being. Here trust is mainly portrayed as an instrumental attitude taken on deliberately by rational actors. Subsequently the chapter presents accounts of trust that take a more extended approach to human being. Here an actor's being is seen as contingent on the social context, and the concept of trust is here portrayed in a more situational way. Finally, a few accounts of trust based on an interpretive understanding of being are presented; these accounts tend to portray trust as a more complex phenomenon closely linked to social practices.

Inspired by the interpretive or hermeneutic understanding of human being, the third chapter develops an existential account of trust in forestry actor relations. This interpretation relies particularly on the school of thought that comes from the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. The developed account argues that trust is inextricably linked to social relations and is a phenomenon that often is tacit and linked to temporally and spatially embedded social practices that to a large extent structure our social roles, relations and interaction. As such, trust is seen as closely linked to *praxis*. The emergence and maintenance of trustful relations in this account is seen as depending on what actors see as meaningful in a situation and how well their views match with those of other involved actors. What actors see as meaningful is seen as depending on the existential world from within which they see, and the way they are 'being-in' a specific situation, that is, the way they relate to and behave in the situation.

In the fourth chapter the proposed existential approach is exemplified by the empirical example of introducing Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification of forest management in Denmark. The case is not an analysis *of* certification. Certification just provides an appropriate and

representative forest policy issue exemplifying how contemporary forestry actors relate to each other. The aim of applying the proposed theoretical perspective on trust to a practical example is to make the theoretical considerations more tangible by bringing in the context-dependent, practice-based and concrete aspects that influence the shaping of relations.³⁶ A series of qualitative interviews with the actors involved in the case provide the data material for the empirical example.

The fifth chapter discusses more generally the extent to which the characteristics of the existential perspective are of relevance to the contemporary forestry situation. In the sixth chapter a conclusion presents the proposed argument in a condensed form.

In the understanding of this work the cultivation of trust in relations between forestry actors requires a shared meaningfulness in the understanding of forestry — a shared existential world. With this understanding, therefore, the main challenge to the organisation of forestry practices that shall be based on genuine co-operation and participation, is to develop a generally shared understanding of forestry that transcends the many different more specialised forestry interests.

³⁶ Cf. Flyvbjerg 2001, chapter 6 for a persuasive discussion of case studies.

2 TRUST IN LITERATURE

The purpose of this chapter is to inquire into different characteristics and understandings of trust. First some general remarks on the literature on trust are presented. Subsequently an introductory part presents some basic characteristics of trust that seem to be shared by most accounts of it, and following this, differences in the understandings of trust are examined. The differences in the depiction of trust are structured relative to their underlying assumptions about human being³⁷ and three categories representing such different understandings are used. Together they form a continuum.

The one end of this continuum consists of what is traditionally framed as a rational approach to human being. This normally implies a more reductionistic and deterministic approach to understanding and a Cartesian-inspired understanding of human beings as independent subjects driven by internal beliefs and desires. This end of the continuum is normally not very concerned about the social structures and contexts in which the actor exists. The other end consists of more interpretive approaches that normally seek to understand being relative to historical and cultural contexts.³⁸ Between these two opposite categories of understanding human being, are the many mixed versions of these perspectives that argue from a position in between or have a less clearly defined understanding of human being.

Trust is covered to different degrees in the literature. A large body of social science literature draws upon the concept, but does not discuss its meaning in detail. The body of literature that deals with trust specifically, on the other hand, has been rather limited until recently. Within the

³⁷ The assumptions made about human being will influence how behaviour, action and interaction are interpreted.

³⁸ Cf. e.g. Rabinow & Sullivan, 1987:1-30 for an introduction to interpretive social science. For a discussion and critique of interpretive science, see Collin, 1985

last three decades, though, it seems to have attracted increased academic attention in social science. This increase can be interpreted as an indicator that trust is increasingly felt to be disappearing from social relationships, since such a development accentuates the need to understand better its function and dynamic. As with many other aspects of life that are taken for granted because they are so pervasive that we do not notice them in our daily being, their presence is not appreciated before they are endangered or lost. In a peaceful culture, for instance, we are so used to trusting each other not be hostile, it is only when this is no longer so that we appreciate the way it was. In this respect, trust is often far more conspicuous by its absence than by its presence.

The increased academic interest in trust covers a wide range of social science disciplines: sociology, business management and economics, philosophy, history, political science and law. The focus within the different fields mainly reflects a concern with trust in the interaction of the social systems these disciplines traditionally focus on and trust is often depicted and treated relative to the general style of interaction in these systems. Business and economics are mainly concerned with interaction and relationships within the economic system. Law is concerned within the legal system, and political science is concerned with interaction within the political system. Sociology is the more overall discipline covering a broader span concerning interaction in diverse societal systems.

2.1. Introduction to trust

Trust, as a concept, exists as a noun and as a verb. The noun trust refers to something existing in some form between trustees. It is an inter-subjective phenomenon that is closely linked to some form of relationship. The verb trust, on the other hand, refers to something that is done or can be done. The focus here is on someone that trusts. But this use also seems to imply some sort of relationship, and it is difficult to think of a use of trust that does not involve some kind of relationship.

Are there any basic features of trust that can be identified irrespective of its conceptualisation? As suggested above, a basic feature of trust is that it exists relative to some sort of relationship. This need not be only between humans. Relationships between animals or between people and animals can also be described in terms of trust. Dogs, for instance, possess the ability to trust. It makes less sense, however, to speak of flowers or trees as trusting, and likewise it is not a term applied to things such as soil, stones or planets. The ability to trust seems to be limited to the higher levels of the evolutionary ladder — living organisms with a mind and therefore the ability to recognize the relationship. But we also talk about trusting the bank, trusting the government, and trusting skills or expertise. The bank can trust its customers and the government its citizens, and *vice versa*. Collective actors in the shape of organisations can also display trust and exist in a trusting relationship. We can also display trust in symbolic elements such as laws,

money, ideas and so on; in these cases the relationship is unilateral. It does not make sense to speak of money and laws trusting us. Money and laws are symbolic elements constructed relative to human relationships, so when speaking of trust in money or laws, this only makes sense relative to the relationships in which these symbols exist as shared meaning. Luhmann, recognising that modern societies increasingly base co-ordination of interaction on abstract systems rather than on personal relations, groups trust in *Personvertrauen* (personal trust) and *Systemvertrauen* (system trust).³⁹ The first refers to trust in a person (a neighbour for instance) and the latter refers to trust in more abstract socially constructed systems such as money, laws and governments. While the first kind of trust is based on expectations of a person, the trust in the monetary system, for example, is based on the expectation of the functionality of this system in interaction. It is based on the expectation "... daß ein System funktioniert, und setzt sein Vertrauen nicht in bekannte Personen, sondern in dieses Funktionieren. Ein solches Systemvertrauen wird durch laufend sich bestätigende Erfahrungen in der Geldverwendung gleichsam von selbst aufgebaut."⁴⁰

Therefore, an important point relative to the understanding of trust is that it is inextricably linked to *relationships*. As most relationships exist in a complex and interwoven matrix that ultimately constitute society, a deeper understanding of trust in relationships easily, therefore, becomes a matter of understanding the context in which these relationships exist and are embedded.

A feature that also seems to characterise trust and is related to a relationship is *interdependence*. Some sort of dependence between the involved parties will define their relationship. Even the encounter with a total stranger on a road would be a situation characterised by a relationship and a dependence on each other. The normal relationship to strangers in the street is one of just passing each other, but implicit in this relationship is also some kind of dependence that the other party adheres to this normal passing by and does not, for example, attack us.

Another aspect inextricably linked to trust is the existence of *shared expectations*. When passing a stranger in the street most people share the expectation that the other party will not attack.⁴¹ In a situation of war this general relationship is different. Another example of shared expectations is the relationship between an employee and her employer. Each expect the other to fulfil their respective roles of employer and employee, which are defined relative to a set of formal legal and organisational procedures and to less formal forms of social structure, such as tradition and norms. In a trusting relationship the employee trusts the leader to perform the leadership functions. The credibility of the leader comes into existence qua the relationship. It can be seen as an

³⁹ Luhmann, 1989

⁴⁰ Luhmann, 1989:54

⁴¹ The type of street and the time of day also play a role. In rough neighbourhoods and at night our expectations are different. Here we are likely to relate to strangers in a more suspicious way.

asset residing with the leader,⁴² but it exists more qua the expectations in the relationship than as an inherent personal feature. Some employees can have a trusting relationship to their boss and others cannot, depending on the relationship. When it becomes known that the leader is generally performing well in her role, actors can take the view that the person is credible. The credibility of the leader is then vested in this leader's reputation and maintained through the fulfilment of the high expectations of the parties in the relationship. The ability to meet or influence these expectations is, therefore, crucial to the maintenance of the credibility or trustfulness of the leader.

Another general feature of trust is the *positive value* it most often carries. It is a desirable characteristic of a relationship. When trust carries a more negative value, it is, for instance, when it is 'blind'. This use conveys a behaviour that in retrospect is found naïve and characterised by a lack of personal judgement or responsibility relative to normal expectations. The concept of distrust, on the other hand, is normally undesirable and carries negative value, except in the few situations where it, in retrospect, was found 'right' to exhibit such a feeling. The infusion with positive or negative values indicates to us that trust is not a neutral concept relative to moral and ethical concerns. It reflects our general desire to maintain 'good' relationships where 'good' is assessed relative to our general understanding of what a good relationship is and should be. It is not an absolute or objective entity but exists relative to what is culturally defined as normal. One could imagine settings where low-trust relationships prevailed and where trusting generally would be considered a naïve attitude to display, but low-trust is here defined relative to a different type of normal relation to each other that is characterised by a higher degree of normal trust.

Beyond these general features of trust and the general tendency to see it as desirable but gradually eroding in contemporary Western societies, the agreement in literature on the concept begins to fade. As with many other concepts in the social sciences that are applied in a variety of fields, a rich diversity of definitions and uses exists. More than anything else such diversity provides evidence that the phenomenon of trust is multifaceted and difficult to grasp independently of the situation in which it is used.

2.2. Rational perspectives on trust

At the rational end of our analytical continuum we see studies that perceive actors as rational agents who are individual subjects that act and interact mainly based on a rational way of being. Action is mainly seen as a product of well-reflected decisions. Some of the studies based on the more rational perspective have been interested in trust relative to the process of co-operation. Game theory is an example of such an approach applied to model the outcome of games be-

⁴² As e.g. done by Kouzes & Posner, 1993

tween rational actors who (often) fail to co-operate for mutual benefits. These studies focus on how interaction develops over time in specific situations, where actors behave strategically relative to other actors and a set of behavioural assumptions. *The Prisoners Dilemma* is a classical example of such a situation. So is the 'Tragedy' example of exploitation of common property resources illustrated by Hardin⁴³ where two actors, each behaving rationally, cause an irrational outcome that is undesirable for both parties. This example has become a paradigmatic illustration of undesired outcome in common property resource settings.⁴⁴ The objective of game-theoretic exercises is often to learn more about development of behaviour in interaction over time in order to be able to predict human behaviour and outcomes in similar situations, assuming that the rational motives for behaviour hold true.⁴⁵ Though the game-theoretic method can be helpful to enlighten and illustrate simple situations of interaction with stable and predictable behaviour, many real life situations are too complex to be well grasped by the simplified modeling assumptions. The assumption of the rational agent is often insufficient to catch the behaviour of the actors.

A key question concerning rational theory is what kind of behaviour is actually rational and therefore encompassed by the term. Being rational often seems to imply a conscious computing of the situation in order to maximise utility. But what is rational in a situation is likely to depend on a web of underlying assumptions defining the rationality. Behaviour is rational relative to a certain frame of reference. This means that rational behaviour has a cultural and historical basis, namely that basis which defines what is expected to be rational to do. Hollis, among others, has made this theme central to his philosophical investigations and concludes that rational behaviour is highly situational and contingent, and for rational action to be a valuable concept we have to extend it far beyond the narrow instrumental perception of reason.⁴⁶ In his work *Trust within Reason*, he sets out to discuss to what extent it is rational to trust. The conclusion he reaches, having extended the concept of rationality to include e.g. moral aspects, reciprocity and pursuit of a common good, is that it is very rational to trust, and in light of the decline of trust in our societies it would be irrational not to trust.⁴⁷

But this broad conceptualisation of what it means to be rational, encompassing consideration for possible implications outside the narrow situation and for 'the common good', is still not typical and certainly more difficult to model. Most of the rational-oriented literature on trust operates with a more limited understanding of rational behaviour that is less morally concerned and less oriented towards a common good than towards optimising individual gain in a more narrow (given) situation.⁴⁸ To these studies trust is often seen as a lubricant of interaction helpful to at-

⁴³ Hardin, Garrett, 1968

⁴⁴ Cf. Ostrom, 1990 for an introduction to the literature on collective action dilemmas.

⁴⁵ Cf. also Axelrod:1970:chapter 3 and 1984 for the game theoretic approach to co-operation.

⁴⁶ E.g. Hollis, 1994.

⁴⁷ Hollis, 1998, chapter 8.

⁴⁸ cf. e.g. Hardin, Russel, 1993, 1993a, 1996; Hayashi, et al., 1999

tain co-operation.⁴⁹ It is presented as an abstract but instrumental 'tool' to be applied in a situation. Or it is seen as an attitude one consciously decides to display based on an assessment about whether trust is a beneficial attitude in the situation. In sociology Coleman can be seen as representing the more rationally based approach. He sees trust as closely linked to a perception of risk, and states: "This incorporation of risk into the decision can be treated under a general heading that can be described by the single word 'trust'. Situations involving trust constitute a subclass of those involving risk. They are situations in which the risk one takes depends on the performance of another actor."⁵⁰

Between fully rational actors, however, there does not seem to be much of a need for trust as a noun since everything is explicit and nothing (no thing) is taken for granted. Everything is made explicit and included in the formal decision process. The rational approaches mainly focus on trust as a verb. It is referred to as an outcome of rational decision processes – something the rational agent chooses to do, based on such a process. This makes Williamson, in transaction economics, who advocates a rational approach to human behaviour in economic interaction, argue that trust is not an appropriate term to use in the context of calculative economic behaviour. "Calculative trust is a contradiction in terms" he states,⁵¹ explaining that the use of a concept like trust is misleading in transaction economics where the focus is on devising cost-effective safeguards in support of more efficient exchange.

2.3. Extended perspectives on trust

Scholars taking what is here called extended perspectives on human being and behaviour often do so because they feel that the rational perspectives do not adequately reflect the situational aspects of human behaviour. So the extended perspective is extended relative to the rational perspective:

A reflection on how trust actually seems to operate, even in modern societies, quickly raises the suspicion that to understand trust simply as the product of rational judgement does not seem to capture its cultural logic. To ask here whether the trust that a given individual might have in others is well-founded or not often misses the point. Generalised trust of others, just like generalised distrust, can be self-fulfilling. For example, if everyone behaves as if others are generally untrustworthy, then people will actually be so. What matters most at the level of society as a whole is less whether people can make well-rounded judgements about others, and more whether people are of such a character as to be inclined towards trust and co-operation. From this perspective, trust is

⁴⁹ cf. also Misztal, 1996, pp. 77-88 for a discussion on trust in rational approaches. Or Lane & Bachman, 1998 in the introduction. See also Baker, 1987. Bradach and Eccles (1989) is an example of a more rational approach to trust.

⁵⁰ Coleman, 1990:91

⁵¹ Williamson, 1992:11

less a matter of individual discernment and cognition and more like a kind of social glue that binds people into generalised relations of mutuality.⁵²

These scholars share their critique of rational theory as overly narrow and as an approach to trust that generally misses the many complex and subtle situational aspects of human being. They do not, however, fully endorse the more detailed and situational investigations into being taken by the interpretive approaches.

Between the rational perspectives and the interpretive perspectives on human being and interaction on our analytical gradient, there is a relatively large group of works, especially sociological, focusing on trust from extended perspectives on human interaction. One of the most cited works in this group, which has inspired many works on the topic of trust, is the book *Vertrauen* by Niklas Luhmann.⁵³ Published in 1968 it is one of the early contemporary works on trust.⁵⁴ Luhmann's analysis focuses trust's role in the social organisation of society.⁵⁵ In accordance with his interest in the increased functional differentiation of modern societies and their increasingly complex structure, trust is perceived and analysed as a mechanism that reduces social complexity:

Wo es Vertrauen gibt, gibt es mehr Möglichkeiten des Erlebens und Handelns, steigt die Komplexität des sozialen Systems also die Zahl der Möglichkeiten, die es mit seiner Struktur vereinbaren kann, weil im Vertrauen eine wirksamere Form der Reduktion von Komplexität zur Verfügung steht.⁵⁶

It is not straightforward to place Luhmann on the continuum. On the one hand he sees actors as making sense from within an inter-subjectively constructed reality, when he states that "[Die Anleitung des Erlebens durch Konstitution von Sinn und Welt zur Erfassung komplexer Daseinsbedingungen ist eine intersubjektive Leistung. Eine transzendental-phenomenologische Aufhellung der Welt und ihrer Komplexität muß diese transintentionale Intersubjektivität der Konstitution mit im Blick behalten. Denn der Bekanntheitsstil, die Wahrheitsfähigkeit und der faßbare Komplexitätsgrad des Seienden in der Welt ändern sich mit dem Stil des intersubjektiven Konstitution von Sinn und Welt.](#)⁵⁷" But on the other hand, the actor is not of primary interest to Luhmann. Human beings to Luhmann are a complex collection of different systems (genetic system, organic system, mental system, etc.).⁵⁸ His primary interest is to analyse how trust functions relative to the structure of complex industrialised socie-

⁵² Szerszynki, 1999:246-247.

⁵³ Luhmann, 1989

⁵⁴ Not least after it came out in English in 1979 in combination with Luhmann's early work on power (*Macht*) in 1988.

⁵⁵ Though often criticised for his functional perspective, as for instance by Giddens (1984:introduction) and for the lack of interest in the active role of the social agent in the continuous shaping of social structure (structuration), it seems a misreading of Luhmann to equate the functional focus with a lack of sensitivity towards the role of people (agents) in the dynamics of trust.

⁵⁶ Luhmann, 1989:7-8

⁵⁷ Luhmann, 1989:18

⁵⁸ cf. e.g. Luhmann, 1987, 67-68, Krause 1996:133

ties, and his focus is more directed towards the dynamic of the system level than towards understanding human being. So despite a more phenomenological understanding of a shared social construction of reality, his approach to trust remains functional. In Luhmann's case, however, it does not mean that trust is seen as a tool or instrument that can be directly applied to reduce social complexity. There is a difference between accepting that trust has the ability to reduce social complexity, and accepting that it can be applied to reduce social complexity. The latter assumes an instrumental understanding that sees trust as a tool that can be applied. But this is not necessarily possible and may be like attempting to apply 'love' or 'fear'. However desirable it could be, these modes of being are more often reactions towards something than they are attitudes taken on in an instrumental fashion.

Barber⁵⁹ has written an account of trust that has close resemblance to Luhmann's in the line of argumentation, but the focus is somewhat different. The perspective is also sociological. Through a focus on social order, it investigates whether the modern American society is distrustful. It does so through an analysis of trust in the context of the family, in politics, in business and in the professions. As in Luhmann's analysis Barber sees trust as closely linked to social expectations and to the way social structure is organised and maintained through such expectations. Trust, according to Barber is heavily dependent on actors' expectations. He states that: "In my exploration of the meanings of trust I start with the expectations that actors have of one another, because expectations can be thought of as the basic stuff or ingredient of social interaction...All social interaction is an endless process of acting upon expectations, which are part cognitive, part emotional, and part moral."⁶⁰

In the more functional line of argumentation and with a main focus on business relations, two edited works on trust have recently emerged. The one edited by Lane and Bachmann⁶¹ focuses on organisational aspects of trust in the context of business interaction. Their point of departure is the observation that trust is "being viewed as a precondition for superior performance and competitive success in the new business environment."⁶² Hence a better understanding of trust is needed. Where Fukuyama's book on trust⁶³ investigated the relationship between the general level of trust in societies and economic performance through historical and cultural lenses, this collection provides specific and case-based examples of how trust plays a role in organisational interaction. Bachmann⁶⁴ concludes that the "foremost problems relating to the analysis of trust seem to be connected to the understanding of the role of the institutional environment in which business relations are embedded," and recommends a multidisciplinary perspective to get a better grip on the complex in which trust (and the understanding of it) seems to be embedded.

⁵⁹ Barber, 1983

⁶⁰ Barber, 1983:9

⁶¹ 1998.

⁶² Lane & Bachmann, 1998:1

⁶³ Fukuyama, 1995

⁶⁴ 1998:298

The other work, edited by Kramer & Tyler,⁶⁵ sees trust as an important and increasingly scarce asset in organisational interaction. It takes an American focus and the general aim is to develop an understanding of trust in an organisational context. The understanding of trust here is instrumental. The assumption is that trust can be applied.⁶⁶ It is conceptualised as something actors decide to do, or not to do, depending on the evaluation of a decision situation. The perspective seems to mirror the tendency in modern organisation theory to expand the classically more narrow and rational focus to include a broader understanding of the social context in which organisations are embedded.⁶⁷

In a similar vein, Gambetta⁶⁸ has edited a volume on the role of trust in the "making and breaking of cooperative relations." Gambetta departs from an interest in the economic and political functioning of society in Italy and the lack of adequate understanding of the development of different regions in Italy. The overall purpose is to investigate why co-operation fails to appear in situations where it would be very rational to co-operate.⁶⁹ This made him want to look into co-operation through the 'elusive' term of trust, seen as a "belief on which cooperation is predicated."⁷⁰ Covering a broad array of disciplines, the volume presents a picture of trust as a complex but necessary premise for co-operation.

Earle & Cvetkovich⁷¹ are concerned with what they call social trust. This is a general form of trust that is produced in societies. As such their approach differs from accounts taking an actor-focussed approach to trust. It inquires into trust through a search for the existence of it in the past and present American society and is guided by a desire to identify a better basis of social organisation. They recognise two different types of trust: pluralistic and cosmopolitan trust, which support opposing ways of life. The former is rooted in the past, individualistically based and is leading to a type of society whose sustenance is very resource demanding. The latter, inspired by thoughts on a more virtuous community, is found to be better and more desirable solution to societal organisation, which they project on the future. A central theme, as in Luhmann's work, is to see trust as a strategy for the reduction of cognitive complexity and trust as closely linked to risk.⁷² Compared to Luhmann their arguments follow a more culturally and normatively based path, and their main line of argumentation evolves around the claim that "social trust is based on cultural values that are communicated in narrative form within society by elites."⁷³ But trust still seems to be depicted in a somewhat instrumental fashion – a tool that can be applied to reduce cognitive complexity.

⁶⁵ 1996

⁶⁶ Kramer & Tyler, 1996:10

⁶⁷ cf. also e.g. Powel & DiMaggio, 1991 for a similar neo-institutional perspective.

⁶⁸ 1988

⁶⁹ Gambetta, 1988:213

⁷⁰ Gambetta, 1988:foreword

⁷¹ Earle & Cvetkovich, 1995

⁷² Earle & Cvetkovich, 1995:40

⁷³ Earle & Cvetkovich, 1995:10

Another work on trust that deserves mentioning here, in the 'middle group' of our gradient but inclining more towards an interpretive perspective than towards an instrumental and rational understanding of human being, is written by Misztal.⁷⁴ This work embarks upon an analytical search for the bases of social order in modern societies through the lens of trust. She argues, based on the classical as well as on the more recent sociological literature, that the existence of trust is at the core of social order.⁷⁵ The initial investigation of the meanings of trust leads her to identify three types of social order – "stable order, which accounts for the predictability, reliability and legibility of the social reality; cohesive order, which can be seen as based on normative integration; and collaborative order, which refers to social cooperation."⁷⁶ To each type of social order, Misztal identifies a distinct form and practice of trust. In the stability of collective order, trust is defined as "a device for coping with the contingency and arbitrariness of social reality"⁷⁷ In a cohesive social order (community), trust "takes on the connotation of passion, out of which motive and belief arise. Trust is seen here as operating through internalization and moral commitment."⁷⁸ In the collaborative order, trust is defined as a "device for coping with the freedom of others. Its function here is to foster cooperation."⁷⁹ So a key finding of Misztal's work is the observation of a pertinent linkage between types of trust and types of social order and organisation that characterise a social system. In regard to the definition of trust, Misztal also points out that: "Definitions of trust in sociological literature generally reflect the theoretical stands of the various authors, and as such they need to be discussed in the context of their respective theories".⁸⁰

In the same way as Misztal, Putnam⁸¹ in his search the roots of civility in Italy, and Seligman⁸² in his analysis of societal development in Western democratic societies, are interested in, and link the existence of trust to the basis of social order. They both perceive trust as a fundamental variable of orderly social interaction, they both see trust as a fragile asset, and they both understand the emergence of a trustful and civil society as a slow process with deep historical roots. Seligman investigates trust structurally through social relationships and the classical concept of social roles and the expectations such roles create. He identifies trust in social relationships as being closely linked to the modern (industrialised) type of organisation,⁸³ and he frames trust historically and sees "it as an emergent property of human interaction."⁸⁴ It is a form of "belief that carries within it something unconditional and irreducible to the fulfillment of systematically mandated role expectations."⁸⁵ Putnam sees trust as social capital.⁸⁶ Where Putnam

⁷⁴ Misztal, 1996

⁷⁵ Misztal, 1996, chapters 1 to 3

⁷⁶ Misztal, 1996:64

⁷⁷ Misztal, 1996:96

⁷⁸ Misztal, 1996:98

⁷⁹ Misztal, 1996:99

⁸⁰ 1996:15

⁸¹ 1993

⁸² 1997

⁸³ Seligman, 1997, introduction

⁸⁴ Seligman, 1997:8

⁸⁵ Seligman, 1997:44

⁸⁶ Putnam, 1993:167 ff.

seems to anchor many of his arguments in political economics, Seligman seeks a perspective that he frames as the middle way between the "Scylla of rational-choice perspectives on trust... and the Charybdis of a normative perspective".⁸⁷ Through their different paths of argumentation, however, they both reach the same conclusion: trust is a key element of social interaction in our contemporary societies.

Baier,⁸⁸ a contemporary American moral philosopher with an interest in Hume, Kant and feminist theory, has also been concerned with the conceptualisation of trust. She argues that trust is "letting other persons (natural or artificial, such as firms, nations, etc.) take care of something the truster cares about, where such "caring for" involves some exercise of discretionary powers ... In emphasizing the toleration of vulnerability by the truster I have made attitudes to relative power and powerlessness the essence of trust and distrust "⁸⁹ So in contrast to more interpretive accounts, Baier sees trust as a more conscious acknowledgement of risk and vulnerability – trust as entrusting. A criticism of this point is that entrusting ignores the reliance on the trust that already exists in the relationship and makes this entrusting possible.⁹⁰ Lagerspetz⁹¹ is critical of the appropriateness of connecting trust with risk, when risk is used in the sense of betrayal.⁹² The person trusting does not normally perceive a risk, exactly because she trusts.

The concept of trust also plays a key role in Giddens' observations on modern society as accounted for in e.g. in his essay on *Consequences of Modernity*.⁹³ Giddens sees trust as a central prerequisite for the functioning of 'disembedding mechanisms'⁹⁴ which are symbolic tokens such as money and expert systems such as the medical system, the legal system, and also, for instance, the forestry system, which are so central to the design of contemporary Western societies. "Trust is therefore involved in a fundamental way with the institutions of modernity,"⁹⁵ Giddens states. He is especially interested in the meanings of trust that are incorporated into social relations.⁹⁶ In contrast to the more functionally oriented branches of sociology, Giddens sees trust as bound up with contingency rather than with risk. He defines trust as "confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given set of outcomes or events, where that confidence expresses a faith in the probity or love of another, or in the correctness of abstract principles (technical knowledge)."⁹⁷ Trust is furthermore bound up with ontological security, which refers to an emotional and most often unconscious basic human need for a feeling of security.⁹⁸ In Giddens view, therefore, trust is not as unilaterally conscious an attitude as in

⁸⁷ Seligman, 1997:8

⁸⁸ 1986

⁸⁹ Baier, 1986:240

⁹⁰ Dancy, 1995:241

⁹¹ 1998

⁹² Lagerspetz, 1998:42

⁹³ Giddens, 1990

⁹⁴ Giddens, 1990:26

⁹⁵ Giddens, 1990:26

⁹⁶ Giddens, 1990:30

⁹⁷ Giddens, 1990:34

⁹⁸ Giddens, 1990:92

the more rational approaches. "*All trust is in a certain sense blind trust!*" he states.⁹⁹ Giddens' approach, thus, represents a sociological perspective further in the direction towards an interpretive approach, where trust is something that cannot be applied. It is not primarily instrumental, but rather something that exists in the social background against which we see and act. An approach to trust somewhat similar to that of Giddens is found in the work of Eisenstadt who focuses on the role of trust in patron-client relations.¹⁰⁰

2.4. Interpretive perspectives on trust

The last step in identifying the different meanings of trust on our analytical continuum that started with the conceptualisation of human being as rational and deliberate, is the interpretive perspective of human being which tend to see human being as historically and socially situated and where trust is something that emerges from social interaction. In this interpretive perspective, social actors are not seen as independent, conscious, lucid and rational subjects but more as embedded actors existing in time and social practice.

The body of literature that approaches trust in this way seems smaller than in the above two categories and much of it comes out of philosophical circles. In these writings, an understanding of human being and interaction does not so much form an assumption of the work as it is the work itself. A shared characteristic of this pool of literature, therefore, is the degree to which it stands out and defines itself against simplistic deterministic and reductionistic assumptions about human being.

In 1998, Lagerspetz published a work on trust called *Trust, the tacit demand*.¹⁰¹ Lagerspetz, as the title implies, stresses the tacit character of trust. He investigates "*the way the notion of trust enters various aspects of human agency*"¹⁰² and does so from a perspective of post-Wittgensteinian moral philosophy. He contests the conceptualisations of trust based on what he refers to as 'methodological individualism', which is similar to what is here called rational perspectives. The assumption challenged is that the individual's needs and beliefs can be described and understood in terms that are logically independent of the fact that beings or actors have social relations with others. Instead, it is argued that ambiguity of behaviour (as opposed to the standard of predictable behaviour) is more often the rule than the exception.¹⁰³ Lagerspetz's point of departure is that trust is not a special state of mind. It should therefore be conceptualised based on the way it enters human interaction rather than based on psychology.¹⁰⁴ Lagerspetz argues that "*[t]o speak of trust is not primarily to describe a phenomenon that exists*

⁹⁹ Giddens, 1990:33

¹⁰⁰ Eisenstadt, 1984, 1995

¹⁰¹ Lagerspetz, 1998

¹⁰² Lagerspetz, 1998:1

¹⁰³ Lagerspetz, 1998:75

¹⁰⁴ Lagerspetz, 1998:2

independently of the way in which we see and discuss human action. It is to invoke a perspective on human action. It is to present behaviour in a certain light; in a light that....above all calls for moral responses. To see an action as an expression of trust is to see it as involving a demand - a tacit demand - not to betray the expectations of those who trust us."¹⁰⁵

Hertzberg, the academic supervisor of Lagerspetz, has also provided a conceptual account of trust, likewise inspired by the works of Wittgenstein, arguing that trusting is a learnt attitude.¹⁰⁶ It is something that exists qua an actor's upbringing and socialisation into the world. It is not a conscious reflective attitude. For the more conscious and reflective attitude, Hertzberg reserves the concept of reliance.¹⁰⁷

Johnson¹⁰⁸ also relying on a more interpretive style of investigation, discusses how trust, power relations and moral character cross the boundary between the public and private spheres. He does so based on three literary works.¹⁰⁹ The aim of his mission is to present an understanding of "moral and political trust, its loss and recovery, as a feature of a narrative"¹¹⁰ in public and private contexts. As with other texts in the 'interpretive' group strict definitions of trust are not as readily set forth as in the above two categories. Johnson, in his conclusion, instead of deducing a definition of trust, points to the diversity of trust: "Trust is diverse both in value and location. As a relational good, it calls attention to the attributes of truster and trusted. It may be understood as a precondition of human cooperation and a distinct policy available in specific circumstances. Trust may be inspired by the speaker or the speech, by character or action; as a feature of public institutions whose rules are open to alteration, trust may be construed as an artifact, a device that human beings can control and adjust to changing needs and demands. Trust may be a conditional value, justifying praise only on specific occasions, or it may express an unqualified trustworthiness signifying fidelity or mutual faithfulness. Love, an exclusive loyalty or affection, may make trust blind; equally trust can attract trust in return."¹¹¹ So rather than reducing trust to a clearly defined act or element, Johnson illustrates the width of the concept and emphasises the need to understand trust from within the context that contains it or is devoid of it, and the shared practices from which it emerges. He ends his essay by stating that: "Trust is not to be seen as uniquely the territory of the sentimental or the calculating; both in and out of politics it claims its own special province of merit. If we can agree that trust finally is neither celestial nor hard-faced, then this might go

¹⁰⁵ Lagerspetz, 1998:5

¹⁰⁶ Hertzberg, 1988:313

¹⁰⁷ Hertzberg, 1988:318. Giddens also applies this distinction between trust and reliance. Cf. Giddens, 1990.

Luhmann reverses this use somewhat and lets trust connote a conscious element of interpersonal relations, and uses confidence to connote 'taken-for-granted' and more unconscious behaviour often displayed in interaction with more structural elements (elements whose meaning and function we have internalised). He states for instance: "Trust remains vital in interpersonal relations, but participation in functional systems like the economy or politics is no longer a matter of personal relations. It requires confidence, but not trust."Luhmann, 1988:102.

¹⁰⁸ 1993

¹⁰⁹ Johnson, 1993. The literary works are: Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida*, and Zola's *Thérèse Raquin*

¹¹⁰ Johnson, 1993:2

¹¹¹ Johnson, 1993:166

a long way toward its restoration as a virtue that repays the close attention of the assiduous individual's steady gaze."¹¹²

Solomon¹¹³ sees trust as an integral part of social relationships and blames the discipline of philosophy for being insensitive to this aspect: "What most of the philosophical views share, I think, is a failure to take trusting seriously as an element in dynamic relationships."¹¹⁴ Likewise he rejects the attempts to reduce trust to a single dimension: "The choice between trust as a set of beliefs and trust as a noncognitive 'affective attitude,' I want to suggest, is a bad choice indeed. It encourages us to conceive of trust either as calculating distrust or as dumb but warm feelings, neither of which deserves the important place trusting obviously occupies in virtually all of our [dynamic] social relationships."¹¹⁵ ...What gets left out of such characterizations, what get lost in the Chisholming down of counter-examples and revised attempts at definition, is the rich picture of interaction and background practices that are involved in trust.¹¹⁶ This rich picture of interaction and of background practices is what we must be sensitive to, he claims, to understand trust in social relations. The drawback of seeking to reduce trust to something in itself, "is that [it] leaves out what is most exiting about trust, the fact that trusting is an ongoing process, a reciprocal (and not one-way) relation in which both parties as well as the relationship (and the society) are transformed through trusting."¹¹⁷

A final representative of a more interpretive approach to human being and trust is the ethicist Løgstrup. Løgstrup, like Lagerspetz, sees trust as a tacit demand.¹¹⁸ To him trust is at the basis of all human interaction. Without it we could not live an ordinary life.¹¹⁹ Løgstrup illustrates this understanding of trust by using an example from Forsters' novel "Howard End" where Leonard Bast's meeting with the Schegel sisters comes to be characterised by a lack of trust because their different 'worlds' makes it too difficult for them to understand each other fully.¹²⁰ There is nothing conscious or explicit in this misunderstanding. It rests on a level that is more fundamental than the conscious, namely on the level of the social conventions that we are already dwelling in qua our existence.¹²¹ Løgstrup states that: "...if trust is met by any other attitude than a reception of it, it reverts into suspicion."¹²²

¹¹² Johnson, 1993:172-173

¹¹³ 2000

¹¹⁴ Solomon, 2000:232.

¹¹⁵ Solomon, 2000:233

¹¹⁶ Solomon, 2000:234. See also Solomon and Flores, 2001.

¹¹⁷ Solomon, 2000:234

¹¹⁸ Løgstrup, 1991:chapter 1. See also Løgstrup, 1961:228ff.

¹¹⁹ Løgstrup, 1991:17

¹²⁰ Løgstrup, 1991:21-22

¹²¹ Løgstrup, 1991:30

¹²² Løgstrup, 1991:30. Own translation of: "...hvis tilliden bliver mødt af en hvilken som helst anden holdning end en modtagelse af den, slår den om i mistro.

2.5. Choosing between the perspectives on trust

Like many other 'resource use' fields, forestry has, as already mentioned, traditionally been dominated by the natural sciences and with them a more rational mode of inquiry and understanding of what it means to be an actor. While this understanding of the actor was appropriate in the more traditional organisation of forestry, it seems less appropriate in relation to the new intent of sustainable forest management to organise forestry based on co-operation between all interested stakeholders.

The rational understandings of human being seem most appropriate within a setting where behaviour is predictable. This will require a setting that is well understood and quite stable. It can be compared to sports. Here the rules are fixed and the field is clearly demarcated. The behavioural rules for what it means to be a player are shared and are clear to everyone. The expectations concerning the other players are clear. This creates a setting where it is clear to everyone in a shared way what is rational to do. Hence predictability is high. In such a situation the social structure, or background, against which the behaviour of the actors is shaped, is shared, stable and well defined.

But as it was argued in the introduction, this does not seem to be true for the contemporary forestry situation. Here changes are taking place. The last decades have been characterised by a search for new and more sustainable forest management practices to accommodate the changing societal values regarding forests. Characteristic of this situation is that the existing practices, relations, and understandings of what is meaningful and normal to do in forestry, are also changing. The usual relations and roles of the actors, such as the NGOs, the forest owners, the public agencies, hereby change. In such a situation a dominant, stable and shared forestry understanding is lacking. This means that there is not yet *one* clear and shared rationality dominating. The normalness is not yet defined and therefore there is no clearly demarcated field and no clear set of rules. The situation is one where the social structure defining the playing field is itself being re-organised. In such a situation, perspectives assuming a fixed behaviour seem inappropriate.

The immediate impression from the case of introducing Forest Stewardship Council certification in Denmark, which we shall return to in the fourth chapter, was that different rationalities were at stake. Some actors discarded what was considered rational behaviour from within one perspective, as an irrational or emotional response to the situation. What is needed to understand relations in such a situation is a perspective that is able to handle different rationalities or frames of understanding. The rational perspectives on trust, that are sensitive to only *one* rationality, are therefore inappropriate in relation to the intent of sustainable forest management to include a diverse group of stakeholders in the forest management process. When seeking to organise forestry in this way a perspective that is open toward the many different rationalities that are involved, will be required.

How appropriate is then the extended perspective on trust in relation to the contemporary forestry situation and the quest for sustainable forest management? Also this perspective does not seem fully appropriate to grasp the relations between forestry actors. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this perspective is often an extended version of the rational perspective. It is so in the sense that it acknowledges that rationality is bounded and acknowledges the existence of other rationalities, but it is still less concerned about understanding these different rationalities. It therefore seems less appropriate to cope with the 'irrational' and 'emotional' dimensions of behaviour that have characterised much of the environmental debate.¹²³

Much attention, in the works on trust based on the extended perspective, is directed at the functionality of trust in organisations and in society. While it is important to underline and understand the importance of trust for social organisation, such approaches seem less appropriate for understanding why actor relations are trustful or suspicious. When focussing on how trust functions, the concept of trust is often 'instrumentalised' and become a matter of prescribing how to build it. But often this instrumental focus loses sensitivity to the differences in understanding and to the difficulties in changing existing understandings. And these aspects seem very important when seeking to establish the genuine co-operation that is desired in forestry.

The attitudes, for example, of the different actors towards an initiative like that of introducing FSC certification in Denmark did not seem to be formed based on a free and open (rational) spirit of inquiry. Rather it seemed as though it was initially encountered based on an already existing understanding, like Løgstrup pointed out above. This raises the question of whether rational reflection is possible in a way that is unbiased, or if it is always biased by some pre-understanding based on which the initiative is seen before closer reflection is initiated. The latter would require a perspective that is sensitive to how seeing and understanding is influenced by history and by culture and the extended perspective on trust is often not sufficiently sensitive towards this requirement.

Hence, for a perspective to be appropriate for the forestry situation it should be able to throw light on the 'deeper' layers of social structure that shape being and give rise to the different rationalities that are involved. It is necessary to go one step further and inquire into the structure of what it means to be an actor and what shapes actor behaviour, and therefore the interpretative perspective on trust, seems to be the most appropriate relative to the situation in contemporary forestry.

The tacit and structural character of trust emphasised by Lagerspetz and Løgstrup seems sensitive toward the deeper layers of social organisation that influence actor relations. The sensitivity to the different attributes of truster and trustee and the institutions in which they exist, emphasised by Johnson, seem important to recognise, if the desire is to understand and respect the different stances of the many forestry actors. And the dynamic character of relationships, empha-

¹²³ Cf. e.g. Huxham, 1999

sised by Solomon, likewise seem important to acknowledge when seeking to understand trust in the shifting relations between forestry actors.

Common, however, for the different authors approaching trust from an interpretative perspective is that they come from philosophical circles. This means that the interpretative interpretations of trust exist in a form where the main purpose is a philosophical discussion of trust and such a form is not directly applicable to an analysis of trust in actors relations in forestry.

The challenge therefore, in the attempt to understand and analyse trust in the forestry actor relations, is to identify an account of trust, which relies on the richness in understanding of being that characterises the interpretative tradition, but at the same time is analytic in its form.

Heidegger's philosophy

In line with Lagerspetz's point that "to speak of trust is ... to invoke a perspective on human action", ¹²⁴ and the requirement for a rich understanding of human being outlined above, the search in the social and human sciences for an appropriate theoretical structure, met a match when acquainted with Heidegger's existential philosophy. This provided a path and a perspective that seemed a promising and relevant basis to investigate and understand the degree of trust between actors in forestry. It had a very nuanced understanding of being and it was sensitive to multiple rationalities and the historical and situational embeddedness of them.

Although it may seem unnecessary to go into detail with such philosophical (in the meaning of overly theoretical) considerations on being, which are intuitively clear to most of us, the claim here is that it *is* important to make this basis clear *exactly because* of its intuitive obviousness. Our closeness to our own existence makes it obvious to us and this obviousness often makes us blind. It makes us blind to the assumptions based on which we act, or to the different bases that make other actors behave differently. The uncovering of this blindness inherent in *praxis* is what much of Heidegger's writing in part one of *Being and Time* is about. He observed that it is difficult to gain understanding of our own being (Dasein) *exactly* because it is so close to us:

...Dasein is not only close to us – even that which is closest: we are it, each of us, we ourselves. In spite of this, or rather for just this reason, it is ontologically that which is farthest.¹²⁵

Despite Heidegger's controversial personality and especially his highly questionable affiliation with the Hitler regime for a period before the Second World War,¹²⁶ many consider Heidegger among the most influential thinkers of modern times.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ 1998:5

¹²⁵ Heidegger, 1962:36

¹²⁶ Cf. e.g. Ott, 1992. Safranski, 1998, Weischedel, 1975:274ff.

¹²⁷ Dreyfus, 1991:9, mentions that prominent thinkers such as Foucault, Bourdieu, Derrida, Merleau-Ponty, and Habermas all are highly inspired by Heidegger. Also authors who are more critical of the developments in society

With Heidegger the term *hermeneutics* was ascribed new meaning. From traditionally being a term referring to the methodology of studying (interpreting) old sacred texts, the term was widened through the work of Dilthey and generalised further by Heidegger, calling attention to the fundamentality of interpretation in all human existence.

For Heidegger, hermeneutics begins at home in an interpretation of the structure of everydayness in which Dasein dwells."¹²⁸

Subsequently Gadamer — a student of Heidegger — elaborated the hermeneutic approach further. He called his approach *philosophical hermeneutics* or universal hermeneutics to elucidate the transition from hermeneutics being a methodology to it becoming something inherent in all human being. In the foreword to an English translation of some of Gadamer's publications, Linge concludes:

“Hermeneutics no longer refers to the science of interpretation, but rather to the process of interpretation that is an essential characteristic of Dasein.”¹²⁹

Gadamer has stated that: “...the problem hermeneutics poses can be defined by the question “what can we make of the fact that one and the same message transmitted by tradition will be grasped differently on every occasion, that it is only understood relative to the concrete historical situation of its recipient?”¹³⁰

The understanding presented by Heidegger should, first and foremost, be seen as a contrast to and a rejection of the Cartesian based view that the “...basic relation of the mind to the world is a relation of a subject to objects by way of mental meanings.”¹³¹ As such the approach is an attempt to get away from the assumption, which have dominated for centuries, that the subject is the most basic entity. The interpretive approach sees culture as more basic: “From the Greeks we inherit not only our assumption that we can obtain theoretical knowledge of every domain, even human activities, but also our assumption that the detached theoretical viewpoint is superior to the involved practical viewpoint...[Heidegger] follows Wilhelm Dilthey in emphasizing that the meaning and organization of a culture must be taken as the basic given in the social sciences and philosophy and cannot be traced back to the activity of individual subjects.”¹³²

towards value relativism and feel that this development rests on interpretations of Heidegger and Nietzsche, acknowledge their philosophical importance. Cf. e.g. Bloom 1988.

¹²⁸ Dreyfus, 1991:34

¹²⁹ Linge, 1976:xlvi

¹³⁰ 1987:115

¹³¹ Dreyfus, 1991:3

¹³² Dreyfus, 1991:6-7

A main thesis in Heidegger's thinking is that we as beings are socialised into an already existing world and culture in which we learn to cope. *Praxis* in his understanding is more basic than theory. His inquiry into being departs from the shared everyday activities in which we dwell. We acquire practices by which we cope in and through our "everydayness." Our making sense of things is not independent of our being in some setting, situation or time. Therefore, the social practices are more basic than intellectual or conscious reflective processes. Normally it takes some sort of disturbance in our everyday understanding to evoke deeper conscious reflection to make sense of the elements that do not fit the picture. Such reflection, however, is still made relative to the world we know and live in and will differ relative to the interpreter's culture, interests, capabilities for understanding, intuition, history, experiences, position, efforts put into the interpretive process, etc. It will, in short, depend on the interpreter's temporal and spatial situatedness. As Heidegger puts it:

In every case this interpretation is grounded in *something we have in advance – in a fore-having*....in every case interpretation is grounded in *something we see in advance – in a fore-sight*.....the interpretation has already decided for a definite way of conceiving it [an entity], either with finality or with reservations; it is grounded in *something we grasp in advance – in a fore-conception* ...An interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us.¹³³

The understanding that being is rooted in *praxis* is not new. Already Aristotle¹³⁴ advocated primacy of practical wisdom to technical or scientific knowledge.¹³⁵ Practical wisdom comes from everyday experiences. Our practical wisdom, in the form of own or taken over experiences, shapes how we encounter things and situations. Things are not encountered as bare things, but as something fitting into a larger whole in a certain way. This larger whole is what makes the thing intelligible and gives it value. As such the *praxis*-based understanding includes instrumental as well as value distinctions.¹³⁶ This means that actors do not encounter a situation in two distinct processes where the first is seeing the bare facts and the next is adding value distinctions like utility, right or wrong or good or bad to it. It is perceived as a whole. When seeing a chair this is not seen as a wooden construct with four legs. It is just a chair like we have always known it. And the chair is noticed on a certain background and situation, namely a need to sit down and rest.

A corollary of the above is that conscious reflection in this perspective plays a less dominant role than in more rational perspectives. Much of our daily doing is not guided by conscious reflection but rather by practical coping in normal situations. It is guided by how things are normally done. When we drive, cook, or work we assume many of the situations without deliberate

¹³³ Heidegger, 1962:191-192

¹³⁴ In his work *The Nicomachean Ethics*

¹³⁵ Cf. also Flyvbjerg 2001:2

¹³⁶ Cf. Flyvbjerg 2001:4

reflection. Roads, stoves, and computers are so familiar to normal behaviour that they do not normally call for reflection.¹³⁷

The above line of thinking has inspired many of the more recent thinkers in philosophy, sociology and psychology¹³⁸ and influenced the shaping of the growing body of *interpretive* literature in the social and human sciences. A body of literature that, as already mentioned, seems to be defined by its opposition to the earlier Cartesian understanding of beings as primarily conscious, intentional and self-contained subjects.¹³⁹ According to Bernstein,¹⁴⁰ the interpretive perspective (or hermeneutic as he calls it) resides beyond *objectivism* and *relativism*. By this he refers to the perspective's attempt to call into question the assumptions of both *isms* and move beyond them and thereby avoid the stalemate situation that occurs by defining them relative to each other.¹⁴¹

Relative to the concept of trust, the *praxis*-based perspective has implications for the extent to which the act of trusting is understood to be conscious on the part of the person who trusts. This aspect is pivotal in Lagerspetz's work on trust.¹⁴² His main argument is that trust is most often an unconscious act on the part of the person who trusts. The truster is not consciously aware, in the situation where he trusts, that this is what he is doing. He is not deciding to do so. Trust is a tacit but appropriate response to a situation. It is an inherent part of a relationship.¹⁴³ There are many examples from daily life of trust being a tacit phenomenon that is unconscious on part of the person involved and only observable from a third person perspective. The tacitness is exactly what makes life 'daily.' And a tacit form of trust does always seem to underlie more conscious reliance. When consciously deciding to rely on certain elements, there are still many elements of a situation that are taken for granted, since if nothing could or would be taken for granted, an unimaginable situation of total relativism would occur, as Løgstrup also pointed out.¹⁴⁴

Heidegger's phenomenological or interpretive understanding of being, therefore, seemed an appropriate basis and point of departure to understand trustfulness in actor relations in forestry. As it shall become clearer in the coming chapter, his understanding of being allowed for sensitivity to the elements emphasised by the interpretive accounts of trust above. His focus on *praxis* allows for sensitivity to the tacit and structural character of trust that Lagerspetz and Løgstrup

¹³⁷ For a work on the praxis element of human behaviour cf. also Garfinkel, 1986

¹³⁸ e.g. Foucault, Merleau-Ponty, Habermas, Derrida, Bourdieu. Cf. Dreyfus, 1991:9

¹³⁹ Cf. e.g. Dreyfus, 1991:introduction.

¹⁴⁰ Bernstein, 1983.

¹⁴¹ Bernstein, 1983:49

¹⁴² Lagerspetz, 1998

¹⁴³ In a trustful relationship a husband, for instance, does not normally suspect his wife of being unfaithful to him when leaving for work every day. Neither does he, explicitly or consciously, consider her not to do anything of the sort. Therefore, there is no element of risk presented to him. Trust (now as a noun) is taken for granted. For the husband to come to the point where he asks himself whether or not to trust his wife to be faithful in his absence, there must be some kind of disturbance that makes suspicion emerge. Another example illustrating the point that trust is often tacit and a product of practice is our daily use of money: we trust that the money we receive in the bank has exchange value in the bakery. This is not an issue we normally think about. We take it for granted. It has always been like that.

¹⁴⁴ 1991:14

emphasised. It furthermore allows for sensitivity to the attributes of truster and trustee and the institutions in which they exist, as Johnson emphasised, and to the dynamic character of relationships emphasised by Solomon. Heidegger's theory hence possessed sufficient complexity in the understanding of being to allow the incorporation of these interpretive dimensions in an understanding of trust.

But also Heidegger's understanding of being has a form that makes it difficult to apply directly to the analysis of the degree of trustfulness characterising actor relations. Therefore, it was necessary, based on Heidegger's account of being, to develop an account of trustfulness in the form of an analytical frame, which will be able to analyse and increase understanding of trust existing in actor relations. This analytical frame shall be presented in the next chapter. It shall be referred to as an *existential* account of trust in actor relations because of its reliance on Heidegger's existential philosophy and because trusting, according to Solomon is more than a matter of individual psychology or personal character — it is something that presents us with an *existential* dilemma:


"Trusting, whether it involves social or institutional constraints and sanctions or not, is more than a matter of individual psychology or personal 'character.' It presents us with an, existential dilemma, one captured well by Fichte, who insisted that "the sort of philosophy one adopts depends on the kind of [person] one is."¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵ Solomon, 2000:244

3 AN EXISTENTIAL ACCOUNT OF TRUSTFUL RELATIONS

Trustful relations exist primarily through actors' more or less tacit understanding of them as such. Much of our daily interaction with other people, whether at home or at work, is based on relations we are familiar with. We are not consciously or reflexively thinking much about these relations. We perceive them as perfectly normal and it is because of this normalness that we do not think much about them. In the present understanding of trust, it is this unquestioned normalness and familiarity with a normal and well functioning relation that indicates the existence of trust in the relation between the parties.

The main thesis in this account of trust in the relations of interdependent parties is that the existence, maintenance and emergence of trustful relations in shared situations depend on two main dimensions: 1) how the different actors make meaningful sense of the situation they are in, and 2) how well their meaningful understandings match. It is argued that if different parties make sense of a situation differently and if the different views do not match well, so that the understanding of the one party lacks meaning to the other, it is likely that the relation between them will be one of suspicion rather than of trust.



Following these two main dimensions, the first and main part of this chapter presents an existentially based understanding of how actors see, or encounter, things and situations as meaningful. The second part then argues why a shared meaningfulness is important for trust to evolve in the relation.


3.1. What actors see as meaningful

How we as actors relate to things and situations in our everyday activities is fundamentally dependent on how we make meaningful sense of them. A situation we recognise as familiar (for example, a telephone ringing) makes us elicit a certain normal behaviour (answering the phone). But people who have never seen a telephone before would relate to the telephone in a different way. Although this is a simple example, it illustrates the point that we relate to the ringing phone by answering it because we see it as a meaningful response to the situation. It is not something we reflect a lot about. We just do it. It is a normal procedure.

In order to understand better how actors relate to each other it is important to understand how they see each make meaningful sense of the situation they are in together. This section shall, therefore, outline a structure of dimensions that influence how we make sense of things or situations. Two interrelated dimensions shall be used to structure how actors see a situation. The first dimension is that of an *existential world*, which is the background based on which actors see a thing or a situation as meaningful. The second but interrelated dimension, is the *being-in* of actors, which refers to the temporal and spatial dimensions of an actor's existence in a situation, which influences how this situation is understood as meaningful.

The concepts of seeing, making sense of, and perceiving are used interchangeably and refer to how actors, more or less tacitly, understand a thing or a situation. This seeing of a situation forms the basis for their subsequent behaviour or action. Often, seeing is a matter of tacitly recognising familiar situations and sometimes seeing is based on a more conscious and reflexive process.

And seeing, as the basis upon which we relate to others, is contingent on the existential world from within which an actor sees, and upon the being-in of the actor. These dimensions shall be explained in further detail below.



3.1.1 Seeing depends on existential worlds

An existential world is that from within which we make meaningful sense of a thing or a situation. It is the background against which something appears to us as meaningful.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁶ Heidegger, who is the architect behind the concept, uses 'world' instead of 'existential world', but to avoid confusion with other and more colloquial uses of 'world', the term *existential world* shall be used here. Existential is also

The "wherein" of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this "wherein" is the phenomenon of the world.¹⁴⁷

"[T]he nature of any given element is determined by its meaning (Sinn, sens), which can only be defined by placing it in a larger whole... [but] the larger whole is not just an aggregation of such elements... the "elements" which could figure in a foundationalist reconstruction of knowledge are bits of explicit information. But the whole which allows these to have the sense they have is a "world," a locus of shared understanding organized by social practice."¹⁴⁸

When seeing a forest, for instance, it does not just show up to us as an unattached collection of woody trunks with branches. It appears as something we understand in a richer way, something that fits into and is meaningful relative to a larger background. This larger background is an existential world. It consists of an already existing, culturally and historically determined understanding of what a forest is, which infuses the term 'forest' with a certain meaning and a certain value. The vast majority of situations we are in are intelligible to us qua some sort of existing background relative to which we understand it, even though we often are oblivious of that background.

The general Danish understanding of a forest is likely to be different from, for instance, the general Greek understanding. Different species, landscapes, history, and cultural uses of the forest create different pictures of a forest in the minds of Greek and Danish people. But also within a national culture or within a climate zone, forests can be understood differently. The traditional utilitarian forester, to use a stereotypical archetype, sees the forest differently than the environmentalist (to use another archetype). For the former the forest is primarily meaningful as an area that produces timber, and for the latter it is primarily meaningful as a fragile ecosystem. A central reason for them to perceive forests differently is the different existential worlds from within which they make sense of the forest. The different ways of seeing the forest are anchored in different backgrounds against which the forest is meaningfully understood.¹⁴⁹

An existential world constitutes a referential totality. It provides a meaningful whole relative to which, for instance, a forest is placed. It includes the standards of reference for how the forest is seen and valued and it includes a certain language. When seeing a forest as a threatened ecosystem, it appears as such against a larger background of industrialised society, pollution, species

chosen to underline the existential character of the perspective and the close linkage between existential worlds as the background for how actors' see, and the actors' existence.

¹⁴⁷ cf. Heidegger, 1962:87

¹⁴⁸ Taylor, 2000:116

¹⁴⁹ The understanding of concepts such as traditional utilitarian forester and environmentalist, like the use of all other concepts, are made intelligible against some sort of background. This is also why different people interpret them differently. Despite the fact that such archetypes only exist as such, they can help illustrate the difference between understandings.

extinction, man's role in nature, etc, that forms the meaningful whole relative to which the forest is seen. The forest is understood and gains its value relative to this larger whole. This means that when we see a thing as a thing it becomes meaningful and gains its value relative to a whole set of other relations. Therefore, it is often difficult to define an issue independently of its relation to the larger whole relative to which it gains its meaning.¹⁵⁰ With relation to other people, and the relation to them, this means that the ability to understand their point of view genuinely requires an ability to discern the larger totality relative to which the point makes sense to them.

Existential worlds are shared. They exist outside the single individual and provide a collective background for understanding.¹⁵¹

Dasein is with equal originality being-with others and being-amidst intraworldly beings. The world, within which these latter beings are encountered, is ... always already world which the one shares with the others.¹⁵²

Even though it can be claimed that we each have our own experiences, which form the basis for our behaviour, such experiences are made meaningful relative to something that was already there before and against which the experience becomes an experience. This already existing 'something' is an existential world. Relative to forestry, the existential world that shapes the understanding of a forest in Denmark exists as a totality that shapes many Dane's understanding of what a forest generally is and what it generally looks like.

Our history is made up of present interpretations of past existential worlds, as the way practices were organised and meaningful in former times. At the most general level, a culture constitutes an existential world. It provides the shared background that frames meaning and gathers the people of the culture, and it prescribes and makes meaningful the practices that are normal to and define this culture relative to other cultures.

Existential worlds can be seen to exist at many levels.¹⁵³ On the one hand the existential world of, for instance, agriculture — which defines the practices of agriculture— can be seen to exist at a more specific level than that of a national culture because farming practices exist within the more general practices defining the national culture. The farmers and their practices exist within and constitute a part of the national culture. On the other hand, the existential world of agriculture can be seen to define shared practices of agriculture globally. Despite a degree of sharedness at this general level, defined by the shared characteristics of agriculture globally, there are

¹⁵⁰ This may also help to explain why it has been so difficult to specifically define a term like *sustainable forest management*.

¹⁵¹ But they are, as everything else, only available through interpretation of them.

¹⁵² Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 1982:297

¹⁵³ The concept of existential world, as a set of organised practices, has similarity to social systems as e.g. described by Luhmann (see e.g. Luhmann, 1987) and as a background for making things and situations intelligible it is similar to Pirsig's concept of static patterns (see Pirsig, 1992).

many different ways of doing agriculture. And the different elaborations of agricultural practices in different places can be seen as sub-worlds of the more general world of agriculture. Existential sub-worlds, hence, provide the more specific background of meaningfulness within the overall existential world.

"[T]he world is the whole of which all subworlds are elaborations."¹⁵⁴

Similarly there may also be, in for instance the existential world of business, several different sub-worlds, representing different more specific understandings of what it means to do business. And just like the many sub-worlds of an overall culture contribute to the shaping the culture as a whole, the sub-worlds of business contribute to define the larger existential world of business.

In this way the overall existential world of forestry in Denmark constitutes a background for the general understanding of what a forest is, and makes certain forestry practices more meaningful than others. But when going into more detail about what a forest is, there may be many different sub-worlds of forestry representing different elaborations of what a forest is more specifically.

As actors we normally function relative to many different existential worlds. Our behaviour in business, for instance, takes place against the existential world of business that prescribes the general and normal patterns and practices of business behaviour. And our behaviour in the family takes place against the existential world of family life that prescribes the general patterns and practices of family behaviour. The involvement with so many different existential worlds and so many somewhat different normal ways of behaving may help to explain why some people in some situations behave in ways that may seem contradictory to the observer. The environmentalist, for instance, that commutes to work by car. Despite a concern for pollution when being in the environmental existential world, the environmentalist also functions within the modern commuter society where behaviour is often prescribed by the labour market existential world within which commuting is a normal practice.

A shift in perception, so as to see a situation from within a different existential world than one normally does, is possible but not necessarily easy. If traditionally seeing a forest primarily as a 'machine' that produces wood, it may be difficult to come to see it as a fragile ecosystem, depending on how deep the perception of the forest is anchored in one's identity. For some, a specific understanding of the forest constitutes a defining part of one's existence. For a forester this role may not be just a job, but a way of being. It is a lifestyle around which most other things are built. In such cases a shift in view is likely to have implications for the identity of the person. And, as we all know, identities are often difficult to change.

¹⁵⁴ Dreyfus, 1991:165

We are socialised into and exist in a world already full of existing understandings and meaningful wholes defined by the different existing existential worlds. Since actors are socialised into already existing understandings of what is, for instance a forest, the understanding conveyed by the existential world is most often prior to the individual's conscious reflection on the meaning of a forest. When new understandings of a forest emerge, perhaps as a product of vision or reflection, they emerge relative to existing understandings. And the hitherto existential world does not dissolve or disappear as a frame of understanding, but new existential worlds may oust it and come to dominate the general understanding of what a forest is. The older existential worlds are then mainly perceived as remnants of the past that are marginalized and of interest especially for historians seeking to understand the understandings that prevailed before.

New existential worlds are products of change. The emergence and crystallisation of such new existential worlds are most often slow processes. Statesmen, artists, thinkers, or other people who exist on the borderline of existing society, seem to play a central role in articulating the visions that over time come to prevail and form a new background against which people see. The historian Paul Johnson opens his book *Modern Times*¹⁵⁵ by describing the new relativistic (existential) world that emerged in the beginning of 1900 symbolised by Albert Einstein's discoveries in physics. Such a discovery contributed to, and was part of, a development that gradually made people see many things in a different light. Where many things and relations before were seen as absolute, they now became relative. So, for example, discoveries in physics can contribute to the opening of a new overall existential world in which things become meaningful in a different way than before.

Although existential worlds constitute the backgrounds against which our daily lives become meaningful and intelligible and thereby influence what we do, we are often not cognizant of their presence.

The world as already unveiled in advance is such that we do not in fact specifically occupy ourselves with it, or apprehend it, but instead it is so self-evident, so much a matter of course, that we are completely oblivious of it.¹⁵⁶

Existential worlds often withdraw from us and come to form an unnoticed background. We are in them like we are in atmospheric air. Most often we do not pay attention to the fact that we have air to breathe. It is the most normal thing to us. Only in special situations, as for instance when it is lacking, or when we study it, are we reminded of its normal presence. But normally we are not consciously aware of the existential worlds that constitute the frame of meaning for what we see.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵ 1991

¹⁵⁶ Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* 1982:165

¹⁵⁷ And when explicitly or analytically being aware of existential worlds they are only accessible to us through interpretation.

A main advantage of the concept of existential world relative to understanding what actors' see, is that it makes us sensitive to the layer of culturally and historically conditioned structures that exist outside the single actor and tacitly provides a set of background assumptions that shape what he sees. It points to the existence of somewhat structured totalities into which we are socialised and which we come to take for granted through the process of socialisation. And it is, therefore, an expedient conceptual tool to understand and analyse that in which different perceptions of forests are anchored.

Heidegger has proposed a general structure of existential worlds.¹⁵⁸ He refers to this structure as the *Worldhood* of an existential world and according to this it consists of *roles*, *objectives*, and *equipment*. Here below is an interpretation of these structural elements of an existential world.¹⁵⁹

Roles

The *roles* of an existential world define the positions, the tasks and the relations of the different actors that belong within the referential totality of an existential world. The existential world of, for instance academics, contains and defines the roles of a professor, a student, an opponent, etc. And similarly the existential world of forestry defines the normal roles and expectations of a forest supervisor, a forest ranger and a forest worker. Such roles are defined by a certain normal behaviour and by certain values and they include an understanding of what it means to be a good forester and how a forester generally relates to the forest and to the other roles. It includes, for instance, a certain way of behaving and dressing. The general understanding of a traditional forester as a bearded man in a green uniform comes from such a role. With the role came a certain authority that was granted by the roles' meaning and relevance to society. The environmentalist also has a role within the existential world of traditional forestry. From within this world it has traditionally been seen as a role with a more emotional relation to the forest as opposed to the more utilitarian and professional role of the forester.¹⁶⁰

Real life actors do not fit such roles completely. The role exists only relative to the existential world and provides the general background for our understanding of what, for instance, a forester is. It *is* not the forester. It is only the pre-judice (in the sense of pre-understanding) existing qua the existential world of traditional forestry that gives meaning to the term. From within a

¹⁵⁸ See chapter 3 of division 1 in *Being and Time*, Heidegger, 1962

¹⁵⁹ Spinoza et al., 1997, suggest adding the concept *style* to describe how practices are co-ordinated and expressed within an existential world. They give the example of the different driving styles in New York and the Mid West. In the former an aggressive understanding of driving prevails. On the other hand, the Mid West style of driving is more relaxed. The two different ways of driving reside in two different existential worlds. Drivers from the different places see driving differently and they do that because they understand the practice of driving based on different existential worlds. The role of the driver and the purpose of driving are different in the different worlds. And they make different sense of things and opportunities in the two understandings of driving. So the practices are co-ordinated by different styles. Style, therefore, refers to the type of relations that the existential world prescribes.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. e.g. Alston, 1983.

more environmentally inspired existential world of forestry, there may be other roles defining forestry. Here the ecologist and ecosystem manager have important roles. The traditional forester may also exist as a role in this existential world but may be understood relative to this whole as a residual from a previous but now surpassed understanding of forestry.

Objectives

The *objectives* of an existential world define the overall purposes towards which the activities of an existential world are directed. They are the ends that make the world's practices meaningful. To stay within the forest example, an overall objective for the traditional existential world of forestry has been the ideal state of the *normal forest*. This objective prescribes an optimal organisation of forestry relative to the steady provision of mature timber to society. This objective was in Denmark an answer to the exploitation of forests in the 18th century, which triggered a need for organised forestry in order to secure a more steady supply of timber. The role of the forester in this existential world was to manage the forest toward this objective. The situations and problems encountered during the work were seen primarily in the light of this objective. This means that problems constituted 'problems' relative to this objective, and opportunities constituted 'opportunities' relative to this objective. Activities were assessed and valued relative to their appropriateness towards this objective, etc. In short, the objective of an existential world defines the overall purpose that makes certain practices meaningful and of importance to management.

An example that illustrates how practices are meaningful relative to a certain purpose is the traditional use of chemicals to spray stumps after harvesting spruce to avoid the spreading of root fungi. The spraying practice assumes an understanding that gives priority to the objective of producing timber and less to the objective of protecting e.g. ground water or biodiversity. The spreading of fungi constitutes a problem relative to the objective of production. From the perspective of a more environmentally concerned existential world, the problem would be the risk of nitrogen pollution in the ground water that might follow from the use of a nitrogen-based compound for spraying. Another example is that the main Danish M.Sc. course for foresters on fungi is called forest *pathology*. This implies the potential pathological character of fungi for forestry and not the beneficial character of fungi for the biodiversity of the forest ecosystem. Such a name-giving is likely to be different in more environmentally concerned existential worlds. The elements of fungi hence appear differently in light of the different overall objectives.

Equipment

Equipment refers to the elements that naturally belong to and have a meaningful place in the existential world. Within the existential world of forestry, as a set of organised meanings and practices, elements like trees, wild flowers, deer, birds, and visitors have a natural place. They fulfil certain functions and fit into the overall referential totality.

When going further into detail, however, with the specific species of flowers and trees that are perceived to belong in a forest, and the functions they fulfil relative to the larger whole, there may be differences between different existential worlds. The example of fungi used above can also illustrate this point. The one existential world understands fungi as damaging to forestry, whereas the other appreciates the presence of them. So they constitute different elements in the two different existential worlds.

Another example is the preferred choice of tree species. In the more traditional existential world of forestry emphasising production of wood, spruce and fir played a central role. They were seen as productive species that fitted beautifully into the normal forest model and the understanding of the forest as a production machine. In the environmental existential world of forestry native tree species, which in Denmark means deciduous trees, are preferred. The main concern in this existential world is the conservation and protection of natural biological processes; a native forest left to its own dynamic is what is meaningful and constitutes the beauty of the forest.

This means that from within different existential worlds different elements are found meaningful, valuable and mattering. Some elements and activities are found more worthy and valuable in some existential worlds than in others. So when interacting on forestry issues where different existential worlds are present it may be possible for different actors to make quite differently sense of the very same species because they are made meaningful relative to different overall frames of meaning. Such differences may be a barrier to communication and interaction between the parties and may very well influence the relation between them.

To summarise this section briefly, we have introduced existential worlds that are referential totalities relative to which we encounter things or situations as meaningful. It consists of three structural elements: *equipment* that refers to the elements that meaningfully belong to the referential totality. Such equipment assumes meaning in the light of the *objectives* toward which the equipment is used. In forestry the chainsaw, for instance, is used *in order to* cut down trees *in order to* grow forests *in order to* be able to provide a sustained production of wood to society. *Roles* are the stands that people take upon themselves and ascribe to others when using the equipment. They are the identities prescribed by the existential world.

In regard to the quality of social relations, it means that if we interact with another actor and meaningfully recognise this actor as fulfilling a certain role relative to the existential world from within which we understand the situation, we relate to her based on the pre-defined relations, roles and equipment which is included in the totality of the existential world. Therefore, existential worlds are influential in shaping what we see and how we relate to others.

3.1.2 Seeing depends on the Being-in of actors

Like existential worlds, the being-in of actors also influences what they see. Where the existential worlds point to the existence of a totality relative to which the seen is made intelligible, the being-in side refers to how beings more specifically are relative to these structures. The existential structure of being-in includes five dimensions: 1) Being-in a situation, 2) Being in time, 3) Being in space, 4) Being disturbed, and 5) Being open. Each of these has influence on what actors see. As before, Heidegger is the main source of inspiration for this understanding of being-in.

Being-in a situation is inspired by Heidegger's observation that we are always in some kind of situation and the specifics of this situation influence what we see. Being-in time relies on Heidegger's observations on the temporal situatedness of being, and similarly, being-in space refers to the spatial situatedness of being. Being disturbed refers to the *praxis* dimension of being. It is related to Heidegger's observation that actors often cope in situations based on a certain normal behaviour. Most often it is only if this normal behaviour is disturbed or breaks down that conscious reflection replaces the more tacit coping. Being open has to do with the degree to which actors are aware of their own embeddedness in a certain existential world and relates to Heidegger's observation that the existential world, from within which we see, often withdraws so that we are not aware of it.

Together, the five dimensions cover central existential dimensions that influence what actors see as meaningful and thereby how we relate to each other. In this way they are important for the trustfulness characterising the relations. Each of the five dimensions is elaborated upon below.

Being-in a situation

Being-in first of all has a situational dimension that we should be sensitive towards when analysing what actors see. A corollary of actors always being-in some kind of existential world from within which they make sense of a situation, is that they are always in a situation that they seek to respond to in a meaningful way. Whether being at work, being at driving, being at thinking, at cooking, reading, discussing, socialising, etc., there is always some specific situation we are in.

"...[we] are always in the world by way of being in some specific circumstances...always in the world by way of being in a situation – dealing with something specific in a context of things and people, directed toward some specific end, doing what it does for the sake of being Dasein in some specific way [role]."¹⁶¹

¹⁶¹ Dreyfus, 1991:163

The situation we are in can be more or less familiar to us. Most of the situations we encounter in daily life are, as mentioned, familiar to us. That is what makes the daily life 'daily' and provides us with the certainty and comfort of normality. We cope in these situations. Not much conscious reflection is involved in this and often we do not question why we do it specific way. When negotiating at work with our usual partners, for instance, one behaves, to a large extent, based on how negotiation normally takes place. Interaction takes place within familiar frames of meaning (existential worlds) and is meaningful to the involved parties through these. The normal behaviour in an organisation is to a large extent a product of a general business culture (the existential world of business) and of the sub-culture in the specific company that defines the roles of the employees and the objectives they work towards.

Most people are familiar with experiences where their behaviour, in retrospect, felt misplaced and where the situation called for a different response than was actually given; an ill-timed ironic comment, or a vociferous comment at a dinner party, are simple examples. So, certain situations call for certain normal behaviour. Aristotle used the concept of *phronesis* to describe the ability to identify the appropriate behaviour a situation is calling for.¹⁶² This he saw more as a practice based on skill and sensitivity to the situation than a product of conscious reflection.¹⁶³

In less familiar situations behaviour will generally be more uncertain and careful. Here we do not enjoy the certainty of normalness and we will seek to make sense of such situations by placing it relative to some already known existential world that can provide an overall framework for making the situation meaningful. When having to co-ordinate and co-operate with other parties in unfamiliar situations it is, therefore, very important for the quality of the interaction that all parties can find a shared meaningfulness so that good relations can emerge.

The situation we are in or come into is likely to have a mood. Such a mood has to do with the atmosphere of the situation. Movie directors and dramatists are familiar with this dimension. Their task is often to create an atmosphere of romance, of uncanniness, or of horror to convey the mood of the situation. A meeting or a party, for instance, can have a certain mood. This can influence the mood of the participants. If the mood of a party is happy and joyful, one's own mood is likely to become influenced by the mood of the party when one enters the situation. If this is not so, it may be more difficult to enjoy the party and feel in tune with it. The mood of the situation may hence influence what we see. If the mood at a situation is joyful or constructive, we may take over this mood and see things in the light it casts.

Relative to trustful relations, the mood of a situation of interaction can, therefore, influence the relations. If the mood of the situation is positive and constructive, relations may be formed in a different ways than if the mood of the situation is perceived as negative. If actors enter a situation and express or sense a mood of suspicion, the interaction may become more suspicious.

¹⁶² For contemporary use of Aristotle's work on *phronesis* see e.g. Flyvbjerg (2001) and Kemp (2001).

¹⁶³ In retrospect most of us recognise this practical and experience-based intelligence. Often behaviour that is a product of reflection can be awkward, whereas experience-based responses to a situation are more appropriate.

And if actors sense an atmosphere of trust, as a positive way of relating to each other, their own behaviour is likely to be more trustful. The mood of a situation, therefore, is an important factor to consider when seeking understanding of why trust is able to foster trust and suspicion is able to foster distrust. In regard to the understanding of trustfulness in the relations between forestry actors it is therefore also important to be sensitive to the mood of the situations where such actors interact since it may shape how they see.

Being in time

Luhmann alludes to the important link between trust in relations and the understanding of time when he states that: "[Schon bei oberflächlichem Hinblick ist am Thema Vertrauen ein problematisches Verhältnis zur Zeit erkennbar. Wer Vertrauen erweist, nimmt Zukunft vorweg... Eine Theorie des Vertrauens setzt eine Theorie der Zeit voraus.](#)"¹⁶⁴

Temporality, according to Heidegger, is that what makes being intelligible. It is the horizon by which to understand how 'being' and 'the world' presuppose each other.¹⁶⁵

Temporality exists to us as past, present and future. Each of these corresponds to a certain type of being. Our shaping by the past through our thrownness into an already existing and structured world into which we are socialised corresponds to '*being-already-in*'. As beings coping in the present we are '*being-amidst*'. And as always '*being-ahead*' of ourselves we are constantly projecting upon the future. So, existentially our being in time is not to be understood as being along a successive line of minutes and hours. Time is constitutive of being. The present is never an isolated 'now' but rather defined by the available from the past and that what is yet to come, as expressed by Heidegger:

Dasein does not exist as the sum of the momentary actualities of Experiences which come along successively and disappear. Nor is there a sort of framework which this succession gradually fills up...Dasein does not fill up a track or stretch 'of life' — one which is somehow present-at-hand. It stretches itself along in such a way that its own Being is constituted in advance as a stretching-along. The 'between' which relates to birth and death already lies in the Being of Dasein.¹⁶⁶

This also means that temporality is inherent in the process of seeing and making sense. It is in the present that we see and understand, but we always do this relative to something already there from the past and relative to projections upon the future:

¹⁶⁴ Luhmann, 1989:8

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Being and Time, division2, and also Dreyfus 1991:243-244. In the sense that time is the horizon by which being and world presuppose each other, it is not a dimension independent of world and the other dimensions of being-in. The temporality of our being also touches upon disturbance and openness. Therefore it is also treated more in detail than the other dimensions of being-in.

¹⁶⁶ Heidegger, 1962:426

Projecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out, and in accordance with which Dasein arranges its Being. On the contrary, any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities.¹⁶⁷

Our constantly *being-ahead* is closely associated with feelings such as fear and hope. Projections presenting desirable results create hopeful expectations. Undesirable results of projections, on the other hand, evoke fearful expectations.¹⁶⁸

Relative to our being-in time, trustful relations can be seen as a product of the past based on which we see the present and project upon the future. A person relating in a trustful way to others see them in a certain way and tacitly expects (projects) a certain course of the interaction. The trustful relation is constantly being tested in the present. If it over time remains an appropriate response to a situation it is further cemented. But if it, on the other hand, turns out as an inappropriate response to the situation it was expected to match, it may lead to a more suspicious relation.¹⁶⁹

Trust, however, is not visible to the truster in the present. Inherent in the dynamic is an asymmetry between a first person perspective and a third person perspective.¹⁷⁰ Trust in a relationship is observable only to an observer in the present. The person trusting is not aware of his own trusting. He sees the situation in a trustful way but does not see himself seeing it in a trustful way. For the trusting person to perform 'self-observation', a temporal asymmetry is required. Only in retrospect, and after some kind of disturbance in his usual pattern of relating has brought the issue to his awareness, can the first person, the trusting person, describe himself as trusting at that point in time.

In regard to our analysis of what actors' see, the awareness of the temporal situatedness of actors' being should make us sensitive to how the actors make sense of the situation they are in as meaningful relative to a certain past and relative to certain projections upon the future.

Being close to or far from — concern

A spatial dimension of being-in also influences what actors see. Existentially, spatiality can be expressed in terms of nearness and farness, but not nearness and farness in terms of meters. Existential distance refers to a distance in terms of concern and affectedness. It is a question of how the situation we are in matters to us and affects us.

¹⁶⁷ Heidegger, 1962:184-185

¹⁶⁸ See e.g. Heidegger, 1962:179 for fear as a state of mind

¹⁶⁹ The same is true for distrustful relations although the surprise here often will be considered more pleasant than when trust is broken. This makes Luhmann conclude that distrust is not the opposite of trust but rather its functional equivalent. Cf. Luhmann, 1989:78

¹⁷⁰ Lagerspetz, 1998, Chapter 3

When we are existentially close to something, as for example environmentalism, we are concerned about the environment. We may feel affected by, for instance, the destruction of tropical rain forests. They may matter to us and play a central and meaningful role in our existence. The people felling the rain forest, on the other hand, are closer to different things. They may be more concerned about making money from felling. Or they may be concerned about procuring fertile soil for agriculture. Therefore, they are affected differently by a felling.

Foresters making sense of the forest from the more traditional world of forestry are normally concerned about securing a sustained supply of timber. This is an issue that is close to them in their professional role as a forester.

This means that concern is closely linked to the roles actors take on and relative to which their existence is defined and acquires meaning. So, despite actors sharing the same overall culture, they may have very different concerns within this overall space. Most of us are close to our next of kin, our interests and our work. We care about them and they provide our existence with meaningfulness. Concerns mirror our role values in certain situations. The care for our children, the desire to protect the environment, the drive to invent new gadgets or establish international corporations are all examples of concerns that motivate and drive our behaviour in specific situations.

We see a situation in light of our concerns and react to it based on them. Though concerns are shifting they also form part of our identity and understanding of what is good and bad, right and wrong. They influence our judgements. They condition how we see and what we notice in different situations. The meaningfulness of actors' identities evolves around the concerns for roles, such as being a successful father, a protector of the environment, or a good professor. Institutions exist because of shared concerns.¹⁷¹ Environmental institutions evolve around a shared concern for the environment; forest owner associations evolve around the shared interests of being a forest owner, and both may be concerned about being sufficiently profitable to maintain their existence. That which we are close to, we often relate to in a trustful way. Whether it is the family or the environment, the closeness to persons or issues often rests on taken-for-granted relations. So the spatial dimension of existence forms another dimension of our being-in that we need to be sensitive towards in order to understand how different actors meaningfully see and relate to others in a situation.

Being disturbed

Disturbance is an occurrence that challenges ones normal understanding of a situation. It moves an actor out of the 'normalness' and moves her towards different modes of being, such as more creative ways, defensive ways, or constructive ways of being.¹⁷² Most people have experienced

¹⁷¹ cf. e.g. Selznick 1992:233

¹⁷² C.f. e.g. Garfinkel, 1963, 1986. He has made empirical (ethnomethodological) observations of behaviour and trust in situations where perfectly normal situations are being interrupted by anomalies.

the feeling of disturbance on holidays when exposed to practices of other cultures that are different from our own familiar practices.

In situations of disturbance the presumed familiarity with the situation breaks down and so does normal problem solving. Something does not fit into and disturbs the normal pattern. This results in a situation that is not immediately meaningful in relation to the pre-understanding of it. Actors then have to make sense of the situation anew, often in a more conscious and reflective manner. In this situation we seek to make sense of the situation based on other experiences by placing it in relation to other meaningful wholes.¹⁷³

Disturbance can occur at levels that are more or less fundamental to one's existence. If one's marriage is disturbed, this may be more fundamental than if the daily mail is not delivered on time. We are much more concerned about the former than about the latter. If the traditional forester, who is used to making judgements from within the existential world of traditional forestry, is brought into a setting where practices and problems are defined in relation to a more environmentally existential world, his normal coping would be disturbed. If his existence is dominated by his professional identity, it can indeed be very difficult for him to shift to another frame of understanding. The good and bad and right and wrong of the existential world that has dominated his existence no longer work and the 'goods' and 'bads' and 'rights' and 'wrongs' of the new dominant frame of understanding may be meaningless to him. This may place him in some form of an identity crisis.

So, what is merely a superficial role to some can be a whole identity to others and if we experience disturbance or breakdown at levels that are fundamental to our existence, it may cause a breakdown in the entire web of familiar or trustful relations and practices with which we were comfortable.

Disturbances also carry the potential for change and for new ways of relating. In science, for instance, disturbances and anomalies may carry the potential for new and better understandings. Anomalies may lead scientists, if they hang on to them, to search for new frames of understanding capable of explaining the anomalies.¹⁷⁴ Though disturbances for many are undesirable in the present, they may in retrospect turn out to be beneficial because of their potential to procure new and better ways of understanding.

Disturbances challenge existing and expected relations and as such they are more conducive of suspicion than of trust. Trustfulness resides in the normal and since this is what is disturbed, it may lead to suspicion. Environmental accidents can exemplify this. If a local industrial plant normally cleans their waste before discharging it into a stream, the community is likely to have a good relation to the plant. The plant is trusted to clean the discharge water. If it turns out,

¹⁷³ This is related to what Spinoza et al., 1997:4 call cross-appropriation.

¹⁷⁴ In his book *The Essential Tension*, 1977, Kuhn presents ample illustration of how historically situated tension between ways of understanding has triggered new scientific understanding.

based on studies of the water quality, that pollution has been higher than expected, even though locals had not noticed this, the community may be more suspicious of the plant behaviour in the future. The new results of the water quality study disturb the trustful relation that subsequently may change into a more suspicious one.

The important thing relative to this account of trust in relations is that when the normality, and the tacit expectations that follow from this, breaks down, normal meaningfulness also breaks down. This lowers predictability and may cause uncertainty and the need for reassessing the situation, which may then appear to us in a different light. Therefore, disturbances can influence how we see things and thereby how we relate to others.

Being open

Being open has to do with the degree to which actors are open to other ways of meaningfully seeing a situation. And it has to do with the extent to which they are open to their own structural embeddedness in existential worlds and thereby how able they are to see new understandings. Openness is related to, for example, concepts such as *agency*¹⁷⁵ in sociology and *entrepreneurship* in business. It is also related to the concept of learning.

According to Heidegger our normal way of understanding ourselves is shaped by a tradition we are brought into. This throws a certain light in which we see our possibilities and ourselves:

Dasein has grown up both into and in a traditional way of interpreting itself: in terms of this it understands itself proximally and, within a certain range, constantly. By this understanding, the possibilities of its Being are disclosed and regulated.¹⁷⁶

Turned around, this argument states that the possibilities of our being is influenced by the degree to which we are open to our own embeddedness. The available, that reveals itself through our normal way of seeing and is made meaningful by a certain existential world, may change if we are open to other ways of seeing. As being open our understandings are constantly seasoned by our experiences of how well this coping functions. So, depending on our degree of openness to the situations we are in, we undertake a perpetual process of learning. This need not be a conscious learning process. Learning may be a tacit process originating from a more unconscious openness to situations we are in.¹⁷⁷

The relation to the situation is circular. We encounter situations based on past experiences (prejudices). Depending on how successfully we cope in the situation, we may adapt our practices

¹⁷⁵ Cf. e.g. Emirbayer & Mische, 1998.

¹⁷⁶ Heidegger, 1962:37. Kierkegaard referred to the same thing in his famous observation that life must be lived forwards but is understood backwards.

¹⁷⁷ The ability to learn in this 'open' way may petrify with age for many. This may explain why aged people often find it more difficult to adapt than young ones.

and reconsider past experiences. This may lead to a new way of encountering situations, to new expectations, to new practices, and to new identities. This constant circling is what Gadamer refers to as the hermeneutic circle of being.¹⁷⁸

Openness has to do with awareness and with interest. And it has to do with how affected an actor is by a certain matter. We do not question many of the things in daily life that we are not involved in or concerned about. People that are not interested in, or affected by, forestry practices, are neither particularly open nor closed to a change of such practices. They are indifferent. Openness also has to do with the interest in exploring new ways of seeing and with the capability to see. Whether gifted with intellectual, entrepreneurial or political vision, people who hang on to anomalies and have the drive to search for new ways may be seen as more open than people who do not. Though a certain level of knowledge may improve the ability to be open, an expert may, on the other hand, have difficulty escaping the perspective of his discipline. This may inhibit openness. Experts tend to be deeply entangled in the web of assumptions on which their disciplines exists.¹⁷⁹ As such they are taking a lot of things for granted and may be incapable of questioning these assumptions. Existentially they may be too close to the assumptions to be able to question them. And they are often existentially anchored in a certain paradigm around which they have built their lives. Therefore, they may repudiate new perspectives that challenge their "expertise". Kuhn has referred to this and linked it to the fact that paradigmatic change in science often happens through people who are new to a discipline and not entangled in their tacit web of assumptions.¹⁸⁰

An actor's span of experiences and affinity for risk also influences one's openness. The wider the span of experiences, the more likely it is that an actor is open to other ways of seeing. An anthropologist who has experienced a lot of different cultures may be more open to diverging behaviour than a person who is only familiar with one's own culture. Comfort may also play a role. The more comfortable one is in the existing situation, the less incentive one has to be open to new situations. Necessity is the mother of invention. However, a too immediate threat may not, for some actors provide the necessary distance and composure it takes to be open. Instead, it may trigger other modes of being, such as a defensive attitude may dominate.

Of the above factors that influence one's openness, some are determined by abilities of the person to see and think, but openness may also be seen as culturally determined. In this form openness exists as a general openness to openness. A more open attitude can be institutionalised in a culture whereby it becomes a normal practice to question and search for new ways. Fukuyama, for example, sees the American culture as characterised by a high degree of general openness.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ Gadamer 1976:9

¹⁷⁹ Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1987

¹⁸⁰ Kuhn 1996

¹⁸¹ Fukuyama, 1995.

Openness is not the same as respectful and polite interaction. Actors may be able to interact in a respectful way without being open to each other's views. This form of interaction does not necessarily make them open to other views and open to the identification of a new and shared understanding. Respectful and polite interaction may be a good start for constructive interaction, but to be successful in problem solving, there must also be a shared desire to find solutions. Smooth behaviour is not enough. In some cases it can even be a barrier if it is smooth in the sense of being dishonest or strategic, maintaining a certain façade to reach one's own objectives and not actually to identify shared objectives.

In regard to openness, at least three types of relations can be identified: blind, normal, and 'agency.' These three types form a continuum. The normal way of being is the one where the actor exists in, and for a large part take over, already existing practices. The normal set of practices forms the basis relative to which the actor constantly seeks to identify and adjust her own role. In the blind variant of relating, the actors uncritically take over the normal relations prescribed by the existential world that makes the situation intelligible.¹⁸² There is practically no openness. One is uncritically taking over already existing roles. The 'agency' variant, at the other end of the spectrum, is the one where one seeks to be open to one's own embeddedness and that of others. This way of being is open to a questioning of existing practices and to new ways of organisation and co-ordination. Such actors are the entrepreneurial ones that are likely to open up new existential worlds.

Though openness may cause distrust because it may involve alternatives to normal practices, it is also important to the overcoming of distrustful relations. Often a certain degree of openness is needed for actors to overcome existing discrepancies in seeing and to establish new and shared ways of understanding a situation which can form the basis for improved relations.

The Achilles heel of openness is the lure of foundationlessness. Absolute understanding often brings certainty to one's existence through the fixed meaningfulness and causality it creates. The feeling of being part of something meaningful creates existential certainty. The questioning of the assumptions of one's own existential world may, therefore, cause a feeling of uncertainty because the structure that was formerly unquestionable and thereby provided security now becomes questionable whereby the security it provided may disappear.¹⁸³

To summarise, this section has pointed to five dimensions of being-in that all influence what actors see. In addition to sensitivity to the involved existential worlds we shall, therefore, be sensitive to how these dimensions influence the actors' meaningful understanding of the situation to understand how different actors relate to each other in a situation.

¹⁸² Blind should not necessarily be understood in a negative sense. Heidegger uses the concepts of inauthentic, undifferentiated and authentic, where the latter is the mode of being where one seeks to be open to one's own embeddedness. Cf. Heidegger 1962: chapter one, division one. Cf. also Dreyfus 1991:240

¹⁸³ In science this feeling is related to what in Bernstein, 1983:16 refers to as the Cartesian anxiety.

3.2. How well views match

The overall thesis, pointed out at the start of this chapter, is that the emergence and maintenance of trust in social relations depends on what actors see as meaningful in a situation, and how well their views come together. A match between how they perceive a situation will make them share a meaningful understanding of it and will facilitate the interaction. Interaction over time that is found by the involved actors to be successful will contribute to the emergence of trust between them. Above we have presented existential dimensions of how actors see, and below is a substantiation of the claim that some kind of match between views is important for trust to emerge.

Shared meaningfulness

Being-in is always being-with. "[T]he World of Dasein is a with-world. Being-in is Being-with others."¹⁸⁴ The being with others requires social organisation to co-ordinate and facilitate interaction. And an important element for co-ordination of interaction is a shared understanding of shared situations. It is in a shared situation that social relations are more or less consciously tested and re-shaped. Through the circularity of our being mentioned above, the meaningfulness of our pre-understandings is constantly tested in situations. This also means that the trust that resides in and characterises our social relations is constantly being tested more or less consciously in the situations we are in. If our normal meaningful understanding of the situation is not successful in dealing with the situation and we feel disturbed, the trustful relations that exist qua the normal understanding and the existential world that makes it meaningful will also break down. So it is in the absence of 'normality' in relations that trust is challenged.

In a situation involving several actors that each have a certain pre-understanding that makes them elicit a certain type of behaviour, the situation will be a product of how different actors see it. Interaction will thereby be influenced by how well different views come together. It is not enough that one actor finds it meaningful. The emergence or maintenance of trust in relations is dependent on all actors finding a form of meaningfulness. Shared meaningfulness in a situation, therefore, becomes an important parameter for social organisation and for trust to evolve in social relations. For this to be true, some kind of match between the different actors' understandings of the situation is required to exist or to evolve through interaction,¹⁸⁵ as is illustrated in the diagram below.

¹⁸⁴ Heidegger, 1962:155. See also Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 1982:297

¹⁸⁵ It can be claimed that if views are compatible but not shared, there is not much of a relation. A relation implies something shared.




Figure 1: The relations between actors are shaped by their perception of the collective situation. This means that if the outcome continues to meet their expectations and these are desirable, trustful relations are maintained. But if the shared situation disappoints their expectations, the relations between the actors may change towards less trustful ones.¹⁸⁶

A shared meaningfulness requires shared existential worlds. "Heidegger calls Dasein's understanding of the referential whole *familiarity*."¹⁸⁷ When a situation is familiar to us it is so qua an existential world as a larger referential whole that infuses it with meaning. With the understanding of a situation, therefore, comes a set of pre-understood relations that tells us how things fit together. The roles of one self and those of others fit the roles of the existential world. By sharing the existential world that makes the situation intelligible, the involved actors share an understanding of the situation and feel that their interaction is meaningful in order to fulfil the objective of this existential world through the roles it prescribes. If this is not the case, the parties that do not find it meaningful will not find the relation to the others meaningful since their behaviour does not meaningfully contribute toward the same end and does not meet the expected role. Interaction will not be meaningful and therefore trust is not likely to emerge.

Walter Firey, an American resource sociologist, has inquired into the social basis for resource management and the overall point he makes is that for management of natural resources to be successful over time, a resource complex is required.¹⁸⁸ A resource *complex*, as opposed to a resource *congeries*, is a forestry system characterised by social stability and well co-ordinated interaction.¹⁸⁹ This means that a certain degree of social stability and shared meaningfulness must characterise a field in order for it to be effective. If sustainable forest management is understood as a form of social organisation of forestry, that by involvement of all interested actors secures effective co-ordination and problem solving over time, this means that social stability and shared meaningfulness is a prerequisite for sustainable forest management.¹⁹⁰ In the language of this thesis, it means that the development of sustainable forestry practices requires that the involved actors make sense of forestry from within shared existential worlds. And it also means that trustful relations are a prerequisite for sustainable forest management.

Interaction over time that is based on shared understandings and results in outcomes that are meaningful to the involved actors will lead to the development of such practices becoming normal social practices. They are social because they are meaningful in a shared way to the in-

¹⁸⁶ The dynamic between part and whole is also sometimes referred to as the hermeneutic circle. Cf. also Dreyfus, 1991:201 for the circularity of Being.

¹⁸⁷ Dreyfus, 1991:102

¹⁸⁸ Firey, 1960

¹⁸⁹ Firey, 1960:14

¹⁹⁰ This is the conclusion of Lee, 1990

volved parties. As such they function to co-ordinate social interaction. Political interaction, on the other hand, evolves around issues that are made sense of differently and where meaningfulness is not shared. Views do not match. In this form of interaction, disturbance is more normal.

If different views do not match well in a situation of interdependence, it is likely to be political and the shaping of relations is likely to depend on either openness or dominance, or a mix of them. On the openness end of this continuum, the different concerns are able to meet by identifying or creating shared understandings. Here a new light in which to understand the situation emerges from the interaction whereby the actors come to share an existential world. Dominance, on the other hand, is the version where the different understandings attempt to gain a power position relative to the others so that they can overrule the discrepant views. Each actor seeks power in such a situation. Not necessarily in the sense of forcing others, but in the sense of gaining a dominant position and thereby enjoying the power that comes with and is vested in the dominant rationality.¹⁹¹ In a democratic type of society, approaches that appeal to the majority of voters by being able to meet their concerns, gain such power. In business it comes from winning market shares. In the case of certification, it comes from becoming the favoured scheme.

The argument here in a condensed form is that trust in social relations emerges when interaction over time remains meaningful to the involved parties and the interaction results in an outcome that meets their concerns. Trustful relations, therefore, are a product of meaningful and well functioning interaction over time — a product of a shared way of seeing and understanding. By referring to trust as a product is meant that it is something that emerges from and is maintained (and eventually breaks down) through interaction. But like love, it is something that is difficult to produce instrumentally. The key, therefore, to understanding the degree of trustfulness characterising social relations is to understand how different actors make meaningfully sense of the shared situation and to understand the degree to which the different views match to produce a successful and coherent whole.

If we share a frame of meaningfulness we tend to see the same issues as problems and identify ways of solving the problems that are meaningful to all involved parties. This shared meaningfulness comes qua the shared existential world that organises practices and defines certain issues as problems, and certain solutions as successful. Therefore, not much time is spent in a trustful situation on identifying the problem. In distrustful relations or in political situations this is different. Here, most of the time is spent on identifying what is actually the problem and often this is difficult. A form of social organisation characterised by trust is therefore likely to be more effective in problem solving than a form where distrust prevails. Therefore, interaction based on trust requires less energy than interaction based on distrust. The ability to solve problems for a group characterised by trustful relations is higher, because they agree on what constitutes the

¹⁹¹ For a discussion of this understanding of power cf. Dreyfus 1996, where he compares Heidegger's use of being to Foucault's use of power. See also Flyvbjerg 1992, vol. 1

problems and have largely the same understanding of what makes a solution meaningful or acceptable. The emergence and existence of effective social organisation is, therefore, closely linked to the emergence and existence of trustful relations. The extent, therefore, to which it is possible to establish a 'fusion of horizons'¹⁹² qua a shared existential world that makes everyone share language, problems and solutions, is likely to influence its effectiveness.

The relation and dynamic between trustful relations and successful social organisation seems to be one where the one presupposes the other. Trustful relations contribute to more effective problem solving qua shared meaningfulness, and effective problem solving contributes to cement trustful relations further. But the dynamic also works the other way around. Once the shared meaning about a field starts to erode, there can be an element of self-perpetuation in it. When a lack of shared understanding characterises the forestry situation, the capacity to effectively solve problems is hindered. This causes disturbance. When such disturbances continue over time, people are confronted with more and more situations where things are not working well; this may cause behaviour to become more opportunistic.¹⁹³ The lack of unity and shared meaningfulness in problem solving also weakens decision makers and makes room for new actors and new rationalities as possible sources of order and meaningfulness. But it may also create a kind of vacuum where many actors come to compete for a space in the new order.

As such, the dissolution of shared meaningfulness is likely to lead to more general relations of suspicion or distrust. The circularity mentioned above, where trustful relations are constantly tested in a situation, may then lead to circularity where it is suspicious relations that are constantly tested in the situation. Here the circular dynamic becomes a hermeneutics of suspicion instead of a hermeneutics of trust.¹⁹⁴

Summarised, the argument in this section is that a match between actors' understanding creates a shared meaningfulness that facilitates social organisation and interaction. It facilitates problem framing and problem solving and, since effective problem solving makes actors appreciate the existing relations it establishes or maintains trust in these relations.

Anchorage at a higher level

Interaction between parties that have different understandings of a situation is not necessarily based on distrustful relations. Parties with different understandings at one level can still maintain somewhat trustful relations at another level. But this requires a shared understanding and a shared respect that exists at a higher level. The development of mutually acceptable references

¹⁹² The expression 'fusion of horizons' belongs to Gadamer. Cf. Gadamer, 1999:311. Gadamer's horizon refers to that which one sees in a situation. In a situation where horizons merge, the different actors come to share an understanding of the situation. This is the same thing we refer to here by establishing a shared existential world whereby the situation is made meaningful relative to the same background.

¹⁹³ 'Opportunistic' here means opportunistic relative to the shared objective. Terms like successful, opportunistic, good and bad, depend on some form of reference. In the present forestry situation the shared frame of reference is the ideal democratic style of interaction that the concept of sustainable forest management is striving for.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. e.g. Dostal, 1987 or Gadamer, 1984 for a philosophical account of the hermeneutics of trust and suspicion.

and forms of interaction on political issues is an example of this. Although there may exist different understandings of an issue, the understanding of how to interrelate on the issue is shared and anchored in the shared references for interaction, which exists at a higher level.

Whether there is consensus or not, the condition of there being either one or the other is a certain set of common terms of reference. A society in which this was lacking would not be a society in the normal sense of the term, but several.¹⁹⁵

This means that sharedness at a higher level can procure the necessary meaningfulness and thereby trust at a more general level that allows for discrepancies in understanding at the lower level. As such suspicion at a lower level becomes acceptable because of trust at a higher level. In politics, for example, a reasonable form of interaction between professional politicians requires a set of rules of interaction that is respected by all. Although it may not make sense to speak of trust between the single political actors, there can be trust in relation to the political system that makes well-coordinated political interaction possible. Trust in personal relations is here replaced by trust in more general systems at a higher level.

Another variant of such a situation can be exemplified by the controversy between fishermen and environmentalists because of turtles and dolphins being caught in fishermen's nets.¹⁹⁶ By inventing new kinds of nets, so that these animals no longer get caught, the problem is solved. In this situation the relation between them is neither trustful nor distrustful. It rather ceases to exist because the problem that led to their interdependence is solved. The trustful relation has shifted to a higher level, namely to the level of government, where the use of the new nets is being enforced.

If forestry is considered a societal sub-system, orderly interaction in this system among actors that do not share meaningfulness on forestry issues, would hence require a shared respect and meaningfulness that is anchored at a higher level than forestry. Such shared respect could be anchored in a well-respected forest act or in the functioning of the legislative or democratic system in general. It could also be anchored in science, or in a shared understanding of democracy. But shared meaningfulness (and thereby trust) at a certain level is required to maintain order in the social organisation. If no such shared meaningfulness and thereby trust exists, there is no community, and this would constitute a problem for forestry, since the intent to re-organise forestry is driven by a desire for such a community.

Common meanings are the basis of community. Intersubjective meaning gives a people a common language to talk about social reality and a common understanding of certain norms, but only with common meanings does this common reference world contain significant common actions, cele-

¹⁹⁵ Taylor, 1987:57


¹⁹⁶ This example has been brought to my attention by Prof. M. Korthals.

brations, and feelings. These are objects in the world that everybody shares. This is what makes community.¹⁹⁷


3.3. An analytical framework

The purpose of this chapter was to propose an existentially inspired perspective on trustful relations that can be used to understand and analyse the degree of trust in relations between forestry actors.

As illustrated below, the main thrust of the argument is that the maintenance and development of trust in relations between actors depends on 1) what actors see as meaningful, and 2) how well their views match and are able to produce meaningful interaction that further cements trustful relations.



The argument has further been that, to understand how actors see and make meaningful sense of a situation, it is important to understand the existential world from within which the situation is made meaningful and the way the actors are in the situation.



The existential world constitutes a referential whole. It prescribes and organises a set of practices and relations through objectives, roles, and equipment. To understand what the actors see, therefore, attention should be paid to the referential wholes which give meaning to their understanding. By inquiring into the roles they assume and the roles they assign others, and by inquiring into their objectives and the elements they emphasise as naturally belonging to their way of seeing the situation, such understanding can be gained.

Further understanding of how the actors see can be gained by being sensitive to their being-in. This implies inquiring into how they make the situation intelligible by a certain past and a certain future, what they are particularly concerned about, what disturbs them and whether or not they are open towards their own embeddedness and that of others.

¹⁹⁷ Taylor, 1987:60

The argument in the last part of this chapter has been that the maintenance or emergence of trustful relations in a situation involving different actors is dependent on the existence or emergence of a shared meaningfulness that can co-ordinate interaction successfully. Without such shared meaningfulness there is a lack of ability to agree upon and solve problems, and trust is difficult to maintain or establish.

Therefore, in the quest to understand the trustfulness of relations between actors in forestry, we shall be sensitive to how they see the shared situation, and how well the different views match. Schematically the analytical framework can be summarised as below:




Figure 2: A schematic illustration of the analytical framework

In addition to the above description of the perspective where seeing, and thereby the maintenance and development of relations is shaped by the structural dimension of existential worlds and the situational dimension of being-in, the arrows seek to illustrate the circular dynamic whereby the pre-understandings of the actors are constantly shaped by and shape the shared situation in which trust will either be maintained, increased or lost, depending on the ability to identify shared meaningfulness.

In the next chapter the application of the above framework will be exemplified by an analysis of the case of introducing FSC certification in Denmark. Based on a series of interviews, the actors' understanding of the certification situation is linked to the involved existential worlds and the actors' being-in. Subsequently the match between these views is discussed in order to understand the trustfulness that characterises their relations. For the readers who are not familiar with the actors in Danish forestry and their positions in the FSC case, it can be recommended to read the paraphrased interview statements in the Annex before proceeding.

4 INTRODUCING FSC CERTIFICATION IN DENMARK

The main purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the application of the analytic framework presented in the previous chapter. It shall be applied to understand and analyse the trustfulness characterising the relations between the actors in the case of the introduction of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) forest management certification in Denmark.

The FSC case is an illustration of different forestry interests coming together to develop standards for certification of sustainable forest management. The issue of forest management certification has been a key concern to most Danish forestry actors during the last decade. More than 150 articles in the main Danish forestry journal *Skoven* have dealt with the issue of forest management certification. During the peak period from 1997-1999 there were 122 contributions to the topic. This makes it one of the most debated policy issues in the history of Danish forestry.

It is as a major political process in Danish forestry, and as an illustration of the shaping of actor relations in times of changing understandings of forestry, that this case is of interest to this thesis. The certification issue touches upon some of the key political questions of contemporary forestry, namely by what standards should forests be managed, and who is eligible and legitimate to set the standards for forest management.

Throughout the 20th century, the overall standards for forest management in Denmark were set within the framework of an established governmental system, and they were formally expressed in forest acts.¹⁹⁸ Traditionally the task has been left to governmental institutions. But in the case of FSC certification, the initiative for new standards came from green NGO interests. Thereby the introduction of the FSC certification scheme carried the potential to break with a long tradi-

¹⁹⁸ Cf. e.g. Fritzboøger, 1994:370ff

tion and to create a new situation where standards for forest management could originate outside the established political system. In this light the FSC certification scheme can be interpreted as a disturbance to the more traditional understanding of the forestry configuration, and a process illustrating the desire for change in forestry. The introduction of FSC certification becomes, therefore, a medium for change in forestry and carries the potential of significantly influencing the future of Danish forestry and thereby the destiny of the forestry actors. As a disturbance related to the organisation of existing forestry practices, this presented dire prospects for some and captivating opportunities for others. Whether in favour of or against the initiative, all main actors in Danish forestry participated in the certification process. Since the involvement between the actors was direct face-to-face interaction over time through a series of meetings over several years, the case provides an excellent opportunity to study direct interaction and the forming of relations between actors in Danish forestry. Therefore, the case of introducing FSC certification in Denmark is seen as critical¹⁹⁹ and representative of the more general forestry situation in the sense that it reflects the problems of organising forestry and co-operating to develop new practices.

4.1. Forest management certification

As a child of the last decades, forest management certification is a relatively new issue in Western European forestry. The emergence of certification expresses a felt need for scrutiny and validation of existing forest management processes, and a key component in the establishment of viable certification schemes is the quest for credibility in forest management:

The essence of certification is credibility. Credibility is more likely to be secured by independent third-party evaluations controlled by institutions with high credibility among the public, rather than by governmental institutions.²⁰⁰

The premise of the idea of certification is therefore a perception that the traditional forest management patterns can and should be improved. As such its emergence can be seen to express the emergence of new forest understandings and a lack of trust in traditional management authorities to manage forest resources. It can also be seen to express a trust in the ability of formal sets of certification standards to improve management.²⁰¹

Many different forest management standard setting initiatives have emerged in recent years.²⁰² Most of them have their roots in the concern about conservation of forests that emerged in the 1980's in response to the growing deforestation and degradation of, especially, tropical forest resources. In agriculture the phenomenon of certification has been known for decades, but it was

¹⁹⁹ Cf. Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 77-79 for the use of critical case studies.

²⁰⁰ Viana, et al., 1996:247

²⁰¹ Cf. Egestad, 2001

²⁰² Cf. Egestad, 1995.

not until 1990 that the first forest operation was certified.²⁰³ Trade boycotts were first attempted to stop deforestation, but these had the opposite effect. Forests lost their value when there was no market for their products and the lands were cleared for other purposes. These experiences created the fertile bed for certification as a forest policy instrument.²⁰⁴

Unhappy with the perceived ineptness, or at least long-windedness, of the established official systems both at the national and international levels, the environmental interests choose to launch an initiative that instead could improve forest management practices through the market system.²⁰⁵

How certification works

Forest management certification was introduced as a market-based tool²⁰⁶ that should work through consumer preferences for certified wood products. Consumers' potential preferences for wood produced in a certain way created a pull through the chain of custody all the way to the beginning of the chain where the forest owners were provided an incentive for complying with the management behaviour prescribed by the standards, in order to meet the consumers preferences and sell their timber. This means that ordinary people, through a mobilisation of their preferences²⁰⁷ and not as voters in the political system, can influence forest management via the market system, by preferring products that are coming from forests managed by certain desirable standards.²⁰⁸

There are three types of certification depending on who performs the certification. In the case of *first party* certification, the producing organisation (e.g. the forest owner) issues its own certificate, stating the forest is managed according to certain standards. *Second party* certification refers to a process where the management process is assessed and certified by a customer or external trade organisation; this means second party certificates are issued from within the trade relation. In *third party* certification three bodies are involved in the certification process: the first is the *standard-setting* organisation, the second is the *accreditation* organisation, and the third is the *certifying* organisation. The standard-setting organisation sets the standards to which the management process must comply. An accreditation organisation accredits other organisations as eligible to perform certification; they certify the certifiers to ascertain that the certifying

²⁰³ Viana, et al., 1996:xi

²⁰⁴ Viana, et al., 1996:3-5

²⁰⁵ Deloitte & Touche, 1997; Hansen & Juslin, 1999.

²⁰⁶ That it is formally a market-based tool does not mean that it does not have political implications. Certification, like forest policymaking, has to do with preferences for forest management. The main differences are that in forest policymaking, preferences are normally expressed in a formal policy arena. In certification, preferences are expressed through the market. Cf. e.g. Elliott, 2000, Elliott & Schlaepfer, 2001; and Klins, 2000, 2000a, for certification as a policy tool. These authors provide detailed works on certification. And in both works, the Advocacy Coalition Framework plays a central role.

²⁰⁷ Consumers do not normally design their own standards for forest management. Forestry interests, who seek to mobilise or oblige a concern by the public for changed forest management practices, develop the management standards and make them available for consumer support.

²⁰⁸ The experience Shell had with the mobilisation of environmentally concerned consumers during the Brent Spar controversy provides evidence of the power vested in the mobilisation of public preferences. See e.g. Egestad, 1997

organisation is competent to perform the certification. When accredited, the certifying organisation performs the evaluation of the forest management practices. If these comply with the standards, a certificate is issued. The main purpose of accreditation is also to ensure and increase credibility.²⁰⁹ In contrast to *third party* certification, first and second party certification are generally not considered independent schemes since they are not independent of the interests of the certifiers.

FSC certification

The initial seed developing into the Forest Stewardship Council was sown at meeting in California in 1990, where especially environmental NGOs came together to discuss ways to improve forest conservation and reduce deforestation.²¹⁰ World Wildlife Fund (WWF) played a key role in this process. The conclusion of this meeting was that an honest and credible system for identifying well-managed forests was needed. In 1993 a meeting was held in Toronto, Canada where 130 representatives representing an array of non-governmental forestry interests, including industry interests, came together to discuss the establishment of an international non-governmental body for forestry. The result was the FSC, officially founded in October 1993. Since then the organisation has grown much larger.²¹¹

FSC is both a standard setting and accrediting organisation. It has its own overall standards for forest management and accredits organisations to certify forests. The overall standards are called *Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship*.²¹² These principles and criteria are not intended directly for certification at forest management level. Instead, they form "a consistent framework for the development of locally-defined forest management standards,"²¹³ by which certification can be made.

The Danish FSC process

A set of locally adapted standards was what the Danish FSC process started out to prepare based on a co-operative effort involving the main forestry interests in Denmark. The Danish branch of WWF, in collaboration with the Danish environmental NGO Nephentes, initiated the group. It was introduced in Denmark as a 'green' initiative that, in the spirit of the concept of sustainability, invited all other interests to participate either as full members of the initiative or as observers to the process.

²⁰⁹ Hansen & Juslin, 1999:6

²¹⁰ Cf. the official FSC website (http://www.fscoax.org/html/fsc_faq.html) for a history of FSC.

²¹¹ Number of members and certified area can be found at their website <http://www.fscoax.org>

²¹² Cf. the official FSC website: <http://fscoax.org/principal.htm>. Document 1.2 Revised February 2000.

²¹³ FSC Guidelines for Developing Regional Certification Standards. FSC Document 4.2. <http://fscoax.org/html/noframes/4-2.html>

The participants came to encompass all of the main actors in Danish forestry²¹⁴ representing the government, green interest, outdoor interests, and more traditional forestry interests. The main division among actors was the one between observers and members of FSC, where the members of the Danish FSC working group were the ones endorsing the idea of FSC and the observers were more hesitant about FSC. The organisations representing the more traditional forestry interests and favouring the present configuration in forestry such as the Danish Forest Owners Association and the Danish Forest and Nature Agency, were sceptical of the initiative.²¹⁵

The point of departure for developing the Danish certification standards (principles and criteria) was a set of guidelines developed by Nepentes Consult, the consulting branch of Nepentes, in a project funded by the Danish Ministry of Environment to develop criteria for sustainable forest management at management unit level in Denmark.²¹⁶

The inaugurating meeting of the Danish work group took place in June 1996; in October 1999 the international FSC Board endorsed the group.²¹⁷ By now the process has consisted of a series of more than 20 work group meetings where both FSC members and observers have participated more or less actively. A public hearing was held in 1997 to provide all interested actors with the opportunity to comment on the Danish draft principles and criteria and express their opinion on the initiative. FSC International has praised the process in Denmark for the degree to which it has been participative and consensus-based.

In the period from 1997 to 2000 FSC certification was the dominant certification initiative in Denmark both in terms of support and in terms of its potential to influence the Danish forest management standards. In February 2000 the members of the work group decided that in the future only full members of the working group could participate in the meetings. The observers were thereby excluded. In practice this meant that organisations representing more traditional forestry interests were out of the co-operative process. During the fall of 2001 the observers were again invited to participate. This happened roughly at the same time as the Danish Parliament proposed to FSC certify all Danish state forest areas. At the end of 2001 as an election to parliament was called, the proposal was dropped.

Presently, the new government seems to be in favour of the competing PEFC initiative.²¹⁸ Despite a long co-operative process, a final and broadly approved set of Danish standards has not

²¹⁴ The members and observers of the Danish process appear at the Danish FSC website: www.fsc.dk.

²¹⁵ All the actors to the process are introduced in the next sub-chapter.

²¹⁶ Project Sustainable Forestry (Projekt Bæredygtig Skov). Cf. Sørensen, et al., 1996

²¹⁷ FSC National Initiatives: Contact details. Document 5.1.2, May, 2000. Cf.: <http://www.fscoax.org/html/5-1-2.html>

²¹⁸ At the present there are two overall forest management certification initiatives in Europe. The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and The Pan European Forest Certification scheme (PEFC). The two schemes are mainly defined by their support by different interest spheres. The FSC initiative is 'green' in its origin, defined in opposition to the existing structures in forestry. PEFC is an initiative of non-industrial forest owners that represent more traditional forestry interests. The PEFC scheme was launched in June 1999 as a response to the FSC scheme and it is currently developing. It is based on standards that follow the Pan European governmental policy process working to meet the commitments made under the auspices of the United Nations towards sustainable forest management, but at the European level. As such, it is also a more governmental loyal scheme than FSC.

yet emerged.²¹⁹ And despite intense efforts and inclusion of all forestry actors the process has been long-winded and controversial and can be seen to illustrate the difficulty of narrowing down an understanding of sustainable forest management to an independent and objective set of standards.

4.2. Interviews with the actors

To analyse the shaping of trustfulness in the relations between the involved actors, the initial step, according to the framework of the last chapter, was to find out how they *see* the certification situation. Therefore, a series of 10 interviews with representatives of the involved organisational actors has been carried out in the beginning of 1999 after more than 2 years work to cooperate on the matter. All actors that were active in the FSC process at the time of the interviews have been interviewed and they include all the main Danish forestry interests.²²⁰

Interview method

In order to obtain an honest and direct version of the actors' views, personal interviews with the involved organisations' representative on forest management certification were chosen. If relying on more widely published or public material, a more indirect and politically adapted version of their view could be expected. For that reason it was explained to the interviewed persons that the interviews were made as part of a project to understand social relations in forestry and not about certification as such. They were also told that this work does not form part of the process and that their statements would not be passed on to the other actors. Furthermore it was mentioned that the case of FSC certification was seen an example of a co-operative situation where relations are shaped. This was mentioned explicitly to avoid that some would see the interviews as an opportunity to influence the ongoing process.

The interviewed actors are all organisational actors. Organisations can themselves be seen as existential worlds in the sense that they exist as a set of practices organised and co-ordinated in a certain way. The organisation is an entity characterised by an organisational culture. It has objectives and encompasses different roles that work to meet these objectives with certain equipment, which belongs meaningfully to these objectives and roles. So when representatives 'repre-

²¹⁹ FSC Denmark expects the standards to be approved by FSC International sometime during 2002.

²²⁰ In accordance with the overall interpretive perspective of this work, it shall be kept in mind that the uncovering of these views is influenced by interpretation. The background of the interpretation is the author's being-in a situation as observer and interpreter of the certification process. This effort is taking place within the existential world of social science, and more specifically within the sub-world opened by the existential or phenomenological thinking of Heidegger. The role taken in this existential world is that of being a scientific observer for the sake of understanding actor relations. The being-in this situation will be marked by the observer's pre-understandings and are, for instance, shaped by my experiences as a forester and a government employee. No attempt shall be made to evade this embeddedness. It is inevitable. And rather than claiming that the situation is seen objectively, the way that it 'really' is, it would be more proper to say that it is seen the way the author is. Admittedly I can only observe that I cannot see what I cannot see, to lean on an expression by Luhmann, (1990:65). The best counterweight to such inherent bias is the exposure of it to other interpretations and here I shall rely gratefully on my readers and critics.

sent' their organisation, they take on a role that gains its meaning relative to this world. The employees do, of course, interpret their role and as such the employees are both shaped by the organisation's existential world, and may contribute to shape this world through their interpretation of their role.²²¹ Relative to our frame of analysis, it makes no difference whether the actors are organised actors or individual actors. Since both are embedded in existential worlds, and have a certain being-in, both types of actors can be included in the analysis.

The interviews were conducted in the form of informal conversations and the author carried out all interviews.²²² They were *semi-structured* and followed a simple interview guide that can be found in Annex 1.²²³ The aim was to let the interviewed person talk freely, as far as possible, about the issues that were important to the organisation's understanding of the initiative. Therefore, the interview guide was not followed strictly. The guide was simply meant to function as a checklist to the interviewer in order to remember the dimensions to be covered. As the interview went along, the items on the guide were checked in the order that they were covered. Questions were asked to stimulate the conversation and make it flow, but not necessarily as they were formulated in the guide. The interview structure aimed at uncovering how each actor sees the certification process, what has led to its emergence, how they have reacted or plan to react in or towards the process, and how they saw other actors, etc.

The interviews lasted one to one-and-a-half hours. Their duration was dependent on how talkative the actors were. Not all actors were equally talkative during the interviews, and the length of their answers provides evidence of this. It became clear that the main actors, those who either initiated the certification initiative, Nepenthes and WWF, or those that were most affected by the initiative, Danish Nature and Forest Agency and the Danish Association of Forest Owners, were the ones that had the most to say about it.²²⁴ The ones that were less involved in or concerned by the FSC initiative seemed to have a less detailed understanding of it.

Data treatment

All interviews were recorded and transcribed. Subsequently the interviews were reduced and paraphrased through a *summarising qualitative content analysis*.²²⁵ This reduction consisted of extracting and paraphrasing all expressed views from the interview statements. The interviews were examined paragraph by paragraph and statements concerning what the actors see were extracted. For each extracted view or statement, reference is made to the original statement(s) in the interview to secure that the qualitative interpretation of the content of the view can be traced back to its original place in the conversation.

²²¹ This is also why organisations display certain inertness in their identity, but at the same time possesses the ability to change their corporate image over time. Cf. e.g. Selznick, 1991 and 1996 for a sociological view on organizational identity and change.

²²² Kvale, 1996:19ff

²²³ The design of semi-structured qualitative interviews relied on Andersen, 1990, chapter 8; Kvale, 1996; and Olsen & Pedersen, 1999, chapter 8.

²²⁴ Cf. Kvale, 1996:144ff (Chapter 8) for the use of reply extent and richness as a indicator of quality.

²²⁵ Zusammenfassende Inhaltsanalyse. Cf. Flick, 1995:213 and Lamnek, 1995:205-210

The paraphrased narratives have been translated into English by the author. This poses an extra layer of interpretation. However, for each statement, reference is made to the original transcripts in Danish, to allow for this interpretation to be traced back to the original source.

After paraphrasing and reducing the statements, the 'views' were sorted. Views concerning their understanding of, for instance, the origin of the initiative, or their views of other actors, were bundled together. The purpose of this was to produce a reduced and coherent narrative that presents the organisation's views as a whole. This paraphrased narrative, which forms the main source of information on how the actors see the initiative, is available in Annex 2.

4.3. The actors and their roles in the certification situation

The 10 organisations below have been interviewed to uncover their understanding of the FSC initiative. As either members or observers of the FSC working group, they have been participating to develop a set of FSC standards for certification of forest management in Denmark.

- | | | | |
|----|--|------------------|--|
| 1. | WWF, Denmark | M ²²⁶ | The Danish branch of the World Wide Fund for Nature is, like its international mother organisation, an environmental NGO working to solve nature- and environment problems globally. WWF is one of the two initiators of the FSC project in Denmark. |
| 2. | Nepentes / NEP-Con | M | A Danish environmental NGO that was originally concerned with tropical rainforests but more recently has extended its focus to include Danish forestry. Nepentes is co-initiator of the FSC project in Denmark and has been running the secretariat. A fraction of Nepentes has opened a non-profit consultancy company called NEPCon. This company does consulting on sustainable forestry worldwide. It is affiliated with the Smart Wood certification scheme, which is a FSC accredited certifier. |
| 3. | Danish Forest & Nature Agency | O | The Danish Forest and Nature Agency is the public agency under the auspices of the Ministry of Environment and Energy responsible for forestry in Denmark. |
| 4. | Danish Forest Owners Association | O | An organisation representing the interests of Danish forest owners. It is the only organisation of its kind in Denmark and represents all types of owners. In Denmark the organisation also hosts the secretariat of the PEFC initiative. |
| 5. | SiD / BAT | M | The SiD (Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark) is the Danish Union of Semi-skilled Workers. Forest workers belong to this union. BAT (Bygge-, anlægs- og Trækartellet) is an organisation handling the affairs of workers in the wood industry. The main concern of both unions is to promote worker interests in forestry and in the wood industry. The or- |

²²⁶ Indicating whether the organisation is a member (M) or an observer (O) at the time of the interview. The members are the ones supporting the work fully, whereas the observers are more hesitant to do so.

ganisations are affiliated with the International Labour Organisation, ILO.

- | | | | |
|-----|---|---|--|
| 6. | Danish Wood Industry Association | O | An organisation representing the interests of employers and owners within the Danish wood industry. In relation to forestry, the association is interested in a steady delivery of raw wood as input to the wood industry. |
| 7. | Danish Outdoor Council | O | Danish Outdoor Council is an umbrella organisation for outdoor interests in Denmark. Their main concern relative to forests and forestry is the public use of and access to forests for recreational purposes. |
| 8. | Danish Conservation Society | M | The Danish Society for the Conservation of Nature. It is the largest environmental organisation in Denmark in terms of members. It was founded in 1911 and its concern is broadly directed at securing environmental protection and planning in Denmark. |
| 9. | Greenpeace Denmark | M | The Danish branch of the environmental organisation Greenpeace International. In the field of forestry it mainly represents protective environmental interests. |
| 10. | Danish Ornithological Society | O | The Danish Ornithological Society. A membership organisation founded in 1906 focusing on bird protection and nature conservation. From 1996 it has partnered with Bird Life International. In relation to forestry, their main concern is the protection of forests as habitats for birds. |

Based on the interviews, these ten actors were divided into three groups as either *opponents*, *preservers*, or *opportunity seekers*. These roles are defined relative to the existing set of Danish forestry practices and the organisation of these, and refer to the main role the actors take on in their reaction to the FSC initiative. This division will structure the rest of the chapter and anticipates the substantiating argumentation that will follow here.

The two environmental NGOs WWF and Nepenthes introduced FSC forest management certification in Denmark. Their main motive for doing so was to improve Danish forestry practices and the organisation of forestry. The improved forestry practices they aim at shall, relative to the existing ones, put more emphasis on the ecological forestry dimensions. And forestry shall be organised in a way that is more effective. They feel that the existing management practices are unnecessarily bureaucratic and slow and incapable of successfully solving contemporary forestry problems. As such their initiative opposes the practices of the existing dominant existential world of forestry and we shall therefore refer to the two initiators as *opponents* relative to this existential world.

Across the table, on the other side, there are two organisations that work to defend the existing existential world of forestry that organises the dominant contemporary forestry practices. They shall be referred to as the *preservers* of the existing existential world of forestry in the certification initiative. The first one is the Danish Forest and Nature Agency and the second is the Danish Association of Forest Owners. Both these organisations oppose FSC certification. They are

more unhappy with the political implications of FSC certification than with certification *per se*. They feel disturbed by the initiative's implications for forestry in general.

The third role is referred to as the *opportunity seekers*. The actors in this group are neither opponents nor preservers of the existing forestry practices in the case. To them the certification process is mainly seen as a good opportunity to consider their concerns. 'Opportunity seeker' is not meant to carry the negative meaning 'opportunist' sometimes does. Unlike the main actors, they are not present because of a concern for the overall organisation of forestry, but rather to promote and secure their more special interests, which intersect with forestry. The remaining six organisations belong to this group. The Danish Outdoor Council is there to represent outdoor interests. The SiD/BAT is there to attend to the interests of forest workers. The Ornithological Society are mainly interested in forests as habitats for birds. Greenpeace Denmark and the Nature Conservation Society are mainly interested in the protection of forests as nature types. And the Danish Wood Industry Association is mainly concerned about timber as input to the wood industry.

This way of dividing the actors reflects an understanding of the FSC initiative as something that is brought into an already existing forestry configuration. The existing set of dominant practices which are especially defended by the Danish Forest and Nature Agency and the Danish Forest Owners Association in the situation, are challenged by the green interests represented by Nepentes and WWF, because they feel that the existing organisation is incapable of securing appropriate management of the Danish forests. They alternatively propose to establish new forestry practices in a set of FSC standards that shall be co-ordinated via the market.

Such an initiative has the potential of changing existing forestry practices and this potential is seen as the main force that drives the actors to participate. As already ahead of themselves and projecting upon the future, the prospects of such an initiative are likely to evoke a feeling of hope or fear within the organisations. For those preferring the existing forestry practices, the FSC initiative is likely to evoke reservations; and for those preferring different practices, the initiative's opportunity for change may evoke a feeling of hope.

4.4. The involved existential worlds

The main idea of presenting the different existential worlds involved in the certification process is to make explicit and place the different backgrounds that are involved in making sense of the FSC initiative, and thereby shaping the views of the actors, relative to each other. Most often the structural level of existential worlds remains hidden under the surface. They are taken for granted by the actors themselves and remain their unquestioned assumptions. They are so close to them that they cannot see them. Precisely because of this, the existential worlds have the po-

tential to cause difficulty in interaction. By bringing them to the fore it may become clearer how the actors see the situation and thereby how they relate to each other. That the existential worlds presented below, are the probable existential worlds from within which they make the FSC initiative meaningful, is argued based on the paraphrased interview statements listed in Annex 2. The numbered references in brackets refer to these. The first part of the number is the number of the organisation, and the second part refers to the statement of that organisation.²²⁷

4.4.1 *The opponents' existential worlds*

WWF and Nepenthes are environmental NGOs and the existential world from within which they see the initiative shall be referred to as the *existential world of environmentalism*. Historically this world has emerged as a response to the loss of natural environments because of the modern industrial society's exploitative practices and expansion. It has evolved around the belief that human societies to some extent have developed at the expense of the natural environment.²²⁸ Its objective is to protect and improve natural resources and habitats. The practices it prescribes as meaningful are those protecting the environment and developing a harmonious relationship to nature. The roles of this existential world are manifold. The existential world encompasses for instance the roles of environmental NGOs that work to protect the environment against the modern society. It contains the industry, which traditionally have been seen as the ones polluting the environment. It contains foresters, which traditionally are defined by this existential world as utilitarian and production-oriented. And it contains the government, which is supposed to do the job of protecting the environment, but which has neglected to do so and therefore is put under pressure by environmental NGOs. The equipment that naturally belongs to the existential world of environmentalism, like the hammer belongs to the existential world of craftsmanship, is maybe best depicted by the absence of the industrial equipment that is otherwise normally used, and against which the existential world is defined.

The indication that WWF and Nepenthes make sense of the certification initiative from within the existential world of environmentalism is, first and foremost, that they have introduced the FSC initiative in Denmark. WWF and Nepenthes mainly see, and have introduced certification in order to change, existing forestry practices (1.1; 1.2; 2.1). Their effort is not only directed at changing management practices in a narrow sense, but also at changing the entire organisation of practices, which they see as inefficient and unable to solve contemporary forestry problems, to be less bureaucratic (2.8).

²²⁷ For instance, (3.10) refers to the third organisation (The Danish Forest and Nature Agency) and the tenth statement.

²²⁸ Cf. e.g. Milton, 1993

As such their role and objective is in accordance with that of the existential world of environmentalism²²⁹ and they see the other actors in terms of the set of roles that are defined by the existential world of environmentalism. Nepenthes, for instance, sees the general public as the ones they serve (1.1), and sees themselves as sharing vision and understanding with other green organisations (1.13). WWF's understanding of the role of the Forest and Nature Agency and the Forest owners as being antagonistic to (hating) the FSC initiative and being ineffective and bureaucratic, indicate that they share the understanding of the roles as they are defined within the existential world of environmentalism (2.15; 2.16; 2.17; 2.18; 2.19; 2.20; 2.21; 2.25).

This means that the opponents of the existing forestry practices and the organisation of these, WWF and Nepenthes, are seen to make sense of the certification process primarily from within the existential world of environmentalism.

4.4.2 *The preservers' existential worlds*

In the certification situation, the Danish Forest and Nature Agency and the Danish Association of Forest Owners represent the owners of the forested land in Denmark and are the practitioners and administrators of the existing forestry practices, which they in this situation seek to preserve. They are the ones being potentially most directly influenced by potential changes to these practices.

The existential world they inhabit and from within which they make the certification initiative meaningful, we shall refer to as the *existential world of forestry*. It prescribes and organises the existing set forestry practices in Denmark in response to which the FSC initiative has evolved. This existential world of forestry prescribes the contemporary dominant forestry practices that are guided by the objective of *multiple-use forestry*. This is in the formal and mandatory forestry objective as it appears in the Danish Forest Act, as amended in 1996. Before that, the formal objective of forestry had been relatively stable since 1805, aiming primarily at the production of timber. The change in objective in 1996 was the formalisation of a gradual change towards less emphasis on timber production and more emphasis on the recreational and protective functions of the forests, as has already been mentioned.

A main role in this existential world has traditionally been held by the public and private managers as 'balancers' of the different societal interests relative to forests.²³⁰ The Forest and Nature Agency plays the role of the official enforcer of the forest act and is at the same time owner of about one third of the total Danish forest area. Another key role of this existential world is the role of the forestland owners. In their existential sub-world of forestry they traditionally work to

²²⁹ See e.g. Dalton, 1994: chapters 1 and 2

²³⁰ Cf. e.g. Alston, 1983. See also Glück, 1987

maintain the forest as part of their estate and protect their ownership rights and freedom to make decisions over their property.

The equipment that belongs naturally and contributes to define the existential world of forestry include, for instance, the planning and management tools that are used to balance and optimise the different forestry interests. More recently new elements such as participative planning are beginning to find their way into forestry practices and its referential totality.²³¹ And the equipment of this existential world does, of course, also include a range of preferred tree species.

The indication that the two preserver organisations make sense of the certification initiative primarily from within the existential world of forestry is that they seem to identify themselves and others relative to the objectives and roles of this world. The Forest and Nature agency sees it as their role to balance the different interests in (multiple-use) forestry in order to meet this objective. And they see it as their task to define standards for sustainable forest management (3.6; 3.7). They play the role of guardians of representation and democracy within forestry (3.8) and this is also the role they defend in this situation because they see the opponents (WWF and Nepenthes) as trying to gain authority in forestry in a way that lacks transparency (3.14).

The Forest Owners association are suspicious and critical of the green interests (4.15). They see the general public as emotional in their relations to forests, and see the green interests as taking advantage of this (4.3; 4.4; 4.5). This emotional approach threatens their identity as professional foresters and landowners, which is the role the forest owner's play in the existential world of forestry, where they defend their profession and property against (unprofessional) interests from outside.

Therefore, the referential background for meaningfulness of the preservers' understanding of the FSC initiative is seen as the existential world of forestry defined by the practices, roles and objective that is defining and dominating Danish forestry today and from which they gain their identity.

4.4.3 The opportunity seekers' existential worlds

The main common characteristic that defines the opportunity seekers is, as mentioned already, that they mainly see the initiative as a good opportunity. They are neither initiators of the FSC initiative, nor do they feel as directly influenced by it as do the preservers. That it constitutes a good opportunity for them means that participation in the FSC process becomes meaningful in light of the existential world from within which they see the initiative.

²³¹ Cf. e.g. Healey, 1993 for a theoretical account of this development.

The SiD/BAT is a union that works for workers rights. Their understanding of the certification initiative primarily gains its meaning from what we shall refer to as *the existential world of employment*. The practices prescribed by the existential world of employment are mainly evolving around relations between workers and employers. Historically the unions are products of the industrial society, where they were formed to counter the exploitation of workers by employers and to seek improvement of conditions for the working employees. The main roles of this existential world are those of workers and employers and traditionally the objective of this existential world has been to secure the rights and freedom of workers relative to the interests of their employees. The elements or equipment that naturally belong in this world are, for instance, contracts, strikes, rights, salaries, etc.

The indications that the SiD / BAT representatives dwell in this existential world and make sense of the certification initiative from within it is, for instance, their direct statements such as "We seek to promote the ILO (International Labour Organisation) interests in FSC" (5.2), or "We are concerned about the rights of forestry workers" (5.3). Here they directly state that they see the FSC initiative through the optics of workers rights, which is what they are primarily concerned about.

Second among the opportunity seekers, representing the interests of the owners or employers, is the Danish Wood Industry Association. The existential world that provides the frame of meaningfulness by which their understanding of the certification initiative is mainly based, shall be framed as *the existential world of business*. This world prescribes practices for doing business. Historically the existential world of business came out of the need to exchange goods and services for other goods and services or for shared valuables (money, gold, etc.) The main objective of it, as it is dominantly interpreted nowadays, is to produce or trade products in a viable (competitive) manner through the market. The main roles that this existential world encompasses are, for instance, those of producers, buyers, customers, workers, and the like. The equipment or elements that naturally belong to this world are money, profit, factories, accounts, invoices, etc.

It is a statement like "We have been most concerned about certification being manageable relative to our industry interests. To avoid separate product lines." (6.7), which provides indication that this is the existential world from within which the Danish Wood industry representative sees the initiative. Another indicator of the existential world of business forming the background for their understanding of the situation is that they are convinced that WWF is also into certification to make a profit (6.3; 6.4). The projection upon WWF of this businesslike behaviour also seems to reveal their embeddedness in this world.

The representative from the Danish Outdoor Council resides in what we shall call the *existential world of recreation*. This world defines and organises practices of recreation. It has evolved historically in relation to the practices of working and living and defines the more joyful practices one takes up when not working.²³² The main objective of this existential world is to provide opportunities for pleasure, relaxation and recreation. Its roles include those of, for instance, tourists, hikers, travellers, vacationers, etc. The equipment that naturally belongs in this world is backpacks, golf clubs, tourist agencies, forest trails, maps, etc.

The indication that it is from within this existential world that the representative from the Danish Outdoor Council makes sense of the certification initiative is a statement like: "Our purpose is to encourage and work for improved possibilities for outdoor recreation...The certification process is one way of furthering the interests of the Outdoor Council." (7.4; 7.9).

The fourth of the opportunity seekers is the representative from the Danish Conservation Society. The existential world that he inhabits we shall refer to as the *existential world of conservation*. This world organises and prescribes the practices of nature and species conservation. Like the broader world of environmentalism, it can be historically seen as a set of practices that have emerged as a response to industrialisation and the disturbance of nature this process has caused, but the focus of the existential world of conservation seems more specific than that of environmentalism.²³³ The main objective of this existential world is nature conservation and the preservation of natural amenities. Some of the main roles it includes are e.g. conservationists, land owners, land management authorities, and municipalities. The elements that meaningfully and naturally belong in this existential world are declarations of preservation, cattle for nature restoration, and fences for demarking certain areas, signs restricting access, etc.

Indication that the Danish Conservation Society makes sense of the certification initiative from within this world is a statement like "FSC could be an lever to change forestry in a greener direction" (8.18) or, "We have been really happy that questions concerning forest biodiversity have made the agenda." (8.6).

Fifth on the list of opportunity seekers is Greenpeace Denmark. Like their colleagues from WWF and Nepenthes, we shall see them as inhabiting the *existential world of environmentalism* when making sense of the certification initiative. Traditionally they have taken on a slightly different role within this existential world than those of the two other organisations. Greenpeace does, as they express it themselves, normally work more action-oriented (9.8), but they share the objective of the existential world, namely that of protecting the environment. In their more ac-

²³² Cf. e.g. Elands, 2002

²³³ It can also be argued that the existential world of conservation has different historical roots than that of environmentalism. The latter has especially grown in the last part of the 20th century, whereas that of conservation is older. See e.g. Hays, 1959.

tion-oriented approach they make use of different equipment from the existential world of environmentalism. Banners for protesting, for instance, and handcuffs for chaining oneself to an oil platform, and zodiacs or ships such as the Rainbow Warrior for blocking or disturbing practices they object to.

An indication that Greenpeace is among the opportunity seekers is for instance a statement like "If we had designed the process we would have designed it differently, but we participate because we see certain opportunities to influence." (9.9). A statement like " We would be happy if forest management was regulated by the public authorities at a standard corresponding to that of the FSC. But the governments are not doing enough about it, though they ought to." (9.24), indicates that Greenpeace sympathises with the objective of the existential world of environmentalism.

The last of the opportunity seekers is the Danish Ornithological Society. The existential world based on which they primarily see FSC certification, we shall refer to as the *existential world of ornithology*. This world organises and gives meaning to the set of practices that evolves around protecting birds and their habitats. The objective of the existential world is to understand bird behaviour and protect birds and their habitats. Its roles include ornithologist, biologist, and landowner, and the equipment that naturally belongs to this world encompasses birds, bird predators, binoculars, bird guides, gazeboes, etc.²³⁴

The indication that the Ornithological Society makes sense of the certification initiative as an opportunity seeker is a statement like: "I have mainly been there to make clear how we stand relative to the process and the issues debated. Especially the issues where our view on nature and our stand on preservation is of interest" (10.4). A statement like "Forests are very central to our main interest, which is the protection of birds. We work to protect nature in the forest." (10.5), indicates that they see the FSC initiative from within the existential world of ornithology.

In a schematic form the involved existential worlds can be presented as follows:

	ACTOR		EXISTENTIAL WORLD
1.	WWF, Denmark	Opponent	Environmentalism
2.	Nephentes / NEPCon	Opponent	Environmentalism
3.	Danish Forest & Nature Agency	Preserver	Forestry
4.	Danish Forest Owners Association	Preserver	Forestry
5.	SiD / BAT	Opp. seeker	Employment
6.	Danish Wood Industry Association	Opp. seeker	Business
7.	Danish Outdoor Council	Opp. seeker	Recreation
8.	Danish Conservation Society	Opp. seeker	Conservation
9.	Greenpeace Denmark	Opp. seeker	Environmentalism
10.	Danish Ornithological Society	Opp. seeker	Ornithology

²³⁴ Cf. e.g. Farber, 1982

4.4.4 Synthesis of the involved existential worlds

It should be kept in mind that the proposed existential worlds do not exist as objective entities independent of the observer proposing them. They are proposed as analytical constructs to improve understanding of the different actors' reference for meaningfulness. They could have been named differently and framed at different levels of generality. The main aim when identifying existential worlds is to look for and form a picture of the structural backgrounds that give meaning to the actors' understanding.

To help visualise the proposed involved existential worlds, a simple two-dimensional overview is presented in the figure below. The existential world of forestry, which is shaded, is the one containing the practices that the FSC initiative brings into focus and around which the case evolves. The certification initiative concerns the practices that are defined by this existential world. The initiators of the FSC initiative, WWF and Nepenthes, residing in the existential world of environmentalism, are by their initiative challenging the forestry practices, and they do this because their existential world also is concerned about forestry.




Figure 3: A schematic illustration of the different existential worlds that are involved in making sense of the certification initiative.

The proposed existential worlds are not independent of each other as it is illustrated by their overlap. The existential world of business, for instance, has overlap with that of forestry since forestry practices also involve business practices. And the existential world of ornithology has overlap with that of conservation since ornithology is also concerned with protecting habitats. Common for all the actors in the FSC certification case is that their existential worlds overlap with that of forestry. Their concern for the issue of forestry is what makes it meaningful for them to participate. The world of environmentalism can be seen to exist on a more general level than the world of conservation since most conservation practices can be interpreted within the overall objective of environmentalism. Similarly it can be argued that the existential world of business, for instance, exists at a more general level than that of employment since most employment practices take place within the overall existential world of business. The existential worlds of ornithology and recreation also share practices with the world of environmentalism, which the overlap between these indicate.

The levels of abstraction at which the different existential worlds exist represent the level of generality characterising the organisations' understanding of the situation. Some see and place the situation in a more general context than others. We shall return to this when discussing the match between the different views. The important thing here has been to identify the backgrounds as referential totalities that give meaning to the different actors' understanding of the certification situation. By identifying those it becomes easier to understand why the actors focus on different things and see the situation differently.

4.5. Being-in the certification situation

Above the various existential worlds, that provide the meaningfulness for the different actors' understanding the FSC initiative, has been presented. Now we shall turn to the being-in of the different actors in the certification situation. Based on the interviews²³⁵ we shall inquire into the existential dimensions of being-in. The first of the five being-in dimensions that influence how actors see, is the situation they are in. The specific case situation has been described at the beginning of this chapter, so here the focus is directed at the remaining four dimensions of concern, temporality, disturbance and openness.

The focus on *concern, temporality, and disturbance* shall increase our understanding of how they understand the certification situation they are in and to what extent they share the meaningfulness of the situation that is so important for the emergence or maintenance of trustful relations between them. At the end of the chapter we shall turn to the actors' *openness*.

²³⁵ As before, the bracketed numbers refer to the interview paragraphs.

Concerns, it may be recalled from the last chapter, are the issues that the different actors are existentially close to and therefore concerned about. Those are the issues they are likely to direct their attention towards. Their meaningfulness of the situation is gained by placing it in time as meaningful relative to a certain past development and as meaningful relative to a projected course of events. The elements or episodes that do not fit into this meaningfulness are the ones they are likely to be disturbed by. By paying attention to what they are close to and how they make the situation meaningful by placing it temporally relative to certain past experiences and certain projections upon the future, we can understand in a more detailed way how they see the certification initiative.

4.5.1 Opponents' being-in

Nepenthes and WWF are concerned about improving existing forestry practices to increase sensitivity to natural dynamics and biodiversity and they see FSC certification as a tool towards this end (1.1; 1.5; 2.1). Their general focus is not just Danish forest management but improving forestry globally (1.13; 2.3; 2.4; 2.6). In order to improve forestry practices they feel there is a need to reorganise forestry. They feel the need to involve people in their role as consumers more directly in forest management in order to establish a more direct and transparent management system (1.1; 2.10).

WWF expresses a nuanced understanding of what has paved the way for the initiative. A lack of results by the existing bureaucratic and inefficient governments in solving forestry problems has heavily influenced the WWF understanding of the situation (2.3; 2.4; 2.6; 2.7; 2.8; 2.9; 2.10; 2.11). As such WWF is disturbed by the degree to which international forest management is drowning in bureaucratic inefficiency and opaqueness. This sense of disturbance is what made them initiate FSC certification in the first place, and made them concerned about initiating certification as a system that can document actual progress in implementing sustainable forestry practices (2.5; 2.31). They clearly recognise that certification is a tool that is less about the setting of standards for sustainable forest management than about power relations in forestry (2.12; 2.13; 2.14). They hope that the certification initiative can lead to an improved Forest Act (2.2). So temporally they make the introduction of the FSC initiative meaningful as a tool to change previous insufficient and ineffectively organised forestry practices. They project upon the future an improved situation characterised by more direct democracy and a more effective forestry organisation that is characterised less by inefficient bureaucracy. And they project improved forestry practices that are based on ecosystem management. An event during the FSC process that disturbed WWF was the launching of the competing certification initiative, PEFC, which was initiated and supported by the European forest owners. WWF is suspicious of a system where forestry interests certify themselves (2.22; 2.23; 2.24) and the existing practices.

Nepenthes makes the certification situation meaningful temporally by reference to increased public awareness of forestry and increased knowledge about the international character of forestry problems (1.8; 1.13). The elaboration of certification criteria is a first step of a process to improve forest practices. This improvement must come through consumer demand for certified products. If the consumer interest for certified products, or the support from the economic forestry interests, fail to appear, there may be a need to stimulate consumer interest and pressure (1.6; 1.7). A process-related concern of Nepenthes comes from their role as secretariat for the process. They are generally in favour of a process based on consensus, but experience that it is a demanding job to involve everyone and they feel slightly disturbed that some parties are not sufficiently motivated (1.9), that some are driven only by economic incentives and lack an idealistic desire for change (1.5; 1.14) and that so many organisations remain observers to the process (1.15).

4.5.2 Preservers' being-in

The Danish Forest Owners Association and the Danish Forest and Nature Agency are both sceptical of the Danish FSC initiative (3.8; 4.14). Like the opponents, the preservers place the certification initiative historically as a product of the Rio Summit, increased environmental awareness, globalisation, and green consumerism (3.1; 3.2; 4.1; 4.2; 4.3; 4.4; 4.9), but they make it meaningful somewhat differently.

A main concern which is expressed by both preservers, is the FSC initiative's lack of institutional anchorage in the sense of its inability to either link to the existing institutions or to provide its own institutional security (3.6; 3.7; 4.10;). In the eyes of the preservers the certification initiative is not sufficiently democratic and open. It lacks a credible form of organisation and an institutionalised set-up (3.8; 3.9; 3.12; 3.13; 4.11; 4.29; 4.33). It is not anchored in a solid democratic system as the existing forestry practices are, and this lack of institutional transparency makes the preservers uncertain.

Like the WWF, the Danish Forest and Nature Agency and the Danish Association of Forest Owners see the certification initiative more as a political struggle for power than a process about developing standards for sustainable forest management certification (3.14; 3.15; 3.16; 4.15). But unlike the WWF, they see this as inappropriate. They see politics as a concern of the political system that should not be exercised via the market (4.17; 4.18).

The Forest and Nature Agency focuses on their own role as initiators and custodians of the process towards sustainable criteria for forest management, (3.3; 3.4). The reason why they participate in the process, although they feel they have been caught up in a power game between organisations (3.21), is the projection upon the future that the initiative may become too influential (3.22) and undemocratic (3.9), and a fear that FSC will monopolise certification (3.24) at the

expense of e.g. smaller forest owners (3.29) and at the expense of profitability in forestry. They fear that if green interests come to dominate there will be a lack of consideration for the economic aspects of forest management (3.28; 3.29; 3.30; 4.16; 4.34; 4.35). And they are concerned about the potential threat of certification influencing or maybe ousting the Danish Forest Act (3.22), taking over a role of authority in Danish forestry (3.14; 3.19). Therefore, they ask for certainty, that there will be a system in place to secure representing all interests in a balanced manner, in case the certification initiative does become powerful and successful. They see lack of institutional security as a barrier to a sound certification process (3.13). The scepticism of the Forest and Nature Agency seems to be made meaningful temporally between their pre-understanding of the role of green NGOs as critics of the existing system, and a projection upon the future of a new role where NGOs gain a position where they can set their own standards for forest management and thereby bypass the governmental system.

The Danish Forest Owners Association traces the initiative back to 1993 when Nepenthes and WWF formed an alliance and started to focus on Danish Forestry instead of on tropical forestry (3.8). Their present understanding of the situation is that it is emotional (4.6) and that a 'horse trade' between existing interests not necessarily will lead to a sustainable outcome (4.12). They project, as an undesirable scenario, a process that is driven by emotions rather than facts. Another projection that leads them to fear the project is that FSC will be in a position to produce private laws (4.33). They also project a fear that prices do not increase on certified products whereby the initiative only will lead to increased costs (4.20). They fear an increased market pressure because it makes certification something producers are forced into (4.22; 4.26), and they fear the prospect of losing market share to products such as plastic and concrete (4.27). They do not yet see a consumer interest in certified wood, which should be the main drive of the process. Instead, they interpret the impetus of certification as coming from the profit-oriented industrial and wholesale links of the chain of custody (4.21; 4.28; 4.36). These concerns seem to rest on an understanding that the certification initiative may decrease the stability and predictability of the existing existential world of forestry and its practices. Therefore, they hope the FSC initiative disappears (4.17).

This means that both the preservers see the entire initiative as a disturbance to the existing set of practices and relations in forestry. The Danish Forest and Nature Agency and the Danish Forest Owners Association which, to a large extent, define and represent forestry in Denmark, feel threatened and disturbed by it. The initiative challenges their roles in forestry.

Another cause that was perceived by the preservers as a disturbance to the co-operative effort of the FSC process was the WWF Scorecard publication²³⁶ (3.26; 3.27). They felt that the WWF and Nepenthes were double-dealing: on the one hand they invited parties to participate in a close co-operative process, and on the other hand they criticised them heavily in the public

²³⁶ The WWF scorecard is another forest initiative by the WWF where they grade forestry in Europe relative to a sustainability scale they have developed. They have done this for some years and in 1998 Denmark came in last among all the investigated countries. This result was published during the FSC process.

sphere (4.32). This was experienced as destructive to the relation that had been attempted during the previous FSC meetings, and it stood out in sharp contrast to the closer and more intimate tone that had been established during these meetings. WWF did not see it this way; they found this view unprofessional and were surprised that the private forest owners were insulted by the publication. It was only meant as a critique of the forest authorities (2.32; 2.33; 2.34). Another thing that disturbed the Danish Forest Owners Association is the way the non-profit consultant branch of Nepenthes (NEPCon) and the Association for Ecological Construction were made representatives of the economic interests in forestry. This they saw as an attempt to introduce disguised green interests into the economic chamber of FSC (4.34; 4.35).²³⁷

So whereas the opponents mainly are concerned about the inertness and lack of problem-solving ability of the existing forestry institutions and therefore try to bypass them with a certification initiative, the preservers are mainly concerned about the absence of a solid government-anchored institutional structure in certification that provides and secures a fair distribution of power.

4.5.3 *Opportunity seekers' being-in*

Generally, the opportunity seekers seem to have a less detailed knowledge about certification than the main actors who are more potentially influenced by the initiative. All the opportunity seekers make the emergence of the FSC initiative meaningful relative to an understanding of a general increase in environmental awareness in Western societies (5.14; 6.1; 6.2; 6.3; 7.1; 7.2; 8.1; 8.2; 9.1; 9.2; 9.3; 9.4; 10.1). A shared projection that makes their participation meaningful in the situation, despite lack of resources for some, is that by participating in the initiative they gain an opportunity to influence or avoid missing out on such an opportunity (5.5; 5.6; 6.17; 7.10; 8.4; 9.6; 10.2). For them, the initiative provides a good opportunity.

The opportunity seekers were more disturbed by issues related to the process than by the issue of certification as such. Incidents of stiff and uncooperative behaviour stalling or derailing the process were disturbing to some (2.27; 5.30; 9.26); several noticed that the Outdoor Council especially displayed such behaviour (2.26; 5.34; 9.27; 10.23). What was disturbing was the insistent behaviour by some organisations on matters that seemed marginal to others in the group. It was experienced as an unnecessary block to the process. To the actors not concerned about public access to forests, it is of course a disturbance if a 'marginal' matter like that stalls the process. But to the actors close to this matter, the 'stalling' behaviour had much more meaning. It is the matter that they are there to defend. The problem is a matter of different existential distances to certain matters.

²³⁷ To secure balanced representation, FSC is divided into three chambers: an economic, an ecological, and a social.

The union representatives from SiD / BAT mainly expressed a concern for workers' interests and rights (5.1; 5.2; 5.3; 5.5; 5.8; 5.9; 5.11) and see the FSC initiative as a good opportunity to nurse these concerns (5.6). They also express concern about and support for the use wood as a material (5.4). Their concern mirrors and confirms this organisation's existence in the existential world of employment. To them the FSC project gains its meaningfulness because of its potential to improve forestry (5.10) and because it includes a concern for worker's rights (5.18; 5.19). They also appreciate its use of locally adapted criteria (5.20). They see the process as aiming at the development of a globally credible label (5.21), but in the long run they find UN- or EU regulations more desirable (5.15; 5.16). An element that in their understanding hampers the Danish process is the lack of large economic actors in Denmark (5.22; 5.23) and the inertness of the process, which comes from the inability of some of the organisations to co-operate (5.30).

The Danish Wood Industry Association is only marginally concerned about forest management certification, but has decided to follow the process as observers (6.5; 6.6; 6.17). They feel that the level of environmental awareness in society has peaked already (6.10; 6.11). And in case of an increased demand for certified timber, they feel confident that they can get this from Sweden (6.7). Therefore they do not feel that their existence is being threatened.

In case certification gets implemented, they are concerned that it will be manageable relative to existing timber processing practices, so that separate product lines, which could complicate the industry process and thereby increase costs, can be avoided (6.8; 6.12; 6.22). They tend to prefer declaration to certification and do not really see a need for certification (6.9; 6.10; 6.15; 6.20; 6.21). The lack of transparency as to where the process ends makes them slightly uneasy (6.18), and a potentially undesirable outcome is a FSC monopoly (6.14). Their main concern therefore is to be able to do 'business as usual.' This seems in line with their making sense of the initiative from within the existential world of business.

The Outdoor Council is mainly concerned with about outdoor interests and they work to improve public access to recreational areas (7.4; 7.5; 7.6; 7.8). They do not feel that their interests are sufficiently considered in the existing forest and nature legislation (7.3) and they therefore see the process as a good opportunity to advance these interests (7.9; 7.10; 7.11; 7.13). They generally find the FSC approach acceptable (7.16; 7.17) and prefer it to the ISO (International Standards Organisation) standard for certification and to the PEFC (7.13; 7.15). Their support, however, requires that they find the frames of certification reasonable (7.12). At present they see no prospects that further work will make the process more sensitive to their concerns of increased access to private and public forests. Therefore, it is not meaningful for them to commit further to the process just now (7.21). They feel, based on the course of events so far, that they have gone as far as they could (7.22). This makes the 'wait and see' approach they presently take meaningful to them (7.23).

The Danish Conservation Society generally welcomes forest management certification although they are not very active in the process (8.8; 8.9). They find FSC a credible label at the international level and a good lever to change forest practices (8.18). They are especially appreciative of the impetus and discussion it has created (8.3; 8.4; 8.6; 8.7). In Denmark, however, they do not yet see the initiative as enjoying full credibility (8.20). In general they feel that forest management practices in Denmark are developing in the right direction, since environmental concerns are increasingly considered (8.5). This projection makes them supportive of the existing organisation of forestry practices. They see legislation and certification as complementary and not as rival systems (8.13). In general they believe conservation is best regulated through legislation (8.14) and think that the sustainable management of forests should be regulated by the governmental system (8.12). Like others they fear a situation where single actors acquire sufficient power to monopolise forest management standard setting (8.10; 8.11). Their desired situation in forestry is one based on dialogue (8.16) and this is also what they appreciate FSC for having initiated (8.7).

Greenpeace were hesitant in the beginning to support FSC (9.6). Their general concern is directed towards the use of polluting compounds. They are not against the commercial use of forests (9.11) and they see the Danish forestry problems as small compared to other regions (9.5). Furthermore, they had initial reservations about the set-up (9.25) and about the pragmatic style of working of the WWF, which was different and less direct than their normal more 'contrastful' style (9.8; 9.9). But they now see the process as a good and meaningful opportunity they would like to contribute to (9.6, 9.7), not least because of the opportunity it has provided for direct co-operation between the different forestry interests, and for stimulating the debate (9.12; 9.21). At least up until the publication of the WWF scorecard survey which disturbed the co-operative process (9.16). They generally support the idea that management and labelling is regulated by legislation. For, as the say, "if we cannot trust the government, whom can we trust?" (9.25). They do, however, share the initiators' concern that the government does not go far enough with environmental protection (9.23; 9.24). They see it as a problem that forest owners are not active in the process (9.17) and that no forests have yet been certified in Denmark (9.22).

The final group of opportunity seekers, the Danish Ornithological Society, has followed the process somewhat passively (10.2; 10.3), but they find the process meaningful as an opportunity to express their main concerns, namely the need to secure forests as rich in biodiversity and protected as habitats for birds (10.4; 10.5; 10.6; 10.16; 10.17; 10.18; 10.19; 10.20). Like most of the other opportunity seekers, the Danish Ornithological Society also projects that the management of forests by a public system is more desirable than via the market (10.7; 10.8; 10.9; 10.10; 10.11). They find the existing organisation of forestry practices acceptable (10.13; 10.14), although they see some room for improvement (10.15). They see no threat in FSC (10.27), but do not see it as an alternative to legislation.

4.5.4 *Being open*

Before turning to how well the involved views of the situation match, attention shall briefly be directed to the degree of *openness*, as the last of the existential dimensions of being-in that is displayed by the different actors in the certification situation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, openness has to do with the degree to which actors are open to the embeddedness of their own understandings and those of others. This openness influences the ability to establish shared ways of seeing and thereby the capacity to form trustful relations.

As argued above, the different actors came into the FSC situation with a certain pre-understanding of certification and see the initiative from within different existential worlds. Their openness in and towards the situation is what determines the extent to which the interaction with other actors is able to influence their pre-understanding and thereby the ability to identify shared frames of meaningfulness during the process of interaction.

Several of the organisations see themselves as being open to compromise (1.11; 2.26; 2.27; 5.24; 5.25; 7.22). Others state directly that their positions and understandings have not changed during the process (3.7; 9.11; 10.26). Most of the participating organisations state that the process has created improved understanding of the other actors or improved the relationships between the organisations (1,18; 2.28; 5.26; 6.26; 7.24; 9.10; 9.12; 9.21; 10.21).

But even though the different actors see themselves as open, there is no evidence in the interviews of actors mentioning or evaluating or questioning their own assumptions or trying to follow the argumentation of the other parties. The positions of the actors have not changed significantly during the process. So if they have been open to the embeddedness of their own position and that of the others, they have probably concluded that their initial position is the best after all. But if this is the case, it is surprising that formulations in the interviews indicating a critical stand on actors' own position and positive interpretations of the positions of other actors, are so scarce.

The actors' general perception that they are open to others may have something to do with the existence of a general belief in western democratic culture that we are open towards the views of others since we see ourselves as democratic and therefore feel open 'per definition.' But it may also have something to do with a lack of awareness of the level of existential worlds. If one is oblivious of this level, openness easily becomes a matter of only being open to something if it fits well into the meaningfulness of the existential world one already resides in. It would not make one open to challenge this and therefore it is difficult to identify sharedness with actors that does not exist within one's own rationality that exists qua this existential world. Openness in the understanding of this perspective is openness at the level of existential worlds. True understanding of others requires an effort to judge them by their own standards. That is, by the understanding and meaningfulness of their existential world. Such openness would also include an attempt to understand one's own existential world in order to be openly able to judge whether

the meaningfulness of the other's really is preferable, or if a third way that merges the two might be a superior solution.

Being open to one's own embeddedness is not an easy process. But it may be required for interaction to be successful in a democratic setting that is characterised by a desire for acceptance of a high degree of diversity. Although an existential perspective cannot procure new and shared bases of meaningfulness, it can help increase sensitivity and openness towards the 'hidden' structures that may otherwise block the development of shared meaningfulness.

4.5.5 *Synthesis of the actors' being-in*

The closer look above on what the different organisations are concerned about, how they place the initiative in time, and what disturbs them, has brought a more detailed understanding of how they each see the certification situation. While the primary drive of the *opponents* is a hope to introduce an alternative to the bureaucratic and inert government-based system which they feel has not demonstrated sufficient ability to implement sustainable forest management, the primary drive of the *preservers* is a fear that the certification initiative will 'monopolise' forest management and not provide sufficient institutional security. Common to the opportunity seekers is that they are less concerned about the general organisation of forestry than they are about representing their more specialised interests intersecting with forestry practices.

In the existential perspective, therefore, it becomes evident that the different actors see and look for quite different things in the certification situation. Their different existential worlds make them sensitive to different things, their concerns in the situation are different, the initiative is meaningful to them in light of different aspects from the past and towards different situations in the future, and different things disturb them. These differences are likely to influence the relations between them.

4.6. **Matching views — trustful relations**

The ability to establish or maintain trustful relations between the actors in the situation depends, it has been argued in the previous, on the degree of sharedness and compatibility between their views. The above discussion of the actors' being-in has improved our understanding of how they each see the certification situation. The question is now, therefore, how well the different understandings of the certification situation match.

The picture is the following: In their understanding of the FSC situation WWF and Nepenthes are in the existential world of environmentalism but not in the existential world of forestry.

They mainly see and have introduced FSC certification as a tool to change the existing forestry practices and organisation. These practices are not meaningful to them and therefore they are not in the existential world of forestry. Their certification initiative is defined in opposition to the existing forestry practices and this is why they seek to change them. FSC certification is an attempt to by-pass this inert official system. They find forest authorities slow and bureaucratic and feel that they are unable to successfully solve the problems of forestry.

The other main actors, The Danish Forest and Nature Agency and the Danish Forest Owners Association, feel disturbed by the initiative precisely because they see it as an attempt to change a set of practices that to them are meaningfully organised and in which their identities are anchored, namely the existing forestry practices. As such they reside within the existential world of forestry but outside the existential world of environmentalism in this situation. They defend themselves against something that they see as an attack on the established system and do this by pointing to the inability of this new system to provide the necessary institutional security. So what the one group of main actors finds bureaucratic, inert and unable to solve forestry problems, the other finds necessary to secure the concerns and interests of all forestry parties in a fair and transparent manner.

The views of the two groups of main actors in the situation hence involve incompatible understandings of how forestry practices should be organised and co-ordinated. There is a lack of shared meaningfulness between them. In this situation they compete for an authoritative role in forestry — the role to set standards for forest management — and the understanding of this role gains meaning from different existential worlds that are incompatible. As such the two pairs of main actors are competitors rather than collaborators in the FSC situation and therefore it is difficult to establish trustful relations between them.

A more trusting relation between the two main actors that could bridge the discrepancy in their meaningful understanding of forestry would require them to share an existential world at a higher level than forestry. This could be a shared meaningfulness and respect for the democratic set-up in which forestry exists, for example. But also at this level the two groups have different understandings: the preservers defend the existing democratic set-up in which their preferred forestry organisation exists, whereas the opponents are critical of it. The FSC initiative includes a critical stand on the democratic practices that give legitimacy to the inert governments. For them this is where the inertness and bureaucracy come from. So they also seem to have different understandings of democracy. It is difficult to find shared ground at a more general level than forestry, therefore, in which more trustful relations can be anchored.

The opportunity seekers 'see' from within different existential worlds: SiD/BAT within the world of employment, seeing the initiative primarily as an opportunity to improve the rights of workers. The Danish Wood industry within the world of business, is mainly seeking to avoid a certification process that could complicate business lines. The Conservation Society sees the ini-

tiative from within the world of conservation and mainly focuses on its potential for improving conservation. The Outdoor Council sees it from within the world of recreation. Greenpeace sees it from within the world of environmentalism, and the Ornithological Society see it from within the world of ornithology which makes them principally particularly sensitive to bird issues.

In contrast to the main actors that see the initiative in the context of the roles and organisation of forestry more generally, the opportunity seekers do not seem to see it as an attempt to change the general organisation of the existing forestry practices. All of them seem to accept the roles and the present organisation of the existing dominant existential world of forestry. Though some see room for improvement and see it as their role to improve forestry within the field of their interest, they seem to accept the general distribution of roles and the objectives that exist. They hereby accept their own more marginal roles and the roles of the existing forest authorities and forest owners. As such they are positioned within the existential world of forestry at the same time as they are positioned within the respective existential worlds. These shape their more specific focus and exist at a more specific level than the existential world of forestry that. But the more general existential world of forestry is by and large able to gather and accommodate their concerns. This means that they can co-exist with the preservers in the existing existential world of forestry because they share the general meaningfulness of this world. Thereby they can maintain a relatively trustful relation to the preservers.

This is a main point of difference between the opponents and the opportunity seekers. The opponents question the roles and objectives and thereby the legitimacy of the existing existential world of forestry in the situation; the opportunity seekers do not. But the opportunity seekers can also co-exist and maintain a good relationship with the opponents. They generally seem to accept the roles and the objectives of the existential world of environmentalism in the situation and their own existential worlds overlap with this more general existential world. But they do not see the initiative from the more general level of environmentalism, as do the opponents. They see it more specifically from within their own existential world. For them the initiative is not about challenging the existential world of forestry. They do not see the opponents as opponents since the initiative is not challenging their existential world. Therefore the opportunity seekers do not relate to each other, or to the main actors, as challengers of their existential worlds or as competitors. They can co-exist with both the preservers and the opponents in the situation and do not have suspicious relations with either of them.

The figure below seeks to summarise this overall picture. It depicts the involved existential worlds and the more specific positions of the actors in these worlds as they have been explained above. All the opportunity seekers are, hence, positioned within both the existential world of environmentalism and the existential world of forestry, as well as in the existential world shaping their more narrow understandings of the situation. But the main actors are either within the existential world of environmentalism or within the existential world of forestry. And in the situation the understandings of these two existential worlds are incompatible.




Figure 4: The map of the involved existential worlds and the actor's position in these. The main actors are marked by slightly larger dots.

The actors, in other words, who are placed within the shaded circle (the existential world of forestry) share sufficient meaningfulness to maintain a trustful relation in the situation. Those who are placed within the existential world of environmentalism also share such meaningfulness. But the main actors who are positioned in one of these existential worlds, but not in the other, are more suspicious of each other because they question each other's legitimacy, compete for authority and lack shared meaningfulness in regard to the organisation of forestry practices. The opponents oppose and challenge what the preservers seek to preserve, namely the existential world of forestry with its practices, roles and objectives. They do not share meaningfulness of the roles and objectives of the other's existential world and therefore the behaviour of the one is disturbing to the meaningfulness of other and *vice versa*. This lack of shared meaningfulness may well make their relation more suspicious.




Figure 5: A schematic illustration of the degree of trust in the relation between the groups of actors in the FSC certification situation.

Schematically the relations can be summarised above. The mutual lack of trust between the main actors may infuse the overall situation with a somewhat suspicious mood. And such a suspicious mood may contribute to making it more difficult to find areas of shared meaningfulness and therefore more difficult to find shared solutions in the situation, as suggested in the previous chapter. A suspicious mood may, instead of inducing the actors to actively and constructively seek for shared solutions, cause a more defensive or strategic type of behaviour, where it becomes more important to manifest ones own position than to identify shared solutions. Thus, a suspicious mood contributes to reinforcing the suspicious relations it is itself a product of. And this is an unfortunate dynamic to be caught up in since it may lead actors into the common property dilemmas that were referred to earlier, where a type of behaviour that is rational from the single actor's point of view causes an output that is not desired by any of the parties.

The hesitant attitude towards the FSC initiative held by some of the opportunity seekers may also be nourished by the suspicious mood of the situation. They may find it important, in a situation which they sense is controversial, to 'bet on the right horse' or in any case maintain a position that will not weaken their opportunities in future co-operation. As such they may project that their decisions in this specific situation can influence their possibilities in other situations of interaction in the area of forestry in the future. And a suspicious mood may make them feel uncertain as to how future co-operation will be determined by the outcome of this process, which may make them more hesitant. Such hesitance can, however, contribute further to a mood that is not conducive to identifying shared solutions. In this way suspicion and hesitation may be seen as 'infectious' and it can initiate a kind of vicious circle that further hinders effective co-operation.

5 AN EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVE ON FORESTRY

The application of the proposed existential perspective on trust to the FSC case in the previous chapter has been used to exemplify the analysis of trust in the relations between the involved actors. The outcome of this analysis is not so much that some of the relations are suspicious and that others are more trustful. Many of the parties who has been involved in or followed the process will have sensed this already. Much more interesting is to understand *why* the relations are the way they are. This thesis started with an argument for a focus on social relations and the trustfulness of those. It was argued that in a changing forestry configuration with shifting social relations and an objective of sustainable forest management, which implies a desire to organise management based on democratic values of co-operation between all interested actors, it becomes important to understand the quality of social relations between forestry actors. Improved knowledge on *why*, therefore, provides an improved basis for organising interaction in a way that is conducive towards the co-operative and participative intent of sustainable forest management. It is toward this end that the proposed existential perspective may be of help by its elucidation of aspects that are important relative to the establishment of this democratically inspired form of organisation.

In a discussion structured by a set of concepts that are central to the discipline of social science, this chapter aims to clarify further in what way the aspects elucidated by the proposed existential perspective are of importance more generally to the contemporary challenge of re-organisation towards sustainable forest management. Once again, the discussion takes place relative to the civic spirit of this concept to base forest management on genuine co-operation in interaction and participation of all interested stakeholders. The social science concepts that are used in this chapter are structure, agency, power, relativism and complexity. The chapter is closed by a brief note on how the perspective can be of use to other social entities than forestry.

5.1. Structural embeddedness

By sensitivity to social structure is meant a sensitivity to how being and thereby interaction is shaped by social structures. Some may see the perspective's emphasis of social structure as structuralistic. This predicate seems to be unappreciated in our time, where a central and defining element of our democratic culture is the individual freedom to choose and the free will of the agent. In such a culture we prefer to see ourselves as free agents rather than as determined by structure. But a culturally determined desire of beings to be free from structural determination does not in itself mean that we become structurally independent. A blind fascination for such a way of being may, on the contrary, make us insensitive and uncritical to possible structures that shape our being. Only by being sensitive to social structures, as natural and inevitable products of society, can we decide on their desirability. Only by being aware of them can we avoid being absorbed by them.

In some respects, as for instance when they reduce complexity in their function to order interaction, when they provide security and meaningfulness, and when they produce complexes instead of congeries without which interaction most likely would be anarchic, social structures are very valuable for a society. But when seen as a means of power and suppression they are much less desirable. It seems futile, however, to blame social structures for influencing our way of seeing. In a democratic society that emphasises and values the responsible and open agent, it seems more appropriate to blame ourselves for not being sufficiently aware of them, and for not seeking to be open to the threats and opportunities they pose.

A perspective on the social relations of forestry, therefore, that does not recognise and dig into the social structures, is at risk of taking them for granted. Therefore it is seen as an advantage of the proposed existential perspective that it directs attention to how social structures, in the form of existential worlds, shape our seeing and being. This is especially valuable in a situation, like that of contemporary forestry, where a re-organisation is taking place and where objectives and social relations are being redefined. Here it seems important to be sensitive to the different referential wholes (existential worlds) that underlie proposals for new forestry practices. By being aware of them and questioning them, we force ourselves to judge more openly on their appropriateness and value relative to the objective of sustainable forest management. In less political situations, where interaction is more trusting qua a shared meaningfulness in the understanding of forestry, it may be an advantage to let the existential worlds withdraw to the background,²³⁸ whereby complexity is reduced in interaction and resources are freed for other purposes.

Below three examples of structural characteristics at the level of culture are provided to exemplify how such phenomena through their influence on being can obstruct progress towards the desired form of sustainable forest management. The first example illustrates how the approach

²³⁸ In the earlier discussion of existential worlds it was mentioned how they often withdraw to the background and therefore become less visible as structures that shape being.

to the problem of sustainable forest management can be seen as culturally conditioned. The second example points to how increased differentiation in society more generally may be seen to influence interaction in forestry. The third example illustrates how the cultural phenomenon of entitlement shapes our way of seeing. The common point to understand from these three examples is how sensitivity towards characteristics of existential worlds can be helpful relative to implementation of the intent of sustainable forest management.

Trust in numbers

The tendency to approach sustainable forest management in the technical style of inquiry that was referred to in the introduction, can be seen as conditioned by culture. Our culture has for a long time been characterised by a high degree of trust in numbers.²³⁹ Scientific truth in our time with its 'impartiality' and 'objectivity' can be seen as taking over the role of absolute impartiality that in former times was produced by religion.

A result of such a cultural understanding is that things, which can be expressed scientifically and preferably in numbers, gain a certain legitimacy and impartiality through their scientific objectivity. In the language of this work, such culturally conditioned trust in numbers exists qua a dominant shared existential world that values impartiality (or fears bias) and ascribes authority to numerical solutions. That which is expressed scientifically in numbers possesses the impartiality that is felt to be lacking when issues are dependent on personal relations. Therefore, impartiality is valuable to interaction and to social organisation because it creates certainty by its reduction of the influence of personal judgement.

"Perhaps most crucially, reliance on numbers and quantitative manipulation minimizes the need for intimate knowledge and personal trust"²⁴⁰

But the flipside of such a culturally conditioned belief in science is that the expression of certain things in a numerical scientific style may provide a good strategy for attaining an aura of impartiality and thereby avoiding a situation where it seems like special interests are being preferred or pushed through. So the problem of a culturally anchored 'trust in numbers' from a social science point of view is that expression in numbers can be used more or less consciously (by strategy or by blindness) to favour a set of values that are not inherently objective or impartial. In such examples, and expressed in the language of this work, a cultural belief in the impartiality of science and numbers can be used to favour an understanding anchored in and made meaningful by a certain existential world. Therefore, numbers can become tools to gain legitimacy in political and administrative affairs.

²³⁹ Porter, 1995 presents this argument. Cf. also Egestad, 2001 for a similar argument on the issue of forest management certification. Shapin, 1995 presents a similar argument.

²⁴⁰ Porter, 1995:ix

In science, as in political and administrative affairs, objectivity names a set of strategies for dealing with distance and distrust."²⁴¹

In regard to the definition of a concept like sustainable forest management, attempts by some parties to define this concept 'objectively' should make us sensitive to the extent to which the claimed objectivity is covering up a certain background. If deliberate, such behaviour would be strategic and this type of behaviour seems inconsistent with the intent in sustainable forest management to organise in a way that is open and transparent and based on co-operation. To uncover and help laying bare such hidden backgrounds or strategies, the proposed existential perspective can of help.

Social differentiation

Contemporary sociologists have observed that modern Western societies are increasingly characterised by differentiation compared to most former societal types.²⁴² Dreyfus has similarly interpreted Heidegger to express that the being of modern society, which Heidegger refers to as *Technology (Technik)*,²⁴³ has been one characterised by dispersion rather than by gathering.²⁴⁴ What they express, in our terminology, is that while modern society is characterised by an increasing number of somewhat independent existential worlds,²⁴⁵ with each their own meaningfulness, set of objectives, roles, and equipment, it increasingly lack an overall existential world to integrate these specialised worlds. Examples of such specialised existential worlds are, for example, the economic system, the legal system, and the political system.

So compared to, for instance, the Christian-dominated type of society (a world which can be seen as dominated by a shared Christian existential world that united society), which was gradually replaced as modernity gained influence during the 20th century, the modern technological society is more characterised by differentiation because it lacks such an overall culture that gathers society and in light of which the more specialised existential worlds exist.

Such increased differentiation, it can be argued, makes it generally more difficult to identify and maintain shared identities and shared meaning across the differentiated systems. Without a general culture to integrate and compensate for the differentiation at lower levels, there is a risk that shared understanding at the level of society, which after all must be defined by some sharedness, is weakened. In this light, a general challenge and dilemma of our contemporary democratic culture is to secure that the objectives of the differentiated systems, or existential sub-worlds, fall within the overall objective of our democratic culture. If this is not the case the overall culture risks being disintegrated by the different existential worlds it consists of.

²⁴¹ Porter, 1995:ix

²⁴² Cf. e.g. Luhmann, 1998, chapter 4. The concepts of differentiation and integration are key to Luhmann's work on social systems.

²⁴³ Heidegger, 1982: Die Technik und die Kehre.

²⁴⁴ See Wrathall & Malpas, 2000:331 (vol. 1). Dispersion and gathering carry the same meaning as differentiation and integration.

²⁴⁵ A concept to describe this is autopoiesis, which has been introduced by Maturana and Varela (1980) based on their research on closed systems in cognition and neurology, and taken over by e.g. Luhmann in Sociology.

At the level of forestry the development of multiple-use forestry can be seen to reflect the tendency to, and the dilemma of, increased differentiation. This type of forestry involves many different but equally worthy and meaningful purposes: production of timber, production of recreation, protection of nature, protection of groundwater, etc. These purposes have over time grown into fairly separate systems in the sense that different organisations, as we have seen in the case, focus on one or some of them, but are less concerned about the other systems and about the overall ability for the involved systems to into one. Each purpose of multiple-use forestry thereby develops its own existential world. Such development may, however, make it more difficult to integrate forestry as a whole. The responsibility to integrate the different interests seems to disappear from the single sub-systems. Traditionally the Danish Forest and Nature Agency had the role of securing integration between the different sub-systems, but also internally in this system there seems to be increased differentiation in the sense that different divisions have more limited concerns and fail to take responsibility for overall integration.²⁴⁶

The more differentiation comes to dominate over integration, the more likely it is that trustful relations will exist within the independent existential worlds that share values, a language, and objectives, but not between them due to a lack of this sharedness and thereby shared meaningfulness.²⁴⁷ Organised in the way, interaction between different interests easily becomes characterised by an '*us against them*' attitude, which may lead to a competitive mood of interaction. To facilitate the establishment of trustful relations between existential worlds, a shared existential world is required to prescribe practices, at a more general level, which can integrate the different types of meaningfulness.

A step, therefore, towards integration between social, economic and ecological concerns that is conveyed by the concept of sustainable forest management, may be facilitated by an awareness of, and an identification of, the different involved existential worlds. This will form an improved basis for understanding the being-in of the different differentiated interests, and subsequently for seeking to integrate the differentiated concerns into a shared meaningfulness that at the same time is socially, economically and ecologically sensitive. Such integration would internalise the social, economic and ecological dimensions into the normal shared way of seeing, which is quite different from a situation where it is necessary to find a compromise between differentiated social, economic and ecological interests. Where the latter seeks to identify solutions that can exist as a compromise between the different meaningfulness of different existential worlds, the former seeks to establish a shared culture at a more general level, which will internalise concern for all three dimensions. In the latter case, therefore, specialised interests will exist within a more general and shared interest of integrating the three dimensions.

²⁴⁶ This development may help to explain why some feel that the Danish forest authorities have been somewhat unable to integrate its many different forest and nature strategies into one overall strategy or vision. Cf. e.g. Strange et al., 2002

²⁴⁷ Cf. e.g. Yamagishi, et al., 1998

Entitlement

The FSC certification case intended to involve all forestry interests in the co-operative and participative spirit prescribed by the concept of sustainability. But as it was mentioned earlier, the course of the case illustrated the difficulties of co-operating and of involving the different actors sufficiently in the process to make them take on responsibility for its outcome. Another structural element of contemporary culture that can be seen as contributing to these difficulties is the phenomenon of *entitlement*, which Samuelson sees as a characteristic American culture²⁴⁸ that has also been seen to characterise Danish culture.²⁴⁹ It refers to a culturally conditioned way of seeing that makes people feel entitled to having things their way.

Samuelson links the emergence of entitlement to the advances in technological development, which has increased the general ability to solve problems dramatically, and has given rise to a higher level of well being. In the welfare society people have generally gotten so used to having most of their problems solved by government that this has evolved into a general expectation of feeling entitled to having one's problems solved.²⁵⁰ Thereby it has become a tacit cultural characteristic that shapes the way we relate to each other.

In forestry such a characteristic does not seem conducive to the intent of sustainable forestry to base management on co-operation and to make single actors take responsibility for the success of interaction towards this objective. Especially when entitlement exists in combination with the increased differentiation in society that was mentioned above. If most actors feel entitled to have their specialised concerns met and no one feels a responsibility to bring these different concerns together because they feel entitled to having their own problems solved for them, interaction and co-operation may be impeded.

Recently, at a conference in Denmark organised by the Danish Forest and Nature Agency to discuss the overall strategy for Danish forests, a result of one of the working group discussions was "We want it all",²⁵¹ meaning that forest management should be able to meet all the demands that were put forward. If all actors and interests feel entitled to having their concerns met, it poses a substantial organisational challenge to the Danish Forest and Nature Agency since the agency is responsible for implementing the strategy. Although a situation in which all interests are met is, of course, desirable, it is rarely possible in practice, and it is almost impossible for the public agency to live up to an expectation like that. If everyone feels entitled and expects to have their problems solved, some expectations will not be met and such disappointed expectations are likely to cause erosion in the trustfulness of relations. Entitlement, therefore, may not be conducive to the establishment of the desired trustful relations in forestry.

²⁴⁸ Samuelson, 1997

²⁴⁹ Cf. Østergaard, 2002

²⁵⁰ Samuelson 1997:xvi

²⁵¹ Statement made during the final discussion at a conference organized by the Danish Forest and Nature Agency at Kolle Kolle, December 8th, 2000.

The awareness of entitlement as a culturally conditioned way of seeing makes it possible to seek to change it and to establish ways of seeing that are more conducive towards the intent of sustainable forest management. Former president of the United States John F. Kennedy's attempt to invoke a civic responsibility, by making people ask what they could do for their country instead of asking what their country could do for them is an example of seeking to cultivate a different way of seeing. And in a similar vein one can imagine a type of forestry where actors ask what they can do for forestry instead of what forestry can do for them.

In a perspective that sees sustainable forest management as an object rather than an outcome of social relations, structural phenomena are less likely to be taken into account. But by using optics that, as in the proposed existential perspective, develops sensitivity to the structural layer of social organisation, it may be easier to identify cultural phenomena that contribute to or hinder the successful implementation of new forestry practices.

5.2. The conscious actor

An advantage of the existential perspective lies in its analytic separation of beings' being-in and the social structures, in the form of existential worlds, that constitute the frame of reference for this being-in.²⁵² The proposed perspective, therefore, sees both social structure, in the form of existential worlds, and agency, in the form of openness towards these structures and towards the formation of new ones, as part of actors' being. In that respect this perspective shares the duality understanding of structure and agency that is seen in, for instance, Giddens' concept of *structuration*,²⁵³ and Sztompka's concept of *social becoming*.²⁵⁴ The advantage of this duality is that it directs attention to the interplay between our being-in and the forming of the structures we are in.

Although the proposed existential perspective emphasises social structure in the form of existential worlds and sees being as often characterised by tacit and coping within such worlds, it does not deny that the being of actors can also be conscious, reflective, critical and innovative. It objects, however, to the understanding of actors as always consciously reflecting, fully open and rational beings. Actors are primarily seen as embedded in, and growing up into, certain 'normal' practices which come to influence their 'normal' seeing. They are much of the time acting or coping within normal situations dominated by normal practices and normal ways of seeing and when being open, critical and innovative, this way of being still takes place within and relative to familiar social structures in the form of existing existential worlds. This understanding of being is not reductionistic in the sense that it seeks to reduce being to a set of context-independent

²⁵² The distinction between being and beings is what is referred to as the *ontological difference* in Heidegger's work. Cf. chapter 2 of the introduction in *Being and Time*.

²⁵³ Giddens, 1984:16

²⁵⁴ Sztompka, 1993:213ff

characteristics. Because of its intent to understand beings in their complexity, as structurally embedded and temporally and spatially situated, it is better described as phenomenological.²⁵⁵ Even though such an understanding may increase complexity in the understanding of being, it seems more respectful of its richness.²⁵⁶

The actor in the proposed existential perspective, therefore, is one that always already exists within 'normal' structures that co-ordinate and give meaning to normal practices. The determination by them, therefore, depends on the awareness of them. The actor's situation in this understanding is not one of structural determination, but rather one characterised by the constant risk of *falling*²⁵⁷ into structural determinacy if not seeking to be open to the structures that are inevitable products of human interaction and organisation. This means an understanding of the actor as one that must constantly seek to understand and pay attention to the social structures, in the form of existential worlds, in order not to be uncritically determined by them. Such an actor is *authentic* in the words of Heidegger.²⁵⁸ Perpetual effort is necessary to uncover one's own embeddedness. Without such a constant effort, one easily falls back into structural determination.

Sensitivity to the anchorage of being in certain existential worlds makes it clearer how a role may be a central element of an actor's existence. Such sensitivity is especially important when roles are changing or new ones are created, such as is happening in the re-organising of forestry practices.²⁵⁹ An attempt to change roles may imply an attempt to change identities that dominate an actor's existence and this is not something one just does overnight. This can be a process that involves changing how the actor generally sees the world.

In relation to the desire for co-operation in forest management between all types of actors, it seems relevant to apply an understanding of actors that is sensitive to the richness of their understandings and to the differences and the diversity in their motives. A more simplified approach to what it means to be an actor (as is for instance taken in the more rational perspectives) would risk creating social relations that mirror such an approach. This means that an attempt to organise forestry relative to an understanding of actors as strategic and rational, may actually cause actors to become such 'rational' beings because this is the behaviour that becomes most meaningful relative to such type of organisation. In this way the understanding of being be-

²⁵⁵ Cf. Løgstrup, 1961:236..

²⁵⁶ In literature the Raskolnikoff character in *Crime and Punishment* can be seen as an illustration of an attempt to portray being in its complexity. Cf. Dostoyevsky, 1997

²⁵⁷ The concept of falling is treated in *Being and Time*. Cf. e.g. p. 219

²⁵⁸ Cf. *Being and Time*, p. 349ff

²⁵⁹ The importance of this is well illustrated in the forest controversies in the Pacific Northwest where the small rural timber communities that made a living from forestry felt their existence threatened by the growing environmental concerns that originated in urban areas and threatened their existence. This gave rise to a serious and long-lasting conflict between these interests. Cf. e.g. Lee, 1992. Much effort was spent on arguing which approach to forestry was better: the traditional or the environmental. Had the process been more sensitive to the existential anchorage of the involved views, it might have been possible to avoid the confrontational conflict and establish a more respectful mood of co-operation.

comes self-fulfilling.²⁶⁰ Relative to the intent of sustainable forestry, however, the challenge is to foster civic and responsible actors and towards this end an interpretive understanding of being seems more helpful than a rational understanding of being.

A final element on the actor side of the proposed existential perspective that makes it helpful to the present forestry situation is its ability to encompass both the being of individual actors and the being of organisational actors. The understanding of seeing as anchored in certain existential worlds and influenced by the actors' being-in those can be applied to both types of actors. Both types are embedded in existential worlds and both types have certain concerns and make a situation meaningful by a certain past and a certain future. Both types of actors can be disturbed when their normal practices break down and both types will display a certain degree of openness. This is not to say that there are no differences between the two types but merely to stress the advantage of a perspective that can cover both types.

5.3. Power

The focus on trust in relations, some may object, does not pay sufficient attention to the aspect of power. Like trust, power can be seen to exist in a social relation. The two dimensions do not exclude each other. If there is a match between how actors see the relation and if they both more or less consciously accept the power ratio of the relation, this can be marked by trust despite an unequal distribution of the power. Power is, therefore, not necessarily a barrier to trust in relations. The relation, for instance, between employer and employee exemplifies this: their relation can be acceptable to both parties despite the fact that an employer in most cases is the party with the most power.

But often the obvious power relations are the least problematic ones in a democratic setting and relative to the co-operative and participative spirit of interaction desired in sustainable forestry, it may be more important to develop a sensitivity towards the less obvious power structures since they can be seen to form a contrast to the desire for openness and transparency in interaction. Towards this end the proposed perspective can be of some help qua its openness to the structural level of existential worlds and their tacit shaping of what is seen as meaningful.

Our socialisation into a 'normal' way of seeing often makes us blind to the power that is actually vested in this way of seeing. As Dreyfus states it in a study comparing Heidegger's concept of clearing (which is similar to the concept of existential world in this work) and Foucault's concept of power: "[Socialization into norms is the universal way the understanding of being or power governs the actions of the members of any society.](#)"²⁶¹, and he continues "[One might](#)

²⁶⁰ This is sometimes referred to as the 'Thomas Theorem' in social theory. Cf. Merton, 1968:475. For a similar understanding of trust as a self-fulfilling attitude, cf. e.g. Sztompka, 1999:23; and Govier, 1994:241.

²⁶¹ Dreyfus, 1996:9

say, paraphrasing Heidegger, that power is that on the basis of which human beings already understand each other..."²⁶² In this understanding, power is not seen as instrumental. Like trust it is something residing in relations where it is often inconspicuous because it exists in the shade of normality.

Analytical awareness of the level of existential worlds, as the tacit backgrounds of relations, and of the being-in of actors, can be helpful in bringing to the fore some of the background aspects that create a certain power relation. This opens a possibility to reconsider, in an open and transparent manner, whether the existing distribution of power contributes well towards the desired objectives of the relation. In general this is very helpful in a situation of re-organisation. In relation to the FSC case such awareness could lead to a more open discussion of whether the powers that come with the normal roles of the Forest and Nature Agency and the WWF are effectively and constructively contributing to the development of sustainable forest management. If this is so, the relations and the trust they possess can remain intact. If this is not true, however, the suspicion or openness that caused the question to be asked in the first place seems justified and the powerful spell of normalness or privilege to power can be revised. More generally, therefore, the efforts to re-organise forestry towards the idea of sustainable forest management could benefit from applying a perspective that increases understanding of the structural embeddedness on the existing forestry roles and relations and discusses the appropriateness of the power vested in them relative to the new objective. The changed role of some environmental NGOs from protest organisations in the more traditional understanding of roles in forestry towards team players in the emerging understanding of roles²⁶³ is, for instance, an important aspect of the new organisation of forestry practices that touches upon the aspect of power.

5.4. Relativism

Openness to structural embeddedness is, as already mentioned, not necessarily an easy process. Identity and belonging to certain ways of seeing often provide a sense of security that comes with the being within a certain fixed understanding of things. The proposed perspective's disclosure of different, but in themselves equally meaningful understandings that exist qua different existential worlds, may for some give rise to a feeling of uncertainty and for others be interpreted as leading to relativism. It may for some people be uncomfortable if something that is absolute in their understanding is questioned. For others it may cause fear that the perspective leads into an abyss of relativism.²⁶⁴

The alternative, however, (that all parties stick to the comfort zone of their existing meaningfulness) may make the quest for new forestry practices more a matter of sheer power (that is, a

²⁶² Dreyfus, 1996:4

²⁶³ Cf. e.g. Aulinger, 1996

²⁶⁴ cf. Bernstein, 1983

matter of suppressing or neutralising the understandings of other parties rather than seeking to accommodate them and attempting to identify a shared understanding). Such a process is most likely going to be ineffective, costly and tiresome. It is going to increase the 'transaction costs' substantially (to use economic language)²⁶⁵ and it is not in line with the democratic ideal that inspires sustainable forestry. Furthermore it may lead to a new set of forestry practices that is a result of the lowest common denominator of all involved existential worlds. It is possible, of course, that the successful solving of smaller problems may lead to improved relations, and through a step-by-step process lead to a gradual increase in shared understanding that can prepare the way for more substantial changes.²⁶⁶ This will, however, require the solving of the smaller problems to be identified as part of a strategy to build trust and improve social relations in order to solve the larger problems.

The existential perspective, therefore, should not be interpreted as an opportunity to sabotage by relativism (though this of course is a possibility) but rather as a help to open up the actors to their own embeddedness and that of others. This openness should also make them open to the need for shared values to define sustainable forest management. It should not make them give up their values or come to the conclusion that no values are more valuable than others, but rather provide an opportunity to question, in an authentic fashion, why their values are more valuable to sustainable forest management and make them open to the value other values have that may be superior to their own.

Two challenges, to a process that emphasises such openness, is the uncertainty that it may cause, and the increased process costs in terms of time and effort. This was also what the FSC case illustrated. Some actors felt it to be a tiresome and long process. The requirement for actors to be open to arguments and take responsibility for the process is ambitious. But the desire to establish a forestry that is truly co-operative and participative will require a certain way of relating to each other, and the building of such relations is likely to take time. A claim that the process of procuring new forestry practices is based on openness and participation, which is not backed by a willingness to create the proper frames of interaction, is likely to remain hollow and will most likely be unable to maintain credibility over time.

5.5. Complexity

The perspective, it can be argued, may (through its more complex understanding of beings and the relations between them) increase theoretical complexity rather than simplifying things. The intent, however, is not to increase theoretical complexity for its own sake. The intent is first and foremost to suggest a theoretical tool that can handle and help understand the complexity that *is*

²⁶⁵ Williamson, 1987

²⁶⁶ cf. e.g. Ostrom, 1990:183-184, who has pointed to the importance of step-by-step approaches to bringing success in building new institutions

already reduced in certain ways. Although often part of the unquestioned background (and therefore inconspicuous) there are always complex social mechanisms in place to organise and co-ordinate interaction. Trust in social relations is one of these 'mechanisms' that is very important for the successful co-ordination of interaction. So the aim is to understand in what way existing social structures function to reduce social complexity and how they thereby influence interaction and shape relations. By being open to the fact that complexity is already reduced in certain ways, we may, at the same time, be more open to other ways of reducing complexity. Rather than aiming to increase complexity, the proposed perspective acknowledges it and seeks to provide the theoretical complexity that can successfully match the existing reduction of complexity in order to judge its appropriateness towards the new objectives and organisation of forestry.²⁶⁷

Democratic forms of organisation that desire and appreciate diversity are likely to face a higher degree of complexity in social organisation than more authoritarian or hierarchical types of organisation. Complex ideals require a complex form of social organisation. And more complex academic tools for understanding the social complexity may facilitate such complexity in organisation. When attempting to re-organise forestry in a direction that is likely to increase social complexity, a perspective, therefore, that seeks to inquire into and understand the complexity seems more appropriate than a perspective that ignores it.²⁶⁸

At the present stage it may seem as if the quest for sustainable forest management has not reduced but rather increased social complexity in forestry.²⁶⁹ The intense questioning and discussion of existing forestry practices, and the proposal of many different understandings of what sustainable forest management is (which have not yet crystallised into a new dominant and agreed upon set of practices) can be seen as increasing the level of complexity. It has certainly increased the number of possible solutions to the problem. And the uncertainty that is created by this situation may be what makes us feel a need for better and trustful relations in forestry. But trustful relations are themselves, as it has been argued above, a product of successful interaction over time and not something that can be applied instrumentally. We need a degree of shared meaningfulness to establish trustful social relations and we need trustful relations to establish a shared meaningfulness. This 'stalemate dynamic' is what makes its establishment in relations a gradual process. In that respect there seem to be no obvious shortcuts or easy 'one-step-solutions' to improved social organisation and the reduction of complexity that follows from it.

²⁶⁷ This argument rests on Luhmann's observation that 'Nur Komplexität kann Komplexität reduzieren.' Luhmann, 1987:49.

²⁶⁸ To give a more general example, the current so-called right turn in European politics may be interpreted as an expression of the lack of understanding for, and openness towards, the difficulty in the task of maintaining diversity and the integrative elements needed in order to maintain it. Openness to the complexity of democracy in forestry (as well as in society more generally) is necessary in order to avoid the blindness that may lead to 'democratorship' instead of democracy. If we really want true inclusion, participation and democracy in forest management, it is important to acknowledge and understand the complexity of it so that it can be managed successfully.

²⁶⁹ Münch, 1992:101f has referred to this as the 'paradox of instrumental activism', which means that every action to solve a problem causes, at the same time, a multitude of new problems. See also Schanz, 1999:247 for an application of this in the field of forestry.

This also means that although new resource practices in forestry will evolve out of a political setting that questions the existing practices and thereby increases social complexity, the successful institutionalisation of new practices (whereby they become functional in reducing social complexity) will require a more social setting characterised by shared understanding and more trustful relations. Continued political activity which is not gradually bringing the parties closer to each other is, therefore, not likely to provide the small steps that are required for progress. The way out of this 'stalemate' may, once again, depend on the openness of the actors to face this dilemma and on their ability to progress in small steps (where the successful implementation of a step provides the fuel - in the form of increased trust - to make another step possible).

5.6. Other uses of the existential perspective on trust

The focus in the previous chapters has mainly been on the understanding of social relations in forestry relative to the challenge this system faces in its transition towards sustainable forest management. Hopefully the proposed perspective can be of help to the analysis of trustfulness in other situations as well. Since the value of a theoretical perspective is related to the variety of situations in which it can be of help, a brief note on other uses shall close this chapter.

Social relations exist everywhere and whenever social relations constitute an important element for effective problem solving, it may be helpful and relevant to understand the involved actors and their relations in terms of their being-in and in light of the existential worlds from within which they see. The type of social entity and the level of aggregation are not decisive. So whether it is a family, an organisation, a society, or an inter-organisational effort like the FSC case, relations and their trustfulness are analysable in terms of existential worlds and the being-in of actors.

In all of these the establishment of a shared existential worlds implies the development of a shared meaningfulness, a shared language and a shared sense of objectives, roles and equipment that can facilitate interaction and produce a synergy that makes the whole add up to more than the sum of the parts.²⁷⁰

The organisation can be used as an example of a social entity. Within an organisation, the proposed existential perspective can be of relevance, for example, to a process of re-organising the organisation. In such a situation it can be helpful to understand better the social relations that make up the organisation in order to improve its effectiveness. Most organisations seek to estab-

²⁷⁰ Cf. e.g. Covey, 1989:262ff for an account of how creative co-operation produces synergy.

lish a strong organisational culture in order to be effective.²⁷¹ This task is the same as establishing a shared existential world. Such an existential world provides all employees with a shared background for seeing and for solving problems in their daily work. In that respect it coordinates and gives meaning to the organisation's practices. The objective of the existential world provides the organisation with a shared loadstar in light of which the activities carried out are made meaningful. The sharing of an existential world will, qua the shared meaningfulness it provides, make it more likely that the concerns of the single members of the organisation will be in tune with the overall concerns and objectives of the organisation. Their shared existential world will improve their ability to identify solutions that are valuable to the organisation. Such solutions are made meaningful temporally relative to the organisation's past experiences and relative to the organisation's future objectives. An organisation characterised by a shared existential world, therefore, is likely to experience fewer internal disturbances and competition in interaction since the practices and roles exist in light of the overall existential world that coordinates them relative to each other.

²⁷¹ Cf. Schein, 1994 for an argument for the importance of organisational culture. Schein emphasises the need to penetrate the upper layers of artefacts and superficial values and establish sharedness at the level of fundamental values and assumptions.

6 CONCLUSION

This work has proposed, exemplified and discussed an existential perspective on trust in actor relations in forestry. The background that has caused the inquiry into social relations is the changes that are taking place in forestry to re-organise practices towards the intent of sustainable forest management. This concept emphasises an ideal democratic form of organisation that is based on co-operation and participation between all forestry actors. Organised in this way, the quality of relations between the involved actors is important and this accentuates the need to understand the character and shaping of social relations. Trust became the central concept of the inquiry because of the importance it has for the type of civic social relations that are strived for in sustainable forest management. The thesis gives rise to several conclusions. Some of those are of practical relevance, some are of theoretical relevance, and yet some are of political relevance.

The perspective proposed by this work is seen to be of practical relevance to the actors in forestry — the many organisations that interact around forestry issues. For them the existential perspective can help to direct attention to their own existential worlds and their own being-in-shared situations of interaction. It can help them to understand why the other actors think and act in the way they do, by directing their attention to the existential worlds that make these understandings meaningful. If this knowledge is used in a way that is responsible and loyal to the intent of the shared objective of sustainable forest management, the basis for co-operation and interaction is likely to be improved. If, on the other hand, such understanding is used to benefit the organisation's own agenda, the insights are used in a way that may be less conducive towards the intent of the shared objective. The miniature example of the perspective, provided in the fourth chapter, can be of help to forestry actors as an illustration of the many different ways of seeing that were involved in the FSC process. It may help to illustrate how this diversity

poses a challenge to the establishment of trust in the relationships between the actors and to the effort of reaching a solution that was meaningful to all involved parties.

Of theoretical relevance is the presentation of the different understandings of trust that was treated in the second chapter. These different understandings were presented relative to the understanding of human being they assume and a continuum between rational and interpretive understandings of being was used. The main argument of this chapter was that when seeking to re-organise forestry relative to a desire for co-operation between a wide diversity of interests, an interpretive understanding of being, which contains the necessary sensitivity to different ways of being, was found most appropriate. Of scientific interest and relevance is also the existential account of trust that was proposed in the third chapter. It has been developed as a frame to analyse trustfulness in actor relations and is inspired by Heidegger's philosophy. The proposed account of trust argues that an understanding of trust in actor relations can be gained by an understanding of what different actors see as meaningful in a situation and how well their views come together in this situation. The meaningfulness of what actors see, it has been argued, depends on the existential world from within which they make sense of the situation and on the actor's being-in this situation. This account of trust in relations is not restricted to the analysis of actor relations in forestry. As argued in the previous chapter is possible to apply the tool in all cases where social relations constitute an important factor for success in interaction. When social organisation must be able to handle the challenges that come with a desire for increased co-operation and participation in a genuinely democratic style of interaction, the perspective's sensitivity to both social structure, in the form of existential worlds at different levels of generality, and to actors' being-in, is seen as helpful.

In comparison with more rational or instrumental perspectives, the proposed existential perspective has emphasised the need to place trust relative to the deeper layers of social organisation that contain 'social capital',²⁷² in the form of shared meaningfulness of objectives and roles, that are so valuable for effective social organisation. In that respect the perspective can be seen as a tool that can help to expose these layers. In times where practices are changing and where the normal problem solving and existing relations break down such an 'x-ray' perspective will hopefully be of help in identifying the fractures.

Politically this work can be of help in the process of re-organising forestry towards sustainable forest management. It directs attention to the social character of this process and provides a framework to help map some of the social and existential barriers to the implementation of the ideal democratic inspired type organisation in forestry. Trust, it was argued, is difficult to engineer instrumentally in relations. It is a product, like love, that emerges out of a successful interaction over time and is maintained through a well-functioning relationship. It grows out of shared meaningfulness and successful problem solving. It is at the same time a product and a

²⁷² The concept of *social capital* has been used by e.g. Coleman (1988) and is also an important element in the answer to Putnam's question of what determines high institutional performance in democracies. Cf. Putnam, 1993. For a review of the concept cf. Wall, et al., 1998.

required element of a shared culture. As such the proposed perspective on trust emphasises the advantage of a shared culture, a shared existential world, for interaction in forestry. Such a shared existential world could define a degree of shared meaningfulness among the involved actors and establish a style of interaction that is constructive and responsible towards the objective of sustainable forest management. The establishment of such a culture is, to a large extent, a political challenge and for policy makers it may therefore be of importance to increase sensitivity to the structural characteristics of society, like for example entitlement and differentiation, which may obstruct the implementation of co-operation in forestry.

The proposed existential perspective on trust in actor relations is merely a theoretical optic and cannot in itself provide for a new and shared meaningfulness in forestry. But it can hopefully be used to contribute to the establishment of such a new and shared existential world by improving the understanding of existing relations between forestry actors as these are shaped and maintained in interaction. The task of establishing shared existential worlds — that is, of actually creating social integration and cohesion in practice without imposing it and thereby making it a question of power — requires more than a theoretical perspective.²⁷³ It requires a new way of seeing. In his work *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger sees the artist as playing an important role in the process of establishing new shared ways of seeing — new truths — that make a new organisation of practices meaningful.²⁷⁴

Art then is the becoming and happening of truth²⁷⁵...Art lets truth originate.²⁷⁶

The artist in this understanding is the one being sufficiently open to see, articulate and gather people around the new truths that give rise to and infuse meaningfulness into new practices. Just like in math where differentiation is a skill and integration an art,²⁷⁷ the establishment of a new and shared existential world in forestry may require the openness of an artist. And what place is better to start searching for this artistic openness than within oneself?

²⁷³ Cf. e.g. Spinoza et al.,1997:1

²⁷⁴ Heidegger, 1975:15-87

²⁷⁵ Heidegger, 1975:71

²⁷⁶ Heidegger, 1975:77-78

²⁷⁷ Nielsen, 2002

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ANNEX 1: INTERVIEW GUIDE

Introduction:

- Who am I (Ph.D student, based in Freiburg / Wageningen)
- What is the project about (Relations between forestry actors - certification just as example)
- What do I expect of them (Their understanding of the process. How do they see it?)
- Duration ~ 1-1½ hours

How they see the FSC process:

- Why has the FSC initiative emerged at this point in time?
- What are the central problems that have created the process?
- What are the objectives of the process?
- What are your concerns in the process?
- What are the advantages/disadvantages of the process?
- What risks does the process involve?
- What is the bottleneck of the process?
- What is the credibility of the process? Has it changed over time?
- How do you perceive the other actors (patterns/roles)?
- Why are the other actors participating?
- Who are the influential, active, driving, sceptical actors, etc.?

Reaction to the process:

- Why do you participate?
- Why are you supporting or opposing the initiative?
- Why do you participate in the process as member / observer?
- What are the motives for this position and has it changed over time?
- What will your strategy be in the future?
- What is the most important for you to get from the process?
- Has the process affected or influenced your understanding of how to manage forests?
- Has the process changed your perception of the other actors?

ANNEX 2: PARAPHRASED AND SORTED INTERVIEW STATEMENTS

The tables below present the paraphrased and sorted interview statements. The left column contains the statements and the right column contains the reference to the original transcribed interview. The statements are the author's translation of views that were stated in the interviews. These are sorted relative to content so that the statement can be read as a narrative presenting the interviewee's understanding of the FSC initiative.

1 Nepenthes

Text	Or. Interview paragraph
1. Certification is a possible tool to improve forestry. It is a new opportunity to improve forest management toward more ecosystem-oriented management. A consumer-based tool. We support the involvement of consumers. We provide consumers with a lever to influence management. Direct democracy. Power to the people and not to the bureaucracies. We see certification as a democratic tool. People decide whether it is a good idea. It is a deeply democratic initiative.	(1-10)
2. We are willing to use other means to further our case. FSC certification is a means, not a goal in itself. But for now we see no alternatives to FSC.	(58)
3. FSC is good because it is widespread, flexibly designed, well prepared, and highly credible. Other initiatives are not genuinely green. The market shall decide which of the initiatives will survive.	(56)
4. FSC is a credible initiative. We have no economic interests in certification. We are idealists. This makes us credible.	(16)
5. We are morally committed. We started as an organisation focussing on the tropics, but we feel the time has come to focus on our own forestry practices. Our purpose is to question and improve forest management in the industrialised world. In order to be critical of forest management in the tropics, our own forest management must be sound. We try to apply the critical perspective we use on tropical forests, on our own forests.	(74)
6. Once we have created a set of guidelines for certification, further activity will depend on a demand for certification and certified products. If the actors with economic interests in forestry are not supporting the initiative we will let it rest for a while and make an attempt to influence the consumers so that pressure will rise from this group.	(63)
7. The propagation of FSC in Denmark shall be based on increased foreign demand for certified wood products.	(68)
8. An initiative like FSC rests on improved public knowledge and awareness of forest management around the world. The world is smaller nowadays. It would not have been possible 20 years ago to launch a similar initiative.	(84)
9. We see the consensus-based approach of the process as a strength. But it also has weaknesses. It has been a demanding job to involve everyone. Some parties lack the motivation to actively participate in and further the process.	(45,48,50)
10. But we have deliberately aimed for internal consensus in the group instead of fight-	(50)

ing the battle publicly. It is a new thing to bring all the interests together. The process would be easier for us if we put our energy into creating a demand for FSC certified products.

11. We are willing and open towards finding a compromise between the different interests of the involved actors. (60)

12. The collaborative process has improved relations in the community of green organisations. We have gained visibility and improved network relations through this process. (89,90)

13. Our vision and understanding is shared with Greenpeace and WWF. And SiD also has a feeling for the international character of the certification issue and can place it in a larger perspective. Generally the green organisations tend to see the initiative in an international context. The Ornithological Society and the Danish Conservation Society have a narrower Danish focus. (38)

14. Some of the other actors lack idealism and are driven by economic incentives. (18,24)

15. We are surprised that so many organisations remain observers. The forest owners seem to want the initiative to disappear by itself. Otherwise they would support it more actively. (60)

16. The Ornithological Society has been surprisingly hesitant. It seems to prefer to be a protest organisation. Their representative lacks an international focus. (28,33)

17. We think the FSC process has changed how other organisations perceive us. We have established better relations with the forestry actors. Traditional forestry actors have generally been very suspicious of us. They see us differently than we see ourselves. (88)

18. We have not come much closer to the traditional forestry organisations, but mainly to the greener part of the traditional forestry community and the forest owners. (92)

19. The more established forestry organisations are generally more rigid but it depends on the person representing the organisation. (94)

20. It is worth keeping in mind that some of the other actors such as the Association of Forest Owners and Niels Elers Koch think we are interested in making money on certification. They want to question and discredit our motives and accuse us of not having honourable intentions but rather being in it for the money. (106)

2 WWF, Denmark

Text	Or. Interview paragraph
1. The objective driving Nepenthes and us has been to establish a system of certification capable of improving the forests and forest management. Certification is only a means to attain the end of sustainable forest management. Certification is not an end in itself. And it has worked. Without FSC we would not have advanced since Rio.	(551)
2. We hope this process will contribute to changing the Danish Forest Act towards more focus on nature and biodiversity and less on production. We want to focus on what the future forests should produce.	(615)
3. FSC has grown out of the work of ITTO and the problems of tropical timber and management of tropical forests. Out of the work that did not happen there. There were many intentions on paper to improve forest management, but we were concerned that no changes happened on the ground level. It is of no use writing about SFM if it cannot be defined through operational criteria able to impact and to change basic forest management.. This wasn't possible under ITTA. The ITTO Year 2000 objective was empty. It was just words. Therefore the idea of labelling was hatched in the late 1980's.	(503)

4. The different ivory towers of sustainability held by the different parties turned out to be built of empty words, so we dropped the ITTO. (509)
5. It is not enough to claim to be sustainable; it must be documented. And documentation became the keyword of the FSC way of thinking. It is not enough to say something. It must be documented as well. (505)
6. We had reason to be deeply suspicious of the tropical timber trading countries. They cannot be trusted to warrant their own management processes. Their systems were corrupt and driven by a narrow concern for profit. They were not interested in a dialogue on what SFM should imply. (505)
7. The Rio Summit led nowhere. The documents were useless. Too bracketed. And the distrust between the countries was obvious. So the official lack of will to do something about the problems made us initiate work on labelling. We met in Canada with all forestry interests except for the governments. They would just delay or stall the process. Labelling was deliberately chosen to avoid the official governmental system. Governments may ideally have the tools to control forest management but they cannot act because they are caught in a political web of favours and interests. There is a lack of transparency for outsiders and this is not concordant with our agenda. So green interests from the entire spectrum — human rights organisations and industrialists, drawn by the prospect of marketing advantages — showed up. What everybody agreed upon before the Canada meeting was that the official system was incapable of regulating forest management. (511-517)
8. We had given up on governments. They could not solve the problems. They delayed the process and lied. (519)
9. The problem is that it is OK and fairly costless to be untruthful in these official or governmental settings. They do it in the Danish Parliament. The people in the Danish Forest and Nature Agency are also lying when they say that we already have sustainable forest management in Denmark. We are slowly getting closer but are not there yet. (525,527)
10. It was a scandal that millions in taxpayer's money was wasted on officials telling lies at meetings. And they come to believe the stories they tell. The same thing happened in former times when we accepted slavery and suppression. (521)
11. Now the focus has shifted away from tropical regions. Industrialised countries should also be able to document that their forest management is sustainable. But the industrialised countries (including Denmark) do not at all like the thought of somebody from outside interfering with their way of forest management. (505)
12. The discussion of the process is only formally about criteria for SFM, but in reality it is about shifts in or potential loss of power. (509)
13. The biggest part of the problem is not that people ascribe different meanings to the term sustainable, but that it is a political game. (535)
14. We cannot hide behind not being able to define sustainability anymore. And it is not the content of the FSC standards we are discussing and disagreeing over in the group. It is all about what is opportune to do. About power relations, about maintaining power. (539)
15. As we see it, the forestry establishment does not like to give up power. And we understand that. It is very human. The reaction is emotional because with reason you cannot argue against FSC. The arguments I have heard so far are not valid. (507)
16. The Forest and Nature Agency and the traditional forest interests hate FSC. Not because it doesn't work but because it is beyond the control of the state. They cannot bear that. (505)
17. If you could persuade the people in the Forest and Nature Agency to take off their mask, they would admit that their management is not sustainable. They are nice people, but they are playing a game. (535)
18. The Forest and Nature Agency were helpful facilitators, but also highly political. (549)

- Their constructive comments were objective and good; their obstructive comments were highly political. We simply ignored their politics.
19. The Forest and Nature Agency writes that they want many things and want the same as we do, but they do not act. It is just words. They do not have a policy. They talk a lot about policy. (617)
20. The forest owners fear that open access to their forests will lead to abuse. It is not a real fear, but more like an "it-could-happen" fear. They are fencing what they think is righteously theirs and feel threatened from the outside. (543,545)
21. Foresters in Denmark are a brotherhood. (557)
22. Now the Forest Owners Association is trying to launch their own PEFC certification initiative. But it is highly incredible to certify oneself. (629)
23. Well, if they come up with a balanced set of criteria and have an independent party performing the certification, it is OK with us. (631)
24. But if the set-up is not balanced we will discredit them. And the Panda has substantial power among the public. More than the traditional forest interest organisations. But we will not give up FSC and support their criteria. Now that FSC has a name of its own we will continue with that. If they want to play, they will have to accept the FSC label. (635)
25. After all, money is all that matters to foresters. If it is profitable to certify, then they are in. During this process they have carefully maintained the balance between being against certification and keeping the door open in case certification succeeds. (571)
26. WWF is more pragmatic than some of the "preservers" like the Danish Ornithological Society and the Danish Conservation Society. The Outdoor Council thinks, and is concerned about, that everything should be open access. The Forest Owners are terrified by the prospect of extra certification expenses. The unions, BAT and SiD have been happy as long as their workers' concern was met. SiD has more interest in the forest than BAT. The latter represents industrial workers whereas the former represents forest workers. (547,549)
27. Some actors were not willing to compromise. But this process is about compromising. It is about learning from everybody. Nobody knows what sustainable forest management is. The FSC system is designed to learn and adapt. WWF and Nepenthes agree to that. (549)
28. The participants have come closer to each other during the process. In retrospect it has been an enormously positive process. We have been able to focus on substance, not on politics. The present set of standards is something worthwhile. . (565)
29. Nepenthes or NEPCon could be the organisation performing certification in Denmark. It does not matter that they are also part of the process. Their certification is independent because the certifier does not own the forest. (579,589)
30. We would prefer to have somebody from the outside do the certification but that is not possible now. We cannot afford to have companies like Deloitte and Touche to do it. (597, 601)
31. Afforestation in Denmark lacks clear criteria. The plans for afforestation depend too much on the local forester's discretion. If the foresters were good, in my sense of good, they would establish good forests. There is no control and there are no clear criteria. (559,561)
32. The WWF Score-Card survey set the co-operative effort on certification back. After that the other actors went down into their trenches again. This was a very unprofessional reaction, in my view. I was very surprised they were so unprofessional. But now they have calmed down again. (567,569,571)
33. What we criticised with the Score-Card survey was not the forest owners, but the authorities. (573)
34. The Forest and Landscape Research Centre has evaluated the Score-Card project to show that it was all propaganda, but their critique was nothing but words. No substance. (611)

3 Danish Forest & Nature Agency

Text	Or. Interview paragraph
1. FSC was created in the wake of Rio and the lack of results that were attained then.	(314)
2. The green organisations then decided that other instruments were necessary and decided to use the market and consumers to help decide forest management.	(314)
3. FSC took over, based on work we had started on criteria for sustainable forest management.	(377)
4. The Danish project "Sustainable Forests" financed by us and carried out by Nepenthes was what was used as the basis for the Danish FSC criteria. But there was no agreement then, and there is no agreement now, on what sustainable forest management is.	(318)
5. For us, certification is just one of several means towards sustainable forest management.	(365)
6. We think it is a public task to set the standards for sustainable forest management. We should be in charge of the standard-setting process.	(375)
7. Our stand has been clear all along. As a public agency our task is to balance the different interests in order to attain what we understand as sustainable forest management.	(429)
8. We do , in principle, support the idea of certification. But it needs to be a credible system based on democratic processes.	(330)
9. It is a fundamental prerequisite that the main actors participate on equal terms. It must be a democratic process.	(310)
10. The process is not credible as it is in Denmark now.	(350)
11. The FSC system is not sufficiently open for it to be credible.	(361)
12. FSC has a problem with credibility, transparency, impartiality, and cost efficiency.	(308)
13. The FSC initiative cannot provide the necessary security. When we act, we do so against the Forest Act. They lack a similar authority structure to provide security for the involved parties. The Forest Owners have a right to such security.	(306,308)
14. Our reservations do not concern the actual content of the certification standards. We could come to agreement about that. I think even the forest owners could agree. But it is rather the structure of the initiative. There is a lack of transparency. FSC assumes a role of authority in forestry.	(300)
15. The specific standards are not far from what can be accepted by the forest owners. The problem is not the standards but that the forest owners do not want to end up in the pocket of an organisation they do not trust and which, after all, is dominated by green NGOs.	(346)
16. The controversy is not about the specific criteria but about a shifting power balance.	(356)
17. The reason that many oppose the initiative can be found in their political differences. Everybody knows that this is a continuation of a political process. Therefore there is a lack of trust.	(372)
18. Ideally certification should work without trust. But it doesn't.	(413)
19. Even though FSC is voluntary, their activities influence forestry more generally. If they are successful they will gain influence. This means they are part of a political game.	(316)
20. The setting of forest management standards is part of a political process. Just in the	(356)

- arena of certification instead of in international negotiations.
21. We have been caught in power struggles between organisations. (354)
 22. We feel it is important to participate since we do not know how influential it will become. But it is not influential enough to oust the Forest Act. (387-389)
 23. We do not see the agreement, which is a prerequisite for FSC, emerging. (320)
 24. We want to make sure that FSC does not monopolise certification. There shall also be room for other initiatives. (334)
 25. The FSC snowball is big and already rolling. It will not disappear. (385)
 26. Now the situation has developed into trench warfare where each group pursues their private objectives and others withdraw from the process. FSC is a fight for power more than a co-operative process. (404)
 27. The WWF Score-Card initiative has made co-operation between WWF and the forest owners more difficult. WWF did not play fairly and openly by launching the Score-Card initiative. (395)
 28. There is an imbalance in the process because of a lack of actors in the economic chamber representing economic forestry interests. (344)
 29. If FSC becomes successful it may happen at the expense of the smaller forest owners. (407)
 30. The Forest Owners Association is afraid that it wouldn't be profitable to certify. (375)
 31. We doubt it is possible for smaller forest owners to benefit from certification. (302)
 32. In Sweden they are more opportunistic. They can profit from it. (372)
 33. In Sweden the larger forest owners participate but in many places the green interests dominate the initiative and that is against the central idea of the sustainability concept. (312)
 34. It is often the large industry interests that support the initiative. They are interested in gaining market shares from it. (363)
 35. Globally there are many interests vested in the survival of FSC. (385)

4 Danish Forest Owners Association

Text	Or. Interview paragraph
1. Certification comes out of the tropical timber debate.	(743)
2. In 1993 Greenpeace and Axel Springer Verlag had a famous press conference attacking Finnish and Swedish forestry. The day before the press conference, representatives from the big Nordic industries sent out a press release where they praised forest management certification.	(743)
3. The use of market instruments has a lot to do with the mobilization of the political consumer such as we have seen with Brent Spar and French red wine.	(745)
4. The fact that it is now acceptable for green organisations to use market-based instruments can have something to do with the fall of the iron curtain. After that everybody seemed to accept the market.	(749)
5. It was predictable that forests would make the political agenda because ordinary people have become highly emotional in their relations to forests. Environmental organisations work from public emotions.	(745)
6. The whole FSC process is very emotional.	(781)
7. But the problem is that forest policy has to do with a 100-year time horizon and should not be made based on emotional short-term fluctuations.	(745)
8. The situation in Danish forestry changed in 1993 when Nepenthes extended their	(775)

focus from the tropics to include domestic forest management. WWF and Nepenthes formed an alliance. Nepenthes casts the professional bullets and WWF does the PR work.

9. Another reason for the emergence of FSC is that the green organisations feel the public system works too slowly. (747)

10. FSC is fundamentally not credible. They have the legislative, the judicial, and the executive power in one body, where the social and ecological interests have two thirds of the power. That is not democracy. (761)

11. FSC is like a pot where everybody can throw in their special interests It has, for some, been a good opportunity to promote increased access to private forests. (729)

12. The logic has been that if only social, economic, and ecological interests are represented, then the outcome will be sustainable. But what we want to secure is the interests of future generations and they are not present at the negotiations. A horse trade between present interests does not secure the interests of future generations. (729)

13. I have suggested that we stop using the concept of sustainability. It will just make us politically vulnerable. We cannot document it. We might as well call it true forest management. (751)

14. We don't believe in certification as a means toward SFM. (765)

15. The problem is not so much the concrete set of criteria for SFM as it is the fear of losing control. The FSC initiative has made the traditional forestry organisations suspicious. WWF has created FSC, and we don't like that. (759)

16. In the Nordic countries it would be possible to combine official standards for sustainable forest management with FSC, but the Nordic countries do not want to do that because they do not like FSC. The initiative is too green. Traditional forestry interests feel that going into the process would be like putting their heads into a noose that slowly tightens. (753,755)

17. We don't see certification as benefiting forests or forestry, so we are against it. We hope the scheme comes to nothing. (812)

18. Our view is that politicians should make politics and the market should be formed by free market powers. (749)

19. What is 'sustainable' will always be a weighing of different interests. It is not a matter of science. (751)

20. There is no prospect of being paid more for certified wood. Rather it seems that there is a prospect of being paid less for non-certified wood. (737)

21. We work to consider the interests of the smaller forest owners and we are unhappy with the big forest industries because they made the certification snowball roll. But they did what they had to do. (771)

22. The worst thing for us now is increasing market pressure. We hope the big buyers are not moved by their fear of potential consumer pressure. (812)

23. I think it is much easier to mobilise people as voters than as consumers when it comes to forests. Forestry is further away from most people than food is. Although they have emotions about forests, they are less concerned about them than about food quality. It is not the end consumer that drives the certification process, but the wholesale link. (807)

24. Danish consumers are not easily scared about Danish forestry. It is much easier to get scared about forestry in other countries. And this phenomenon is true in other countries as well. (810)

25. Despite the fact that certification is a voluntary, the Danish forest owners have a bad feeling about it. They are afraid of it being just a first of many steps in the wrong direction. (783)

26. If there is a market pressure to participate, certification is not voluntary at all. (783)

27. There is an internal battle within the wood-sector on the certification issue. If we could win market shares from the plastic or concrete industries it would be a different (741)

- story. An internal battle is damaging for the forestry sector. Damage to the forestry sector means damage to the environment because we lose relative to substitute products like plastic and steel.
28. The large British wholesale buyers don't need consumer pressure. They fear it and want to avoid it. (809)
29. In some places the green organisations make membership of FSC a precondition of communication. That is absurd! In Sweden it worked. But only because the Swedish timber industry are very afraid of publicity. In the 70's they got into trouble. I don't believe the Swedish industry went into FSC just to get a short-term market advantage. They cannot have been that stupid. I think they have been driven more by fear. Fear that the green organisations could cause a stricter Forest Act than the one already existing. (767)
30. What almost tore the process apart was the question of access to private forests. The Outdoor Council claimed to be representing social interests. They wanted increased access to all types of forests. We said that if that were going to be part of the criteria set, the forest owners wouldn't participate. That put the green organisations in a dilemma and endangered the alliance between green and social interests. (777)
31. What changed the dilemma of increased access was the appearance of a private forest owner who wanted his forest certified, but did not want increased access. The initiators were very anxious to have the forest area certified and therefore the access question was left unsolved. (783)
32. The straw that broke the camels back in the Danish process was the WWF Score-Card survey. With one hand the WWF asks us to co-operate around FSC, and with the other they strike us with the Score-Card survey. (761)
33. Lately there has been more interest from some green movements in making changes to the Forest Act. They may have realised that FSC, as an initiative that tries to make private laws, is seen as an enemy of the state. This creates an invisible alliance between the government and the forest owners. Only by trying to make changes through the official system can the green organisations split this alliance. (805)
34. The Danish FSC process did not at first have any members represented in the area of economic interests since no forest owners participated, but then NEP Con, the consulting branch of the Nepenthes people, became an economic member. Beautiful, isn't it! (789)
35. Another economic member now is the National Association for Ecological Construction. The members are architects that are interested in building houses in a green way. Their chairman is a member of Nepenthes. Things like that make it very hollow and untrustworthy. (795,797,799)
36. The problem is that for ordinary citizens, since they cannot see through all this, FSC sounds like a very good idea. (801)
37. The Swedish timber industries do not risk much by getting involved in FSC. They have extra costs but nothing they cannot afford. They have bought public credibility for at least some years. The ones at risk are the smaller forest owners. They cannot afford to take on extra expenses. (771)
38. The Swedish forest industry giant Assi Domain finances three permanent positions at the FSC headquarters. It is a wise move from Assi because they make WWF economically dependent on them. But we find it untrustworthy. (773)
39. The Danish Conservation Society had not been taking an active part in the political forestry debate for quite some years. FSC was an opportunity to get them back in the discussion. (775)
40. Had Greenpeace Denmark had a forestry person, they may also have been more involved in FSC than they have been in this process. (777)
41. For organisations like the Outdoor Council or the Nature Conservation Society, it is often so that they are pro-active on behalf of their members. They want to show them

their ability to win in the political game.

5 SiD / Bat Kartellet

Text	Or. Interview paragraph
1. It is the objective of the IBTU (International Building and Tree Workers Union) to pursue forest management certification. This type of certification is concerned with worker's rights. Green organisations have been good at including that.	(111)
2. We seek to promote the ILO (International Labour Organisation) interests in FSC.	(113)
3. We are concerned about the rights of forestry workers, not just in Denmark but also in other countries.	(110, 127)
4. We would like to promote wood as a material, secure jobs in the sector, and improve forestry.	(115)
5. Nationally and internationally the certification initiative can have an impact on the work we do. That's why we chose to participate.	(145)
6. We see FSC as a departing train. We are not afraid to miss the train but it is a drag to be in the 3 rd class compartment in the last carriage. First class up front is better.	(145)
7. We are concerned with the social and economical aspects and want to leave the biological discussions to others. When it comes to employee's rights we do not think the Outdoor Council should interfere.	(149)
8. We are concerned about the existence of agreements between employers and employees.	(153)
9. Our primary task is red, not green. We participate primarily to represent the red interests.	(173)
10. We participate in this because we feel that in the longer run it helps to improve forestry.	(175)
11. We care more about people than about trees.	(171)
12. We think certified wood will be sold at higher prices.	(117)
13. The credibility of the process is improving. But there is a whole set of prejudices one has to fight. The credibility comes from broad participation in the process.	(147)
14. The green organisations have initiated certification. They have become more powerful due to neglect of the traditional organisations. Now they set the agenda.	(142,145)
15. FSC is not perfect but the best we have for now. We would prefer EU or UN rules.	(119)
16. It would be best if rules for forest management were made under the auspices of the UN. But it is a slow process and FSC can be seen as a step in a process leading to such overall rules.	(117)
17. FSC represents better management than what is required as a minimum by the Forest Act.	(123)
18. We prefer FSC to other initiatives because of the social part; the concern for worker's rights. Certification is a means of distinguishing well-managed forests from other types.	(121)
19. FSC can be used to improve the quality of the jobs in forestry.	(186)
20. We appreciate that FSC operates with locally adapted sets of criteria.	(147)
21. The overall objective is to create a globally credible label.	(195)
22. The problem is that we do not have big economic interests at stake that can drive the process in Denmark.	(208)
23. If we had bigger timber corporations like the Swedish Assi Domain, we would have FSC in Denmark. It is the big customers like IKEA that drive the process. FSC	(138,139)

- has much to do with paper.
24. The FSC process is a negotiation process. We have a long tradition in negotiation. To get, one must also give. (127)
25. In the worker's organisation we are good at making compromises. (171)
26. The FSC process is consensus- based. It is a slow process. It is a weakness because it takes a long time. But it is going slowly in the right direction. (129,131,133)
27. Seen in retrospect the process should have been more controlled. The discussion was too fragmented in the beginning. The Forest & Nature Agency helped structure the debate. The discussion was not well organised. (163,165)
28. The process has worked well when we divided ourselves into sub-groups. (151)
29. We have stayed out of the professional and technical discussion where we do not have a clear stand. (149)
30. Sometimes the traditional positions of the organisations are too rigid. (134)
31. The Forest Owners Association is generally opposed to regulation. They are also opposed to open public access to private forests. We have not participated in the open access dispute. (124)
32. Greenpeace is often antagonistic. They are often not willing to negotiate and compromise. And some of the other green interests are not willing to give. (127)
33. I do not understand that the Forest Owners Association does not participate actively to influence the process. (134, 136)
34. The Outdoor Council risked destroying the entire process because they were unwilling to compromise about the question of open access to forests. (127)
35. The Private Forestry Consultants (Skovdyrkerforeningen) are more positive than the Forest Owners Association. (134)
36. Some actors are surprised that the Forest and Nature Agency does not support or promote the idea. I think the Forest and Nature Agency has done well in the process. They have been facilitating the discussion very well, but they cannot directly support the initiative. That would make it an officially endorsed regulation of forestry which the forest owners would object to. (136)
37. Concerned and dedicated people initiate an initiative like FSC. They are people who care about the forests. They have seen that if this is to work, most of the forest interests should be represented. (163)
38. Nepenthes has been the dedicated and driving actor in Denmark. (163)

6 The Danish Wood Industry Association

Text	Or. Interview paragraph
1. The emergence of certification in forestry has something to do with changed attitudes towards environment and forests.	(821)
2. The tropical forest debate also influenced the emergence of certification.	(823)
3. At this point in time it fits in. And maybe WWF needed money.	(821)
4. I am convinced that WWF is driven both by ideology and by a desire to make money from certification.	(856)
5. We haven't been very active in the process. We are just observers.	(817)
6. We haven't been very emotionally engaged in the process.	(844)
7. Our situation is different from that of the forest owners. If consumers demand products made of certified wood, we just buy our timber in Sweden. That is all there is to it.	(826)

8. We have been most concerned about certification being manageable in terms of our industry interests. To avoid separate product lines. (844)
9. Generally we are more in favour of declaration than certification. With declaration I refer to information about the product. (852)
10. I would prefer information in the form of declarations. (862)
11. FSC is a question of belief, just like religion. I don't believe the environmental aspect to be substantial. It is a trend that has already peaked. (842)
12. We find FSC too expensive. And there is also a logistical problem. If we are to operate with certified wood we have to have two? distinct lines of operation in the wood industry. (832)
13. Whatever happens in the field of certification, we think it should take place at the European level and be part of an existing institutional framework. (854)
14. We wouldn't like the FSC certification scheme to turn into an overall global label. That would give them a monopoly situation. That would be the worst scenario. (860)
15. So we don't feel there is this large need for certification. (874)
16. But we have decided to follow the process and see what happens. (876)
17. At first we thought we wouldn't participate. But then we thought that it might come to influence us. That's why we decided to participate as observers. (884)
18. The biggest problem for us is that we cannot see where the process ends, and how much there will be to it. (877)
19. Not many of our customers ask for certified wood. The process has been driven more by what could happen if certified wood suddenly was the only thing in demand. (828,830)
20. It is only once every year that we are asked about whether our wood is certified. And then we normally send the questioner a one-page information sheet about how wood is produced in Denmark. That has been sufficient so far. (872)
21. So far it has been enough for us to explain to our customers how forests are managed in Denmark to satisfy their demand for sustainable forest management. (830)
22. Certification creates expenses for forest owners. , but they will not absorb these. They pass them on to us, and we pass them on to the customers. If affects our ability to compete in the marketplace. (840)
23. The process has contributed towards some improvements, but I don't believe that everything has to be certified. (842)
24. It does not add to the project's credibility that FSC is not open about the criteria. We have asked for the Polish ones, but could not get them. (834)
25. We know already that they are concerned about other things in Poland than sustainability. That's why it seems untrustworthy that they can become FSC certified. They may lack the environmental organisations. The birdwatchers and outdoor people have nothing at stake in the existing forestry. They are free to make their demands. (836)
26. My impression is that the actors in the process have gotten closer to each other during its course, although the Forest Owners Association seems to hope that this thing will disappear by itself. (844)

7 The Outdoor Council

Text	Or. Interview paragraph
1. Certification is a reaction to the inability to establish an international forest convention. WWF brought it to Denmark.	(240)
2. It coincides with a general increase in the interest in a more ecosystem- based for-	(240)

- est management.
3. We feel there are some things in regard to recreation that are not well reflected in the Forest and Nature Protection Acts. (228)
 4. Our purpose is to encourage and work for improved possibilities for outdoor recreation. And possibilities for outdoor recreation can be improved. Especially in private forests. (228)
 5. Outdoor recreation and spare time activities are important in our type of society. (251)
 6. We work for better public access. Both to the forests and to the decision process on forests. (228)
 7. We are interested in becoming involved in the planning process. (234)
 8. We are concerned about the social dimension of sustainable forestry. (250)
 9. The certification process is one way of furthering the interests of the Outdoor Council. It is one lever to use in the process of more general change. (238)
 10. We have not felt we had to be present to influence the process, but it is a good opportunity to further the interests we represent. (253)
 11. Environmental labelling is not our concern *per se*. We were invited and saw it as a good opportunity. (277)
 12. Our principle is that if the frames of certification are reasonable we are willing to use them. (296)
 13. FSC is for us an instrument to further our objectives. It is preferable to other initiatives because it aims at absolute standards for performance in forest management, and not relative ones like with ISO certification. (230)
 14. We were attracted by FSC because it covered social as well as economical and ecological interests. (251)
 15. Compared to PEFC we prefer FSC. So does the Danish Conservation Society. (273)
 16. FSC is not the only thing, but the elements of FSC are generally positive. (277)
 17. We prefer FSC because it has a name internationally. (279)
 18. We want certification to be a genuine label of quality, not just a label which requires business as usual. (263)
 19. The credibility of a certification process must come from its ability to do more than what is required by law. (263)
 20. It has been a heavy process to argue for our concerns. (257)
 21. We don't feel we can go further now without compromising our concerns. That is the reason we remained observers to the process. (257)
 22. We feel we have gone far already in reaching a compromise. We are not willing to go further to facilitate the process. (273)
 23. Our strategy is to wait and see what happens in the process. We are not actively pursuing changes now. (259)
 24. We feel that the different participants have come much closer together. (257)
 25. The production- oriented forestry interests have been very reluctant to embrace FSC. (246)
 26. The Forest Owners Association has participated in the process to minimise the damages. (255)
 27. Forest owners are afraid of the costs and the loss of influence. (234)
 28. Forest owners cannot set their own certification standards. (232)
 29. No one expected to convince the Forest Owners Association. (257)
 30. The Forest Owners Association should be careful to claim that certification is not the right instrument to attain sustainable forest management. (275)
 31. We can see the problem in Sweden, where the process is driven by the large forest industries, and the smaller forest owner feels left out. (281)
 32. We do not perceive the Swedish process as environmentally hollow just because it is industry- driven. (285)

8 The Danish Conservation Society

Text	Or. Interview paragraph
1. Certification is partially a product of our time and partially a phenomenon that is 'fashionable'. And it is linked to an increased concern for biodiversity and sustainability, which is also expressed in processes like the Rio Summit.	(431)
2. The present focus on temperate forest management is to a large extent arising from the debate on tropical forests.	(489)
3. We enjoy the discussion created by the FSC. It raises general questions about Danish Forest Policy and the objectives for Danish forestry.	(451)
4. Certification initiatives constitute a good opportunity for dialogue.	(461)
5. Danish forestry is still dominated by production forests. But natural dynamics are increasingly being considered.	(483)
6. We have been really happy that questions concerning forest biodiversity have made the agenda.	(489)
7. The FSC initiative is a breath of fresh air in forestry. It has had a huge impact on the discussions in forestry.	(487)
8. We have not taken part actively in many of the more detailed discussions about public access and forest management.	(449)
9. At the moment we are sitting on the fence. Observing what comes out of the process.	(439)
10. We like many of the elements but find that it can be dangerous to bet on just one initiative.	(439)
11. We are a little nervous about getting married to a specific process of certification.	(437)
12. We work through the official political system.	(433)
13. FSC and the Danish Forest Act should complement each other, not compete.	(457)
14. We are following the process carefully, but do not participate actively. Our main focus is to work through legislation — through the Forest Act.	(433)
15. We work for changes in practice.	(433)
16. We would like to avoid that FSC becomes the sectarian process is only applied in parts of Danish forestry, and the discussion on forest management then stops. We would like the dialogue to continue so that forestry all over Denmark is sustainable.	(491)
17. FSC goes further with forest management than the international governmental processes.	(437)
18. FSC could be an active lever to change forestry in a greener direction.	(441)
19. FSC has the attention of all the major actors in forestry.	(441)
20. In Denmark FSC does not yet enjoy full credibility. But in general, internationally, we find the set-up credible.	(453)
21. The issue about access to private forests has been controversial throughout the process.	(449)
22. We welcome the FSC initiative in Sweden and follow it with interest.	(463)
23. My impression is that so far the Danish process has not been dominated by specific organisations.	(467)
24. We have a good relationship with the Danish forest owners, despite our diverging interests.	(463)

9 Greenpeace Denmark

Text	Or. Interview paragraph
1. The emergence of certification is a mix of a lot of factors but increasing consumer awareness is an important factor.	(654)
2. The debate, especially about tropical forestry, has increased the awareness of forestry issues. Many had expected the public authorities to come up with criteria, but nothing happened.	(654)
3. The reason certification becomes an issue now is that society is much more sympathetic toward environmental issues now than 10 or 15 years ago.	(654)
4. Timber companies from e.g. Indonesia were not trustworthy. There was a need for impartiality in assessment of forest management.	(654)
5. The Danish problems are small compared to the international ones.	(709)
6. At first we were hesitant to join FSC. Some elements were not credible. But now the process is broad and we feel we would like to contribute to the shaping of the process.	(656)
7. We have limited resources and have to consider carefully where we spend our energy.	(656)
8. Normally we work in a more direct manner. The process is too "slow". It lacks the big saints and the big sinners.	(719)
9. If we had designed the process we would have designed it differently, but we participate because we see certain opportunities for influence.	(717)
10. What we have gained from the process is that we have become more aware of other interests.	(707)
11. Our basic understanding has not changed. We are against the use of polluting compounds but not against the commercial use of forests.	(707)
12. Talking to each other directly is much better than communicating through the newspapers.	(698)
13. At the present the certification group is not active. Either it will start certifying or it will die out. We shall mainly be active if something does not happen as it should.	(690)
14. It has been a tough process. Getting closer to each other is a difficult process. Some actors have been hostile towards each other.	(694)
15. It is difficult getting closer to each other without compromising one's own ideology.	(696)
16. The process has created a good and stimulating debate. But the WWF Score-card initiative really made a mess. The Forest Owners Association accused the WWF of being untrustworthy. And then it is difficult to respect each other. That has negatively influenced the FSC debate.	(700,702)
17. We are not concerned about who took the initiative to certify Danish forests. The problem is that the forest owners are not active in the process.	(658)
18. WWF knows that the credibility of the process depends on everybody being in it.	(658)
19. In Sweden Greenpeace has left the FSC process because they allowed the cutting down of old growth forest and the use of fertilisers and pesticides. This is fundamentally unacceptable to us.	(684)
20. There has to be a balance between local adaptations and more strict principles which define the initiative.	(686)
21. A good thing about the process is that we have learnt a lot about each other.	(698)
22. It is a problem that still no forests have been certified in Denmark.	(680)
23. The governmental effort within forestry is not far-reaching enough.	(676)
24. We would be happy if forest management was regulated by public authorities at a standard corresponding to that of the FSC. But they are not doing enough about it,	(672)

- though they ought to.
25. It is important with labelling that there are not 117 different labels. I would prefer a governmental label. If we cannot trust the government, whom can we then trust? (672)
26. There have been different degrees of commitment from various actors during the process. The Danish Ornithological Society, for instance, has been very rigid. We have also been critical. I was shocked that there was discussion about whether pesticides were OK to use. (664)
27. The Outdoor Council has been very stiff and un-co-operative. They seem unaware that private foresters for centuries have had property rights to their land and that this is difficult to change. It is no wonder that they are opposed to that. Access is not that big an issue for us. There is no need for open access. (660)
28. I think the forest owners are concerned about it all being so formalised. To a large extent it is my impression that they have a good relation with the local people using the forests. But they find the FSC process overly bureaucratic. (668,670)
29. The forest owners have been defensive from the beginning. They felt their domain was being violated. Often we do not think of a forest being owned by someone. It is often considered common property. (704)

10 Danish Ornithological Society

Text	Or. Interview paragraph
1. Labelling comes out of a desire to distinguish sustainably grown timber from 'ordinary' timber. Whether that is in the interest of producers or consumers is the question. In Denmark the green interests have obviously driven the certification process.	(912)
2. Due to a lack of resources we have mainly followed the FSC process from the sidelines. We do not have the means and resources to follow all the meetings.	(897)
3. We see no reason to commit further to the process. It is mainly a forum for more affected interests like the forest owners and the green organisations.	(929)
4. I have mainly been there to make clear how we stand relative to the process and the issues debated. Especially the issues where our view on nature and our stand on preservation is of interest.	(897)
5. Forests are very central to our main interest, which is the protection of birds. We work to protect the nature in the forest.	(902)
6. We are interested in protecting natural forests. The Forest Act does not secure specific kinds of forest.	(904)
7. We don't think that the best way to protect forests is through certification or voluntary agreements. It should happen within the established institutional system.	(908)
8. We have expressed early in the process that we would prefer a public scheme, but others found that it was important to have something that was internationally recognised such as the FSC. And they may be right.	(933)
9. It is OK that legislation secures a minimum standard and that there are voluntary initiatives where it is possible to get credit for doing more than is required. But I would prefer raising the minimum requirements in the legislation.	(984)
10. It is necessary that certification schemes like this one have some kind of public control in order to be credible.	(912)
11. In Denmark we generally find public schemes more credible than private ones. In Asia it is the other way around.	(935)
12. The more different labelling schemes that emerge, the more necessary it will be to	(933)

- have some kind of public scheme. It is necessary to have scheme that people know and find credible.
13. We have not seen the certification initiative as a process of change in power in forestry. (945)
 14. Generally we are happy with the distribution of power in forestry. But we are not happy about the way the Forest and Nature Agency manage their forests. They should produce less timber and be more concerned about nature and recreational values. (978)
 15. The implementation of sustainable forest management in state forests goes much too slowly. It is going in the right direction, but it's too slow. (986)
 16. From a 'bird' point of view, natural forests are much more valuable than plantations and planted forests. (962)
 17. Forest management is still too oriented towards production and too little toward nature protection. Placing biologists (or people with different training than forestry) at the state forest districts could further nature preservation. (988)
 18. It should be as important to produce badgers and bats as to produce beech. (994)
 19. We should be able to measure the nature and biodiversity values so that they can enter into the forestry balance sheets to track its development. (996)
 20. Foresters should get credit for producing nature. I could become prestigious to produce diverse nature. (998)
 21. The credibility of the process in Denmark is OK and the process of getting closer to each other has been OK. (922)
 22. At the present stage there is a set of compromise standards, but there seems to be a lack of will to go further. Especially among the forest owners. (924)
 23. The discussion about public access to the forests has dominated the process. (925)
 24. We have a split stand on the access question. On one hand we are interested in quiet forests for the birds and on the other hand we are interested in access to the forests so that we can enjoy the birds. But forests are the least fragile type of nature; visitors don't disturb nearly as much in a forest as in e.g. meadows. (926)
 25. So far there is no need to restrict access to forests in Denmark. (927)
 26. We have learned some by participating in the process, but our attitude has not changed during it. I have become more convinced that if we have to protect areas it must be done through legislation. (956)
 27. It is not a problem to us if FSC became a big success in Denmark. (982)
 28. The process was initiated by WWF but they seem to have given the process over to Nepentes. Without them nothing would have happened. (1004)
 29. The Forest and Nature Agency have been very passive in the process. But they may be in a dilemma between the productive and the protective interests. It seems like they have decided most for the productive side and neglected the protection side in this process. (947)
 30. The Nature and Forest Agency thinks that we should influence forest management through the Outdoor Council. But we don't think they represent our interests well. (972)
 31. The Association of Forest Owners has been the main opponent. The Outdoor Council has played a key role on the access question. (1004)
 32. If WWF, Nepentes and Forest Owners Association had agreed upon an issue, no one else would have interfered. Except for the access debate. (1004)
 33. I expect that there are economic incentives behind the industry's desire to join the FSC process in Sweden. (916)

SUMMARY IN ENGLISH

This work has proposed, exemplified and discussed an existential perspective on trust in actor relations in forestry. The background that has caused the inquiry into social relations is the changes that are taking place in forestry to re-organise practices towards the intent of sustainable forest management. This concept emphasises an ideal democratic form of organisation that is based on co-operation and participation between all forestry actors. Organised in this way, the quality of relations between the involved actors is important and this accentuates the need to understand the shaping of social relations. Trust became the central concept of the inquiry because of the importance it has for the type of civic social relations that are strived for in sustainable forest management.

To come to grips with the different understandings of trust, a literature survey was undertaken. The result of this survey is presented in the second chapter. Here different understandings of trust are presented relative to the understanding of human being they assume. A continuum between rational and interpretive understandings of being is used. When seeking to organise forestry based on an intent to secure co-operation between a wide diversity of interests, an interpretive understanding of being, which contains the necessary sensitivity to different ways of being, was found most appropriate to the forestry situation.

Since the interpretive tradition, however, mainly consisted of philosophical works on trust that were not directly applicable to the analysis of actors' relations, the third chapter of this work develops an existential account of trust that can be used to analyse trustfulness in actor relations. The proposed account of trust is inspired by Heidegger's philosophy. The sensitivity in his account of being, to the temporal and spatial situatedness of actors, was very helpful to improve understanding of the many different rationalities, or existential worlds, that are involved in cooperative efforts in forestry. The proposed account of trust argues that the development or maintenance of trust in relations must be understood through an understanding of what different actors see as meaningful in a situation and how well their views come together in this situation. The meaningfulness of what actors see, it has been argued, depends on the existential world (structural background) from within which they make sense of the situation and on the actor's being-in this situation. The proposed existential perspective has, in comparison to more rational or instrumental perspectives, emphasised the need to place trust relative to the deeper layers of social organisation that contain the 'social capital,' in the form of shared meaningfulness of objectives and roles, which is so valuable for effective social organisation. In that respect the perspective can be seen as a tool that can be of help to expose these layers. In times where practices are changing and where the normal problem solving and existing relations break down such an 'x-ray' perspective will hopefully be of help in identifying some of the fractures in the social structure of forestry. Trust, it was argued, is difficult to engineer instrumentally in relations. It is a product, like love, that emerges out of a successful interaction over time and is

maintained through well-functioning relationships. It grows out of shared meaningfulness and successful problem solving. It is at the same time a product and a required element of a shared culture.

In the fourth chapter the proposed existential account of trust is exemplified by applying it on the case of developing standards for sustainable forest management certification in a co-operative effort under the auspices of the Forest Stewardship Council in Denmark. As a miniature example of the more general process to establish sustainable forestry based on co-operation, this case seemed well suited for an analysis of actor relations. The analysis of the case elucidated the many different ways of seeing that were involved in the process, and illustrated how this diversity posed a challenge to the establishment of trust in the relationship between the actors and to the effort of reaching a solution that was meaningful to all involved parties.

In the fifth chapter it has been discussed more generally in what way the aspects that are elucidated by the existential perspective are of relevance to the quest in forestry to organise practices relative to the intent of sustainable forest management. It is emphasised that the perspective's sensitivity to both social structure in the form of existential worlds at different levels of generality and to actors' being-in, is helpful to a situation in which the desire is co-operation between many actors with different perspectives on forestry, shaped by different frames of reference. The chapter also emphasises the importance of being sensitive to shared structural characteristics at a more general level, like a general 'trust in numbers,' 'entitlement' and increased societal differentiation, that may obstruct the successful implementation of co-operation in forestry.

SUMMARY IN DUTCH

In dit proefschrift wordt een existentieel perspectief geïntroduceerd, geïllustreerd en besproken voor vertrouwen in relaties tussen actoren op het gebied van bosbouw. De reden om onderzoek te doen naar deze maatschappelijke relaties zijn de veranderingen die momenteel plaatsvinden in de bosbouw, en die ten doel hebben de bosbouwpraktijk aan te passen aan het beoogde duurzame bosbeheer. In dit concept valt de nadruk op een ideale, democratische organisatievorm, gebaseerd op samenwerking en participatie door alle actoren in de bosbouw. In een dergelijke organisatievorm is de kwaliteit van de relaties tussen de betrokken actoren van groot belang, wat de noodzaak onderstreept van inzicht in de wijze waarop maatschappelijke relaties tot stand komen. Het onderzoek concentreerde zich op het concept vertrouwen vanwege het belang daarvan voor het soort civiele maatschappelijke relaties waarnaar wordt gestreefd bij duurzaam bosbeheer.

Om inzicht te verkrijgen in de uiteenlopende interpretaties van het begrip vertrouwen, werd allereerst een literatuurstudie verricht. Het resultaat hiervan wordt gepresenteerd in het tweede hoofdstuk. Hierin worden diverse interpretaties van het begrip vertrouwen besproken in relatie tot het inzicht in de mens dat deze veronderstellen. Hierbij wordt gebruik gemaakt van een continuüm tussen rationele en interpretatieve opvattingen van het zijn. Bij de pogingen om te komen tot een bosbouw die gebaseerd is op de intentie tot samenwerking tussen zeer uiteenlopende belangen, blijkt een interpretatieve opvatting van het zijn, met de vereiste aandacht voor verschillende manieren van zijn, het meest geschikt voor de bosbouwsituatie.

Aangezien echter de interpretatieve traditie op het gebied van vertrouwen grotendeels bestaat uit filosofische werken die niet rechtstreeks aansluiten bij een analyse van relaties tussen actoren, wordt in het derde hoofdstuk een existentiële beschrijving van het begrip vertrouwen ontwikkeld die kan worden gebruikt om vertrouwen binnen relaties tussen actoren te analyseren. De hier gepresenteerde beschrijving is geïnspireerd door de filosofie van Heidegger. De in diens beschrijving van het zijn aanwezige aandacht voor de temporele en ruimtelijke gesitueerdheid van actoren was van veel nut bij het vergroten van het inzicht in de vele uiteenlopende rationaliteiten, of existentiële werelden, die betrokken zijn bij de samenwerkingsverbanden in de bosbouw. In de hier geïntroduceerde beschrijving van het begrip vertrouwen wordt gesteld dat het ontwikkelen of handhaven van vertrouwen binnen relaties begrepen moet worden via inzicht in wat de verschillende actoren als zinvol beschouwen in een bepaalde situatie, en de mate waarin hun opvattingen in deze situatie overeenkomen. Er wordt wel gesteld dat de zingeving van wat actoren zien, afhangt van de existentiële wereld (structurele achtergrond) van waaruit zij zin trachten te geven aan de situatie, en van het zijn van de actoren in deze situatie. In het hier geïntroduceerde existentiële perspectief ligt, vergeleken met meer rationele of instrumentele perspectieven, de nadruk op de noodzaak om vertrouwen te plaatsen tegen de achtergrond van de diepere lagen van de maatschappelijke organisatie waarin zich het 'sociaal

kapitaal' bevindt, in de vorm van gemeenschappelijke zingeving aan doelstellingen en maatschappelijke rollen, dat zo belangrijk is voor een effectieve maatschappelijke organisatie. In deze zin kan het perspectief gezien worden als een instrument dat kan helpen deze lagen bloot te leggen. In tijden waarin de praktijken veranderen en de normale probleemoplossende relaties en andere bestaande relaties verbroken raken, zal een dergelijk 'röntgenperspectief' hopelijk kunnen bijdragen aan het identificeren van bepaalde breuklijnen in de maatschappelijke structuur op het gebied van de bosbouw. Gesteld wordt dat het niet eenvoudig is vertrouwen instrumenteel te bewerkstelligen in relaties. Vertrouwen is een product dat, net als liefde, geleidelijk aan ontstaat uit succesvolle interactie en wordt onderhouden via goed functionerende relaties. Vertrouwen ontstaat uit gemeenschappelijke zingeving en het op succesvolle wijze oplossen van problemen. Het is tegelijkertijd een product en een noodzakelijk element van een gemeenschappelijke cultuur.

In het vierde hoofdstuk wordt de voorgestelde existentiële beschrijving van vertrouwen geïllustreerd door deze toe te passen op de ontwikkeling van normen voor het certificeren van duurzaam bosbeheer in een samenwerkingsverband onder auspiciën van de Forest Stewardship Council in Denemarken. Als kleinschalig voorbeeld van het meer algemene proces van de invoering van duurzaam bosbeheer op basis van samenwerking leek deze casus uitermate geschikt voor een analyse van relaties tussen actoren. De analyse van deze casus toont de vele verschillende zienswijzen die in dit proces een rol spelen, and laat zien hoe deze diversiteit een uitdaging vormt bij het bewerkstelligen van vertrouwen in de relatie tussen de verschillende actoren en bij de pogingen om een oplossing te vinden die voor alle betrokken partijen zinvol is.

In het vijfde hoofdstuk wordt meer in het algemeen besproken op welke manieren de aspecten die door het existentiële perspectief aan het licht gebracht worden, relevant zijn voor de pogingen in de bosbouw om praktijken in te voeren tegen de achtergrond van het streven naar duurzaam bosbeheer. Benadrukt wordt dat de gevoeligheid van dit perspectief zowel voor de maatschappelijke structuur, in de vorm van existentiële werelden van verschillende niveaus van algemeenheid, als voor het zijn van de actoren, nuttig is in een situatie waarin gestreefd wordt naar samenwerking tussen vele actoren met een uiteenlopende kijk op bosbouw, voortvloeiend uit verschillende referentiekaders. In dit hoofdstuk wordt ook benadrukt hoe belangrijk het is aandacht te hebben voor gemeenschappelijke structurele kenmerken op een meer algemeen niveau, zoals een algemeen 'trust in numbers' (vertrouwen in getallen), 'entitlement' (toegang) en toegenomen maatschappelijke differentiatie, die een succesvolle samenwerking in de bosbouw in de weg kunnen staan.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Peter Stenz Egestad was born on 19 November 1967 in Aalborg, Denmark. He graduated in 1995 from the Royal Agricultural and Veterinary University in Copenhagen with a M.Sc. in forestry. The last two years of this masters degree took place at University of Washington in Seattle (1993-1994), at the European Commission in Brussels (1994-1995), and at Albert-Ludwigs-Universität in Freiburg (1995). After graduating a position with the Danish Ministry of Environment began and an additional degree in Organisation theory and Strategy was completed at the Southern Danish Business University. In 1997, a study leave was granted by the Ministry and Ph.D studies were initiated in Freiburg, Germany. After a stay as a visiting scholar at University of California at Berkeley in 1998, the PhD studies were continued in Wageningen 1999. In 2000 the leave from the job at the Danish Ministry of Environment ended, and the PhD studies were finished while working with the Ministry's Division of Forest Policy.